

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 26

PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK

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COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*
GERHARD A. GESELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*
JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, *General Counsel*
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, *Associate General Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*
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4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
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36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
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Zucca, Emil Lawrence			2590a-2596					

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 144

[TOP SECRET]

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF AN EXAMINATION OF
WITNESSES CONVENED BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVYTO RECORD TESTIMONY PERTINENT TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII, ON 7 DECEMBER 1941

February 12, 1944—June 15, 1944

[i]

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¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

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[1] RECOMMENDED SEQUENCE FOR READING THE TESTIMONY CONTAINED HEREIN

Insofar as there was a plan for the sequence of witnesses, it consisted of examining officers who were in Hawaii, 7 December 1941, and then following what they brought out by examining officers who were elsewhere, most of such being of the Navy Department. However, it was necessary to seize opportunities when and where officers were available and irrespective of logical sequence.

Therefore, in reviewing this testimony it will be advisable to depart from the order of the actual proceedings and the following sequence is recommended. However, some reviewers may find that for them the flow of thought will be better if Part III is read before Part II.

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PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY

3

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23 Joel W. Bunkley, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret).....	Commanding Officer, U. S. S. CALIFORNIA.....	413
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3 Richmond K. Turner, Vice Admiral, USN.....	Director of War Plans, OpNav.....	250, 262
4 Robert O. Glover, Captain, USN.....	Attached Plans Division OpNav.....	170
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6 Charles Wellborn, Jr., Captain, USN.....	Administrative Aide to CNO.....	383
7 Roland M. Brainard, Vice Admiral, USN (Ret).....	Director of Ship Movements Division, OpNav.....	399

¹Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

In reply address
Secretary of the Navy
and refer to No.

[1(1)]

[Copy]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 12 February 1944.

JAG: D-1: LLP

PRECEPT FOR AN EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES AND THE TAKING OF TESTIMONY PERTINENT TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII

From: The Secretary of the Navy.

To: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Subj: Examination of witnesses for purpose of recording and preserving testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941.

Whereas, on 7 December 1941, Japanese armed forces made an attack against Army and Navy installations and ships of the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, which attack was a complete surprise to the commanders of the said installations and ships, and

Whereas, regrettable loss of life and extensive damage resulted from the said attack, and

Whereas, certain members of the naval forces, who have knowledge pertinent to the foregoing matters, are now or soon may be on dangerous assignments at great distances from the United States, and

Whereas, it is now deemed necessary, in order to prevent evidence being lost by death or unavoidable absence of those certain members of the naval forces, that their testimony, pertinent to the aforesaid Japanese attack be recorded and preserved,

I hereby detail you to examine such members of the naval forces thought to have knowledge of facts pertinent to the said surprise attack and fully record the testimony given thereby. Under the authority of Title 5, Section 93, of the U. S. Code, you are authorized and directed to administer an oath to any witness called by you to testify or depose in the course of this examination into the subject-named matter.

In view of the fact that Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, was, on 7 December 1941, serving on active duty as the commander-in-chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of Admiral, U. S. Navy, and [A(2)] therefore, has an interest in the matter into which this examination is being made, you will notify him of the times and places of the meetings to be had and that he has the right to be present, to have counsel, to introduce, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce matter pertinent to the examination and to testify or declare in his own behalf at his own request.

Upon completion of the examination you will submit a complete record of all the testimony taken, including any documents introduced therein, to the Secretary of the Navy.

The provisions of Sections 733 and 734, Naval Courts and Boards, will govern the proceedings of this examination, in so far as such provisions are applicable thereto.

The necessary clerical assistance to aid you in recording the testimony will be furnished you upon your request by the appropriate command in the area in which meetings are held.

(SGD) FRANK KNOX.

[B] Office of the Secretary.
JAG: D-1: ps.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington 25, D. C., 16 Feb 1944.

To: Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. Navy.

Via: The Judge Advocate General.

Subj: Orders as counsel to assist examining officer.

1. You are hereby directed to report to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, as counsel to assist him in the examination of such members of the U. S. naval forces thought to have knowledge of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941, which examination was directed by my precept of 12 February 1944.

/s/ FRANK KNOX,
Secretary of the Navy.

1-End.

17 FEBRUARY 1944.

To: Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. Navy.

1. Delivered.

/s/ T. L. Gatch,
T. L. GATCH,
The Judge Advocate General.

Confidential

2-End.

17 FEBRUARY 1944.

To: Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. Navy.

1. Reported this date.

/s/ Thos. C. Hart,
THOMAS C. HART,
Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired.

[C] Office of the Secretary.

JAG: D-1: ps

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington 25, D. C., 16 Feb. 1944.

To: Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., U. S. N. R.

Via: The Judge Advocate General.

Subj: Orders as assistant counsel to assist examining officer.

1. You are hereby directed to report to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, as assistant counsel to assist him in the examination of such members of the U. S. naval forces thought to have knowledge of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941, which examination was directed by my precept of 12 February 1944.

/s/ FRANK KNOX,
Secretary of the Navy.

1-End.

17 FEBRUARY 1944.

To: Lieutenant William M. Whittington Jr., U. S. N. R.

1. Delivered.

/s/ T. L. Gatch,
T. L. GATCH,
The Judge Advocate General.

Confidential

2-End.

17 FEB 1944.

To: Lieutenant William M. Whittington Jr., U. S. N. R.

1. Reported this date.

/s/ Thos. C. Hart,
 THOMAS C. HART,
Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired.

[D] Office of the Secretary

JAG:I:ps

(SC)/P16-4/00

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington 25, D. C., 27 April 1944.

To: Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. Navy.

Via: The Judge Advocate General.

Subj: Orders as counsel to assist examining officer.

Ref: (a) SecNav. ltr., JAG:D-1:ps (SC) P16-4/00, dated 16 February 1944, with endorsement thereon.

1. When directed by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, you will consider yourself relieved of the duties assigned by reference (a) and will then report to the Judge Advocate General and resume your regular duties.

/s/ JAMES FORRESTAL,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.

JAG:AJ:RLD

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
28 April 1944.

End-1

From: The Judge Advocate General.

To: Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. N.

1. Delivered.

/s/ F. L. Lowe,
 F. L. LOWE,
Assistant Judge Advocate General.

Confidential

2nd Endorsement

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C. 9 May 1944.

From: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy (Ret).

To: Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. Navy.

1. Relieved as counsel to assist the examining officer. You will carry out the basic orders.

/s/ Thos. C. Hart.
 THOS. C. HART.

A true copy. Attest:

THOMAS C. HART,

Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired,
Examining Officer.

[E] Office of the Secretary
JAG:I:ps
(SC)P16-4/QR3

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington 25, D. C., 28 April 1944

To: Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., U. S. N. R.
Via: The Judge Advocate General.
Subj: Orders as assistant counsel to assist examining officer.
Ref: (a) SecNav ltr., JAG:D-1:ps (SC)P16-4/QR3, dated 16 February 1944, with endorsement thereon.

1. Reference (a) is hereby modified to the extent that when directed by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, you will assume the duties of counsel to assist him in the examination of such members of the U. S. naval forces thought to have knowledge of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941, which examination was directed by my precept of 12 February 1944.

/s/ JAMES FORRESTAL,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.

JAG:AJ:RLD OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
28 April 1944.

End-1

From: The Judge Advocate General.
To: Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., USNR.

1. Delivered.

/s/ F. L. Lowe,
F. L. LOWE,
Assistant Judge Advocate General.

Confidential

[1] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1944

FIRST DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:00 a. m.

Present: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer.

The examining officer read orders from the Secretary of the Navy, originals prefixed marked "B" and "C" detailing Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. Navy, and Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve, to act as counsel and assistant counsel, respectively, to the examining officer. Captain Wallace and Lieutenant Whittington took seats as such.

The examination was cleared, and the examining officer read the precept, original prefixed marked "A(1)" and "A(2)".

All matters preliminary to the examination having been determined, and the examining officer having decided to sit with closed doors, the examination was opened.

The examining officer introduced in evidence a certified copy of his confidential letter of 17 February 1944 to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, interested party, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 1".

The examining officer introduced in evidence the original of a letter from Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, interested party, signed by Captain Robert A. Lavender, Retired, by direction, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer, dated 19 February, 1944, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 2".

The examining officer announced that the request of the interested party contained in the above mentioned letter is approved, to the extent that the interested party will be afforded a reasonable time to prepare for the examination, and that the examination, upon completion of the present session, will adjourn until called by the examining officer.

The examining officer stated that on 19 February 1944, he had delivered to Captain Robert A. Lavender, U. S. Navy, Retired, counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, interested party, two copies, marked Confidential, of the precept signed by the Secretary of the Navy, dated 12 February 1944, ordering the present examination.

The examination then, at 10:15 a. m. was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[?]

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 1944

SECOND DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:07 a. m.

Present: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

The examining officer introduced Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, as reporter.

The record of proceedings of the first day of the examination was read and approved.

The examining officer and the reporter were duly sworn.

The examining officer read a copy of a letter, dated 4 March 1944, from the examining officer to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, retired, interested party, informing him of the beginning of proceedings in the present examination of witnesses and the taking of testimony pertinent to the precept, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 3 (1) and (2)".

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows: This examination is convened by order of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 12 February 1944, for the purpose of examining witnesses and the taking of testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941. The precept states that certain members of the naval forces, who have knowledge pertinent to the foregoing matter, are now or soon may be on dangerous assignments and that it is now deemed necessary, in order to prevent evidence being lost by death or unavoidable absence of those certain members of the naval forces, that their testimony pertinent to the aforesaid Japanese attack be recorded and preserved. From available records, it is believed that you have knowledge pertinent of the aforementioned attack. The examining officer asks your statement of facts personally known to you covering certain points. In such statement you should, as far as you can, speak from your knowledge prior to the event and as the situation presented itself before the actual attack. In making such statement, your attention is invited to Sections 280 and 281 of Naval Courts and Boards, regarding the use of documents to refresh and supplement your recollection.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, will you please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Claude C. Bloch, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, on duty as a member of the General Board, Navy Department.

[3] 2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December 1941, Sir?

A. I was Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, Commandant of the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor, and Commander of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier.

3. Q. For how long had you been Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. I reported on April 10, 1940.

4. Q. Who was your immediate superior in performing these duties, Sir?

A. By order of the Navy Department, I was a member of the forces afloat, Subordinate to Commander of the U. S. Fleet.

5. Q. Will you please explain the nature of your organization under the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet.

A. Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson as Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet in February, 1941, and almost immediately thereafter he issued a Base Defense Order known as "2CL". Its date was in February sometime. And in that order, the Commandant of the District, who was me, was Commander of the Base Defense Force. The object of that order, as I understand it, was to assure the security of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet, insofar as the Commander-in-Chief and his forces could augment the forces of the Army, who really had the responsibility for the defense of all land areas, and Pearl Harbor particularly. This order was subsequently revised in October, 1941, by another order known as "2CL (Revised)", and in that order some changes were made in the original order. In the Fall of 1940, as Commandant of the District and having a very close liaison with the Army, I became convinced that the Army's means of defense, insofar as it related to aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, was insufficient, and I discussed this matter with the Commander-in-Chief, which was Admiral Richardson. I told him my views and he became alarmed and he asked me how many guns the Army had, anti-aircraft guns, how many fighter planes, and how many bombing planes. And I told him approximately how many I understood that they had and, as the result of that conversation, Admiral Richardson went to the Commanding General, General Herron, and asked General Herron to go around with him and interview, first-hand, the officers and find out what guns, what planes, and what forces the Army had there. At the conclusion of this tour around the Army posts, Admiral Richardson gave me a memo informing me of a number of anti-aircraft guns, the number of planes, marks and models, that were in existence at Oahu and discussed the matter again with me. As the result of this information and my conversation with Admiral Richardson, I wrote a letter to the Navy Department setting forth the numbers and that I considered the defense inadequate and presented the entire matter to the Department. This letter was taken by Admiral Richardson and he put a strong endorsement on it and sent it to the Navy Department.

Note: The letter mentioned by the witness was later introduced as Exhibit 23 of his testimony when he was recalled at a later date. Record page 87.

A. (Continued) That correspondence was the basis of a letter written by the Secretary of Navy to the Secretary of War, under date of 24 January 1941 in which the Secretary of Navy presented this condition to the War Department and expressed his anxiety about the security of Pearl Harbor, and asked [4] that some action be taken immediately.

Note: The letter mentioned by the witness has been identified by the examining officer as being a letter from the Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941, file No. Op-12B-9-McC, (SC) A7-2(2)FF1, Serial 09112, and copy of which is now on file in the Secret-Confidential File Room with the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. The answer of the Secretary of War to this letter has been identified by the examining officer as being letter of February 7, 1941, subject: "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii", the original of which is on file in the Secret-Confidential File Room with the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. (Subsequently, both letters were introduced in evidence as "Exhibit 40", Record Page 407.)

A. (Continued) Before we received any information from the Navy Department about what was happening about this letter, Admiral Kimmel superseded to the duties of Commander-in-Chief and he was even more concerned—or equally concerned, I'll say, not more concerned, with the security of the ships in Pearl Harbor from an air attack. And when I refer to "air attack", I don't mean an air attack necessarily which would initiate a war but I mean any air attack which might develop in the course of a war. So he went over certain information that had been left by Admiral Richardson and decided that as long as the ships in the harbor had certain anti-aircraft batteries themselves, they should be used to the fullest extent in increasing the volume of fire and protection that the Fleet would have in the harbor, over what could be furnished by the Army itself. Furthermore, he decided that inasmuch as the Navy also had a lot of planes on shore—usually had a lot of planes on shore, a great many of them carrier planes that had been sent ashore while the carriers were alongside, they should also be used. Admiral Kimmel loaned to me Admiral Halsey from his command and Admiral Bellinger from his command to talk over with the Army how we could coordinate the action of the planes. They reported to me before they had their meeting with the Army authorities, and, I suggested to them that all the fighting planes that we had on shore, at any time that an attack might be made, would be placed under the Army's command for fighter purposes, to be run by the Army in such way as they saw fit; that all bombers that the Army had which were capable of going to sea would be likewise turned over to the Navy command for fighting off ships and carriers. That agreement was reached and signed. Then we had in the security order the use of the ships' batteries for anti-aircraft purposes, all Navy planes, fighting planes, to be consolidated for use in attacks under the Army, and all Army bombing planes capable of flying over the seas to be consolidated with Navy bombers under Admiral Bellinger. Concerning the order itself, insofar as it related to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, who was a task force under this order; it specifically assigned to him the duty of operating the gates, sweeping mines, and using local defense forces a certain ways for patrol of the harbor, and also, in one paragraph, more or less summarized the duties of the task force commander.

6. Q. Admiral, I show you a document. Can you identify it, sir?

A. This is "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter, 2CL-1941 (Revised)" and it is the order of which I spoke in my testimony.

[5] The letter was thereupon filed in evidence and is appended marked "Exhibit 4 (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6)".

7. Q. Where was Admiral Kimmel on the morning of December 7, Admiral?

A. Admiral Kimmel's Fleet Headquarters were on the second floor of the Submarine Base, which is immediately adjacent to the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor. I have no first-hand information where he was at the time of the attack but I believe he was in his residence, which was about a half mile away from the Submarine Base.

8. Q. Had he been physically present in Oahu during several days before the attack?

A. Yes.

9. Q. Where were your headquarters, Sir?

A. My headquarters were in the office building which is located in the heart of the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor.

10. Q. In carrying out the functions you have outlined as a Task Force Commander, you have referred to an agreement had with the Army. Could you further identify that, Sir, does it have a name?

A. I don't believe that I know the title of it. The agreement was a local agreement between the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Short, and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. After the agreement was made, it was submitted by me to the Commander-in-Chief for his approval and he did approve it. I do not believe that it was sent to the Navy Department in the first instance, but I have a definite recollection that at a later date Admiral Stark asked for a copy of it because someone had told him about it and he said that so far as he knew it was the first agreement of its kind between the Army and Navy and he wanted a copy here to see if he couldn't get similar agreements in other districts, and I believe a copy was sent to him.

11. Q. Admiral, I show you a document. Can you identify it, Sir?

A. This is a Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department, Fourteenth Naval District, short title "JCD", I think we called it, "'42". It was signed on April 11 by the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

12. Q. Is that the document to which you have just referred, the agreement to which you have just referred?

A. No, this is not the one. This is not the one that I just referred to.

13. Q. The agreement to which you referred and this document, both relate to agreements between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. Can you give the relationship between the two?

A. This later document, which I now have before me, JCD, Hawaiian Department, '42, is a part of the War Plans known as "Rainbow 1", and it was a requirement that all commandants submit such a plan of their joint action. The other agreement which I refer to was supplemental to this and was made in order to clarify a situation with regard to command relations between the [6] air forces of the Army and the Navy Air; and I'm sorry that I can't remember the exact date of it, nor have I been able to find a copy in

the Department since I have been here, though I looked once. It must be here.

14. Q. Was this document now before you the plan under which you were operating on 7 December 1941?

A. That was the plan, the joint agreement, for the Hawaiian coastal defense that was effective from the date of signature, but all features there were not in execution by the terms of the plan itself. The plan was not to be executed until "M" day, unless the War and Navy Departments decided to put it into effect sooner or unless the Commanding General and Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District should mutually agree that certain parts of it or the whole thing should go into effect sooner. Actually, on the 7th of December, certain features of that plan were in effect. For instance, by the plan, the Navy, in paragraph 18 (a) was required to furnish inshore patrol. We had an inshore patrol working on 7 December. By (b), we were required to have offshore patrol. An offshore patrol of an intermittent character, forces being furnished by the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet, was in effect at that time, usually at the time of sortie. (c) and (d) were not in effect, except (d) was partially in effect by this joint air agreement we held, as we usually had a lot of wheeled fighting planes on shore which, at the time of attack, would be turned over to the Army. (e), which is the harbor control post, was effective and in active operation. (f), which was installation and operation of an underwater defense, was effective. We had some buoys, sono-buoys. I'm not sure whether the magnetic loops had been laid, or not. I think they had been and were in operation. Nets, torpedo nets, at the entrance to both Honolulu and Pearl Harbor were in operation. (h), sweeping channels and mine fields: they were swept every day. (i) distant reconnaissance; the district had no forces capable of performing that task, as the Commander-in-Chief and the Navy Department knew. We had been informed that 108 patrol planes would be furnished us at the earliest possible date but none had come to Pearl Harbor, and I believe, on that particular point, that I had asked Admiral Kimmel about the distant reconnaissance and asked him if he would furnish me patrol planes, and he told me he would do what he could, but he couldn't make any promises of furnishing a force because there was a possibility of the Fleet leaving and taking its forces with it. (k) maintenance of guard against sabotage: that was effective. (l): with regard to supplying local communication service for prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence, that was being worked on and largely effective. (m): all preparations had been made to assume censorship of the part that the Navy was to assume censorship of and was put into effect immediately after the attack. (o): supply and hospitalization provisions had been made for that.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to War Plans Division, Commander-in-Chief U. S. Fleet's Office, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 5".

[7] 15. Q. This joint plan, you stated, is based on Rainbow No. 1 Plan, Admiral. Did it also take into consideration the provisions of the letter 2CL-41?

A. This plan JCD-42 was a Navy Department plan. 2CL-41 was the Commander-in-Chief's order and I do not believe they are in conflict. As a matter of fact, I think 2CL-41 contains certain provisions that are also in JCD-42. But, the difference was that 2CL-41 was effective from the date of its signature and was in execution the entire time, but JCD-42 does not necessarily go into execution until "M" Day, except insofar as it relates to items agreed to for execution ahead of time.

16. Q. Your agreement with respect to the use of aircraft was effective on December 7?

A. That was effective from the date of signature and to be in execution in the same manner as JCD-42.

17. Q. Admiral, did you look upon Admiral Kimmel's physical presence in Pearl Harbor as having become a fairly permanent condition?

A. Admiral Kimmel moved his offices ashore in February, 1941, almost immediately after he assumed command, and with exception of possibly a couple trips at sea and one trip to Washington, he was there the entire time, so I looked on him as being permanent, although he told me that in time of hostilities that he would go to sea. That was his intention.

18. Q. Did you, during those last few weeks prior to 7 December and in carrying out the duties which had been imposed upon you or which you had assumed in connection with security, feel any embarrassment or, say, unhappiness in your required cooperation with the Army on account of Admiral Kimmel's presence?

A. Well, I wasn't unhappy and I can't say that I was embarrassed. My relations with Admiral Kimmel were extremely good, extremely cordial; my relations with the Commanding General were cordial and our cooperation, I thought, was good. But the Commanding General had a right to go to the Commander-in-Chief directly and he also had a right to discuss matters with me, and, on one or two occasions, I didn't know exactly whether he had discussed matters with Admiral Kimmel before or whether he was coming to me in the first instance, but I can't say that it caused any disagreement because I talked everything over quite fully with Admiral Kimmel and I don't think there was any doubt in my mind as to where I stood in the picture.

19. Q. Admiral, this plan, Exhibit 5, JCD, required of both the Army and Navy certain functions, many of which would require close coordination. Will you please make a statement of anything within your knowledge as to how this plan worked out in the days leading up to the 7th of December, particularly with respect to coordination between the Army and Navy in preparing to execute this plan, and in carrying out the planning functions for which it provides, the Joint Planning Committee and representatives and all?

A. I had subordinates who dealt with the Army constantly, about the details of the plan, two in particular, the Chief of Staff, Captain J. B. Earle, and the War Plans Officer, Commander C. B. Momsen. They had to carry the load, but they were almost in constant contact with the Army. And the District Communication Officer, Captain Graham, I think he was just before Pearl Harbor, was in constant communication, getting communications straightened out, making preparations for the necessary teletypes and telephones, radio. While

we had differences of opinion, there were none of them serious. Some of them [8] were referred to Washington but they were always settled and I don't know that you can ask any more than that. I thought that our preparations were being prosecuted very vigorously.

20. Q. During the time that your representatives were working with the Army, were you kept fully advised as to the work of the Joint Planning Committee and the other representatives?

A. I think so.

21. Q. This joint coastal plan requires considerable on the part of the Army. Was there brought to your attention in any way the ability of the Army, from the viewpoint of both materiel and personnel, to carry out the commitments of the plan?

A. As I have stated before, we knew the Army was deficient in anti-aircraft guns and fighting planes and bombing planes, back in the Fall of 1940. After the Secretary of Navy wrote his letter of January 24, 1941, subsequent to that date a large number of fighters were sent out to Hawaii. Some bombers; a large number of fighters and some bombers. So far as I know, no additional anti-aircraft guns were sent. So it was my knowledge that their fighter strength had been increased considerably. I believe they had somewhat in excess of 250 fighting planes on the 7th of December, but their anti-aircraft guns were deficient in number and we knew that. We knew nothing about the deficiencies of the coast guns, the coast artillery. I had no knowledge as to whether the personnel of the Army was deficient or adequate, but was very definitely of the opinion that it was being increased all the time and was considered, with certain minor deficiencies, adequate by the Army for its task.

22. Q. Similarly, you previously stated that there were certain deficiencies in your force.

A. Well, I knew the Army had a deficiency in numbers and types of planes capable of performing one of their agreed functions. That's the inshore air patrol. They had told me they only had three planes capable of performing that duty and they knew that I had no reconnaissance planes attached to the District.

23. Q. Did you or your representatives, together with the Army officers in Hawaii, endeavor to make any sort of makeshift arrangements to fill these deficiencies caused by shortage of personnel or materiel, prior to the 7th of December?

A. I had pressed the Bureau of Personnel on the question of officers very vigorously; I had quite a number of reserve officers, but I wanted, in the key posts, more experienced officers and I was never able to get what I considered an adequate number in those positions.

24. Q. What I had in mind, Admiral, was that there are certain functions, such as distant reconnaissance, that you could not carry out, which the war plans called for, similar—

A. (Interposing) I had represented that to the Navy Department and asked for aircraft. I had taken it up, talked with the Commander-in-Chief, about it and asked him if he would supply the planes for it and he told me he could not commit himself to that duty, except insofar as was possible on any [9] occasion; that he might have to go away from the locality and take his forces with him and the District should really have its own forces.

25. Q. What I was getting after, Sir, was the practical problem as to what was done in the absence of the ability to fill all the commitments, to do as much as you could with what you had.

A. It is my very definite understanding that, in the absence of any planes of my own, any missions of reconnaissance to be performed would have to be performed by the Fleet planes. That's the patrol planes belonging to the Fleet; and, it was also my very definite understanding that Admiral Kimmel reserved, to himself or his command, his echelon of command, the handling of patrol planes for oversea work; although, order 2CL did, insofar as it related to an air attack, place dispatch of essential planes under the Commandant of the District in a supervisory way. Actually, it was done by a Fleet officer, Rear Admiral Bellinger. He was Commander of the Patrol Squadrons of the Fleet. He was also in command of the Base Defense Air Force. So, while the order says that the Commandant of the District would dispatch planes to look for carriers and enemy vessels in the case of air attack, actually it was done by Admiral Bellinger, and it seems obvious that the Commandant of the District couldn't use patrol planes without permission of the Fleet because the planes were employed by the Fleet on other missions. It had to be done by the Fleet, and I don't believe there was any confusion of thought. It was well understood, and, owing to the fact that Admiral Bellinger was both my Task Group Commander and a Fleet Air Commander, Admiral Kimmel actually would be the officer—or somebody delegated by him would be the officer who designated what reconnaissance was to be made.

26. Q. Admiral, you gave in numbers of Army fighters what really amounts to a very strong force. What did you know of the relative efficiency of the personnel of the fighter command?

A. Well, my knowledge of the capabilities of personnel is not first-hand information. I heard from other people. I think though it is fair to state that they had some good pilots and many inexperienced ones.

27. Q. Did you have an airman on your staff?

A. Up 'till the summer of 1941, I had no airman on my staff whom I could use. At that time, I was able to obtain, by calling into active duty from the reserve at Honolulu, quite a good man except that he had been out of the Navy for a number of year; he was a good flyer and a dependable and loyal man. Admiral Kimmel was very cooperative. He placed Admiral Halsey and Admiral Bellinger at my disposal on a number of occasions and I never hesitated to call on them, and I also had the Commanding Officers at the Air Stations at Kaneohe and Pearl Harbor, who were in my command. I could talk with them. They were difficult to get hold of but I could and did talk with them.

28. Q. Did you get advice from any of those officers concerning the efficiency of any of those officers—the efficiency of the Army pilots?

A. I can't say that I did. As usual in conversation, after our joint exercises, and we had a great many of them, I would hear the usual criminations and recriminations between the Army and Navy as to about how poor the other fellow had been and what he failed to do, and so forth and so on, but whether they were correct or not, I don't know.

[10] 29. Q. Inasmuch as even in those days, it was rather generally known that the best defense against an enemy air attack

lay in fighters, numbers of planes, and efficiency was highly important, was it not?

A. I think it was generally accepted that, in view of the deficiency of the guns of the Army for anti-aircraft purposes, that we had to depend largely on the fighters. In addition to these 250 fighters that the Army had of their own, that is my recollection of the number, the Navy usually had quite a large number of fighters available that were to be turned over to the Army. Each morning at eight o'clock Admiral Bellinger, who was Air Commander under 2CL, would give the Army a list of the planes that were available to them that day for fighters and they were supposed to send to him at that same time a list of Army bombers that were available to the Navy. That was done. That was routine. Whether it was done on the 7th of December, I don't know.

30. Q. Admiral, do you know of any other instructions issued to you or to other officers in Hawaii at the time relating to—by Admiral Kimmel, concerning the defense of the Island, other than this 2CL-41?

A. 2CL is a governing order for base defense. It also governs sorties and a number of other things. Contributory to that order, of course every task force commander got out a great many orders of their own. For instance, the Commandant of the District, the Base Defense Officer, had to get out an order about the minesweepers, about the nets. I also got out one order which required the Air Commander of the Base Defense Force, Admiral Bellinger, to get out an order about the air defense. All of those were contributory to the plan and were not signed by Admiral Kimmel. The Army had copies of them and at first we had hopes, when we had the drills—we had an air raid drill and blackout drill once a week to start with and, later on, we couldn't have it that often—and we had hopes the Army would come in on the drills. They didn't always come in. On occasions we'd have a carrier at sea coming in and she would send her air group in and on those occasions nearly always the Army joined. We had some interferences because the time I would choose for the air raid drill wasn't always agreeable to other forces; it interfered with their work, the force commanders at sea. Some of them complained. Then just about the time this order was issued we decided that we would set the dates two or three months ahead, certain definite dates when everyone would know they were going to happen on that day. We definitely prefaced every air raid drill by broadcasts on a frequency that all ships at sea were guarding and all ships in port and all stations, telling that this was a drill so there would be no mistake between the real thing and a drill. We always let them know, ahead of time, when we would have a drill. But I know of no other order issued by Admiral Kimmel.

31. Q. In your conversations with Admiral Kimmel, did he indicate that this was his basic order, so far as his participation in the defense was concerned?

A. No, I don't know that he ever said that. If you are trying to establish command relations, I think it was thoroughly well understood by Admiral Kimmel, and by the Commandant of the District, that the Commandant of the District would do everything in his power and everything would be done to the best of the Commandant's ability.

32. Q. Admiral, JCD, as of course you will recall, has several entries concerning what would be done when certain reinforcements were available, the [11] plan, of course, to be effective, on "M" Day when it was declared. In the meantime, and prior to such declaration, of course some plan for security of the Fleet was necessary. My understanding of your testimony was that you look upon the 2CL-41 as, in effect, being the security plan and putting into effect everything in the way of precaution which was required by the JCD and for which you had forces available; is that right?

A. No, that is not correct, in this respect. While I think that 2CL-41 is consistent with JCD, it actually puts into execution certain requirements of JCD but not all of them. For instance, it puts in the minesweeping, it puts in the inshore patrol, it puts in the underwater defenses—that is the nets, but it did not—I see no place in 2CL-41 where the distant reconnaissance was put in force.

33. Q. That is about the only—

A. (Interposing) If you will examine JCD, you will find that the Army is charged with the defense of the land insofar as it relates to the coast and anti-aircraft defenses and with particular respect to Pearl Harbor. In other words that was their specific responsibility: it might be said that the Navy had no responsibility because there is nothing said in JCD to the effect that the Navy had any responsibility for protecting Pearl Harbor against an air attack, but yet, by 2CL the Commander-in-Chief felt the necessity, on account of the fact that he had means that he could use, that he must help out.

34. Q. Admiral, the Army's warning system, particularly the radar part of it; what steps did you take to ascertain the Army's efficiency in that respect?

A. Such information as I had about the Army's warning I had received from the Army and the contacts of my subordinates with Army subordinates. I made no formal requests for information but I kept in touch by contact—occasionally, General Short would tell me something about it and frequently some of my subordinates would contact the Army and let me know the situation. When I arrived in Honolulu in 1940, General Herron was in command and he told me at that time—that was in April, 1940—they were putting in this warning net, that they were starting to put in the radar, that they were making the surveys and selecting the sites. And he told me how wonderful it was and I told him I knew very little about it, although some of our ships had it. When General Short came in February, we talked about it and as the net progressed in completion, he came to me—I think it was in September or October, 1941—and told me he had no operators, that he wanted to begin to train his operators. None of the Army knew how to train them and he wanted to know if there was anything I could do to help him. I told him I had no means myself but the Fleet had radar operators and the Fleet had radar installations, and I made the request on the Commander-in-Chief to permit General Short to send a number of his men to sea, which he did. In November, it was my knowledge that they were training the operators and that they were having difficulties; this information came to me—I don't know whether General Short came to me or whether my subordinates told me, having obtained it from their opposite numbers in the Army—and as of December I thought

that the net was still in the condition where all the kinks were not out of it and they were still training operators and could not be depended upon, but I had no knowledge as to whether or not they were standing regular watches on it, nor did I make any inquiries about it. And I would like to supplement that statement by [12] saying at that time, December 7 or thereabouts, that we had not developed a means for controlling our own aircraft to the degree that we knew where they were at all times—or that the Army had not developed any means to know where all the planes were at all times—friendly planes, so that they could differentiate friendly planes and other planes.

35. Q. Admiral, will you please explain the facilities you had for obtaining intelligence of possible enemies, what your setup was.

A. We had a unit at Pearl Harbor, when I arrived, composed of communicators and intelligence people, Japanese language students, and they were separated into two units and their information had to be coordinated, and all the information we got from that intelligence, by radio intelligence and such other information as we got from that unit, was transmitted to Cavite and the Navy Department. They had a private circuit or private channel, they talked to us and we to them telling what we were getting, and the material was correlated and sent out. That was our principal source of Japanese intelligence; We also got the intelligence that was collected at Cavite. That was sent to us over this private channel and we knew that. When I arrived, I was dissatisfied with the organization and I organized it into one unit known as "Combat Intelligence" where they were under one head, which unit consisted of radio direction finders, radio interceptors, and all the other things they had with one officer in charge. In the middle of July, 1941, when we had the facilities, we put them in one big room in the basement of the office building, a secure place, with their own channels of communications to the radio stations and radio direction finders, and so on; I always did my best to augment the force by getting more men and better men. In addition to that unit, we had the District Intelligence Officer who was in close touch with Army intelligence and the FBI; we had local intelligence that way, and, we also had such reports as were sent by the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington. We kept touch with the Commander-in-Chief as best we could. He was on shore and within a mile and a half of us. I never had any way to know whether I got everything, or not, but I had the feeling that we were getting everything that was pertinent. The Commander-in-Chief had many sources of information that I didn't have. He had all of his subordinates in the Fleet. He unquestionably had a good many reports from ONI and the Chief of Operations that I knew nothing about unless I happened to hear about them; I think he conscientiously endeavored to give me everything that he thought I should have. I had a very definite feeling that the Navy Department knew more about the situation and were able to evaluate matters far better than we were because they had the liaison of the State Department, the political situation, the Department of War, and the President. I thought their knowledge was far greater than ours about actual conditions.

36. Q. Please state the name of the Intelligence Officer in command of this Combat Intelligence unit.

A. Rochefort; I think his name is Commander J. J. Rochefort.

37. Q. He was a subordinate of yours?

A. He was a subordinate of mine and, in a way, he was also, while he had no orders to be, a subordinate in the Fleet. This unit was a Fleet unit and the Commander-in-Chief had the right to take any man away if he wanted to for other purposes.

[13] 38. Q. Was the information that they received always delivered to the Commander-in-Chief?

A. All of it. As a matter of fact, my Staff, my subordinates, had orders to send the Fleet everything that could possibly have any bearing on movements: ships coming in or going out, enemy, or anything new. This had to be done as the Commander-in-Chief was physically present in the place; it was very simple to do it. I think he was also on our teletypes to the Army and he had the same telephone lines to the Army that we had, so he was in a position to get the information over these circuits.

39. Q. Did you also receive intelligence or other dispatches from the Navy Department relating to the international situation and possible enemy action?

A. My recollection is that originally, in 1940, they were sent to the Commandant as an addressee and, later on, they were all sent to the Commander-in-Chief, as the addressee, and I was not always included as an addressee, although, on some occasions, I was. On other occasions, it was stated in the dispatch that I was to be shown this dispatch. While I have no way of knowing whether I saw everything that came in, or not, I think that Admiral Kimmel endeavored to keep me informed. Of course, it must be borne in mind that Admiral Kimmel, as well as Admiral Richardson, had almost constant communication with the Chief of Naval Operations by mail. Occasionally, I would see one of the letters, but not always.

40. Q. Can you recall any specific messages relating to the international situation in the Pacific or intelligence of Japan which were received in the two months preceding Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, I can, and I would like to go back to the summer of 1940, if I may, because I think it is pertinent to this examination. Sometime in the summer of 1940, the date I can not recall, General Herron, the Commanding General, came to my office and stated that he had just received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff of the Army to the effect that an overseas raid was impending and that he was to go on the full alert at once. He told me that he had received this dispatch, that it was a bolt from the blue, that he knew nothing about it, but he had gone on the alert and came down to see me and wanted to know if I had received a similar dispatch. I told him, no; I knew nothing about it. He then said that he was very much disturbed about this, he didn't know the nature of the raid, didn't know when it was going to be, what it was about, but he wanted my advice. And I said, "Well, I'm not the senior officer present in the Fleet. While I am an officer of the Fleet, there is a superior officer here, Vice Admiral Andrews, and I think you had better show him the dispatch." We went aboard the Flagship and told Admiral Andrews about this, and after conference, it was decided by Admiral Andrews that we would have morning and dusk reconnaissance patrols, and patrols were then ordered to be sent out. The Commander-in-Chief was Admiral

Richardson, but he was not present. Admiral Andrews sent him a dispatch telling him of the condition. Admiral Richardson flew in and as he had never heard of the warning, he sent a dispatch to the Chief of Operations and it was my recollection that he never received a reply to it. Now this alert continued for some two or three weeks. When the Army had this alert, had been warned of an overseas raid, they were not told it was an exercise or drill, they were told it was an overseas raid that was expected. The Navy was in a [14] position of knowing nothing about it. I think, subsequently, the Commander-in-Chief got information about it here in Washington, but, so far as I know, we got nothing there. To go ahead with your question, the Neutrality Act was in effect. The President had issued an order covering the movement of submarines in our territorial waters, and about the maintenance of neutrality and the responsibilities of commandants and Naval officers and Army officers in connection with it. In 1941, possibly July or August, some tense situation arose and I can not recall how we received information of it, whether it was by letter to the Commander-in-Chief or the radio. At any rate, Admiral Kimmel had a conference on the subject and I suggested to him the advisability of sending out reconnaissance patrol planes with the median line of the sector pointing to Jaluit. I think the sector was 15 or 20 degrees. And we sent planes out every morning to 500 miles. He adopted the suggestion and sent planes out a few days and it was discontinued. In October, I remember distinctly a dispatch, but I do not remember whether I was an addressee or whether the Commander-in-Chief informed me, but I remember a dispatch to the effect that there was a change in the Japanese Government and we might expect things to happen in the next few days. I'm quite sure Admiral Kimmel had a conference after that, although it is hard for me to remember when we had the conferences because I saw Admiral Kimmel practically every day: I can not remember whether General Short was present, or Admiral Pye, Admiral Halsey, or who was present. Again, on November 27, a warning was received which was stated to be a war warning. That dispatch was received, I think, on Thursday, the 27th of November in the afternoon, somewhere around four o'clock. I was not on the station. I had gone up town to the hospital to see a patient and when I returned the Chief of Staff telephoned to me and told me he would like to come over and see me. He came over and he had a paraphrase of this dispatch. As I recall it, I saw Admiral Kimmel the next morning. I can not recall who was present besides myself. There were other persons there. In that dispatch there was a term used whereby he was directed to take defensive deployment. Just exactly what Admiral Kimmel's opinion was, I don't know, but it is a fact, at that time, there were four submarines deployed to the westward, two at Midway and two at Wake. They were there for information purposes and defense. I don't know what orders they had. Some other instances came up in the Summer of 1941, prior to this warning on the 16th and prior to this warning on the 27th that caused me to write letters to the commanding officers of the outlying bases. Under the District, we had outlying bases at Palmyra and Johnston, we had one at Midway, and one was under construction and being garrisoned at Wake. The substance of my letter to these commanding officers was to try and train their civilian workers there in the use of the arms to

supplement the armed forces. Somewhere about that same time, Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston, having been designated as defensive sea areas by Executive Order of the President, I gave the commanding officers instructions about the planes that came in there that were not identified as being friendly; they were to be fired on. I think that all those actions were taken as the result of some warning or some feeling on my part, derived from some definite information I had received that the situation was tense. Now there were a lot of other dispatches that were received and I am unable to remember now whether my knowledge of those dispatches, warning dispatches, was information that's been acquired since the 7th of December or whether it was before.

[15] 41. Q. Were you receiving, during those few days prior to 7 December, any radio intelligence which was supplied by your Combat Intelligence Unit based upon things which they received from Japanese in Oahu?

A. We received nothing from the Japanese on Oahu, except I had knowledge from the District Intelligence Officer of the existence of about 200 representatives of the Japanese Consulate spread over Oahu and who were not registered agents of the Japanese Government. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had definite information to convict these men of being unregistered agents. While anxious that they be indicted and tried, the Army would not agree and the matter was referred to Washington and the War and Navy Departments agreed that they would not be brought to trial.

Note: A letter on this subject written by the witness has been identified by the examining officer as being one from the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District to the Chief of Naval Operations, classified Secret, dated November 10, 1941, file S-A8-5/EF37/ND14, Serial 01216. The reply thereto is identified as letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, classified Secret, dated 6 December 1941, file (SC)A8-5/EF37, Serial 01348816. Both of the above mentioned letters are now on file in the Chief of Naval Operations Secret and Confidential File Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

42. Q. Then you were unable to get any information at all based upon communications which those Japanese were sending out?

A. We were unable to get any information based on dispatches being transmitted by the Japanese. The various communication companies, commercial communication companies, did not and would not give us dispatches.

43. Q. Did those dispatches go entirely by cable?

A. They went by cable.

44. Q. None by radio?

A. So far as I know, none by radio.

45. Q. You have mentioned, Admiral, the warnings received prior to December 7. Will you please state what you felt to be the probabilities and possibilities of surprise hostile action on the part of the Japs, if you have any thought beyond what you've given us?

A. The dispatch of November 27 had as its preface that negotiations with Japan, looking toward a stabilization of the Pacific area, had stopped. Then the dispatch went ahead to say that they expected action on the part of Japan within the next few days, based on that premise. Then the dispatch went on to some extent in giving a deployment of Japanese forces, amphibious forces, pointing to general war on the south coast of China, Siam, and also a statement in the dispatch to

the effect that this was a war warning. Subsequent to the receipt of that dispatch, negotiations were resumed. That had a very definite effect on my mind; that while the negotiations had stopped once, and this was the reason that they thought that action by Japan was due in a few days; subsequently, negotiations were resumed; there was uncertainty in my mind as to whether anything was likely to happen immediately. Furthermore, as I stated before in this examination, I felt that the authorities in Washington had far more information, were far abler to evaluate the situation than I was and I had no apprehension around December 7 that any hostile action in that area was imminent. I know now, and, as I stated before, I'm not sure whether I knew [16] this before the 7th of December, or not, that a dispatch had been sent about the end of November to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet giving him a warning that something was likely to happen, and I believe in that dispatch it was mentioned that the action might be against the Philippines. I can not recall it exactly but I have that impression. But so far as the Hawaiian area was concerned, I had no feeling of impending hostilities around the 7th of December.

46. Q. Will you please relate what action was taken by the Army and Navy with respect to the security of Pearl Harbor after the receipt of the dispatches of November 27. of which you know.

A. I knew that the Army had been alerted and I thought they were in a general alert. I believe that General Short told me they were alert and I thought it was a general alert. Either on the 7th or 8th of December, I asked General Short about it and he told me, no, it was only a partial alert, what they call alert No. 1. He might have told me they were alert No. 1 and I confused it with our condition 1. Our highest form is 1 and their lowest form is 1. So far as the Navy is concerned, I know of nothing particular, except the Commander of the Inshore Patrol at Pearl Harbor had called in the Commanding Officers of Destroyer Division No. 80—they were the only four ships that I had for the inshore patrol and only one of those was equipped with listening gear—and had given them a pep talk. Admiral Kimmel had issued an order about the 27th of November to the effect that any submarines found running submerged in the defensive sea area should be depth charged, and at this pep talk these young men were told to be on their toes. It was my own thought that any action taken by Japan prior to a declaration of war, or after a declaration of war, would be in the form of concentrated submarine attack on the ships of the Fleet, in the operating areas, and they might make an effort to get in the Harbor. That was the reason for the pep talk. I know no other action was taken as a consequence of the warning of the 27th of November.

47. Q. The letter here, Exhibit 4, or 2CL-41, provides for three conditions of readiness. Would you please state, with respect to these conditions, the condition that existed on December 7, prior to the attack?

A. So far as I know, there was no condition prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief and the order gives, as a duty for the Commander of the Base Defense, the duty of advising the senior officer present and afloat the conditions of readiness, advising him what condition of readiness should be kept. What the Fleet orders were in addition

to the advice that they were to receive from the Commander of the Base Defense Force, I don't know.

48. Q. Did you take any action as Commander—

A. (Interposing) So far as I know, I advised no condition of readiness. I might say that I felt that I could not independently advise a condition of readiness without the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief; I believe the order has a parenthetical expression in it that says I shall advise, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, the state of readiness that shall be kept, which indicates that the Commander-in-Chief would already know; I felt any action that I might take should be consistent with the other things in the Fleet, the conditions of employment, that they had been in or were in, and the future movements. This belief of mine was borne out subsequent to the 7th of December when I advised the condition of readiness, and I was informed by the acting Commander-in-Chief that he wanted a different condition of readiness.

[171] 49. Q. Please state anything within your knowledge relating to any effort which was made after the warning contained in the dispatch of November 27 to establish a distant reconnaissance.

A. There were orders contained in 2CL about the patrol of the operating areas and the covering of the forces going out and coming in, and, in addition to that, either the Commander-in-Chief or the Commander of Air Force Scouting Fleet were undertaking other reconnaissances of which I was not intimately informed of; so far as any additional reconnaissances being conducted by air, I have no knowledge. In other words, I know of no additional aerial reconnaissance that was made as the result of the dispatch of the 27th of November. I did take one other step that I have forgotten to mention that has just occurred to me. The Honolulu area was under command of the District Coast Guard Office. The Coast Guard had been placed under my command prior to the 7th of December. They had three cutters. Captain Finlay, who was the District Coast Guard Officer, was the Port Commander of Honolulu and I required him, on receipt of this dispatch of 27th of November, to put an inshore patrol out of Honolulu, the same as we had at Pearl Harbor, except at Pearl Harbor it would be conducted by Destroyer Division 80.

50. Q. Do you know of any other steps that were taken to counter possible enemy action on the morning of December 7?

A. No, I do not.

51. Q. I understand that you made no recommendation toward instituting distant air reconnaissance?

A. No, I did not.

52. Q. Going back to communications from the Department and your reaction thereto, do you recall being informed that the Japanese had been detected destroying some of their codes and files in certain localities?

A. I recall the existence of certain dispatches to the effect that the Japanese were believed to be destroying their papers, dispatches.

53. Q. Do you remember the dates; was it after the 27th of November?

A. I think it was around the 3rd of December.

54. Q. What was your reaction to that intelligence?

A. Well, I'm not sure that I remember exactly what my reaction was, except that they might be doing it and they might not be doing it, and I didn't know, I had no way of knowing what they were destroying and what they were burning and whether it was something that was really filled with meaning, or not. It might be and it might not be. But I still had a belief that as long as there were negotiations going on in Washington there was a possibility of this period of waiting being extended. I had a very definite feeling that we were going to have war sometime in the future, but just how far in the future, I was unable to predict.

55. Q. Was the subject of the dispatch to which you have just referred discussed between you and Admiral Kimmel?

A. The dispatch of the 27th?

56. Q. Of the 3rd, about destroying the codes.

A. Perhaps it may have been. I don't remember.

[18] 57. Q. Was any action of any kind that related to the defense of Pearl Harbor taken as the result of that dispatch?

A. The security measures prescribed and the additional inshore patrol in Honolulu, and the warning that was given the destroyer captains, and the fact that I believed that the Army was on a full alert, were the only measures that I know that were taken.

58. Q. The JCD plan calls for planning between your representatives and those of the Army. Do you know whether these warning messages were available to this planning group?

A. I do not believe that they were informed. The messages were secret messages and we were admonished to keep them secret to prevent alarming people, and one thing and another, and I'm not sure—my own War Plans officer knew about them but I don't know whether the Army's War Plan people knew about them.

59. Q. Did you consider it a function of the joint planning representative and other planning representatives to keep abreast of such developments and take them into consideration in the preparation of plans?

A. Not as a joint organization. I considered that I had to keep my own war planner advised and I did. He knew everything that came in.

60. Q. But the planning of any action taken as the result of such warning messages, you felt to be a matter personal between you and the Commanding General, so far as it affected your joint plans?

A. I felt there was a definite agreement between the General and myself as to our responsibilities, and within my own responsibilities the planning that I did could be done independently of him, but something that involved joint planning, of course, it had to be taken up with the joint planners, and I had to take it up with the General. And if you visualize the fact that General Short and I saw each other very frequently, Admiral Kimmel and I saw each other practically every day, it is hard to believe that anything of any importance should take place or that anything should be received of even small importance that wasn't discussed between us, because it is only fair to assume that we discussed everything.

61. Q. But any joint planning which would be necessary as the result of such warning would be the function of the highest echelon of commands? And all information that you had, such as condition of the

Army with respect to alerting their personnel, you received from the Commanding General and not through any liaison or other channels?

A. He had in my office an Army Colonel who was a representative of the General and was known as a liaison officer, and I had in the General's office a Lieutenant of the Naval Reserve of the Fourteenth District who was my representative up there and was a liaison officer, and these men were supposed to be informed, although I will say that my liaison officer did not know of dispatches that had been received because I didn't consider it was proper to tell him. He was quite inexperienced. Nor am I sure that the liaison officer from the Army in my office knew about them, but we were in close touch through those liaison officers who were there for that purpose and we felt we knew what was going on. Indications are that there are some things we were not correctly advised on or informed about.

[19] 62. Q. Admiral, please explain the method of rapid communications which existed between your headquarters and those of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

A. The communication plan gotten out in connection with 2CL called for a broadcast frequency from the Base Defense Commander to all ships and points. I don't recall the frequency but every station was required to keep a broadcast receiver of standard wave length and we gave all of our notices of air raid drills, commence fire, cease fire, what was taking place, over that and it was supposed to be listened to at all times by all ships at sea and by the group commanders in port and by my own stations, like Kaneohe and the ammunition depot and the air station at Pearl Harbor and the net depot, and various other places, submarine base. In addition to that, we were actively prosecuting the rapid communication by telephone under JCD. We had teletypes between Army Headquarters and my Headquarters. I think there was a branch of that in Admiral Kimmel's office. We had difficulty in getting direct line to Kaneohe, and I think it had just been established. Formerly we had to go through central in Honolulu but I think we had just succeeded in having the Army put down a special line for us to Kaneohe. We had a telephone from the Harbor Control and Command Posts, both Honolulu and Pearl Harbor, to the gates. I had a telephone between the Harbor Control and the Artillery Headquarters. I think we had a direct line between my headquarters and General Short's headquarters in what he called his "Message Center". My Harbor Control and Operation room was manned twenty-four hours a day. There were always talkers, listeners, and officers on duty there. In addition to that, we had duty officers on duty in the building. The Chief of Staff and the War Plans operation officer and myself all lived close to the Harbor Control Post and could be gotten by yard telephone. All of the lines planned had not been finished. We had means for rapid communication.

63. Q. Did this include communications with the Army warning net system; warning net?

A. The Army warning net lines came into a certain place known as the "Interceptor Command" where they had the plotting room. I'm not sure how well organized the Interceptor Command was prior to December 7, but I think it was just in the forming. There was a means for communicating—for providing a communication from that room to my headquarters, which I immediately put into effect after

the attack on the 7th of December. My talkers, teletype operators, who operated with the various Army places connected with, were there all of the time, twenty-four hours a day, and they were in constant practice communication with these outlying places, but it is my recollection that I was told on several occasions that the Army ends of the line always went dead in the evening, that they could not get anybody on it. It had been a matter that we had taken up, or tried to take up to get rectified, because we wanted Army twenty-four hour a day communication.

64. Q. Did you have in effect any liaison or the presence of a naval officer with the Interceptor Command?

A. There was no officer detailed specifically at the Interceptor Command. As I said before, I don't think the Interceptor Command was completely formed up and I am very definitely of the opinion that the Army did not keep a twenty-four hour watch in the place. The place was not completely organized. Immediately after December 7, they staffed the place by calling in a lot of young women from Honolulu and training them in their duties and, at that time, they asked for watch officers there to communicate with the Navy, although it [20] had been my plan that the communications would be sent by Army people to us and received by the Navy people, but we sent Navy people there on December 7.

65. Q. This net had been in use during some of your tactical exercises, had it not?

A. I think not. I have no recollection of it ever having been used in any tactical operations. The Army was training operators principally and trying to get the system so it would work. There was a great deal of trouble with the electronics in it and they had asked for help; they had come to me once and wanted assistance, had been referred to the Commander-in-Chief, and there was some officer who was transiently present at the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters whom he sent up there to help them, but, that officer was on his way to join some ship, and when he joined up, another officer, by the name of Taylor, appeared. He had had a great deal of experience in radar and he was sent by the Commander-in-Chief to help the Army; but, that was an effort on the part of the Navy to get the Army's net going; he was not sent there with any orders as liaison, and while I knew he was there, I had no idea that he was there in any other capacity other than as an expert to try to assist them with their electrical and mechanical difficulties.

66. Q. Just how far did you feel you could rely on this net to assist you in obtaining a warning of approaching aircraft prior to December 7?

A. I had no feeling of confidence or reliance on it because I was very definitely of the opinion that it wasn't completely formed up; the operators were not completely trained, and we had no way—no way was then established so we could tell what planes of our own were where they could be completely identified.

67. Q. Were the Army and Navy planes operating in the Hawaiian area at that time equipped with any modern recognition devices, such as IFF?

A. No. We had a standard procedure of entrance to Oahu and of departure from Oahu; certain grooves Army and Navy planes must

fly in coming in and going out in order that we might know, assuming the planes that flew in those grooves were our planes and those that flew somewhere else were not ours. In addition to Army and Navy planes, there were commercial companies operating from Oahu, interisland companies operating planes to adjacent islands, Pan American operating planes to the trans-Pacific, and there was an air school located on the municipal airport, John Rogers Field, which had planes up and these planes were controlled by the Civil Aeronautics Authorities.

68. Q. Did the Army warning net have any set up for visual observation of approaching aircraft, if you know?

A. The Army had a number of observation posts around the Island of Oahu and on adjacent islands, but unless they were in a full out alert, these posts would not be manned, but they were of no real use because they all didn't have means of rapid communication direct from the post to headquarters.

[21] 69. Q. Was there any arrangement made by the Navy for obtaining information with respect to approaching ships or aircraft by visual observation?

A. None that I know of, except the signal tower.

70. Q. Do you recall ever having given General Short any ground for supposing that our task forces at sea were anywhere near an adequate guard against a surprise attack by carriers?

A. I gave General Short no reason for believing that our forces at sea were adequate warning against hostile attack.

71. Q. Referring to the Army's force of fighters, were the flying fields available on Oahu adequate for the use of all those planes?

A. The Army's main fighter field was Wheeler Field, which was near Schofield Barracks. They had another fighter field at Bellows Field, which was on the northeast side of the Island, and an improvised field somewhere in the neighborhood of Haleiwa. Some three to four months previous to December 7, General Short had made a request on me to release a field which the Navy had at Kahuku Point to the Army and I had taken it up with the Commander-in-Chief and, as a result, we had appointed Admiral Bellinger and Admiral Halsey to discuss the entire matter with Army air authorities. This joint conference made a report in which they recommended that the Navy keep Kahuku Field. I endorsed on the report to the Commander-in-Chief my opinion that it should be given to the Army and he approved my recommendation. There were other things in the recommendation but that was the principal thing. He approved my recommendation and it was sent to the Navy Department. So far as I know, no reply had been received to that prior to the 7th of December. In my opinion, the Army did not have an adequate number of fields to disperse their fighters on.

72. Q. This is a matter of defensive attitude. As regards operation, were they hampered as regards inadequacy of fields?

A. I can not answer that.

73. Q. Admiral, what provisions were made for obtaining and disseminating to the Army, particularly, any intelligence information, and particularly contact reports, obtained by any of the task forces or other forces operating in the Hawaiian area?

A. All such reports would be received in the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief who had two courses of action open. One was to have them sent to the Army through the District Headquarters, informing the District at the same time, or else sending them direct to both places, as he had direct means of communication on the same telephone line that we had—teletypes that we had.

74. Q. Was any such information actually received on the morning of December 7?

A. On the morning of December 7, the only contact that was made prior to the air raid was with an enemy submarine. This submarine was sighted by U. S. S. WARD, which was inshore patrol, and the U. S. S. ANTARES, I believe. I received no report from the ANTARES. I did receive at 7:12 a. m. a telephone message from the Chief of Staff telling me that he had received a dispatch from the WARD that was somewhat difficult to understand, that he had been attacked and was counterattacking a submarine at the entrance to the channel at Pearl Harbor. He further stated that he was then engaged [22] in escorting a sampan toward Honolulu. The Chief of Staff gave me this message. I asked him what it was; is it a real submarine or is it a report? We had had a number of false reports in the past and he said he didn't know, and I couldn't understand from the nature of the dispatch whether it was bona fide or sound contact or sight contact, whether he had been fired upon or had fired, and I asked him to get it cleared up immediately. Captain Momsen was sent immediately to headquarters; dispatched another destroyer and tried to get information from the WARD. Before we got the information straightened out, the air attack was on. Admiral Kimmel was informed—at least his operations watch officer was informed about the entire matter just at the same time we were.

75. Q. Do you know whether that information was conveyed to the Army?

A. So far as I know, it was not. I'm not sure; but, I don't think it was.

76. Q. And there were no other similar information received to your knowledge?

A. No other contacts.

77. Q. Reverting to that dispatch from the Department, 27 November, containing the war warning, there was also a directive to effect a defensive deployment. It really was a directive, was it not?

A. I think it was.

78. Q. Did you give any thought at the time to what you considered that directive to mean for the Navy forces, other than those belonging to the District?

A. I have a distinct recollection of Admiral Kimmel discussing that matter in my presence with someone else. Who it was, I can not recall. Probably some member of his Staff. The terminology employed is not one that I've ever heard used before. In dealing with war plans, naval tactics, it has always been our practice to use very precise terminology with definite known meanings. So far as I know, I have never encountered that terminology before. It's quite possible—this is a matter of opinion—that Admiral Kimmel might have construed that the fact that he had submarines at Wake and Midway was a

defensive deployment or he may have asked Admiral Stark what it was. I don't know whether he did, or not.

79. Q. What did it mean to you?

A. I don't know.

80. Q. The war warning message, of course, was also to be communicated to the Hawaiian Department. Those words "defensive deployment" being, as you say, unusual, did it occur to anyone to discuss with the Army whether or not those words had a definite meaning which might be obscure to you?

A. Not so far as I know, although I believe the dispatch directed the Commander-in-Chief to transmit a copy of this dispatch to the Commanding General.

81. Q. Then, in effect, it was somewhat in the nature of a dispatch to both Services?

A. It was addressed to the Commander-in-Chief; he was the action addressee. He was told to inform Commandant Fourteen and the Commanding General.

[23] 82. Q. Admiral, this dispatch of 27 November, which will be introduced as an exhibit before you finish your testimony and we'll ask you to identify it then, went on to direct appropriate deployment preparatory of carrying out defensive tasks assigned in WPL 46, which was the Rainbow 5 Plan. I note that your Joint Coast Defense Plan expressly states it is based on plan Rainbow No. 1. Would you please explain anything you know or anything within your knowledge with respect to the situation among the higher echelons of command in Hawaii as to which plan, Rainbow 1 or Rainbow 5, should form the basis for planning or which was considered as the plan which would probably be used in the event of war?

A. Rainbow 1 contemplated the United States being against the Axis Powers and Japan without any assistance except, maybe, some of the South American Republics. We had had that and JCD was based on that. Rainbow 3 had been received some two or three months before and Rainbow 3 was based on the assumption that the United States would be allied with Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies against the Axis Nations and Japan. And the disposition of the Hawaiian Department in that was just the same as in Rainbow 1. Now I don't recall Rainbow 5 distinctly, when we had received it, if we had received it or how long before we had received it, but it is my impression that the provisions in there were about the same as they were in 1 also, that is in so far as related to the Fourteenth Naval District.

83. Q. Are you familiar with the general nature of the task assigned to the United States Pacific Fleet in these plans; were there specific references to whether the plans called for offensive or defensive action?

A. No. 1 was defensive, purely defensive. No. 3, as I recall it, had offensive tasks in it. I remember for our Forces we had to sever the lines of communication from Japan in the East and I think it required certain offensive action from the Asiatic Fleet which was to be reenforced from the United States Fleet. Rainbow 5, I don't recall the tasks in there, although I've read them. I don't recall them now.

84. Q. You did know, however, did you not, that an early offensive movement was required of the Pacific Fleet in the event of hostilities with Japan?

A. In Rainbow 3, I knew it was required and I assume I knew it was required in 5 if the record shows I received it. It is not quite clear in my mind. But I knew that offensive action was required in 3, and if 5 had been received, and I assume that it had been received, I'm not sure about it, I knew that offensive action was required. But Rainbow 1 was the only one where we were on purely the defensive.

85. Q. That being the case, that CinCPac Fleet was expected to make an offensive movement quite early, did it seem to you at the time that such requirement was difficult to reconcile with the requirements for security of the Fleet which obtained up to the outbreak of war?

A. Admiral Kimmel had told me on the occasions which I had asked him for patrol planes to supply the District's deficiencies in that respect, that he would do what he could and supply them when he could, but he couldn't make any commitments because he expected the Fleet, parts of the Fleet, to leave there in the case of hostilities and he might go. He didn't say he might go but he would go. So far as I was concerned, I can not say that I gave any very deep study to what the Fleet was going to do, how they were going to do it, when they were going, or how we could preserve the security [24] of the place after they were gone because I had so many things to do that I could only do so many. I was very much dissatisfied with the deficiency in my forces that were required for me to perform my tasks, and JCD had been approved by both the Commander-in-Chief and the Navy Department; it was not only my plan but their plan. I had made representations to the Navy Department about the deficiencies of the forces, both surface and air. As late as the Summer, I had made a reappraisal of the forces and made definite and urgent recommendations to the Navy Department for ships and planes, which they had promised to do as soon as they could. What went on in the minds of the planners and operating people of the Fleet, Commander-in-Chief, I don't know, but I know they did have plans for offensive action.

86. Q. Then nothing was represented to you by the Commander-in-Chief to the effect that he could not take any other particular or specific security measures because of his commitments for those offensive movements?

A. No, I remember no such representations.

87. Q. Admiral, as Commandant of the Navy Yard, much of your time and thought was given to the employment of its forces on both maintenance and alterations to ships of the Fleet. Those alterations directed made by the Department were considerable, were they not?

A. Our principal activity in the Navy Yard was a twenty-four hour a day schedule of docking, keeping ships' bottoms clean. This had been in effect for over a year. The first instance the Department sent a schedule of docking out in order to keep the ships in condition, which required a lot of ships to go to the coast for docking, and we told them by working three shifts a day we could absorb a lot of this at Pearl Harbor and this was done. So far as alterations to the Fleet were concerned, I don't know of a great many which were being done at Pearl Harbor, although unquestionably we had some in the nature of adding more guns to the anti-aircraft battery and also some radar installations, but I don't recall any tremendous number of other alterations. To understand how the Navy Yard worked, we worked

in close touch with the Commander-in-Chief's people. We worked on the ships and they sent us the work to do. The force was expanding rapidly. In April, 1940, I think there were two thousand total employees, which included maintenance and office force in Pearl Harbor, and by December 7, I think that had been built up to something like eight or ten thousand. I'm not sure of the exact size. It was expanding very rapidly.

88. Q. Then the alterations directed by the Department to be made at Pearl Harbor were never any considerable embarrassment, insofar as you know, concerning affecting the operations of the Fleet?

A. Well, I can not answer that categorically because I don't know. We took the work load that was thrown on us. They knew how much we could take; we told them what we could do at all times. They knew what we had to do and we did it as fast as we could. However, whether that interfered with the mobility of the Fleet, I'm not prepared to state. I don't know.

89. Q. Admiral, you stated, sometime back, that Admiral Bellinger, acting as your subordinate in the matter of relations with the Army, advised the Army each morning as to the number of fighter planes available for Army use [25] in the event of emergency or hostilities. Do you know how many planes were available to the Army at the time of the December 7 attack?

A. There were, or had been, four carriers at Pearl Harbor at various times, and on December 7 two carriers, the LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE were away from Pearl Harbor on missions. The SARATOGA and YORKTOWN were on the coast. It is my recollection that both those ships carried the planes to the coast. It is my recollection that the LEXINGTON and the ENTERPRISE had their planes with them so the only planes that were left at the air station at Pearl Harbor at Ewa Field were a number of Marine fighting planes belonging to the Fleet Marine Force. I believe there were about 70 Marine planes. How many were available on that morning, I do not know.

90. Q. Do you know what number of the 250 Army planes were effective planes, in condition for use?

A. The Army had a number of P-36's, I think they were, when I arrived in Pearl Harbor. And after the letter from the Secretary of Navy to the Secretary of War, the Army sent a large number of fighter planes out; sent them out by Navy carriers and put them ashore for the Army air fields, and I think most of those planes were the type known as P-40. There might have been some P-36's with them but mostly P-40. It is possible I may be mistaken in saying P-39, but I think that's what it was. I guess I'm wrong, it probably was a P-36. P-40's came and they were supposed to be the latest thing. They were a disappointment in the respect that they were only good for about fifty-five minutes in the air and they couldn't go out of sight of land, or only a little out of sight of land, or they'd have difficulty in getting back.

91. Q. Do you know whether the fighter planes were, in fact, used for inshore air patrol purposes?

A. They were not. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force, General Frederick Martin, told me that he only had three planes for inshore air patrol. He couldn't use the bombers because

they couldn't see and he couldn't use the fighters because they couldn't carry bombs and couldn't see very well either. I believe that prior to December 7 one of the planes cracked up so he only had two planes on December 7.

92. Q. Did the Army make a similar report to you or your subordinate commander concerning the number of bombers available for patrol?

A. I think they did.

93. Q. Do you know the number of such planes that were available on the morning of December 7?

A. I don't know what the Army report said. It is my belief that the Army had a few old bombers that were obsolescent, that there were in 1940, and after the Secretary of Navy's letter they had started sending in some B-17's. I think the ones they originally had, were known as the B-18, and they were obsolescent and we began to get in some B-17's. I think that the first B-17's came out were ferried on to the Far East, some twenty-five or thirty of them. That was somewhere in September or October. And that on December 7 that in addition to the B-18's, there probably were not over ten or fifteen B-17's there. As a matter of fact, a squadron of B-17's [26] has been dispatched from San Francisco on the night of December 6 and they arrived at Hickam Field in the midst of the air attack and some of them were lost.

94. Q. Just how did the command over these planes pass from the Army squadron or other commanders to the naval commanders?

A. My general understanding is that Admiral Bellinger would direct his fighters, his fighters that were assigned for the day, to report to the Army and this man would go up and report to the Army. They had a frequency. And the Army bombers reported to the Navy the same way.

95. Q. After they were air-borne?

A. Yes, after they were air-borne.

96. Q. Do you know whether those able to fly did so report during or after the attack?

A. I don't know, definitely.

97. Q. Admiral, aerial torpedoes were used in the attack, were they not?

A. Yes, sir.

98. Q. Would you please outline the facts related to the protecting of ships in Pearl Harbor with respect to attack by aerial torpedoes, what had been done and so on?

A. The Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet had received a letter from the Chief of Operations in which the question of placing nets around ships in Pearl Harbor was discussed. It gave the information that one net, a single net, was forty per cent effective and another net, if spaced 100 feet apart, was ninety per cent effective. That made the outer net 190 feet from the ship's side. CNO wanted recommendations from the Commander-in-Chief concerning the netting in of ships. The Commander-in-Chief and I discussed the matter. I was not very familiar with the capabilities of aircraft torpedoes but I recollect the Commander-in-Chief asked the Navy Department, the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, in what depth of water could an aerial torpedo be expected to be used effectively. I remember a letter

coming back from the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance which stated, in effect, that judging from our own torpedoes that seventy feet was necessary for their effective use; seventy feet of water. The water in Pearl Harbor is forty-five feet deep, and I think when the Commander-in-Chief got that information that he then wrote a letter to the Chief of Operations and the Navy Department. The Chief of Operations and the Commander-in-Chief agreed that there was no need for netting in the ships. I have heard subsequently that a letter was afterwards written by the Bureau of Ordnance modifying the original letter. I never saw the modifying letter and I'm unfamiliar with it.

99. Q. Would you consider the matter of safety through static means of the ships, from attack by torpedo while in Pearl Harbor, as your responsibility?

A. The operation of netting in the ships would be a function of the District forces; the net depot would handle that task, using their craft and their nets. If I had thought it necessary, I would have recommended it to the Commander-in-Chief. The Commander-in-Chief might have had other ideas. One of our seaplane take-offs is right up the Pearl Harbor channel; the best take-off area [27] we had. And at one point in this take-off it had to pass within, I think, two hundred feet of one of the berths in order to get the necessary straight runway to take-off with a loaded seaplane. Naturally, I didn't want to place any obstructions in the Harbor unless it were absolutely necessary. Moreover, the question of getting ships in and out quickly was affected by whether or not they had nets around them and I don't think the Commander-in-Chief or the Commandant of the District wanted to hamper their mobility or their ready mobility unless it was absolutely necessary. I knew little or nothing about the effectiveness of the net except what I was told by the Bureau of Ordnance: forty per cent by the single net and ninety per cent with the double net. I knew very little about whether torpedoes could be used in shallow water of forty-five feet and I depended on the technical sources of information. When the matter was referred to the Commander-in-Chief by the Chief of Operations and he reached a conclusion, I assumed that that was final. I agreed with him and did not protest his decision. After all, the matter was referred to Washington and the Bureaus in Washington probably had more information—certainly had more information than we had on the subject—so no question was raised about it at all. The practice is today there to net ships. Of course, they have ample supplies of nets there for that purpose. At the time this question was brought up, we didn't have enough nets to maintain the gates; when we first put the gates down in the Harbor, we had to use old net which was left over from the first World War and didn't get our new nets—we didn't get our nets for Midway until quite late. In other words, regular nets weren't forthcoming in quantity.

100. Q. About how late did you get a sufficient supply of nets for the gates at Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Midway, and so forth?

A. We had our nets in Honolulu installed in the summer of 1941, but, as I recall it, the Honolulu gate was made up of 1918 net and sometime subsequent to that we received enough net to replace that with new net. I don't know how late it was. As far as Midway is

concerned, we had projects at Midway for installation of nets but I don't believe that at the beginning of war they had been actually installed at Midway. That's my recollection. I'm quite certain after the 7th of December when I wanted nets for dry docks, caissons, floating dry docks, and for ships at anchor, we didn't have nets and we had to improvise. We tore down fences, tore down the fence between Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, took the extruded material that was used for the fence and welded it, lapwelded it to other sections in order to get a sufficient baffle that we could hang in the water at the ends of docks and around ships. And in so doing, of course, we had no knowledge whether that kind of net would be any good at all, but it was the best we had. We also took all of the target rafts we had and hung sections of fence below them and put them in front of the dock caissons and some of the important repair docks.

101. Q. Are you able to say that the nets would not have been forthcoming had you asked the Department for them?

A. I'm unable to say that with any authority.

102. Q. Admiral, was it necessary that this seaplane area, to which you have referred here as requiring the passing of the vicinity of the berth, be used at all times? I mean were there times when only that one seaplane area take-off was available?

A. We had two areas. One was north of Ford Island and one was south of Ford Island. That area was the best area for taking off and was used when [28] possible. Sometimes it was not possible to use that area. Sometimes it was not possible to use the other area because we were continually conducting dredging operations in the Harbor and had these dredges and piles stuck out and we might have to use the other area. Pan American planes usually use the area north of Ford Island. There were times though that either one or the other could not be used.

103. Q. What types of ships use the berth adjacent to this take-off area south of Ford Island?

A. We had one carrier berth there and I think four or five battleship berths, although the battleship berths could take other types, depending upon whether they were filled, or not.

104. Q. On the 7th of December, were the berths alongside of the south side of Ford Island filled with battleships?

A. Yes, with the exception of one ship, I think they were in pairs; two ships in each place, an outer and inner ship. The practice was for the battleships to come in north about Ford Island and go down and head out. They were always moored heading out, and the arrangement of the berthing was made by Commander, Battleships. The berths were assigned to him and he could assign them as he saw fit; he usually assigned them in the sequence for sorties: so they could move right out.

105. Q. It was he who made the decision to moor them in pairs, although that practice wasn't in compliance with the letter 2CL-41?

A. He made the decision how they were to be berthed. He was limited in his choice by the number of berths he had available and the number of ships he had in port. The battleships, I think, were in two separate task forces, and, one was supposed to be at sea while the other one was in port, so that the station and liberty facilities would

not be congested. But on the morning of December 7, I think all available battleships were in Pearl Harbor, both task forces, eight battleships.

106. Q. Were those most severely damaged in the outer position at the moorings?

A. Yes, sir. The ones in the inner berths practically escaped torpedoes except in the case of the—I think it was the HELENA and the OGLALA were moored abreast at 1010 pier. The HELENA was torpedoed; she was outside. She was torpedoed but the explosive effect was enough to sink the inner ship too, the OGLALA.

107. Q. There were no other berths available so that the use of pairs could have been avoided?

A. I think not. There were two carrier berths on the north side of Ford Island. I think they were known at F-7 and 8, or F-8 and 9. I've forgotten the numbers. They were built for carriers and, on this occasion, one had been assigned to the UTAH and one had been assigned to the RALEIGH.

108. Q. Who was the senior officer present at Pearl Harbor other than the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Vice Admiral Pye was present. He was the next senior. He was not on board his Flagship at the time of the attack.

109. Q. Do you know whether a sortie order was issued following the attack?

[29] A. I believe it was. An order was issued to sortie in accordance with the security plan and quite a number of ships went out; small ships. The NEVADA was attempting to go out when she was attacked and torpedoed. She was the only battleship that actually got under way.

110. Q. Do you know who issued the sortie order?

A. I'm not sure but I think it was issued from the Flagship of Admiral Pye.

111. Q. Admiral, during 1941, do you recall having received from the Navy Department any intelligence concerning professional, personal characteristics of the leading Japanese Admirals?

A. No, I don't recall any.

112. Q. Did you ever hear the characteristics of Yamamoto, for instance, discussed?

A. Not prior to December 7.

The witness was advised that he would be recalled at a later date for further examination, was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:28 p. m., took a recess until 2:30 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.

The examining officer introduced Leonard D. Brown, civilian, as reporter, who was duly sworn.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered, was informed of the subject matter of the examination, and was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Benjamin Katz, Commander, U. S. Navy, Officer in charge of the Code Room of the Navy Department.

2. Q. Commander, are you the regular custodian of the classified communication files of the Navy Department?

A. Yes, sir, I am the custodian of classified dispatch files.

3. Q. There are certain dispatches which this examination would like to have. I will give you the dates of those and if you are the custodian and have them in your custody, will you please produce them. The first is a dispatch of 16 October 1941 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

A. I have one that is addressed to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and also to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet for action.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

[30] Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings, to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 6".

4. Q. If you have the dispatch of 24 November from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, please produce it.

A. I have the message.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings, to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 7".

5. Q. If you have a dispatch addressed to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, by the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 27 November 1941, please produce it.

A. I have that message also.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings, to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 8".

6. Q. If you have a dispatch addressed to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet by the Chief of Naval Operations on 29 November, please produce it.

A. Yes, sir, this is it.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 9".

7. Q. If you have a dispatch in your custody addressed to the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, information Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, by the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 30 November 1941, please produce it.

A. I have it, sir.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 10".

8. Q. If you have in your custody the dispatch of 3 December, 1941, [31] addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, and Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts, please produce it.

A. I have that.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 11".

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 2:50 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m. tomorrow.

[32]

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 1944

THIRD DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:30 a. m.

Present: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

The examining officer introduced Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, as reporter, who was duly sworn.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the second day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows: Admiral Smith, I am directed by the Secretary of Navy to record testimony pertinent to the facts attending the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December. My precept states that this is for the purpose of having on record testimony which eventually might be lost due to death or any cause which might make a witness unavailable when the time comes. There is possibility that this testimony will be used in future legal proceedings. Now, in such testimony as you give us, I ask that as far as you can, you speak from your knowledge which you had prior to 7 December and from facts which presented themselves to you before that date. I realize that that is a long distance back, and if at any time you have means of refreshing your memory from documents, or otherwise, we will stop and permit you to do so.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. W. W. Smith, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, serving as Director, Naval Transportation Service, Naval Operations.

2. Q. What was your assignment of duty on 7 December 1941?

A. Chief of Staff, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

3. Q. On what date did you assume the duties of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet?

A. On February 1, 1941, the date on which Admiral Kimmel became Commander-in-Chief. I might add that I served a year and a half, prior to that date, as Captain of one of the Admiral's cruisers

when he was Commander Cruisers Pacific Fleet; and before that date I don't recollect having seen him.

4. Q. As the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or United States Fleet, did you supervise all the divisions of the Staff?

A. Yes, everything.

[33] 5. Q. Then everything that transpired between the Staff members and the Commander-in-Chief passed back and forth through you?

A. Yes, it did. The Commander-in-Chief very frequently would have certain members of his Staff in his office, and spent a great deal of time down in the War Plans Office, and I had other things to do, but nothing was ever completed without my knowledge. I was in his confidence all the time.

6. Q. Did this relate only to matters of major importance?

A. To everything. The usual thing in the morning was to look over the dispatches and talk with him, and then the Fleet Intelligence Officer would come in with his later information. Then, the members of the Staff would be called together at least once a day, not always a full conference, but the people concerned.

7. Q. Were you shown all confidential, secret intelligence concerning the Japanese, both from the Navy Department and from the Staff organizations on Oahu?

A. Yes. My recollection is, we got very little on Oahu except Fleet Intelligence, which was more on the possibility of sabotage than on the war, but we had radio intelligence, and every time the three Force Commanders were in port, or even one or two of them, as a matter of fact, the Commander-in-Chief would have them over, and his Type Commanders who were in port, and have the Intelligence Officer point out on the chart his estimate, by radio intelligence, of where all units of the Japanese Fleet were, at the time.

8. Q. Were you present at such conferences?

A. Yes, all of them.

9. Q. What other members of the Staff were fully informed of all intelligence in this manner?

A. Always the War Plans Officer, who was Captain, now Rear Admiral, McMorris; and the Operations Officer, Captain DeLany, now Rear Admiral DeLany; the Fleet Intelligence Officer, and the Fleet Communications Officer, and as many others as the Commander-in-Chief thought necessary, but those four were always in on it.

10. Q. By "Fleet Intelligence Officer", do you mean Layton?

A. Yes, sir; Commander Layton.

11. Q. You don't include Rochefort?

A. No, sir. Rochefort was Combat Intelligence Officer under the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and was not brought into these conferences at all.

12. Q. Do you feel that the Commander-in-Chief kept you fully advised as to his thoughts and reactions to all such intelligence information?

A. I do. The Commander-in-Chief showed me every letter he wrote, or received—wrote to or received from the Chief of Naval Operations. These letters were usually personal letters because the Chief of Naval Operations had used that form of correspondence for long before Admiral Kimmel took over, and these papers had to be considered

as official papers and they were filed, although they were personal letters. The Commander-in-Chief numbered them all, and I saw everything that he wrote or received.

13. Q. Do you know where that file is, at present?

[34] A. So far as I know, it is still in there with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. It was there when Admiral Nimitz took over, as are also the letters of Admiral Richardson, who preceded him; he left his personal file there, too, because he said it was official business.

14. Q. Were you afforded an opportunity to express your views to the Commander-in-Chief concerning matters of major importance?

A. Yes, sir; always. I might add that that was one of the first things the Commander-in-Chief told me when he took over, that he had had experiences in the past where people were not kept informed and he wanted me to remind him to keep his Force and Type Commanders informed of everything that was going on.

15. Q. What members of Admiral Kimmel's Staff messed with him?

A. Only the Fleet Operations Officer, who was Assistant Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Staff, i. e. Admiral Kimmel, DeLany, and myself. When McMorris, War Plans Officer, was with us at sea, he also was a member. Now, when he moved ashore, the mess was increased to include the War Plans Officer, Captain McMorris; the Fleet Aviator, Captain A. C. Davis, now Rear Admiral Davis—and I think that is all.

16. Q. The Staff conference—was it a daily routine matter?

A. No, sir. There was no set hour for it. He had a conference practically every day, and he would send for the people that he wanted. He would usually have over there officers from the Fleet at the same time. He also very frequently, at his conferences, would send for Admiral Bloch and Admiral Pye, especially Admiral Pye. I have known him to have Admiral Pye over there two or three times a day. Admiral Pye was important.

17. Q. Admiral, would you please advise us as to the organization of the Pacific Fleet just prior to Pearl Harbor, both as to the Type Organization and the Task Force Organization, as you recall it?

A. The Type Organization had existed for considerable time. That is, the Commander Battleships, Commander Destroyers, Commander Cruisers, and the Commander Scouting Force, who was Admiral Brown. One of the first things that Admiral Kimmel did was to split them up into three task forces, exclusive of submarines. Admiral Pye, who commanded the battleships, had one task force consisting of battleships and destroyers; Admiral Halsey had a task force of carriers, cruisers, and destroyers; and Admiral Brown—Wilson Brown—had the third task force, in which he had a carrier, cruisers, and destroyers; and for operation or exercise purposes, battleships would be transferred to those task forces. One task force was always at sea and very often two, and they held exercises against each other. Sometimes all three would be at sea.

18. Q. Were there task forces, other than those you have mentioned, which were composed of the combatant ships?

A. No, sir; except the submarines and the service force, there were only those three major task forces. Patrol Wing Two was organized as a task force to operate with the Fleet.

19. Q. How about the forces ashore, sir?

A. Well, with the exception of the Fourteenth Naval District, the Navy had no forces ashore. Of course, they had Marines and an offshore patrol of destroyers, under Com 14.

[35] 20. Q. Was the Fourteenth Naval District a Task Force or a subdivision of Admiral Kimmel's command?

A. Yes, the Fourteenth Naval District was under Admiral Kimmel's command, and it was listed as a Task Force under his command. I have forgotten just exactly what it was called, but the Fourteenth Naval District has always been under the command of the Commander-in-Chief.

21. Q. How did Patrol Wing Two fit into this Task organization?

A. Patrol Wing Two was under the Commander-in-Chief, both on land, and furnished planes—was used mostly for a constant patrol of the areas in which the Forces were operating. There was a day patrol at all times, regardless of whether the Fleet was operating south of Oahu or north, the operating area was always protected by planes, against a possible submarine attack, and, of course, Patrol Wing Two also had planes at Midway, and made trips to Midway and Wake. The Commander, Patrol Wing Two, Admiral Bellinger, was very often brought over to the Commander-in-Chief's and assigned a task in connection with the operations that were projected.

22. Q. Did the Commander of Patrol Wing Two come under the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. Yes, he did.

23. Q. Would you explain just how that relationship works?

A. You see, he was based on Ford Island and was within the Commander-in-Chief's jurisdiction, but both were under the Commander-in-Chief, and he was subordinate to the Fourteenth Naval District, but Admiral Kimmel very frequently would assign him a task, without going to Admiral Bloch.

24. Q. Was the organization of the Pacific Fleet by Forces as published in Types a published document?

A. My recollection is that it was issued monthly.

25. Q. Was the Task Force organization similarly published?

A. Yes, it is all a matter of record.

26. Q. Admiral, would you please explain the relationship between the Commander-in-Chief and the Army Commander, in Hawaii?

A. Admiral Kimmel assumed command only a week or two before General Short arrived. Before General Short had taken over as Commanding General, Admiral Kimmel went around to see him, both were in civilian clothing, and discussed all the problems of the Pacific and Admiral Kimmel saw them. The relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were better than those I had ever seen between a commanding general and an admiral, either there or in other places. They were together, I should say, at least twice a week, very frequently with their Staffs, and sometimes more frequently than that. We always invited the Army to take part in our exercises, and then developed a relationship such that Army planes would use Navy fields and Navy planes would use Army fields. It was found that the bombs of one would not fit the racks of the other, and that was remedied. The relations between the Army and the Navy out there were excellent.

27. Q. Under the official set-up, Admiral Bloch, rather than Admiral Kimmel, was the opposite of General Short, was he not?

No, sir. Admiral Kimmel never looked upon it that way. He felt that he was General Short's opposite.

28. Q. Was it not the case that the War Plans, and other official documents, were based upon the probability or possibility that Admiral Kimmel would be absent from Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, sir; and in the book known as "Joint Army and Navy Pamphlet", the chart shows Admiral Bloch as the one, and the diagram refers to units of the U. S. Fleet, if present; but Admiral Kimmel felt that when he was present, he was the man who should deal with the Army and with everything else. He took that responsibility.

29. Q. But nothing in the way of official arrangements on paper, at effect, was ever drawn up, was it?

A. To my knowledge—no, sir.

30. Q. That seems to have been an arrangement which might have put Admiral Bloch in some state of uncertainty as to his own relationship with the Commanding General. Do you recall any difficulties attendant to that?

A. No, sir, I do not. As I have said before, Admiral Kimmel sent Admiral Bloch very frequently and I never saw anything in Admiral Bloch's attitude indicating that he resented that. I have on many occasions when Admiral Kimmel went to Admiral Bloch's quarters at night, on receipt of information, to talk things over and ask for advice. He had a great deal of respect for Admiral Bloch.

31. Q. Admiral, under the provisions of the Joint Action Army and Navy, what method of command as between the Army and Navy was in effect at Hawaii?

A. My recollection is that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was the predominate interest, and I think General Short recognized that fact.

32. Q. Although the mutual cooperation method was actually in effect, was it not?

A. Yes, sir. You see, when Admiral Kimmel took over, the first thing that I did before assuming the duty as Chief of Staff, was to inquire all of the means of defense of Oahu. Pearl Harbor had no defense whatever, in itself. I was informed that the Army had no airplanes less than six years old—six years, in design. The Army had only 36 portable 3-inch guns that could be thrown around Pearl Harbor for the air defense. We were not very much impressed with that and realized that any defense of Pearl Harbor would have to be by the Fleet, itself, which it was.

33. Q. Returning to this Kimmel-Bloch-Short relationship, the War Plans, Joint Action Pamphlet, and all, very definitely put the Navy's part of the responsibility for the security upon Bloch, did it not?

A. Yes, sir.

34. Q. Was the reason that the Army and Navy business was between Kimmel and Short, instead of between Bloch and Short, due to the fact that Bloch had practically no force, or was it due more to the physical presence of Kimmel in Pearl Harbor during those months?

A. Kimmel's attitude was that Bloch was under his command and that when he was in port, he had the responsibility and he dealt directly with Short. Probably one reason was that he had a force that Admiral Bloch did not have, but he felt that Bloch was his subordi-

nate while in port, and he dealt directly with the Army. Usually, however, he would call in Admiral Bloch if he had anything important to say.

[37] 35. Q. Then the primary reason was Kimmel's physical presence at Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, sir; and, of course, when he moved ashore, which was in the summer of 1941, after he moved ashore and was there all the time, practically, he just assumed that responsibility of a permanent nature.

36. Q. In speaking of responsibility, do you include responsibility for the Fleet units' safety, as well as for the installations, themselves, at Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes. The plan put out by the Admiral, fifteen days after he took over, directed the Fourteenth Naval District, as well as the Fleet units, what to do in case of an air attack or a submarine attack. The ships' moorings were changed so that they were moored in sectors, where each ship would have a clear arc of fire, and all the moorings would be covered, and if one task force was out, the moorings were shifted to maintain that arc of fire; and if one area was not occupied, the one task force coming in was told where to distribute their ships and where to tie them up so that every arc of fire could be covered. It was realized that the only defense was by the Fleet. There was no defense ashore, except the net or the gate.

37. Q. Was this letter that you referred to subsequently revised?

A. It was revised about the middle of October, 1941.

38. Q. I show you Exhibit 4 before this examination. Could you identify that?

A. Yes, that is the one, revised. The original issue was the 15th of February. This was revised the 14th of October.

39. Q. Does this document, Exhibit 4, contain all instructions that Admiral Kimmel issued with respect to the defense of the base at Pearl—the security of the base at Pearl Harbor?

A. To the best of my recollection—it is a long time ago, of course—everything is in that letter. I don't recall anything else.

40. Q. This letter, Exhibit 4, prescribes certain tasks in connection with the security of Pearl Harbor, to be performed by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Many of these tasks involved coordination with the Army. Was it Admiral Kimmel's intention that Admiral Bloch operate directly, or cooperate directly, with the Army in this connection, or through him?

A. I think, directly; I am quite certain, directly. You see, the Commander-in-Chief occasionally went to sea for tactical exercises, and Admiral Bloch had to carry on directly with the Army.

41. Q. Was the Commander-in-Chief apprised of all the plans that were adopted between the Army and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District?

A. Yes, sir.

42. Q. Were you familiar with the Joint Defense Plan which was signed by the Commanding General of the Hawaii Department, General Short, and Admiral Bloch, as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. I don't remember it.

43. Q. This is Exhibit 5 before this examination, and is that plan?

A. Frankly, I do not remember having seen that document before.

[38] 44. Q. Admiral, was the status of the Fleet, with respect to materiel and personnel, satisfactory to Admiral Kimmel at the time he assumed the command thereof; that is, of the Pacific Fleet?

A. No, it was not; he demanded such things as radar—at the time he took over, to my knowledge, there were only radars on four cruisers and on the carriers. He asked for it on all ships. He asked for additional aircraft guns. He asked for self-sealing tanks for airplanes, and when he finally got them, they had to be installed at Pearl Harbor. He continually asked for men. He demanded them so many times that some members of the Staff advised him that he was only boring the Department with it, because he usually got an answer back that the men were not available. He would ask for 20,000 men; 10,000 to fill vacancies in the Fleet, and 10,000 for more training, because he knew that men had to be sent back for new construction, and the answer he invariably got was that, "The men are not available. They are needed in the Atlantic." In fact, a few days after Pearl Harbor, we received an official letter stating, "I know that you would like to have 20,000 men, and we would like to give them to you." As I remember the exact wording: "The war is in the Atlantic and we here in Washington think you are sitting pretty in the Pacific." That letter was actually received a few days after Pearl Harbor, although written before, of course.

Note: The examining officer identified the letter mentioned by the witness as being one in the form of a personal letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation to Admiral H. E. Kimmel, dated 25 November 1941, file No. FF12/MM(55), and copy is now on file in the Secret—Confidential File Room of the Bureau of Personnel, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

A. (Continued.) The letters from the Chief of Naval Operations were usually personal letters, but they were along the same line, such as, "I have seen the President and I am sorry but he will not give you any more men." And while talking along that line, I might say that in—I think it was towards the end of May, 1941, while at sea, we issued orders by calling destroyers alongside, and detached the YORKTOWN; Battleship Division Three, which was then the strongest division of the Fleet; Cruiser Division Eight, of four modern cruisers; and, I believe, two squadrons of destroyers, which sailed under sealed orders, went through the Panama Canal and into the Atlantic. Those ships were all returned after war was declared, and they were equipped with all of the modern devices that we had tried to get for them while they were in the Pacific Fleet.

45. Q. What was the result, in your opinion, of these personnel and materiel shortages on the training program—the efficiency of the training program of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I think it did not lower the efficiency of the Pacific Fleet. As a matter of fact, the complements had just been revised and I have always felt that they were unnecessarily large. The Fleet was adequately manned, and I considered the ships very efficient and the efficiency of the Fleet was not harmed by this; but, the Commander-in-Chief was looking into the future when he would have to send these men home for new construction.

46. Q. Did that condition ever develop, prior to the 7th of December, whereby the Fleet was reduced due to transfers to new construction?

A. No, it did not; not below the level necessary.

47. Q. Did any of these matters affect the maintenance of the Fleet and the efficient condition of maintenance of materiel?

[39] A. No. Units of the Fleet were sent to the Coast shortly before Admiral Kimmel assumed his duties of Commander-in-Chief, for degaussing and the installation of armor—what do you call it—splinter armor around the decks and anti-aircraft guns. We had a plan mapped out approximately a year in advance for the overhaul of ships when they needed docking and repairs, and that was continued and was in effect when the attack was made on Pearl Harbor. The materiel condition of the Fleet was all right. It was satisfactory to the Commander-in-Chief.

48. Q. Were you able to keep abreast of the program of alterations as laid down by the materiel bureaus of the Navy Department?

A. Yes, sir; pretty well.

49. Q. Did it interfere with the operations and training of the Fleet to carry out this program?

A. No, it did not.

50. Q. Did these conditions such as you have outlined have any adverse effect on the morale and health of the personnel of the Fleet?

A. As far as morale and health of the personnel of the Fleet is concerned, remember that the Fleet went out there in April of 1940, with the idea of carrying on a six-weeks Fleet problem, and was held out there indefinitely. The morale of the Fleet did not suffer. In the summer of 1941, we arranged a schedule whereby small task forces of one or two battleships, cruisers, and destroyers would proceed to the coast of California and remain there for a period of approximately ten days, and return. The force was never large enough to weaken the Fleet, and this step was not taken until at a conference with his Flag Officers, the Commander-in-Chief discussed the question and it was decided by all that it would be a very good thing for the Fleet to keep some of them constantly going back to the coast. About this time, we had completed a stadium which seated about 5,000 men. That took care of the morale of the men pretty well. There may have been a question in the minds of the Flag Officers, and some Captains, as to why they were being kept out there—I had heard discussions of that, unofficially—knowing that part of the Fleet had been moved to the Atlantic Coast. A great many felt that the Administration was keeping them out there unnecessarily since there was no danger of war in the Pacific. The movement of part of the Fleet to the Atlantic Coast undoubtedly had some effect on the minds of the personnel in the Fleet. The health of the officers and men of the Fleet was never impaired by remaining in Pearl Harbor, in fact, it was excellent.

51. Q. Did the fact that the Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor, rather than on the mainland, affect the materiel conditions and the materiel readiness of the Fleet?

A. No, it did not.

52. Q. For war?

A. No, it did not. I might add to that last statement, that he often discussed the question of the condition of the Fleet, and we felt that it was better out there than when it had been based on San Pedro, and I remember the Commander-in-Chief making the statement that we had been wrong by basing our ships at San Pedro and going out for

the day and shooting, that he found the best thing was for them to take them out for a week and keep them going day and night.

[40] 53. Q. Within your knowledge, did Kimmel ever make any definite recommendations that the custom of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor should be changed—during 1941, I am speaking of—and returning to the old way of basing on the California Coast?

A. To my absolute knowledge, he never made such a recommendation by letter or dispatch. In July, I think, 1941, he made a trip to Washington. He was accompanied only by Captain McMorris. If he ever made any such recommendation, it might have been done at that time, but I think I should have heard about it. I never heard him say to me or any member of his Staff, that the Fleet should return to the Coast, although he knew that his predecessor had recommended it.

54. Q. Referring to your statement about feeling within the command which was promoted by the transfer of certain powerful units to the Atlantic Coast, do you think that the mental attitude of the various senior officers in the Fleet was in any way adversely affected by the long maintenance of the position in Hawaii?

A. No, I do not. By that statement, I meant that the danger of immediate outbreak of war might have been more evident to them had the units of the Fleet not been taken away. There was no dissatisfaction or loss of morale.

55. Q. Then, I understand you to mean that, in your opinion, the general war-mindedness of the personnel of the Fleet was improved by its retention in Hawaii?

A. Yes, sir, I think it was. You see, in the early part of our stay out there, the entire Fleet was anchored at Lahaina Roads, with all lights on. I think the Fleet did get war-minded, because they began moving into Pearl Harbor, and even moved the carriers in—moved everything in, and, of course, invariably operated without lights.

56. Q. Admiral, you have stated that when you assumed the duties of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, you made a survey of the Army's ability to defend Pearl Harbor. Please state any knowledge you have of subsequent improvements in the situation in that respect, if any?

A. The situation was considerably improved after the arrival of General Short. He had modern planes out there, modern fighters, before the war broke, P-40's, some Flying Fortresses, and I have traveled across the Island and seen the fighters staked out. When the attack came on Pearl Harbor, after the warnings they had, the Army had assumed, as perhaps they had been trained to, that if there was to be an attack, there would be sabotage, and they feared sabotage more than an attack, and brought them all in the hangars, and that is why they were all burned up.

57. Q. Was Admiral Kimmel familiar with the state of personnel and matériel readiness of the Army to carry out its commitments as to the defense of Pearl Harbor, just prior to the Japanese attack?

A. Yes. He had a shock, though, in the week preceding Pearl Harbor, when we had orders from the Navy Department, and General Short had orders from the War Department, to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all the Marines off of the outlying islands, and all the Marine and Navy planes in the outlying islands, and replacing them

with soldiers and with Army planes, and, as I remember it, practically the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent with the two Staffs together. The Army was undecided whether to put P-39's or P-40's on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake would remain there for the duration, in case of war, because they [41] would have to take off from a carrier and could not come back, and we had no means of putting a ship in there to bring them off, and during the discussion of this, with General Short and his staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force (General Martin) and Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson Brown, the War Plans Officer, the Operations Officers, and I believe Admiral Bloch. Admiral Kimmel said, "What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" And General Martin replied, "We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles off shore." That was a shock to all of us, and Admiral Kimmel's reply was, "Then, they will be no damn good to me." The exchange was never made because the war broke beforehand. The only dispute between the Army and Navy over that exchange was that General Short said, "If I have to man these islands, I shall have to command them." Admiral Kimmel replied, "No, that won't do. If the Army commanded one of the islands, I wouldn't be able to get a ship into one of the ports", or words to that effect, and General Short said, "Mind you, I do not want to man these islands, I think they are better manned by Marines, but if I man them, I must command them." That was as near to a dispute between General Short and Admiral Kimmel as I ever saw, but the plan was made and submitted but never carried out.

58. Q. This was a definite order issued by the two Departments?

A. Yes, sir; by dispatch.

59. Q. About what date?

A. To the best of my recollection, about seven days before Pearl Harbor.

60. Q. What was to be done with the Marines and the Marine planes?

A. That we did not know. We wondered why—whether they were needed elsewhere. We thought perhaps that it was planned to prepare an expedition force and the Marines were needed elsewhere. No member of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff knew why that was done, and we still don't understand why it was not carried out, or what they had in mind—what the Department had in mind at the time.

61. Q. Had the Army situation with respect to anti-aircraft artillery been bettered?

A. Not to my knowledge, no.

62. Q. Did they have facilities for obtaining early information of the arrival of enemy forces by water or air?

A. The Army?

63. Q. The Army.

A. No. The Army had just built a radar station, but it was not in operation. They had a Naval officer named Taylor, a Reserve, who had had considerable experience in England, and he was assigned to the Army with the idea of teaching them how to operate the radar, but it was not in full operation, and of course the radar of the ships was no good because they couldn't go through the hills surrounding Pearl Harbor.

64. Q. The fact that the Army radar station was not functioning was known to Admiral Kimmel, was it not?

A. Yes. It had just been completed and was not ready for operation. It had been on that morning of 7 December but he hadn't known it.

[42] 65. Q. Were you familiar with the local defense forces available to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to execute his functions in connection with the security of Pearl Harbor?

A. I was, at the time. I doubt if I could quote them now, however.

66. Q. Was Admiral Kimmel also familiar with this situation?

A. Yes.

67. Q. Was it your belief that the Army and Navy, operating through the local defense forces, were capable of furnishing complete defense of the Pearl Harbor base against air attack?

A. We thought so at the time. I realize now, we were not.

68. Q. Were you familiar with the plans for reconnaissance and inshore-off-shore patrol then in effect?

A. Yes.

69. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel take any action, to your knowledge, to augment the forces of the Army and the Fourteenth Naval District prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, at any time, in order to enable them to carry out their defense functions?

A. He continually asked for more Navy planes. What recommendations he made for the Army, I don't recall, or what recommendations General Short made, but I know that they conferred on it very frequently. I don't believe that Admiral Kimmel made recommendations for building up the Army—General Short would make those recommendations to the War Department.

70. Q. Did he augment the local forces with any aircraft or vessels of the Fleet, to your knowledge, for defense purposes?

A. Well, he had a destroyer off-shore patrol that was built up, and, as I say, the operating forces were always protected by air coverage against submarines. We were very submarine-conscious and one reason for that was that we had several sound contacts—perhaps all of them were false. On one occasion, which was in the month of February, before Admiral Kimmel had been in command a month, we had a contact by two destroyers south of Diamond Head, and it moved slowly so that they had it for 36 hours. It occurred again a month later. We never found exactly what it was, but we had officers go over to the Bishop Museum to learn all they could about the waters around Honolulu, and came to the conclusion that it was two different water levels, or water temperatures. The destroyers had claimed that they had heard propeller noises. At one time, Admiral Kimmel, about 6 o'clock in the morning, told me to issue orders to Admiral Draemel to bomb this thing, depth charge it. Before the order went out, however, he cancelled it, and reported the fact to the Chief of Naval Operations, saying that he had no authority to do this, except within the three-mile limit around Pearl Harbor, and the reply he got was "Thank God you didn't. It might have caused international difficulties," or words to that effect. So, we had so many of these contacts, probably all of them false, that we were submarine-conscious more than air-conscious, and I think every one in the Fleet expected if an attack came, it would be by submarines

rather than aircraft. You will notice that that order covers both air and submarine attack, but I believe that the people of the Fleet felt little danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

71. Q. Was this off-shore patrol maintained at all times, or intermittently?

[43] A. At all times.

72. Q. What belt around Oahu did it cover, in distances?

A. The area south of Pearl Harbor. Occasionally we had destroyers go around the Island at night, but our destroyers at that time were not equipped with radar, they were equipped with sound. There was not a constant patrol around the Island, we didn't have enough destroyers for that purpose, but there was a constant patrol in the operating area south of Pearl Harbor.

73. Q. Do you know if any other patrol, either air or destroyer, was maintained by either the Army or the Navy?

A. To the best of my knowledge, there was no patrol maintained by the Army. The patrol maintained by the Navy was as extensive as Commander PatWing Two felt he could make it. He claimed that he did not have enough planes to maintain a patrol, daily patrol, in all directions from Oahu, and for that reason the air patrol was confined to the operating areas—the regular patrol.

74. Q. Do you know whether the statement or views of Commander PatWing Two were based upon the fact that a continuous air patrol would fatigue personnel and wear out matériel, or was he referring to his inability to make such a patrol over short periods of time?

A. Based entirely on matériel.

75. Q. Long-range, every day?

A. Yes. The planes wouldn't stand it.

76. Q. Then the only two types of normal patrol maintained, say, a month before Pearl Harbor, that you know of, were destroyers off-shore, and the air patrol covering the operating areas?

A. Well, we had a Patrol Wing at Midway, of course, and they very frequently patrolled back and forth, going by way of Johnston's Island; and of course we had planes on Wake, but there was no patrol such as we use today, the long-range, daily patrol.

77. Q. Would you please explain what action was taken by the Task Forces while at sea to obtain information of important enemy movements in the close vicinity of Pearl Harbor?

A. When the Task Forces were engaged in operations, they were blacked out at night. They had destroyer protection. There was no long-range search, however, made by the carriers with planes, against an enemy.

78. Q. They were not, then, considered as a part of the reconnaissance facilities for the defense or security of Pearl Harbor?

A. Not until the week preceding Pearl Harbor, when Admiral Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, was given instructions by Admiral Kimmel not to return with the Task Force but to take 18 Marine fighters out to within 200 miles of Wake and fly them off, because the Commander-in-Chief was not satisfied with the defenses of Wake, and of course it was for that reason that the ENTERPRISE was not lost, because she was due to be in the port, where the UTAH was tied up, during the attack. Before he left, Admiral Halsey said "This is a very secret movement. What shall I do in case I meet

Japanese forces?" And Admiral Kimmel said "In that case, use your own discretion." And Admiral Halsey replied "Those are the best orders I have ever received, and to keep my movements secret, if I find even a Japanese sampan, I will sink it." So that trip I believe Admiral Halsey had an air search out all the time, in fact, I know he did.

[14] 79. Q. Under the Army-Navy agreement, responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack, bombardment from ships, and landing forces, of course is all Army responsibility. Are you sure that you have conveyed to us all steps known to have been taken to ascertain the Army's readiness to meet their commitments on Oahu?

A. Yes, sir.

80. Q. About how many Army pursuit planes did you understand to be available on Oahu?

A. Something in the vicinity of a hundred, I should say.

81. Q. What do you know about their combat efficiency, particularly as regards personnel?

A. Well, we didn't have a very high regard for it. That was based upon our observations during Fleet Operations, when their Flying Fortresses would come over at almost smoke-stack level, and showed an utter disregard for possible anti-aircraft fire. In the operations between our planes and theirs, our aviators, possibly prejudiced, expressed the opinion that they were not very good.

82. Q. Now, you are talking about the Army bombers, or the Army pursuits?

A. Both.

83. Q. Insofar as you did give thought to the possibility of a Japanese air raid, what did you consider the most effective defense against it?

A. The most efficacious defense against it, we felt, was from our own carrier planes, and when the attack occurred, our carriers were all at sea.

84. Q. Do you say that because of the doubt you had of the efficiency of Army aircraft?

A. That is part of it, yes, sir. I may be unjust to the Army in that. It may have been prejudice on the part of Navy fliers, but the opinions expressed by our aviators, as I saw, were not very complimentary to the Army fliers.

85. Q. You also knew that as against a Japanese carrier raid, the Army radar could not be depended upon to give warning?

A. Yes, sir.

86. Q. Then, if you realized the danger of such an air raid, which events proved was not only possible but probable, you would have seen that outside of anti-aircraft gunfire, there was no security to our installations in Pearl Harbor, including the Fleet,—is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

87. Q. Do you recall the Fleet Aviation Officer having given any opinions or advice on the matter?

A. No, sir; I do not recall that he ever did.

88. Q. Admiral, you were familiar with the basic War Plans in effect in the months leading up to Pearl Harbor, were you not?

A. Yes.

89. Q. Were you familiar with the missions assigned therein to the United States Pacific Fleet?

[45] A. I do not recall what the detailed mission of the Pacific Fleet was, except that we had no orders what to do in case of war, or where to go.

90. Q. Do you recall whether the tasks assigned the United States Pacific Fleet were offensive or defensive, in their nature?

A. My recollection is—they were defensive.

91. Q. Do you recall whether they called for any contemplated movement to the westward?

A. I am positive they did not. I am now thoroughly familiar with the War Plans, but I know that the Fleet had no orders or plans to move to the far westward, such as to relieve the U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

The witness was directed to refresh his memory on the point in question, and be prepared to answer in more detail later.

The reporter withdrew and Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

92. Q. Admiral, what intelligence organizations were available to the Commander-in-Chief to give him enemy intelligence, with respect to the Japanese particularly?

A. There was the intelligence organization of the Fourteenth District, and there was the intelligence officer. The Fleet Intelligence officer and his assistant, a Lieutenant Hudson, were both Japanese-language-speaking officers. Just what intelligence they got from the Army, I do not recall. We had our dispatches, of course, from the Department and radio intelligence. The Fleet Intelligence officer believed he knew where all units of the Japanese Fleet were and would report them from day to day. Of course, it turned out he was wrong.

93. Q. The Commander-in-Chief then was given the intelligence information available in the Combat Intelligence Office of the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. Oh, yes.

94. Q. Were you also acquainted with such information?

A. Yes, every morning the Fleet Intelligence officer came to the Commander-in-Chief about nine o'clock in the morning, after the Commander-in-Chief had read the morning dispatches, and gave him the latest information. I was always present when he did.

95. Q. Did the Office of Naval Intelligence provide the Commander-in-Chief with periodic information as to Japanese current movements?

A. I can recall only their pamphlets, stuff that they regularly put out. I don't recall any dispatches from Naval Intelligence.

96. Q. Are you familiar with their fortnightly summaries that they provide to the senior command afloat?

A. Yes.

97. Q. What information was furnished concerning Japanese naval leaders?

A. The best information that we received on Japanese naval leaders came through Commander McCrea on his return from a mission to the Commander-in- [46] Chief Asiatic. That was a week before Admiral Kimmel took over and gave Admiral Hart's estimate of each one of these Japanese naval leaders and was the best estimate we ever received. I can not recall that we ever received one from Naval Intelligence or from the Navy Department.

98. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel receive this information from Commander McCrea?

A. Yes, he and Admiral Richardson, Captain McMorris, the War Plans officer, and I were together on the PENNSYLVANIA in the Commander-in-Chief's cabin when McCrea came through and we had an all afternoon conference. McCrea read out from this little book that he carried these comments. They were copied down and put in the secret file.

99. Q. Did his information include information concerning Japanese Admiral Yamamoto?

A. Very much so; yes. As I recall the comment on him, he was efficient and bold, a poker player, and dangerous. I may have those words wrong but that's the impression I got at the time.

100. Q. During 1941, was Admiral Kimmel informed as to the duties being performed by Admiral Yamamoto in the Japanese Navy, as to his position?

A. I'm quite certain; yes.

101. Q. The Commander-in-Chief was in touch with anything vital in the way of local intelligence obtained in Hawaii, was he not?

A. Yes, sir, except that we did not have access to the files of the cable office. The Fleet Intelligence Officer had made some effort to get these files. My recollection, it was taken to Mr. Mackey of the Postal Telegraph, being contrary to the United States law to divulge a telegraph or cable message. At that time, there were certain Japanese codes which we could break and the intelligence officer felt that if he could get those messages he might learn what was going on. We didn't get them until three days after Pearl Harbor. We never got anything from that before the war.

102. Q. Do you know anything of an attempt having been made to arrest or otherwise segregate suspected Japanese agents?

A. I remember an incident a few months before the war where an American came from San Francisco; he had communicated with the Fleet Intelligence Officer before doing so. He was in the employ of the Japanese and was sent out by the Japanese, by plane. The intelligence officer made contact with him by placing an officer in yeoman's clothes, and we removed from the files two or three papers, mostly on the results of target practice, and gave them to this American who flew back to the West Coast and, as the result of all this, a Japanese Lieutenant Commander and a Japanese servant, I believe a Charlie Chaplin, were arrested. No action was taken. The State Department intervened and the Japanese Lieutenant Commander was returned to Japan. What happened to the Japanese servant, I don't recall, but we knew that the money had come from the Japanese Embassy. We did not know of the activities of Japanese agents in Hawaii, although it had been developed years before that some of the priests were ex-Army officers. I was informed by Captain Kilpatrick, who had been a previous Intelligence officer, that an effort was made to deport one of these priests, but it was found nothing could be done because of an old agreement between the United States and Japan, based upon our missionary activities of the past, that once a man in the religious status arrived in the country, if he chose to undertake other activities, nothing could be done about [47] it. I know that Admiral Bloch knew of that case. In the summer of 1940, when

Admiral Richardson had the Fleet, we were ordered to rendezvous the entire Fleet one afternoon well off shore and a course was set toward San Pedro. I believe that no one beyond the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief knew why we were out. We changed course after dark and stayed at sea for a week or more, preserving radio silence, and engaged in no real tactical operations. What this was all about, I have never learned. But on our return to port, I learned, through Admiral Bloch, that there had been a great deal of activity on the part of Japanese communication between Oahu and the Island of Hawaii, trying to learn the whereabouts of our Fleet. We knew there were Japanese agents working but, to the best of my knowledge, the Fleet Intelligence Officer and the Commander-in-Chief did not know who these Japanese agents were. We suspected all of them.

103. Q. Then you do not recall a discussion between the Army and Navy at Oahu concerning the rather wholesale arrests or segregation of some agents?

A. No, sir, I do not. I believe that the Army did have certain Japanese spotted with the idea of taking them in, in case of war, but I did not take any active part in discussions of that.

104. Q. Other than daily reports by Layton, in which he considered that he knew the location of all important Japanese naval units, do you recall receiving any other similar intelligence during the last few weeks of 1941?

A. We had frequent dispatches on the course of events from the Navy Department. The last of which I believe was the 27th of November. No, sir, all that I received was through the Fleet Intelligence Office.

105. Q. On or about 1 December '41, where do you recall that information to have indicated the important Japanese naval units to be?

A. I can not recall that in detail. One Fleet was supposed to be at Truk, and, to the best of my recollection, the main part of the Japanese Fleet was supposed to be in Empire waters.

106. Q. What about the carriers?

A. We had no knowledge of those; no. The Fleet Intelligence Officer said that he did not know where they were.

107. Q. Do you recall any difference of opinion between the radio intelligence units of the Fourteenth District and Cavite concerning the location of enemy carriers?

A. No, sir, I do not.

108. Q. Admiral, you have referred to certain dispatches received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Navy Department with relation to the international situation in the Pacific. I have here Exhibit 6 before this examination, dispatch of 16 October 1941, addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic Fleets, which I will give to you and ask whether you are familiar with that dispatch?

A. Yes, sir, I remember it.

109. Q. This dispatch was received by the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Yes, sir.

110. Q. It is noted that this dispatch refers to the grave international situation and indicates possible action, aggressive action, on the part of [48] the Japanese. Do you recall whether the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff made any estimate of the situation in the Pacific in the light of the contents of this dispatch?

A. To the best of my recollection, no specific change of plan was made because we had received warnings constantly—I should say weekly—for a period of more than a year; warnings long before the Commander-in-Chief ever took over, or Admiral Kimmel ever took over. These were in the form of letters, usually from the Chief of Naval Operations, who frequently wound up his letters by saying “It may happen tomorrow.” So that the Fleet had been pretty much on the alert from the time it got out there. I don’t recall that anything was done particularly about that dispatch; the 16th.

111. Q. The dispatch also provides that the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet inform appropriate Army and Navy District authorities. Do you know that this was done?

A. Yes. I may get that mixed up with a later dispatch. Frequently, those dispatches of that nature were taken over by the Fleet Intelligence Officer in person to General Short and Admiral Bloch was always asked to come over and read them in the Commander-in-Chief’s office. In a later dispatch, General Short was sent for; a dispatch of that nature which I think was dated the 27th of November. There were so many of those that I may confuse one with the other.

112. Q. We’ll get to the others shortly and you may have some comment on them in general. Now I’d like you to confine your testimony about what you know about the individual ones. Do you know whether or not any discussion of the meaning and the possible repercussions which might follow, meaning of the contents of this dispatch, were discussed by the Commander-in-Chief with General Short or with Admiral Bloch or both?

A. I can not recall in this specific case, but I believe that every one of the messages of that nature were discussed by General Short, Kimmel, and Admiral Bloch.

113. Q. What was the nature of such discussions?

A. Well, usually we would call in members of the Staff and, as I said before, Admiral Pye, if in port, and would exchange ideas and information on it.

114. Q. Did these discussions include coordinated efforts to resist any attempt by the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor?

A. Frankly, I do not believe that the Commanding General or Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel expected an attack upon Pearl Harbor, except by submarine.

115. Q. Was there any discussion as to the availability of the proper means on the part of any of the Services to carry out its functions in protecting Pearl Harbor in the light of the warning?

A. The warning was not made that Pearl Harbor would be attacked. The warning indicated that the attack would go elsewhere. We never received a warning about an attack on Pearl Harbor.

116. Q. Was there any contemplation by any of the parties that conferred of an attack on Hawaii by air, any time that you recall?

[49] A. No, I do not, except, as I stated before, the ships were so berthed that they had a clear arc of fire for anti-aircraft guns in all four sectors, and that when a task force came in, the senior officer of a sector invariably reported that he had taken over command of that sector. I believe that’s laid out in that October 15 letter.

117. Q. Do you ever recall that General Short asked for any assistance from Admiral Kimmel in providing for the defense of Pearl Harbor should it be attacked by air?

A. No.

118. Q. Do you ever recall Admiral Bloch asking for assistance from the Fleet carrying out the functions assigned him by the security letter, Exhibit 4?

A. No, never.

119. Q. This dispatch, Exhibit 6, further provides that the Commanders-in-Chief addressed, including Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, should take precautions, including preparatory deployment as will not constitute strategic intention or constitute provocative action against Japan. Do you recall the action taken by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in response to this directive?

A. My recollection is that in each one of those cases, including the one you mentioned, his alert was sent to the forces in the operating areas and, on those occasions, the training exercises were halted and the ships assembled with their destroyer screen and placed, until further orders, as a Fleet and still kept at sea. The ships in port, however, were not moved out. Conditions of readiness were prescribed for ships in port.

120. Q. You speak of the task forces being alerted. Do you mean that a prescribed state of readiness was designated?

A. I believe the October 14 letter told what to do. The message was sent out: Task force operating at sea. Dispatch striking unit. Make appropriate defense disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea. Dispatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Defense Officer and Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

121. Q. It is your belief then that after receipt of this dispatch of October 15 and its further promulgation to the forces afloat, that the action—preparations were made to take the action contemplated by the security letter?

A. On several occasions that was done.

122. Q. Was this concentrating of ships intended as a protective measure for the task force or for offensive action, or as a protection to the base?

A. Not for the protection of the base. For the protection of the heavy ships in the task force and to organize a striking force if the enemy were sighted. There was no idea of protecting the base with the Fleet.

123. Q. Are you familiar with any movements of forces other than those incidentally at sea which resulted from action taken as a result of this dispatch, Exhibit 6?

A. That's not quite clear.

[50] 124. Q. Are you familiar with any other deployment made or movement of ships or aircraft or personnel in compliance with the directive contained in this dispatch, other than the concentration of task forces incidentally at sea?

A. No, I'm not.

125. Q. I show you here a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chiefs of the Asiatic, Pacific Fleet, and certain Naval District Commandants, Exhibit 7 for this examination. Are you familiar with that document?

A. I recall it vaguely. It does not stand out in my memory. As I say, it was one of several. I may confuse one with the other, but I notice that it speaks of attack on the Philippines or Guam.

126. Q. Do you know whether this dispatch was received by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I do not swear to it; no.

127. Q. I have here Exhibit 8 before this examination which is a dispatch addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chiefs of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets for action. Are you familiar with that dispatch?

A. Very much. This is the one that I remember above all others. This was received somewhere in midafternoon of the 27th of November. General Short was immediately sent for and the conference was held and by six o'clock that evening the Army was on the march. Unfortunately, what they did was to station men at the public utilities, the reservoirs, the bridges—in other words, they alerted against sabotage; sabotage because it was the consensus from this dispatch that the attack would, as it states, be against the Philippines or Thai or Kra Peninsula, possibly Borneo. What was considered most likely by the Navy was a submarine attack on our forces at sea and, by the Army, sabotage from the enormous Japanese population in the Islands. At that time, we had two of the three task forces at sea and one of these returned on the 5th of December, which placed two in port, 1 at sea, but the carrier of the task force returning on 5 December remained at sea to deliver planes to Wake.

128. Q. Admiral, at the conference with General Short, was this dispatch carefully considered by the assembled Army and Navy officers so as to determine its exact meaning, insofar as it could be determined?

A. I should say yes, certainly.

129. Q. Was the study made in the nature of an estimate of the situation?

A. No. But remember this is only one of a great many warnings.

130. Q. Were any decisions arrived at as to coordinated action to be taken with respect to the security or defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of this warning?

A. I think the question of the defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of that warning, was never raised except the danger of sabotage by the large Japanese population in the Islands. That's to the best of my recollection.

131. Q. Did the question of possible attack by air arise?

A. No.

[51] 132. Q. Was the Navy fully apprised at that time of the contemplated action of the Army; I mean the alert against sabotage only?

A. I was not. I don't believe the Commander-in-Chief was.

133. Q. Was the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District present at this conference?

A. Yes. He got there before General Short did.

134. Q. Were measures to be taken by his task force—that is the Commandant's Task Force—discussed?

A. I don't recall.

135. Q. Was any action taken in the light of this dispatch to augment the forces of either the Army or the Commandant of the Four-

teenth Naval District, so as to assist them in defense from air attack?

A. Not that I recall, although a squadron of B-17's took off from the Coast a few days later and actually arrived on the morning of Pearl Harbor. Whether that was instigated by the Commanding General or by the War Department, I do not know. They arrived with machine guns mounted and no ammunition, during the attack.

136. Q. Were the task force commanders at sea apprised of this warning?

A. Yes, they were apprised of all warnings received.

137. Q. Were they given any specific directives with respect to action to be taken by the task forces in the light of the warning?

A. Only that as laid down in the directive of 15th of October.

138. Q. Was any action taken to change the condition of readiness of the vessels at Pearl Harbor in the light of this warning?

A. It is very difficult for me to recall that because I get confused between that period and the period immediately afterwards when we shifted from Condition 1, 2, and 3 so frequently. I believe that we did before the war, but I may possibly be in error on it.

139. Q. You mean the condition of readiness of the ships in the Harbor were changed during that period?

A. Yes, they were frequently done for drill purposes also, before.

140. Q. But you do not know what condition of readiness was taken following the receipt—

A. (Interposing) No, I do not. It should be shown in the files, however, of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

141. Q. Admiral, you will note in the dispatch a directive concerning a deployment. State what you considered that directive to mean when you saw it.

A. It was impossible to keep the entire Fleet at sea at all times and had we put the entire Fleet at sea, everytime we got a warning, the Fleet would have been worn out. As it was, we were fueling our task forces at sea. As I remember the decision was made to take the precautions that we had for months laid down in case of one of these warnings, but to make no change in the disposition of the forces in port. As I say, at the time of this warning, two of the three task forces were at sea. It was at this time, however, that the Commander-in-Chief sent the ENTERPRISE task force to deliver planes to Wake and that Force was fully prepared to take offensive action against anything it might meet. There was no disposition made by the Fleet for the defense of Pearl Harbor, because I believe that no one on the Commander-in-Chief's Staff or his force believed that an air attack would be made on Pearl Harbor.

[52] 142. Q. Was what the dispatch says concerning a preparation for doing something else a consideration when it was decided not to change any movements?

A. We had sufficient forces at sea to do what the war plan called for.

143. Q. Do you recall what ships were returned to Pearl Harbor between the receipt of this dispatch and 7 December?

A. Yes, sir, the task force—I believe it was Admiral Pye's Task Force that returned on the 5th of December, two days before Pearl Harbor, with the battleships, cruisers, and destroyers; also part of Admiral Halsey's Task Force.

144. Q. Did that considerably increase the number of ships that were in the Harbor?

A. Very considerably. When that task force entered, Admiral Brown's Task Force departed, I think on the 4th of December, and that Task Force had no battleships in it. He had the LEXINGTON and some cruisers and destroyers in his Task Force. So the result was we had two of the task forces in port when this thing happened; two of the task forces, with the exception of the ENTERPRISE, Admiral Halsey—and accompanying light forces of Task Force Two.

145. Q. Then, in effect, rather than a deployment involving movement outward, there really was a movement of ships inward after the receipt of the war warning?

A. Yes, but not as a result of the war warning. This was our planned operations for the month. It may very well be that these plans were known to the Japanese and that they chose their time when we had scheduled two task forces in port. They were operating on schedule. It was not changed as a result of this.

146. Q. In other words, the operating schedule made and printed weeks previously was not departed from?

A. Yes, sir, that's correct, with the exception of the one outfit going to Wake.

147. Q. This particular dispatch (indicating Exhibit 8) is different from all other warnings received previously in that the words "War Warning" were used. What was your own reaction to those particular words?

A. My reaction was we knew that negotiations were still going on; Mr. Kurusu had flown through a few days before; we were in great doubt as to what was happening. Mr. Kurusu's plane broke down in Midway. Admiral Bellinger called up at night and asked permission to fly him on in a PBY, and I said, "No, it may be that the plane was told by the Administration to break down. They know more what's going on than we do. Let him stay there."

148. Q. Didn't that happen considerable time previously?

A. Not very long previously, to my recollection. Previous to this dispatch, yes.

149. Q. But this dispatch states that negotiations have ceased.

A. As a matter of fact, they had not ceased, Admiral.

150. Q. Then the use of the words "War Warning" did not impress you as requiring any increase in security precautions or any departure from the scheduled routine deployment?

A. No, sir, with the exception of the protection of ships at sea as laid down in our October 15 directive. They did not impress me that there would be an attack on Pearl Harbor.

[53] 151. Q. And in your recollection, all others with whom you were officially associated had reactions similar to yours?

A. Yes, sir.

152. Q. After the receipt of this dispatch, Admiral, is it not true that you realized that a greater part of the arc of approaches to the Pearl Harbor area were not covered by any air or surface forces to give information as to the approach of any possible enemy?

A. Yes, sir.

153. Q. Was this matter discussed at the conferences, either with the Army or by Admiral Kimmel?

A. The danger of ever having an attack on Pearl Harbor?

154. Q. The fact that so much of the arc was not covered by any means.

A. No, sir. That is the last warning that I recall, except that we got one about 5:30 p. m. on the 7th of December, through the Army. It had originated the day before and was sent by cable. It was delivered by General Short's Aide to us some ten hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

155. Q. I have here Exhibit 9 before this examination, Admiral, which is a dispatch transmitted by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commanders-in-Chief—to certain Frontier Commanders, with copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. It is dated November 28, 1941. Are you familiar with it?

A. I don't recall this message. I probably saw it at the time but I don't recall it. I note that it states that this WPL will not be placed in effect in the Pacific.

156. Q. Admiral, I have here a dispatch, Exhibit 11 before this examination, addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, and Commandants Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts, dated December 3, 1941. Are you familiar with that dispatch, sir?

A. Yes, I remember that.

157. Q. Upon seeing this, did you not consider that the steps being taken by the Japanese were extremely significant as point out future action?

A. I did.

158. Q. Did it leave much, if any, doubt in your mind that they were about to make a hostile move?

A. No. In fact, as I recall, we had, by that time, received word from the Asiatic Fleet that heavy Japanese movements were on the way to the southward. It did not occur to us, however, that the attack was coming in our direction.

159. Q. That is, your reaction was that the Japs were about to go to war with someone but it, in no way, conveyed to you any increased imminence of danger of an attack against Pearl Harbor?

A. No, sir. I believed, from previous warnings that we had had, that the attack was going to be possibly against the Philippines but toward the Malay Peninsula.

160. Q. And within your remembrance, was the reaction of the others with whom you were associated at Admiral Kimmel's Headquarters quite similar to your?

A. Yes, sir, it was.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:30 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., tomorrow.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, MARCH 9, 1944

FOURTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the third day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examination by the examining officer (Continued):

159. Q. Admiral, you testified that in the week or so prior to the attack on December 7 several conditions of readiness were prescribed. Do you know if these conditions were at any time prescribed by Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. My recollection is that the condition of readiness came from the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I do know that Admiral Kimmel had prescribed them as a drill. Whether he actually ordered it, I do not recall. However, all of this is a matter of record and can easily be ascertained from the files of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet or from the then Communications Officer, Captain Curtis, now in the Navy Department.

At this point, in order to introduce certain documents into the proceedings which were not until now available, for use in the further examination of this witness, the examining officer directed that the present witness withdraw and Commander Benjamin Katz be recalled.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Commander Benjamin Katz, U. S. Navy, was recalled as a witness by the examining officer and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Do you have in your custody a dispatch dated January 26, 1941, transmitted from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, reference office No. 270038?

A. I have that, sir.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned to the Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document [55] introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 12".

2. Q. Do you have in your possession the dispatch of November 26, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, office reference 270040?

A. I have that too, sir.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned to the Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 13".

3. Q. Do you have in your possession a dispatch dated November 28, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, office reference 282054?

A. Yes, sir, here it is.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned to the Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 14."

4. Q. Do you have in your possession a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, dated November 28, 1941, to the Chief of Naval Operations, office reference 280627?

A. I have that. Here it is.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned to the Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 15".

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, U. S. Navy, was recalled as a witness by the examining officer, who warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

(Examination by the examining officer continued:)

160. Q. Admiral, the Pacific Fleet confidential letter, No. 2CL-41 (Revised), which is Exhibit 4 before this examination, provides that the Commandant of the Fourteenth District, as the Naval Base Defense Officer, should advise the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain. Do you [56] interpret that directive to grant authority to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to order conditions of readiness?

A. Yes, I do. In my recollection, that was what was in effect at the time.

161. Q. Do you know what condition of readiness was in fact in effect just prior to the attack on the 7th of December?

A. I do not. It is impossible for me to remember details that long ago. However, the fact that the ammunition was readily obtainable and the guns were manned very promptly on the morning of 7 December, I believe that a condition of readiness had been prescribed.

162. Q. Where were you when the attack commenced?

A. I was at home. I believe I was one of the first notified. I was at breakfast at home in Honolulu when I received the telephone call saying, "This is not a drill." I proceeded immediately to Pearl Harbor in my own automobile.

163. Q. At about what time did you arrive at the Navy Yard in Pearl Harbor?

A. At about twenty minutes after eight.

164. Q. What was your observation as to the readiness and effectiveness of the batteries of the various ships in meeting the attack?

A. All ships seemed to be firing. The sky was full of bursts. I could see those long before I got down there. The ARIZONA had already been hit and was smoking. Not only the batteries were firing, but men and machine guns and rifles were all over the tops of buildings and out in the park and everybody was shooting.

165. Q. Did you receive a report of any contact with submarines on that morning, prior to the attack, on the part of naval vessels of the United States?

A. I did not. The report of the submarine was received by the Staff Duty Officer who was Commander Murphy, who delivered the message to Admiral Bloch, and, I believe, to Admiral Kimmel. My recollection is that Admiral Bloch informed the Secretary of Navy a few days after Pearl Harbor that he had received this message at 7:15. Talking to Captain Maddox, who was on board the ANTARES, the ANTARES had been about to enter Pearl Harbor and as she turned, the conning tower of the midget submarine broke the surface. He called this to the attention of the destroyer WARD who sank the submarine, and the WARD informed the signal tower, unfortunately by signal, that he had attacked a submarine at the entrance to Pearl Harbor. As Captain Maddox said at the time, he regretted that he had not put the thing out by radio in plain language telling everybody that it actually was a submarine and it actually had been sunk. You see, we had received so many false submarine reports before that time. I do not remember the exact wording of the signal sent through the signal tower, but I gathered from what Admiral Bloch told us later that he did not consider it as serious as it actually was. I'm quoting from a conversation between Admiral Bloch and the Secretary of Navy, a few days after Pearl Harbor, in the presence of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Pye and General Short and myself. But the first message I got was that Pearl Harbor was under attack. I received no message before that about the submarine. You must also realize the communications between Pearl Harbor and Honolulu were very poor. Efforts had been made for months to get more trunk lines through but it was sometimes very difficult to communicate between the two places. It was particularly difficult to communicate

with the Army. It had to go through several stations. The Fleet Communications Officer can give you more details of this than I can, but I do know it had been taken up months before, both by the Army and Navy, to improve these communications. [57] In fact, I was quite astounded that the message from the Fleet Office ashore in Pearl Harbor reached me as quickly as it did. I do not know whether any attempt had been made to inform me of the submarine attack, but if any attempt was made, I never received it.

166. Q. Do you recall the initials of the Commander Murphy who was the Staff Duty Officer?

A. V. R. Murphy, now head of the Post Graduate School at Annapolis.

167. Q. What consideration, if any, had been given by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet or the members of his Staff to the possibility of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor prior to any declaration of war?

A. I believe every consideration that was given is laid down in that directive that you have, dated the 14th of October (indicating Exhibit 4). There was no one, to my knowledge, on the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, or, from later inquiries I have made, in the Navy Department itself, who believed that there was danger of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor. As I have stated yesterday, it is provided for in our directive but in the minds of the people out there, it was not expected.

168. Q. As I understand the directive, that sets up the measures to be taken in the event of an air attack. What precautions were taken to get advance warning of an air attack?

A. We had no air patrol to the northward; we had submarines patrolling at Wake and Midway and had had them there for some time. I would say that on the morning of the 7th of December no special precautions were taken against air attack. The air patrol to the South of Oahu was being maintained.

169. Q. And upon what consideration was this decision that such a surprise attack was not considered a possibility based; why was the possibility of a surprise attack not considered and taken into consideration in formulating the security plans of the Fleet?

A. I believe that the attitude was very well stated by the War Plans Officer in his testimony before the Roberts Board when asked that question. I don't know whether it is a matter of record, but I was informed at the time his reply was: "I didn't believe they had the guts to try it, and if they had, they wouldn't get away with it." Unfortunately, I believe that was the attitude of most of us.

170. Q. Under the Navy's usual methods, everything of that sort is primarily based upon an estimate of the situation, is it not?

A. Yes, sir.

171. Q. Those estimates usually contain the courses of action open to the enemy; is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

172. Q. Do you recall any serious consideration in any estimate of the situation which was made of that particular course of action, which naturally was open to the enemy?

A. The estimate of the situation is laid down in the Pacific Fleet Contributory War Plan issued about the 1st of July, 1941, and it did not, to the best of my knowledge, consider that the Japs would make

an attack against Pearl Harbor. It contemplated their action against Malay and the Philippines, with raids on our outlying islands: Wake, Midway, Palmyra, Johnston. To the best of my knowledge, this estimate did not consider an air attack possibility against Pearl Harbor itself.

[58] 173. Q. Admiral, I show you a publication which is listed as "U. S. Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow 5". Do you recognize that?

A. I do. It was issued after receipt of the Basic War Plan, Rainbow 5, and was prepared by Captain—now Read Admiral McMorris and his Staff in the War Plans Division of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff. It was issued about July 1, 1941.

174. Q. Was it approved by Admiral Kimmel as the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Pacific Fleet?

A. It was approved and signed by Admiral Kimmel.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned to Registered Publications Section, Chief of Naval Operations Office, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 16".

175. Q. Admiral, are you familiar with the contents of this document which has just been introduced and identified as Exhibit 16 before this examination?

A. Yes.

176. Q. In your testimony of yesterday, with reference to the Basic War Plans, you made certain statements concerning the tasks assigned the U. S. Pacific Fleet. Since that time, through the use of this plan, have you recalled to your memory more specifically the provisions of the plans provided herein?

A. Yes, sir, there were a number of task forces, and the Task Forces 1, 2, and 3 stand out in my mind more than the others. Task Force 1 was the battle force under Admiral Pye. He then had six battleships and cruisers and destroyers, the exact number I do not remember. He was the supporting force. And striking Task Force 2, under Admiral Halsey, consisting of one division of battleships and one carrier, cruisers, and destroyers, was to make a raid on the Marshalls, supported by Task Force 1 of heavy ships. Task Force 3 under Admiral Wilson Brown, was composed of one carrier and some eight heavy cruisers, and destroyers, and that Task Force was scheduled to raid enemy commerce. All of this was in accordance with the basic plan. The basic plan also called for us to capture—to deny to the enemy the Marshalls and Carolines and to capture a fleet base in Truk. You will find that the Pacific Fleet Plan is divided into several phases, because obviously the capture of Truk was impossible. We had only one division of transports, then under intensive training at San Diego for amphibious operations; we had none in Pearl Harbor. We had only a few hundred Marines; we had no supply ships beyond those necessary to service the Fleet, and the outlying islands. In fact, we found it rather difficult to supply the outlying islands with what we had, so that we could not have possibly taken any of the Marshall Islands. We could raid them but we could not capture them. The plan called for the movement, as soon after declaration of war as possible, of the Second Marine Division from the California Coast to Hawaii. I might add also, the submarines were given the task of es-

tablishing patrols in enemy Empire waters, and in the Marshalls and Carolines. Their plans were all made and what to do, but we were continually warned not to take any action until Japan made a move which indicated opening of hostilities. We had not based our submarines in Japanese waters, but we had established a submarine patrol operating from Wake and from Midway.

177. Q. Admiral, confining the problem to the first phase, notably the intended raid to the westward, was readiness for that step to be made immediately after [59] the outbreak of hostilities very much in the picture around Admiral Kimmel's Headquarters and to such an extent that it amounted to a major preoccupation?

A. It was very much in the minds of Admiral Kimmel and of Admiral Halsey. In fact, Admiral Halsey was anxious to go.

178. Q. Did that preoccupation have any decided effect on the measures for security of the Fleet while in Pearl Harbor?

A. I believe that the question of the security of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was not seriously considered. The Fleet was ready to carry out its task at the outbreak of war. The question of an attack before negotiations were completed, in spite of the fact that the Japs had done it in previous wars, was not, in my opinion, seriously considered. There was a great deal of confusion in the minds of the entire Staff. They knew that Mr. Nomura and Mr. Kurusu were still in Washington, and perhaps we were too trustful.

179. Q. Referring to your testimony about qualities of Japanese naval leaders, did you not receive anything direct from the Navy Department and in addition to what Commander McCrea told you?

A. Not to my recollection; no, sir.

180. Q. In the minds of the various members of the Pacific Fleet Staff, do you remember much expression of opinion as to the relative efficiency of the Japanese navy prior to the outbreak of the war?

A. It was very much discussed at Staff conferences and it was brought out by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, as it had been brought to my attention years before through Commander Rochefort while on the Staff of Admiral Reeves in 1935, that we had very little knowledge as to the efficiency of the Japanese Navy, but it had spent a great deal of time at sea and we believed it was very efficient. We had a high regard for the Japanese Navy on the meager information obtainable, and we were informed by our intelligence officer that it was impossible to get any information on the Japanese Fleet since our ships were never near it. And when ships of our Navy visited a Japanese port, such as the ASTORIA did, about 1939, if they met units of the Japanese Fleet, those units were immediately surrounded by a smoke screen. All of our information on the Japanese Fleet was by radio intelligence only, meaning as to its location.

181. Q. Then you did not, in the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, tend to underestimate the Japanese, as we now know was the case in other circles?

A. Not at all. We did not underestimate them.

182. Q. Admiral, I gather from your testimony that you, yourself, were very much preoccupied with the day to day administrative duties of the position of Chief of Staff. Did you think at the time that you were being left insufficient time for thought on matters of greater import, particularly into the future?

A. I felt then, and still feel, that entirely too much of my time was taken up with administrative matters. I was warned to that effect by my predecessor, Admiral Taffinder. While still afloat, while the Commander-in-Chief was in the PENNSYLVANIA, there was time for deep thinking because it was possible to close the door and shut people out and there were intervals at sea when we had plenty of time for thought, but when the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff moved ashore, with the desk always full of papers and many times a day spending hours in conference with the Commander-in-Chief and as many members of his Staff as he had present, I found it difficult to keep the day by day routine going. And I found it almost impossible to give deep thought to future events. I did know, however, that we had four very competent officers in War Plans who were spending all of [60] their time on that and I attempted, so far as possible, to keep the pressure off of those officers because the pressure is high in a Staff organization on shore where the Chief of Staff has one very small office and people are constantly coming in and going out.

183. Q. Who, if anyone, was to blame for that situation in which you found yourself?

A. Possibly I was to blame myself. I had given instructions to the Flag Secretary as to the type of papers which were to be shown to me and many, many papers were not brought to me at all. I attempted to reduce that paper work, but the Commander-in-Chief, whose office was next to mine, rang my bell perhaps too frequently and kept me too long in the office. He knew that because I told him so. But he was a very energetic man, he worked long hours, and when something was on his mind he would always send for me and usually for several other members of the Staff. I believe now that we spent entirely too much time in those discussions.

184. Q. Do you blame anyone outside of the Fleet?

A. No, sir, I do not. The entire Navy system of paper work, as you know, is somewhat to blame, but it was not any more so in the Pacific Fleet than it was in the rest of the Navy organization.

185. Q. Do you think that the fact that you, yourself, spent most all of your time and energy on the day-to-day administrative matters left the Commander-in-Chief correspondingly free to give thought to matters of greater importance, particularly dealing with the future?

A. I tried to make it that way, and I believe he was more free. I know he was much more free than I to think of future events. The Commander-in-Chief's day did not end at the office; he considered these things far into the night in his quarters.

186. Q. Admiral, was the matter of the protection of the ships berthed in Pearl Harbor from torpedoes dropped from aircraft considered by the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff?

A. Yes, and by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. In the Summer of 1941, we had a communication in the form of an official letter from the Chief of Naval Operations asking whether we needed barrage balloons and torpedo nets for protecting berths. This letter was accompanied by a letter from the Bureau of Ordnance which stated definitely that torpedoes launched from aircraft could not be effective in a depth of water less than 75 feet. The question of the advisability of installing nets about the berths at Pearl Harbor was thoroughly discussed by the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Bloch,

Admiral Pye, and members of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff. The chart showed that we had practically no spots where the water was more than forty-six feet in depth. And I remember at that conference Admiral Bloch having stated that these nets would further reduce the maneuvering room in the waters of Pearl Harbor, and that if torpedoes were not effective in such shallow water, it would seem unnecessary to use torpedo nets. As a result of that conference, an official letter was signed by the Commander-in-Chief. I would not trust my memory to the extent of making a definite statement, but I believe that the letter to the Navy Department stating that we did not want torpedo nets was originated by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and that the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet put a concurring endorsement on it. At any rate, I know that we officially informed the Navy Department that we did not consider nets necessary. I believe the opinion expressed by the Bureau of [61] Ordnance was based, of course, on our own torpedo experience and we did not have the information on the Japanese torpedo.

187. Q. Admiral, I show you here several letters, a part of the Secret-Confidential Files of the Navy Department. Can you identify them?

A. I remember the letter from the Chief of Naval Operations on 15 February, 1941, very well. It is this letter I had in mind in my recent testimony. I do not recall ever having seen the second letter.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 17".

188. Q. Admiral, I show you a letter signed by Admiral Kimmel, on file in the Secret-Confidential Files in the Navy Department, dated March 12, 1941. Can you identify it?

A. Yes; it passed through my hands before it was signed by the Commander-in-Chief and this letter was written as a result of the conference to which I referred. I was under the impression that it was an endorsement on the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District's letter but I see it originated in the Office of the Commander-in-Chief. I do know, however, that Admiral Bloch was very much in the discussion before that decision was reached.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 18".

189. Q. Admiral, I show you a letter, now on file in the Secret-Confidential Files, Navy Department, dated June 13, 1941, addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the several Commandants of Naval Districts, and marked that a copy was furnished, among others, to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Can you identify that letter as anything you received?

A. I do not recall ever having seen that letter.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 19."

190. Q. Admiral, do you recall whether the decision of the Commander-in-Chief, as outlined in his letter of March 12, 1941, Exhibit 18, was at any subsequent time reconsidered by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. I'm positive it was never reconsidered. I believe that in the original discussion one of the factors that were stressed was that these old battleships of ours, all overweight and drawing much more water than they were designed to draw, were very difficult to handle at slow speeds, and that the argument advanced by Admiral Bloch was that these torpedo net baffles would restrict too [62] much the maneuvering room in Pearl Harbor in the vicinity of the berths. But the main reason for stating that they were not necessary was that impression carried by this CNO letter that torpedoes could not be expected to be effective in depths of less than 75 feet and that a depth of 150 feet was preferable.

191. Q. In discussing the possibility of providing torpedo baffles, was consideration given to the fact that in the channel that approaches Merry Point, there would probably be clear water for torpedoes to run a sufficient distance to arm themselves, thus making an approach by torpedo planes from that direction a distinct hazard to battleships moored along the south shore of Ford Island?

A. Yes, consideration was given to that, but it was not a question of whether there was sufficient water for the torpedo to arm itself but it was the 75 foot depth required which made us believe that the torpedo could not be launched in that water. I would like to bring out in this record an opinion that is very strong with me, that we are entirely too secretive about such things as torpedoes and that we do not give enough information to the Fleet itself. I have in mind a movement ordered in the early part of 1941 when a number of cruisers and destroyers were ordered to Samoa by the Chief of Naval Operations and they were to be prepared for distant service. The Commander-in-Chief, himself, did not know what this service would be. It turned out to be a cruise to Australia and New Zealand, but the destroyers were ordered to equip themselves with the Mark VI exploder. This dispatch was read by the Commander-in-Chief in my cabin and I asked him if he knew what the Mark VI exploder is. He did not. I told him that I suspected it was a magnetic head because such a magnetic head had been under experiment while I was manufacturing officer for torpedoes in Newport in 1928 and 9. I had never been able to get any information on whether this magnetic head had been a success. We sent for the Fleet Gunnery Officer, Captain Kitts, now Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, and asked him if he knew what the Mark VI exploder is and he replied that he did not, although he had been a gunnery man practically during his entire career. We returned to port and sent for Admiral Draemel, then commanding the Destroyers of Pacific Fleet. Neither Admiral Draemel nor his Staff had ever heard of the magnetic head. The exploders were in store at the Submarine Base at Pearl Harbor and the submarine people were the only ones who had any knowledge in the Fleet. Now if all of our torpedo information is kept as secret as the Mark VI exploder was kept, then I can understand why we

didn't know at what height or depth of water a torpedo could be launched from an airplane. I bring that out in my testimony in the hope that in the future things will not be kept so secret.

192. Q. Admiral, was the use of barrage balloons, which happens to have been considered along with the baffles, abandoned for the same reason that you didn't feel that torpedoes could run?

A. Yes, that is my recollection.

193. Q. Admiral, in your testimony yesterday you made reference to the proposed relieving of certain Marine units in the outlying islands by the Army. I now show you a dispatch which has been identified as Exhibit 12 before this examination. Can you identify it in connection with your testimony?

A. Yes, that is the message I had in mind in my testimony yesterday. I don't know the exact date, but I stated at the time I believe it was received in the week preceding Pearl Harbor.

[63] 194. Q. Similarly, I show you Exhibit 13 before this examination.

A. The Army received a message similar to that (indicating previous Exhibit 12). Yes, I remember also that the Army had no guns to put on the islands. It was agreed that we would leave our guns there.

195. Q. Can you identify Exhibit 15 before this examination?

A. Yes, I remember that dispatch which was prepared as a result of the conference we had with the Army. You will note that it questions the usefulness of Army airplanes since they cannot operate more than twenty miles off shore, and it answers the question of whether Army bombs can be used in Navy planes, or Navy bombs in Army planes. That had already been remedied. And it also makes that statement, as of 26 November, that Marine fighters were being sent to Wake. This was the special trip that the ENTERPRISE made.

196. Q. Similarly, I show you Exhibit 14. Can you identify that, sir, as a dispatch under consideration by the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Yes, I have a recollection of that dispatch, and the SARATOGA was in San Diego at the time, I believe.

197. Q. Admiral, it is noted that the first two dispatches, by exhibit numbers 12 and 13, were transmitted by the Navy Department on the 26th of November, 1941, and that the Commander-in-Chief replied to these dispatches on November 28, 1941. It is also observed that the war warning dispatch was dated November 27, or the day intervening. Would you please explain to us the consideration given by the Commander-in-Chief to this problem in connection with the war warning problem, and give particular reference to the bearing of this problem, presented by this series of exhibits, on the actions and thoughts of the Commander-in-Chief as it related to his decisions with respect to the war warning?

A. I don't believe that the dispatch concerning the outlying islands was considered related to the war warning. We had the impression that Marines were needed elsewhere. Also it is my recollection that the discussion didn't end with the dispatch sent by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on the 28th of November, but it lasted several days as plans were being made. I have always felt that the question being given such full consideration by the combined Staffs of the Army and the Navy was diverting at a time when we should have been thinking about other things.

198. Q. Then you think that it amounted to a decided mental preoccupation on the part of the highest Army and Navy officers in Hawaii?

A. I certainly do.

199. Q. Referring to your previous testimony concerning personnel of the Pacific Fleet, was the Fleet being hampered and administrative difficulties and work increased by repeated directives to transfer personnel elsewhere?

A. We had, for years, before us this problem of repeated transfers of personnel, and most officers complained of it, but the plan of new construction was known and, in my opinion, the efficiency of the Fleet didn't suffer from too frequent changes of personnel.

200. Q. Admiral, was the lack of mental apprehension of a carrier raid based upon preoccupation incident to what would be required of the Fleet in the way of an offensive movement at the beginning of a war?

A. No.

[64] 201. Q. Was that same lack of apprehension in any degree incident to the administrative difficulties facing the Fleet which were caused by long-time basing at Pearl Harbor?

A. In my opinion, no.

202. Q. Was it due to a lack of warning of possible surprise attack from the Navy Department; lack of warning from the Navy Department?

A. I think very possibly, yes. This and the fact that all of our warnings mentioned attacks in the Far East probably resulted in a state of mind where we did not believe that we would be subjected to an air attack at Pearl Harbor. We did expect a submarine attack. I believe you will find that the mental attitude of every one, practically every one out there, was such that they did not expect an air raid on Pearl Harbor, although plans were made to meet one, as I have said, by the stationing of ships and conditions of readiness.

203. Q. You've mentioned in previous testimony warnings of surprise hostile action somewhere having been received over a long period of time prior to 7 December. Do you think that so many of those warnings had been received that it was something of the nature of too much crying "wolf"?

A. I most certainly do, because those warnings had been received not only during Admiral Kimmel's administration but the files show they had been received at least six months previously by Admiral Richardson, usually in weekly letters from the Chief of Naval Operations in the form of personal letters, all of which were kept on file.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: The thought I have had in mind is that we spent too much time in worrying about the outlying islands. We had large forces of civilians working on Wake and Midway and the Commander-in-Chief spent a great deal of time, in fact more time than I think we should have spent, in efforts to complete the defenses of the outlying islands. He even went to the extent

of personally auditing the records of the number of rounds of ammunition of all sorts on each island. He was much more concerned about the outlying islands than about Oahu, as the estimate shown in the Pacific War Plan will indicate. Looking back upon it, I think that we probably gave too much thought to these islands and not enough to the larger thing. I may be wrong about that but that is my opinion.

(Examination by the examining officer continued:)

204. Q. That is the way it looks to you now?

A. Yes.

205. Q. It did not so occur to you at the time?

A. It did at the time. And to emphasize that, I will state that one afternoon I went into the Commander-in-Chief's office and found him comparing these lists of ammunition with a list brought over by Admiral Bloch at the [65] Commander-in-Chief's direction. The two papers disagreed. And I made the remark that the Commander-in-Chief should not be counting bullets, that he had a Staff to do that. Both Admirals laughed and agreed with me.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 11:05 a. m., took a recess until 2:30 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as the reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

[66] No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please give us your name, rank, and present station.

A. Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics Plans.

2. Q. Where were you stationed on December 7, 1941, sir?

A. I was Assistant War Plans Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

3. Q. Was the War Plans Office of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, divided by duties?

A. Yes.

4. Q. Will you please explain just where you fitted into that division of duties?

A. Under Rear Admiral—he was then Captain—McMorris, I was responsible for the preparation of the written War Plans for the Pacific Fleet, which were required to implement the basic Navy war plans then in effect.

5. Q. And how long prior to December 7 had you been performing these duties, sir?

A. I reported for that duty on February 1st, 1941.

6. Q. In connection with your performance of your duties, were you familiar with this document, which is Exhibit 16 before this examination?

A. Yes.

7. Q. In connection with the Exhibit before you, will you please state the commitments the U. S. Pacific Fleet provided during the first phase of the war, such as contemplated by Rainbow 5 plan?

A. In general, it was to defend the United States and its possessions, some of which were in special categories, specifically Guam, which was in the category "F", which indicated that it was more or less indefensible; it was to divert the Japanese strength away from the Malay Barrier by raids, and the capture of positions in the Marshall Islands; to protect our sea communications; raid the enemy sea communications—I believe that, more specifically, it was to interrupt the Japanese communications east of Longitude 180.

8. Q. With respect to the task forces composed of combatant ships, then this would provide basically for offensive operations, is that not correct, sir?

[67] A. That is correct, up to the extent of the capabilities of the Fleet at that time, which limited such operations to raids.

9. Q. Please explain briefly what parts and what percentages of the ships available, to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, would thus be engaged in offensive operations during this first phase, or first phase providing for Japanese participation in the war?

A. If you are taking into account the use of a covering force, you might say that it was the whole of the Fleet.

10. Q. Was there any question in your mind as to the adequacy of the forces then available for making that first raid to the westward?

A. I would say that I was of the opinion that with the three carriers which were attached to the Fleet, if they had been available, we could have raided an island in the fringes of the Marshalls without undue risk. At that time of December 7, there were only two carriers, there being one at the Navy Yard.

11. Q. Was it the custom, or, we will say, the routine of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to keep this part of his plan in any way fluid, to fit the availability of his forces, or did you simply hope to carry out the plan as laid down, with whatever might be available?

A. I can't state for certain, but I believe that it was the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to carry out the plan, even with the two carriers that were available. I would like to make it clear that that is not confirmed knowledge. But, the Fleet was organized at that time, before the outbreak of the war, into three main task forces of which one was a striking force, with the main carrier strength, one was a covering force, and one was the force that we visualized would support whatever amphibious operations were conducted. These three forces were trained together, went to sea together, and were specifically ordered to train for the tasks which their names imply.

12. Q. I understand from your answer, Admiral, the, that the operating schedules were more or less built around the War Plans, insofar as the operations of the task forces were concerned.

A. That is correct, with the one exception that we had no actual amphibious forces available to us out there, or with any certainty of getting them in any very short period, with the possible exception of the Second Marine Division, which was the Fleet Marine Force.

13. Q. Admiral, were you present at the conferences of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, with his Staff, which related to war plans, future war planning?

A. At a small percentage of them.

14. Q. Were you familiar with the general attitude of the War Plans Division, as it reflected the Commander-in-Chief's attitude with respect to his current thoughts with respect to the international situation and possible future Fleet operations in case of war?

A. I think that Captain McMorris kept his section adequately informed, but there were undoubtedly matters that he and Admiral Kimmel, discussed, of which we were not informed—the remainder of the section was not informed.

[68] 15. Q. Did the War Plans Section make its own estimates of the situation, of possible enemy action, or war operations?

A. I can remember only about two formal estimates of the situation that were prepared along those lines. I would say that the Commander-in-Chief arrived at his opinions of what enemy action might be more through the means of these conferences that I speak of.

16. Q. During your preparation of war plans did you not, though, perhaps informally rather than formally, in estimating the situation, keep fully apprised of such information as was available with respect to the international situation?

A. I would say that I was quite generally informed of the information that Admiral Kimmel received along those lines, but the usual channel of information was from the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel, in the first place, rather than through any channels that the staff might have to do with.

17. Q. Did you, in your war planning, cover all possible courses of action, as you saw them, of the enemy, Japan, in the event of war?

A. Yes.

18. Q. In arriving at such decisions as to possible courses of action, would you please outline what you believed to be the courses that were open to the enemy?

A. The courses open to the enemy, as we saw them, were in the nature of raids on our positions and communications by means of air and submarine attacks, and the seizure of our possessions which lay easily within their reach. I will change that to the seizure of all possessions in the Western Pacific. So far as any employment of their heavy forces, you might say that it was considered most improbable that they would venture out of the Western Pacific.

19. Q. You no doubt listed a possible attack by air on Pearl Harbor as a course of action, though; sir?

A. Yes.

20. Q. In the preparation of plans, Admiral, which situation was of major concern to the staff planners—the offensive movements of the Fleet or the security measures needed to protect the islands to the westward of Hawaii?

A. I think probably the best answer that I could make to that question is to state where I think the predominant attention was focused—preparation for offensive movement, the countering of Japanese action against Wake and Midway, and protection of the Fleet against submarine attack. In regard to attack by air at Pearl Harbor, it was of course given full consideration, and a great deal of time and attention had been, or rather, was placed on defensive measures against such attack. Immediately after Admiral Kimmel took command, he activated our planning with the Army, on Oahu, with the idea of making up complete plans for repelling an air attack. As

regards the probability of such attack, particularly before war was well under way, there is no doubt that a very low degree of probability was assigned to it. If you like, I can go into more detail in connection with the actual preparations that were made under Admiral Kimmel's direction.

[69] 21. Q. No, we don't need that. That opinion just expressed—was that based upon careful consideration of the availability of the forces that the Japanese had, and in such an investigation did Admiral Kimmel call in the advice of any of the Navy aviation personnel?

A. I would say that the capabilities of the Japanese from this point of view, were constantly in mind, but undoubtedly were greatly underestimated. I don't think that any of us, including Admiral Kimmel's aviator advisors, had any real conception of how far the Japanese had come in their training and preparations for such an attack as they made. With respect to Admiral Kimmel's aviation advisors, I would say that they were able, as near as I know, and had full opportunity to present their views.

22. Q. But you do not recall any disagreement in that general point of view on the part of any of our aviation personnel?

A. I do not.

23. Q. Admiral, I show you a letter—are you familiar with that—which is Exhibit 4 before this investigation?

A. Yes, I am.

24. Q. Was that prepared by the War Plans Section of the Staff, sir?

A. It was prepared chiefly by the Operations Section of the Staff, although I should say that the War Plans Section had sufficient opportunity to advise on it.

25. Q. That letter, of course, was intended to provide for the security of the Fleet while in bases, particularly Pearl Harbor. In your preparation of war plans did the War Plans Section consider that the protection afforded through the means set out, to be adequate for the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor prior to the declaration of war?

A. I should say that we had the opinion that this was the best deployment and arrangement that we could make with the forces that we had. When it came to being ready to have war brought to Pearl Harbor, the next day, you might say, no one was under any illusions as to the inadequacy of many parts of the means at hand. In general, I might make the remark that it didn't seem possible to be ready in all respects for war until mobilization had been accomplished, and the deployment of extra forces that everyone knew would be necessary, had been accomplished.

26. Q. Did the offensive mission of the combatent forces during this first phase of war enter into your conclusions with respect to the adequacy of the security measures provided in this letter?

A. I don't believe I understand that question.

27. Q. In connection with the security of Pearl Harbor, was consideration given to using Fleet units to augment the Army and local defense forces in event of war, or surprise attack?

A. Yes, decidedly. The Fleet would constitute the backbone of any defense of its own security, and there were little available in the way

of naval force in the Fourteenth Naval District which would contribute in any degree. The necessity for training for offensive missions, or any other part of war, naturally makes it impossible to keep the forces wholly employed in routine security measures.

[70] 28. Q. Then, the foremost thought in the minds of the Commander-in-Chief's war planning advisors was the offensive movements to be contemplated, rather than the security angle?

A. I don't think that is true, to the state of imbalance, although it was the intention to make the maximum offensive use of the Fleet which its comparatively small size permitted.

29. Q. Admiral, what sources of enemy intelligence were available to the War Plans Section of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff?

A. We had, of course, the routine publications of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the studies on Japan, and the Japanese. As regards any operational or combat intelligence, if you might call it that in time of peace, I would say that there was no information that came to us except I think that we were cognizant of all warnings that came to the Commander-in-Chief during the pre-war period.

30. Q. Did the Intelligence Section of the Staff provide you with periodic reports as to the information available to them?

A. I may be drawing a blank, but I don't believe I ever saw one. If there was such a one, undoubtedly Admiral Kimmel used it, and probably told Admiral McMorris. I will answer that question by saying that I had no knowledge, I personally had no knowledge of any Japanese movements until we saw despatches, I think about two despatches, in the days just before the war, in which the Asiatic Fleet had seen large movements on the way south, off Indo-China.

31. Q. Do you recall the source of that information, sir?

A. I believe that came in the form of a despatch from the Navy Department, but I am not quite sure.

32. Q. But you were not furnished with daily or periodic reports by the Staff Intelligence, or Fleet Intelligence?

A. For the War Plan Section, as a whole, I would say not. The answer is "No."

33. Q. In formulating such estimates of the situation as you did work through, were the personal characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders taken into consideration?

A. No specific characteristics were ever, in any estimate that I had any part in the preparation of.

34. Q. Did War Plans section receive any intelligence derived from local sources?

A. I remember no instances of it, except a case or two of dealing with counter-espionage.

35. Q. Did you ever hear anything concerning a Navy effort to have certain Japanese agents arrested, or otherwise segregated, somewhat prior to 7 December, 1941?

A. I have no recollection of it.

36. Q. You were cognizant of what is known, or what has come to be known as the "War Warning Despatch" from the Navy Department, 27 November?

A. I remember one such despatch which had.

[71] 37. Q. You know what I am talking about?

A. I had the impression this is it.

38. Q. When did you first see that dispatch?

A. Probably the day that it came in.

39. Q. Do you recall any particular significance which you then attached to those words "War Warning"?

A. To me, the words were impressive as a general method of alerting for war, but I might add that I had seen a good many messages during the previous months which were only slightly less impressive.

40. Q. At that time, did any thought come to you that perhaps the force in Pearl Harbor should be doing anything different from what they were actually doing, and continued to do until 7 December?

A. I think we all, on Admiral Kimmel's Staff, had knowledge of the warning, reviewed the measures that might be taken, and I am not quite sure as to just the exact measures that were taken, but I think it was as a result of this message that some further action was taken in regard to Wake, and our ships in Pearl Harbor were always in a designated condition of readiness and, although at this time it was the lowest condition of readiness, as I remember it, all higher conditions of readiness would have considerable effect on the condition of the personnel and their ability to continue the program of training for war.

41. Q. That dispatch contained a directive concerning deployment. Do you recall at the time what that directive meant to you?

A. It meant that the forces should be placed in the best position to initiate tasks in the War Plan, if war eventuated immediately. It did puzzle us that the term "defensive deployment" was used. My recollection is that further strengthening of the islands to the westward and defensive submarine patrols were the only changes that Admiral Kimmel and his Staff could derive from this directive.

42. Q. Insofar as the security of the Fleet was concerned, the Japanese submarines were the major considerations, is that right?

A. That is undoubtedly true.

43. Q. Is it true that concern for the outlying islands west and south was a major worry, as regards a surprise attack?

A. Aside from submarine action, that is my recollection.

44. Q. So, security of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was really quite a minor consideration in the thoughts of everyone, is that correct?

A. Except for the submarine menace already mentioned, which might include a submarine entering the harbor, I think that is true. I can say that I know of no one present at Pearl Harbor who was not completely surprised by the Japanese air attack.

45. Q. As one of the associate members of the Staff, rather than simply as a War Plans officer, do you recall having had any particular doubts as to the ability of the Army Air Forces on Oahu to meet their commitments as regards the security of the Fleet?

[72] A. In line with what I said about all forces being insufficient for a state of actual war at Pearl Harbor, the Army aircraft were insufficient in number, and due to the limitation of Army fighters over water, were of limited usefulness for that purpose.

46. Q. What was the particular difficulty about Army fighters flying over water?

A. My understanding is that it was the lack of navigational equipment and some weakness in radio—probably no radio.

47. Q. Was comparative efficiency of personnel in your mental picture at the time?

A. No, sir.

48. Q. Admiral, did you take part in the joint planning with the Army located on Oahu?

A. I took part in some of the conferences which were held in connection with the joint defensive and security matters, which I have already mentioned were initiated by Admiral Kimmel.

49. Q. Did you take part in any conferences during which the warning message, Exhibit 8, was discussed?

A. I am quite sure that I was present at one conference that Admiral Kimmel held in connection with this message.

50. Q. At that conference, was the meaning of this message discussed with the Army officers?

A. I haven't an exact recollection of this particular instance, but it was my observation General Short usually attended Admiral Kimmel's conference when warning messages were discussed.

51. Q. Were the relations of the Army and Navy with respect to contemplated action, joint action, cordial, at these conferences?

A. According to my observation, yes.

52. Q. Then Admiral, you participated, as a Planning Officer, in the work which led up to 2CL-41 (revised), which is Exhibit 4 in these proceedings?

A. I did, insofar as there was joint planning with the Army.

53. Q. Admiral, we have no further questions to ask you. We will be very glad if you will give us any other testimony pertinent to the facts which you consider would be helpful.

A. I am very glad to testify that, in my opinion, no one could have been more whole-heartedly and self-sacrificingly devoted to getting the Fleet ready for war than was Admiral Kimmel. There is no doubt about the fact that we, at Pearl Harbor, did, for various reasons, have what you might call a blind spot in connection with any real probability of the carrier raid on Pearl Harbor. I think that with the means at hand, and with the known difficulty of detecting such an approach, it has been proved many times by our carrier task forces in this war, that we would have suffered almost as greatly, if this blind spot that I mentioned had not existed.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

[73] The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 3:30 p. m., adjourned until 2:45 p. m. tomorrow.

[74] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

FRIDAY, MARCH 10, 1944

FIFTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 2:45 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the fourth day until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

The examining officer introduced in evidence a copy of a letter, dated 10 March 1944, from the examining officer to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, informing him of the progress of proceedings had under the precept, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 20".

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station, sir.

A. Walter S. DeLany, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Staff for Readiness, of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December 1941, sir?

A. Assistant Chief of Staff and Operations Officer for the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet.

3. Q. And how long had you been performing those duties?

A. Well, since February, 1941, when Admiral Kimmel took command, and previous to that, I had been his Chief of Staff when he was ComCruBatFor.

4. Q. Admiral, available records indicate that you have knowledge pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that occurred on 7 December 1941. Please state the facts within your knowledge concerning the attack and the major events leading up thereto. It is

especially desired that you cover the following, and a written copy of this question is handed you so that you may refer to it as you testify: Forces available to CinCPac, with organization thereof. Briefly, the general nature of the tasks assigned in the War Plans to the Fleet during the early phases of war with Japan. Methods of training the Fleet prior to the attack and the relationship of this [75] training to the war tasks. Consideration given by CinCPac and his Staff to the possibility of a surprise attack on the ships and installations at Pearl Harbor and security measures adopted with respect thereto. Information available as regards the imminence of hostilities with Japan with the source thereof. Action taken by CinCPac during the weeks preceding the attack in the light of such information. Relations with the Army Command on Oahu, particularly with respect to mutual cooperation in the preparation for war.

A. Well, I think so far as the first question there, "Forces available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, with the organization thereof," the most accurate statement of the forces available appears in the Commander-in-Chief's Confidential Letter 14CL-41, of 31 October 1941, which cancelled a previous organization of a similar nature, and is a revision of the task force organization.

5. Q. May I interrupt, sir? Do you have in your custody a copy of that order? I would like to introduce it in evidence and then give it back to you, so we would know where it is.

A. I have the Chief of Naval Operation's file copy of it, because when I saw this question, I went to the files of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and got his copy.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

NOTE: Because of the confidential nature of the document, it was returned to Admiral DeLany. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 21".

A. (Continued.) I would like to have this included. I want to point out that this reference is not a new concept of the organization of the Pacific Fleet, because the Fleet had been organized into task force organizations, the same as this, ever since about April of 1941. The main difference between this and the previous letter was that it made the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District a task force commander under the Commander-in-Chief whose primary mission was to train, organize, and develop the island bases in order to insure their defense and provide efficient service to the Fleet units engaged in operations. It also provided on paper for the organization of submarines and patrol planes into task forces, although this was true before this letter of 31 October placed it into the Fleet Organization on paper.

6. Q. Would you like to go right ahead, sir?

A. So far as this next general statement is concerned, the War Plans Section of the Staff was continually keeping Pacific plans up to date, and was forced to revise them continually because I think you are familiar with the fact that the Pacific Fleet had been rapidly decimated in that carriers and battleships and destroyers and transports and other types had been withdrawn from the Fleet. The concept of what could be done in the Fleet with the forces available had to be changed continually, with the reduction of the forces that became available to the Commander-in-Chief. So far as the situation around

Pearl Harbor was concerned, we did keep a plan which was in possession of the Duty Officer continually, on what would be done with the forces in the Fleet that were available in the [76] in the event that we were informed that war had been declared against Japan. One of the things was the raiding forces to the northward, and another, as I recall it, was a strike in the Marshalls. It was not possible to make those things effective because of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Plans were actually available and the people on the Staff knew what they were, and everybody knew what they were supposed to do.

This question of "training the Fleet" I think I have already mentioned the fact that one of the first things the Commander-in-Chief did when he assumed command out there was to change the organization of the Fleet from a type organization into a task force organization, with the available forces in the Pacific Fleet roughly divided into three task forces, so that the types of the Fleet could become familiar with the requirements of inter-type tactics in a combined task force. That even went so far as to require the patrol planes and the submarines to be assigned to the surface ship task forces. In all training exercises in the operating areas, the surface, submarine, and air forces available in the Pacific area conducted coordinated and inter-type tactics. In addition to that, the Army Air Forces were always invited and usually did participate in the exercises at sea. Their long-range planes would come out and look for the task forces operating in that area. It is my personal belief that so far as that joint training was concerned, there was a very clear understanding between the people of my own echelon of what the joint problem in the area was.

I believe that there is, there must be, copies of the letters on file which were issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, which required Army planes to land on Navy fields and to be serviced by the Navy, and required Navy planes to land on Army fields and be serviced by them. I think there was a very definite understanding between the people that Army and Navy bombs had to have certain modifications in order to fit into each other's planes, and all that had been taken care of in the training exercises that had been conducted before this 7th day of December.

The Fleet letter which the Commander-in-Chief issued early in February and then kept modernized, so to speak, indicates the concept which everybody had out there, that it was a joint responsibility and a joint job to do what they could do to defend Pearl Harbor in the event of an attack. I think everybody realized that the defense of the Island did depend on the Navy there, because certainly the Army didn't have any ground forces, anti-aircraft installations, radar, or anything else that would make Pearl Harbor a well-defended operating base. The training of the Fleet had been given such consideration, and as I say, it was organized into what the Commander-in-Chief's concept of a war task force would be. I believe his concept has been shown to be correct because if we look at any of the task forces that appear in this letter we see that their organization is almost identical with the present carrier task forces.

Our training operations were not confined to particular areas. We operated to the northward of the Island and operated to the southward of the Island. The Commander-in-Chief personally discussed this training with the Commanding General out there, and I know,

so far as any relations with the Army on my [77] own level were concerned, that we discussed them frequently. We used Army facilities in our range-finding checks. We developed the use of smoke outside the harbor. And the Army was enthusiastic about the training cooperation they got from us because they had high-speed targets running around the Island that they had never had before and I am sure that we appreciated very much the service we got from them. I know the same thing existed about air, because I mentioned that before. The training was not only conducted with the idea of training the Fleet in seagoing tactics in the operating areas, but as that letter there shows, we also had given quite some consideration to the defense of Pearl Harbor, and I believe that you are familiar with the defense letter that shows how carefully the ships had been moored in Pearl Harbor and how the sectors were assigned and what the whole concept of the defense was.

We did conduct numerous air raid drills, and whenever a drill was conducted, we carefully analyzed what had been done at the drill, so far as communications and joint cooperation was concerned. In that connection, I feel that the Commandant of the District there, too, was entirely familiar with the whole concept of the thing because he was the Base Defense Officer, so far as local defense was concerned, and as I pointed out, in this letter here he was actually a task force commander within the Pacific Fleet organization for outlying bases. It wasn't only the defense of Pearl Harbor that was involved but also the defense of the outlying islands with which the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was concerned. I know that nothing was undertaken having to do with the training for the defense of the bases that the Commandant of the District and the Commanding General of the area were not consulted about.

This next thing of "surprise attack on the ships and installations at Pearl Harbor"—I will say it this way—from my own personal point of view, and with a rather complete knowledge of the dispatches and correspondence within the command out there, I did not and never would have expected that the Japs would attack Pearl Harbor as they did. I believe that everyone there was of the opinion that our danger lay in the fact that submarines might operate in the area and also that there might be sabotage on the Island. The general concept of our defense of the Island and the security of the Base there was based on that idea. I believe that you know that in several instances that it was suspected that submarines might be operating off the Island and I think probably it is a part of the previous record, the decision that the Commander-in-Chief took regarding his defense of the Island against submarines and the exchange of correspondence between the Commander-in-Chief and the Navy Department on the question of dropping depth charges on what was supposed to be sound contacts off the Island.

I have covered the training and general set-up that we had for the security measures around the Island, and I believe that the security letter of the Commander-in-Chief's which was in effect at the time was quite indicative of our concept of what might happen there.

7. Q. May I interrupt, Admiral? This is Exhibit 4 before the examination. May I ask if that is the letter to which you have been referring?

A. Yes, 2CL-41 of October 14, which revised previous letters on that same subject.

8. Q. And that is the one to which you referred?

A. Yes.

[78] 9. Q. I just wanted to get the record straight.

A. (Continued.) This question of "Information available as regards the imminence of hostilities with Japan", I believe I saw every dispatch that came into the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters out there, and there had been a series of these dispatches, but I think in no single instance was there any expression in any dispatch which indicated that anybody here in Washington, or anybody any place else, had the belief that hostilities would open with an attack on Pearl Harbor. The information, I think, indicated that there were movement of transports and the Japanese Fleet. There was every indication that something was going to break because the dispatches indicated burning codes, and so forth, but from my own point of view there, as I said before, there was nothing in any dispatch which indicated that hostilities would be started the way they did.

"Action taken by the Commander-in-Chief during the weeks preceding the attack", I know that the Commander-in-Chief was fully aware of the fact that a tense condition was existing, he appreciated that, and, in my opinion, he took proper precautions to safeguard the Fleet whenever it was in the operating areas conducting vital training exercises. I believe that he was familiar with the terribly weak defense of Pearl Harbor and realized that the main defense of the place from an air attack lay in the anti-aircraft guns of the Fleet, and I believe that his letter there, which we referred to before, his security measures, indicated that he had given a lot of thought to that. As I mentioned previously, he did have a plan which everyone on the staff knew about, as to what would be done with the Fleet there in event hostilities did break out, and I feel certain that the Commandant of the District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Area, and every senior officer in the Fleet organization was given the information that the Commander-in-Chief had. I know that the Commandant and the Commanding General attended numerous conferences when this whole matter was discussed.

This "Relations with the Army Command on Oahu, particularly with respect to mutual cooperation in the preparation for war"—I think that the Commander-in-Chief, as I said before, discussed all matters with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Area, and that there was a mutual understanding of what cooperation was going to be required under a joint effort in the Hawaiian Area. I think that the Army was entirely familiar with the efforts that the Navy was making to secure more equipment for the Navy in the area, and I believe, too, that the Navy was familiar with the communications that went on between the Commanding General and the War Department in his effort to get more material into the Hawaiian Area. They both appreciated that whether it was anti-aircraft, radar, or aircraft, or anything else, the whole area was woefully weak and both of them knew of the efforts that the other one was making to get more of such materials. I feel that the training exercises that were conducted by the joint effort out there indicates that there was an understanding of the problem, and I can certainly say that the re-

lationships between the Army and the Navy out there was one of complete understanding and very close relationship.

10. Q. Admiral, do you feel that everything was done that was possible with the forces under your disposal, under the Commander-in-Chief's disposal, to secure early information of possible attack, considering the shortage of aircraft suitable for that purpose, and the shortage of ships, the necessity [79] for carrying on the training program, the general situation, in the light of the warning dispatches—did you consider that you had done everything reasonable?

A. Yes, within our concept, as I said before, and the belief that enemy activity within the area would be confined to submarine activities and sabotage within the Island.

11. Q. Admiral, are you familiar with the dispatch that was received on the 27th of November, which contained a war warning, which is Exhibit 8 before this examination?

A. Yes.

12. Q. Do you know, sir, whether Admiral Kimmel discussed this dispatch with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

A. I believe that he did, and, as I say, that with the feeling that I don't believe any dispatch ever came to the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters of this importance that was not discussed before the Commandant of the District and the Commanding General.

13. Q. Were you present at this discussion?

A. Yes, I am quite sure I was.

14. Q. Did it discuss an interpretation of the meaning of the dispatch with respect to the war warning angle?

A. Yes, and, as I recall the thing, I believe that the Island was alerted on this dispatch and I believe that the Commander-in-Chief put certain aspects of that security letter in effect with the forces afloat.

15. Q. Admiral, this dispatch, Exhibit 8, requires certain action in the nature of deployment. Will you please state, as well as you can recollect, your reaction to the meaning of that provision?

A. I think the fact that the Fleet was organized into task forces which, from the concept of the organization and the missions assigned to them were to be offensive in nature, indicates the actual deployment of the Fleet. The fact that the Commander-in-Chief issued, or rather, directed compliance with certain paragraphs in 2CL was indicative of the fact that he appreciated a situation had arisen wherein he had to take action to prevent a surprise attack on the Fleet at sea from submarines, which, as I said before, was the general concept that everybody had of the way that action might be taken in the Hawaiian Area. No further action, so far as offensive deployment or offensive steps should be taken in this thing because the very nature of the organization of the Fleet was such that the Fleet had been organized and ready for a deployment for offensive action.

16. Q. Admiral, do you know of any action taken by the Commander-in-Chief other than that you have outlined in compliance with that directive?

A. So far as aircraft is concerned, Commander ComPatWingTwo was given orders to accelerate the refitting of all the planes in the

Hawaiian Area which had come to us without self-sealing tanks and other offensive war equipment on board. I don't remember when the submarines were sent out on patrol at Midway and Wake; I don't recall whether that was incident to this dispatch, but I am quite sure it was very close to this time.

[80] 17. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with the Army's aircraft warning service—radar?

A. Yes, I think I was. Of course there wasn't very much to be familiar with.

18. Q. Do you recall its condition as to readiness for use on the 7th of December?

A. I believe that the radar itself was operative, and that certain periods were assigned for training operators. I know that not only the Commander-in-Chief's Staff but the people in the Naval District and the Army and ComPat Wing Two's Staff had paid a lot of attention to the aircraft warning set-up that was to go into the District, because the organization actually appeared on paper, a diagram of the stations, the personnel that were required to man it, had all been actually prepared and, well, all we needed was the equipment which just didn't get there.

19. Q. The Commander-in-Chief's Staff, then, didn't rely on it for any information at that time.

A. No, because the whole warning service that was in existence on that day was just the normal telephone communication that existed in the Island, and as I said, the radar itself had just been installed and was being used for training operators. The idea that the Island would have an air warning service was fully accepted, and we knew that we were supposed to get the equipment but it had not arrived and we were prepared to use it as soon as we could get the equipment because, as I said before, the actual diagram and layout of the whole warning service, organization, equipment, personnel, and the need for the respective stations had all been drawn up.

20. Q. Admiral, you stated several times that you and other members of the Staff didn't think a surprise attack by air possible at Pearl Harbor. Could you develop your reasons why that wasn't taken into consideration, or was deemed an improbability?

A. I believe that I am correct in stating that the last information which we had regarding the location of the Japanese Fleet placed them in home waters. I believe the idea that the Japanese Fleet would come to the Pearl Harbor area for an attack was not considered likely because of the inherent danger that was involved, and also the fact that from my own point of view, and that was discussed out there, there was one thing that would inflame Americans into war and that was an attack on their home territory. We frankly felt that with the indecision that we knew and interpreted from the dispatches as to what America would do if Japan went into the Malays or went into India, or went into any other place,—it was such that the Japanese must have been of the same opinion that we had there, that the one way to incite America into the war was to come over and attack the Hawaiian Islands and I believe, and still feel as I always felt, that the one single thing that put America in the war with a bang, was the attack on Pearl Harbor and I don't believe anything else would have done it. I think that there was a lot of discussion about that around the Pearl

Harbor area as to just what an attack of Pearl Harbor would mean to the United States, and to throwing the United States into a full war effort, and all-out against Japan.

[87] 21. Q. In that formulation of opinion did you give much weight to the characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders, Admiral Yamamoto, in particular, who had been described as bold, reckless, an air expert, a man who built up the Japanese Naval air forces; was that given much weight?

A. Yes, I think that that was discussed, among other things, in the general concept of what might happen in the event that Japan decided to take some offensive action.

22. Q. During that tense period preceding 7 December, were the outlying islands, notably Midway, Guam, and Wake in particular, a matter of great concern to the Commander-in-Chief's Staff?

A. Yes, sir, very definitely so, and it was at the insistence of the Commander-in-Chief that the defenses of Midway and Wake were pushed and strengthened, because I think he appreciated the value of those two places. As you know, prior to this time, the Army and Navy out there were quite involved in a discussion which originated here in the Navy Department as to putting planes on those islands. The Commander-in-Chief made the decision, himself, to put Navy planes on those islands and as you know, the task force was out there at the time of the attack putting planes on both the islands. In addition, everything was set up and patrol planes were actually operating from Midway.

23. Q. Did the Departments' proposal to make certain shifts in those garrisons from Marines to the Army cause additional worry and concern?

A. Yes, they did; because so much was involved in the thing. There are differences in the tables of organization of the Army and the Marines. The Marines are set up with a defense battalion organization and I believe I am correct in saying that there is nothing comparable to that in the Army setup. And, there was the fact that it would have meant shifting not only personnel but equipment, with vital shipping and other things involved. Then there was a continued discussion as to whether Army fighters would go into the islands, and we just couldn't see how that could be done, and that caused a lot of concern and was a subject of many conferences not only between the Commander-in-Chief and the Commanding General, but also between the respective members of the Army and Navy Staffs, out there.

24. Q. And it came at a bad time?

A. Yes, sir; I think it was just about the time this dispatch was received, if I remember correctly. (Exhibit 8.)

25. Q. In late 1941, what were your own thoughts concerning the correctness of the Department's action in continued basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor?

A. Well, to be very frank, Admiral, it is my own opinion and I believe it is the opinion of other people that were there, that we could not see the consistency in basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, with the idea of having it as a threat to Japan, and at the same time being continually advised of the fact that whenever we asked for material, we were more or less told that the war was in the Atlantic, and that we were continually being picked upon to get units of the Pacific Fleet

moved into the Atlantic Ocean. Admiral Kimmel had the same point of view because I believe that his trip to Washington, here, in the early summer of 1941, one of the subjects of discussion, involved that very thing.

26. Q. As seen by you as the Operations Officer, were the attendant difficulties of maintenance of supplies and materials, supplies for the Fleet, health and morale of personnel, such as to make that long-continued basing out there questionable?

[82] A. So far as the morale of the officers and enlisted men of the Fleet was concerned, the biggest single factor that came into that was the one of indecisiveness. I believe that the sailorman's nature is such that he is satisfied to serve where he is ordered, if he knows that is what he is going to do. The rather indecisive attitude about whether you were going to stay at Pearl Harbor or whether you were going back to the Coast, and what you were going to do, was a matter of concern to everybody out there because it did make it very difficult to handle the whole morale situation. As you know, we did attempt to send units back to the Coast to let them get a bit of a blow back there, but I do believe that the question of nobody knowing just what was going to happen, whether the Fleet was going to stay out there, was a difficult thing to overcome. So far as the material conditions of the Fleet were concerned, it is my opinion that the organization of the Fleet into task forces which required the operating part of the Fleet to be at sea for as long as ten days, in which they were continually busy, and then permitting them to come into port for a period of ten days, contributed to the betterment of the material conditions of the Fleet because you had a long enough time in port to overhaul, and people knew that they were going to be in for that length of time and the entire up-keep project for that period could be laid out. I do believe that the material condition of the Fleet was improved by the operations of the Fleet by the task forces. I don't believe that the continued steaming for ten days, under normal conditions, so far as maintenance, engineering plant, and so on, were concerned, affected the material condition of the Fleet. So far as supplies, and so forth, were concerned, well we just didn't get any of the new material that we read about in letters and books that came to us, so that we weren't too much affected by that except to hope and pray that our turn would come to get something.

27. Q. The Fleet's presence out there increased the war-mindedness of the personnel, did it not?

A. It resulted in the development of a lot of war time practices which were beneficial to the Fleet when war was declared, in that every type of ship out there was required to fuel at sea, every type of ship was required to go into a reasonable organization that was practical, battle organization, instead of just a paper one, because when the Fleet went to sea they actually stood condition watches, and a lot of paper organization that existed in all types had to be revised to meet war time conditions. I think that the fact that the Fleet was required to steam darkened, and the fact that they exercised inter-type tactics developed an understanding between the task force commanders and the lower echelons of the different types, that proved invaluable in war. As to whether or not people became war conscious out there, I believe that everyone realized that the situation was getting graver and that there

would be a war with Japan, but I believe that the war-mindedness turned more toward war time training than it did toward the actual thought that today or tomorrow we were going to be in a war.

28. Q. One of the personal duties of the Operations Officer was the getting out of a periodical known as "Schedule of Employment", is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

29. Q. For what period did you get them out—how long?

A. They were originally prepared on a quarterly basis which attempted to match up task force operating periods with navy yard overhauls, and also the [83] requirement that certain types be degaussed, and have the new anti-aircraft splinter protection put on. I believe I am safe in saying that practically none of those quarterly employment schedules were ever carried out in their entirety because different units of the Fleet would be detached and either sent to the Atlantic, or in the later summer, instituted the convoy systems to the Philippines, so that all those employment schedules were deleted or continually under revision.

30. Q. But they were gotten out for a three months period, at the time?

A. Yes, sir.

31. Q. About how long before a period began was the coming schedule issued?

A. As I recall it, about six weeks before the end of the quarter the task force commanders were required to submit their next quarter's schedule, and that they had about ten days to put that in, and then at the end of that time, the whole quarterly schedule of requirement for services, such as aircraft, and target vessels, and things like that, were discussed and the schedule appeared probably three weeks before the beginning of the next quarter. That is my recollection of it.

32. Q. The schedules were printed?

A. Yes, sir.

33. Q. Under what classification?

A. I believe that up until about June or July they appeared in a Restricted Classification, and after that, they were Confidential. That is my off-hand remembrance of the thing.

34. Q. About how many copies of that were printed each time?

A. I don't know.

35. Q. Was it available for the scrutiny of a good many people?

A. I would say that every commanding officer and all the heads of departments on board ships had access to the thing, in view of the fact that all of the heads of departments of the ships were interested in the ship from a training and material point of view, on the schedule.

36. Q. Well, I gather from that testimony that for any potential enemy who is bent on a surprise attack, possession of one of those schedules would have been invaluable, would it not?

A. Under normal conditions, yes, sir; but as it developed, I think the schedule that appeared in print for the last—for the second quarter of the year, was not actually effective on the 7th of December because it did not, as I recall, contain the carrier trips to either Midway or Wake. That is something that has to be verified, but that is my own recollection.

37. Q. But I understand that there were a considerable number of copies of that printed document, and in all, they were in the hands of a good many individuals?

A. That is correct.

The reporter withdrew and Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

[84] 38. Q. Admiral, coming back to this Exhibit 4, which is Pacific Fleet confidential letter 2CL-41, we have been given to understand that the preparation of this document was in the hands of your operational section of the Staff, is that correct, sir?

A. Yes, sir.

39. Q. With respect to the air patrols that were to be maintained, this provides for daily search of the operating areas, air patrols covering entries and sorties. Would you please state why, if you recollect, air patrols were limited solely to these patrols?

A. Well, the main reason was we felt that the possibility of a submarine attack in the operating area was something that we had to guard against. The patrols on sortie and entrance were definitely with the idea of attempting to prevent any blocking of the channel in and out of Pearl Harbor. The patrols that were maintained were a part of the routine work of the patrol planes there, entirely separate from long-distance training flights which the Commanders of the Patrol Wings there carried out, and were also dependent on the number of long-range patrol planes which were available in the area actually flyable and the limited number of pilots that were available.

40. Q. Were you familiar with the large type Army airplanes that were available to the Hawaiian air force in the months preceding Pearl Harbor?

A. Generally, yes.

41. Q. Was consideration given to the augmenting of the overseas patrol with this type of plane?

A. Not as a part of the regular long-distance search, but I believe I'm correct when I say that long-range Army planes actually trained with and flew with Navy patrol planes for Army training in navigation and overseas flights.

42. Q. Admiral, as Assistant Chief of Staff, were you and the other members of the Staff thoroughly satisfied with the intelligence reports you were getting; in other words, did you feel that you could rely on the information that you had? I'm referring back to the earlier questions as to why the air attack was so much discounted as a possibility.

A. In answering that, I'll say that I believe that the information that was furnished us from our own Staff Intelligence Officers and from the Intelligence Officers of the Fourteenth Naval District, between whom there was very close cooperation, was the best information that those two sources could assemble and prepare for presentation to the Commander-in-Chief from what they were able to get in the area.

43. Q. Were you fully aware that their sources were inadequate, in a sense?

A. Yes. I feel that there was a general feeling among all of us out there that we were more or less operating in the dark, not only from the information that we were able to collect by our own means in the Pearl Harbor area but also the information that was furnished us from other sources.

44. Q. Would that answer be descriptive of your attitude both as to location of Japanese units and as to the international situation and probabilities of an immediate war?

A. Definitely yes to both.

[85] The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 4:10 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., tomorrow.

[86] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

SATURDAY, MARCH 11, 1944

SIXTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:30 a. m.

Present: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the fifth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, Retired, was recalled as a witness by the examining officer, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, in your earlier testimony before this examination you referred to a joint agreement signed by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and yourself as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District covering the use of aircraft. I show you a document which is contained in the Secret-Confidential Files of the Navy Department. Could you identify this document, sir?

A. This document that I have before me was sent to the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter dated 1 May 1941 and was signed by me and is the document which I referred to previously. The letter has two enclosures: "B", which is the joint agreement referred to, and "C", a joint estimate of Base Defense Air and Army Air Force Commanders; dated 31 March 1942.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned, at the conclusion of the examination, to the Secret-Confidential Files of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 22".

2. Q. Admiral, I noted that this document, Exhibit 22, is dated before the issuing of the latest JCD, which is before this examination as Exhibit 5. Did this Exhibit 22 go out of effect with the issuing of the new JCD, Exhibit 5?

A. No. JCD-42, which was signed subsequently to this air agreement, contains a provision in Paragraph 21 that Annexes I to VII continue effective with JCD-42.

3. Q. Then this agreement with respect to aircraft, which is Exhibit 22, was in effect up until the time of the attack, Admiral?

A. Yes, sir.

[87] 4. Q. Admiral, also in your earlier testimony, you have referred to a letter written by you as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District concerning the security of Pearl Harbor, and to the endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief thereon. I show you a file which has been taken from the Secret-Confidential Files of the Navy Department and ask you whether you can identify the basic letter and the first endorsement thereon?

A. I identify this letter as being the letter I referred to.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, at the conclusion of the examination it was returned to the Secret-Confidential Files of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 23".

5. Q. Admiral, having read this letter again, is there anything that you would like to state with respect to its contents?

A. I might invite attention to the fact that this letter, dated 30 December 1940, calls attention to the lack of reconnaissance planes and to the necessity for having to use reconnaissance planes from the Fleet as the District forces had no such planes. I also wish to invite attention to an error made concerning the vessels of Destroyer Division 80. It was stated in the letter that the vessels of that Division had listening gear. As a matter of fact, only one vessel of this Division had listening gear at the time of Pearl Harbor attack. By listening gear, I am referring to supersonics. Throughout the letter are constant references to the lack of suitable craft for the proper protection of an important base. Mention is made also in the letter of the lack of defense of Lualualei and Kaneohe. Subsequent to the time of writing this letter, I took up with the Commanding General the question of the defense of Kaneohe. When the Kaneohe Air Station was established, there was in existence a standing agreement between the Army and Navy that the Army would not have to defend Kaneohe, as they had said that they could not do it. This agreement had been made by some predecessor of mine. The Commanding General agreed with me that the Army should defend Kaneohe and a rough scheme of defense was drawn up and forwarded to Washington and the Joint Planners of the Army and Navy agreed to the Army taking over the defense of Kaneohe. The Army had also insisted that Lualualei could not be defended, although I understand, at the present time, they now admit that it can be defended. In the endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief, I wish to invite attention to his opinion, on the 7th of January, 1941, of the improbability of an air attack under present conditions and also to his opinion on that date that there was no practicable way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the Harbor without greatly limiting the activities within the Harbor and interference with the take-off of patrol planes. I also further wish to invite attention to the Commander-in-Chief's opinion, expressed in paragraph 5 of his endorsement, that adequate and sufficient forces

should be supplied with a higher priority than was to be given to continental districts.

6. Q. Admiral, in your thinking, with respect to any possible attack on Pearl Harbor, prior to the time of the attack, did you ever consider the influence on public opinion in the United States that such an attack as occurred would produce?

[88] A. I can not say that I'd ever seriously considered, nor did I hear anybody else talk about, what the effect on public opinion would be by an attack made on Pearl Harbor.

7. Q. Admiral, did you, in your shore establishments at Pearl Harbor, have any anti-aircraft weapons?

A. There were Marine defense battalions coming and going at Pearl Harbor. They were part of the Fleet Marine Force and were sent out primarily for the purpose of garrisoning the island bases. I think at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, on December 7, there was one such Marine battalion at Pearl Harbor and they had some anti-aircraft weapons. Our plan was made to turn those over to the Army for anti-aircraft defense or Army control, and after the attack they were turned over. Normally, a defense battalion had twelve three-inch anti-aircraft guns and a number of .50 calibre guns. Whether this battalion had all of those weapons, or not, I don't remember.

8. Q. How about your own Marine detachments, Sir, were they provided with anti-aircraft weapons?

A. They had nothing that I know of except their small arms and machine guns, and they were not intended for anti-aircraft. Of course, they could be used and probably were on the 7th of December.

9. Q. Admiral, were there any attempts at sabotage within the naval establishments at Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December, 1941?

A. Prior to the 7th of December, we had many complaints that our internal security orders were unnecessarily rigid, but I believe they were all reasonable and sound, and the mere fact that, so far as I know, there was never any sabotage at Pearl Harbor, with the exception of one or two isolated cases, both of which were disgruntled sailors, leads me to believe that they had a highly deterrent effect. There was no sabotage on the 7th of December, insofar as I know.

10. Q. Had you instituted any conditions of readiness with respect to such guards and other personnel as were under your command with respect to protection from sabotage?

A. I recall none, except our regular security orders.

11. Q. Reverting to this document, labeled Exhibit 22, there is attached thereto a joint estimate concerning air action which is dated 31 March and is signed by Major General Martin and Rear Admiral Bellinger. Under the heading of "Possible Enemy Action" appears the following: "It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles." Was that estimate carried through and was any particular attention paid to it by the higher command echelon, including you?

A. The joint agreement made between the Commanding General and the Commandant became an annex under JCD-42 and was ef-

fective. Every Force Commander necessarily had to get out his orders. Although Admiral Bellinger was a Naval Base Defense Air Officer, under CL2, he had also been one of the important officers in working with the Army to reach the joint agreement, and he and General Martin made plans to implement the joint agreement, and this joint order is the plan. The Commandant of the [89] District received the order and it must be assumed that he was familiar with it. In the joint operation plan, Admiral Bellinger and General Martin made certain decisions, one of which was that their force would locate the attack forces initiating hostile action against Oahu, and, on page 4, under section 4, they made some discussion of their search plans. In this discussion, it was stated: "A search plan will be desirable. It can only be effectively maintained with the present personnel and materiel for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits." On page 8, under section 5, there was included a discussion of conditions of readiness for the air forces. In this discussion, General Martin and Admiral Bellinger referred to establishing a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is, at all times, prescribed by the senior officers present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. Whether or not I concurred with the surveys of opposing strength and the possible enemy action and the action open to us in the joint plan, I can not remember definitely as to details. But I feel quite certain that, generally speaking, I took no exception to their plan.

12. Q. You have testified that prior to 7 December you thought the probability of a Japanese carrier air raid was very remote. In formulating that opinion at the time, did you have in mind the opinion expressed by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger?

A. I don't know. I was of the opinion that a carrier attack against Hawaii, preceding a declaration of war, was remote. Just what all of the logical processes were that caused me to arrive at that conclusion, I'm unable to say, but I believe that one important consideration was my belief that a large body of surface vessels, which would be necessary to launch such attacks, could not cross a large expanse of water, which they would have to cross, without our having some prior knowledge.

13. Q. Do you remember whether or not the existence of that formally expressed opinion by those two officers who, presumably, were the most experienced in their own line, was generally known in the upper echelons of command around Oahu?

A. The Commander-in-Chief had a copy of this Joint Air Operating Plan and he had on his Staff competent officers and I think it is fair to assume that he must have known about the plan. I also believe that General Short must have known about the plan.

14. Q. I'm questioning you particularly as regards this formal joint estimate by those two officers. Did you know of any other formally expressed opinions that were given by officers experienced in aviation on that particular point?

A. I can not definitely say any certain officer had ever expressed an opinion that such an attack was improbable. I had considerable contact with Admiral Halsey, who was Commander, Air Battle Force, as

did the Commander-in-Chief. I had considerable contact with Captain Martin, who was in Command of the Air Station at Kaneohe, and Captain Shoemaker, who was in Command of the Air Station at Ford Island. I do not recall specifically any comment one way or the other by these officers. Yet, I very definitely had the opinion that an attack by air, prior to declaration of war, was remote. Unquestionably, this opinion can not have been [90] reached by me independent of all other opinions and conversations that I had with other officers. At this late date, and even at the time of the Roberts Commission's meeting, I was unable to analyze my opinion and to determine the various factors which had caused me to reach that opinion.

15. Q. Then you are unable to give me any clue to any other formally expressed opinion on the point by air officers; is that right?

A. I am not able to give you any clue to any other expressed opinion by air officers.

16. Q. Admiral, is it proper to say that the situation, during 1941, was with the Pacific Fleet held in a "position of readiness" at Pearl Harbor?

A. The Fleet arrived in Pearl Harbor in April, 1940, and never departed in its entirety up until December 7. What the reasons were for keeping it in Pearl Harbor, I can only guess. I think that all Fleet officers, all people connected with the Fleet, endeavored to keep it in a state of "readiness".

17. Q. Then you think the expression "position of readiness", applied to the location of the Fleet, is not really correct?

As I stated before, I can only guess as to the reasons why the Fleet was kept in Hawaii.

18. Q. From your observation up until, say, November, '41, what did you feel was the overall effect upon actual war readiness of the Fleet, having maintained its position in Hawaiian waters over such a long period?

A. I know that the Commander-in-Chief, in 1940, was somewhat concerned over the stay of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters and that he took steps to arrange having small detachments of the Fleet go back to the West Coast for short periods. I think that after 1940-1941, prior to December 7, that the Fleet was forced to carry out its exercises and training under conditions which imposed considerable strain. I mean by this that the Fleet had to conduct exercises and yet, at the same time, had to take certain measures to be ready to defend itself in case of a sudden attack, and such conditions, over an extended period of time, must necessarily have imposed considerable anxiety upon responsible officers.

19. Q. What was your observation of the effect of those conditions that you just mentioned?

A. I can not give any accurate impressions. In my own position, I had so many things of my own that were closer to me and with which I was more intimately concerned, that I didn't have very much time or opportunity to note what was taking place in the Fleet.

20. Q. You recall that certain of the Pacific Fleet's forces were detached somewhere during 1941, some of those detachments going to the Atlantic permanently, insofar as it was known, another de-

tachment going to the South Pacific. Did you notice any particular effect on mental attitudes due to those occurrences?

A. In a general way, I knew that detachments of the Fleet were going to other places. I knew specifically that certain cruisers went to Australia and New Zealand. I knew that, on one occasion, the entire [91] Fleet was ordered to go to mid-Pacific, east of Hawaii, and remain in a condition of radio silence and without knowledge on the part of anyone as to where they were for a long period of time. But what the reasons were for these movements or what the effects were on our own personnel, I don't know.

21. Q. I believe that in your area a great deal of construction work, preparation of new installations, was in progress in 1941; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

22. At the time, did you think that those installations were generally too elaborate and hence being completed too slowly to accord with the general situation that faced our Nation?

A. At Pearl Harbor, there were two projects of paramount importance, one of which was a new, big dry-dock, another of which was two smaller, twin dry-docks, and a third was underground fuel oil storage. These projects were pressed to my utmost, and, being of somewhat impatient temperament, I naturally thought they were going too slow, although actually the record will show that they progressed very rapidly. There were innumerable other projects, such as the Air Station at Kaneohe, rehabilitation of Ford Island, the Air Station at Barbers Point, the Air Station on Maui, which were all underway, to say nothing of new cold storage plants, new wharves, new docks, barracks, new improvised Marine camp to take care of five thousand Marines; all on Oahu. Then over and above these were the island bases: Palmyra, Johnson, Midway, and Wake. These island bases had been originally conceived as being very small. They were only to consist of a deep water area for seaplanes taking off, and certain minor things, such as gasoline stowage, and small living facilities. As time went on, they expanded in their scope. Midway was required to have a landing strip. Midway became quite a considerable air station. Midway was planned for quite a considerable submarine base. All of these things placed quite a load on the District, and our natural tendency was to endeavor to simplify to the barest essentials. General requests for revisions of plans and for expansions came from the Fleet itself, and in all of those cases, after discussing the matters involved with the Commander-in-Chief or his representative, the Fleet wishes were followed, if the Commander-in-Chief felt they were necessary. Wake Island was not started until 1941. Prior to starting it, I wrote to the Navy Department, via the Commander-in-Chief, and asked if the place should be started at this late date. The Navy Department replied, in what I considered to be a rather unusual communication, to the effect that the Commander-in-Chief and the Commandant were the officers on the spot and they would have to make the decision. This having been thrown in our laps, the Commander-in-Chief and I considered the question. I was of the opinion that Wake would be untenable and that it was a mistake to start it. The Commander-in-Chief heard me and discussed it with officers of his Staff, in my presence, and the decision was to start it. This station was a station of considerable extent and the final plans contemplated

seaplane base, air strip, and some submarine facilities. Maui Air Station was started as an improvement to the municipal airport to accommodate wheel planes, with small barracks and facilities to accommodate one carrier group. Before the original plans had been completed, approved extensions were underway to make it a much larger place than ever was contemplated. [92] In the light of hindsight, I don't say that these extensions were incorrect. More probably they were correct but, at that time, my idea was to complete the places as quickly as possible and get the civilian component out and get the garrisons in.

23. Q. Were the designs and specifications on broad lines fixed by the Navy Department or by the authorities in Hawaii?

A. Originally, the designs were fixed by the Navy Department, but as the work became greater and greater, details of design were largely left to the District.

24. Q. But on broad lines, everything about those installations was then decided by the Navy Department, rather than by local authorities?

A. In fact, all construction work had to receive the decision of the Navy Department, because expenditures of funds were involved and the funds had to be forthcoming from the Navy Department.

25. Q. Reverting to my original question on this subject, did you consider that any or all of these installations were conceived on too elaborate lines and, consequently, slow of construction?

A. I felt that my position as the Commandant of the District was one of service and when ideas occurred to me that something was too elaborate or too expensive, or possibly was not necessary, I would present my argument, but if the Commander-in-Chief, who would have to use these facilities, stated that he wanted them, my job was to do them. As far as the extravagance and expansiveness of the project was concerned, I believe that all of the specific plans of structure were fairly simple and as inexpensive as they could be made, under the circumstances.

26. Q. In, say, November, 1941, were you or others in the high command echelon that you know of particularly worried about the situation in the outlying islands?

A. I will say that I think the Commander-in-Chief and the Commandant of the District were both concerned about the situation in the outlying bases.

The witness was duly warned.

The examining officer then, at 10:41 a. m., took a recess until 11:13 a. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, the reporter, and the witness.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, Retired, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

[93] Examination by the examining officer: (Continued)

27. Q. Was it what you would call a primary worry?

A. All of the outlying bases with the exception of Palmyra were dependent upon distilling plants for their water. Therefore, their capacity to support personnel was limited by their distilling capacity.

This meant that as long as civilian workmen were on the islands, working on public works, not as many military personnel as was desirable could be placed in the garrisons. We were also much concerned about our ability to supply the islands with the necessary items of stores and food, as at no time did we ever have what we considered to be adequate transportation. The Commander-in-Chief actually had to supply cruisers to transport personnel and equipment. The concern of the Naval authorities was heightened in the summer of 1941 by the request of the Army to ferry bombers to the Far East via Midway and Wake. This meant additional supplies of gasoline, and so forth. Concern was also involved by the decision of the Army to build a separate line of bases, whereby planes could be ferried from Hawaii southward to the Australian area, and the amount of naval effort which would unquestionably be required to assist them. In the late autumn of 1941 the question was raised by the Army and Navy authorities in Washington about garrisoning the outlying bases with Army personnel and using Army planes on them for defense purposes. All of these questions caused much concern and many cases compromises had to be reached which were forced by circumstances then existing.

28. Q. In, say, November, 1941, was the security of the outlying islands as against a surprise attack, a primary worry to you and others in the high echelon of command?

A. It was a concern of some weight. In some way, I had gotten a date fixed in my mind that any move on the part of Japan would be April or May. How I got this information or from what source I don't know, but in connection with Wake Island, I had spent some personal effort and a great deal of District effort in devising a means to use the lagoon there by ships of moderate draft, so that it could be completed prior to April or May 1942, rather than the original plan, which would have required several months longer. The Commander-in-Chief was anxious to put a large garrison in Wake Island when the water capacity of the island would only support about 1500 men. In order to expedite construction work there, a minimum force of about 1050 was required, so this limited the garrison on Wake to, roughly speaking, between four and five hundred. At Midway, there was a large garrison, in the neighborhood of 1,000 men, but a larger garrison could be put there as soon as the civilians were evacuated. They could not be evacuated at that time, although the work was drawing to a close rapidly. In Johnston Island, there was particularly an acute situation. The islands are very small and the garrison was necessarily small in order that we could retain civilian workers. In Palmyra, we were working on a long airstrip and devoting every effort to its completion at the earliest possible date as the airstrip there, in conjunction with the airstrip which we were constructing in Samoa, formed a second chain for ferrying planes to the southwest. All of these matters caused concern. The security of bases depended upon just when a war should break out and the condition of readiness at the time.

[94] 29. Q. Were you no more apprehensive of a surprise attack on those outlying islands than you were of such an attack on Oahu?

A. I was more apprehensive about an attack on Guam, Wake and Midway, than I was of Oahu.

30. Q. In late November, '41, did the concern and worry concerning those situations seem to influence anyone as regards the security on Oahu?

A. I'm not conscious of anyone lessening his alertness or concern over any part of his duties. If such was the case, it must have been unconscious because I'm fully convinced that everyone out there was trying his utmost to be on his toes all the time.

31. Q. A somewhat hypothetical question: Could the carrier raid of 7 December have damaged us more effectively and more lastingly if the objective of the attack had been directed against installations other than those which were attacked?

A. In my opinion, yes, we would have been damaged infinitely more than we were. At Pearl Harbor, on December 7, the objectives of the Japanese were, first, the air fields, and then capital ships of the Fleet. In my opinion, with a different method of attack, the Japanese might have caused our entire Fleet to sortie, to seek them out. We know accurately now what force was brought on the attack against Pearl Harbor. Had our ships been effective in making a concentration outside of Pearl Harbor, a serious question is in my mind as to whether or not the entire Fleet would not have been destroyed, in view of the powerful force that the Japanese had in the area. But even assuming that the form of attack that was made had been pursued vigorously against our oil supply, which was all above ground, against our drydocks, repair shops, barracks and other facilities, storehouses, I feel that insofar as the prosecution of the war was concerned, that we would have been very much worse hurt than we were by the attack on capital ships, even though we did have a tragic loss of life.

32. Q. Will you enlarge a little upon that statement as regards the oil tanks?

A. The oil storage, fuel and diesel at Oahu, amounted to approximately 4,000,000 barrels. All of this oil was stored in tanks above the ground, metal tanks, with the exception of one concrete tank embedded in the ground but visible from the air. These tanks were located in two groups of tanks known as the "Upper Farm" and "Lower Farm." They were immediately adjacent to the submarine base, industrial navy yard, hospital, and Hickam Field. Struck by bombs and set on fire, not only the reserve oil would have been destroyed but the burning oil would have flowed over the dykes and caused wide conflagration in the yard and general area. Ships desiring oil would have been unable to obtain it. Submarines desiring diesel oil would have been unable to obtain it. We had one drydock with a battleship in it, and two destroyers, on December 7. If the caisson had been breached, the dock would have been partially destroyed and the ships in it would have been wrecked; a serious casualty would have been the loss of our machine shops and the tools, our storehouses with the spare parts, spare torpedoes, storehouses with our food supply for 50,000 men for a hundred days and all the various elements that went [95] to make up the requirements of the base. An attack on the ammunition depot at Lualualei certainly would have destroyed our radio transmitting stations which were located there and might have destroyed some of the ammunition storage.

33. Q. It has been brought out that prior to 27 November, and extending back a considerable period, the Fleet had received from Wash-

ington numerous warnings of impending difficulties with the Japanese. Were you, by late November, '41, so affected by that multiplicity of warnings as to effect your reaction to the war warning which was given in definite form on 27 November?

A. Not consciously so, but there had been a number of warnings, and I'm of the very definite recollection that the Commander-in-Chief preceding Admiral Kimmel, and Admiral Kimmel, himself, had received written warnings, possibly in personal correspondence from the Chief of Naval Operations. I'm very definitely of the impression that this same question had been discussed by Admiral Richardson and myself in 1940, and that either he or I or both of us had been of the impression that too many warnings were being given and that it might ultimately have a bad effect, but I think I can say that so far as I was conscious of it, in the end of November or early part of December, I knew of no lessening of sensitivity on my part, although, perhaps, such did exist. I was not conscious of it.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I have mentioned in my previous testimony that I considered that the Navy Department had far more information about the general situation, the possibility or probability of hostilities, and the political situation than anybody in Hawaii could possibly have, and that they were in a far better position to evaluate this information than we in the field were. Quite a number of warnings were sent out by the Department from October to December. Yet, with the sendings of all these warnings, the Navy Department never once saw fit to exercise the most certain way of placing everyone on the alert. In JCD-42, and I think in other war plans, the Navy Department had a means of putting into effect all of the war plans prior to "M" day, which would have the effect immediately of indicating to everyone concerned, not only in Oahu but in every other place, that, in their opinion, something was about to happen quickly. Such an action on the part of the Navy Department did not necessarily—did not mean that hostile action was to be undertaken by our forces, and I believe that that is so stated explicitly in some of the war plans. Yet, I believe that if this procedure had been adopted, it would have been far more effective than the sending out of a lot of information and warnings in various telegrams, and particularly inasmuch as the most important warning dealt largely with conditions in the Far East. I have ascertained, subsequent to December 7, that on or about the 27th of November, the State Department sent a note to the Japanese Government which, I believe, was [96] couched in the most positive and uncompromising terms. I knew nothing of this dispatch, nor do I believe anyone in Hawaii knew anything about it until after the 7th of December. In any evaluation, such a dispatch would have important weight.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer, then, at 11:49 a. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., Monday, March 13, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

MONDAY, MARCH 13, 1944

SEVENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the sixth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Arthur C. Davis, Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on the 7th of December, 1941?

A. I was Fleet Aviation Officer of the Pacific Fleet.

3. Q. And how long had you been performing those duties, sir?

A. For approximately a year and a half.

[97] 4. Q. Admiral, available records indicate that you have knowledge pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that occurred on 7 December, 1941. Please state the facts within your knowledge concerning the attack and the major events leading up thereto. It is especially desired that you cover the following, and a written copy of this question is handed you so that you may refer to it as you testify:

The advice that you gave the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, with respect to possibility of a surprise air attack on the ships and installations at Pearl Harbor, together with the basis and reasons therefor.

If you did not advise the Commander-in-Chief in this respect, please state the views held by you prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor with respect to the possibility of such an attack.

The information you had prior to 7 December 1941 regarding the Army Interceptor Command, including:

- (a) Number and types of its planes,
- (b) Sufficiency of air fields for operation and dispersal of airplanes,
- (c) Caliber and experience of its pilots,
- (d) The nature of training in progress,
- (e) Its air warning net,
- (f) Provisions made for command in the air, including direction of planes, so as to bring them into combat with the enemy in the event of surprise attack, and
- (g) Any matter relating to the ability of the Army Interceptor Command to carry out its commitments under the War Plans.

Please include any advice you gave Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, in this respect.

Information regarding efficiency of Japanese Naval aviation available to you and your conclusions drawn therefrom.

A. My duty, as Fleet Aviation Officer, was primarily, if not almost entirely, concerned with technical training and logistics matters. As was the case with the Staff as a whole, our primary interest for many months had been the improvement in strength and proficiency of the Pacific Fleet. As is no doubt well known, it had not been possible, for various reasons, including appropriations, to develop the Fleet to a point which, it is now known, was necessary. However, this fact made it all the more important to concentrate on all phases of materiel and training. I, myself, had little to do with considerations of attack possibilities and I do not recall ever being directly consulted on such matters by the Commander-in-Chief. Naturally, the subject was frequently discussed among members of the Staff and also by the Commander-in-Chief with the Staff at times when I was present. From these discussions, I can definitely state my opinion that it was the Commander-in-Chief's belief that it was vitally necessary to continue as long as possible with training and other Fleet improvements and that going into a defensive status would interfere with [98] this work, so that I am convinced it was his sincere intention to accomplish all that could be done before hostilities began and that he believed there was still time to keep the work going.

As to the imminent possibility of attack, I only occasionally saw or heard of warnings that may have been received by the Commander-in-Chief. I know that there had been many warnings of varying degrees of seriousness over a number of months, and I had the impression that it was within the Commander-in-Chief's discretion to determine how far to go in action with regard to such warnings. I believe his thought, throughout, was to take precautionary steps within reason but to regard the warnings as all the more reason for concentration on improving the Fleet's readiness.

During the period of strain which finally led up to the events of 7 December, I am certain that the Commander-in-Chief gave the situation the carefulest possible consideration. I have to admit, however, that I was, myself, concerned because of information that was available in the press and that I concluded that there must be other information which had not been shown me that influenced the decision to take no greater precautionary steps than were taken.

As to advice with regard to precautions, I was asked not so much for an opinion as to whether or not the fullest precautions should be taken, as for information with regard to the practicability of comprehensive searches and their effect on training. Comprehensive and extensive air searches were practicable and I so stated. I also stated the fact that this would very definitely interfere with progress in general in aviation training in the Fleet. This, as was the case in the Fleet as a whole, was important in view of the training demanded by the rapid expansion that was already beginning to take place.

With respect to the surprise air attack, I naturally expressed the opinion that this was possible and that it could only be prevented by the most extensive searches and efforts to intercept at sea by air and surface vessels. I did not, however, realize to what a high degree of proficiency Japanese naval aviation had been developed. I do not believe that anybody else in the American Navy had any proper conception of this development, either. Certainly I had never seen anything, either officially or unofficially, that would lead me to suppose that Japanese naval aviation was to tremendously effective and well developed as it turned out to be.

This is so well known now, by the average naval officer, that one is apt to forget how universally it was not known before the Pacific war began. I consider this primarily an indication of how effectively the Japanese succeeded in keeping their high state of development secret. I am sure that our Naval Intelligence organization did its best to keep the Navy fully informed, but I am convinced that information on this subject was lacking.

Perhaps a simpler way to put all this is that I do not believe the Commander-in-Chief regarded the damage possibility that might result from a Japanese air raid as very great. I know that he was concerned, of course, regarding all damage possibilities, but it was apparent that he felt that training and improvements of our own Fleet still had priority, particularly in view of what I understood at the time to be his belief [99] that there would not, at that time, be any overt action.

Precautions to a certain degree had been taken, of course. It had, for a considerable time, been standard practice to provide daily covering sweeps by air for all sea areas in the Hawaiian area in which any of our forces might be operating. Also, occasional searches in other sectors, to long distances, were made and sometimes maintained for a considerable time. The idea of these was to give the impression of comprehensive search and at the same time to avoid really extensive interference with other forms of training.

Although I did not feel that I had sufficient information as to the actual situation to undertake to question the Commander-in-Chief's policy, as 7 December approached I was concerned about the general situation with respect to our outlying islands. For this reason, I stressed the necessity for providing some form of air protection at Wake and Midway, which it would have been too late to attempt after actual emergency had arisen. Action was finally taken in this connection and that is why the attack on 7 December found the ENTERPRISE taking force on its way back, having landed Marine fighting planes at Wake, and the LEXINGTON task force on its way to land Marine aircraft at Midway.

5. Q. Were you familiar with an arrangement between Com 14 and the Army for joint command in the air of Army and Navy aircraft, under certain conditions?

A. Yes, sir.

6. Q. Were you familiar with an estimate of the situation by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin in which the possibility of a surprise air raid figured?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. Did you have that estimate at all in mind during the days which led up to 7 December?

A. I did.

8. Q. But I understand, from your testimony, that you made no particular estimate, yourself, along that same line, formal or otherwise?

A. No, sir, it was not that I made no estimate, or did not consider it; it was rather that this, like all of the other very comprehensive and thorough preparatory plans that were made, was contingent, as to its being placed in effect, on prior decision that the situation justified taking up what might be called a defensive deployment. As to whether or not it should, at any given point, have been taken up, I necessarily considered that the Commander-in-Chief's estimate was final.

9. Q. And your advice on the point was not asked?

A. No, sir.

10. Q. Did you see the Navy Department's dispatch of 27 November, the one which has come to be known as the war warning (indicating Exhibit 8)?

A. No, sir.

11. Q. You never saw it prior to 7 December?

A. No, sir.

[100] 12. Q. Admiral, did I understand you correctly, earlier in your testimony, to say that in your opinion a comprehensive air search could have been carried on at that time?

A. Yes, it could.

13. Q. Would you elaborate on that just a little bit, as to how a 360 degree distant reconnaissance could have been carried on with the material at hand at that time?

A. There were not enough planes and pilots to establish and maintain a long-range, 360 degree search indefinitely, or even for more than a limited time. There were, however, enough to approximate this by using relatively short-range planes in the least dangerous sectors, and by obtaining some assistance from available Army aircraft, so that I think it could have been undertaken, had it been considered essential, on the basis that reinforcements could have arrived before personnel and materiel fatigue set in. Unless reinforcements arrived, it could not have been maintained.

14. Q. You may proceed to the written question given you, passing on to the Army part.

A. Prior to 7 December, I had relatively little detailed information regarding the Army Interceptor Command. I knew approximately the numbers and types and my recollection is that they had about 170 P-36's, P-39's, and P-40's, of which the greater number were P-36's and P-39's. Judged by modern war standards, there were enough air

fields to operate them, but not enough to provide adequate dispersal and protection, nor were revetments and dispersal runways provided at the various fields.

As to the caliber and experience of the pilots, they were, naturally, none of them experienced in war combat. I had the impression that the state of training did not average very high, for the Army was handicapped by expansion requirements and there had to be a choice between numbers and skill. I know that they were doing all in their power to improve their skill, and that they were busily engaged in training at all times.

The Army's air warning net had not yet been fully developed. It was, broadly speaking, still in a status of test, completion, and training, rather than on a full-out basis of readiness such as is now recognized as standard. In fact, continuous watches were not yet being stood. It was only fortuitous that radar indications of approaching aircraft were seen on the morning of 7 December.

As to provisions made for command in the air, including directions for interception, these were still only of a general nature and there had been, to my knowledge, no real development along that line by drills, although drills had been held. There were two reasons for this: one is that the air warning net and radar warning system had not yet been completed and placed in actual operation; the other is of a general nature, but, nevertheless, important—the Hawaiian area had not yet been placed on the basis of unity of command so that, human nature being what it is, progress along the lines of mutual drills was slower than it might have been. I kept Admiral Kimmel informed of the general status of the Army Interceptor Command and arrangements for carrying out the joint directive, including progress and development and completion of the air warning net. I was, on the whole, well impressed with the potentialities of the Army Interceptor Command, and with the progress in developing the system. I did not feel, however, that it was yet ready for fully effective employment.

[101] 15. Q. Admiral, what information was available to you as to the character and ability, and so forth, of the various Japanese Naval leaders?

A. I knew nothing about them.

16. Q. Were you present when Captain McCrea discussed these leaders with the then Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson, in the presence of Admiral Kimmel, and some of the Staff, in January, '41?

A. No.

17. Q. What did you know, prior to the attack, concerning the character of Admiral Yamamoto?

A. Nothing.

18. Q. Admiral, in connection with your duties, did you confer with the Army command and echelons of command corresponding to your position—the Army located on Hawaii—regularly?

A. There was not, in fact, anybody in the Army with an assignment similar to mine. I was Fleet Aviation Officer on the Commander-in-Chief's Staff. General Short had no corresponding Staff Officer. The Army Air Corps Commanding General was his senior airman. I consulted with him and his juniors, occasionally, but the primary contact between Army Air and Naval aviation was between the Army Air

Commanding General and Admiral Bellinger, who was Commander, Patrol Wing Two. In short, my job was not an executive job.

19. Q. Were your relations with the senior Army Aviation Commanders cordial?

A. Yes, sir, they were extremely cordial and remained so throughout the time I was on duty on the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, which extended through June, 1942. After 7 December, and the establishment of unity of command, I worked very closely with Army Air in the area in order to be certain that everything possible was done effectively, and I could not have asked for better and more intelligent cooperation.

20. Q. Admiral, were you, prior to 7 December, familiar with the use of aircraft torpedoes?

A. Yes, sir.

21. Q. Had you given consideration to an attack on the ships in Pearl Harbor by this means?

A. Yes, sir.

22. Q. Will you please state your views as of that time as to the possible outcome of such an attack—the possible success of such an attack?

A. My views at that time were based on what I recall to be a definite statement by the Bureau of Ordnance that a torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor, because of the shallow depths, was not practicable. As I recall it, this, together with the desire to have major ships readily able to move in an emergency, was what influenced the Commander-in-Chief in his decision not to protect the major ships in Pearl Harbor with torpedo nets. Shortly after 7 December, I recall a dispatch from the Bureau of Ordnance which clarified its position in the matter. The general tenor of this dispatch was that actually torpedoes could be effectively used in depth as shallow as Pearl Harbor, but that some of them would hit the bottom. The only way I can reconcile this with earlier views is the peacetime attitude; that [102] is, the first question in peacetime had always been whether or not a torpedo could be recovered after a practice drop. Since it was desirable to avoid loss of the torpedoes, the data given to the Service naturally stressed the necessity for depths that would insure against the loss of all but erratic torpedoes.

23. Q. You had no information concerning aircraft torpedoes then that caused you to disagree with the Commander-in-Chief's decision?

A. No. In fact, the opposite was the case.

24. Q. Admiral, did you consider the Fleet aircraft would be necessary to the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack?

A. No, nor did I believe that they should be considered assigned for that purpose, except in the case of shore-based patrol planes. It was my belief that any Fleet aircraft that might be present should be made available while present, but, naturally, carrier aircraft, by definition, had to be considered primarily available for their mission, which certainly was not that of local defense.

25. Q. In the weeks leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, was it customary for carrier aircraft to have guns installed when operating?

A. I cannot state positively after more than two years, but I think so.

26. Q. Do you know if they were kept ready for combat use while shore-based at Oahu?

A. As in the previous question, I am not positive, but I think so.

27. Q. Are you familiar with the condition of readiness for battle of the Marine planes that were present at Barber's Point on the day of the attack?

A. No.

28. Q. Had carrier planes previously been assigned to the Army for use under the plan then in effect during any training exercises?

A. Yes, sir, I think so, but I can not state positively.

29. Q. Prior to becoming air officer on the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, what was your assignment?

A. What was the last part of that?

30. Q. What was your job?

A. I was Commander Aircraft, Asiatic Fleet, and Commanding Officer, U. S. S. LANGLEY.

31. Q. As such, you had long experience with PBY planes, did you not?

A. Yes, sir.

32. Q. And under circumstances under which their ability for reconnaissance, distant reconnaissance, was very much in the picture?

A. Yes, sir.

33. Q. Based on that experience, which indicates you are an expert in the line, I will ask you a question which is perhaps somewhat hypothetical but is pertinent: Air reconnaissance over 360 degrees has frequently been mentioned. The entire circumference was not of equal importance, was it?

A. No, sir.

[103] 34. Q. A considerable arc to the north and west and another to the south and west were the most important; is that true?

A. Yes, sir, that is true, but it doesn't naturally follow that they would be certainly sufficient.

35. Q. Assuming a coverage of, say, 180 degrees so divided north and south, with the long-range planes which were available, including the Army's; suppose a distant reconnaissance patrol had been established upon the receipt of the Department's dispatch of 27 November. At that time, about what chance would you have estimated there was that such patrol would have intercepted the Japanese carriers the day prior to the attack?

A. My estimate at that time would have been that the chance was fairly good, perhaps two out of three, of course subject to reasonable breaks on weather and visibility. Based on knowledge since acquired, primarily that from war results to date, I should be inclined to put the chance no better than one out of two. We have, ourselves, quite often made an attack wherein Japanese search planes failed to sight our forces, even though in many of these cases we know that they were making intensive search flights. In the Guadalcanal landing, as an example, a Japanese search plane, under scattered cloud conditions, came close enough to our force actually to be sighted by long-range telescope from the ENTERPRISE, but failed to see and report the force. In a number of other cases, their search planes either failed to pass near enough for a sighting report or were hampered by bad visibility. On the other hand, the chances have always been

good enough so that defensive search is more than justified. In the case of the attack on Pearl Harbor, it could have been possible for the Japanese, by correct timing, high speed run-in and long-range launching of their carrier groups, to have been outside of search radius of our patrol planes the day before. I have always been of the opinion that the Japanese did launch at very long range in order to make certain that no search would find them the day before. They took this chance long-range launching, I believe, for the sake of certainty of surprise. Therefore, I think that in the specific case of the Pearl Harbor attack, our chances of sighting the Japanese by a previous day's search were actually less than one in two.

36. Q. Would a radar warning net, involving search radar only, which was properly manned and fully efficient, have contributed any greater degree toward the certainty of ample warning for us?

A. Yes, sir.

37. Q. Are you positive of that, and that the degree of certainty would have been quite considerable?

A. On the premise which I understood to be that it was an effective and efficient warning net; yes, sir.

38. Q. Then, in short, the most vital preparation that forces on Oahu could have had to prevent such a surprise air raid, would have been a proper radar net, is that the case?

A. Hardly to that extent, Admiral. I believe that the present provision, and the provision that should be made, is what is standard practice everywhere now. This involves both long-range search and effective radar warning nets. It is always best, if there is any chance of doing so at all, to have more warning than that which can be given by any local radar search. I believe that the two are complementary. I believe that radar is more certain, all things considered, than the air search. On the other hand, the [104] warning it gives is very much more brief than that which can be had from unsuccessful search. This, of course, is another way of stating the old truism that it is better to hit an enemy before he starts than when he arrives.

39. Q. Have you any evidence indicating the distance from Oahu at which the Japs did actually launch their planes?

A. Shortly after 7 December, I saw a chart recovered from a Japanese scout bomber which had been shot down, which had navigational lines drawn on it. These lines indicated the probability that this airplane had been launched from a point 250 miles North of Oahu and that it was to be recovered several hours later about 175 miles North of Oahu.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 11:20 a. m., adjourned until 2 p. m. tomorrow.

[105] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

TUESDAY, MARCH 14, 1944

EIGHTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 2 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the seventh day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Curts, M. E.; Captain, U. S. N.; Staff, CominCh.

2. Q. Where were you stationed on the 7th of December, 1941?

A. I was attached to the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as Pacific Fleet Communication Officer.

3. Q. And how long had you been so serving prior to that date, approximately?

A. Approximately two years, under two different Commanders-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

4. Q. Had you ever had any previous experience of that nature?

A. Yes, sir; several years.

5. Q. With the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, established in a shore command post, through what agencies did you transact the Fleet's communications?

A. Insofar as practicable, and nearly to 100 per cent, in the same manner in which we would have communicated with the mobile units of the Fleet while aboard the U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, the Pacific Fleet Flag.

6. Q. Did you use the ships' installations?

A. We had our own radio station at the sub base to communicate with the ships in the Harbor and with the task force commanders at sea directly from that station. We also had facilities for utilizing the

fixed radio communication facilities of radio station NPM, both by radio control and by land line in parallel. The installation ashore and the location of the [106] Commander-in-Chief's headquarters temporarily ashore, in no way hampered the mobile Fleet communications of the Commander-in-Chief and, to a certain degree, facilitated his communications with the shore activities of the Sea Frontier and the Army and the higher command echelons in the Continent.

7. Q. Then, in effect, you both received and transmitted at that station at the Submarine Base just the same as if you were on board the Flagship; is that true?

A. Yes. We paralleled the shore control lines with radio lines because of our apprehension to sabotage of the land lines. When on the morning of December 7 a bomb or a shell cut the majority of control lines in the Navy Yard, CinCPac did not lose control of transmitters which he was using to work the ships present in the Harbor, the task force commanders at sea, and all ships at sea.

8. Q. Didn't you have telephone lines to the ships that were berthed alongside?

A. No, sir, only few instance. Some of the ships had telephone lines on the regular Pearl Harbor exchange, but that circuit, in no sense, could be called a military circuit.

9. Q. Your communications between Headquarters and ships were entirely satisfactory in all respects then, I take it?

A. Yes; we never lost control of the radio lines even during the attack. We continued to handle combat traffic. Every ship in Pearl Harbor was guarding a common frequency, regardless of administrative organization. This circuit was supposed to be controlled by the Sea Frontier Commander and was primarily established for the issuance of fire control orders, as the batteries of such ships as were present had, by prior arrangement, been made available to the Sea Frontier Commander to assist him in defending the Naval Base.

10. Q. The Commander-in-Chief used the same call, same set of calls, whether he was afloat or ashore?

A. Yes, sir, we made no difference in our communications, external communications, while located at the sub base, from those ordinarily performed on the ship, except that for the Harbor circuit, of which I have previously spoken, which was under the control of the Sea Frontier Commander, who was also the District Commandant. We had special calls made up and promulgated for use on that circuit so that the Army, if they needed them, would have these calls available.

11. Q. Communications to the mainland and other points far removed, were always through Fourteenth Naval District equipment; is that right?

A. Yes, sir. Ordinarily the communications to Washington and the mainland were via radio station NPM, which station was under the control of the Fourteenth Naval District.

12. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief have his own coding boards so that the District personnel had nothing to do with his dispatches?

A. Yes, sir, we operated exactly as though we were aboard ship, using the same facilities, and we kept ourselves mobile to the extent that we could go aboard ship at any time on two or three hours notice, with personnel, code ciphers, and some special equipment.

[107] 13. Q. Still speaking of conditions as of November, '41, what arrangements were there under your charge for communication with Army and with Naval units on shore Hawaii, outside of Pearl Harbor?

A. In general, we communicated with the Army and the District by telephone.

14. Q. Was that through the city exchange?

A. No, sir, through the Pearl Harbor exchange. We, ourselves, had a switchboard which had trunk lines to the regular Pearl Harbor exchange and to the city exchange.

15. Q. Then everything went through the city switchboard?

A. No, sir. The District switchboard, or the switchboard at Pearl Harbor, had some but not all of the District facilities tied into its board. Others were obtainable through the city board. The telephone situation on Oahu, prior to December 7, was far from satisfactory. All trunk lines were overloaded, insufficient equipment was available to take care of the rapidly expanded Naval and Army facilities, and the civilian telephone company found itself in the same position in regard to civilian telephone service.

16. Q. Did the Army organizations on Oahu have direct telephone connection between their various posts and stations?

A. In general, yes, but by a very poor Army cable system, which was subject to constant breaks and deterioration from years of service. As a matter of fact, the Navy also used this Army cable system and it was partially because it was so unsatisfactory that I paralleled it with radio, in order that I might key the transmitters of NPM regardless of failures of this cable from either deliberate sabotage or because it was generally unreliable.

17. Q. Did you have a direct wire to that Army system?

A. Yes, sir, for keying of transmitters and I believe for some teletypes only; not for telephone.

18. Q. Admiral Kimmel's Headquarters was on the teletype system then?

A. I believe that prior to December 7, we had some teletypes installed. However, there was a great shortage of teletypes on the Island and but few of the units desiring same had been able to obtain them.

19. Q. Are you able to tell us anything about the means of communication with planes in the air in the vicinity of Oahu, including whether or not it was satisfactory?

A. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the communication with planes in the air was almost entirely through their base stations. In general, such communication was fairly satisfactory. After December 7, planes in the air were governed by the policy that all planes on a common mission, whether Army, Navy, Marine Corps, land or seaplanes, would be on a common frequency, and that the Shore Commander of this mission and the parent stations of the planes would all guard this common frequency.

20. Q. Was not that the case prior to 7 December; did not that machinery exist?

A. Only for drills, to the best of my recollection. As a matter of fact, the only missions assigned were drill missions.

21. Q. Was it necessary, before conducting a drill, to make special arrangements for those communications?

A. Yes, sir.

[108] 22. Q. Do you recall any particular difficulty in communicating with the Air Station at Kaneohe Bay?

A. Yes, sir. Telephone service—teletype service to Kaneohe Bay from points on the Island of Oahu was entirely inadequate and, in several occasions, air commanders reported that it was quicker to take off from the southside of the Island and fly to Kaneohe than it was to try to telephone; with a considerable degree of truth. In addition, Kaneohe was established as a Naval Air Station with inadequate radio equipment. If my memory is correct, it was actually commissioned before a single piece of radio transmitter apparatus was furnished for installation on the Island by the Navy Department. There existed, insofar as their local radio communications were concerned, portable apparatus which was supposed to be used for landing forces and special use by CinCPac.

23. Q. Captain, looking back upon the few weeks leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, what stand out in your mind as your greatest difficulties of that time? I mean, of course, as regards your own place in the picture.

A. Personally, I had been apprehensive for a long time, not just two weeks, about the danger of Japan starting a war without formal declaration. Insofar as my own work was concerned, I was principally worried because, to my mind, there was not a single unity of command organization, either authorized or set up, and I believe anyone who has had any experience with military communications will agree that if command is not definite and not set up, it is well nigh impossible to anticipate the communication needs when an emergency occurs. I, personally, was very apprehensive of local sabotage, there being in the neighborhood of 150,000 Japanese on the Island of Oahu alone.

24. Q. In that sabotage, you mean particularly as against your important land lines?

A. I rather expected sabotage against both the land line control wires, the telephones, but more particularly against the transmitters and service proper of the shore installations outside of Pearl Harbor. It would have been possible also to have wrecked, with comparative ease, the transmission power lines of the electric companies, which were quite vital to our communications. I had an arrangement whereby, from local power at the sub base, I could key the transmitters in San Diego and carry on Fleet communications from that point. In fact, we often did so and we did so to a certain extent on the morning of December 7.

25. Q. As regards the Communication Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District, was he wholly independent of you or was he, with his own organization, fitted into your own organization?

A. Organizationally, he operated directly under the Commander of the Sea Frontier and of the Fourteenth Naval District. At all times, he, individually, was 100 per cent cooperative with us, and his attitude at all times was that the shore radio facilities under his command were primarily for service to the Fleet.

26. Q. Do you remember if there was a considerable traffic congestion in, say, November '41, over the radio system between Oahu and the Continent?

A. No, I do not, sir.

27. Q. In the few weeks prior to 7 December, were you cognizant that there was much Japanese originated traffic, particularly outgoing traffic?

A. No, sir. You don't mean from the Island of Oahu?

[109] 28. Q. No.

A. No, sir, I was not, but I was not in the Intelligence Department of CinCPac Staff.

29. Q. Then that was a subject in which you had no responsibility and concerning which you were not informed, is that correct?

A. That is correct, sir.

30. Q. I believed you were stationed at the Experimental Laboratory, Bellevue, sometime in the past; if, so, when was it?

A. During 1936 to 1938.

31. Q. While there, did you have any duties in connection with the development of radar?

A. Yes, sir.

32. Q. What duties?

A. I was liaison officer for the Radio and Sound Division, and as such closely watched development of radar, contributed what I could to it, kept the Navy Department informed as to the progress thereon.

33. Q. Did you have any administrative work in connection with that development?

A. Yes, sir; practically all duties I just spoke of were administrative.

34. Q. You used the word "liaison."

A. Yes, sir. I controlled the funds, pushed the applications, endeavored to bring it over from a scientific study to an instrument which could be used aboard ship.

35. Q. You were then a sort of manager and steerer of the technicians and scientists who were working on the development; is that it?

A. Yes, sir; a steerer but not in direct control thereof.

36. Q. Was there anyone on the officer's list who was in any better touch with that development when you left it in 1938 than you were?

A. I don't believe so, sir.

37. Q. What was the state of that development when you left, in general terms, as regards its application for war use?

A. In the summer of 1938, the frequencies, which we were then able to use with radar, had been so shortened that it was practical to install it on board ships of the carrier and battleship class. One model had been tested aboard a destroyer with some degree of success. It had been decided to build a shipboard radar copied directly after the one installed on top of the Naval Research Laboratory for tests on board a battleship.

38. Q. At that time, and using the laboratory installation under average conditions, how far could you detect a medium size plane in flight at the maximum altitudes at which planes fly?

A. The rotating model, at the Navy Research Laboratory, in the spring of 1938, was able to detect aircraft at the higher altitudes to

distances up to 100 miles, with an azimuth discrimination of better than one degree and a position angle discrimination of approximately six degrees.

39. Q. At that time, had any knowledge of this development been communicated to the Army Signal Corps?

A. Yes, sir.

[110] 40. Q. When?

A. Radar, as we know it, was disclosed to the Army by permission of the Chief of Naval Operations, in about January, 1937. It did not appear at that time that we would be able to get a small enough antenna to work aboard ship, and because of its tremendous defensive value to the Army, full disclosure was made.

41. Q. After leaving Bellevue, were you able to keep in any sort of touch with subsequent developments?

A. I lost touch for about one year, except for minor information. At the end of that year, I went to Staff communication duty and followed the development as closely as possible, being interested in its potentialities for the Fleet.

42. Q. In, say, the summer of 1941, how far had the Navy gotten towards actually using and installing radar on board ship?

A. There were approximately twenty search type (CXAM) radars installed on carriers, battleships, and cruisers.

43. Q. In general, what results were they giving as results search for aircraft?

A. From the low altitude positions aboard ship, they were, in general, reliable to distances in the neighborhood of seventy-five miles.

44. Q. What would be the relative difficulties of radar installations on board ship, as compared with similar installations on shore?

A. The principal difficulty of installing a radar aboard ship lies in the necessity of having a large antenna which must be free to rotate, either in its own right or by turning the ship. The larger the antenna is, the better angular discrimination will be obtained and to a lesser degree a better range will be obtained. Topside space on a ship is at a great premium. Similar conditions do not prevail ashore, and a fairly large structure built, if necessary, on a railroad turntable, can be erected.

45. Q. By the end of November, 1941, had the Army Signal Corps gotten to installing and being ready to work radar equipment?

A. In November, '41 the Air Warning Service for Oahu were installing radars on various points in the Island of Oahu. I should say that approximately four Air Warning Service radars had been installed at that time but they were definitely in a training status and were not being used as an integral part of the Air Warning Service except during brief periods of drill.

46. Q. Do you know whether or not the design and conception of the apparatus was entirely satisfactory for war purposes?

A. The early warning sets being installed on Oahu are the Army 270 type which are still being used in a great many locations. They were not a perfect instrument but properly operated and installed, they are reasonably satisfactory. In November, 1941, the Air Warning Service out on Oahu knew very little about this new art. They were

trying to learn how to install them and how to use them at the time of the attack.

47. Q. During those intervening years, had you been personally of the belief that a device of that nature was a very satisfactory security [111] measure in a situation like that on Oahu?

A. Yes, indeed. Search radar extended all the value of aircraft warning service by observers to times of low visibility and to distances far beyond the visible range. It, of course, would have to be coupled with knowledge of the presence of friendly forces or planes or by an efficient electrical identification system which wasn't at that time in existence.

48. Q. Did you then know of any reason why the Army Signal Corps had not been properly equipped with this device as soon as we had the radar on board ship?

A. No, I don't know what delayed the Army in the securing of radar. To my mind, their problem was much simpler than that of the Navy's, as they could use larger equipment, at longer frequencies, and in a part of the radio spectrum more familiar to manufacturers and scientists.

49. Q. Did you ever advise Admiral Kimmel or the senior members of his Staff concerning the state of efficiency of the Army's radar on Oahu?

A. Yes, sir. I informed Admiral Kimmel that the Army radar was in an instruction status only, and not in an operational status. Such was the case on December 7, 1941.

50. Q. In late November, '41, did you see the various dispatches from the Navy Department which contained warnings of the imminence of hostilities with Japan?

A. I believe I saw all of them, sir.

51. Q. When you first saw the Department's war warning dispatch of 27 November '41, what was your reaction to the words "war warning"? What did you think it called for in the way of action, in the way of security measures, or other action?

A. My first reaction was that it was just another war warning, as we had had several dispatches extending over a long period of time, which, although they didn't contain the words "war warning", were, in fact, war warnings. This, plus the inclusion of information in this dispatch giving the probable location of the attack, took the keen edge off the dispatch so far as Honolulu and Pearl Harbor were concerned in connection with an air or amphibious operation. This (indicating Exhibit 8) dispatch, along with several others received about that time, increased my own worry about the danger of local sabotage, particularly because of sabotage reference to Guam and Samoa.

52. Q. Do you recall your reaction, if any, from the use of the word "deployment" and the language around that word?

A. My only recollection is that I questioned how to take a defensive deployment, as this dispatch, coupled with other dispatches which told us to take no offensive action until attacked, confused me as to how I would have placed units of the Fleet, had I been the Commander-in-Chief.

53. Q. Captain, I show you a dispatch which is Exhibit 11 before this examination. Have you seen that dispatch?

A. I don't recall having seen that dispatch. I may have seen it but I don't remember it at this late date.

54. Q. Captain, it is noted that the dispatch which you looked at a while ago, the November 27 dispatch, which is Exhibit 8, directs that the Army authorities be advised as to the contents of the dispatch. Will you [112] please explain your system for conveying such information to the Army?

A. Our ordinary system in Pearl Harbor was to make a paraphrase of such a dispatch, send an officer with the original and with a paraphrase to the addressee's communication office, and have them ask the Commanding General whether he was satisfied with the paraphrase and then to sign the dispatch, the original, as having received the same. This particular dispatch wasn't handled in that manner. This dispatch was delivered to Admiral Kimmel who kept it in his desk drawer with all copies thereof, and, upon my telling him that I had to deliver it to the Army, he informed me that he would take care of it by sending his intelligence officer to deliver this dispatch to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to General Short. I tried to get him to let me get their signatures but Admiral Kimmel refused, saying that Commander Layton had taken care of it. I questioned Layton as to whether he delivered it and he stated that he had delivered it to the Fourteenth Naval District and, in the presence of Captain Earle, the Chief of Staff, had delivered a copy to General Short's G-2 officer for delivery to General Short, and later Layton informed me that this officer, this G-2 officer, told him that he had given the dispatch to General Short personally in his bedroom that night. I was quite concerned, personally, about upsetting the system of receipts, but in my own mind, I am satisfied that this dispatch was delivered to both the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to General Short, although I held no receipt.

55. Q. Do you recall what date that dispatch was received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. It was about the 27th of November. There was no inordinate delay in this dispatch.

56. Q. And the day of delivery to which you referred is the date of receipt—I mean, delivery to General Short and Admiral Bloch?

A. I believe so, but I am not certain.

57. Q. Do you recognize this dispatch, which is Exhibit 6 before this examination?

A. I recall having seen that dispatch.

58. Q. Do you recall anything about its delivery to the Army?

A. No, I do not recall this individual dispatch. I feel certain that it was because in the review of all dispatches prior to this time, we found no non-deliveries, however, I can not recall this delivery of the individual dispatch.

59. Q. Do you recall any other dispatches, other than the one of November 27, that delivery was not made in a normal manner?

A. Yes, I believe there were certain dispatches which were handled through Intelligence G-2 channels, against my protest, which was made only because it upset bookkeeping, not because I had any doubt that the information would ultimately reach the addressee.

60. Q. At the time that you were the Fleet Communications Officer, what was the practice with respect to the retention of such dispatches in the files? I'm getting at the period of time they were retained.

A. We would keep all such dispatches two years, and, in fact when I left, I left directions that all traffic which might be pertinent to Pearl Harbor be retained in the files.

[113] 61. Q. Did these file copies show the signatures of General Short which you have testified about, indicating his receipt of the dispatches?

A. I believe so, except the one of November 27, I know does not contain his receipt.

62. Q. What system did the Army follow in delivering to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, information that they received and were directed to pass on to the Navy?

A. They sent it down by officer-courier, and obtained a receipt for it, in general. There may have been times in which they delivered traffic directly to Admiral Kimmel and I may not have seen it.

63. Q. Was any delivery normally made to you personally?

A. No, sir; to my Communication Watch Officer.

64. Q. Do you recall the receipt from the Army of a dispatch originated on the 27th of November, 1941, in the War Department, containing a warning similar to that contained in the Navy dispatch of the same day?

A. Frankly, I do not recall. There were many warning dispatches received over a long period of time. If we received it, I feel sure it is in CinCPac files.

65. Q. Captain, you've testified, with respect to your apprehensions, that your communication installations might suffer from sabotage in the event of hostilities or a surprise start to hostilities. Did your communication installations in fact suffer on 7 December 1941 from sabotage?

A. No, sir; I saw no evidence of sabotage, interference, or deception by the enemy, or by local Japanese.

66. Q. You referred to the lack of radio equipment at Kaneohe at the time the station was commissioned. Was this condition remedied prior to the attack on December 7?

A. Yes, sir; the radio equipment was, but the telephone lines were still far from satisfactory. We had made them put in some direct telephone lines and teletype lines, but they were none too good.

67. Q. Were they on the teletype system?

A. There were all kinds of teletype circuits around there. I believe they had a teletype installed between Kaneohe, Com 14 and Ford Island.

68. Q. Were you cognizant of an important dispatch from either the Chief of Staff, Army, or the Chief of Naval Operations, giving a very definite warning of the imminence of hostilities which was delayed in transmission and not received until sometime late on 7 December?

A. Yes, sir. I believe that there was a joint dispatch sent by War and Navy through the War Department, via RCA communications, to Shafter at Honolulu, which was not received at Shafter until after the attack had commenced and was not received by CinCPac until late on

the afternoon of the 7th. I believe that dispatch indicated the immediate opening of hostilities.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter [114] of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 3:40 p. m., adjourned until 11 a. m., tomorrow.

[115]

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 15, 1944

NINTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 11:07 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the eighth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Patrick Neison Lynch Bellinger, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy; Commander, Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, with administrative offices at Norfolk, Virginia.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on the 7th of December, 1941?

A. On the 7th of December, 1941, I was Commander, Patrol Wing Two; I was also controlling Patrol Wing One, which was also based on the Island of Oahu with headquarters at Kaneohe; I was Commander, Fleet Air Detachment on Ford Island; I was Commander, Task Force Nine, which was the Task Force of the patrol planes and tenders and such other units as may be assigned by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; I was also assigned as liaison with the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in connection with aviation facilities being developed at the various outlying islands, such as Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston. In addition, I was Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, which was an organization set up by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and headed by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who was termed Commander, Naval Base Defense Force.

3. Q. Admiral, please relate, approximately, the forces normally included in your command as Commander, Patrol Wing Two, and under your control the forces of Patrol Wing One.

A. There were several squadrons of patrol planes with a total of eighty-one planes on December 7, together with the aircraft tenders assigned.

4. Q. Were there any additional aircraft available to you as the Base Defense Force Air Commander?

A. Under the setup of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, in case of emergency, aircraft of the Navy that were then on shore from carriers and otherwise, came under this Command. However, the fighting planes were further assigned, through my organization, to the Army Fighter Command for operation. [116] Also, such planes of the bombardment type as the Army might make available were subject to my operational control in such capacity.

5. Q. Admiral, will you give us, please, the approximate location, with respect to Oahu and the outlying islands, of the patrol planes on December 7.

A. There were 36 planes at Kaneohe Air Station, 33 planes at Pearl, and 12 planes at Midway. Twelve of the planes at Pearl had returned on 5 December, having had, prior thereto, an extensive tour of duty at Midway and Wake.

6. Q. For how long a period preceding the date of the attack had patrol planes been stationed at Midway and Wake?

A. The squadron I last referred to as having returned to Pearl on 5 December had been stationed at Midway or Wake since 17 October.

7. Q. Were any additional planes sent to the outlying islands between the 27th of November and the 7th of December, 1941?

A. I don't remember the date that one squadron was dispatched to Midway in connection with a Fleet operation in the reenforcement of Wake, but I am practically sure it was prior to November 27, shortly thereto. I don't believe any of my patrol planes were dispatched from the Island of Oahu to outlying islands subsequent to November 27.

8. Q. Do you recall that the Fleet operation to which you referred was the sending of a task force to deliver fighter planes to Wake?

A. Yes.

9. Q. It was that?

A. It was in connection with sending Marine planes to Wake.

10. Q. Admiral, please outline the general nature in the deployment of patrol planes in the several months preceding the attack, that is, the nature of the training and so forth.

A. The main effort was expansion training, expansion meaning the qualifying of personnel to form additional patrol plane crews, and to qualify them all personally in their main job. Shortly before December, the patrol plane squadrons were attached for operational control to various task forces of the Fleet, they worked in connection with the training operations that these task forces were conducting. Later, this organization was done away with and the operation of patrol planes with task forces was done by assignment as directed by higher authority. New planes, with which Patrol Wings One and Two were being equipped, arrived in Oahu in accordance with the following dates: 12 planes, 28 October; 8 planes, 28 October; 12 planes, 8 November; 12 planes, 23 November; 12 planes, 23 November; all of 1941. These planes were the PBY5 type, for which there were scarcely

any spares on hand to maintain. Therefore, a great deal of time and effort was utilized in maintenance difficulties and also in the preparation of this new type of plane for war conditions.

11. Q. Were these operations conducted under an approved quarterly deployment schedule?

A. Yes, under approved schedules. Sometimes they were not quarterly.

12. Q. But they were announced well in advance?

A. Yes.

13. Q. Do you remember how they were classified?

A. I think they were confidential.

[117] 14. Q. Admiral, will you please state the condition of the patrol planes on Oahu on December 7, with respect to their material readiness for operations?

A. In accordance with information I gain from notes made on December 19, 1941, the following was the situation: 36 planes were at Kaneohe; 33 planes at Pearl; and 12 planes at Midway. Of these 81 planes, 9 were under repair; 58 were in commission, and 14 were in the air.

15. Q. Were the Marine planes on Oahu subject to your operational control during emergencies up to 7 December, or were your duties in connection with the Fleet Detachment confined to those planes on Ford Island?

A. In my status as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, the Marine planes functioned under my operational control when drills were scheduled, or when there was an actual emergency. That is, those planes that were made available to me. However, I wish to differentiate between the bombing and scouting planes and the fighting planes, the latter, of course, functioned under the Army Fighter Command.

16. Q. In general, what was the state of training of the patrol plane personnel just prior to 7 December, '41?

A. In general, it was good, but there was a lot actually to be perfected as was proved after December 7. However, we were short of our allocated number of crews for patrol planes, and the main training was the expansion training which was being conducted in order to increase the number of crews that would be available.

17. Q. This examination has received an estimate of the situation which is an inclosure to a letter marked Exhibit 22, which is purportedly approved by you in your capacity as Commander, Naval Air Base Defense Force. I hand you the Exhibit; do you identify the inclosed estimates?

A. Yes, sir. This paper was practically wholly prepared by my organization.

18. Q. Do you have in your custody a copy of the Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41 to which this estimate is a supplement?

A. No.

19. Q. It is noted that this estimate recognizes as possible enemy action almost identical with the action of the Japanese Navy on 7 December 1941, and arrives at decisions for the defense of the ships and installations at Pearl Harbor from such enemy action. I would like to discuss certain aspects of the estimate to obtain additional information with respect thereto and to obtain information as to how the

resultant plan worked out when the attack came. It is noted that the estimate, under "Action open to us", provides for daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees. It further states that this would be desirable but that it could only be effectively maintained with personnel and materiel then available for a short period. Would you please explain more fully the reason that the extended patrols had to be so limited?

A. Because of the number of planes available, the limitations of personnel, and the maintenance problems of the aircraft available. As a regular proposition, it is believed that a crew could conduct one patrol every third day of the type listed in the estimate. Crews have done more than that at times for short periods, but the physical fatigue is something that has to be watched in the conduct of continuous search operations. It was estimated that to conduct a search through 360 degrees, to a distance of at least 800 miles, [118] assuming a 15 mile radius of visibility, would require a daily flight of 84 planes. Therefore, to conduct a continuous search of this type would require an overall force of approximately 200 planes. There is always a question, of the life of the planes versus the physical fatigue of the crew. The planes now stand up and can operate continually more and to a greater extent than can the crews. Therefore, the question of number of planes and number of crews for these planes, in order to place them in the air each day a flight of 84 planes, becomes a matter of adjustment and not a concrete statement as regards to the actual number of planes required. But, undoubtedly, it would require 252 crews and more than 170 planes.

20. Q. Admiral, were considerations given to extending a distance patrol to cover the more important arcs rather than the total of 360 degrees?

A. Many phases of a possible attack were considered, and in air raid drills, our own carriers were used. Their location was unknown even to myself. There was no hard and fixed decision as to what direction a possible attack might be launched, although the wind direction indicated that the northern sector might be more desirable. The location of bases from which such attack might come were in the southwesterly direction.

21. Q. Were not such sectors as a narrow one to the southeastward fairly well covered by the presence of other islands in the chain; another, similarly, northwest toward Midway; and was not the steamer lane to the mainland so well occupied that a narrow sector there also would most likely be unused by the enemy?

A. Yes, sir, that is correct, except that there were no planes operating from outlying islands except Midway at that time.

22. Q. You would not expect an enemy to send in an attack which went anywhere near those rather narrow sectors, would you?

A. No, sir. The enemy, undoubtedly, would endeavor to guard against all detection, shipping, and such other operations as they might assume were in progress.

23. Q. What is the basis of those words in the estimate which you have just stated, that a distant reconnaissance would have to extend to at least 800 miles?

A. The following applies to 22 December conditions: Launching radius of enemy carriers, estimated at 300 nautical miles; enemy's night-run, estimated at 27 knots times 13 hours, equals 351 miles;

enemy's day run, before search planes reach 300 mile radius, 81 miles; radius to cover effective at dark, 732 miles. The PBY plane was the only type of plane the Navy had to conduct this search with, and 800 miles was considered about the maximum length of leg that could be carried out by the PBY plane. And to give another estimate for the PBY on the basis of 25 miles visibility, I quote the following: "Radius of delay search, 800 miles; number of searching planes daily, 25 mile visibility, 50; flight times per search plane, 16½ hours; total planes hours per month, 24,750; total number of planes required, 150; number of flight crews required, 225; engine changes per month, average, 82½; spare engines required, 182; fuel consumption per month, gallons of gasoline, 1,980,000; search effectiveness estimated at 50 per cent."

24. Q. Was the 300 miles estimated as an enemy launching radius rather a high estimate?

A. Yes, I thought they would come in closer, but that was selected as giving the enemy the advantage in the estimate.

[119] 25. Q. Admiral, were the PBY patrol bombers equipped with radar at that time, that is, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No.

26. Q. Did conditions of personnel and materiel improve between the 31st of March, 1941, the date of the estimate, and December 7, 1941?

A. In this way only, that gradually facilities were being built up, that obsolete planes were gradually being replaced, that more materiel was gradually being sent out, but even up until November 23, when I received word from an officer who had just arrived in a ferry flight from the Pacific Coast and who had made a special trip to Washington for me, informed me that from all information he could receive, the Atlantic was receiving the priorities.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

27. Q. Were these changes sufficient to cause you to reconsider your estimate of the situation made in March of '41—were there enough differences?

A. Changes?

28. Q. You stated that they did improve somewhat, and I wondered if you considered them sufficient—

A. No; by no means.

29. Q. The estimate further provides that in view of the difficulties that you have just discussed, extensive daily patrols could not be undertaken unless intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable within rather narrow time limits. Did you receive intelligence of this nature prior to the December 7 attack?

A. No.

30. Q. Also as an enclosure with Exhibit 22 before this examination is a supplement, or annex, to a plan signed by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. I show it to you. Do you recognize it?

A. Yes.

31. Admiral, did you consider that this agreement authorized you, acting under Commander Base Defense Force, to call on the Army Air Forces in Hawaii, for planes of an appropriate type that they might

have, to augment your available planes for search purposes, in the absence of a declared or recognized emergency?

A. No, it did not give me that authority, and any time that use of Army planes was involved, and they were involved only prior to December the 7th in case of drill, special arrangements had to be made ahead of time in order to utilize Army planes in the drill, and on account of failure to get joint action in these drills, it was necessary to set up a pre-determined schedule for drills which the Army was asked to agree to. The Army's point of view was that they were so busy training their personnel that they could not divert them to drills. If you will note in this paper, in paragraph 2, "When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each Commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other Commander such a portion of the air forces at his disposal. . . ." and so forth. That was one of the main impediments of this agreement and of this organization. No air [120] defense can be effective unless it is functioning 24 hours every day, and this set-up that existed in the Hawaiian Islands was a paper organization which could not really function to prevent, or take action in an air attack. It was not the primary objective of either Army or Navy. There was no unity of command or control.

32. Q. Was the paragraph 2, of this annex to which you have just referred, used prior to the attack so as to bring the plan into effect?

A. Actually, no. At time of attack, I received no word from anybody. We took action directly with the Bomber Command, General Rudolph, and he agreed to do all he could in carrying out my desires.

33. Q. However, could not an agreement between you and your opposite number in the air, as to correct action, have been reached under a declaration by the highest echelon that danger of attack existed, or even if the two of you, from what you knew, had made such an estimate?

A. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and myself, were in very close accord on many subjects and we worked together in drills, outside of air raid drills. If he saw or I saw an emergency situation, I feel very sure that he would have cooperated in any specific instance.

34. Q. Admiral, you have several times referred to "drills". Did you include in this, regular tactical exercises, involving units of the Fleet, carriers, and so forth?

A. What did you say?

35. Q. Did you include in that term "drills", regular scheduled tactical exercises?

A. That was other than air raid drills, I am speaking about.

36. Q. Yes, but that includes regular Fleet tactical exercises in which the Army Air participated?

A. No, these were special drills or exercises that were arranged between the Army Air Force Commander and myself.

37. Q. Did not the Army also participate in some of the Fleet exercise periods with their Air arm?

A. Yes, by special arrangement.

38. Q. Did the conditions as to cooperation which you have mentioned apply in the same manner as they did during your drills arranged among the Air Commanders?

A. Yes.

39. Q. Admiral, had you been physically present in Pearl Harbor in the week or so preceding the attack on 7 December?

A. Yes, I was at my quarters, and in bed with the "Flu" for approximately five days prior to December 7th, and December 7th was to be my first day up from the "Flu".

40. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch, which is Exhibit 6 before this examination. Do you recognize that dispatch as one you saw prior to the attack?

A. I don't recall ever seeing that.

[121] 41. Q. It is noted from your testimony that on the day following the date of this dispatch certain patrol planes were dispatched to Midway. Was this in accordance with and in compliance with orders of higher authority, sir?

A. Yes, sir.

42. Q. Do you recall whether the dispatching of that squadron had been planned in advance, or whether it was a sudden decision?

A. I think it was a sudden decision by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

43. Q. Were you advised of the reason for dispatching the squadron at that time?

A. I don't think so, except that, as I remember, it was done in connection with reenforcements at Midway, and, later, at Wake.

44. Q. Admiral, I show you another dispatch, which is Exhibit 7 before this examination. Had you seen that prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No.

45. Q. And another dispatch, Exhibit 8; had you seen that prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No.

46. Q. Were you advised—

A. (Interposing) As a matter of fact, I didn't see it until about five days afterward, when Admiral Kimmel showed it to me; after December 7.

47. Q. Were you advised, in any manner, of the receipt of a dispatch of this nature about this time?

A. No, not prior to December 7.

48. Q. I show you Exhibit 9. Had you seen that prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No.

49. Q. Had you seen the dispatch, Exhibit 11?

A. No.

50. Q. Was any other intelligence relating to American-Japanese relations, or the Pacific situation, received either from local or other sources which caused you to extend the air patrols prior to the launching of the attack on December 7?

A. The newspapers, of course, were all alarming; rather, the newspapers indicated a critical situation. I was reading those. There

were no special flights that were carried out, other than the training exercises and the security flights that were ordered by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

51. Q. I had in mind, Admiral, the revision of the estimate to the effect that extensive patrols could not be undertaken unless intelligence indicates that a surface raid was probable, within rather narrow time limits. None of the intelligence information received by you, if you did receive any, was sufficient to bring about the exception here to your patrols so as to cause you to expand the areas patrolled by air?

A. In order to expand the patrols to the extent that would have been necessary to get early information of an approaching force, it would have [122] been necessary for me to take the question up with higher authority, in order to carry out such employment of my forces. That would have been either through the District Commandant, who was Commander of the Naval Base Defense Force, of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The situation in the Pacific had been critical for sometime, but at some times it had appeared to be more critical. It was a question, from the newspaper accounts, of whether the situation was more critical prior to December the 7th then it had ever been before, or not.

52. Q. Did you receive orders from higher authority in the period between 27 November and 7 December to extend the air patrol in any way?

A. Not from Oahu; only in connection with the operations that were taking place at Midway and Wake, and that was for a particular reason with reference to our own forces that were in that vicinity.

53. Q. During those days of your illness, did you do any business at all, or did the officer who normally would succeed you, carry on the work of your command?

A. He came in to confer with me, brought papers for signature, but relieved me of most of the work of the command.

54. Q. Who was he?

A. Captain Logan Ramsey.

55. Q. And you received nothing from him other than, as you have stated, what was in the newspapers, indicating any particular reason for thinking of security in Pearl Harbor?

A. No, sir.

56. Q. It appears that very important information and Navy Department directives were not passed to you. Being a very important subordinate commander, I have to ask how Admiral Kimmel did get advice and information concerning air matters. Insofar as you know, who acted along that line?

A. I dealt directly with Admiral Kimmel quite considerably, and also with his Aviation Aide, who was Captain Davis and Admiral Kimmel seemed to be very much interested in aviation matters.

57. Q. Did you ever talk over with him the possibility of a carrier raid by the Japanese?

A. No, not in conversation. The actual wording of the estimate was never discussed with Admiral Kimmel. In fact, it was never discussed to my knowledge, except in my own organization and with the Army personnel concerned; Army and Air personnel concerned.

However, this estimate was part of the original assignment given me by Admiral Kimmel in connection with his desire to bring about a coordinated scheme of air defense of Oahu.

58. Q. Then insofar as you knew, Admiral Kimmel had never paid any unusual attention to that part of the Army and Navy joint estimate which set forth the possibility of the carrier raid; is that true?

A. Not to my knowledge did he go into any particular phase of it. He knew, of course, of all that had been done in the work with the Army in bringing about this organization, but I was not satisfied with the organization and I so expressed to him and I am sure that he was not, for the simple reason that it was based on too much cooperation and also on the assumption that it would go into effect when an emergency arose, and no organization of this kind is any good unless it functions twenty-four hours a day prior to any air attack, completely and fully manned. And there were insufficient [123] personnel actually in my establishment to have such an organization functioning that way, and I am sure it was the same with the Army.

59. Q. As regards Admiral Bloch, under whom you acted in a certain capacity, did you have frequent conversations with him concerning this same general subject?

A. Yes, sir; but not too frequently. At the beginning when the organization was being set up, I worked with Admiral Bloch, either personally or with his representatives, considerably. Later I took up with him matters in connection with arrangements for air raid drills or matters pertaining to failure of the organization to function particularly as applicable to the Army. As he was not an air man, I only took those subjects up with him that I felt he should know and which he, through his relationship with the Commanding General of the Army, could rectify.

60. Q. As the tenseness of the situation in the Pacific grew, during, say, October and November, there was no particular conversation thereby instituted with Admiral Bloch, is that true?

A. I had many conversations about the various aviation developments that were in his District. The prior answer was with reference to the air defense, only; but since all aviation developments such as at the outlying islands and Kaneohe and Pearl were under Admiral Bloch, many of these matters came up for discussion and they likewise had a bearing on the air defense of that area.

61. Q. Having participated in that joint estimate back in March, 1941, as the tenseness of the situation in the Pacific grew, did not those portions of the estimate dealing with the carrier raid come back into your mind?

A. Yes, sir. I remember discussing the subject matter with a high Navy Department official during his visit to Oahu, wherein he complimented me on the organization that had been set up, indicating cooperation with the Army, and I told him that that was all right, but it wouldn't work in case of war. He mentioned that practically, we were at war, and I stated "Well, true, but not shooting war, yet, in the Pacific." I indicated that there must be unity of command to make it work and also additional facilities and equipment.

The witness was duly warned.

The examining officer then, at 12:45 p. m. took a recess until 2:00 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

(Examination by the examining officer continued:)

62. Q. It has been brought out in other testimony that the estimated most [124] probable courses of Jap action in a surprise attack would be either a submarine attack on ships at sea or a sabotage on Oahu, or both. Were you concurring in those opinions in late November, 1941?

A. Yes, sir, I concurred in the opinion that there might be Jap submarine activity and also sabotage on the Island of Oahu. Of course, I did not discount the other possibilities as indicated in the estimate, but I thought it most probably would be a submarine attack or sabotage.

63. Q. Admiral, during your testimony, with respect to the plan for the deployment of aircraft, through the means of mutual cooperation, you have expressed your opinion to the effect that this was not the best plan which might be used. Did you make any recommendations or take any action with respect to higher authority changing the method of command at Oahu?

A. I didn't think that any joint plan, based on cooperation alone, would function or could function properly in an emergency, and I mentioned my more or less dissatisfaction with the general setup of this air defense, both personally in conversation to Admiral Kimmel and also at one time to Mr. Forrestal, the Under Secretary of Navy.

64. Q. Admiral, were you responsible in any way for the defense of outlying islands, such as Midway and Wake?

A. No, except in this way, that in the war plans of the Pacific, prior to December 7, my job was to control the air operations from Wake, Midway, Palmyra, and Johnston, with headquarters on Midway.

65. Q. Were these to be offensive or defensive deployments?

A. Presumably both, insofar as the forces available and the situation demanded.

66. Q. Did your responsibility in this respect cause you any concern or preoccupy your mind in the days prior to the attack with respect to your more immediate duties at Oahu?

A. My immediate duties at Oahu was expansion training rather than defensive operations against a possible attack. The need for this expansion training in aviation was very vital because every operating outfit was concerned in this expansion, and qualified personnel were being drawn from operating units to be sent to training establishments for further expansion in training. As a consequence, the expansion training was vital and that was what was stressed by high authority. Now with reference to anything taking my mind away from the situation, I was vitally concerned and worried about the lack of many things that were required in the Pacific area which Honolulu represented the main base of, as official correspondence will

show. But you must remember that this Naval Base Air Defense was an organization set up to meet an emergency. It was hoped that that emergency would arrive after prior information which would set the organization in operation.

67. Q. I had particular reference to your planning preparation of security measures under your duties as the Base Defense Air Commander and possibility of the responsibility for defense of the outlying islands, and the need for employment of aircraft there, amounting to a concern and preoccupation in connection therewith.

A. The planes which I had command of, insofar as outlying islands were concerned, had no particularly offensive ability. That is, the patrol planes, except within limitations. To indicate my concern, with reference to these outlying islands, I would like to refer you to a letter which I wrote the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from Commander, Patrol Wing Two, Serial No. 0026, dated 22 October 1941, subject: Types of combatant aircraft for a [125] Pacific campaign, in which I stressed the need for 160 long-range, high-speed, land plane bombers, and 160 interceptor fighters for operations in connection with Midway and Wake Islands, and also the development of these Islands to accommodate operating complements of these planes.

68. Q. Admiral, in your estimate of the situation, dated 31 March 1941, which is a part of Exhibit 22 before this investigation, you pointed out that long-range or distance reconnaissance was possible only for short periods of time when intelligence reports indicated a probable attack on Oahu. Did both the Naval Base Defense Officer and the Commander-in-Chief know that that situation continued to obtain up to December 7?

A. I'm practically sure that they did. The Commander-in-Chief was very aware of the spare part problem with which we were confronted with reference to the 54 planes of the PBY5 type.

69. Q. Whose responsibility was it to order distance reconnaissance when it was indicated that there was a probability of an attack on Oahu?

A. I would assume it to have been that of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. If an emergency was apparent, I would have taken the initiative, and I am very sure that the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District would have taken the initiative, but lacking definite information, then, in view of the employment of forces involved, it becomes a question of authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

70. Q. Admiral, please outline the patrols that were maintained prior to the attack on the morning of 7 December 1941.

A. There were three planes on patrol on the morning of 7 December 1941 whose job was to search the operating areas being utilized by units of the Fleet on that day in the early morning. This form of security patrol was a daily routine occurrence in accordance with instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. That was from Oahu. From Midway, seven planes were conducting a search between 120 to 170 degrees from Midway for a distance of 450 miles.

71. Q. Was that also a normal routine search?

A. The one from Midway was a special search, conforming to an operation directed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

72. Q. Were there any normal, daily searches made from Midway by patrol planes?

A. When planes are based on an island, they conducted search operations from that island, but, normally, they were not based on Islands except for special circumstances.

73. Q. Please relate, if it is within your knowledge, the searches conducted from Midway on 6 December 1941.

A. On 29 November, a squadron at Midway was directed to search area within 100 miles of Midway daily and to be prepared to shift base to Wake. There is an operation order issued by me as Commander, Task Force 9, to Patrol Squadrons 21 and 22 and Commander, Task Group 9.2, which required prescribed flights on certain days from Midway. On December 5, the requirement was to search Sector 126-168 to 525 miles, using 6 planes. The searches from Midway and also from Wake were in connection with a task force that was augmenting air strength on Wake, and the completion of that assignment in connection with Wake was supposed to be on the 5th of December, I believe. The operation order that I'm referring to is in Mailgram from ComTaskForce-Nine, No. 292103 of November, 1941. I do not recall the searches made from Midway on 6 December 1941.

[126] 74. Q. Admiral, with respect to the conditions of readiness prescribed in the estimate, please relate the condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December, prior to the attack.

A. The following was the condition of readiness of patrol planes of Patrol Wings One and Two on the morning of December 7: VP-21: 7 planes in the air conducting search 120 degrees to 170 degrees to a distance of 450 miles from Midway; 4 planes on the surface at Midway armed, each with two 500-lb. bombs and on 10 minute notice. VP-11 at Kaneohe: 12 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice. VP-12 at Kaneohe: 6 planes ready for flight on 30 minutes notice: 5 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice. VP-14 at Kaneohe: 3 planes in the air on morning security patrol, armed with depth charges; 3 planes ready for flight on 30 minutes notice; 4 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice. VP-22 at Pearl Harbor: 12 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice. VP-23 at Pearl Harbor: 11 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice. VP-24 at Pearl Harbor: 4 planes in the air conducting intertype tactics with U. S. submarines; 1 plane ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. All planes were equipped with machine guns and ammunition.

75. Q. What planes for distant reconnaissance did General Rudolph's routine report of 5 or 6 December make ready to you for that week-end?

A. In a dispatch dated December 5, from the Headquarters, Hawaiian Air Force, stated that there were available 8 B-17's, 21 B-18's, and 6 A-20's, all in Condition Easy 5, which is as follows: "All aircraft conducting routine operations. None ready for the purpose of this plan. Degree of readiness: All types, 4 hours." Of the above planes, the only types for really effective search missions were the B-17 type. The B-18 and the A-20 were effective for short-range bombing.

76. Q. Who established this condition of readiness with respect to the Navy planes?

A. The condition of readiness of aircraft, with respect to air raid precautions, was set by the Commander, Naval Base Defense, or higher authority.

77. Q. Were you satisfied with the prescribed condition of readiness, if you recollect?

A. With the work in hand and under the conditions as I saw them, yes. One must remember that the situation in the Pacific, so far as anticipating an emergency, had been going on for sometime.

78. Q. Admiral, you have testified with respect to the report of available planes made to you by the Army. Did you make a similar report of naval planes available, addressed to the Army?

A. I did.

79. Q. Will you please give us the substance of that report?

A. On 6 December, I quote a dispatch to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, from Commander, Naval Defense Air Force: "7 fighters, 5 Condition 5. 9 scouts, 3 Condition 4, 6 Condition 5." Condition 4 means all types ready in two hours. Condition 5 means all types ready in four hours.

80. Q. Did this include the Marine Corps planes available ashore?

A. I think that this was entirely the Marines, although I'm not positive. I quote another dispatch from the Marine Air Group in reporting their readiness to Commander, Patrol Wing Two: "18 scout bombers: 3 Condition 4. 15 [127] scout bombers, Condition 5. For December 5, 6, and 7."

81. Q. Admiral, we do not have your Air Force Operation Plan No. A-41. Was that plan actually in effect prior to the attack?

A. The plan, as a plan that would go into a functioning state when put into such a state, was in effect prior to December 7, but the plan was not a functioning affair except when placed into being.

82. Did the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor place it into being?

A. The Japanese attack did place it into being. There were no orders received by me from any higher authority prior to starting all action that could be taken.

83. Q. The plans, then, for coordination and exchange of planes between the Army and Navy, became effective with the initiation of the Japanese attack?

A. It did.

84. Q. How many of the Army planes reported available actually reported to you after the attack was initiated and the plan became effective?

A. That is a question I was never able to find out. It finally became a question of asking General Rudolph to get planes going as soon as he could on prescribed searches which I requested. We did have certain information as to what the Army sent out but I never was convinced of the accuracy of what actually went out and what they actually did.

85. Q. Were communications established between any of these Army bombers and you as the Air Commander?

A. No. The control of communications between the plane and the base was internal in the Army, and the Navy did not have communications with the Army planes in the air. Any communications to or from the planes was transmitted to the Army planes from the Army Base. That condition prevailed for several months after December 7 when it was finally arranged to set up a communication arrangement within

the bombing planes of the Army so that we could get communication direct with all planes, Army and Navy, that were functioning on the same mission.

86. Q. Do you know if any of the Army planes established communications with your subordinates in the air after the attack was initiated?

A. No, none that I know of, and I'm sure that there was none.

[128] Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

87. Q. In general, Admiral Bellinger, what was the state—what was the adequacy of radio communications available to you for handling your aircraft in the air?

A. We were actually able to communicate with planes in the air from our Base. The communication system utilized was the installations at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor. To meet the various conditions of air operations that were required, considerably more communication facilities were established both at Kaneohe and at Pearl, even to the extent of building, subsequent to December the 7th, a communication and air control center. The difficulty of communication between Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe, itself, was considerable.

88. Q. Did communication or radio matters of this type, that is, the material angle, come under the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and his Communications Officer—that is, base?

A. The shore-based installations came under the air stations which, in turn, came under the Commandant.

89. Q. Was the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District familiar with your deficiencies in the radio field?

A. I feel that he was familiar with it, because I endeavored to keep him acquainted with deficiencies.

90. Q. Was the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, familiar with this problem?

A. Yes, I feel very sure he was familiar with it.

91. Q. Admiral, was any remedial action taken by your superiors with respect to your communications deficiencies prior to December 7?

A. Yes. I would say the answer to that question is, "Yes." Action was being taken, an effort was being made to improve deficiencies, but the question was always, with us, would the deficiencies be provided in time.

92. Q. And it turned out they were not?

A. Not in all respects. I would like to refer to a letter, which was one of the first letters I wrote upon my arrival in Pearl Harbor, concerning deficiencies with which I was concerned in that area. This is a confidential letter, File Number 022, of 16 January 1941, from Commander Patrol Wing Two, to the Chief of Naval Operations, Subject: "Patrol Wing Two—readiness of."

93. Q. Admiral, I show you a letter which has been obtained from the Secret-Confidential Files of the Navy Department. Is that the letter to which you refer?

A. It is.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the confidential nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to Secret-Confidential Files

of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 24".

[129] 94. Q. Admiral, of the planes reported by you as available to the Army, how many of these planes actually reported to the Army after the attack was initiated?

A. That, I am unable to say. I feel very sure that the planes referred to were the Marine planes based at Ewa, and I feel very sure that these Marine planes were damaged by machine-gun fire from enemy planes on December 7.

95. Q. Admiral, were you advised of a contact with a Japanese submarine on the morning of 7 December 1941, prior to the launching of the air attack?

A. No.

96. Q. I mean, it happened prior to the launching of the air attack?

A. Prior to the attack?

97. Q. Yes.

A. No, I was not informed, evidently, because of my being laid up, as soon as I might otherwise have been informed. One reason for the delay in the knowledge of the presence of an enemy submarine was the fact that the dispatch informing the forces of this fact were coded, which caused delay both in sending and in receiving.

98. Q. Do you know if any of your subordinates were informed of this contact prior to the time the Japanese launched their air attack?

A. This is a narrative of events in accordance with data taken from an official letter prepared by me on 20 December: "0700 Patrol Plane 14P(1) sighted and attacked enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance. 0715 Message coded and transmitted to Base. 0735 Message decoded and information received by Staff Duty Officer. 0737 Message relayed to Operations Officer. 0740 Message relayed by telephone to Staff Duty Officer of Commander-in-Chief. 0750 Search plan drafted by Operations Officer. 0757 First bomb dropped near VP-22 hangar. 0758 Message broadcast to all ships present 'AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL'. 0800 Search plan transmitted by radio and telephone and received by some of the planes in the air at 0805."

99. Q. Admiral, your estimate of the situation—

A. (Interposing) Excuse me. You asked me when did I know about that?

100. Q. Yes.

A. I didn't know about it until I arrived at the office. My first information was by telephone from my Operations Officer that we were under air attack. The plane that sighted and attacked the submarine assumed that he sank or damaged same. This was, I believe, the opinion expressed by the destroyer which aided also in the attack.

101. Q. Admiral, your estimate of the situation, enclosed with Exhibit 22, in its list of decisions, states: "Provided a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when * * * (c) information is received that attack has been made on Fleet units." I assume that the operation plan which was built around this estimate contained a similar provision. Do you consider that the episode of the submarine would have the effect of placing your operations plan into

execution as soon as this information reached the higher command authorities?

A. That is a doubtful question, whether it would have or not, as the Army aircraft were concerned.

[130] 102. Q. Admiral, was any attempt made, that you had, at your Command Headquarters, to relay the information of an attack on the submarine to the Army Air Forces authorities?

A. I don't know of any action of that kind. It went to the Commander-in-Chief's office, his Staff Duty Officer. I don't think it went to the Army. Normally, it would not have gone to the Army because it is doubtful what action they would have taken in connection with that particular submarine. There was grave doubt in the mind of the pilot of the plane, at the first sighting, whether that was an enemy submarine or merely one of our submarines, on account of its location relative to the destroyer, and its location relative to the entrance, but having no information of a U. S. submarine in that area, he then definitely assumed that it must be an enemy submarine.

103. Q. If a message had been relayed to the Army that an enemy submarine had been sunk, would that have placed your air operating plan in effect?

A. I doubt it. I think it would have required some higher authority in the Army to place it in effect. Now, in order to amplify that statement, I would like to refer to an air raid drill which was planned by the Army subsequent to the joint estimate and orders issued setting up the air defense plan. During one night, prior to the operations for the next day, I received a message stating that the Bomber Command was no longer subject to the orders of Commander, Patrol Wing Two. I wondered what was the matter. I finally found out that the Army wanted to revert to the old "Joint Action" wherein, if the Navy wanted the Army to assist, it was necessary for the Navy command to so request the Army. Therefore, in the early morning, at 5:00 o'clock, the Army Bomber Command asked if I was going to request the Army to assist. I informed him that I did not understand that that was necessary in our agreement, that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, was the only one to ask the Army to assist. He stated he would like to participate in this drill. I said I would give him the information and he could act as he saw fit, and in accordance with his orders. After that, I made an official report of same to the Commander-in-Chief and also the Commander, Naval Base Defense, and also prepared a letter for the Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, to General Short, trying to straighten this out. In other words, to place the plan for air defense into effect evidently required authorization from higher Army authority for each instance. My letter, just referred to, was designed to correct that situation.

104. Q. Admiral, please outline the operations of the Search and Attack Group under your command, after the attack was initiated by the Japanese.

A. In accordance with my data, which I think is correct, planes of various types, including patrol planes, utility planes, VOVs planes, and Army planes—were dispatched covering sectors primarily from the North through Southwest. Three B-17's were requested to make the flight covering a sector through 165 True to 095. This was at the instance of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, who, from certain information, felt that the Japanese carrier force was in that area.

utility, eleven patrol planes, and six VOVs planes, and nine planes were the Navy planes participating. The total Army's participating were five B-17's, three B-18's, and six A-20's.

105. Q. What else, upon what information was the choice of sectors searched based?

A. Wind direction, the general relative strategic locations, and the general information as developed from the departing Japanese planes.

106. Q. Do you know what information the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had as a basis of the search to the southeasterly?

A. A radio bearing, I presume.

[131] 107. Q. Admiral, please give us, along broad lines, such information or even impressions as you had, say, November, 1941, as regards the ability of the Army Interceptor Command to carry out its commitments toward protecting Pearl Harbor from an air raid.

A. My impression might be expressed by saying that the Army was not ready to perform their part in the protection of Pearl Harbor, and I might say that the need for training of their personnel was one of the reasons brought up for their reluctance to have air raid drills prior to December the 7th. I would say that they were not ready, from the point of view of their radar installations, their ability to control their fighter groups, in the number of planes they had, and in the quality of the general run of their pilots.

108. Q. Did you ever advise either Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch to that effect?

A. Not in so many words, but there were conversations in regard to what the Army was able to do and in regard to the number of planes, and it was also known that the Air Control Center of the Army Interceptor Command was in process of being organized.

109. Q. During your association with the Army, did you ever detect any prevalent belief that they expected the Navy's forces at sea to intercept a carrier raid?

A. No, but in discussing various plans with the Commanding General, Air Force, Hawaiian Area, he apparently expected the Navy to have early information of the movement of enemy forces, so that a raid might be anticipated more definitely.

110. Q. Have you any idea upon what they based that impression?

A. He assumed that the intelligence service would give that information and he seemed surprised when I told him that we should not expect such information.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

111. Q. Did you know, prior to 7 December, of Admiral Yamamoto's previous experience with the Navy Air?

A. Yes, I think so.

112. Were you ever told anything about his personal characteristics?

A. I have read—I'm not sure whether it was prior to December 7, or not, about his characteristics.

113. Q. You have testified concerning the inadequacy of our planes suitable for reconnaissance to extend the full 360 degrees search to the distance deemed requisite. Did it ever occur to you to have ready modified plan, confining the search to the most probable areas, so that

you would more or less build your suit in accord with the amount of cloth that was available?

A. Yes, and that was actually proved in practice in what we subsequently did with the planes we had available in the daily search that started on December 7.

114. Q. Did you ever get so far along that line as to have what might be termed an "As-Is" plan for air reconnaissance, based upon what was actually available?

A. Subsequent to December 7, there was a daily search conducted. There were so many planes available—

[132] 115. Q. Not before December 7?

A. We had search plans made to cover various distances and various sectors and depending upon the number of planes available for search, the sector to be placed in that part of the compass rose where the most logical location of enemy forces were assumed to be.

116. Q. In your previous testimony, I believe you stated that under the full 360 degree reconnaissance you expected about a fifty per cent chance of sighting an enemy within the waters covered; is that correct?

A. Correct.

117. Q. So that even if you had, prior to December 7, been supplied with planes and had actually carried on such a search, that fifty per cent measures about what you thought at the time of the chances. In the light of subsequent experience, what did you think of the correctness of that figure, fifty per cent?

A. I think the fifty per cent would be raised considerably because of the development of radar.

118. Q. Without radar?

A. The fifty per cent was based on twenty-five mile visibility and the various conditions of visibility in the Pacific are quite changeable. Perhaps fifty per cent may be underestimating, but in judging from reports of per cent of coverage of the sectors, assigned individual planes, on search flights subsequent to December 7, considerable areas were poorly covered on account of the weather condition.

119. Q. In view of that degree of probability of detection in a carrier raid, what other instrumentality, which would have been available on December 7, '41, would have given a greater measure of security?

A. You mean in addition to aircraft?

120. Q. No, in lieu of.

A. Considering what was available, I know of nothing more that would give more practical assurance of timely information.

121. Q. What about radar?

A. If radar had been available, then, as it is today, of course the search by planes would have been very much more effective.

122. Q. Was search radar not developed to a high degree of efficiency at that time?

A. No.

123. Q. Were our ships not equipped with search radar that was reasonably efficient at that time?

A. Some were equipped, but all of them were not equipped. Some few ships were equipped.

124. Q. How about those that had the equipment, were they not efficient?

A. They were not as effective as they are today. However, it was a great advantage to have radar and every effort was being made, I know, to get them on ships, particularly aircraft carriers.

125. Q. Radar on shore was under Army cognizance, was it not?

A. Yes, sir.

[133] 126. Q. As far as you know, was the quality of the material available to the Army inefficient?

A. I would say that it was not completely effective; even sometime after Pearl Harbor, many planes arrived without being detected.

127. Q. Admiral, am I correct in saying that you had two commands during the weeks prior to December 7, one Commander of Patrol Wing Two, directly under Aircraft Scouting Force, who, in turn, came directly under the Commander-in-Chief; and, two, Naval Base Defense Air Officer, directly under the Naval Base Defense Officer, who was Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, who, in turn, came under the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Yes, sir.

128. Q. All of the distance reconnaissances contemplated in your estimate of the situation, dated 31 March, contemplated by JCD-42 and the addendum thereto, would all be carried out in your capacity as Naval Base Defense Air Officer, would they not?

A. Yes.

129. Q. That being the case, would you give us your reasons why, earlier in the day, you said that you looked to the Commander-in-Chief and not to the Naval Base Defense Officer, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, for directives as to whether a long-distance reconnaissance was necessary because of developments?

A. Normally speaking, the reason for long-distance reconnaissance would be known to the Commander-in-Chief prior to its being known to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and, in view of the fact that the deployment of planes, as units of the Fleet, under the Commander-in-Chief, must be known to him in order that he would know what he had available to use at any time when he wanted to use them. So that, acting for the Commander-in-Chief, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District might start action, but presumably I would get the word from the Commander-in-Chief, perhaps at the same time that he got it. Although, in an emergency, the set-up of the organization did give the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, as Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, the authority to start action.

130. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff fully realize that you looked directly to them for instructions on distant reconnaissance rather than to the immediate superior under the plans, the Naval Base Defense Force Commander?

A. Actually, I looked to the Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, and when I arranged or when a drill was arranged, it was arranged either by my initiating it to him or by his initiating it, but in view of my relationship with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, I felt that he should know how his planes were being employed and he always knew when a drill or operation of that kind was in progress.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of

record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

[134] The witness made the following statement: Prior to his assuming command of the Pacific Fleet, I called upon Admiral Kimmel to offer my congratulations. During my visit he expressed his interest in the aviation situation in the Hawaiian area and indicated that when he assumed charge of the Pacific Fleet he would take steps to bring about a coordinated Army-Navy plan for air defense. Shortly after Admiral Kimmel assumed command of the Pacific Fleet he sent for me and told me to report to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District for the purpose of working out an Air Defense Plan in conjunction with the General in command of the Army Air Forces, Hawaiian Area. I proceeded on the duty assigned working closely with the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. The Army Air Forces did not take the initiative in the preparation of the Air Defense Plan but followed along with the Navy, although it is stated in an official report of an Army-Navy Board concerning aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian area, dated 31 October, 1941, signed by Major General Commanding Army Air Forces, Hawaiian Islands, and myself, "The mission of the Army in Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out this mission is: (1) To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action by bombardment aviation. (2) To detect, intercept, and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit aviation." The joint estimate of the situation was practically in toto prepared by Patrol Wing Two and from this emanated the orders prepared by Patrol Wing Two and by the Army Air Forces. As a result, there were evolved plans and a skeletonized organization which were to be placed into effect either by higher authority or by an emergency. The basis of coordination was to be by mutual cooperation. Although it was realized that facilities, personnel, and equipment were inadequate for proper and continuous air defense, the main idea was to evolve a plan and organization that would make the most of the tools that were available and conditions that were existing. It is foolish to think that such a skeletonized organization functioning on the basis of cooperation by the Navy and Army Air Forces and set up to be put in motion by special orders or by an emergency occurring, remaining practically non-existent except during periodic drills, could go into action and function effectively at the occurrence of an actual emergency. An organization of this nature to be effective must function twenty-four hours every day, and prior to an air raid not subsequent thereto. However, considering shortages, and deficiencies, other necessary employment of forces, such as expansion training and development of facilities, and lacking unity of command, little if any more in the way of readiness could be expected. It is believed that Admiral Kimmel saw this picture very realistically and I know of no man who, under the circumstances, could have done more. I know this, that the existing deficiencies, the varied duties and schedules of employment, the lack of authority due to lack of unity of command, placed the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force in a very embarrassing position.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 4:35 p. m., adjourned until 10 a. m. tomorrow.

[135] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 1944

TENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 10:14 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the ninth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Wilson Brown, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Naval Aide to the President of the United States.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on the 7th of December, 1941, sir?

A. I was in command of what was known as Task Force 3 of the Pacific Fleet. My orders to sea duty designated me as Commander, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet. I am not quite sure whether my orders from the Navy Department were ever changed from Scouting Fleet to Commander of the Task Force. The thought has just occurred to me, I rather think they were, but my orders on December 7 as Commander, Scouting Force, may not be correct.

3. Q. In the weeks leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, did you not have administrative duties in connection with the Scouting Force, in addition to your duties as Task Force Commander?

A. No, I never had any administrative duties. The administration was carried out by type commanders and as the Commander of the Scouting Force, I had no matters of administration. I had, by designation, some administrative duties ashore which had to do with some of the recreation bases for the men and other administrative duties that had to do with preparation for amphibious warfare.

4. Q. Did you perform such duties as the approval of the employment schedule, which included submarines and aircraft of the Scouting force?

A. I don't understand that.

[136] 5. Q. Did your duties include the approval of the quarterly employment schedule for submarines which were included in the Scouting Force?

A. No, the employment schedule for the Fleet was prepared by the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, after discussion and consultation with task force commanders, but the schedule was prepared by the Commander-in-Chief for the entire Fleet and all of its units.

6. Q. Admiral, will you please state where you personally were on the 7th of December, 1941?

A. I was on board the U. S. S. INDIANAPOLIS, which was my Flagship at that time. I arrived at Johnston Island almost at the exact moment that we received a dispatch that Pearl Harbor had been attacked.

7. Q. Admiral, this is a calendar covering that period; it is in columns here, sir. We would like, if you can give it, your statement as to where you were during the period from the 26th of November through the 6th of December?

A. Well, I tried to refresh my memory yesterday from reading the record that was given to me of the Roberts Board testimony, and there still remains in my mind some doubt as to whether I returned from a tour at sea of about ten days on the 26th of November or the 27th. It was about that time. In other words, I know that I left Pearl Harbor on the 5th of December. I had been in Pearl Harbor for a period of about one week, possibly eight days, and if it was a week, that would have meant returning on the 28th, and if it was ten days, it would have meant returning on the 26th. So there is an element of doubt in my mind as to when I arrived. I could find out from my record, if it is a matter of moment.

8. Q. Admiral, you stated that you returned to Pearl Harbor, after a period at sea, at about the 26th to the 28th of November. Could you please state how long you had been at sea prior to your return at that time?

A. Not with certainty. My belief is that it was a period of about eight or nine days at sea.

Q. How long had you been in port prior to that period at sea?

A. I have records at home from which I can give those exact dates, but my memory is not sufficiently accurate for me to attempt to say without consulting them. In general, the periods at sea and the periods in port varied between one week and ten days.

Memo: The examining officer directed the witness to consult his records and make such further response as they indicate necessary to complete his answer before verifying his testimony.

A. (Continued. See Record Page 170.) My personal records indicate that Task Force 3 returned to Pearl Harbor from sea on 26 November; remained in port until 5 December and sailed for assigned missions at sea on 5 December.

10. Q. Admiral, as a Task Force Commander, and one of the senior Admirals of the Pacific Fleet, during the period preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, it is believed that you were familiar with the em-

ployment and training of the Fleet and the reasons for such employment; also with the security measures prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Please outline, briefly, the facts within your knowledge with respect thereto and state your opinion at the time as to the soundness of the methods used, particularly with respect [137] to the possible sacrifice of some elements of security to further training.

A. I would like to divide my answer in two parts. First, I should like to refer to the statement that as a senior Task Force Commander I was "familiar with the security measures". I think that statement is not accurate. I was not familiar with the details of the employment of submarines, of the extent and nature of the air search, of the Army defense measures, or with the measures of internal defense on the Island of Oahu, other than in the most general terms as I was able to gather them from frequent conferences held by the Commander-in-Chief with the Army and with the Navy on various subjects. I was also not familiar with the details of the defense measures under way to establish the security of the outlying Islands: Johnston, Palmyra, Wake, and Midway, except that I knew that the Commander-in-Chief and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District were bending every effort to complete the defense of those outposts before the outbreak of war. To answer the second part of the question, about the effect of training on security measures of the Fleet, I would like to go back to a period six months before December 7 when the Fleet was divided into three task forces. That reorganization assigned to me the task of developing the technique and assembling materials for amphibious warfare. Before the reorganization, I had expressed my keen interest in that subject and a conviction that the Fleet should develop a major part of its energy to that form of naval warfare. Therefore, during the six months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, my own energies and the energies of my Staff were directed primarily to the subject of amphibious warfare. We also took part in Fleet tactical problems which were held for the training of officers and men in the Fleet, and involved a vast amount of work and preparation for review on the game board at the completion of exercises. For over a year before Pearl Harbor, I believe that all major task force commanders recognized that the primary mission of the Fleet was one of training, because of the large naval building program then in progress and the known need of rapid education of officers and men to man the ships that would soon join the Fleet. During that year, it is my impression that we must have had at least half a dozen alarms when it appeared that war would break with the Japanese at any moment. At each alarm, the question arose and was debated as to whether we should take defensive measures or whether we should continue our training. By "defensive measures", I mean whether each ship of the Fleet should go to Condition Three, which would involve so many night watches that little could be accomplished during daytime in training and education. My feeling was, and I think it was shared by most of the others, that in order to complete our training as far as possible, we must continue training exercises until the moment that war developed, which is what happened in the Fleet. During the last days of November, 1941, the subject of defense measures was discussed by the Commander-in-Chief

in conference with a group of senior officers, of whom I was one. My recollection of those conferences is that our greatest concern was the security of the outlying islands. We had all believed that Japanese submarines would be in Hawaiian waters when they declared war, when the Japanese decided to go to war. We had discussed the possibility of an air raid on the Islands and my own opinion was that it was possible but highly improbable, and that Fleet dispositions should be made for the defense of Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra, rather than for the defense of Pearl Harbor, where we all believed the greatest threat was from local sabotage. On December 7, two of the three task forces were at sea, all engaged in some form of support for the outlying Islands, while continuing sea training in going to and from assigned stations. My own Task Force Three was divided into two parts, the carrier and two of the cruisers and some destroyers [198] were enroute to Wake Island with Marines and air reinforcements. I had the INDIANAPOLIS with six old destroyers converted to sweepers engaged in an attack mission and exercise on Johnston Island. We had with us, at the time, a number of the local authorities on South Sea Island formations. They were with us for the purpose of demonstrating what could be done with dynamite to break through barrier reefs on the weather side to a sufficient extent to allow small boats to attack from the weather side, rather than from the lee side where the attack might be expected. I cite that simply to indicate that my particular group were at Johnston because of our preoccupation with the exposed position and the probability that if an attack was directed at the Hawaiian Islands, those outlying stations would be attacked first before they were ready to defend themselves; while the second part of my task force was engaged on a similar mission to Wake. It is my recollection that Admiral Halsey had taken reinforcements to Midway. I'm not sure. He was up in the neighborhood for some purpose connected with the reinforcement of one of the outlying islands. I would like to complete the comment on that phase with the statement that as I look back on the year 1941, I feel that the entire Fleet, officers and men, were very conscious that war was coming, that all hands were working to their utmost endurance to accomplish as much for the improvement of the Fleet as they could in whatever time might remain available to use for preparation, and that spirit animated all hands through that year.

11. Q. Admiral, how frequently did you confer with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, concerning matters of importance to the Fleet?

A. I think it is correct to say that, in general, the task forces were at sea nearly sixty per cent of their time, and in port about forty per cent. During the time in port, reviews of tactical exercises were held on the game board and such reviews usually required about two days. During the week before December 7, I think I was in almost daily conference with the Commander-in-Chief. During previous weeks, I think I always had at least one and sometimes more during our period in port. In other words, I was present a greater number of times the first week in December than at any other time.

12. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel express his views freely to you with respect to Fleet activities?

A. I don't know that I can answer that question. Admiral Kimmel always had a definite purpose in mind in sending for me and he usually had very clear-cut instructions to issue or definite questions to ask. I think he was more apt to ask other people's opinion than he was to tell other people his own until he was ready to issue instructions, and when he issued instructions they were clear-cut and positive.

13. Q. Admiral, were you kept informed of intelligence received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, concerning the international situation and the movement of the Japanese land and naval forces?

A. All senior officers received the naval intelligence bulletins. The Commander-in-Chief showed some of us some of his correspondence with the Department. I have no way of telling whether he showed us all that he received, or not. My feeling is that it was his wish to keep the senior officer fully informed of the situation and what he was doing about it, and what he looked to us to do about it. His method of carrying out that wish was to send for us when he wished to issue instructions or seek our counsel. And, at that time, he would pass around a file of dispatches which we read there in his office, in turn. That method had the virtue of limiting knowledge of controversies and alarms to a small group. It had the disadvantage that sometimes [139] we had to read dispatches while others were talking and discussion was going on that I found interfered with my strict attention to what I was reading. I go into that detail because I wish to explain why, in the Roberts Board hearing, I was not able to say positively whether I had seen all of the dispatches that they showed me, or not. I feel I was shown, while I was in port, all of the important messages. Whether I saw the particular one that they quoted of 27 November, I do not yet remember.

14. Q. Admiral, were the Commanding Generals of the Army stationed in Hawaii present at any of these conferences which you attended with the Commander-in-Chief?

A. They were present, at about half of them, I should say.

15. Q. And they were advised of information in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief and consulted in the manner you have outlined as to the method used to consult you and the other senior naval officers, were they?

A. I think so. I could see no distinction between Army, Navy, or Marine Corps. The Commander-in-Chief summoned those whose duties had to do with the subject he had to discuss, and when it was a matter of security, naturally the Army was just as much involved, or possibly more, than any of us at sea.

16. Q. In discussing dispatches and intelligence information received, did the Commander-in-Chief express his interpretation of the meaning of such information for the benefit of other officers?

A. I think, as a rule, the dispatches spoke for themselves pretty clearly. I can't recollect any particular dispatch that left any doubt in the mind of the readers what it meant. If you have particularly in mind the warning that was imminent, which was the general tenor of the message that was received on the 27th of November, as I understand it, it is my recollection that there was a prolonged discussion as to what that might involve for our forces and what we should do about it, and what our opinion was about the probable developments; where the Japanese would attack, and when, and how.

17. Q. And opinions with respect to such matters were freely expressed and welcomed?

A. Yes.

18. Q. Did this also include action being contemplated by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in the light of such information? '41, when the Commander-in-Chief contemplated very radical changes

A. I remember quite distinctly an alarm that we had in February, in the movement of ships, the assemblage of forces, because of the threatened outbreak of war, and I remember that I, for one, advised against making any such changes at that time on the general theory that the changes contemplated would have seriously delayed many of our training processes and set us back probably as much as a month. And I remember that my feeling then in February, '41, and also in November, '41, was, as I have stated before, that as far as the units of the Fleet were concerned, our training must remain the major effort until the moment of outbreak of war, which might require other dispositions.

19. Q. Admiral, do you recall seeing the dispatch addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, on 16 October 1941, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor? This is the dispatch which I refer to; it is Exhibit 6 before this examination.

[140] A. I remember being informed of the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and of the tense situation that could be expected to follow. I can't say definitely whether I saw this dispatch, or not. I was informed of the sense of it whether I saw the dispatch, or not.

20. Q. Do you recall any conference with respect to the situation as outlined in this dispatch held by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. Not distinctly, but, as I said before, I think there were at least six alarms of similar nature in the course of the year 1941.

21. Do you recall, Admiral, any change of the deployment of the task forces or the disposition of vessels or aircraft made shortly after this date, 16 October 1941, which you may attribute to the directions contained in this dispatch, Exhibit 6?

A. I think that about that time the haste in the preparation of the outlying islands was increased, if that's possible. It certainly became a greater source of concern to all those in authority. I remember in my own case that I had prepared, about that time, a written recommendation to the Commander-in-Chief that shore defenses be established on the Rat Islands and a request that I be permitted to take a portion of my task force to visit the Aleutians. I sent in the recommendation about the defending the Aleutians. I did not send in my request to go up because of the strained situation and the evident necessity of keeping our naval forces concentrated.

22. Q. Do you recall any additional security measures effected shortly after that date which might be attributed to the dispatch of 16 October 1941?

A. Oh, yes. It is my impression that about that time all available anti-aircraft guns from the Army were assembled in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, and in view of the pitiful shortage of such weapons, that all available automatic weapons were borrowed from Marines and ships established in the general area of the Navy Yard and of the air fields. The Fleet had anti-aircraft watches prescribed, not

around the clock in order not to interfere too greatly with training. The practice from about October on was to have anti-aircraft ammunition at the guns. And as I look back on it, it seems to me that those measures were reasonable and probably as thorough as are now being carried out in various theatres of war. I noted with interest in visiting Africa that some of our air fields within easy bombing distance of enemy bases don't appear to be any more strongly defended than Pearl Harbor was during November, '41.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

23. Q. Admiral, you have already mentioned the dispatch of November 27, but, despite that, I would like to have you look at it as Exhibit 8 before this examination to see if you can now recall having seen it prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

A. I remember being shown this report by the Roberts Committee. I did not then and I do not now remember seeing a dispatch which started, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." I was familiar, at the time, with the other statements made in this dispatch. Whether I obtained that message through reading it or being informed of it verbally, I do not now remember.

[141] 24. Q. Do you recall having seen in a dispatch any phrasing similar to what appears about the word "deployment", in this dispatch?

A. I think so, yes.

25. Q. Do you recall your reaction at the time to those words—any wonder as to the meaning, or what the Navy Department intended should be done by those orders, or in the light of those orders?

A. I think that the two task forces were sent to the general vicinity of the outlying islands in pursuance of those instructions.

26. Q. I understood, from your previous testimony, that those task forces were engaged in building up the defenses of those islands by carrying reinforcements in to them?

A. Yes, that is true; but they were also in a position to attack any attackers of those places.

27. Q. Were there instructions to remain there for that purpose?

A. No.

28. Q. But still you think that the movements of those forces did amount to the kind of deployment which is mentioned in that dispatch?

A. I remember that we discussed what we ought to do, as a result of the warning by the Department. What the Commander-in-Chief had in mind in directing these moves, beyond reinforcing the islands, I don't know. I do not recollect that any other course of action occurred to me at the time, such as, we will say, getting all hands to sea, and having the Fleet formed against an attack by the Japanese fleet, because the thought that the Japanese fleet would attack never occurred to me. I can only speak for myself. I don't know what the Commander-in-Chief had in his mind.

29. Q. Do you recall any quandary in your mind as to the apparent mixture of defensive and offensive attitude which seems to surround that phrasing?

A. No, sir; I do not, because I have no clear recollection of seeing this entire message, or in studying it, or discussing it. I remember only the general discussion for several days of what we ought to do to meet the threatened situation.

30. Q. Admiral, do you recollect the attendance of any of the Army high command at these discussions, at that time?

A. Yes.

In order to facilitate the verification of testimony given by Rear Admiral Arthur C. Davis, U. S. Navy, who is now available, the examining officer directed that the present witness withdraw and that Rear Admiral Davis be recalled.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Rear Admiral Arthur C. Davis, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the seventh day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

[142] Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination prior to the recalling of Rear Admiral Davis, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

(Examination by the examining officer continued:)

31. Q. Did these discussions at which the Army was represented constitute a full and complete discussion of the entire situation in the Pacific, Admiral?

A. I don't remember ever attending a formal—a conference where the entire situation was discussed from beginning to end, as a formal, joint discussion of joint action.

32. Q. Did they go so far as to discuss courses of action which might be available to the Japanese in the event they decided to start a war against the United States?

A. My rather vague recollections of the discussions in which the Army took part are that they had mostly to do with internal security on the island, and secondly, with what shortages existed in defense weapons such as radar, antiaircraft weapons, and various forms of aircraft.

33. Q. Do you recall any discussion of a surprise air attack on Hawaii?

A. I remember one time, I would say in November, when somebody suggested that that might happen.

34. Q. Was the Army present at that time, sir?

A. I don't remember that. I remember that Admiral Halsey was present and that I expressed the opinion that Japanese fliers were not capable of executing such a mission successfully, and that if they did, we should certainly be able to follow their planes back to their carriers and destroy the carriers so that it would be a very expensive experiment.

35. Q. Were you cognizant, at that time, of the personal characteristics of Admiral Yamamoto, in general, as a naval officer, but in particular as regards his interest and work in building up the Japanese Naval Air Force?

A. I knew that Admiral Yamamoto was a very zealous, enterprising officer. I knew that the Japanese Naval Air Force was considered to

be much more efficient than the Army Air Force. My erroneous belief, at that time, was that all Japanese fliers were distinctly inferior to American fliers. I based that opinion on a conversation I had with an American who had spent twenty years in Japan as head of the Singer Sewing Machine, sometime late in November. That gentleman was brought to my cabin by my Intelligence Officer because of the opportunities that he had had to observe the Japanese at first-hand. He stated that of course he had had no opportunity to observe either naval or Army fliers, but that the civilian aviation in Japan was so badly kept up that the Singer Sewing Machine Company had issued instructions to all their employees forbidding them to ever ride in Japanese commercial aviation, and that the general belief was that the Army and the Navy were not very much better. I do not remember ever seeing intelligence reports, prior to Pearl Harbor, that gave a different picture of the skill of the Japanese fliers.

36. Q. Do you recollect any change in the employment of the vessels and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet occurring between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, which you may attribute to the receipt of the information contained in this dispatch; other than the movements you have already referred to?

A. The published schedule of employment had to do only with the dates on [143] which task forces would go to sea and the date on which they would return. Their employment during periods at sea was usually not settled until a few days before leaving port, so that I do not know how the forces might have been employed the week before Pearl Harbor, had we not realized that war was imminent.

37. Q. Do you recall any additional security measures which were placed in effect during that week which you may attribute to the receipt of the dispatch or the information contained therein?

A. I don't remember the date when instructions were issued about the anti-aircraft alert, and special anti-submarine instructions, but sometime during November, I feel sure that we were all warned to be more,—very much on guard, be prepared for air attack, be prepared and always on guard against submarine attack. I can not say when those instructions were given. I am inclined to think that they were reiterated from time to time during November, probably October.

38. Q. Admiral, the Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of 27 November that you have before you now contains a directive in general terms regarding certain deployments. Do you recall whether or not in the discussions of the contents of this dispatch, any mention was made of the necessity of reporting to the Navy Department what deployments or what defensive measures had been carried out pursuant to this directive?

A. No, I don't remember; but I would not be apt to be consulted about what report would be made to the Department.

39. Q. Admiral, normally would you consider that the recipient of such a directive as that you have before you should make a report to the Navy Department of what had been done pursuant to that?

A. No, I would not except it. I would not have made a report, had I been in Admiral Kimmel's position.

40. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with this document which is Exhibit 4 before this examination?

A. I undoubtedly was familiar, at that time, with this order. I had forgotten about it up to the present moment, except that it confirms what I had said before, that it was my impression that the Fleet had been made conscious of possibilities and directed to be on guard.

41. Q. Did you feel, Admiral, prior to the December 7 attack, that this order adequately provided for the security of your task force while at Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes. I was very conscious that the defenses of Pearl Harbor were quite inadequate in anti-aircraft guns, radar, and planes—types and numbers of planes. I was also aware that these shortages had been repeatedly brought to the attention of the Department, and that we were informed that it was not possible to meet those shortages because of more pressing needs in the war in the Atlantic.

42. Q. Will you elaborate that reply in so far as concerns the ability of the Army on Oahu to meet its commitments toward the security of Pearl Harbor?

A. It is my recollection that I overheard Admiral Kimmel frequently question General Short as to what equipment the Army had to defend Pearl [144] Harbor against enemy air attack, and that General Short replied that his equipment was wholly inadequate and that he had done everything possible to try to have it increased.

43. Q. In those discussions, or at other times, did you ever hear anything which gave you the impression that the highest Army command echelons expected our Fleet to intercept any carrier raid initiated by the Japanese?

A. I don't know that I ever overheard any discussion with the Army about a carrier raid, but it was my understanding then, and it is my understanding now, that at that time the general agreement between the Army and Navy was that the Navy should do the scouting at sea and the Army's function was to attack the enemy when located by the Navy.

44. Q. But you do not recall hearing of any impression that the Army was depending upon the ships of the Pacific Fleet to intercept a carrier raid?

A. Not that they were depending upon the ships, but I would have expected them to depend upon naval planes to discover the approach of the enemy.

45. Q. While your task force was at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7, did you, on your own initiative, prescribe any additional security measures?

A. I did not. I felt that the instructions issued by the Commander-in-Chief were well considered and thorough.

46. Q. To what extent did you feel that the vessels of the Fleet present at Pearl Harbor would be required to contribute to the defense of Pearl Harbor in the event of an air attack?

A. Knowing that the Army defenses were wholly inadequate, I think the whole Fleet felt that the ships would have to depend upon their own anti-aircraft for their own defense, while in Pearl Harbor, as well as at sea.

47. Q. Admiral, this Exhibit No. 4, provides, under part G, which is labeled "Defense Against Air Attack", that "the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as Naval Base Defense Officer, advise the Senior Officer Embarked at Pearl Harbor, exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain."

Were you, at any time, the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, that is, any time prior to December 7?

A. I think not. I was the junior of the three Task Force Commanders—wait a minute—I might have been. I would like to change that—I may have been.

48. Q. Under the setup here established, did you feel that you would have prescribed conditions of readiness to be maintained by the vessels present, or that you should rely on the advice of the Commandant in this respect?

A. I had complete confidence that the orders issued by the Commandant were all that the circumstances required.

49. Q. Do you recall having received any advice or orders concerning the condition of readiness to be maintained by vessels in Pearl Harbor?

A. Not prior to December 7.

50. Q. The schedule of employment for the Fleet was a printed document, was it not?

A. Yes, it was in the form of a graph which showed the periods at sea for each task force, the general nature of their employment at sea, and periods in port and that covered a period, I think, of about three months.

[145] 51. Q. Was the quarterly issue in effect that which was to terminate at the end of December?

A. Yes, sir.

52. Q. Were there a good many copies printed and issued?

A. I do not know about that. I'm trying to think how many were issued to my own force; I can not say; I know that the information was treated as confidential, not as secret, that for at least six months a very determined effort had been made to impress on all hands the necessity for being very cautious in ever discussing fleet movements; the families were well indoctrinated with the idea that they might be tricked into answering a question as to whether their husbands were in port or out; that very severe penalties were threatened to anybody who was not security conscious; but, of course, I believe that the Japanese were quite familiar with everything about our proposed schedule.

53. Q. You think it is quite possible that the Japanese, in effect, had a copy of that employment schedule?

A. I think it is quite probable.

54. Q. As you recall, do you think it was essential to print scheduled movements of ships of the Fleet so far in advance?

A. Not essential, but it was very helpful in planning work and educational training schedules. I did not think of it, at the time, as being an unwise practice; as I look back on it now, I think it would have been better had we not issued it.

55. Q. We have considerable testimony from other officers of the Pacific Fleet to the effect that there was rather common agreement that if the Japanese made a surprise attack upon Hawaii, it most likely would be either by submarine or by saboteurs. Did you entirely share that opinion in October–November, '41?

A. I did.

56. Q. Then you considered the possibility of a carrier air raid extremely slight?

A. I thought it extremely slight.

57. Q. During those last few days prior to 7 December, when your own task force was in Pearl Harbor, did it ever occur to you that they were in a dangerous position and, during this period of waiting, would be better off at sea?

A. No, on the contrary, I felt, as I have said before, that the chance of an air attack was extremely remote because of my misunderstanding of Japanese air ability. I did not consider the air a menace. I was not concerned about the security of the ships in Pearl Harbor. And I thought it very necessary—because of the intensity of the training schedule at sea and the hours that men were called upon to work, that when they returned to port they should get rest and diversion in preparation for the following tour at sea. Perhaps, I may be permitted to say at this time that I had watched the threat of war with Japan, of course, with tremendous interest. I directed the thoughts and studies of my Staff to all the books about the Japanese and the Japanese methods of waging war. My Staff and I were in almost daily conference, discussion, about possibilities. My own estimate in December was that the Japanese, having observed a reactionary Congress and the reluctance of the people of the United States to go to war, would avoid an open break with the United States and confine their first attack to one against the [146] Dutch or the British. I probably banked too much on that estimate of the situation.

58. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets and Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts, on 3 December 1941. It is Exhibit 11 before this examination. Are you familiar, or were you familiar, with that dispatch prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. I think so, but I am not certain as it must have come about the time I went to sea. I believe, however, that I did see it and I do not remember to have been impressed by the significance of the alleged instructions to Japanese representatives in Manila and Washington. It occurs to me now, however, that the inclusion of Manila and Washington does not necessarily indicate an intention to attack us but might be in order that they would not be found at fault in case we made war because of their attack on one of our—because of their attack against another country.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: The sinking of the PRINCE OF WALES and the REPULSE, as well as our own losses at Midway and the Coral Sea, fully demonstrated the ability of Japanese naval fliers to inflict heavy damage on naval vessels no matter how well ships might be prepared for attack nor how fully manned the then anti-aircraft batteries. These demonstrations of the ability and determination of Japanese fliers must now make it evident

to all that no matter what our state of alert or deployment at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, might have been, we were bound to suffer great damage even though a more effective alert would have destroyed more Japanese planes. Even if we had known the Japanese intention to attack Pearl Harbor, we could not have kept our ships at sea indefinitely waiting for the blow to fall. Japanese agents in Honolulu were always free to pick the date and hour of attack. It seems to me that to find fault with individuals for the lack of weapons, for the lack of alertness, or for incomplete deployment will not assure security for the future. On the other hand, the high state of efficiency maintained while doubling the size of our Fleet in two years, the seamanship, gunnery, and fighting ability of our Navy during two years of war reflects the quality of our naval leadership and of our training processes during the pre-war period as well as during the war period. On December 7, 1941, the Japanese dared to risk an attack on our Fleet at Pearl Harbor only because they had complete information about our dispositions; their agents ashore were able to observe and report the state of our defenses; and their so-called diplomatic agents on the spot were able to direct the moment of attack. I wish to go on record as being of the opinion that the major lesson for the nation to learn from the attack on Pearl Harbor is that we should never again allow enemy aliens within sighting distance of a major operating base from which considerable portions of our naval and air forces can be observed.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 11:45 a. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., Saturday, March 18, 1944.

[147] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

SATURDAY, MARCH 18, 1944

ELEVENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:35 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the tenth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Captain M. E. Curtis, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the eighth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned and withdrew.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, Retired, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the second and sixth days of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present duty station.

A. William Satterlee Pye; Read Admiral, United States Navy; president, Naval War College, and Commandant of the Naval Operating Base, Newport.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December 1941?

A. Commander, Battle Force, United States Pacific Fleet, and Commander of Task Force One.

3. Q. How long had you been with the Pacific Fleet and in what capacities?

A. From the 6th of July, 1937, to July, 1939, as Commander, Flotilla One, Destroyers, Pacific Fleet; from July, 1939, until January, 1940, as Commander, Destroyers, Pacific Fleet; from January, 1940, to January, 1941, I was Commander, Battleships, United States Fleet; from January, 1941, until after Pearl Harbor, Commander, Battle Force, United States Fleet.

[148] 4. Q. On 7 December, '41, were you the Senior Officer Present in the Pacific Fleet other than the Commander-in-Chief?

A. I was.

5. Q. Admiral, as best you can recall, will you give the periods, working back from December 7, during which you were in port for the four months preceding December 7?

A. I was in port previous to December 7 from Thursday, November 27. I had been at sea with my Task Force since November 21. Preceding that period, I can not recall the exact dates of being in port and at sea, but the general program was one-third of the time at sea and two-thirds in port, the Fleet being operated in three task forces. As I recall, it was about the middle of October until early in November that I had been on the West Coast with a temporarily organized task force. This task force left Honolulu for the West Coast somewhere around the 14th or 15th of October.

5a. Q. Admiral, how would you describe your relations with Admiral Kimmel with regard to the frequency with which he consulted with you, and the completeness of his consultations?

A. When the Commander-in-Chief moved his headquarters ashore, he turned over to me, in effect, the training program, particularly that of Task Force 1, but, on each occasion when Task Force 1 had a period at sea, one of the other task forces worked with us for one day on tactical maneuvers. My effort during this period in Honolulu was primarily directed toward the training of the forces of the Fleet. In that respect, my consultations with the Commander-in-Chief were frequent. In regard to the general conditions, it was his practice, at least once upon each period in which I was in port, to call me to his office to show me those dispatches which he considered to be of interest, both with regard to the Fleet and to the general situation. He frequently also showed me letters which he had received from the Chief of Naval Operations. In addition to that, it was customary for him to call in his Intelligence Officer and to have him explain the situation of the Japanese Fleet insofar as it was known or assumed by the Intelligence Section of his Staff. I considered Admiral Kimmel to have the greatest interest in all matters pertaining to the efficiency of the Fleet or to the use of the Fleet in the event of war. I have never known any Commander-in-Chief in the United States Fleet to be more interested in the training or activities of the Fleet. Due to the large amount of correspondence with regard to matériel, the general logistics situation, and to the international situation, he felt that he could not devote as much attention to training as he would like to have done and, therefore, gave me the responsibility for that particular function.

6. Q. Sir, in arriving at his decisions of a major nature, was it Admiral Kimmel's practice to consult freely, not only with members of his Staff, but also with other senior officers of the Fleet, to give full consideration to their advice, and did you feel that in forming his own decisions he acted on this advice?

A. I feel that during the three or four months preceding the war of December 7, that Admiral Kimmel consulted with all of the Flag Officers to obtain their reaction to the situation as he assumed it to be, and their opinion as to what could be done with the forces available in the event of war. About five months before the war, or December 7, a plan was developed for the use of the Fleet which included an air attack on the Marshall Islands by the carrier groups, supported by the battle line. This plan had been developed to the point where we considered it advisable to play it in the method of a chart maneuver. It was impossible to keep this maneuver going at the usual rate, but he did direct the various task group commanders to [149] make maneuvers corresponding to periods of time, whereupon all of their tracks of their respective forces were noted on a master plot in the Headquarters and any contacts noted, assuming that the Japanese forces would operate as the Commander-in-Chief's Staff considered that they would operate, that is, the Japanese Staff estimate was planned by Admiral Kimmel's Staff; the ships were maneuvered as they thought such forces would operate. This chart maneuver had been carried on for a period of approximately a month but the game time was much less. Because of the frequent absence of forces from port, actually represented a period of about one week in game time. I cite this to show that the plan for the use of the Fleet as it existed had been made out with all Flag officers and Commanders, Task Forces, cognizant of it, and that we were endeavoring, by the use of the strategic chart maneuver, to throw some light on the soundness of the plan. With respect to the general situation, as Commander of Task Force 1, every time I came into port, I was informed of the situation so far as Admiral Kimmel understood it and was asked my opinion as to the significance of the messages or letters from the Chief of Naval Operations, which he showed me.

7. Q. Admiral, during this period, what was the situation as regards frequency of consultation with the high echelons of Army officers present in Oahu at that time?

A. That, I'm unable to say. Personally, I attended no conferences in which the situation was discussed by the Army high command.

8. Q. Admiral, with respect to your consultations with Admiral Kimmel, you were primarily concerned with Fleet operations, is that not correct, sir?

A. That's correct; only with Fleet Operations.

9. The Army, of course, was concerned with security features. Would you say this was the reason you would most likely not be present when Admiral Kimmel consulted with the Army?

A. I should say so. As far as concerned the defense of the Fleet in port and of the area immediately adjacent to the Island, there were two people, other than myself, who were primarily responsible for advice to the Commander-in-Chief, namely, Commander of the Army Forces and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

10. Q. What did you consider to be the primary mission of the Pacific Fleet during the latter half of the year, 1941?

A. Training for the conduct of war, in order to be able to start operations immediately upon the declaration of war.

11. Q. Please outline, generally, the war tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet under the war plans then existing during the latter half of 1941.

A. The plan was to use the Fleet to create as much activity as possible in the Eastern Mandate area, to force the Japanese to send naval forces and air forces there in order to reduce as much as possible the strength of the enemy available in the Philippines and China Coast area.

12. Q. At that time, that is during the last six months of 1941, did you feel that the training mission of the Fleet was occupying such a predominate position in the minds of the Commanding Officers that the war tasks were being relegated to the background of the picture?

A. I did not, although I think the training was carried out more extensively than it ever had been before, and, in my opinion, the Fleet was in the highest state of efficiency that it ever had attained on December 7. The fact that [150] we had plans, that we were engaged in a strategic exercise to determine how those plans could be carried into effect, is evidence that the war operations were not being neglected.

13. Q. Admiral, during the period in question, could you state, generally, what transfers were taking place as regards material and personnel to other areas other than the Pacific Fleet?

A. In June of 1941, there were detached from the battle force three battleships, four light cruisers, and one squadron of destroyers, with orders to report to Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet. If I recall correctly, there had been detached one division of destroyers previous to that time; so that the power of the Pacific Fleet had been materially reduced in order to strengthen the forces in the Atlantic. I do not consider that this detachment would actually have made much difference in what the Pacific Fleet could have accomplished, because the situation with regard to logistics was such that the Pacific Fleet could not have operated more than 2500 miles from Honolulu, no matter what its strength. The number of tankers available had been seriously reduced and the amount of fuel oil in Honolulu storage had likewise been reduced to purely the amount that was considered necessary as a reserve.

14. Q. Sir, in addition to the detachment of the units which you mentioned in your answer, was there any widespread detachment of individual officers to either the Atlantic Fleet, or returned to the mainland to man new construction?

A. There was. I couldn't state the percentage, but there was a tremendous depletion of the personnel of the Pacific Fleet in order to man new construction.

15. Q. What protest or recommendations were made by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in regard to detachments of both units of the Fleet and personnel?

A. I don't recall that I have seen or did see any of his official correspondence in that respect. However, I recall many letters, personal letters, to the Chief of Naval Operations with respect to these detachments, in which he stated that the efficiency of the Pacific Fleet was being reduced to an unsatisfactory point for the conduct of war.

16. Q. Sir, do you recall the answer or reaction of the Chief of Naval Operations, or the Navy Department, to these representations by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. The reactions I received from the letters from the Chief of Naval Operations was that the situation in the Atlantic was very much more

dangerous than the one in the Pacific and that the Atlantic had to be taken care of first.

17. Q. What was the state of mind on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, his Staff, and other senior officers of the Fleet, as to the correctness of this attitude on the part of the Department?

A. I can only state my own, it probably being indicative of theirs. The reaction in my mind was that whatever happened in the Pacific would be on the initiative of the United States; that I felt that our Government had decided that if we went into war, we would have to lick the Germans first, that we probably would not be engaged in war in the Pacific except at our own volition. I think that the basis of that was sound. I think that had the Japanese not attacked Pearl Harbor that we would have been months later in getting into the war in the Pacific. In my mind, the attack on Pearl Harbor was the worst psychological blunder that any nation has ever made.

[151] 18. Q. Admiral, do you recall whether or not you expressed those opinions to the Commander-in-Chief and whether or not he made any statements to you as to whether or not he agreed or disagreed with your estimate?

A. I couldn't say that I ever used those words, because I don't think any of us felt that that attack would be made before a declaration of war, if ever. But I believe that that was the way most of us felt, and, confirming that as being the opinion in Washington, in a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations received about the time of the warning message, the Chief of Naval Operations used words somewhat of this tenor: "I do not know what this Country will do." In other words, it impressed me, and I think probably those others who saw it, that the option was going to rest with us.

19. Q. Admiral, on approximately what date did the Pacific Fleet move to Pearl Harbor as its base?

A. I think it was in April, 1940. We went out there presumably on a cruise anticipating remaining in Pearl Harbor for about a period of ten days, but before that ten day period was over, the Commander-in-Chief was directed to remain in Pearl Harbor, to retain the Fleet in Pearl Harbor.

20. Q. Sir, when it became known to the Commander-in-Chief and to you and others that the decision had been made to base the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor indefinitely, what were your reactions to the wisdom of this decision?

A. There were two reactions. The first was that it was a move towards Japan, which might incite them to take action; and the second was that it was a very poor time to make such a move because we were not prepared to move to the westward in case of war, because of the lack of proper logistics support. I think that all officers recognized one great advantage in having the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. That one was that in order to spend the money on the ships for repairs and overhaul in Pearl Harbor would permit the Navy Yard to be expanded at a greater rate and thus be better prepared to handle the Fleet in the event of a war in the Pacific.

21. Q. Admiral, in two or three of your answers, as I understand them, you've mentioned shortages, deficiencies in logistic support for the Pacific Fleet. Could you amplify that subject a bit, indicating what were the most critical of those shortages?

A. Probably the greatest deficiency was tankers. The other deficiency was the inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as a base. But Pearl Harbor Navy Yard was in a state of development and in order to continue that development, the money that was normally assigned to a yard performing repairs, would go to Pearl Harbor if the ships of the Fleet were to be repaired there, and, consequently, such action would permit the industrial element in the Yard to be built up.

22. Q. Admiral, did you feel, at that time, that these deficiencies or shortages in logistics were such that the Fleet was not in a condition of materiel readiness to carry out its offensive war tasks as outlined in the then existing war plans?

A. The existing war plans were rather indefinite as to what the Fleet could do. As I say, the estimate by the Commander-in-Chief, and I think agreed by all of the officers in responsible positions, was that the Fleet could not operate to the westward of the Marshall Islands. It was very questionable in my mind that even with plenty of tankers that the Fleet could have operated much farther west than that, because of the lack of adequate repair facilities or bases of any kind. Therefore, I considered the situation with regard to the Fleet was such that it could not have carried on an offensive as far to the westward as the Philippines or the Japanese Islands.

[152] 23. Q. Referring to your testimony to the effect that you did not think the Japanese would initiate a war. In the estimate behind that opinion, did you take into account the fact that steps had been taken to freeze the Japanese credits so that they would have at least great difficulty in obtaining petroleum products, tin, rubber, and so forth, from the East Indies?

A. In my statement, with regard to the initiation of the war, it was the initiation of war against the United States that I referred to. It was firmly believed that the Japanese would go into the Dutch East Indies and possibly into Singapore and Thailand, so that while we had anticipated war, an extension of the war in the Pacific, we did not anticipate that they would take action against the United States at that time. May I add that they could have obtained the rubber, tin, and so forth, without initiating war with the United States.

24. Q. The logistic deficiencies, Admiral, were well known to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of course?

A. Yes, sir.

25. Q. Do you know of any action that he took with respect to remedying the situation?

A. I remember of being informed by him of numerous letters which he had written but I can not recall the letters or having seen the letters.

26. Q. Admiral, what response did the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, get to his attempts to remedy his logistic deficiencies?

A. I should say very little. The rate at which the fuel oil was being used in Honolulu, during the training periods previous to December 7, was greater than the rate at which fuel was being delivered, and the reserve was being reduced.

27. Q. Sir, I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, and other addressees, dated 16 October 1941, which is Exhibit 6 before this examination. When did you see that dispatch?

A. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time I've seen this dispatch. At the time it was received, I was in California with Task Force 1 on a two weeks trip for recreation for personnel. My Force was in San Pedro at the time and I did receive a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief stating that the—I don't remember the words of the dispatch, but, in general terms, that the general situation was considered serious. I immediately put my Task Force on twelve hour notice preparatory to return to Pearl but no further word was received before the scheduled date of sailing on the return trip to Honolulu, which was sometime around the end of October.

28. Q. After your return to Pearl Harbor, were you apprised of the subject matter of the dispatch?

A. In general terms, yes, that the situation had been considered serious at that time. My return was two weeks or so after the date of this dispatch and while it was mentioned to me, so far as I am aware, I never saw the full dispatch before.

29. Q. Do you recall whether or not you were informed that the dispatch contained a statement to the effect that an attack by Japan on the United States was a possibility?

A. I don't believe I was so informed.

[153] 30. Q. Do you know of any additional security measures or other action undertaken by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific pursuant to this dispatch?

A. I was not there. The only information I have was the dispatch he sent to me, which indicated to me that he might want us to return almost immediately and I put the force on twelve hour notice. After I got back to Honolulu, I found he had sent another dispatch, which was never received by me, putting my Task Force on twelve hour notice. When he received my dispatch putting it on twelve hour notice, he thought it was in answer to his. We just happened to hit on the same twelve hour notice.

31. Q. Did any of the vessels of your task force return earlier than planned in the employment schedule?

A. Not that I know of.

32. Q. Admiral, you have stated that you were at sea during the period 21-27 November. I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac and other addressees, dated 24 November, which is Exhibit 7 before this examination. When did you first see this dispatch?

A. I saw this dispatch first on Saturday, November 29. Task Force 1 and Task Force 3 had been engaged in a strategic problem which ended on Sunday, the 23rd. My task force was not due to enter Pearl until Thursday, the 27th. On the night of the 24th, I received a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief to take all precautions against possible submarine activity. From the time of the receipt of that dispatch until after the entry of Task Force 1, complete defensive formations and operations against possible enemy submarine activities were taken. It had been the custom for the Commander-in-Chief to signal to incoming task force commanders when he desired to have a conference with them. No such signal was received upon my entry, nor later, but, upon Saturday morning, I went to the Commander-in-Chief for a conference on my own volition. It was at that time that he showed me this message. He called

in his Intelligence Officer and the Intelligence Officer explained the locations of the enemy forces, so far as he was able to judge, which indicated no unusual activity in the major forces of the Japanese Navy. He also showed me the latest letters he had received from the Chief of Naval Operations, which I mentioned, and in which the Chief of Naval Operations said, "I do not know what we will do," was one. We discussed any possible action that would be taken by Task Force 1 at that time, and Task Force 1 being the only task force, with the exception of the battleships of Task Force 3, being in port, we decided that there was no action that could be taken by that task force which would better prepare them for the possible action that might come. Task Force 2, under Vice Admiral Halsey, had gone out before my task force returned to port, and part of Task Force 3, as I recall it, left on the same day that I had entered. So that there were in Pearl Harbor, at the time I saw this message, no carriers and only the portion of the destroyers of the Fleet assigned to Task Force 1.

[154] Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the examining officer (Continued):

33. Q. Admiral, your attention is invited to certain wording in the dispatch before you to the effect that a surprise attack in any direction might be anticipated. Was any particular consideration given to that wording by the Commander-in-Chief and his advisers as regards the possibility of that direction being Oahu?

A. I was not present at any conferences between the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff, or other senior officers. So far as I can recall, there was, between Admiral Kimmel and myself, no discussion as to the possibility that Oahu might be attacked by air. There was, and had been for some months, a feeling that a surprise attack by submarines might be possible. The differentiation between these two attacks, at least so far as I was concerned, was based on the belief that a submarine attack could be made without definite proof that it was enemy action, whereas, an air attack could not. In the absence of any protection by carriers, it was felt that the Fleet in port, with the presumed effectiveness of the Army Air Forces, would be in a better position for defense than they would be at sea.

34. Q. Admiral, in the dispatch that you have before you there is a directive that Army officials be informed. Do you have any knowledge as to whether that was, in fact, done, and to what extent they were consulted?

A. I have no knowledge.

35. Q. Sir, I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, and other addressees, dated 27 November 1941, which is Exhibit 8 before this examination. Will you state when you first saw this dispatch?

A. To the best of my recollection, on Saturday, the 29th of November.

36. Q. In other words, the two dispatches, Exhibits 7 and 8, were seen and discussed at the same time?

A. I am positive—yes, these two were seen at the same time, the 29th of November.

37. Q. In addition to the dispatch that you received at sea in regards to precautions against submarine attack, do you know what action was taken by the Commander-in-Chief pursuant to these two dispatches?

A. I don't recall any positive action other than his talking over with me these dispatches.

38. Q. In a previous answer, I understood you to say that the Commander-in-Chief called in his Intelligence Officer, into this conference on the morning of 29 November, and received a report from him as to the then whereabouts of various units of the Japanese Fleet. At that time, what degree of credibility did you assign to this intelligence report?

A. I think the credibility assigned was fairly high, in view of the fact that there was no other intelligence or information by which a comparison or evaluation of the respective points of view might be made.

39. Q. At that time, did you know what sources the Intelligence Officer was relying on for his information?

A. Yes.

40. Q. In the dispatch of 27 November, Exhibit 8, what interpretation was placed on the wording, in general, which directs that certain deployments be made?

[155] A. In order to execute the plan of the Fleet, it would have been necessary to recall the task forces which were at that time absent, in order to properly prepare them, from a logistic point of view, and consequently there was no deployment that could be made immediately that would have better prepared Task Force One than that which existed. Task Force Two was on its way to ferry some fighting planes to Wake and was not expected to return for over a week, consequently there appeared to be no action to be taken by the Pacific Fleet that would have better prepared it against an indefinite date of beginning operations, than that which was then in progress.

41. Q. Admiral, am I correct in saying that the return of your task force to Pearl Harbor on 27 November was done in accordance with the then existing employment schedule?

A. It was.

42. Q. What was the nature of the employment of the task force for its scheduled time in port, beginning 27 November?

A. Overhaul and training and preparation for the next period at sea. In addition, and as a part of that training, the holding of a critique for the exercise which had been terminated on the Sunday previous to our entering port. That exercise had been one to develop air attack on an escorted convoy group, and alternatively, the defense of such a group. Task Force Three, containing a carrier, had been the force which attacked Task Force One, which was acting as escort to the convoy group. I state this primarily to indicate that the question of air attack at sea was uppermost in the minds of all of the officers during the period of training. The system of training that had been developed for these exercises was the most extensive that had ever been practiced by our Fleet. Before the problems were executed at sea, they were played out on the Maneuver Board which was established on shore at the Submarine Base Bachelor Officers' Quarters. The problems having been laid out and commented upon, on the Board, previous to the exercises at sea, were then carried out

as an exercise at sea. Upon return to port, the exercise was criticised, the critique being held on the Maneuver Board, as had been done on the same exercise before the Fleet went to sea. So, for each exercise, there were three distinct periods of mental training—the preparation and trial of the exercise before it was carried out at sea, the conduct of the exercise at sea, and the critique of the exercise after we returned from sea. This critique was to be held on Wednesday following our return to port, and with the exception of the Saturday morning when I went up to see Admiral Kimmel, I was primarily concerned with preparing the critique of this exercise for presentation on the Wednesday following.

43. Q. In other words, is it correct to say that no change in the scheduled employment of your task force was made by virtue of this dispatch?

A. No change was made. The only thing was that during the period at sea, from the time we got that dispatch we were especially careful about maintaining the maximum effectiveness of the anti-submarine defense.

44. Q. When was your task force next scheduled to go to sea, Admiral, if you recollect?

A. About December 11th, I should say,—we were generally in about two weeks.

45. Q. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, did you receive any orders changing that scheduled sortie?

A. No, I did not.

[156] 46. Q. Did you receive any orders or instructions changing the procedure while in port which would indicate any change in the contemplated use of your task force when it went to sea for its next scheduled period?

A. None that I recall.

47. Q. Did your task force have its full allowance of ammunition and other stores such as would equip it for combat purposes in event of war?

A. To the best of my knowledge, every ship had adequate material on board to exercise its functions in time of war. Many requests had been made for modifications of the anti-aircraft armament, to include more machine guns, which had not been received, but the vessels themselves, in their then state of equipment, were ready to fight.

48. Q. What I had in mind, Admiral, was to determine from any action taken whether the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, felt that on your next departure, you might be leaving on an assigned war task which would require additional ammunition or equipment, and as to whether any such was provided during this period.

A. Well, we were kept up to a point where we expected to be able to operate at any time, should it be required, and I don't think there would have been any hesitancy about going ahead and executing that plan which had been contemplated, had we gone to war under normal conditions.

49. Q. You feel that your ships, had they sortied in accordance with the schedule, would have been so prepared?

A. Yes.

50. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch dated 28 November, from Chief of Naval Operations, in which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, is an information addressee, which is Exhibit 9 before this examination. Will you state whether or not you saw that dispatch, and if so, when?

A. To the best of my knowledge, I did not see that dispatch before December 7th.

51. Q. Admiral, I hand you another dispatch, which CinCPac was only an information addressee, from OPNav to CinC Asiatic Fleet, dated 30 November, which is Exhibit 10 before this examination. Do you recall whether or not you saw that dispatch, and if so, when?

A. It is difficult for me to say whether or not I saw this dispatch previous to December 7th, but I believe that I saw it on Wednesday or Thursday, the 3rd or 4th of December, after the critique of the exercise which the Fleet had been holding—I saw the Commander-in-Chief for a short time and again on Thursday, the 4th. It is my opinion that on one of those two days he showed me this dispatch.

52. Q. Do you recall if the indications mentioned as to the direction of a Japanese attack caused any change of the attitude on your part over what you had had as a result of the preceding dispatches?

A. I think it tended to confirm the reaction of the previous dispatches that the activities were anticipated, even by the Department, in the Far East.

53. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch dated 3 December, from Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, and other addressees, which is Exhibit 11 before this examination. Did you see that dispatch?

[157] A. I saw this one on either Wednesday or Thursday—Wednesday, the 3rd, or Thursday, the 4th—this one I am confident I saw before December 7th. This one we discussed—I discussed with the Commander-in-Chief only to this point: “most of their codes”, it said, it did not say “all”, I don’t suppose they could have said “all”, but this same idea had been expressed in the newspapers of that day or the day before. We were completely unaware of the methods by which this information was received and we did feel that if inferences were to be drawn from this, that the best place to draw them was where they had the maximum information.

54. Q. In your discussions with the Commander-in-Chief as to the significance of this dispatch, was any particular mention made of the fact that among the places listed where it was thought the code and cyphers had been destroyed, were the capitols of the United States and the Philippines?

A. I don’t recall any particular discussion of those two points, but it seemed perfectly evident that this could precede war by many days; that it was not to us indicative of immediate action; and we were also, as I say, unaware of the source of information. As this information had appeared in the papers, it probably did not mean as much to us as though we had been aware of how the Department obtained it.

55. Q. Admiral, in addition to the series of dispatches that you have just seen, what other intelligence reports, or information were available to the Commander-in-Chief and to you, as one of his advisers, in making your estimates of the situation as regards the probability of immediate hostilities?

A. There were none available to me, and as I have previously stated, my primary concern was the training of the Fleet. On no occasion was I called into conference with the other Flag Officers and Admiral Kimmel to discuss the possibility of immediate action by Japan.

56. Q. At that time did you feel that you, and the other commanding officers, in Oahu, were sufficiently informed as to the international situation, or did you feel that you were more or less operating in the dark, out there?

A. Well, I can only speak for myself. I don't know how the others felt. I felt we were operating pretty much in the dark.

57. Q. In making your own estimates of the situation, and in giving such advice to the Commander-in-Chief as you did, how much consideration was given to the fact that the Axis nations had been departing from the usual rules of the game, usually, in making surprise attacks without formal declarations of war?

A. I don't think—a great deal. It seems to me, and it seemed to me then, that in every case of a surprise attack there must be something to be gained by it to make it worth while. I felt, and I presume others felt the same way, that the reaction of the United States to a surprise attack would so arouse the people that it would be a very bad psychological blunder for any nation to do such an act against the United States.

58. Q. Also with relation to your estimates of the situation, do you recall any emphasis being given, or any consideration being given to the personal characteristics of the Japanese high command, with relation to any specific individuals of the Japanese high command?

A. If any such studies were available to the Commander-in-Chief, I have never seen them.

59. Q. Although it is apparent that the matter was not particularly discussed [158] in your presence, did you ever feel, during those days, that enough attention was being given to the study of the psychology of the Japanese in general, particularly their military cult?

A. Well, I had personally considered it quite extensively, but to what extent it was given consideration by the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff, I don't know.

60. Q. Admiral, had you formulated an opinion as to the capability of the Japanese naval air arm prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. I think the general impression was that they were fairly good. I don't believe that we thought that they were as good as they appeared to be immediately after Pearl Harbor. In the rules that had been used for the exercises in relation to the efficiency of aircraft, I should say that full weight had been given to the value of air attack as indicated in the particular exercise that was completed by the First and Third Task Forces on Sunday, the 23rd of November. The complete convoy had been wiped out and many of the escorting vessels seriously damaged by constructive bombing. I feel that the attitude of the Fleet toward aviation was confirmed by the later effects. I do not believe that the air has proved any more efficient than we had given it credit for, with this one exception—that I don't believe any people before the war, especially not in the United States, believed that such a large percentage of the industrial capacity of the country, or any country, would be put into aviation. There is one thing with regard

to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and aviation, which I think should be stated: Some discussion had been held between the Commander-in-Chief and the Bureau of Ordnance as to the possibility of using torpedo planes in shallow water. The Bureau of Ordnance had expressed an opinion that the use of torpedo planes in less than 75 feet of water would probably not be effective. As the water in Pearl Harbor was shallower than that, there was probably created an opinion in the minds of the officers of the Fleet, that the torpedo plane could not be used there as effectively as it was used.

61. Q. Admiral, in that connection, did you have any reason to question that information that you received from the Navy Department in regard to torpedo planes, and did you feel that the Fleet was relatively safe from torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor?

A. While I won't say that we felt we were relatively safe, we felt that the efficiency of any torpedoes used in that area would be very much below what might be expected in the open sea. Most of our own torpedoes, dropped from planes, at that time were diving in the neighborhood of 75 feet before they ran.

62. Q. You had no information to the effect that other nations might have developed torpedoes that would be effective at lesser depths?

A. We had no information as to what they actually had developed.

63. Q. Had you any information, sir, as to the aggressive spirit which the Japanese naval air arm displayed on that occasion,—any advance information?

A. No, I don't recall that we had any particular data with regard to that. I think everybody felt that they had plenty of spirit, if they decided to it, they would come in hard—there wasn't any question about that. We had had air raid drills frequently in port, and had a standard routine for it. The defenses of the Fleet, of course, were largely in the hands of the Army, and the condition of readiness was not set by the Fleet, itself, but was set by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

[159] 64. Q. Admiral, in several of your previous answers you have touched on your own estimate of the situation as regards the probability of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and on the reasons why you and other officers present did not rate it very high, as a possibility. Is there anything you can add to what you already said as to your estimate of that probability, and the reasons for that state of mind?

A. I don't know that there is much that I can add. I think I have explained, from my point of view, several features, and a primary feature of all was that I felt that Japan could gain more by delaying our entry in to the war than they could possibly gain by any damage that they could do at Pearl Harbor. I am still firmly convinced that that was the case. I am also convinced that that was the opinion held in Washington, at least to this extent, that on the day the Secretary of the Navy arrived at Pearl Harbor, after the attack on Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December, one of the first statements he made was that no one at Washington had stated to him any possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, even Kelly Turner, who was the most aggressive minded of all. These are not quotations, but that is the sense of what he said. I think the feeling that was in Honolulu was greatly

influenced by the attitude of the Department through the preceding months, in taking away forces from the Pacific and indicating throughout that they considered the situation with Germany much more serious than with Japan, and that there was inadequate knowledge of a shift of opinion in Washington, if there was one; that there were no real definite instructions received out there after November 29, I think it was. The only other dispatch that I recall seeing was that one about the burning of the communications cipher code. During that period of about a week, many things were happening in Washington of which we in the Fleet were not cognizant. So far as I know, there was never any follow-up, either on that message received on the 16th of October—even after stating that condition existed, there was never any relaxation of a state of emergency indicated, and yet, six weeks went by before the attack. It seemed to me, and I think it seemed to all, that they were merely additional confirmations of a general feeling that war was approaching, and that we, the Fleet, should be in a state of readiness to carry out our part in the plan. If any change or immediate indication of war had been made in the Department, it seems to me that the message previously referred to would have been followed up by further messages; at least to the extent of asking the Commander-in-Chief what he had done, or what he intended to do.

65. Q. The war plan which was current appears to have been dated sometime in May, 1941, and the growth in tenseness of the situation in which Japan was concerned, was rapid after that. During those months, did it occur to you that the effective war plan had become out of step with the real situation?

A. I think that the plan for the actual use of the Fleet had not become out of step, because due to lack of logistic facilities, it was impossible for the Fleet to take any more offensive action than the contemplated attack on the eastern Mandates in order to try to relieve the situation in the Far East.

66. Q. As regards the broader concept behind the plan, to the effect that our position in the Pacific was purely defensive, did you think that part had become out of step?

A. So far as the Pacific Fleet was concerned, it seemed to me it was only one thing we could do and we were prepared to do that; we discussed, in this problem we were carrying on at the time what we could do with the Fleet. Well, you couldn't do much because it didn't have oil to get anywhere, and you didn't have repair facilities if you got there, and so far as the Fleet was concerned, [160] the only thing of any usefulness that could be done was to make an attack on the Marshalls with a view to drawing much of the enemy strength to the westward with a view to helping the Allied Forces around Manila and the East Indies. So, so far as I was concerned, the approach to that possible entry in the war had no particular effect on the thing that could be done with the Fleet. At the time I first learned about these messages, Task Force Two was bound out to Wake, part of Task Force Three had gone out to Johnston Island. There was, at that time, nothing that could be done by Task Force One, and it was felt if anything did occur, we should get the other task forces back as quickly as possible and prepare to carry out the plan that had been prepared—for the Fleet to move out to the Marshall Islands.

67. Q. Then no apparent fault in the basic war plans occurred to you during those months?

A. Well, my opinion about the plan, Rainbow Five, was that it was not kept up to date, that people were not sufficiently concerned with keeping the plan abreast the changing situation. If you go still farther back than that, I consider that the whole basic war plans, as I have known them for years, have really not been operations plans but development plans. They have been used as a lever to get more men and ships and naval shore establishment development.

68. Q. Admiral, I hand you an estimate drawn up by Commander Patrol Wing Two and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Army, dated 31 March 1941, which is a part of Exhibit 22 before this examination. Were you familiar with this estimate prior to December 7th?

A. To the best of my knowledge, I never saw it before December 7th.

69. Q. In this estimate your attention is invited to a statement made in Paragraph III(b), that "It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack." Do you feel that this estimate is completely out of step with the estimates of the Commander-in-Chief and other senior officers present in Oahu at that time?

A. Well, in making an estimate of enemy capabilities, there are two methods of procedure: One is known as the method of intentions, and the other is the method of capabilities. The higher up you are in the scale of command, the more apt one is to use the method of intentions, or trying to determine what the enemy intends to do. In the lower echelons of command, in which Rear Admiral Bellinger was, at that time, he was more concerned with the physical capacity of the enemy to do certain things in relation to the activity which he is commanding. For that reason, Admiral Bellinger, being responsible for the use of the aircraft based on shore to cooperate with the Army in defense of the Fleet, or at least to obtain information for the Fleet in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, would have assumed situations which required action by his force, and naturally one of those was the information, preceding an offense against air attack on the Island of Oahu, of vessels in the immediate vicinity. I feel that this particular position of Admiral Bellinger led him to this conclusion as being necessary for him to make out his plan, and a perfectly legitimate assumption as a basis for his plan, but that does not mean that the enemy was more apt to do that than something else. So far as I can see Admiral Bellinger's assumptions do not indicate that he anticipated an attack in advance of a declaration of war.

[161] Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

70. Q. Admiral, am I correct in saying that the Commander-in-Chief and his senior advisers all considered that the primary mission of the Pacific Fleet was training, and that that training would continue until such time as immediate hostilities were indicated?

A. That is correct. And with the tremendous shift in personnel that was constantly taking place, it was absolutely essential that training be kept up to the last moment.

71. Q. Did you feel at that time that all necessary steps had been taken to effectuate a rapid change from the training mission to the war mission when hostilities became imminent?

A. Yes, I considered that the Fleet was capable of proceeding on its war mission immediately.

72. Q. Referring back to the dispatches that you examined earlier, in the dispatch of 27 November, the statement was made to the effect that aggressive movements by Japan could be expected within the next few days. Did you feel that that statement on 27 November should have caused a change in the mission of the Fleet?

A. I did not consider that any change was necessary. This dispatch is addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for action. It was common knowledge that was expected to make an aggressive move into Thailand, and there is nothing in this message that indicates specifically any apprehension on the part of the Department that the aggressive move is to be made against the United States. The extent to which an aggressive move against Thailand or against British or Dutch possessions in the Far East might influence the United States is not mentioned.

73. Q. Admiral, how often were the employment schedules for the Pacific Fleet drawn up and published?

A. I couldn't say definitely, but my estimate would be about once a month.

74. Q. What classification was given to those published documents?

A. Confidential, I should say, although I can't swear to it.

75. Q. In general, how wide a distribution did the employment schedules receive?

A. Through Commanding Officers, I should say, but, naturally, when each Commanding Officer knew the schedule, or each Task Force Commander knew the time he was going to be at sea, he had to make out an employment schedule still more in detail for the various ships, often including various types of target practice and tactical exercises. Those that included target practice, naturally information had to be given to the Gunnery Officers and the gunnery personnel of the ship. So it became well known. Such schedule generally provided for routine periods at sea for each of the three specific task forces.

[162] 76. Q. During the months leading up to Pearl Harbor, and in view of the tense international situation and the general feeling that war with Japan would come sooner or later, did you have any apprehension as to the wisdom of publishing such schedules, from a security point of view?

A. No, I can't say that I did. The schedules had to be worked in such a way that some of the ships were at sea all the time, and in order to carry out the exercise of the Fleet, the people that handled the target practice material, the drones, and so forth, had to know well in advance that certain exercises would be carried out. I don't feel it would have made any particular difference, if an air attack was to have been made on Pearl Harbor, what particular task force was in. The case as it occurred was probably the most advantageous to the United States, because had carriers been in Pearl Harbor under the conditions of the attack, they probably would have been sunk, and that the loss of obsolescent battleships was less serious than would have been the loss of carriers.

77. Q. Admiral, as a matter of fact, how closely did the ships present in Pearl Harbor on December 7 correspond to the published employment schedule?

A. So far as I recall, Task Force 1 was scheduled to be in port at the time of the attack. Task Force 3, I believe, intended to be at sea. Because of some additional duty that had been given to Vice Admiral Brown, he proceeded with a part of his task force, I don't remember exactly, but not including the battleships, to Palmyra or Johnston, one of those, and as I recall it the three battleships of the First Division, which were normally in his task force, returned to port several days in advance of the normal schedule of that task force.

The witness was duly warned.

The examining officer then, at 11:50 a. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

Rear Admiral William Satterlee Pye, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

(Examination by the examining officer continued:)

78. Q. Admiral, upon whom did the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor against attack rest?

A. Primarily upon the Army. Naturally, the vessels and naval units in the Harbor were required to take such action as they could on their own behalf.

79. Q. Are you able to cite any plan or other commitment by the Army assuming responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. I never saw any plan gotten up by the Army, but by The Joint Action of the Army and Navy. The Army is charged with such responsibility.

80. Q. During the year 1941, what information did you have as to the ability of the Army to fulfill its commitments for the defense of Pearl Harbor and how did you evaluate this information?

[163] A. It was definite knowledge that the air force available to the Army and the anti-aircraft installations were below those which were considered necessary for proper defense.

81. Q. Was the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, fully aware of this situation?

A. Yes, to the best of my knowledge and belief, and I am quite confident that he had expressed this idea to the Chief of Naval Operations and also to the Army officer in command.

82. Q. Can you outline, in very general terms, what precautions the Army had taken against a surprise air attack?

A. The only direct information that I have came to me after the attack on Pearl Harbor, which was to the effect that in their interpretation of the order received, their primary active had been taken to prevent sabotage.

83. Q. Are you familiar with the Army's anti-aircraft warning net?

A. Yes, of the fact they had many lookout stations in the Island, for visual observation of approaching planes. I was not familiar with the state of radar development. Radar at that time was considered a very secret instrument and while the Navy had made use of it to quite a moderate degree, it was my general understanding that the

Army was behind in this development. I had knowledge that the Army was intending to install radar equipment in the Island, but, to the best of my knowledge and belief, I had no information that even one such instrument had been established.

84. Q. As contrasted with the available means for detecting the approach of hostile aircraft, what defenses did the Army have against such an attack, once the attack had arrived?

A. They had fighting planes and mobile anti-aircraft batteries. So far as I am aware, these mobile anti-aircraft batteries had been deployed for use by December 7.

85. Q. At that time, what was your appraisal of the state of readiness of the Army's fighter planes, and do you recall that this was discussed by the Commander-in-Chief and other senior officers present there; what appraisal they made of the ability of the Army Fighter Command?

A. I don't recall any special discussion of that fact, other than the general position that the Army's installations were not what we'd like to have them. It was not known to me that at any time previous to December 7 the Army had taken any action which reduced the effectiveness of their aircraft defense.

86. Q. Admiral, I hand you the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan for the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and Fourteenth Naval District, which is Exhibit 5 before this examination. Were you familiar with this plan at all prior to December 7, 1941?

A. Yes, I had read that plan.

87. Q. By the terms of this plan, upon whom was the responsibility for carrying out distance reconnaissance off Hawaii?

A. It would be, apparently, the Navy, under the direction of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

[164] 88. Q. Did you know whether or not such reconnaissance flights were being carried out by naval aircraft during the period from October through December '41?

A. I knew that such patrols were being carried out in certain instances, and that they were covering areas in which the operating forces of the Fleet were usually engaged in target practice. The immediate extent of the aircraft search, I did not know. The plan for that was not part of my immediate responsibility and I assumed they were doing the best they could with what they had.

89. Q. Sir, do you know whether any additional reconnaissance flights were ordered after the warning dispatch of 27 November?

A. I have no positive knowledge.

90. Q. As you would interpret the terms of this plan, upon whom was the responsibility to order such reconnaissance flights when the situation indicated that they would be necessary?

A. I think that under the plan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet would be responsible for designating a policy.

91. Q. Referring back to your earlier answer that the Commander-in-Chief and his advisers were aware of the inability of the Army to fully carry out its mission of the defense of Pearl Harbor against attacks of all kind, including air attack, what steps were taken by the Commander-in-Chief to augment the defenses of Pearl Harbor against such an attack?

A. Additional destroyer and small craft patrols in the areas off the entrance. So far as the air is concerned, I don't know what, if any, additional patrols were actually put in operation.

92. Q. Sir, I hand you Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter, 2CL-41 (Revised), which is exhibit 4 before this examination. Were you familiar with the terms of that at the time of its issue?

A. I was.

93. Q. Admiral, in paragraph "G" of this 2CL letter, under the duties of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, is listed "advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain." It does not seem to be stated definitely who should order the condition of readiness, but is the interpretation of that that the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor should actually issue the order prescribing the condition of readiness?

A. My interpretation was that the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District would inform the Senior Officer Present Afloat as to the condition warranted by the existing circumstances, and the Senior Officer Embarked would order the Fleet to assume such condition.

94. Q. From 28 November to 7 December, were you the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor?

A. I was.

95. Q. Did you prescribe any condition of readiness for the ships in the Harbor pursuant to this?

A. Condition 3 had been prescribed as the standard condition and was in effect on December 7. It had been prescribed previous to our last entry but it was understood that Condition 3 would be the condition unless other notice was given.

[165] 96. Q. During the same period, did you receive any advice from the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as to maintaining any other condition or any directive from the Commander-in-Chief as to maintaining a higher condition?

A. No, sir.

97. Q. Admiral, in the same paragraph, your attention is invited to a provision that "the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shall arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced". Were any Army guns actually emplaced at Pearl Harbor on December 7?

A. I believe that there were certain anti-aircraft, fixed defenses, not in the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor. I believe this order is interpreted to relate to the mobile guns. So far as I know, they had not been distributed with any intention of defense of the Naval Base previous to December 7.

98. Q. At what distance were these Army guns from the Base, the nearest of the Army guns?

A. I think there was one battery of guns at or near Kamehameha, which was near the entrance to Pearl Harbor. Others were not located within five miles of Pearl Harbor, but I think within two miles of the City of Honolulu. They were closer to the Port of Honolulu than they were to Pearl Harbor.

99. Q. Up until the time of the attack, did any naval officer have any authority over the use of those guns?

A. None that I know of.

100. Q. Sir, did the Navy have any anti-aircraft batteries on shore at Pearl Harbor on 7 December?

A. So far as I recall there were none until after the attack.

101. Q. Admiral, under subparagraph 5, of paragraph "G", of 2CL, the Senior Officer Present in each Sector, described in the preceding paragraph, is responsible for the fire in his own sector. Was that interpreted to mean that the Senior Officer Embarked could direct the Sector Commanders or was each one of them an entirely free agent?

A. The interpretation was that he was a free agent, because the time element would not permit the senior man to act. However, that paragraph was discussed many times with the Commander-in-Chief before December 7, pointing out to him with the possible distribution of any attacking planes, it would be impossible for anybody to direct fire. It actually was true on the morning of December 7, that the planes came from so many directions that it was impossible to control the fire of the ships in any one sector.

102. Q. Then, as I understand you, as a practical matter, each ship's batteries were their own directors?

A. As a practical matter, that's what it amounted to. Each ship knew the general direction that they were to guard and that they had a primary responsibility for that direction of approach, but I think when they found something they could shoot at in some other direction that they shot there too.

103. Q. Admiral, there's another subparagraph in this same paragraph "G" that I'll ask you to give your interpretation of. That is subsection "a" of subparagraph "9", which states that "the Senior Officer Embarked at Pearl Harbor shall execute the emergency sortie order" which will accomplish certain [166] results listed thereafter. "This order must be prepared and issued in advance." Does that mean that a plan for sortie was drawn up in advance and given to the Commanding Officers so that all that would be necessary, in the event of an emergency, would be an order for execution?

A. By the time that had been in effect for—this was in revision; the original was much earlier than this—there was a definite order of the sorties, the order of ships being the destroyers, cruisers, and battleships, and all that was necessary to give in this case was the order to execute an emergency sortie.

104. Q. In other words, the plan was in the hands of the various commanding officers?

A. The plan for sortie was in the hands of the commanding officers.

105. Q. Admiral, on the morning of December 7, when and by whom was the order for execution issued?

A. I was on shore at the time the attack occurred and returned to the CALIFORNIA at approximately twenty minutes of nine, about forty minutes after the original attack. Upon my arrival on board, my Chief of Staff informed me that this provision had been carried out and that the order for emergency sortie had been given by him. That was when the attack had first been made. By the time I arrived, about forty minutes after the first shots, some of the destroyers were underway; one or two cruisers were underway then or immediately afterwards; none of the battleships were in condition to proceed to sea with the exception of the NEVADA which started out in accordance with the order. About the time she passed the Flagship, executing this maneuver, we came to the conclusion that one ship outside would be no better off than inside and would probably be in more danger of

submarines, and as she passed us, we directed her to anchor. She had not gone more than a quarter of a mile beyond that when she was bombed and was unable to maneuver to an anchorage and was actually beached in the channel. About this time, we received an order from the Commander-in-Chief that no other ships would sortie. That order was passed around by visual, I believe, but I think it had little effect, because all of the ships that could move by that time were out. That's with regard to the sortie. Most of the destroyers did get out. There were several of the cruisers, among them the DETROIT, the Flagship of destroyers, got out. There were no carriers present; no heavy ships could go out. That was the condition after the attack. Several light cruisers had been damaged. No heavy cruisers were in port except alongside the dock under overhaul.

106. Q. Under Condition 3, what was the approximate number of anti-aircraft guns which were being manned by each of the battleships in Pearl Harbor?

A. The battleships, as they were disposed there, were in two sectors. That required four guns in either sector. That required only eight guns to be manned, in accordance with the order, but I'm quite certain that there were more manned. I'm quite certain that there were at least two on each battleship manned. I believe that order was given by Commander of Battleships.

107. Q. About what percentage of the total anti-aircraft batteries of battleships would that be?

A. It varies somewhat. It would be about—most of them had eight; I think it probably would run about twenty-five per cent.

108. Q. Approximately what proportion of officers and men of the ships of [167] your task force were on board their ships by the time the Jap attack started?

A. A check of that was made after the attack and, as I recall it, at the time the attack started, there were about seventy per cent of the officers on board and ninety-eight per cent of the enlisted personnel.

109. Q. What was the condition of the ships as regards watertight integrity, meaning the closure of watertight doors and hatches?

A. Everything was supposed to be closed except during working hours. They were allowed to open whatever doors were necessary during the daytime to carry out their work.

110. Q. This being Sunday morning, you would normally expect practically everything to be closed then, was that the case?

A. That was not true on the CALIFORNIA, which happened to be my Flagship, because they were working on Sunday morning in the compartments. I can not say about the other ships, and I can only say *that* through information received from the Commanding Officer.

111. Q. In such a situation as developed under that attack by the Japanese, who, if anyone, would normally be expected to order fire opened by the anti-aircraft guns?

A. It was the general understanding in any attack that fire would be opened without waiting for orders.

112. Q. So far as you know, were any orders given?

A. Not to my knowledge, but I was not on board at the time.

113. Q. Do you know of any orders, other than that for sortie, which your Staff gave prior to your arrival?

A. No.

114. Q. Admiral, did you feel, at the time, that the Commander-in-Chief's instructions adequately provided for the security of your task force when it was in Pearl Harbor?

A. The only thing that was questionable in my mind at all was the part about the sector fire control. I never felt that ships could be held to fire in one sector, nor did I think that if they had targets in another sector they should be confined to the one sector. That had been discussed with the Commander-in-Chief on several occasions. In fact, I had written a modification of the order which was not in effect but simply to eliminate the responsibility which I did not feel could be carried out by any Sector Commander; that if an attack should come and from different directions, that no one should be held responsible for designating targets, that ships should fire when they had the opportunity.

115. Q. Did you feel that the whole scheme of things there relating to the defense of Pearl Harbor were as good as could be done, looking at the overall picture?

A. Yes, I think that as far as the Fleet was concerned, and I can not say for the Army because we were not informed—I was not informed as to what the Army actually was doing.

116. Q. In connection with the command relationships, did you feel, at that [168] time, the need for unity of command there?

A. I felt that for at least ten years before.

117. Q. Unity of command, as a general project, had, for long, been a matter of discussion within the Navy, had it not?

A. Yes.

118. Q. During those few weeks prior to 7 December, do you recall any specific discussions which actually looked to following through to an early improvement?

A. I couldn't place the exact time, but for more than a year previous to that time, I had been advising several Commanders-in-Chief that the coordination was not adequate and that they should get some Army officer on their Staff so that it could be better arranged at least.

119. Q. You looked upon that as a minimum step?

A. As a minimum step, due to the fact that it seemed impossible to get anything higher than that.

120. Q. Admiral, did you take part in the conferences with respect to the replacing of the Marines in the outlying islands with Army troops?

A. No. I was present during a part of one discussion between the Commanding General and Commander-in-Chief with regard to who should man several of the islands, but I was merely a listener and took no part.

121. Q. Had you discussed the defense of the outlying islands with the Commander-in-Chief?

A. No.

122. Q. Do you know whether the position of those islands, with respect to defense, was a matter of grave concern to him?

A. I believe it was.

123. Q. But you didn't discuss it so as to be familiar with his views?

A. He didn't discuss it with me. He had his Marine and Army people, but he didn't discuss it with me.

124. Q. Returning to your testimony concerning the Army's radar installations, were you aware, in those days, of the great part which radar had played in the defense of Britain against the German bombing attack?

A. In a general sense; yes.

125. Q. Had you heard enough about it to bring home to you that it was a most essential installation, essential to the security while in Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes.

126. Q. Had the radar installations of ships of your own personal command arrived at a state of real efficiency by early December, '41?

A. The efficiency, compared to what it was a year later, might be considered low, but this was due more to the types of radar than to the personnel. The type on the PENNSYLVANIA was very satisfactory; the CALIFORNIA had a different type which was less satisfactory, but had been used with a very good success at maneuvers and the location of planes. Within a short trip, after the beginning of the war, while at sea, planes of the clipper type had been picked up and tracked distances of eight-five miles with the radar on the PENNSYLVANIA.

[169] 127. Q. Do you know of any reason why the Army's Signal Corps radar system should not have arrived at an equal state of development and efficiency?

A. None at all. As I have previously stated, it was known that the Army was trying to get radar out there and it was their intention to install it, but I had never been informed that one set had arrived.

128. Q. Did it occur to you, at any time between your return to Pearl Harbor, about 27 November, and the Japanese attack, that it would be well for you to take your battleships to sea in view of what you knew about the deficiencies in the defense abilities of the Army?

A. No, because it was our confirmed opinion that our greatest danger was from submarines, and that the Fleet at sea was certainly in much more danger from submarines than it was in port. Also, in view of the fact that we had no carriers to go with us, we would have had no air cover at all, and had we run into an air attack at sea, we would have been in presumably a worse position than we were in port where the Army had some protection for us.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I would like to state as my definite opinion that Admiral Kimmel was a most efficient Commander-in-Chief, that when he was nominated as the Commander-in-Chief, although I did not expect to stay at sea at that time, I wrote him a letter congratulating him on his selection, and I firmly believed that he was as good as any other officer that could have been selected.

He had shown tremendous interest in the tactical development of the Fleet while in the Command of Cruisers, and he and I had worked continuously together for six months in trying to develop the tactics of light forces. In this respect, his interest was superior to those of any Commander-in-Chief I had served with. He was also tremendously interested in the material and the logistic support of the Fleet, and worked conscientiously in all respects to bring the Fleet to its highest state of readiness in preparation for war.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 3:43 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m., Monday, March 20, 1944.

[170] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

MONDAY, MARCH 20, 1944

TWELFTH DAY

. NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 2 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the eleventh day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that, in accordance with the examining officer's directive at the conclusion of his answer to 9. Q. (Record Page 136), he desired to make further answer, which, for the purpose of continuity, was inserted at the conclusion of his answer to 9. Q. With this addition, he pronounced his testimony correct, was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows: Captain Glover, I constitute an examining board acting under a precept from the Secretary of Navy to record testimony under oath concerning the facts surrounding the surprise attack of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. The purpose of the recording is to have preserved testimony of witnesses who might not be available at some future time and will be needed for some purpose possibly not known now. The precept contains the words "pertinent to the facts", which constitute the gist of my instructions in that line. It appears that I have to make my own decisions as to what is pertinent and what is not, and in previous testimony facts come out which point the way to other facts, which, in the first instance, do not seem particularly connected but probably are. I believe that you are in position to testify concerning some of those points. I will be asking you to give testimony on things which were known to you over two years ago, and must ask you to testify from what you then knew, as well as you can, unaffected by what you have learned since. Please do your best in that respect. We will pause at any time for you to refresh your memory by consulting documents or otherwise. I will

give you an opportunity to verify your testimony in rough and correct it if necessary.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Captain Robert O. Glover, U. S. Navy, attached to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and also in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics Plans.

[171-172] 2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year of 1941?

A. I reported to the Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, in January, 1941, and during 1941 was assigned various planning duties while in the office. Up to about August, 1941, my duties were in connection with all the color plans, with my principal attention being given on the Pacific and Asiatic areas. In August, 1941, the planning problem was concentrated by what is known as "WPL-46", or "Rainbow 5".

3. Q. Were you the specialist on Pacific plans in the War Plans Division during those months?

A. After August, I was given special cognizance of certain parts of WPL-46. These parts are: Part 3, Chapter II, Sections 1 and 2; Chapter III, Chapter V, Sections 2 and 3; Part 5, Appendix 2; Chapters II and IV and V. These sections generally dealt with the Pacific, Asiatic, and the Naval Transportation Service.

4. Q. On about what date did WPL-46 become effective?

A. About August, 1941. I think that's correct, Admiral. There ought to be a letter when it became effective.

5. Q. Did the plan contemplate Japan as an enemy?

Yes, sir. The plan divided possible enemies into two categories: first consideration being given to Germany as an enemy; the plan further considered Japan as an enemy.

6. Q. Was there anything in the plan, WPL-46, which indicated that hostilities with Japan could eventuate otherwise than at Japan's own initiative?

A. I don't recall the plan indicating by what means hostilities with Japan might occur, except to state possibly following a period of strained relations.

7. Q. Can you give the approximate date of the preparation of the plan?

A. The plan was completed in May. Preparation of the plan covered several months prior to that date. It was a continuing process.

8. Q. Was the plan based upon the forces which were then actually stationed in the Pacific or did it look forward to changes in those forces?

A. The plan states that deployment of forces had practically all been made. Redeployments of forces prior to May and up through June and August had been made. The plan contemplated the dispatch of certain forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic.

9. Q. What was the approximate composition of the forces thus detached, and about when was the actual detachment made?

A. As I remember, the forces set up in the plan to be detached was one cruiser division. Other detachments had been made during 1941,

prior to August. The approximate size of these forces were: one BB division, one crudiv, and one desrons.

10. Q. Was there any other considerable detachment of forces from the Pacific Fleet, detachments which were of a permanent nature or of a temporary nature, which continued over a considerable period?

A. The principal force involved were submarines, two divisions, No. 202 and 203, which were directed to remain in the Asiatic rather than being withdrawn to the Pacific Fleet.

[173] 11. Q. Was there a movement of forces to Australian waters which endured over any considerable period?

A. In July, 1941, a task force of cruisers was dispatched from Pearl for the purpose of escorting to Australia a Dutch ship loaded with aircraft and carrying, as passengers, Chinese air pilots. This task force remained in Australia approximately four days, and then returned to Pearl Harbor via Fiji.

12. Q. As regards reenforcements to the Pacific Fleet, did the War Plans Division not have in mind any increases in that force during the first few months after the plan became effective?

A. No.

13. Q. Then was it the case that you intended WPL-46 to be a strictly "As-Is" plan, based entirely upon realism and what was actually available in the way of forces?

A. My concept, at that time, was that the plan made a deployment of forces on a realistic basis to meet the situation that might develop.

14. Q. Did you consider that there was available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, an adequate logistic support for what the plan called for from forces under his command?

A. I believe that he had adequate logistic facilities for his initial defensive task assigned by the plan.

15. Q. Did the plan not call for offensive measures on the part of the Pacific Fleet?

A. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was given an offensive task to prepare for the capture of positions in the Caroline area. He was also given the task to support the forces of the associated Powers, by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial or capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions. My concept of the plan was that the initial attitude of the Pacific Fleet was defensive, and that it did not have the means available to assume an outright offensive, and it would not have the means available to assume an outright offensive attitude for sometime.

16. Q. However, was not the diversionary movement, which you have just mentioned, something to be classed as a decidedly offensive movement?

A. I believe his action in that case, to my mind, had better be described as by raids rather than by movement of total force.

17. Q. Did you consider that the logistic support provided the Pacific Fleet was sufficient for such raids?

A. Yes, sir.

18. Q. In the course of your work, during the first half of 1941, did it occur to you that our general method of producing, issuing, and keeping up to date of basic war plans was in any way defective?

A. My initial impression, when I first joined the office in January, was that the preparation of our war plans was a very laborious and

slow process. WPL-46 was based on Staff conversations between the British, Canadians, and the United States. I, personally, did not take part in those conversations and my only connection with the plan was after it had been issued. I considered WPL-46 was prepared reasonably expeditiously, and issued to interested officers expeditiously. It represented a realistic appreciation of the situation existing at that time, and a calculated risk in the Pacific.

[174] 19. Q. You have just said, "at that time." Was it your feeling that WPL-46 tended to be too much frozen or was the plan, itself, and methods for employing it sufficiently elastic to meet situations as they would arise in the future?

A. I felt, at the time, that the plan was elastic. In fact, the plan did meet the situation in the future. Lines of communication were maintained to Australia, and the enemy denied the Pacific east of 180 degrees.

20. Q. Was any special provision included in the working methods of the War Plans Division for keeping the plan in step with forces available as changes therein would eventuate?

A. Yes, sir. On 21 August 1941, a memorandum from the Head of the Plans Section of the War Plans Division, was issued which states the following pertinent to the question:

Plan Section, War Plans Division, is charged with (a) Preparation of changes in the plan made necessary by changes in the assumptions or in the strategic situation, or which may be required to keep the plan current with administrative action; (b) The preparation of directives placing the whole or any part of the plan in effect; and (c) The continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so that advice may be given in regard to the composition and distribution of forces, operations, and other matters in relation to the execution of the plan.

Note: The examining officer identified the memorandum mentioned above as being one dated August 21, 1941, classified Restricted, addressed to "Plans Section, War Plans Division", Subject:—"Cognizance of Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5", signed by Captain C. J. Moore, U. S. N. Said memorandum is on file in the War Plans Section, Commander-in-Chief office, Navy Department.

21. Q. Do you recall any action effecting the content of the plan, itself, in consequence of that directive from which you have just quoted?

A. As I recall, no change was made in the plan prior to December.

22. Q. Do you recall any consideration having been given in your offices to our Government's action in freezing the Japanese credits in this country sometime during the first half of 1941?

A. I can recall nothing definite in regard to freezing these credits as it affected war plans.

23. Q. Was the situation, the international situation, upon which any war plan is presumably based, reestimated in the light of Japan's probable position in being denied strategic materials incident to the freezing of credits.

A. I can only assume they were. I, personally, had no part in that matter. My only assumption is that Japanese action must have been considered during the aforementioned Staff conversations.

24. Q. Had such a reestimate been made, would you not have been concerned in it?

A. I would probably have known, if such was going on.

25. Q. As you recall, who would have actually made the estimate or the reestimate?

A. Probably Admiral Turner, assisted by Captain C. J. Moore.

[175] 26. Q. Was it well known to the War Plans Division that the situation visavis Japan grew in intensity from, say, June, '41 onward?

A. The intensity of the situation was common knowledge with the officers of the War Plans Division. I discussed the matter personally with Captain Wright, who was a special assistant to Admiral Turner.

27. Q. What was done toward a reestimate of the situation in the Pacific in the light of that tense situation?

A. No action, as far as I know, was taken to modify WPL-46.

28. Q. And no formal reestimate was made?

A. To my knowledge; no.

29. Q. Did the War Plans Division know that the Army took steps in the summer of 1941 to build up its forces in Hawaii and the Philippines?

A. Yes, sir; particularly the Philippines.

30. Q. Did the Division participate in any of the discussions or estimates which lead to that action by the Army?

A. I don't know; personally, I took no part in any such discussions. If held, they must have been held by the director.

31. Q. Do you recall if, at that time, you thought that such build-up was putting the Navy out of step with the Army or that it was a matter of getting the Army up into step with the Navy in the Pacific area?

A. In the case of the Philippines, my thought, at that time, was that our forces there, our Navy forces there, were only adequate for a defensive action, and the build-up of the Army would only add to their deficient strength. In the Hawaiian area, by view was that the build-up of the Army forces brought them more in line with the strength of the naval forces deployed.

32. Q. You have stated that a fundamental idea of the basic plan was that our attitude in the Pacific was defensive. Did that idea prevail in the War Plans Division right up to 7 December '41?

A. That was my personal view, and I believe it was the view held generally by the officers of the War Plans Division.

33. Q. That being the case, did the question arise in your offices in, say, October, '41, or thereafter, of the correctness of retaining the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters?

A. I do not recall any study either being made or any conversations pertinent to the question after August, 1941, when WPL-46 became effective.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

34. Q. Is it your recollection that during the latter half of 1941 the Fleet was being retained in Hawaiian waters primarily for the defense of our positions in those waters, or, to be in a position of readiness for making the offensive movements which the Plans called for?

A. My concept was that the Fleet was there for both purposes—first to assist in the protection of the United States east of the 180th Meridian, and, secondly, to be in a position from which raiding operations could be projected.

[176] 35. Q. What thought or consideration, if any, was given in your offices concerning the security of the Fleet in the Hawaiian area against a surprise attack by the Japanese?

A. Referring again to the order of August 21, 1941, signed by the head of the Plans Section, War Plans Division, one paragraph of this order designated Commander Ansel, in collaboration with Captain Wright, to draft daily and submit to the Director (Admiral Turner) a short strategic summary of the international military and political situation. Commander Ansel, in preparing these summaries, had made available to him dispatches of Military Intelligence Division, Naval Intelligence Division, the State Department, and the press. While a surprise attack by the Japanese was discussed, no definite warning, as far as I know, was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

The examining officer directed the reporter to re-read the question.

A. (Continued.) I don't think we were worried about it.

36. Q. Will you please ascertain if those daily studies by Commander Ansel are still on file in the Department, and, if so, enter data in the record from which they could be identified?

A. Yes, sir.

Note: From information later furnished by the witness, the examining officer identified the memoranda under discussion as being those contained in a notebook titled "Daily Information Summary—Op 12", now on file in the Combat Intelligence Section (F-20) of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, Room 3704, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

37. Q. Was that because of your low estimate of the probability that the Japs would attack in that way, or because of your belief in the security measures both by the Fleet and by the Army forces which were charged with the security of Pearl Harbor?

A. I don't believe it was generally felt by the officers in the Plans Division that the Japanese would strike in the way they did. In my own case, I did not feel so. I felt that there were adequate means available to the Army and Navy.

38. Q. By the last part of your answer, do you mean, among other things, that the Army forces on Oahu were fully adequate to the defense of Pearl Harbor against an air raid?

A. I felt we had adequate air forces there, adequate Army air forces there, to repel a Japanese air attack?

39. Q. During those days in which the situation with the Japanese was becoming so very tense, do you recall any concern within your offices over the possibility of severe damage by sabotage from the large number of Japanese on Oahu?

A. Yes, sir; I recall that matter being discussed. If my memory serves me right, it appeared in the warning dispatch either by the Army or the Navy, to the Commanders in the Hawaiian area.

40. Q. Do you remember if that caused any reconsideration of the retention of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters?

A. I have no knowledge of any discussions in regard to the question asked.

41. Q. Will you give, insofar as you can remember, the views held in your offices in, say, October, 1941, on the situation as regards the outlying islands such as Wake and Midway?

A. I discussed Wake with, as I recall, Captain Moore, and it was Moore's view and mine, that we should not attempt to fortify Wake.

The question was up because of a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, stating [177] that it was his intention to do so. I believe the decision was made to go along with the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation. As regards Midway, the view in the offices of the Plans Division was that we should attempt to maintain our position there. This view, as I remember, was concurred in by the Commander-in-Chief.

42. Q. Then as you recall—our sending forces in to Wake—was at the initiative of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. Yes.

43. Q. Did the Pacific War Plan then current contain any provision for putting parts only of the plan into effect?

A. The plan provided for execution, in part, by dispatch, indicating the nations to be considered enemy and the tasks to be executed, or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan, or additional tasks, thereof.

44. Q. In order to connect up the Board's record in general, will you explain, briefly, the meaning of "M" Day", and the connection of that term with the Pacific War Plan then current?

A. "M" Day is commonly understood as the day of execution of a war plan. In the case of WPL-46, "M" Day, unless otherwise designated, was to be the date of an Alnav dispatch worded as follows: "Execute Navy basic war plan Rainbow No. 5." Upon receipt of this Alnav, the Naval establishment was to proceed with the execution of WPL-46, including acts of war. WPL-46 stated that all parts of the plan might be executed at once, or in part by dispatch indicating the enemy, tasks to be executed or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken.

45. Q. In, say, late November, 1941, could an "M" Day have been declared in such a way as to become effective only in the areas west of the Pacific Coastal Frontier areas?

A. Yes, that could have been done.

46. Q. What would have been the effect of such a declaration?

A. Naval forces based on Hawaii and on the Asiatic station could have been ordered to place WPL-46 in effect. Of necessity, the method used in declaring "M" Day west of the Pacific Coastal Frontier, would have required that these forces be informed that war had not been declared. The declaration would have had the effect of directing the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, the Governor of Samoa, and the Governor of Guam, to take certain mobilization deployments. The effect certainly would have been to alert all naval commanders at sea west of the Pacific Sea Frontier.

47. Q. Would you have thought, at that time, that such declaration would have been more effective in putting our forces upon the alert than the method actually used by the Department promised to be?

A. Using the method under discussion of "M" Day did not occur to me at that time. Possibly its use might have been more effective.

48. Q. Could a directive from the Department, placing portions of the current Pacific War Plan into effect, have served as a more definite means of putting our forces upon the alert?

A. I believe that the plan did not lend itself very easily to be put into effect as a means of warning only. The plan was based on war activities and if used only as a means of warning, would, in my opinion, have required quite a lengthy dispatch in explanation of what was exactly intended.

[178] 49. Q. Is it true that the War Plan then current really did not contemplate the advent of hostilities through surprise action of any enemy, but rather was primarily based upon our starting a war ourselves, through definitely offensive action, after a proper declaration of war?

A. It is my view that the plan contemplated the commencement of hostilities after a declaration of war.

50. Q. I pass you a document which, before this Board, is known as Exhibit No. 5. Were you familiar with it?

A. Yes, I have seen this document before, when it was first issued.

51. Q. And it had been approved by the Navy Department?

A. Yes, sir.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

52. Q. What agency would be required in putting that plan in effect and how would he have to act?

A. The plan provided to become effective on "M" Day, or that certain features of it might be placed into effect by the War, Navy Department, or the local Commander prior to "M" Day. The plan states that "M" Day might precede a declaration of war.

53. Q. Was there any reason why the Department should not have ordered that plan into effect on or about 27 November?

A. No, sir, I see no reason why that plan could not have been made effective, if desired.

54. Q. At the time, would you have thought that action to be a very effective means of placing the forces in Hawaii on the alert?

A. Using that method didn't occur to me at that time, Admiral.

55. Q. Do you recall any discussion, or other happenings in your offices, during 1941, concerning putting into effect the unity of command project for Hawaii?

A. The matter was discussed but never came anywhere near following through to any action.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 4:05 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., tomorrow.

[179]

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

TUESDAY, MARCH 21, 1944

THIRTEENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:50 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twelfth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Commander Paul C. Crosley, U. S. Navy, Executive Officer, Postal Affairs, Division Naval Communications.

2. Q. Where were you serving on the 7th of December, 1941?

A. On the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as Flag Secretary.

3. Q. Do you have in your possession the Pacific Fleet Employment Schedule covering the second quarter of the fiscal year 1942?

A. I do. I have the copy issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated August 13, 1941, in which the schedule is outlined and was duly authenticated and distributed to Force and Type Commanders, Pacific Fleet, OpNav, CinCLant, Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District; ten copies each to action addresses, and three copies each to the Type Commanders

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the confidential nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 25".

4. Q. Is this copy, this document, complete?

A. No. When drawn from the files, it was observed that enclosure (A) thereto was missing.

[180] 5. Q. What is the nature of enclosure (A)?

A. Enclosure (A) is a photostatic copy of a diagrammatic layout of the schedule as written in the letter.

6. Q. Do you have an employment schedule for any other quarter which has attached to it such a photostatic copy?

A. Yes; I also drew from the files of the Chief of Naval Operations proposed employment schedule for the ensuing quarter, schedule dated 10 November 1941, which has an enclosure similar in form to that one originally contained in the schedule dated August 13, Exhibit 25.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the confidential nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 28".

7. Q. Do you have any knowledge as to the present location of the missing enclosure to Exhibit 25?

A. No, I do not, and when inquiry was made as to its location, the Secret File Room stated that they did not know what disposition had been made of it.

8. Q. Do you have any knowledge as to when it was found to be missing from the letter?

A. No, sir, I do not, except that the file room informed my officer messenger that previous requests had been made for copies of this correspondence.

9. Q. In addition to the copies of this letter required for the distribution you have outlined, to the best of your recollection, how many other copies were made at the time?

A. To the best of my knowledge, there were no spare copies made except for the files of the Commander-in-Chief, which we usually did with all correspondence in case an additional copy was required by some visiting Flag Officer; in other words, someone would come in to see the Admiral and he'd want to give them one of the copies. We always kept a record of it if that was done. The only way we could determine whether any additional copies of this were issued, would be to check the receipt record in Honolulu and Pearl Harbor.

10. Q. Were copies distributed among the members of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff?

A. They were.

11. Q. To what members, as you recall?

A. The Operations Officer, the War Plans Section, and that was all; the other was a copy that was routed around. Oh, one other; the Admiral kept one in his book.

12. Q. Was any method of accounting prescribed for the copies that were distributed?

A. None other than the usual receipt cards system where the addressee would send back a card acknowledging receipt of a letter or the usual registered receipt handled through the guard mail system.

[181] 13. Q. Did the Task Force Commander supplement this employment schedule with schedules of their own?

A. They did. Each Task Force Commander printed this schedule and gave it a distribution in accordance with the Pacific Fleet mail distribution list.

14. Q. Do you have in your possession copies of the employment schedules for the three task forces covering the second quarter for the fiscal year of 1942?

A. I do. I have Task Force One, Two, and Three schedules.

The documents were introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the confidential nature of the documents, they were returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the documents introduced in evidence are appended marked "Exhibit 27", "Exhibit 28", and "Exhibit 29" respectively.

15. Q. It is noted that the three Task Force Schedules, Exhibits 27, 28, and 29, are all in printed form. Where would the printing of these schedules take place?

A. Usually it can be determined by the printer's symbols on the schedule. Normally, it is done by the Flagship of the Task Force Commander, or, if he is at sea, he will leave the printing work to be accomplished ashore by whatever print shop is designated by the Force Commander of the Commander-in-Chief, depending upon what printing facilities are available. Some of the printing in Pearl Harbor was done by the Submarine Base, some by the Commander Service Force, most of it by the Commander Service Force's Flagship. But for rush work, the Flagship of the particular Command involved was usually used. Task Force One Schedule does not indicate what ship it was printed on, but the CALIFORNIA, at that time, was doing most of their work and it is safe to assume that the CALIFORNIA printed that schedule. Task Force Two likewise does not show the printing shop, but the ENTERPRISE had printing equipment and as the Flagship of Commander, Task Force Two; it is safe to assume that the ENTERPRISE did the work. Task Force Three, with the LOUISVILLE as Flagship, does not indicate the print shop but it is also safe to assume that ship did the printing. I might add, that these printing jobs were normally supervised by an Ensign, commissioned officer, attached to the Staff or to the ship's complement, and the practice was for that officer to watch and maintain custody of the schedules to and from the print shop to the point of distribution.

16. Q. It is noted that the schedules are assigned no registered numbers. What system was in use for accounting for copies distributed?

A. No system of accounting was maintained as it was treated the same as confidential correspondence.

17. Q. Have you information as to the number of copies that were actually struck off in the print shops of these schedules?

A. The printer did not include that information on the three Task Force Schedules, but a close estimate can be made from the distribution list.

[182] 18. Q. That list does not show the spare copies printed, does it?

A. No, sir. I might add, the consensus of opinion seems to be that it was necessary to give these schedules as wide a distribution as possible because of the various activities concerned in the operations outlined therein, such as supplies, gunnery schedules, and other important operations requiring close coordination between the various Type Commanders. This was particularly emphasized in the shift-over

to the task forces, when ships of different types were operating in the various task forces.

19. Q. Will you please state the distribution made of one of the employment schedules, say Exhibit 27, Task Force One, to whom copies were distributed, and how many copies to each?

A. The distribution list for the Task Force One Employment Schedule included as special distribution: the Chief of Naval Operations (50 copies), the Navy Department bureaus (3 to 20 copies), the Fleet Personnel Officer (2 copies), the Commandants of the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Naval Districts (2 or 3 copies), the West Coast Receiving Ships, Ammunition Depots and Supply Depot (1 copy each), the West Coast and Pearl Harbor Navy Yards (3 or 4 copies), Battle Force Mail Clerk (2 copies), Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (1 copy), Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and Atlantic Fleets (8 copies each); plus the regular distribution to the Task Force including Type, Squadron, division and commanding officers ships, Marine and aircraft units (1 to 5 copies each). Total distribution, 729 copies. I have estimated that it would take approximately 600 copies of each of the Employment Schedules of the other two task forces to complete the distribution prescribed for those schedules. Thus, a total of approximately 1,929 copies of the three task force employment schedules were required to complete all designated distributions.

20. Q. With reference to the Commander-in-Chief's employment schedule, Exhibit 25, does that show the movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor and the dates which it was planned that they would be present therein?

A. It infers the same information by stating when the operating period commences and ends, as well as the upkeep period. It also includes tactical periods. These schedules could not be religiously followed because of diversions and other incidental changes that occurred from time to time, but they were very closely followed.

21. Q. Then one in possession of that schedule could calculate, in advance, the ships that were likely to be in Pearl Harbor on any given date?

A. That is correct. To the best of my memory, the WEST VIRGINIA was an exception. As I recall, the WEST VIRGINIA was scheduled for overhaul period on the West Coast and I was present in the Admiral's cabin at the time the desirability of retaining her at Pearl Harbor was discussed, and, at that particular time, he had lost the service, temporarily, of two of his battleships and considered it desirable to retain the WEST VIRGINIA and defer her overhaul period until the balance of battleship power was back to normal. I believe, otherwise, the WEST VIRGINIA would have been on the West Coast on that date (7 December 1941).

22. Q. Similarly, from the employment schedules of the Task Force Commanders, could one determine in advance what ships would normally be present in Pearl Harbor on a given day?

A. Yes, because the Task Force Commanders' schedules were much more in [183] detail, whereas the Commander-in-Chief's schedule was a general schedule. I might add that it is my positive conviction that if any leakage of schedule information occurred, it could be obtained much more easily from the Task Force Command

schedule, and subsequent correspondence, than from the Commander-in-Chief's schedule, because everyone recognized that the latter was always subject to detailed changes after its issue. Also, the mimeographing and printing of the Commander-in-Chief's schedule was under very close supervision in a very small office; any spare copies misdirected could easily be detected.

23. Q. Do you recollect anything which indicates any particular attention to be given to the security of the information contained in the Task Force Commanders' employment schedules?

A. No, sir, I do not.

24. Q. Inasmuch as a great number of copies of the Task Force Commanders' schedules were actually printed and issued, did it occur to you, during that time, that security of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters was being thereby endangered?

A. No, sir. Everybody had been thoroughly indoctrinated and instructed not to discuss the proposed ship movements, repeated letters had been issued on the subject, and warnings by the Commander-in-Chief. The actual movements of the ships could easily be observed from any vantage point in Pearl Harbor or from merchants in town, but I do not ever recall having heard anyone discussing prospective movements.

25. Q. Did you ever hear anyone discuss the possibility of a spy obtaining one or more copies of the Schedules containing this information, which would be vital because it indicated movements of units of the Fleet so far in advance?

A. No, sir. It would have been quite easy for anyone to obtain the information, if they had so desired, by copying it from the schedules in the various offices of the addressees, although I believe it would have been difficult for an agent to have obtained a copy without its disappearance being noted, because the schedules were frequently referred to by the persons concerned with carrying them out.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I have no written documents to back up my statement, but I was frequently present when Admiral Kimmel would receive or send correspondence to the Navy Department, both official and unofficial, personal or otherwise, and I repeatedly heard him complain that he could not get what he was asking for, materiel and personnel that he considered essential to put the Fleet in the proper fighting condition, and I know that this worried him considerably and that he never ceased trying. In some cases, he was successful, but in those cases, it appeared to be purely action which he initiated himself rather than outside assistance. As an example, the security measures that he placed into effect in Pearl Harbor, as well as the training of the crews in gunnery and tactical drilling. I recall a particular message, (although I did not have custody of it), I recall [184] a particular message which arrived shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor and I distinctly recall that

the impression of all those who read the message was similar to other messages of that nature that had been received, and it did not strike anyone as being any more critical, although I never heard individual opinions expressed on the subject by the Admiral. I believe this message to which I refer is the one about which there was considerable publicity after the attack. I recall, one day, I can not tell accurately whether it was before the receipt of this message or after, but the Admiral walked to the chart in his office and said something like, "I wonder what those rascals are up to now". I believe it was at the time when the Japanese were reported en route to the East Indies area. The impression that I'm trying to create is that everyone that I had contact with on the Staff, as well as visitors to the Headquarters, felt that the situation bore watching, but that with the representations being made in Washington, at that time, that there had been no critical change other than would normally be expected, and that no definite word indicated that we could believe otherwise.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 10:50 a. m., took a recess until 2 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the third and fourth days of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Commander Benjamin Katz, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the second and fourth days of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the fourth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

[185] Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Sir, will you state your name, rank, and present duty station?

A. Willard A. Kitts, III, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December 1941?

A. I was Fleet Gunnery Officer of the U. S. Fleet—U. S. Pacific Fleet.

3. Q. And how long had you been on Admiral Kimmel's Staff in that capacity?

A. Since the first day of February, 1941.

4. Q. Admiral, would you make a statement as to your relations with Admiral Kimmel, with these points in mind: The frequency with which he consulted you, and whether or not those were individual consultations or general Staff meetings?

A. My relations with Admiral Kimmel were quite close and intimate, both personally and officially. I had served with Admiral Kimmel intermittently since 1918. I had served part of every sea cruise with Admiral Kimmel except one, when he served in the Orient and I served in the Pacific Fleet on the West Coast. My official relations and contacts with Admiral Kimmel were frequent, but in general not in Staff meetings and consultations. I was, as Fleet Gunnery Officer, part of the Operations Division of the Staff, and Staff consultations were generally attended by the Chief of Staff, the Operations Officer, the War Plans Officer, and Intelligence Officer. However, Captain, now Admiral, DeLany, who was Operations Officer, passed on all information in which members of the Operations Division of the Staff had interest. Aside from that, I had very close and frequent contact with the Admiral several times a week, and usually alone, in that my primary duties, as he had laid down for me when I first joined the Staff, were the gunnery training of the Fleet—more than the gunnery training, the general Training of the Fleet; a matter in which he was greatly interested and which he continually checked up with me about.

5. Q. Admiral, did you feel that the attention of the Commander-in-Chief was primarily occupied with the training mission of the Fleet, to a point where war readiness was somewhat relegated to the background?

A. Well, you must understand that I was the Training Officer and the Gunnery Officer of the Fleet; therefore matters that he discussed with me dealt with those problems. I know they held a very high place in his mind and he was greatly concerned about furthering the training of the Fleet and took many, what at the time appeared to be, radical steps, in bringing that about. As to his interest in training occupying him to the extent that the war readiness of the Fleet was neglected, that doesn't follow. I do not think that he was unduly occupied with training matters to the extent that he lost sight of the other aspects of readiness and security.

6. Q. Sir, prior to December 7th, were you shown, or were you familiar with the contents of various dispatches coming from the Navy Department containing warnings of the possibility of hostilities?

A. I was not shown any warning dispatch. It is my understanding that those were revealed and discussed at Staff conferences which, in general, I did not attend. However, the purport of all those that had anything to do with my particular work on the Staff was passed to me and I did know of the general tenor of some of the warnings. I can not state as to how many of those were [186] passed on to me by Admiral DeLany.

7. Q. Admiral, prior to December 7, 1941, what was your own personal estimate as to the probability of an air attack on Oahu?

A. My own personal opinion was that an attack on Oahu was definitely possible. I think my opinion was reflected in a Fleet Circular

Letter which I helped compile, that is, 2CL-41, which by my recollection was revised a couple of times. I think it was first written in February or March, 1941. As a matter of fact, seven or eight months after the attack on Pearl Harbor its major part was still in effect in the Fleet. One of the chief considerations of that letter was that the Fleet could be attacked and if it were attacked, it would be by submarine attack, an air attack, or a combination of the two. It was widely discussed between Captain, now Admiral, DeLaney, and myself, that the presence of either submarines or aircraft would lead us to look for the other. I haven't access to that letter, but I believe that thought was written into one of the drafts. I did not think the attack—an air attack on Pearl Harbor was probable, but it was considered as a very serious possibility.

8. Q. Admiral, I hand you a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, dated October 14, 1941, styled "2CL-41 (Revised)", which is Exhibit 4 before this examination. Is this the letter to which you referred in your last answer?

A. This letter is a revision of the letter to which I referred. I think this letter follows very closely the previous and original draft. I probably had nothing to do with the draft of the revision because at the time it was issued I was on temporary duty in Washington.

9. Q. Would you give the approximate date of that temporary duty in Washington, the time you were absent from Pearl Harbor?

A. I left Pearl Harbor on 6 October, 1941, and returned on 8 November, 1941.

10. Q. Referring back two questions to your answer that you did not consider a surprise air attack a probability but a strong possibility, would you say that that represented the consensus of opinion of other members of Admiral Kimmel's Staff?

A. Yes, sir. This letter, which I consider one of the most important letters which was issued to the Fleet, so states.

11. Q. Sir, can you amplify a bit the reasoning behind this statement that you have made, which is, as you say, contained in 2CL-41; can you amplify on the reasons behind the basis for this statement?

A. Well, a large part of the world was at war. We were engaged in quasi-war in the Atlantic—this is all my opinion, my reasoning—we were engaged in a diplomatic controversy with Japan which finally ended in conferences in Washington. I, personally, had been in the Hawaiian detachment and had arrived at Pearl Harbor in the Fall of 1939, and all the signs indicated to me, and I can't speak for other members of the Staff, but I feel that they were of like mind, in the discussions with them, that it would be very difficult for us to avoid eventual war.

12. Q. Admiral, at that time, what was your evaluation of the intelligence reports available to you and other members of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff as regards the relations between the United States and Japan?

[187] A. Well, my evaluation of the situation, my own evaluation of the situation, was somewhat colored by a secret message which I delivered by word of mouth from Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief exactly one month before Pearl Harbor. I had been absent from the Fleet for thirty days, and prior to that time I had not, as a regular routine, attended the Staff conferences—I was in

what you might call the second echelon—I did, through conversations with the Fleet Intelligence Officer, know the estimate was that the Japanese were on the move in the Far East and it was a matter of common knowledge in the press that we were trying to persuade Japan to move no further, and that representatives of the Japanese had gone on to Washington to discuss the matter. My estimate as to it, I saw, was colored by the message I brought from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which I did not interpret in any way to Admiral Kimmel other than learning the message by rote. The only interpretation I made of it was to myself. I told no one of this message except Admiral Kimmel, himself. My own conclusion was that the probability was that the move would be in the Far East.

13. Q. Admiral, can you state the contents of that message from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel?

A. Yes. Admiral Stark outlined one or more courses of action which the Japanese might follow, and the United States' probable reaction thereto. A surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was in no wise presaged by that message which I carried.

14. Q. Sir, upon your return from Washington to CinCPac Headquarters, what was your feeling at that time as to whether the Department here in Washington was furnishing full information to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific in regard to the Japanese situation?

A. Having carried that message, I could personally have no other thought but that information, as it was available here in Washington, was furnished, in that case, to the Commander-in-Chief.

15. Q. During the month or six weeks prior to December 7th, what information was available to you and other members of Admiral Kimmel's Staff, as regards the then location of the Japanese Fleet?

A. I can not speak as to what knowledge other members of the Staff had. My recollection is that I had knowledge of a large concentration of Japanese naval forces near Camranh Bay. From the time I returned from Washington until the attack on Pearl Harbor, I had not seen any warning messages.

16. Q. Sir, in considering the possibility of a surprise air attack, was any great emphasis placed upon the form that the attack might take—whether by bombs or by torpedoes?

A. All methods of air attack were considered—by high bombers, dive bombers, and by torpedo planes. The danger of a particular type of attack, that is the torpedo plane attack, was minimized in my mind by information contained in one or more letters from the Chief of Naval Operations. I can not quote or recollect the exact phraseology or the figures given. However, to me and in my recollection, the purport of that information was that the success of a torpedo attack, against ships in a harbor with a depth of less than ten fathoms was improbable. In discussions with the War Plans Division of the Staff, my recollection is that we wanted nets to counter such an attack, but the information at the time as to the probability of the success of such an [188] attack allowed us to put the nets, which were not available and hard to get, on a lower priority than other war materials which we needed. There was never a feeling in my own mind that such an attack was impossible, or that nets being available, we should not have them, but the nets definitely took a low priority.

I draw no conclusions for anyone else but myself—they took low priority in my mind. I have a recollection of more than one letter received from the Chief of Naval Operations on the subject of torpedo nets. And, serving in the Bureau of Ordnance, I have had made a search of Bureau of Ordnance files for any letters written by the Bureau of Ordnance dealing with torpedo nets and addressed to the Commandant of the District, or the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and have been unable to locate any. The only letter I have been able to locate is a copy of one from the Chief of Naval Operations to the various Commandants, with information copies to CinCPac.

17. Q. Admiral, I hand you a letter from Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of the various Naval Districts, with the information copy for CinCPac, dated June 13, 1941, which is Exhibit 19 before this examination. Do you recall having seen that letter?

A. I think I did see this letter. I do not remember it exactly, but I am led to believe I have seen it before because the figure of "10 Fathoms" which had been in my mind in the past two years, is in this letter, and I imagine I got that date from this letter. I do not recollect the letter in detail.

18. Q. Admiral, during the period in question, what information was available to you as to the frequency with which the Japanese had used torpedo plane attack?

A. I do not believe I had any information at all as to what the Japanese, up until the attack on Pearl Harbor, had been able to do with torpedo planes and torpedoes as an aircraft weapon. As I look back on it now, I know of no instance where they used the torpedo plane in action. Although they were undoubtedly well drilled in its use, I had no information on it.

19. Q. Sir, were any additional security measures against torpedo plane attack undertaken pursuant to the statements of the letter of June 13 that you just examined?

A. I have no access to the files, but I have a definite impression that the idea of torpedo nets was not abandoned but was given a low priority, a lower priority than other material which was required. I do not recollect any conversations with the Commandant of the District, to whom these letters were addressed, with copies to CinCPac, although quite possibly conversations were had with them. They were frequent visitors at our Headquarters, and these matters were discussed from time to time. My recollection was that the nets were not available, that the ships would have to be left free to maneuver and make quick exits from the Harbor if necessary, and that the non-availability of the nets and desire not to have the Harbor cluttered up had a bearing on our placing the nets at that time in a relatively low priority.

20. Q. Admiral, who was responsible for the defense of the naval base at Pearl Harbor against an attack of any kind?

A. Well, not referring to this letter, 2CL-41, but to my memory of the letter, which I think is important because I helped to write it—the thought behind the letter—we had spent a great deal of time and effort and ammunition in the training of the Fleet in anti-aircraft gunnery. The defense of [189] Pearl Harbor, since it was a shore base, was, in accordance with the terms of this letter, placed in the hands of the District Commandant, and when one or more ships of the

Fleet were in Pearl Harbor, the guns of the Fleet were turned over to the District Commandant in the person of the Harbor Control Officer, as anti-aircraft weapons in the defense of the harbor. When I say responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was placed in the hands of the Commandant, I mean to the extent that alerts were passed on to the ships by him, the conditions of readiness, and the red, yellow, and green signals were all controlled by the Harbor Control Post. I had a fairly intimate knowledge of the setup there in that the Harbor Control Post was one of the CP's, or Command Posts, in the anti-aircraft setup on the Island. The whole anti-aircraft defense of the Island was headed up by an officer of the U. S. Army Air Forces, a Brigadier General. It was placed in his hands because he was the Fighter-Interceptor Commander for the Army, and aircraft attacks were to be countered by fighters and gunners. The Army Anti-Aircraft, the Coast Artillery Anti-Aircraft Brigade, was under the tactical command of this Air Force General, and the Harbor Control Post was a Command Post of the Anti-Aircraft. My recollection is that in the one or more revisions of this letter, we slightly changed the sectors which would be covered by various ships in the Harbor, and I think the second draft of this letter was improved by insuring that at least one ship should be in any one sector. My recollection is that when we first put this into effect, and we had drills from time to time, when few ships were in the Harbor, one sector was left vacant. The guns of the Fleet were under the control of the Harbor Control Post in Pearl Harbor and that Harbor Control Post, which was under the Commandant of the Navy Yard, was a part of the anti-aircraft and interceptor-fighter setup of the Island. The Harbor Control Post received its orders and its directions from the Anti-Aircraft Gun Commander.

21. Q. What portions of the anti-aircraft defense were the direct responsibility of the Army?

A. All those not mounted aboard ship, with the exception of, I believe, one battery of three-inch anti-aircraft artillery, mobile, that the Marines had at the barracks in the Yard. That battery, as I recollect, was part of the equipment of a Defense Battalion which was forming to proceed to one of the outlying islands.

22. Q. Admiral, what Army guns were placed close enough to Pearl Harbor to defend the ships there from dive or torpedo bombing?

A. It eventuated that at the time of the attack that there were not any, except fixed batteries, three-inch guns, at Fort DeRussey, some distance from Pearl Harbor, and I believe on Sand Island, the western side of Honolulu Harbor. The Army's anti-aircraft batteries, aside from fixed batteries, were mobile batteries of three-inch anti-aircraft guns. I believe that no ninety millimeter modern guns reached the Island until after the attack. There may have been one battery on the Island of Oahu, but it was not in operating condition. There were mobile batteries actively engaged in training and firing target practice west of Pearl Harbor at a training camp on the beach.

23. Q. Admiral, on the morning of December 7, do you know the condition of readiness of the Army guns that you mentioned as regards the presence of personnel and availability of ammunition?

A. They were not in place in the field, but were in their gun parks ready to move.

[190] 24. Q. In addition to the one battery that the Marines had at the Pearl Harbor base, did the Navy have any other shore anti-aircraft batteries at Pearl Harbor?

A. Not before the attack; we had many afterward.

25. Q. Do you know anything of the condition of readiness of that one Marine battery?

A. No, except that it was emplaced on that day.

26. Q. In general terms, will you describe the anti-aircraft armament of the ships in the Harbor, by types, as to number and calibre?

A. Yes. The battleships were equipped generally with 3-inch 50 calibre AA guns which were mounted in emplacements which were destined to take 1.1 quadruple mounts. They had their regular batteries of 5-inch 25 AA guns, and were equipped with —

27. Q. Just give the total number and calibre?

A. Eight 5-inch 25 guns; six to eight 3-inch 50 guns; and about twelve 50-calibre machine guns. I might state that the 3-inch 50 guns were interim armament in lieu of 1.1 automatic guns, quadruple mounts. Cruisers were equipped with eight 5-inch 25-calibre guns, except two which had 5-inch 38-calibre guns. Some had 3-inch 50 AA guns in lieu of 1.1 quadruple guns, and some had 1.1 quadruple mounts, four in each case, and eight to twelve 50-calibre machine guns. There were no 20-millimeter guns mounted in vessels of the Fleet, nor were there any 40-millimeter quadruple mounts.

28. Q. Admiral, what fire control plans were in effect for coordinating the fire of the ships and the limited number of shore guns available in the event of an air attack?

A. Speaking of Army guns, now?

29. Q. Overall. Was there any unity of command?

A. The strength of the Army AA defense rested in their mobile mounts and to my knowledge, none of them went into action on that day. The plan for the ships was for ships to cover their regularly assigned sectors, the Senior Commanding Officer in the sector in general command of that sector. The alerts and the orders, general overall fire control orders, were to come from the Harbor Control Post. The overall command of anti-aircraft defense, in accordance with the plan, rested in the Brigadier General of the Army Air Forces, whose station was at the Army Filter Station. He commanded fighters, interceptors, and the gun defense of the Island,—of Pearl Harbor. The Anti-Aircraft Brigade Commander, under this Brigadier General, had three commands; gun batteries, automatic weapon batteries, and searchlight batteries. The gun batteries of the Fleet were under the command of this Anti-Aircraft Brigade Commander through the Harbor Control Post.

30. Q. Were those control arrangements really in effect—working order?

A. They did not work, sir.

31. Q. Could they have been worked, had the personnel been properly alert?

A. As a matter of opinion, sir, I would say—probably. Certainly it would have worked better than it did, if the mobile batteries had been properly emplaced.

[191] 32. Q. How would the Central Control Station on shore, in Pearl Harbor, communicate fire control orders to the ships' guns?

A. By lights on the big water tower, sir, the signal tower, and by voice radio.

33. Q. In view of the speed of the targets for aircraft batteries, do you think such method of communication would have been effective, or did you think they would have been effective?

A. Yes, sir. Under the plan which was in effect in the ships, and I base this opinion on many drills held after the attack, when this plan, with little or no major change, remained in effect.

34. Q. Where were communications from the voice radio intended to be received on the ships?

A. Well, I cannot state that exactly, sir; various ships had various arrangements. In general a radio watch was kept on that circuit. No too great dependence was placed on that radio communication. The regular alert signals, sirens and lights, and search lights flashing the signal from the water tower were in effect, and before the attack on Pearl Harbor, and afterwards, actual fighting of a battery aboard ship was the responsibility of the commanding officer to take the proper targets under fire. The fire control of the Harbor Control Post over the ships in the Harbor was one of warning and alerting, and no attempt was made, before or after the bitter experience at Pearl Harbor, to require the Harbor Control Officer to pick out targets and direct fire on those targets.

35. Q. Was the system of assignment of fire sectors for the various ships sufficient to prevent confusion when various ships were firing?

A. I think when the attack actually came, that any targets which presented themselves to a ship were taken under fire provided the guns of that ship would bear. The chief reason for assigning sectors was to insure the presence of an even distribution, to insure that no sectors of the 360-degrees around the Fleet anchorage would be left uncovered; so that guns would not bear on any bearing. When the attack came, gunners followed the targets through where ever they presented themselves.

35. Q. Admiral, what fire control orders were actually issued on the morning of December 7, by whom, and how effective?

A. I do not believe that any orders as fire control other than those issued by the ships' commanding officers were issued. The alert came at the moment of the attack. There was one fire control order which was issued by the Commander-in-Chief on the evening of December 7, when some ships of the Fleet opened fire on what appeared to us on the Staff to be friendly planes, and there was broadcast from the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters, "Cease firing," I believe, "friendly planes". In other words, we stepped in.

36. Q. Was any damage done to the friendly planes by that mistake?

A. I believe that one or two friendly planes were shot down that night, sir.

37. Q. Admiral, again speaking in general terms, what was the condition of readiness of the shipboard anti-aircraft batteries, as regards presence of personnel and availability of ammunition, immediately prior to the attack on December 7?

[192] A. I think I would have to refer to this letter, to give an accurate answer. I was not actually in the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters when the attack came, but I believe that the Fleet was

in Condition 3, in accordance with this letter. I do know, from first-hand accounts, that ready ammunition was available on the required ships standing watch in the sectors and that fire against the attacking planes was promptly taken up.

38. Q. Do you know who issued the order for that condition of readiness, Condition 3, and when that was put into effect?

A. Well, the Naval Base Defense Officer was the Commandant and he set conditions of readiness.

39. Q. Admiral, do you know of any modification prescribed with respect to this Condition 3 in the battleships?

A. No, sir, I do not. I recollect one modification in conditions of readiness which was permitted by the Commander-in-Chief and that was after the attack on Pearl Harbor. He permitted one or two submarine tenders, moored to docks at the Submarine Base, to modify Condition 3 so that a fewer number of guns need be manned in Condition 3. That was because of the crew of those ships being occupied with submarine overhaul. I might state that my recollection of some of these things is a recollection of immediately before and after Pearl Harbor, because I was Fleet Gunnery Officer for nine months after the attack.

40. Q. What were the dimensions of the sectors which anti-aircraft batteries were assigned, which were assigned by 2CL-41?

A. As I remember it, there were four sectors, and refreshing my mind with the letter, I see there were four.

41. Q. That is ninety degrees each?

A. Not exactly, Admiral. The sector to the southeastward was 135 degrees; the sector to the northeastward was 45 degrees; and the other two were 90 degrees.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

42. Q. At the time of the attack of 7 December (these instructions insured the readiness of only a relatively small proportion of the total number of anti-aircraft guns which could have fired into the southeast sector; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

43. Q. About what percentage?

A. A small percentage actually manned with men on watch.

44. Q. Admiral, did the ships of the Pacific Fleet have on board their full wartime allowance of ammunition and other ordnance materials on the morning of December 7?

A. The Fleet not only had its full allowance of ammunition aboard but, in general, had its mobilization allowance, which is an extra amount of ammunition. This statement applies to all categories of ammunition. There was, however, a shortage of .50 calibre ammunition for anti-aircraft machine guns throughout the Navy and throughout the Fleet. This particular shortage had no effect on the attack because no ship expended all of its ammunition that it had on board.

[193] 45. Q. Were the conditions of ordnance material satisfactory to you prior to the attack?

A. Absolutely, except for numbers and types which were destined to come to the Fleet and had not yet reached the Fleet. May I ex-

plain. Many ships had three inch .50 calibre AA guns which were interim-armament and were to be replaced by 1.1 quadruple mounts. Some ships, notably cruisers, would have a mixed battery of three inch .50 calibre AA guns and 1.1's, because a sufficient number of 1.1 mounts had not arrived for the Fleet. The Fleet was destined to receive 20 mm machine guns and only two had been received. Sufficient ammunition, aside from these shortages I just spoke of, was available in the ammunition depot and within twenty-four hours all ships, except those that were very seriously damaged, had their ammunition replaced.

46. Q. Keeping in mind the strained international situation and the imminence of war, and the war tasks of the Pacific Fleet, will you give us the views of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as you knew them at the time, with respect to his satisfaction with ordnance and gunnery conditions as they existed in the period leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack.

A. I think that the Commander-in-Chief was well satisfied with the state of training of the men in the Fleet, considering personnel shortages which existed in the Fleet and very large turnovers of men which we had had continuously for the previous year. Target practice allowances had been greatly increased during the previous ten months. The number of practices that the ships fired had been increased, in some cases, by using a certain amount of ammunition for two or more practices, firing less in one practice and a smaller number of guns. Night surface firing had been stressed and drones had been made available in quite sufficient numbers, and anti-aircraft firings had increased, I would say, three or four hundred per cent, considering the additional targets, drones, and the better anti-aircraft visibility conditions existing in the islands.

47. Q. Were the status of your fire control doctrines well established at that time to your satisfaction?

A. Yes, sir, and I feel that is borne out by the splendid performance that the anti-aircraft batteries of the Fleet put forth on the 7th of December. My recollection can be checked by the report of Pearl Harbor, which I helped draw up, and I believe at least twenty-eight planes were shot down by vessels of the Fleet. Not a bad performance for men who had never fired a shot in action and considering the number of guns engaged. I might state that the planes shot down, no matter what their number was, were very carefully screened and identified as to where they landed and what happened to them.

48. Q. In the last several months leading up to the attack, had the gunnery training of the Fleet involved advance practices?

A. Yes, sir, of all kinds. First of all, short-range battle practice, or short-range practice, as we had known it before, had practically passed out of the picture; sled targets were used in place of raft targets. That resulted in higher speeds. I might state, along with gunnery training, I think this has a bearing, that at Admiral Kimmel's insistence the Fleet Gunnery Officer, the Force Gunnery Officer, and Type Gunnery Officer were given flight orders and required to witness practices of their forces from the air, so that immediate corrective actions could be taken by the ships as soon as they came into port. No observation parties were allowed to be transferred at sea.

[194] 49. Q. In these advance practices, using your established fire control doctrines, were the results obtained satisfactory to the

Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as practices held in a period when war was quite imminent?

A. I don't think Admiral Kimmel would have ever been satisfied with any performance. He was a perfectionist and nothing less than perfection would do. The people who were responsible for the gunnery training of the Fleet were greatly pleased with the state of training and the progress that was being made daily, and I think secretly Admiral Kimmel felt that a good job was being done. I don't think Admiral Kimmel would have ever been satisfied with any results; completely satisfied.

50. Q. Of those twenty-eight enemy planes which you estimated to have been shot down, how many were recovered and examined?

A. Admiral, I'd have to refer to the report, because in that report we actually spotted where the planes landed. Several of them—I can't give you the exact number—landed in the water. Some of those that landed in the water were recovered. Several, number I can not recollect, landed in the cane fields and burned almost completely. There was a large recovery of junk.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: Admiral, I would like to add, even at the expense of perhaps repeating some of the things I have said here in answer to questions, and in view of the fact that the apparent readiness and state of training of the Fleet has been one of the questions that has been foremost here in this testimony, that I do not know what more could have been done, under a Commander who was a very hard taskmaster, to put the Pacific Fleet in a higher state of training than it was on the morning of Pearl Harbor. I think that state was very high and I know that if there was anything left undone in making it higher, it is something that I, as an afterthought, have not been able to think of.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter dated 16 March 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, from Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the transcript of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the testimony given by him on the ninth day of the examination was correct, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 30".

The examination then, at 4:05 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[195]

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, MARCH 23, 1944

FOURTEENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 11:25 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirteenth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral W. S. Pye, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the eleventh day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station?

A. Vincent R. Murphy, Captain, U. S. Navy, Head of the Post-graduate School, Annapolis, Maryland.

2. Q. Where were you stationed on 7 December 1941?

A. I was a member of the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Kimmel's Staff as Assistant to the War Plans Officer.

3. Q. Where were you at the time the Japanese air attack was launched against Pearl Harbor on that date?

A. I was the Staff Duty Officer, and when the attack was launched I was in the War Plans Office, at the Submarine Base.

4. Q. What was the nature of your duties as Staff Duty Officer?

A. They were the usual duties of a Staff Duty Officer, to represent the Commander-in-Chief in his absence, to act on routine matters that might come up, to act on non-routine matters in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, if they came within the confines of established policy; to refer matters not under my immediate knowledge

to the appropriate member of the Staff who had cognizance, if such matters came up; and to keep the Commander-in-Chief informed of unusual or untoward circumstances.

[196] 5. Q. Will you please expand your answer just a little bit to include your authority and duties in connection with the Fourteenth Naval District, if any?

A. The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, commanded a task force under the Commander-in-Chief which was charged with the naval defense of Pearl Harbor. He came under the Duty Officer's cognizance the same as any other task force commander or any other unit of the Fleet.

6. Q. At what time and date did your tour of duty commence?

A. As well as I remember, the time of relieving for Duty Officers was after working hours which, on Saturday, would have been around 12:30, when the Chief of Staff went home—on Saturday.

7. Q. At what time on the morning of December 7th did Admiral Kimmel, or a member of his Staff senior to you, appear at the Headquarters so as to relieve you of these extraordinary functions?

A. The first member of the Staff was Captain, now Rear Admiral McMorris, who I would estimate arrived about five minutes after the attack started, which would be around 8:00 o'clock. Admiral Kimmel arrived, I would say, about ten minutes after that, but that could be in error ten minutes either way because I was very busy and he could have easily come in and I wouldn't have seen him. I think Admiral McMorris met Admiral Kimmel when Admiral Kimmel came in.

8. Q. Captain, what information with respect to the international situation in the Pacific was furnished you when you went on watch as a Staff Duty Officer?

A. There was no specific information furnished me as Staff Duty Officer, because I was already cognizant of most of the general picture, anyway, by virtue of my connection with War Plans. I was furnished with a memorandum from Captain McMorris giving me the dispositions of the ships and forces of the Fleet, and giving me instructions that if war were declared or an attack took place, the general idea of what to do with the ships. That idea, as well as I recall, was to get Admiral Halsey's forces, which had been at Wake and which were or would be, out of fuel, back into Pearl Harbor and get them fueled ready to conduct the first operation of the War Plans. Admiral Brown's force was then at Johnston Island, as I recall, getting ready to conduct a practice landing operation. Another force under Admiral Newton, I think it was a task group under Admiral Brown, was delivering planes, or on the way to deliver planes at Midway. The general plan was to get all those ships back and fueled and proceed with our War Plans. I had that information in a memorandum from Captain McMorris. I was also furnished information that locked in the Operations Office was a chart showing what we thought to be the location of the force which was operating under radio silence—Admiral Halsey's force.

9. Q. Were you familiar with the Fleet Intelligence Officer's estimate of the location of Japanese Army and Navy forces?

A. Insofar as I know, I was. There may have been something that the Fleet Intelligence Officer told other people that he did not tell me, but if there was, I don't know about it.

10. Q. Did you keep advised daily of the situation as he viewed it?

A. To the best of my recollection, the Fleet Intelligence Officer reported every morning to Admiral Kimmel and summarized the situation for him. Captain McMorris was generally present at those conferences, I was not, but Captain McMorris made it a point to inform me, as to what went on. I am not [197] sure whether Captain McCormick was in on those conferences or not.

11. Q. Did you feel at that time that you had all the information of that type that it was necessary for you to have in order to properly perform your duties as Staff Duty Officer?

A. I felt, at that time, that I had all the information that was available, but I know of no Staff Duty Officer, or any Commander-in-Chief, who could ever feel that he had all the information that was necessary.

12. Q. Had you been advised of the receipt, in the week preceding the attack, of the dispatch containing a war warning received from the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Yes, sir; I had.

13. Q. Had you been advised of the Commander-in-Chief's views with respect to the significance of the information that was available to him and his Staff, concerning the international situation?

A. Not altogether. When the message came in, I was sent for, and to the best of my recollection, Captain Smith, now Rear Admiral Smith; Captain McMorris; myself, Captain, now Rear Admiral W. S. DeLany; and, I think, Layton, the Intelligence Officer,—were called into Admiral Kimmel's office and he read the dispatch to us and he passed it around and he said, "What do you think of it?" As well as I recall, each one expressed an opinion, and then Admiral Kimmel said that he would have a conference later on in the afternoon, with his principal commanders, on the subject. I do not believe that Admiral Kimmel gave us, at that time, a complete or even a partial picture of his reaction to the message—inasmuch as none of us had had time to study the message in any detail. Later that afternoon, I would estimate around 4:00 o'clock, there was another conference that I think I attended for part, but whether I was there for the entire time, I can't recall. The best of my recollection of that conference is that it was attended by the same people who came that morning, and I think Admiral Calhoun was there. I think Captain Earle, Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District, represented Admiral Bloch, but that is subject to correction because there were many conferences and I can't separate them in my mind—each one. At that conference, I believe the decision was made to reenforce Wake particularly, with planes and radar gear, and to send some planes to Midway, which consisted of one patrol squadron, as I remember it, and some fighters, to be delivered by the LEXINGTON. The movement to Wake was made with particular emphasis on secrecy, particularly inasmuch as my recollection of the war warning message specifically warned us against any overt act.

14. Q. Were you, at that time, familiar, Captain, with the Army's responsibility in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. I was familiar with the provisions of Joint Action of the Army and Navy, which made the Army responsible for the defense of Naval bases—I interpreted that to include Pearl Harbor.

15. Q. Were you familiar with the Army's setup so as to know just how capable they were of fulfilling their obligations under the Plans and Joint Action?

A. They only feature that I was familiar with was their general airplane picture, and their anti-aircraft gun picture. As I recall it, they had around 200 fighting planes and about 30 or 40 bombers, and I think the figure was 56 anti-aircraft guns, although it could have been 37.

[198] 16. Q. Were you advised as to their condition of readiness, or condition as to alertness on that morning?

A. As well as I recall, the condition of readiness was prescribed by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

17. Q. I am still speaking of the Army.

A. I was not aware of the details of their condition of readiness.

18. Q. Did you know whether they had been alerted at all, or not?

A. I did not.

19. Q. Were you familiar with the radar and air warning net setup of the Army?

A. Only vaguely. I knew that seven or eight stations were in process of being set up. How many of them were actually set up, I did not know.

20. Q. Did you know, the morning of the 7th of December, whether any of them were operating or not?

A. I did not.

21. Q. Did you have any other instructions or information with respect to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's plans for immediate action to be taken in event of sudden starting of war, that is, other than the instructions that were given you by Admiral McMorris?

A. The instructions which would govern the situation that actually occurred were contained in the Joint Plan for the Defense of Hawaii, I have forgotten the name, and under that there was a specific plan for the defense of Pearl Harbor which charged the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, with responsibility for the Fleet's part of that defense, with the distribution of ships in the Harbor, to assist in repelling anti-aircraft attack, with the prescribing of conditions of readiness for the situation, as he might see it.

22. Q. I show you Exhibit 4 before this examination. Do you identify it?

A. Yes.

23. Q. Is that the plan to which you have just referred?

A. Yes.

24. Q. Were you, at that time, or had you, at that time, been advised as to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's views with respect to a surprise air attack on the vessels and installations at Pearl Harbor?

A. Not specifically. I mean by that, by association with the Staff, particularly the War Plans branch, I was, I think, generally familiar with the Commander-in-Chief's views, but I was not specifically advised as to his views of a sudden attack.

25. Q. What were your views, at that time, with respect to such a surprise air attack?

A. I did not think that such an attack would be made. I thought that it would be utterly stupid for the Japanese to attack the United States at Pearl Harbor. I thought it was questionable whether they should attack even the Philippines. I thought that the Japanese could probably have gone into Thailand and Malaya, and even the Dutch East Indies. I doubt if the United States would have declared war under those circumstances. I thought that the [199] Japanese Staff was faced with the proposition of guessing what the reaction of the United States might be if they did not attack the United States and proceeded with their plans; and, having to weigh that possibility, against their open flank if they left the Philippines. I thought that the Japanese, who, in my opinion, generally follow the book, might attack the Philippines, just by virtue of being afraid to leave an open flank—I did not think they would attack at Pearl Harbor because I did not think it was necessary for them to do so, from my point of view. We could not have materially affected their control of the waters that they wanted to control, whether or not the battleships were sunk at Pearl Harbor. In other words, I did not believe that we could move the United States Fleet to the Western Pacific until such time as auxiliaries were available, as the material condition of the ships were improved, especially with regard to anti-aircraft, and until such time as the Pacific Fleet was materially re-enforced. I thought it was suicide for us to attempt, with an inferior fleet, to move into the Western Pacific.

26. Q. Did you recognize, at that time, the possibility of such an attack?

A. Yes.

27. Q. With respect to the security of the vessels at Pearl Harbor, did you have any instructions other than those contained in Exhibit 4?

A. Not that I recall.

28. Q. Did you, at that time, feel that the provisions of Exhibit 4 adequately covered the situation?

A. I felt that the provisions of Exhibit 4 covered the situation as well as it could, with the other considerations which entered into the picture, those considerations being the forces available, our own War Plans, which required almost immediate movements to the attack, and, the requirements of training in a Fleet which contained a considerable portion of new officers and men, and which was very deficient in anti-aircraft defense. The question of patrol plane, all-around search, had come up many, many times. Much thought had been given to it. It was a question of wearing out our planes over a considerable period of time, wearing out our pilots, and not knowing when to expect a declaration of war, to find ourselves completely worn out by practicing for war, including the psychological aspects thereof, and unable to fight it when it came.

29. Q. Do you remember the use of the word "deployment" in the message which contained a war warning?

A. Yes, sir.

30. Q. What was your reaction when you saw that word?

A. The first time I saw that word, the word "defensive" or "defense" was out of place in the message, as I recall it. It said, "Take defensive

deployment for the tasks of Rainbow 5". My thought was that "defensive" was not in that, in its right place, that the message should be: "Take deployment for the defensive tasks of Rainbow 5".

31. Q. Did you think that the presence of heavy ships in Pearl Harbor amounted to a defensive deployment, insofar as they were concerned?

A. I thought it amounted to a defensive deployment for the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5, in that our plan called for the immediate movement of those ships to the attack. I felt that the risk, if it were greater in [200] Pearl Harbor than it might have been at sea, had to be weighted against the advantage of an immediate moment. Had those ships been at sea, it would have been necessary to bring them back in to port and refuel them, and get them ready to move. I, personally, wanted to move fast; I felt that our original plan was bold for the forces we had available and that a great deal depended on speed in its execution.

32. Q. Did you then think that those words "defensive" and "deployment" in any way meant security measures?

A. I was not sure, but I interpreted them to leave it open to us. I was doubtful.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

33. Q. Captain, I refer back to your statement when you were giving your estimate of the situation as regards the possibility of surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor. Did I understand you correctly to say that in formulating your estimate you considered that the Fleet was not ready to make any westward move, because of the lack of auxiliaries and lack of material readiness on the part of vessels of the Fleet?

A. I said that and I would like to add to that that we were, in the Pacific, an inferior Fleet. I saw nothing in the Far East that could necessarily have tied up parts of the Japanese Fleet to allow us even approach equality.

34. Q. Captain, at that time, was it the belief of the members of Admiral Kimmel's Staff that the Japanese were obtaining rather full intelligence as to the condition of the Pacific Fleet?

A. There was a general impression that the Japanese could know everything that they wanted to know about the Pacific Fleet.

35. Q. In view of those two answers, why was not the possibility more seriously considered that the Japanese High Command would be rather anxious to disable the Fleet at Pearl Harbor before it could remedy these deficiencies which precluded it from striking westward?

A. I do not know what the general Staff reaction to that possibility was. For my own part, and I may have been guided more by a political analysis than a military one, I did not think that they would attempt to do it.

36. Q. Captain, had you, at that time, formulated any opinion as to the efficiency of the Japanese naval air arm?

A. Yes.

37. Q. Would you please state what your opinion was at that time?

A. My original opinion was that it was poor. That opinion was altered by a conversation with Admiral Yarnell. I then thought that

Japanese aviation was probably pretty good, but nowhere near approaching our own.

38. Q. Did you consider it capable of performing the tasks that it did perform on the 7th of December?

A. Yes.

39. Q. Did that consideration enter into the formulation of your opinion as to the possibility or probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes.

[201] 40. Q. Captain, with respect to your duties as the Staff Duty Officer, what instructions did you have or what did you consider to be your duty in connection with advising the Army Command on Oahu of any matters of importance that came to your attention?

A. If anything unusual had come up during my tour of duty, I would advise Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who would have advised the Army, as he was charged under Joint Action of the Army and Navy with dealings with the Army.

41. Q. Captain, when did you first receive notice of a contact with any Japanese forces on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. I would say somewhere around 7:20 or 7:25.

42. Q. What was the nature of that contact?

A. It was a report of the Duty Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District to the Assistant Duty Officer, to the effect that a submarine had been sunk by the WARD or had been attacked and sunk by the WARD in the Defensive Sea Area.

43. Q. Please state what action you took, based on that report.

A. At that time, I was in the process of getting dressed in my quarters. Lieutenant Commander Black gave me the report. He was Assistant Duty Officer. And I said, "Did he say what he was doing about it? Did he say whether Admiral Bloch knew about it, or not?" And he said, "No." I said, "While I'm finishing dressing, call him and see what he's doing about it and whether or not he's called Admiral Bloch." I finished dressing, Black came back and said he had dialed and dialed and the line was busy. It was a dial telephone system. I said, "All right, you go to the office and start breaking out the charts and positions of the various ships; I'll dial one more time and then I'll be over." I dialed the phone and it was busy. I then dialed the operator—it was a local dial system—and told him to tell the Duty Officer to call me immediately and to break in on any conversation he might be holding unless it was of supreme importance. I went to the office and as I walked in the office, the phone was ringing. I answered the phone and it was Ramsey—now Captain, L. C. Ramsey, from Pat Wing-Two. He said he had a report from a patrol plane to the effect that a submarine had been sunk in the Defensive Sea Area. I said, "I have just had a report that I have not been able to get any more details on," and told him what the report was. At that time, the phone rang from the Fourteenth Naval District and the Duty Officer was on the phone. He said that Admiral Bloch had been informed, that he had ordered the ready-duty destroyer out to assist the Ward and to investigate, and had ordered the stand-by destroyer to get up steam. I said, "Had you any previous details or any more details of this attack?" He said, "The message came out of a clear sky. There was no word of preliminary search or chase of any kind." I then called Admiral Kimmel and

gave him both messages and told him that Admiral Bloch knew it and of the ready-destroyer being ordered out and of the stand-by destroyer getting up steam. He said, "I will be right down." About that time, and I'm not sure of the sequence, Ramsey called again and said that he had nothing further and did I have anything further. I said, "No," but I thought it might be wise for him to make his search planes available in case the Admiral wanted them. About that time, the phone rang again; it was the Duty Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District. He said that he had another message from the WARD saying that she was towing a sampan into Honolulu Harbor and dequisting a Coast Guard tug be sent to his assistance. I called Admiral Kimmel and gave him that message. Before I finished that message, the yeoman [202] came in, said, "There's a message from the signal tower saying the Japanese are attacking Pearl Harbor and this is no drill." I gave that message to Admiral Kimmel, either directly on that one call or a call immediately thereafter. I do not recall exactly whether it was the same call or thereafter. I then told the Communications Officer to send a dispatch to Chief of Naval Operations, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, with priority of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, over the Chief of Naval Operations, and to our forces at sea: "JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL." I then called Ramsey and said, "How many planes have you got available"—no, I'll correct; I told the yeoman to call the signal tower and ask if the Pearl Harbor Defense Plan had been executed, and he said it had been by Admiral Bloch. I called Ramsey and said, "How many planes have you got available?" He said, "I don't think I have any, but I'm scraping together what I can for search." I then called all the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief; some I called myself and some the yeoman called, using every phone we had in the office. I distinctly remember talking to Captain Smith myself. By that time, Captain McMorris came in, either just preceded or followed by the Admiral, I don't recall, and we drafted a more formal dispatch to the forces at sea, giving them instructions and information. From then on, the duties were largely taken over by the regular Staff and the War Plans Division helped in advising the other people who had the immediate direction of events.

44. Q. Upon receipt of the contact report, did you formulate any opinion as to its significance with respect to other possible enemy movements?

A. Yes. The contact itself was about the third or fourth of a series of such contacts. All previous ones had, insofar as actual proof is concerned, turned out to be negative. This one, I thought, might be the real thing, but I wanted some information leading to why he thought he had sunk a submarine so that I could formulate whether there was a submarine there or whether there wasn't a submarine there. As in previous contacts, we had never been able to definitely establish that there was a submarine there. I did not interpret the submarine attack as possibly being accompanied by an air attack on Pearl Harbor. I will say this: I had less doubt about the authenticity of this attack than I had had about some of the others.

45. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel express his views as to what significance should be attached to the contact when you notified him of it?

A. He said, "I will be right down." That's all he said.

46. Q. Did you notify anyone other than Admiral Kimmel of this contact, prior to the launching of the air attack?

A. No.

47. Q. Where were you, physically, during the performance of these duties which you have just recounted?

A. In the Commander-in-Chief's Offices, in the Submarine Base Building at the Submarine Base. I was actually in the outer offices.

48. Q. You've mentioned difficulties in telephone communications on that morning. Can you tell me anything concerning the general inadequacy of wire communications in and about Pearl Harbor, including those to the Army?

A. I made some investigation of this when I was War Plans Officer for the previous Commander-in-Chief. At that time, I can best describe the communications system, particularly with respect to communication with the Army, as almost non-existent. There was projected, at that time, the building of a communication center in which a tie-in with the Army circuits would be provided. That building, I believe, was almost complete at the time [203] of the attack, but I do not believe that the facilities or the installations had been completed, although I am not—or was not, familiar with the details of the arrangement. I would say that the methods of communication were most unsatisfactory, in that all the communication that I had with the Fourteenth Naval District was by telephone, and likewise with the Army. There was a Harbor defense circuit by radio in which all ships were connected and which was tied-in with the Army anti-aircraft system and with the plane system. I mean by the "plane system", with the control of aircraft in flight, particularly fighters. I've forgotten the frequency that circuit was on.

49. Q. Was it effective, as yet?

A. I believe it was, Admiral, but I'm not sure.

50. Q. The difficulties of the telephone system, I understand to lie in the fact that everything was via the usual peacetime switchboard arrangement and there was nothing corresponding to a battle telephone circuit?

A. There was not.

51. Q. Was that also true with communications to the Army and did they involve the commercial switchboard in Honolulu?

A. I don't know, sir.

52. Q. Referring to your estimate to the effect that the Japanese would attack someone else in the Far East and they would probably not attack the United States. Did you see a dispatch from the Department of about 3 December concerning some steps that the Japs were taking with their communication equipment?

A. I did.

53. Q. Did seeing that dispatch alter your mental attitude as to the direction in which a Japanese attack might take?

A. No, sir. I considered it a routine precaution in case the United States or Great Britain should declare war and unexpectedly take over the Japanese diplomatic residences.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a mat-

ter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I would like to say this. That the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was confronted with an almost irreconcilable situation in that he had a Fleet which was badly in need of training and matériel improvement, particularly with respect to new planes and new pilots in the patrol squadrons, as well as ships themselves. He had to guess how much training he could do and include in it the possibility of maintaining a continuous alert, which would be destructive both in matériel and, in my opinion, even more important, the morale of the Fleet. I do not believe that any force can maintain, for a long period, an attitude of complete defensive readiness without severe loss of morale. I think that these considerations weighed heavily upon the Commander-in-Chief's mind.

(Examination by the examining officer continued:)

[204] 54. Q. Were those thoughts which you have just expressed with you during that period, November-December, '41?

A. Yes, sir.

55. Q. Did anything occur to you which would have remedied those circumstances and conditions?

A. Only the thought: "If I can only have full information."

56. Q. Did you advocate, or even seriously consider in your own mind, definite steps toward basing the Fleet on the Pacific Coast instead of at Hawaii?

A. I had advocated those steps in my capacity as War Plans Officer for Admiral Richardson. I did not advocate it, as well as I recall, later, because I thought the matter had been settled.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:35 p. m., took a recess until 2:50 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Captain Vincent R. Murphy, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the fourteenth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examination then, at 2:52 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[205]

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

SATURDAY, MARCH 25, 1944

FIFTEENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 10 a. m.

Present:

. Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the fourteenth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral Willard A. Kitts, III, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirteenth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Captain Robert O. Glover, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twelfth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Commander Paul C. Crosley, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirteenth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 10:25 a. m., took a recess until 11 a. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLany, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the fifth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examination then, at 11:05 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[206] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

MONDAY, MARCH 27, 1944**SIXTEENTH DAY****NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.**

The examination set at 10:08 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The record of proceedings of the second through the fifteenth days, both inclusive, of the examination was read and approved.

The examining officer read and received in evidence a copy of a letter, dated 22 March 1944, from Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, informing him of the adjournment of the examination on March 27, 1944, to such places away from Washington, D. C., as pertinent witnesses may be found available, which places are now unknown, and of the examining officer's inability to inform him further of such times of meetings, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 31."

The examination then, at 10:29 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[207] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

TUESDAY MARCH 28, 1944

SEVENTEENTH DAY

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
San Francisco, California.

The examination met at 12:50 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the sixteenth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Joseph John Rochefort, Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer U. S. S. ABSD2.

2. Q. What were your duties during 1941 calendar year?

A. 1 January 1941 until approximately 15 May 1941, attached to and serving on board the U. S. S. INDIANAPOLIS as Assistant Operations Officer and Force Intelligence Officer for Commander, Scouting Force. During the remainder of the calendar year, I was officer in charge of combat intelligence, attached to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

3. Q. Did you spend some time in Japan learning that language?

A. Yes, sir, three years, from September, 1929, until September, 1932.

4. Q. Did you qualify as Japanese interpreter?

A. Yes; interpreter and translator.

5. Q. In addition to attaining that qualification, did you then, or have you since, made any particular effort towards study of the mental, moral, and psychological characteristics of the Japanese?

A. Yes, sir. Whenever my duties at sea and ashore permitted, which were, due to the fact that I was Fleet Intelligence Officer for two years and Assistant District Intelligence Officer for two years, rather extensive.

6. Q. Other than from the work of your own unit at Pearl Harbor, did you have other sources from which you obtained similar information?

A. Yes, sir, from the Washington Headquarters, and from the unit similar to mine attached to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

[208] 7. Q. Was there any other source in particular?

A. Other Government agencies, such as the Army in the Hawaiian Area, the Federal Bureau of Investigation field office in Honolulu, Federal Communications Commission office in Honolulu. However, the information furnished by these agencies was of no value prior to December 7, 1941.

8. Q. Was there a free interchange of information between units similar to yours located in Washington and in the Far East, and your own?

A. Yes, sir, most free, due to the fact that all of our messages were common to all three offices. That is, any message originating in one unit automatically was sent to the other two units.

9. Q. Then did you feel that you had access to all the information which the Navy had available from those two sources?

A. Insofar as general intelligence was concerned, we had access to all information available. Certain types of information were handled either in Washington, alone, or jointly between Washington and the unit in the Far East.

10. Q. Then the three units did, to a certain extent, specialize in certain fields within their own general specialty?

A. Yes, sir.

11. Q. And you were not positive that you received all of the important information in those particular fields?

A. No, sir, we did not.

12. Q. To what officials did you report concerning the intelligence which came into your hands, during the latter half of 1941?

A. To the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, personally, and to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, via the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

13. Q. And you, yourself, or none of your subordinates made direct contacts with the Commander-in-Chief or other members of his Staff, other than with his Intelligence Officer?

A. Except in rare instances, I had no contact with the Commander-in-Chief personally. On several occasions, the Commander-in-Chief came to my office for discussion of certain points which had been raised by either Washington, the Far Eastern Unit, or myself?

14. Q. Did your unit engage in study of material gained from the Japanese Foreign Service?

A. No, sir.

15. Q. Did you receive, during November and early December, anything which the other two units obtained from that source?

A. To the best of my knowledge, no, sir.

16. Q. Did you receive from the Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, directly or otherwise, a copy of some communications in which the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu was concerned, at any time around 1 December '41?

A. Yes, sir.

[209] 17. Q. Did those communications amount to much in the way of volume?

A. No, sir, I would say, perhaps, ten to fifteen messages.

18. Q. Did they come direct to you from the District Intelligence Officer?

A. Yes, sir.

19. Q. Did you have any request or any instructions in connection with them?

A. Yes, sir. He stated he was vitally interested in any information they might contain.

20. Q. Did you succeed in extracting any information from them?

A. Yes, sir.

21. Q. When?

A. In all except two or three of the messages, within twelve hours; the remaining two or three messages on the evening of 10 December.

22. Q. Did the lot which you handled easily contain any important information?

A. No, sir.

23. Q. Did the other lot?

A. Yes, sir.

24. Q. Why were you unable to obtain that information at an earlier date?

A. Because of the inherent difficulties in the task which were such that we were unable to get earlier results.

25. Did you employ your ablest assistants in that task, and approximately how much time did they devote to it?

A. Yes, sir. It was made a matter of paramount importance and approximately twelve to sixteen hours daily were devoted to that work alone.

26. Q. Was it a part of your duties, or those of your unit, to monitor radio traffic in the so-called "amateur" status with the object of disclosing if any Japanese spies were communicating direct with Japan?

A. No, sir.

27. Q. Did you know whether any of that work was being done on Oahu?

A. In conversation with F. C. C. personally, I received the impression that it was their function and that they were endeavoring to cover such channels to the best of their ability.

28. Q. Did you know whether or not it was a sincere and effective effort on their part?

A. Insofar as the local personnel on Oahu were concerned, I believe it was.

29. Q. Did you ever hear of their apprehending any improper communications of that nature?

A. No, sir.

30. Q. Over what channels did the Consular General, Hawaii, communicate with his superiors in Japan?

A. Primarily by cable, occasionally by radio.

31. Q. Was there ever any telephone communication in which he was engaged (I mean trans-Pacific telephone)?

A. None of which I had been informed.

[210] 32. Q. Now, Commander, I will ask you to state, chronologically, as nearly as possible, the results which your unit obtained in keeping track of the movement of units of the Japanese Fleet, beginning on or about 1 October 1941.

A. On 1 October, the general mission of the unit at Pearl was to endeavor to obtain information from the specific types of traffic

as assigned by Washington. Secondly, to obtain information, by a study of radio traffic originated by the Japanese stations. And, thirdly, to obtain information by radio direction finder bearings. As of 1 October, the first mission mentioned was being only partially carried out due to inability on the part of the personnel concerned. The second and third missions were, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, being carried out. Late in October and during the month of November, some minor successes were obtained in the field covered by the first mission. However, the information thus obtained was not in any sense vital. Beginning in early November, it became apparent that certain moves were afoot, and after about three weeks constant study an estimate was drawn up which was submitted to the Commandant, who released a dispatch to Washington, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. To the best of my knowledge, this dispatch was sent out on 26 November. Between that date and the 7th of December, very little information was obtained by means of radio intelligence, due to the lack of traffic. During the latter part of November and the first week in December, information previously unavailable, due to legal restrictions, was made available from the files of the communication companies in Honolulu. This traffic contained the incoming and outgoing files of the personnel attached to the Consulate General in Honolulu.

33. Q. On broad lines, what was the substance of that estimate which you made about 26 November?

A. The estimate submitted on 26 November consisted, in the main, of the opinion that the Japanese were concentrating to the south of Japan, one force proceeding toward Indochina; the direction of advance of the other force was not known. An additional force of some strength and containing at least one carrier division was placed definitely in the Marshalls area.

34. Q. How many carriers did the Japs organize in one division?

A. Two, sir.

35. Q. At about the time of this aforesaid estimate, what were you getting along similar lines from the other two units?

A. Nothing definite except that the Far East Unit had stated, on many occasions, that an offensive move was apparent. To the best of my knowledge, no direction or composition of forces was given prior to the dispatch of the estimate from Pearl.

36. Q. Narrowing this testimony down to Japanese carriers—do I understand you to say that you thought you had located two in the Marshall Islands or proceeding in that direction?

A. In our opinion, at that time, at least two Japanese carriers were in the Marshalls area.

37. Q. Did you estimate other Japanese carriers to be to the southward of, say, Formosa?

A. I do not recall whether the task forces which we included in our estimate contained carriers south of Formosa, or not.

38. Q. On this subject of location of carriers, of which it is well understood the Japanese possessed ten, was the unit in the Far East in agreement with your estimate?

[211] A. No, sir.

39. Q. In what respect?

A. The estimate mentioned previously was not replied to by Washington. The following day, the Far Eastern Unit, commented on the dispatch and I believe the Far Eastern Unit was in general agreement except for the direction of movement and particularly the placing of at least one carrier division in the Marshalls.

40. Q. Did the Far Eastern Unit suggest that more was known about the location of Japanese carriers than was shown in your estimate?

A. I do not recall.

41. Q. Do you know if the aforesaid estimate and the dispatch from Com 14, which was based thereon, were communicated to the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Yes, sir, the following morning the Commander-in-Chief, accompanied by Com 14, came to my offices and discussed the matter at great length, at least an hour and a half, I would say.

42. Q. Do you recall if that disagreement which came to you from the other unit in the East was likewise communicated to the Commander-in-Chief?

A. I am almost positive that it was by reason of the fact that all messages of that type were given to the Commander-in-Chief.

43. Q. Were you, at that time, aware of the very tense situation that existed between us and the Japanese, particularly insofar as diplomatic negotiations were concerned?

A. Yes, sir, I believe I was.

44. Q. You did not, however, obtain anything in the nature of a similar estimate from Washington, is that correct?

A. No, sir, we did not. I might amend that slightly by stating that several days after the dispatch of our estimate and the dispatch of the Far Eastern Unit's estimate a warning dispatch was received from Washington. That was on the 27th. They, obviously, tied together but there was no direct answer.

45. Q. Did it occur to you, at the time, in view of the importance of this subject, that you had a right to expect something from Washington?

A. No, sir. We had submitted our estimate to our superior officers in Washington. Whether or not they replied, I considered a matter within their purview.

46. Q. Did you look upon Japanese battleships and carriers as the most important units?

A. Yes, sir.

47. Q. Did you recall any uneasiness of mind because you did not have a greater number of those ships located?

A. There was great unease in all of our minds because of the lack of traffic. The inability to locate more battleships and carriers was not considered, in itself, as a bad sign by reason of the fact that up until that time we had generally been unsuccessful in locating the majority of the larger ships.

48. Q. What particular types of Japanese man-o-war did you feel you were well in touch with and what importance did you put upon their movements?

[212] A. We maintained close touch with all of the vessels engaged in building up bases in the Mandates and, generally, with seaplane tenders, and occasional cruiser divisions.

49. Q. Did your unit assume that because they did not hear the large Japanese ships talking that they were all in port?

A. No, sir.

50. Q. From, say, the 27th of November onward, do I understand you to say that Japanese naval radio traffic was unusually light?

A. Yes, sir.

51. Q. Did you recall any previous occasion when it was as sparse as during that period?

A. Yes, sir. During the advance and occupation of Hainan.

52. Q. Did it occur to the minds in your unit that this silence might be presaging another offensive movement?

A. Yes, sir, we considered that it did definitely presage another offensive movement.

53. Q. Were you emphatic in calling the attention of your seniors to the importance of this lack of traffic?

A. Yes, sir.

54. Q. To whom did you represent that?

A. To the Commandant and to my opposite number on the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, namely, the Fleet Intelligence Officer. However, the objectives, insofar as my unit was concerned, did not include areas to the eastward of the Mandate islands.

55. Q. Reverting to the subject of your general study of Japanese characteristics, do you recall any conversation in which you engaged concerning the characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders of that period, particularly of Admiral Yamamoto?

A. I do not recall any specific conversations, but I had, over a two-year period, during which I served on the same Staff as the then Captain McMorris, many conversations with him and other senior officers of my opinion as to the characteristics of the various Japanese naval high command.

56. Q. Do you recall what your general size-up of Yamamoto was at that time?

A. Prior to December 7, 1941, I considered Admiral Yamamoto as not being particularly brilliant, but rather being of a type of General Araki. In other words, a strong character who might take violent action even without the knowledge or consent of his superiors in Tokyo.

57. Q. You thought that he belonged to the so-called younger officer clique?

A. Yes, sir.

58. Q. Did you have in mind his previous work in building up the air force of the Japanese Navy?

A. Not particularly, sir. In reading the various statements attributed to him, and during the one or two occasions that I met him, my estimate was that he was one of the—what we then called “firebrands”, and might conceivably disobey any order from Tokyo under certain circumstances.

[213] 59. Q. Did you look upon him as dangerous as well as venturesome?

A. Yes, sir.

60. Q. Insofar as you know, were those opinions of yours and the others with whom you discussed it ever communicated to Admirals Kimmel or Bloch?

A. I could not say definitely whether they had, or not, except in one or two cases where I had prepared, while attached to the Staff of the Commander, Scouting Force, estimates in connection with the various Rainbow Plans.

61. Q. Do you recall if the Fleet Intelligence Officer, whom I understand likewise is a Japanese language interpreter, agreed with you in your opinions?

A. I have reason to believe that he did, sir.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I would like to mention, briefly, the equipment which was available prior to December 7. The Pearl Harbor unit was also charged with operating, under the general supervision of the Navy Department, the mid-Pacific radio direction finder net. This was not as efficient or as productive of results as it might have been, due to the type of equipment, lack of trained operators, and long distances involved which rendered an efficient radio direction finder net operation rather difficult. In the summer of 1941, the Commandant personally ordered the erection of additional radio direction finder sets at Midway and Palmyra, after I had discussed the matter unsuccessfully with the Navy Department. It is my opinion that the Commandant ordered the erection of these stations after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief. In connection with the exchange of information between the three combat intelligence units, all traffic, other than purely technical traffic, was also sent to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. Prior to December 7, the Army, to the best of my knowledge, was not engaged in any work comparable to that of the Combat Intelligence Naval Unit in the Hawaiian Area.

Examination by the examining officer (continued):

62. Q. Was the Army in Hawaii equipped with material and personnel to do that kind of work?

A. No, sir.

63. Q. As regards the Pacific radio direction finder net, did you ever propose that still further stations be erected?

A. Yes, sir. In general, our proposal was that additional stations be set up in the various Pacific naval air bases then being established, namely, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and Midway, as soon as they could be accommodated. No satisfactory answer having been received, the Commandant directed the establishment of Midway and Palmyra, and plans had been made and material had been allocated from the pool at Pearl Harbor for Wake.

64. Q. Was the equipment of your RDF stations up to date?

A. No, sir, it was perhaps the best available at that time but the office of Naval Communications was then developing and had promised us, to my knowledge, since June of 1941, modern equipment, but it had not been completed or satisfactorily tested prior to December.

[214] The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 2:15 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[214] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

FRIDAY, MARCH 31, 1944

EIGHTEENTH DAY

PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The examination met at 10:20 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the seventeenth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Edwin T. Layton, Captain, U. S. Navy, at present Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet, Staff of the Commander-in-Chief.

3. Q. Previous to that time, did you spend some time in Japan learning the language?

A. I did, sir.

4. Q. When?

A. From September, 1929, until October, 1932. Again, when I returned to Japan as Assistant Naval Attache in April, 1937, until late March of 1939.

5. Q. And you are qualified as a Japanese interpreter and translator?

A. I am, sir.

[215] 6. Q. In addition to that qualification, have you made any particular study of the mental, moral, and psychological characteristics of the Japanese?

A. To the utmost of my ability; yes, sir.

7. Q. Have you devoted a good deal of effort in that line?

A. I have, yes, sir, both while in Japan and while in America, continuing study along things Japanese and Japanese history, person-

alities, psychology, and particularly study of the characters in prominent positions in Japan, in civil, economic, and military life.

8. Q. As Fleet Intelligence Officer in 1941, from what sources did you obtain information concerning the Japanese Navy?

A. The principal source was Office of Naval Intelligence, in various intelligence reports, estimates of fleet organizations position and Fleet Commanders, also from dispatches from Naval Attache, Tokyo, Naval Attache, Chungking, and his assistants, also from the Communication Intelligence Organization, which had sections at Cavite, Guam, Pearl Harbor, and Washington, D. C.; also from Consular and State Department reports forwarded through ONI to the Commander-in-Chief; also liaison with British intelligence agencies, both through ONI and direct through a representative attached to the British Consulate in Honolulu.

9. Q. Do you recall that in, say, October-November, 1941, you felt that you were obtaining from those sources as much and as good information as should have been supplied?

A. Intelligence being evaluated information and a commodity of which you can never have quite enough, it is difficult to say. I thought at the time in question that our Intelligence coverage was good, always, of course, leaving details of the picture incompletely filled, the task of filling which would be monumental. By this I mean it is like a jigsaw puzzle with parts missing; the whole picture is rarely available as important pieces are missing.

10. Q. Then as you recall, you, at that time, felt that our intelligence sources were doing as well as could have been done?

A. They were doing as well as could have been done with the number of personnel available and the coverage commensurate therewith.

11. Q. Did you feel that available information originating in our State Department, or its agencies, was adequate as well as reliable?

A. The State Department and Consular reports were largely academic political studies, and intelligence—that is, military intelligence—goes, were practically valueless.

12. Did you feel that the State Department was probably in possession of information and estimates which would have been valuable if known to the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Emphatically so. I say that knowing the type of reports made by the American Ambassador in Tokyo from 1937 until 1939 during a period of the beginning of the so-called "China incident." Knowing the character of those reports, I think that the State Department reports perhaps contained information in the period in question that would have been of value to the Commander-in-Chief in arriving at an estimate of the situation.

13. Q. As Fleet Intelligence Officer, did you intimately concern yourself with the results being obtained by the Combat Intelligence Organization?

A. Yes, sir.

[216] 14. Q. Did you study the relationship between the results obtained by the three principal organizations?

A. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, the information from all sources was collected, collated, and used, but the results obtained and made available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were principally

from the unit at Cavite and the local unit here at Pearl Harbor. In fact, almost nothing came from Washington.

15. Q. Did you make your own personal estimates of the distribution of Japanese naval forces?

A. Yes, sir. These estimates were made and placed in Fleet Intelligence Bulletins and distributed to the forces afloat, for their information and guidance in individual estimates.

16. Q. Did you feel that the principal unit in Washington might have contributed more toward the intelligence picture along those lines than actually was the case?

A. I did. As a matter of record, when the Japanese became active in the militarization of the Mandated islands about December, 1940, through my liaison with the local Communication Intelligence Branch, a very careful study and check was constantly made of this move. The Commander-in-Chief was kept constantly informed of the situation and when visiting Washington about June, 1941, a discussion regarding the situation apparently arose resulting in OpNav sending the Commander-in-Chief a dispatch stating, in substance, that the Pacific Fleet Intelligence organization apparently had some information on the organization and militarization of the Mandate naval units and requested it by dispatch. It was sent. This information was, at the same time, available in Washington but, apparently, had not been either utilized or collated, much less disseminated.

17. Q. How often did you communicate the intelligence available, concerning the Japanese naval forces, to Admiral Kimmel?

A. Daily, at about eight-fifteen in the morning. If subsequent thereto an important dispatch was received, generally from Cavite, or if important developments took place and reported from local communications intelligence unit, I would take it to Admiral Kimmel at the first opportunity he was free.

18. Q. Did those daily visits to Commander-in-Chief usually bring forth discussion concerning the intelligence?

A. Yes, sir. A discussion concerning the intelligence submitted and as to the Japanese disposition, intentions, and future operations of the forces concerned, and a general discussion of the situation in general.

19. Q. Was it usual for any other members of the Staff or any of the Commanders of the Fleet's task forces to be present during those discussions?

A. The Chief of Staff was most always present. On important occasions, the senior War Plans Officer and the senior Operations Officer were called in and a discussion then held. Often during these discussions, I was no longer required and was permitted to retire. When Task Force Commanders, who were then operating out two weeks and in one week, approximately, would return to port, the Admiral would send for me and have me review for the benefit of the Task Force Commanders then in port the situation and developments that had taken place during their absence and a general discussion of Japanese potentialities, capabilities, strength, would ensue. Sometimes I was present and sometimes I was excused, as their discussions probably concerned future operations.

[217] 20. Q. During those discussions with Admiral Kimmel, whether or not there were others present, were you in the habit of

expressing your own estimates and opinions of the situation which confronted the Commander-in-Chief?

A. I did, sir, and Admiral Kimmel welcomed and encouraged my independent estimates or opinions, even though we would discuss them sometime if we did not have the same one.

21. Q. Captain, will you elaborate a little further concerning those discussions?

A. The discussions were very general, generally starting with the Japanese situation, both political and military, the disposition of the Fleet, and their apparent intentions from the knowledge we had at hand. The Admiral was particularly interested in the Mandates and their development, both as air and other bases, and these matters were discussed in general with the task force commanders and other officers present, such as whether or not the Japanese had radar, whether it had been received from the Germans via the trip of the ASAKA MARU which went hurriedly to Europe by the Panama Canal, the extent of the air search in the Marshalls, the estimated air strength in the area, the question as to whether sound contacts obtained off Pearl were true contacts or false contacts, that is, fish and so forth, a discussion of whether or not it would be proper to start a depth charge practice on one of these contacts, whether the reported presence of baby submarines—they were called “submerged submarines”—off Molokai, were submarines or whether the report was true or false, or things of that nature. The importance of certain Japanese diplomatic moves and its reflection on military policy were also discussed. The future movements of the Pacific Fleet or its Task Forces in compliance with the Rainbow War Plan were the subject of conversations and discussions.

22. Q. During October and November, 1941, did you obtain, through Combat Intelligence, any definite information which they gained from the Japanese foreign service?

A. There were several messages that came from Washington regarding Japanese foreign service matters, particularly those concerning destruction of cryptographic devices or documents, and one concerning a hidden broadcast, a pseudo “weather broadcast”: if it’s “east wind and rain”, it meant war with America, and “north wind and clear” meant war with Russia, and “west wind and showers” meant war with England, or some such phrases. There was another in particular I recall which spoke of an intrigue in Thailand, wherein the British were to be drawn into crossing the border on the West coast in reply to an alleged Japanese landing at Singora on the East coast. Insofar then as the British had crossed the border, the Siamese were to declare war, as the British had invaded them, and ask Japan for aid.

23. Q. I hand you a document which is attached to this record as Exhibit 11. Do you recall having seen that when received?

A. Yes, sir.

24. Q. Give, if you can recall it, your own personal reaction to the information contained therein.

A. The reaction at that time was that Japan was prepared for war and was carrying out the previously indicated Southern move and was making preparations accordingly. The fact that Manila and Washington were included was considered highly significant.

25. Q. Do you recall if this dispatch was delivered to the Commanding General, Hawaii?

[218] A. I do not recall, sir.

26. Q. Do you recall the receipt from the Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, of copies of certain communications, which the Japanese Consular General at Honolulu was concerned with, at any time around 1 December or after?

A. I recall receipt of material received from Commander Rochefort on or about 9 December, but definitely after the attack.

27. Q. Then you got nothing from him concerning those prior to the attack?

A. Nothing from him, nor nothing from OpNav, or from any other source.

28. Q. Were you in touch with any measures being employed by any organization on Oahu toward monitoring the so-called "amateur" radio traffic which might have been emanating from there?

A. No, sir. This subject had been discussed with the District Intelligence Officer and with the officer in charge, Combat Intelligence, and with the Fleet Communication Officer, Commander Curts. It was pointed out to me at this time, which was considerably before December, 1941, that this function was not a function of the U. S. naval service, nor the U. S. naval communication service; that under the joint action of the Army and Navy, the control of amateur broadcasts was vested in the Federal Communications Commission, and that the monitoring of other radio transmissions was, by agreement, vested in the Naval Communication Service and the Army Signal Corps by mutual agreement.

29. Q. Did you, personally, inquire into the efficacy of the measures which you just mentioned?

A. I did not.

30. Q. And do I understand you to say that you were not put in touch with any of the results obtained by those organizations?

A. I received nothing from the F. C. C. or the Army, directly or indirectly, so far as I know, although the Japanese foreign office intelligence referred to previously may have come from one of these organizations via OpNav. I did not ask, nor was it considered proper to inquire, as to its source. I believe, however, that that was naval source and not Army Signal Intelligence or F. C. C. I would like to add that the District Intelligence Officer's office maintained certain monitoring of Japanese radio broadcasts as a service toward appreciation of Japanese news from the Japanese point of view. I do not recall the details of this, however.

31. Q. Were you frequently in touch with G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

A. About the early part of October or late September, the G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force, Colonel Edward Railey, called on me and said that he had been made, by the G-2 Hawaiian Department, the liaison between the Army and the Fleet here, insofar as the functions of the Army Command in this area would rely principally on air operations, and any coordinated action would undoubtedly be through the Hawaiian Air Force in conjunction with the naval units stationed or based here. From that time on, I saw Colonel Railey almost every day, sometimes two or three times a day, and we main-

tained intimate liaison regarding the general situation in the Pacific and, specifically, regarding the rise in Japanese naval air strength in the Marshalls and the increased Japanese surface forces in that area also, insofar as they presented a definite problem in connection with the defense of the Hawaiian Islands.

[219] 32. Q. Did you obtain from Colonel Railey any valuable information which you had not received from other sources?

A. I did not receive from Colonel Railey, or any Army source, any information of the enemy. We received reports concerning the flight of Army B-17's to Manila by Midway and Wake and northern New Guinea, and we furnished them with weather and other information concerning the route.

33. Q. Will you now please state, chronologically, insofar as you can, the results which were obtained toward keeping track of movements of units of the Japanese Fleet from about 1 October on.

A. Commencing in late October, many reports were received from China, from pilots in the Chinese Custom service, from our Assistant Attaches in South China, and through Chinese intelligence sources, of the movements of considerable numbers of Japanese transports and troops to the South from Shanghai, from Foochow, from the Canton estuary, and the movements of troops southward from northern China through the Shanghai port of embarkation. The Naval Attache at Tokyo informed us, on about 1 November, that elaborate plans for the joint Army-Navy occupation of Thailand by the Japanese were complete and that the combined Fleet was then in the Kure-Sacki area; that the invasion was to follow the lines of the German blitzkrieg of Holland and Belgium, and that considerable air forces were being assembled in the Taiwan-Hainan area, and that the Indo-China forces were being strengthened to a total of 100,000. The withdrawal of the Japanese merchant ships from Western Hemisphere waters was noted locally as well as our being informed by OpNav. The movements of men and materiel to the Mandates was also observed in the early part of November. Reoccurring reports of movements of Japanese transports, escorted by destroyers, to the South along the China Coast, and their arrival in the French Indo-China area and Haiphong and Saigon were received from time to time. The loadings of some of these transports—that is, landing craft, tanks, troops, railroad equipment, motorboats—led to a belief that amphibious operations were being contemplated, the area of operations to be in the South, exact location as yet undetermined. In mid-November, our best intelligence sources detected the beginning of the formation of the Japanese surface-force task forces; concerned and associated with southern destinations, as well as the movements of naval aircraft to the Hainan Islands—Southern Formosa region. These were more or less confirmed by reports from the North China area by Army and Navy observers, and somewhat substantiated by one report from the American Consulate at Tsingtao. These groupings and activation of units of the Combined Fleet with southern destinations were noted and commented on by Admiral Kimmel, and the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District, specifically noted this activity as the forerunner of operations, judging from past experience, and Admiral Kimmel asked what we had received from other units. I replied, "Nothing yet." He then directed me to tell Commander Rochefort

that he desired them to initiate a special message concerning the developments noted to OpNav and Cavite, Guam then being inactive. This resulted in a dispatch sent by the Com 14 Combat Intelligence Unit in which a task force organization was laid out in the general tenor as follows: That a task force under the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, has been organized, comprised of the Second Fleet, the Third Fleet which includes the First and second Base Forces and Defense Divisions, which corresponds, generally, to our amphibious forces), the combined Air Force of the Shore-based Air Command, the Destroyer Squadrons of the Second and Third Fleets, plus one squadron from the First Fleet, plus two Subrons and one Battleship Division. These were estimated to be forming up for movement to the South China area and associated with the French Indo-China, Sama (Hainan Island), and Taihouku and Takao, Formosa. It was noted, also, that the naval units at Palau were [220] somewhat connected with this Second Fleet Commander's activity, and that perhaps certain of these units might even proceed in that direction. It was noted, also, that there was a concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, and estimated that at least one Carrier Division, plus about a third of the submarine fleet, were in the Marshalls area. It was estimated that these forces would operate in the southern Asia area, with component part possibly operating from Palau and the Marshalls. Almost coincident with this time was an inquiry from the Dutch Naval Command as to the possibility of a Japanese seizure of Portuguese Timor and expressed the determination of the Dutch High Command that should Japanese forces carry out such an indicated thrust, that the Dutch would consider it an invasion and act accordingly. We were asked to comment on this development, but could find nothing positive to substantiate the Dutch report. After receipt of the Combat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District, estimate of Japanese formation of the task forces and its indicated direction of movement, the Cavite unit, under Com 16, confirmed the indications noted here and estimated that this task force of the First, Second, and Third Fleets and Submarine Force were comprised into a loose-knit organization, apparently divided into two major sections. The majority of the strength of cruisers being in the first section and destined for the South China area. Minor strengths being probably destined for the Palau area, and that carriers of CarDiv 3 and possibly CarDiv 4 were concerned with the South China area movement of the No. 1 Force. The First and Second Fleet carriers were also estimated to be in the Sasebo-Kure area. Com 16's unit, however, could not confirm the supposition by 14's unit that carriers and submarines, in force, were in the Mandates. Prior to this, specifically on the 25th of November, the Commander-in-Chief received a dispatch from OpNav which stated, in substance, that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations then pending in Washington were very doubtful, and expressed the opinion that a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, to be a possibility, and cautioned against anything that would complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. On the 27th, as I recall it, a war warning was received from OpNav. I believe that it was aided by the two dispatches I referred to from the Com 14 unit and the Com 16 unit. It stated that the negotiations in

Washington had ended and that an aggressive move by the Japanese within the next few days was expected, that an amphibious expedition was probably imminent against either the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. We were told the War Department was sending a similar warning. This message was passed in paraphrase form, which I wrote myself, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, through the liaison officer with the Hawaiian Department. That same evening, incidentally, the liaison officer with the Hawaiian Department brought over from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the Army's warning they had received separately, and showed this copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff, and other high ranking officers present. I did not see the Army dispatch, but from the discussion that came up, I could conclude only that it was almost a duplicate as those words were used. This Navy Liaison Officer reported to me, subsequently, that he had returned the Army dispatch to the senior officer of the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, in the absence of both General Short and his Chief of Staff, and, at the same time, delivered the Navy's paraphrased war warning to the same officer, after trying to deliver it in person to General Short or his Chief of Staff. When unable to deliver it in person, he gave it to the Senior Staff Officer on duty in G-3 with the statement that this was a very secret dispatch sent over from Admiral Kimmel for General Short. On the 28th, information was received by the British Consul, locally, [221] from a source usually reliable, stating that the Japanese would attack the Kra Isthmus from sea on 1 December without ultimatum or declaration of war. The main landing was to be at Singora. At this time, the message regarding the false weather broadcast to indicate a condition of war was also received, and from the State Department were reports of movements of troops and ships in the Saigon and French Indo-China general area, substantiating previous estimates and reports of increased forces being rushed to that area. On 1 December, there was received a dispatch from OpNav, I previously referred to regarding the intrigue in Thailand to get the British to attack, and in this Singora was again mentioned and seemed to fit in with previous dispatches regarding future Japanese activity in that area. On 2 December, reports received from CinCAF of Japanese submarines and transports off Saigon and in Camranh Bay, which checked previously indicated movements and previous information. On 3 December, there was received a dispatch I was previously shown as Exhibit 11, which tends to confirm the general picture presented to that time, that is, active military operations were about to commence with the "Southern Expansion Program" of the Jap Navy to be put into effect. On 6 December, a report from CinCAF received stated CinC China had reported a twenty-five ship convoy, six cruisers, and ten destroyers, in a position in the Gulf of Siam, as well as another convoy of ten ships, ten destroyers, and two cruisers in a different position, all on course West. Also that CinCAF forces sighted thirty ships and one large cruiser in Camranh Bay. On 1 December, the Commander-in-Chief requested that I present to him a paper showing the approximate location of the Japanese naval units, which I prepared and submitted. In showed, briefly, that except for Battleships Divisions One and Two, DesRon One, CarDivs One and Two, and

Cruiser Division Eight, and possibly CruDiv Six—the latter was marked “May head for the Mandates?”—that all other important Japanese naval forces were South of Shanghai, the majority of which were in the Bako and Takao area, that a considerable concentration of shore-based aircraft, probably 250, under Commander, Combined Air Force, were in the Hainan-Takao area, and that the CinC Second Fleet, in command of the Task Force, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was at Takao; that in the Mandates was the usual Fourth Fleet, consisting of three cruisers, two old cruisers, eight destroyers, one submarine tender, seven submarines, two minelayers, twelve auxiliary minelayers, patrol boats, etc., and thirteen auxiliary transports, and 140 planes. Admiral Kimmel asked me how well identified and how well placed in Japan were the battleships and carrier divisions that I referred to previously. I told him that they were not positively identified in Japanese ports but were believed to be in Japanese waters, due to their past activity and lack of, or negative information.

34. Q. How many carriers did the Japanese organize in one division?

A. Normally two carriers plus two destroyer plane guards to one division.

35. Q. And how many divisions would that mean, total?

A. That would mean that they had approximately five divisions. At the time in question, there was positively identified: Carrier Division One of the AKAGI and KAGA; Carrier Division Two of the SORYU and HIRYU; Carrier Division Three of the RYUJO and one unknown carrier; Carrier Division Four of the KASUGA and it was believed another carrier that we didn't know, nor do I know to this date; Carrier Division Five of the new SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU were just completing training and had not been particularly active with the Fleet. These were the two newest and latest carriers.

[222] 36. Q. As regards what type of ship was the main disagreement between those units of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts?

A. The only disagreement noted was the Fourteenth unit believed that a carrier division and one-third of the Japanese submarine force was in the Marshalls. The Sixteenth District unit said, in substance, that they could not confirm the supposition that the above forces were in the Marshalls.

37. Q. Did the two units generally agree as regards the numbers of carriers in home waters?

A. I don't believe it was ever a matter of disagreement or agreement, as, at that time, all units forwarded their reports to OpNav and any disagreement in these matters would be not so much errors in judgment, as the matter of available material, due to distance and other factors. OpNav made no attempt at this, or other times prior to the war, to reconcile or evaluate the opinions expressed or clarify the general picture from the reports produced. There may have been messages passed between Fourteen and Sixteen, of which I had no knowledge.

38. Q. At about the time in question, say from 27 November onward, did you, personally, make anything which constituted an estimate of the situation on the possibility of an organization containing carriers striking at Hawaii?

A. I do not believe that such an estimate was made after 27 November, but the possibilities of this occurring had been discussed at some time previous. This occurred in a discussion wherein Japanese potentialities and capabilities was being discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and I told him of their books, written for their own propaganda purposes and increased armaments; that in this book the author stated that the American Commander-in-Chief, when his Fleet was concentrated in Hawaii, would be concerned with three possible Japanese measures of attack: (1) Attack on Pearl Harbor, using carriers, cruisers, and fast battleships; (2) An attack on the Aleutians, including an occupation force; and (3) An attack on the American mainland. The discussion was in a broad sense but I do not recall any of the details thereof.

39. Q. Did you ever advise Admiral Kimmel that with the set-up of forces as placed by your intelligence toward the end of November, the Japanese would be unable to supply cruisers and destroyers sufficient to form a carrier task force which could strike at Hawaii?

A. I do not believe that point was made specifically. That, however, was my personal estimate; that with the allocation of forces to the southern movement, the remaining forces were weak, particularly in destroyers and cruisers, although potentially powerful in offense; that is, the carriers. I expressed that as an opinion before the Roberts Commission and not as an estimate of the situation that I had expressed, formally or informally, to Admiral Kimmel. I do not recall having expressed that as a formal or informal estimate.

40. Q. Do you recall any personal concern which you had because of the lack of information from Washington, based on intelligence sources of the nature which you have just been discussing?

A. I recall that at the time, particularly over the week-end of the first of December, that I couldn't understand why Washington didn't give us more information, but presumed that perhaps they didn't have it. It was a source of considerable concern both to Commander Rochefort and me and we remained at our telephones throughout that week-end, although I was back at the office on the Sunday to confer with Admiral Kimmel.

[223] 41. Q. Was it reported to you, during the week or ten days prior to 7 December, '41, that the lack of radio traffic on the part of the Japanese Navy was, in itself, an ominous sign?

A. That is a difficult question because the Japanese changed their call signs on 1 December, which, in itself, was considered rather ominous in view of the other information. The lack of identifiable traffic could be anticipated under those circumstances. The lack of great volumes of traffic does not always indicate an imminent move but it fitted very well with the picture of the southern movement discussed previously.

42. Q. Reverting to your answer to my question concerning general study of the Japanese characteristics and so forth, do you recall any advice and opinions which you gave Admiral Kimmel during the latter half of 1941, say, concerning the characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders?

A. I believe that the discussion regarding Japanese naval leaders was before the end of 1941 but certainly was in the middle of 1941. I don't recall the exact date, but there was a discussion as to who the

Japanese leaders were, particularly when General Tojo became the Premier. There were many discussions as to General Tojo, what sort of a policy he would follow, and also regarding the character, general background, of the leading Japanese naval officers. There were also discussions as to Admiral Nomura, their Ambassador to Washington, and Mr. Kurusu, and the probable negotiations and mission concerned therewith.

43. Q. Do you recall any particular estimate which you gave concerning Admiral Yamamoto?

A. I do. I knew Admiral Yamamoto personally. My estimate was, in effect, that he was very capable, a very thoroughly grounded and trained officer; that he possessed more brains than any other Japanese in the High Command. I illustrated it by saying that he could win at poker among good poker players, and could play better bridge than most good bridge players, and that I knew he was a champion in his own right of the Japanese chess game, "Go." I illustrated that to show that his mind was keen, alert, and that also from my personal observation and from general Japanese service reputation, he was an outstanding officer.

44. Q. Did you consider him one of the so-called "younger officer" element?

A. No, sir, I did not. I do not believe that he was associated with the so-called "young officer movement".

45. Q. Did you advise Admiral Kimmel of Admiral Yamamoto's previous experience in building up the Japanese naval air force?

A. I do not recall the exact details, but I think I discussed the fact that he was not only the Vice Naval Minister when I was in Tokyo, but was also the Commander of Naval Aviation Headquarters, the first that they appointed, and that he was, at the time of the first bombing of China in 1937, particularly concerned with the welfare and operation of the Japanese Naval Air Force. I do not recall, however, as to what degree this was discussed.

46. Q. Did you point out that Admiral Yamamoto was particularly venturesome?

A. No, sir, other than to say that he was an able opponent at poker or bridge, and that he always played a poor hand well.

47. Q. Did you ever specifically warn Admiral Kimmel that in view of these characteristics of Admiral Yamamoto, or of others, there was probability of a carrier raid upon Oahu?

[224] A. That matter was discussed at the time, as I previously mentioned. I gave a brief outline of the Japanese book wherein a carrier raid on Oahu was specifically mentioned, and he asked me then what I thought of the chances. I said, "I only hope we can intercept them," and that "I hope that the air search will find them in plenty of time." In the discussion in general regarding Japan's strength, I believe that the subject of Japan's carriers was mentioned and that Japan could not afford to gamble too much wherein she might lose the war in the first battle when she had larger stakes, more vital stakes, at hand.

48. Q. Do you recall your own reaction to the phrase concerning war warning in the Department's dispatch of 27 November?

A. As it was the first dispatch that I had ever seen saying "This is a war warning", I took particular note of it. I thought it over

considerably. Meanwhile, its subconscious impression was that it certainly fitted the picture up to date, and that we would be at war shortly if Japan would decide to leave her Philippine flank open and proceed southward, hoping, meanwhile, to mollify us through a compromise deal via Kurusu-Nomura negotiations. It made me feel that the picture we had was a good picture, and perhaps complete, and that the times were very critical and perhaps the Department hoped for a last minute compromise in view of their statement that nothing should be done to aggravate an already serious situation. I saw the Army, that evening, take their condition of readiness, trucks moving, troops moving, and I thought I saw weapons moving in the street, and I presumed that they were going into full condition of readiness, including the emplacement of anti-aircraft and other mobile weapons around Pearl Harbor and other important points on Oahu.

49. Q. Did you then estimate that the Japs really would make an attack to the southward, perhaps beyond Thailand, leaving the Philippine position on their flank?

A. My estimate was unclear. I was not convinced that they would leave their flank unguarded. On the other hand, I was convinced that they would continue their southern advance perhaps depending on a compromise settlement in Washington to see to it we remained out of the hostilities due, first, the threat, and second, our relatively unpreparedness for war.

50. Q. Did your thinking along those lines at that time take into account the position in which the Japs found themselves, incident to frozen credits, under which they could not obtain petroleum products from the southern oil fields?

A. It did. The freezing of credits wherein their supplies from America were cut off, crystalized my belief in the "expansion to the South" being for the means of obtaining, by military means, if necessary, the petroleum products for which they had fruitlessly negotiated with the Nei through Yoshizawa earlier in the year.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I have one matter which I think should be properly included in the record. Admiral Kimmel, as I mentioned [225] before, always consulted with his Task Force Commanders, District Commandant, on the war warning for instance, and had with them, many times in my hearing, a complete, free, and frank discussion of the situation, and asked and received their opinions regarding it. I frequently took messages of secret, ultra-secret, and confidential nature to these Commanders on their Flagships on specific occasions as there was on Saturday morning, 6 December, when the report I have mentioned from CinC Asiatic Fleet, giving the sightings of the Japanese naval and auxiliaries units in the Gulf of Siam and Camranh Bay by CinCAF forces. I took that to Admiral Pye on his Flagship, the CALIFORNIA, and there again a complete and free discussion took place as to what all this meant, not only this message but others they had seen and discussed.

That was the only place that I recall as having said positively that the movement into the Gulf of Siam was, I considered, very significant and that the only problem remaining was whether or not they would leave us on their flank as a menace or take us out on the way down. Admiral Pye and his Chief of Staff told me their opinion was that the Japanese would not attack us. When I returned the message to the files, Admiral Kimmel asked me what they said. I repeated their conversation, in abbreviated form. On other occasions, other Admirals expressed apprehension as to the status of the Asiatic Fleet and our forces in the Asiatic waters, and were very anxious regarding the situation, indicating that they were not convinced that Japan could by-pass our Philippine flank. It was my personal opinion that the thought of attack on Pearl Harbor at that time was very far from most people's minds. I want to say this: I had all the information of intelligence sources, and I had spent all of my time trying to evaluate these jig-saw puzzle pieces to make the true picture of events to come, and I think I was as surprised as anyone when the Japanese attacked the following morning.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:12 p. m., took a recess until 2:10 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.

The examining officer introduced George Warrington, Jr., Yeoman First Class, U. S. Navy, who was duly sworn.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. W. L. Calhoun, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander Service Force, Pacific Fleet.

2. Q. Sir, what duties were you performing on December 7, 1941?

A. I was Commander Base Force, U. S. Fleet, on board my Flagship, the U. S. S. ARGONNE at ten-ten dock, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

[226] 3. Q. Admiral, what opportunity did you have to observe the condition of the officers and men of the Fleet on 7 December 1941 in regards to sobriety or drunkenness?

A. One of my duties as Commander Base Force was in charge of Shore Patrol. At about twenty-five or twenty-seven minutes after eight o'clock on the morning of 7 December 1941, I was entering through the main gate of Pearl Harbor. It was necessary to clear a way for me as traffic conditions were quite crowded. On one or two occasions I had to get out of one car and into another car and I passed many officers and men returning to their ships. Realizing the importance of getting these men off promptly to their commands, I stopped long enough to talk to the beach guard and patrol officer on the dock and saw that both were being efficiently and properly handled and the people were readily and rapidly being returned to their ships. At about 0845, I arrived at ten-ten dock and on board

the ARGONNE and thereafter used all of our boats and commandeered many other boats to return officers and men to the Fleet. Admiral Kimmel had directed that I take charge of all activities on the waterfront. Ships not having full crews aboard, getting up steam, and ready to go to sea were directed to apply to Commander Base Force and I made up details of men whose ships had already proceeded to sea and sent them to ships, principally destroyers. I, personally, rubbed shoulders with hundreds of officers and literally thousands of men that morning. And it is with a feeling of pride that I can state that they were extremely orderly and cold sober, naturally, to some extent, awed and surprised by the events of the morning, but they were all a well-behaved, very sober group of officers and men, who had only one desire and that was to return to a ship in which they could render service. One the forenoon of December 7, 1941, I sent my Flag Secretary and Flag Lieutenant, whom I ordered the moment I went aboard the ARGONNE that morning to go to the various landings and in the yard and circulate among the men with exactly the idea of seeing what was their conduct. In 1923, I commanded the U. S. S. Young, Destroyer 312, lost at Honda. I well remembered on that Sunday morning, December 7, how the papers of the West Coast of the United States had commented on drunkenness and published cartoons of drunken men and officers in the Honda wreck. With this thought in mind, that is why I personally sent my Flag Secretary and Flag Lieutenant to generally observe the conduct of the men and officers of the Fleet while assisting in boat transportation and carrying out other waterfront duties while so observing. My Flag Secretary was Lieutenant E. P. Southwick, now Commander Southwick, and my Flag Lieutenant was Lieutenant Harry Johnson, now Commander Johnson. Both of these officers and the Beach Guard Officer on duty at the Fleet Landing that morning reported to me that the conduct of all hands was excellent. I can not recall having seen one officer or man who was not cold sober. That is a fairly large order, as it was a week-end crowd that had been in town with no idea of sudden return to duty early that Sunday morning.

4. Q. Sir, were arrests by the Shore Patrol for drunkenness on the night preceding the attack greater than was usual for a Saturday night?

A. No, on the contrary our records show that for the two or three weeks preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor that there had been almost no disorderly conduct at any time except an occasional boy here or there who had too many beers in the heat of the tropical sun.

5. Q. Do you recall the orders affecting the men belonging to ships as to determination of liberty on the week-end?

A. Yes. All liberty except for special cases and passes, and except for those married men of the former Hawaiian Detachment who had their families [227] here, was up at one a. m. Overnight liberty was granted for Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers First Class. Commanding Officers were granted fairly wide latitude and over this particular week-end a fairly large liberty party was ashore, consisting of married men, Chief Petty Officers, and Petty Officers First Class, and other special passes granted to men who had their homes in the Hawaiian Area. I should state that a great number of

people who crowded the roadway there when I passed through the main gate of the Navy Yard were attached to the Fourteenth Naval District who lived out in the housing area and were quartered there. There were certainly two or three hundred officers concerned and seven to eight hundred men who had liberty in accordance with existing orders. At that time, there must have been at least fifty thousand enlisted men here in the Fleet and I consider that a very small percentage of people ashore over a week-end. A much higher percentage of officers were ashore than of enlisted men.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I became Commander Base Force when Admiral C. C. Bloch was Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. I served as Commander Base Force, through the entire period of command of Admiral J. O. Richardson who relieved Admiral Bloch as Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet; and I continued to serve as Commander Base Force throughout the entire period of Admiral Kimmel's command of the U. S. Fleet. The morale, conduct, and behavior of the officers and men of the Fleet were well known to me. I did not go to sea in task forces. In addition to my other duties, I was in charge of Shore Patrol, and was also in charge of the Off-shore—In-shore Security Patrol until relieved of them by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in February-March, 1940. The Fleet was in a healthy state of training. The conduct of the officers and men after the surprise attack on Sunday morning, and the way they fought back when they did get going, is certainly one of the finest traditions of the United States Navy. I attended all conferences. Admiral Kimmel gave to all Flag Officers in his Fleet every bit of information which he had which he was permitted to pass along to us. I know that the Commanders of the three Task Forces, into which the Fleet was divided, Task Force One, Two, and Three, headed by Vice Admirals Pye, Brown, and Halsey, when they were in port, received this same information because I sat there and heard it. I never missed the Admiral's conferences, because I was always in port. I give as my considered opinion, as one of the senior Rear Admirals here at that time, that Admiral Kimmel would have gladly entertained from any officer under his command any suggestion at any time for the betterment and safety of the Fleet. He repeatedly asked at conferences, when he informed us what he was doing, if anybody had any suggestion for change. Having signed for almost two years the orders for the Security Patrol, which included the Off-shore destroyer patrols and close-in destroyer patrols, until relieved by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District some months prior to the Japanese sneak attack, I do know that most of the emphasis on security was placed on the fact that we were protecting ourselves against the acts of irresponsible nationals. The last order issued by me stated: "As an assumption that responsible foreign powers will not provoke war under existing conditions by attacks on the Fleet or Base, that irresponsible and misdirected

[228] nationals of foreign powers might attempt sabotage or block the channel to Pearl Harbor or to lay magnetic mines outside of Pearl Harbor, or to make submarine attacks without warning." I did not hold or entertain any idea that as long as there was a Minister of Peace in Washington, from Japan, that there would be any imminence of attack. Had I held that opinion, I would have stated it to Admiral Kimmel and I feel sure that nearly every other officer here felt the same as I. We did not expect any immediate sneak attack by the Japanese at the time it came. When I say "we", I mean from the conversations and discussions which I heard almost daily in the Commander-in-Chief's office, where certainly some of the best talent of the Navy was collected. I knew of Admiral Kimmel's orders for patrol and how he was using what little he had, and did not have any suggestion to offer to improve the situation. I would have felt free to make suggestions if I had had them. The attack came as a complete one hundred per cent surprise to me and it was only the terrible tragedy of the morning that really made me believe it had occurred. There was one occasion when acting in charge of Off-shore patrol that a destroyer reported he had contacted a submerged submarine and asked for instructions. At that time, I was Senior Officer Present Afloat, the Fleet being out under command of Admiral Richardson. I gave orders if they had contacted a submarine submerged in the restricted defensive sea area and could not identify it as our own to attack it with depth charges and destroy it. These orders held until Admiral Richardson and the Fleet returned to port and were very soon thereafter cancelled by him. In giving me this order of cancellation, he informed me that it was done on the orders of higher authority. This occurred some time in August or September, 1940, during a period when the entire Fleet was ordered to sea in secrecy. The Fleet took a course, later known to be to the South and Eastward of the Island of Hawaii and stayed out of touch with everybody and everything, in radio silence, for a period of seven or eight days. I know that there was much newspaper comment as to where was the Fleet.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 3:03 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[229] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

SATURDAY, APRIL 1, 1944

NINETEENTH DAY

PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The examination met at 9 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the eighteenth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Granville C. Briant, Commander, A-(V)G, U. S. N. R., Aviation Aide and District Aviation Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, and Hawaiian Sea Frontier.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the latter half of 1941?

A. Performing the duties of Aviation Aide to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

3. Q. That was Admiral Bloch?

A. Yes, sir.

4. Q. Will you give a brief resume of your naval experience prior to assuming those duties?

A. I graduated from the Naval Academy in 1929, was commissioned Ensign following graduation, reported to the TEXAS in New York Harbor at the time. I was on the TEXAS and acted as junior watchstander and in the Gunnery Department, later Assistant Navigator, until I was detached and sent to preliminary flight training in Norfolk. Upon completion of that duty, I returned to the TEXAS and joined the ship at Guantanamo. I stayed on the TEXAS until October—I believe that's correct—1930, and I went to Pensacola for flight training. Completed Pensacola and was ordered to U. S. S.

LANGLEY as a naval aviator in Scouting Squadron One. I, later, was transferred to the LOUISVILLE as aviator on the LOUISVILLE, Scouting Squadron Ten. From there, I went to Patrol Squadrons, and, following from Patrol Squadron duty, to the SARATOGA. I resigned from the Navy in November, 1939, and attended the Harvard Post-Graduate School of Business Administration. I was in the Naval Reserve while at Harvard, flying from the Naval [230] Reserve Base of Squantum. I was ordered to active duty on the 2nd of June, 1941.

5. Q. Aviation Aide Officer to Admiral Bloch, who, in addition to other duties, was the Naval Base Defense Officer, do you recall having given him any advice concerning the possibility of carrier raids into the Pearl Harbor area in the latter part of 1941?

A. No, sir, I do not.

6. Q. Did the probability or possibility of such a surprise attack enter in your thoughts to any great extent?

A. Vaguely, yes, brought to mind more when Lieutenant Commander Taylor appeared in this area to set up an aircraft warning system for this area.

7. Q. During November-December, '41, were you one of the District Watch Officers?

A. Yes, sir.

8. Q. How many were on that watch list?

A. I think there were eight to ten officers.

9. Q. Over what hours of the day was that watch carried on?

A. From about four in the afternoon to eight the following morning. On Sundays, the duty officer was on watch all day.

10. Q. How many hours long were the watches?

A. The watches—the one officer—the Operations Officer took the watch, to the best of my memory, from eight in the morning, when he was there, until four in the afternoon. The District Duty Officer, I believe it was called, had to sleep on the Base and perform the functions of District Watch Officer from four in the afternoon until eight in the morning.

11. Q. Where was the regular watch normally stood?

A. It was a room in the Administration Building, Fourteenth Naval District.

12. Q. But after working hours, the District Watch Officer was not required to be physically present?

A. Yes, he had to be in the vicinity and he could go out for food. They ate over at the Officers Club.

13. Q. Could he turn in at night?

A. Yes, sir.

14. Q. In his own quarters?

A. No, sir, he had a bunk in the Duty Officer's room. I was only on that watch list a short time.

15. Q. I show you Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41, which is Exhibit 4 before this board; was that available to the District Watch Officer at all times?

A. Yes, sir, I believe this was in our Watch Officer's Manual. I remember having read this.

16. Q. Were there other specific instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer to the District Watch Officers?

[231] A. There were several directives as to how to proceed on air raid warning. We had an air raid warning system of sounding alarm. I don't remember the details of it but I'm sure there was a procedure in effect for air raid defense.

17. Q. Do you recall whether or not you, as one of the District Watch Officers, considered those instructions sufficiently definite and as covering possibilities in case of surprise attack?

A. At that time, I think the instructions would probably be satisfactory to an officer with considerable naval experience.

18. Q. Were there any changes made in the DWO's instructions as the situation with the Japanese grew more tense in November, 1941?

A. I believe that the Operation Department continually revised operation procedure for defense in this area.

19. Q. Do you recall anything specific which came to you as one of the DWO's during that period?

A. No, sir, I don't.

20. Q. Do you recall whether your last tour of duty as DWO was prior to 7 December?

A. No, sir, I do not, but my next tour would have been on the following Saturday night and Sunday morning, through an exchange of watches.

21. Q. Because of your general naval experience prior to this time, it would appear that you were sufficiently qualified for the duties of DWO and were fully acceptable as such. At the time, what was your own opinion as to the number of officers on the DWO's list who were also qualified for the duty?

A. From, possibly, five. The others had not recently been, in my opinion, in close contact with naval combat activities.

22. Q. Did all the officers on the DWO's watch list have other duties during working hours?

A. Yes, sir, to the best of my memory. I do not believe the Operations Officer was required to stand that watch, except during working hours. He was senior watch officer, to the best of my memory.

23. Q. Would it have been practicable to so assign the District's officers that no one would have been included on the list whose qualifications were doubtful?

A. Possibly, by including heads of departments.

24. Q. As you recall, were there no other officers available to Admiral Bloch who could have been given these duties without doubling up, as additional to their regular duties during regular working hours?

A. No, sir.

25. Q. Outside of working hours, was there anyone in the Duty Watch Officer's post who was awake at all times?

A. I don't remember that.

26. Q. Was there a continuous watch of enlisted men for communication purposes?

[232] A. In the Communication Department, yes, sir. The adjacent Communication Office had a twenty-four hour watch.

27. As one of the Duty Watch Officers, did you consider that the local communications were adequate to carry out the duties which would result from surprise enemy action?

A. At the time, the continuous revision of the defense measures was tending to result in the establishment of a control center which could

receive information from various parts of the Island. That was set up within a day or two after the 7th of December. It was in the process of being set up.

28. Q. Were there available to the Duty Watch Officer any rapid communication other than the regular peacetime telephone system?

A. There was an air raid warning signal, siren, which was used in air raid drills. We had air raid drills weekly. Admiral Bloch stressed the need for it. That's the only outside one that I can remember, other than the standard communication system.

29. Q. What facilities did the DWO have for coordinating anti-aircraft fire in case of attack?

A. The signal tower and the normal communication channels.

30. Q. How could the signal tower function in that respect?

A. Well, they could send a message by semaphore and they had flag hoists signal, also a signal light. That was the three methods of standard communications. In the Yard there, it was used the same as the signal bridge on a ship; the signal hoists and the usual communications.

31. Q. And nothing else in addition to the regular Yard telephone system; is that correct?

A. Nothing that I remember other than the siren which, when sounded a certain number of times, meant air raid warnings, all clear, etc.

32. Q. Do you recall any changes made in composition of the DWO's watch list immediately after 7 December?

A. Yes, sir.

33. Q. What?

A. The Admiral required the immediate Staff be available continuously—one of the immediate Staff be available continuously on watch for some period after the 7th (after the attack) until other officers were trained and watch standees were used as part of the Defensive Control Office.

34. Q. What responsibility did the District Watch Officer have with respect to the Harbor nets in Pearl Harbor and Honolulu Harbors?

A. To my memory, the Harbor nets were controlled by the Harbor Control Post and he could have those opened or closed as he saw fit.

35. Q. Did he have to get permission from the Commandant or higher authority?

A. I don't believe he did.

36. Q. What was the routine with respect to the nets as to being opened or closed, hours that they were opened and closed, and so forth?

A. I don't remember the exact details on that.

[233] 37. Q. What authority did the District Watch Officer have with respect to the ready-duty destroyer?

A. I can not remember that, sir.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: In my own opinion, the message which was supposed to have arrived on the 26th of November, concerning the Japanese situation, should have been disseminated throughout the Staff and to the watch officers. To my mind, no attention was ever invited to us of the seriousness of the situation.

Examination by the examining officer (Continued):

38. Q. Then during the latter half of November, and up to 7 December, '41, the officers of the DWO's list received no specific warnings of the tense situation which might presage an attack?

A. No, sir.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 9:40 a.m., took a recess until 2 p.m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Charles H. McMorris, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff for Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Pacific Ocean Area.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year 1941?

A. During January, I was Operations Officer on the Staff of the Commander, Scouting Force, and from 1st of February to the end of the year, I was War Plans Officer for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

3. Q. As War Plans Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did you attend the Staff conferences?

A. Yes, almost without exception.

[34] 4. Q. Were your relations with the Commander-in-Chief close?

A. Very close. I had his complete confidence and I believe that I knew his views extremely well, advised and consulted with him with the greatest freedom, and was nearly always present at any important conferences with his Flag Officers or with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

5. Q. Did the then Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, welcome the expression of your views and opinions with respect to matters as they came up?

A. I definitely felt so, and certainly had no hesitancy in expressing my views to him, whether or not he was in accord with those views.

6. Q. Admiral, about when did you receive the basic war plan, Rainbow 5?

A. It may have been immediately on joining Admiral Kimmel's Staff. If it were not, it was immediately thereafter. No, that was Rainbow 3; Rainbow 5 was not received until about June.

7. Q. Do you recall the nature of the tasks assigned the Pacific Fleet in that Plan; that is, particularly whether they were offensive or defensive in nature?

A. The Pacific Fleet was charged with maintaining the security of the territory of ourselves and Allies in the Western Hemisphere, safeguarding our communications, etc. The primary offensive mission was to divert Japanese forces from the Malay Barrier by the activities of our Fleet forces in the Japanese Mandate islands through denial and capture of Marshall positions and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

8. Q. Did you feel at that time that you had adequate forces available to you, or rather to the Commander-in-Chief, for the fulfilling of these tasks? By "that time", I refer to the time leading up to Pearl Harbor when the planning was at its height.

A. Realizing that enemy raiding forces, or even strong Fleet forces, could strike over very wide areas, and that the offensive tasks assigned to the Fleet were few, I felt that we could carry out the missions charged, although there were many marked deficiencies, particularly in anti-submarine craft. I felt, of course, the definite lack of suitable craft for amphibious operations toward the Marshalls and was very much concerned over lack of suitable craft for the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier to furnish adequate anti-submarine protection. I appreciated the scarcity of carriers and of aircraft and knew of various elements of weakness. But I also knew of the power in our Fleet and expected it to be effective.

9. Q. Were you sufficiently familiar with the views of the Commander-in-Chief at that time to state how he felt in this respect?

A. Yes. I believe that he felt that far larger forces could be employed and that certain weaknesses with regard to aircraft and light forces were very marked. He was concerned also because the plan called for the probable detachment of a portion of the Fleet for transfer to the Atlantic; and for the movement of a division of cruisers to the southeast Pacific. I believe, however, that he considered we did have strong naval forces that could be effectively employed, notwithstanding some handicaps.

10. Q. At the time, how did you feel with respect to logistics support of the Fleet in carrying out its war task; the sufficiency of the logistics?

A. I felt that our tasks would be made more difficult because of the current logistics situation and that we might, from time to time, have to [235] determine the operations that would be possible with the logistics support at hand. I was not happy over the logistic situation, but certainly not discouraged over it.

11. Q. Will you please state, if you can, the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in the several months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, with respect to the carrying out of the war plans in the event of war?

A. To clarify this, and any possible future remarks, it should be mentioned that the plan, Rainbow 5 I believe it was, made provisions both for our entering the war with Japan a neutral or with Japan in the war. My remarks will deal only with the aspects of Japan in the war. His intention was to, at once, sweep for any Japanese merchant ships that might be at sea, unless intelligence had shown that such an operation would probably be fruitless. It was the intention to make an immediate reconnaissance in force of the Marshall Islands. While it was not expected that the main part of the Japanese Fleet would be encountered in such an operation, it was intended to have

the entire available strength in easy supporting distance of the reconnoitering forces. Operations to establish ourselves in the Marshalls were to be carried out as expeditiously as possible. Patrol plane searches in approaches to Hawaii were to be inaugurated.

12. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, at that time, feel that the units of his Fleet were ready to carry out such tasks?

A. He undoubtedly recognized many weaknesses and strenuous efforts were being made to improve the efficiency of both materiel and personnel. Perhaps no Commander is ever completely satisfied of his complete readiness to fight, but certainly he felt that a fairly high standard of efficiency was being developed. There were large numbers of green officers and men, and the complements of most, if not all, ships were lower than was to be desired. The anti-aircraft batteries were, in general, far weaker than we desired, and they were being improved as rapidly as material could be made available and the yards could take ships. There was much concern over lack of radars and the requisite skill in their use. There was also weaknesses in certain carrier aircraft and some difficulties were experienced with patrol planes; engines, I believe. The lack of skilled crews in the patrol planes and the lack of replacement crews was very keenly felt. Transports and amphibious craft were lacking; and there were disturbing deficiencies in auxiliary craft and in some materials. Notwithstanding matters of this sort, however, it was felt that the handicaps were not too great to cope with such situations, as were envisaged as arising if war commenced.

13. Q. Did you, at that time, sir, concur in the views of the Commander-in-Chief as you have expressed them?

A. Yes, and it may be that in answering the preceding questions that I have erred somewhat toward giving my own views rather than those of Admiral Kimmel, although they were probably substantially in accord. He was inclined to be somewhat more pessimistic in that regard than myself.

14. Q. Did you, at the time, feel that everything was being done, either locally or by making recommendations to higher authority, to correct the deficiencies and weaknesses that you referred to?

A. We certainly felt that there was much to be done and all hands were working very hard to overcome deficiencies. I believe that, in general, suitable representations had been made to higher authority and that the [236] Commander-in-Chief and his subordinates were taking all corrective measures that they felt within their own power to accomplish. It is doubtful if any were entirely satisfied with the rapidity of progress.

15. Q. Admiral, going back to the basic Rainbow 5 war plan, what was your opinion at the time as to how that plan contemplated that war with Japan would start?

A. The plan itself may not, probably did not, directly give such an indication, but it certainly must have contemplated that such a war would probably not have been preceded by a formal declaration but rather that it would arise from such hostile attack on the part of the Japanese.

16. Q. In estimating the situation with respect to the Pacific Fleet, was a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor considered as a course of action available to the Japanese to initiate such a war?

A. Probably not. At least, I, as War Plans Officer, did not hold such a view with respect to the Hawaiian Area, although I did consider such an act possible in the Philippines or even against Midway or Wake. It may have been that such a possibility was discussed with the Commander-in-Chief or with other members of the Staff. Probably some such discussions may have taken place, although I have no specific recollection of such a one.

17. Q. Do you recall that during this planning period any consideration was given to the efficiency of the Japanese naval air forces?

A. Yes. While specific data was lacking, I, and I believe others within the Staff, felt that there was a rather high degree of proficiency in Japanese naval air organization.

18. Q. Do you recall any discussion as to the ability of the Japanese naval air forces to conduct such an attack as they did on the 7th of December?

A. I think perhaps some such discussions, informal discussions, took place. I do remember giving consideration to dangers of torpedo attack to ships in Pearl Harbor, particularly after the British night attack on the anchored Italian ships in the heel of Italy; but even though some thought and consideration was given to the possibility of a raid such as occurred on 7 December, I, personally, never considered it as more than a remote possibility.

19. Q. Admiral, are you able to state the views that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, held at that time in this respect?

A. I feel that if he had entertained the idea that there was serious danger of that nature, I would have heard of it in every emphatic terms. I am certain that he was not anticipating any such attack.

20. Q. Admiral, in your thinking and planning at that time, that is the six months leading up to the attack, do you recall what consideration was given to the characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders, particularly Admiral Yamamoto?

A. The leadership in the Japanese Navy was discussed from time to time between Admiral Kimmel, myself, his Chief of Staff, his Operations Officer, his Intelligence Officer, and perhaps others. As I recall now, the general impression that obtained was that in case of war we would have to contend with rather capable and aggressive leadership on the part of the enemy.

21. Q. Were you, at that time, familiar with the character of Admiral Yamamoto?

A. Not especially so, but I did consider him capable and bold.

[237] 22. Q. Do you recall discussing him with Commander Rochefort, while you were serving together on the Staff of the Commander, Scouting Force?

A. While I have no specific recollection of such discussion, I feel that it is almost certain that a number of such discussions did take place; not only when Rochefort and I were serving together in the Scouting Force, but also after I came to Admiral Kimmel's Staff and Rochefort was serving with the Intelligence unit in the Fourteenth Naval District.

23. Q. Admiral, during this planning period leading up to the attack, do you recall occasions on which the Commander-in-Chief communicated with naval aviators with respect to the ability of Japanese naval air forces and the possibility of such attack as occurred on 7 December?

A. No, although it is quite possible that I was present at some such discussion with Admiral Halsey and Admiral Bellinger or perhaps other aviation personnel, including Captain Davis, the Staff Aviation Officer; but I have no recollection of any discussion with any of them with the particular idea in view that we should have to contend with such an attack.

24. Q. Did you have knowledge of any aviator whatever who really foresaw the raid of 7 December and so expressed himself before that time?

A. No, sir.

25. Q. Admiral, in the preparation of the Commander-in-Chief's Contributory Rainbow 5 War Plan, was it contemplated, at the time, that it might be placed in effect either in its entirety or in part by order of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, prior to the start of actual war?

A. I believe it was not contemplated that the plan be placed into effect, either in whole or in part, by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, without reference to higher authority, because of the rapidity of communications; but, on the other hand, I do not believe that that plan circumscribed the Commander-in-Chief's in any way toward taking any suitable action to meet whatever circumstances that might arise.

26. Q. At that time, then, what methods did you contemplate using for alerting ships, should the international situation so require and before actual start of war?

A. By preparatory or warning message.

27. Q. Admiral, as I understand your previous testimony, it was your estimate, as well as the estimate of practically all of Admiral Kimmel's Staff, that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a remote possibility. Will you state the basis for that conclusion?

A. For us to make an attack on Japan would have required steaming long distance with probability of detection and then attack in the face of shore-based aircraft where damage to ships would be likely and difficulties of returning to our own base would be so marked that the damaged ships might not regain their base. We felt that the Japanese would find the same considerations would deter them from making such an effort against us. It also seemed highly probable that more attractive targets could be found to the southward of Japan and that their naval units could be more profitably employed there. We felt that even should such an attack be launched, that the Island defenses would be sufficient to make the damage inflicted small and and that the attacking forces would suffer heavy casualties quite disproportionate to the damage they might inflict.

28. Q. Do you recall that your thinking along those lines gave due value [238] to the power of initiative if employed by the enemy in a surprise attack?

A. I don't think so now; I did think so then. We did anticipate that heavy submarine concentrations would be encountered in this area and had considered it quite possible, if not probable, that a mass submarine attack about the time that considerable forces were sortieing or entering Pearl Harbor might be the commencement of the war.

29. Q. Admiral, under the Joint Action, Army and Navy, what service was primarily responsible for the defense of Oahu?

A. The Army.

30. Q. Were you, in the months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, familiar with the Army's ability to fulfill its commitments prescribed by that document?

A. In a general way, yes. I had made a tour of the Island of Oahu with the Commanding General and some members of his Staff to see the defenses, and, as a part of that tour, attended a short presentation at Fort Shafter with particular reference to AA defenses. With my limited knowledge of the Army requirements and methods of defense, I, personally, felt they were good and adequate, although I knew, and the Army authorities too felt that certain improvements should be made, particularly as to AA.

31. Q. Were you familiar with Admiral Kimmel's opinions with respect to the ability of the Army to defend the Island?

A. I believe that he felt that there was some deficiencies, particularly if the Fleet were absent from the area, and I include in the Fleet, the shorebased aircraft. He had been concerned over the AA defenses and talked with the Commanding General and with the Chief of Naval Operations on the subject.

32. Q. Who acted for the Navy in coordinating efforts toward the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. In general, the Commander of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

33. Q. Would you explain, please, just how the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, felt that he belonged in the picture of the coordination of the efforts of the Army and Navy in the defense for Oahu, while he was present here at Pearl Harbor?

A. In general, he looked to the Commander of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier to accomplish that, but recognized the necessity for utilizing whatever Fleet units might be present to assist in the defense. He visited the arrangements because the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier was a part of his command and because of his immediate concern for whatever Fleet units might be present, aside from his general concern of maintaining the safety of his primary base. He was particularly active in developing coordination of air operations and communications between the same.

34. Q. Were your plans, during the weeks preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, based on the premise that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, would remain in Pearl Harbor after start of a war with Japan?

A. The Commander-in-Chief, himself, had always been very reluctant to accept the idea that he must remain ashore. He had an operational staff that accompanied him when he went to sea. He was slowly accepting the fact that if war came, he would, of necessity, have to be continuously shore-based. That was a matter that I discussed with him a number of times; for I never believed that he would, during war, exercise tactical command at sea but felt that he would be habitually shore-based. The plans, however, were not premised on having the Commander-in-Chief tied to any shore base.

[239] 35. Q. Did this belief on the part of the Commander-in-Chief cause him to feel any additional personal responsibility for the defense of Oahu, and particularly Pearl Harbor?

A. That would be difficult to say, although I doubt if he ever felt that he was divested from the overall responsibility for safeguarding the Fleet. He did, however, look to the duly constituted authorities

to protect Hawaii, namely, Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier and Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

36. Q. Did you, at that time, contemplate that the Fleet would take any part in the defense of Oahu, other than the use of the anti-aircraft batteries of the vessels of the Fleet in their own defense and the use of shore-based aircraft located at Pearl Harbor?

A. We certainly contemplated that any Fleet units that could be brought into contact with enemy forces actually attacking or threatening the Hawaiian Islands would be employed as effectively as possible. That would be true whether the units (when the enemy was first discovered) were in port or in the coastal waters or further afield. Moreover, it was realized that some of the shore-based Fleet aircraft would have to be made available to the Coastal Frontier Commander even though employment for them would be desirable further afield. Such plans or thoughts were necessitated because such aircraft were not available within the Coastal Frontier for its Commander's use. It was also realized that some Fleet destroyers would have to be sacrificed by the Fleet for local anti-submarine protection, even though the Fleet was far short of the numbers desired. In short, if the Fleet left Pearl Harbor it would have to be weakened by leaving behind some aircraft and destroyers. If it were in Pearl Harbor, it would be used to get at the enemy.

37. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with this letter 2CL-41 (Revised), which is Exhibit 4 before this examination?

A. Yes, I remember this letter. Although it was prepared by the Operations Section of the Staff, I had opportunity to review it and recall having initiated some minor changes in the earlier drafts; although, at this time, I have no particular recollection of what those changes were.

38. Q. Were there, so far as you can recollect, any other directives of a general nature affecting the security or providing for the security of vessels in Pearl Harbor in effect in the months preceding the attack?

A. I do not now recall whether or not there were. In general, such directives, if there were any, were prepared by the Operations Section and I would have seen them and had opportunity to comment before their issuance.

39. Q. Do you recall whether, at the time, that is, in the months preceding the attack, you considered this letter, Exhibit 4, to adequately provide for the security of the Fleet units at Pearl Harbor, had the instructions therein been fully complied with?

A. I recall that we were not entirely satisfied with the arrangements for coordinating air warnings, air operations from the different services, and anti-aircraft from ships and shore and the like, and that some discussions and conferences to better perfect arrangements were in progress under the general guidance of Captain DeLany, the Operations Officer. On the whole, however, I must have thought that the security arrangements set forth in this letter were satisfactory, else I would have initiated action to effect a change.

[240] 40. Q. Admiral, do you recall the Joint Coastal Defense Plan which was signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. I remember that there was such a plan, although whether that was the exact title or the principal provisions of the plan, I do not remember.

41. Q. Do you recollect whether Admiral Kimmel, as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, approved the plan to which I have just referred?

A. Probably, although I can not now say "yes" or "no".

42. Q. Were you familiar at the time with an annex to that plan known as the "Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan, No. A-1-41", of which I show you a copy, which was signed by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin?

A. I do not now have specific recollection of this particular plan but it is almost certain that I did see it, and acquiesced in its provisions.

43. Q. Were you, at the time, familiar with the annex—I think it is No. 1—of that plan which is an estimate of the situation, prepared by, or under the direction of, Admiral Bellinger and General Martin, which is Exhibit 24 before this examination?

A. After examining this paper, I have no particular recollection of it, although it is not only possible but highly probable that I did see it and probably before it was signed or approved. Admiral Kimmel frequently conferred with Admirals Bloch and Bellinger and Army authorities and pressed for development of plans for coordinated action and for drills by joint forces to test them and to develop skill in their use.

44. Q. Admiral, do you recall whether or not this operating plan, including the proposed use of aircraft, was approved by Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. Although I do not have any specific recollection, I would expect that the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Kimmel, was familiar with its general terms and indicated his acquiescence even though there may have been no formal approval.

45. Q. Admiral, under the plans in effect just prior to the December 7 attack, what was your understanding at the time as to the responsibility for obtaining early information of the approach of any possible enemy engaged in conducting a surprise attack on the Fleet and installations at Pearl Harbor?

A. It was, in general, a naval responsibility. Forces available for such detection, in general, were the Fleet patrol planes of Pat Wing Two, but the extent of any search that they might carry on was determined by the number available for that purpose and that determination was in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. As a practical matter, it was impossible, with forces and material at hand, to maintain an effective patrol for any but a brief period.

46. Q. Did you, at the time, contemplate any other means of obtaining such information prior to declaration of war?

A. No, it was not contemplated that any surface vessels would normally be used for that purpose. Lack of coastal frontier craft that might be used for pickets was recognized, but it was felt that destroyers or cruisers could be more profitably employed in offensive operation. Advantage would, of course, be taken of any intelligence information, but it certainly was not contemplated habitually using Fleet forces for picket duty in the approaches to Hawaii.

[241] 47. Q. Admiral, do you feel that the provisions made for obtaining such early information of the approach of a possible enemy were the best that could reasonably be made consistent with training and other demands on the units of the Fleet?

A. Answering now from hindsight, the answer is, "No." At the time, the answer is, "Yes." The number of patrol planes was very limited. Some difficulties were being experienced with engines. An extensive patrol planes training program was in progress. Many of the pilots and crews were green and there were very heavy demands for furnishing nucleus personnel for new patrol craft being built. The extent to which searches could be carried on was a matter of serious consideration by the Commander-in-Chief, his Aviation Officer, and his Operations Officer, and I was frequently brought into the discussion. With the number of search planes available and the number of crews available, it was felt that only limited sectors could be searched. At one time, some sectors were searched one day, other sectors another, in order not to hold to a set pattern in case enemy agents were aware or might become aware of the details. To carry on any reasonable effective search would have necessitated complete disruption of the highly necessary training program, and it was strongly felt that many engine hours would be put in at a time when the need was not extremely urgent, and that as a result when the planes were most needed many of them would be due for engine overhaul. At the time, the most serious menace was expected to be submarine activities in the Fleet operating areas, and, as a consequence, the searches were very largely limited to the Fleet operating areas and the approaches thereto, rather than to distant searches. Subsequent events have shown that the decision in that regard may have been unwise. It is my personal belief that had training been discontinued and the searches been conducted to the maximum degree possible of continuous maintenance in what was regarded as the more probable sectors of approach, that the sector from which the attack on Pearl Harbor was actually made might easily have been one not covered. In any event, knowledge of the tenseness of the situation, the availability of forces, the intelligence at hand, and the factors which I have mentioned were given careful consideration in the days immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, and it was felt we were using good judgment in making our dispositions and searches.

48. Q. Admiral, are you able to state whether or not Admiral Kimmel's views at that time coincided with those which you have just expressed as your own?

A. I believe that he had about the same considerations in mind.

49. Q. Did you continue to hold those opinions which you have just expressed throughout the period October-November-December despite dispatches from the Department which were more or less warnings of impending dangers?

A. Substantially, yes. There had been a greater or lesser degree of tenseness from the time I joined the Staff on 1 February, and several times training was curtailed in order to increase the searches. In the latter part of November, a warning was received that indicated the situation was particularly tense and the considerations mentioned were considered anew about that time.

50. Q. Admiral, during the period from the middle of October until the time of the attack, what were your views at the time with respect to the accuracy and sufficiency of intelligence available to you for use in connection with your planning?

A. We felt that we would like to know lots more than we did. I would say that on the whole that we felt that it was somewhat insufficient, but did not see the probability of achieving improvement.

[242] 51. Q. As War Plans Officer, did you conduct a continuing study of the plans then in effect in the light of such intelligence, particularly with respect to the international situation, as you received it?

A. Yes, and I had been making a habit of giving the Commander-in-Chief, sometimes daily, sometimes every other day a brief memorandum as to the specific action that I thought should be taken if war eventuated in the succeeding twenty-four or forty-eight hours.

52. Q. Were any major changes effected in the Contributory War Plans, based on the intelligence you had as to the international situation during that period?

A. No.

53. Q. Did you feel that the basic plan of the Department, Rainbow 5, continued to meet the international situation as it developed from the middle of October on?

A. Rainbow 5, in brief, called for the major effort of our forces to be in the Atlantic. I was not in a position to determine the merits or demerits of that; but accepting that, then the mission given to the Pacific Fleet was not one upon which I felt that I could improve.

54. Q. Admiral, are you able to state the views of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in this respect?

A. My impression is that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, felt that it might be highly advantageous to American interests to make an early all-out effort in the Pacific.

55. Q. Were you in touch with any informal communications between Admiral Kimmel and higher authority, either written or oral, which bear upon the subject of this examination, of such importance that you think a record of what you remember should be made?

A. Yes. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, exchanged a number of personal letters that bore on the general situation. This was a practice that existed throughout my period of service in the Staff. As these letters frequently dealt with matters of the utmost importance, I, once or twice, suggested to Admiral Kimmel that communications of that nature between the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and the Chief of Operations were necessarily official letters rather than personal ones, as they dealt with official matters of the utmost importance. Although they were written in a personal vein, they did deal with official matters and could be and should be treated as official, and suggested that it might be well to have them in the usual official form; that their secrecy could be safeguarded just as well and that they would become matters of permanent record. Those letters frequently referred to the tenseness of the situation. It was important that the Commander-in-Chief receive such information as was contained in those from the Chief of Naval Operations. I believe that I read every one of the letters in question, both incoming and outgoing. Some of the letters dealt with difficulties in obtaining personnel or matériel and the reasons therefor. Some of them gave highly secret information with regard to discussions on international matters taking place in Washington or elsewhere among important officials. As to the specific

parts that bear directly on this discussion, I would say that many of the letters indicated a continuous degree of tension between the American and Japanese Governments, with the situation being more critical at some times than at others. They definitely gave the impression that a Japanese war with Great Britain was highly probable and that we might or might not be drawn into it from the beginning. In the latter part of the year, there were more frequent indications that we would be in at the very start.

[243] 56. Q. Admiral, I show you a paraphrase copy of a dispatch which is Exhibit 6 before this examination. Are you able to identify that dispatch?

A. Yes, I remember this dispatch.

57. Q. With respect to the wording used, it directs the taking of certain precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not constitute provocative action. Will you please state the meaning that you gained from these expressions at the time that you first saw this dispatch.

A. I felt that war was likely to eventuate on short notice and that if we came into it, it seemed quite possible that the initiation would probably be the result of hostile action committed by the Japanese. I considered we should maintain adequate security measures and be prepared to commence our offensive operations as promptly as possible.

58. Q. Were your plans restudied at that time in the light of information contained in this dispatch?

A. Presumably they were. I suspect that the consideration was primarily given toward making the plans effective with least delay.

59. Q. Do you recall the decisions made as the result of this study?

A. It was about this time, possibly somewhat earlier, possibly somewhat later, that Flag Officers were advised of the necessity of being ready to move to distant service on very short notice. They were enjoined to keep certain limits on their fuel supply, below which ships should not be permitted to go. They were cautioned to examine anew their provisions for finally stripping ship, if it were not already completed. Use of aircraft and submarines for protection of Midway was increased and submarines were dispatched to cover Wake. I believe the Commander, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, was enjoined to push the construction work at Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra as rapidly as possible. Consideration was given to putting aircraft on Wake, but the construction work there at that time would not permit that Island to receive them. I do not now recall whether or not any additional Marines were sent to those places, or not, but certainly the matter was given consideration.

60. Q. Admiral, were you present at any conferences at which this dispatch, Exhibit 6, was discussed with the Army High Command on Oahu?

A. At this late date, it would not be possible to say, with reference to this particular dispatch, but during the Fall of 1941, I was present at a number of conferences in Admiral Kimmel's office when General Short and possibly other Army officers were present. It is quite probable that one of those conferences was a result of this dispatch.

61. Q. Admiral, do you recall any major matters that were causing Admiral Kimmel concern at this time, other than matters you have discussed; causing him grave concern at the time?

A. He was very much concerned as to the safety of Midway and Wake, particularly the latter. He was continually concerned, to a very great degree, at the lack of anti-submarine craft available in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. The situation, which, despite numerous and vigorous protests, did not improve.

62. Q. In your planning, was the discussion of war tasks or such security matters as the lack of patrol craft for Oahu given the major consideration during these months leading up to the attack?

A. Our major consideration as to employment of the Fleet was to use it effectively to reduce the pressure which we anticipated the Japanese would [244] be exerting in the China Sea by so operating our forces as to cause them to divert important portions of their own force to oppose us. The lack of anti-submarine craft, whatever deficiencies might have existed in the local defenses or even in the outlying bases under construction, did not deter the Commander-in-Chief from giving his principal consideration toward utilizing the Fleet offensively as quickly and as much as possible.

63. Q. It appears that over five weeks elapsed between this dispatch of 16 October and the next similar dispatch from the Navy Department, to which we will come in a moment. During that five weeks, was anything received from the Department which rescinded the directive in this dispatch of 16 October to take preparatory deployments and so forth?

A. No.

64. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch, Exhibit 7 before this examination. Were you familiar with that dispatch at the time of its receipt by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. Yes, I remember this dispatch without having specific recollection as to the date of it.

65. Q. Do you recall the meaning that you attached at the time, or the significance you attached at the time, to the statement that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction might be a possibility?

A. My reaction was, I think, that it contained no new information.

66. Q. Did this dispatch cause you to make any changes in your current plans at the time?

A. I think not.

67. Q. During the period between these two dispatches mentioned in the evidence, did there become known to you any change in the distribution of Japanese naval forces which, to you, seemed significant?

A. Until sometime in the early Fall, I, personally, had felt that a Japanese war was certain; but felt that her probable enemy would be Russia and did not believe that she would take on more than one major Power. But the situation gradually changed; and sometime in the late Fall, possibly in late November, our intelligence activities reported not only a large number of transports in Indo-China Sea, but indicated that very large numbers of combatant ships were moving to the southward. I believe that my recollection in the respect is correct.

68. Q. But you do not remember, other than what you have just stated, any specific change in distribution of major units which came to your attention in late November?

A. I feel quite sure that I recall the movement of important units, approximating fleet size, as being reported moving to the southward and, if recollection serves, battleships were sighted toward the Indo-China area, or were reported as sighted. Our information as to location of all Jap naval forces was incomplete, but we thought we knew the general location of his principal strength.

69. Q. Do you remember if, at the time, you connected up in your own mind that intelligence with this particular dispatch of 24 November?

A. I may or may not have connected the two, but probably did. And I do recall that it was about that time that I became convinced that the Japanese war would be directed toward the Malaysia area; and speculated as to whether [245] the Japanese would dare risk moving into that area without attacking the Philippines, and reaching the conclusion that it was improbable.

70. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch dated November 27, 1941, which is Exhibit 8 before this examination. Do you recall having seen that at the time of its receipt by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. Yes, I remember this.

71. Q. Will you please state, as near as you can remember, the meaning which, at the time, you gave to the clause or phrase in there calling for the execution of appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out certain tasks?

A. The question that you have just asked was one that within the Commander-in-Chief's Staff was frequently propounded for some days, and the general conclusion was that we were practically already so deployed and that what we should really do was to stay outside of the Marshalls area rather than to move immediately into that area. In short, we construed it to mean that war was imminent but not certain and that we were to avoid taking a deployment to commence offensive operations until there were further developments.

72. Q. You mean that you were not to undertake offensive operations after a declaration of war or start of war?

A. To amplify: Our plan called for reconnaissance, including attacks in force, on Marshall positions. We felt that we should not move within easy striking distance where we might be sighted and possibly disturb any remote chance that still remained of averting war. As a consequence, our forces were held in close proximity to Hawaii where they could be kept fully fueled and ready to move toward the Marshalls. Two groups, each of which included a carrier that had been carrying aircraft reinforcements to Wake and to Midway, were exceptions. They were to return to Pearl Harbor as soon as possible after completing their assigned task.

73. Q. Do you recall whether or not Task Force One entered Pearl Harbor subsequent to the receipt of this dispatch?

A. Yes, it did.

74. Q. Did you consider that the presence of heavy ships in Pearl Harbor was consistent with the understanding of defensive deployment which you have outlined?

A. We determined that we should continue training operations in the vicinity of Oahu and considered that forces either within Pearl Harbor or in the general vicinity were in consonance with this directive.

75. Q. When you state "we," are you including the views of Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. Yes, I think so.

76. Q. Was any other action taken by the Commander-in-Chief, based on the dispatch, Exhibit 8?

A. The matter was discussed at considerable length, both on receipt of this dispatch and on subsequent days, and it was determined that existing plans, operations, and arrangements were in accordance with existing instructions, including this dispatch. Prudent security arrangements and readiness to commence offensive action on very short notice were considered to be in effect.

[246] 77. Q. Do you recollect whether the defense forces of the outlying islands were further augmented at the time of the receipt of this dispatch?

A. Whether from this dispatch or from those that had shortly preceded it, additional aircraft were sent to Midway and Wake, arriving at those places in early December.

78. Q. Do you recollect any additional security measures prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief at that time?

A. Except for further warnings, I believe that no additional measures were taken, other than to direct depth bombing submarine contacts suspected of being hostile and to repel hostile planes that might be encountered. As I now recall, the directive with regard to attacking hostile planes was given to both Admiral Newton and Admiral Halsey, who were in command of the forces carrying reinforcement planes to Midway and Wake. I do not recall whether those instructions were written or by dispatch or verbal.

79. Q. Do you recollect any discussion of this dispatch with the Army command on Oahu?

A. No, and I'm under the impression that no discussion occurred, because it was felt that about all had been done that could be done or should be done. Although a general discussion with General Short, Admiral Bloch, and others on defensive matters did occur about this time in connection with a Departmental proposal relative to forces on Wake and Midway.

80. Q. Were you familiar with the condition as to alertness of the Army in the week preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No. If I was at the time, I'm not now.

81. Q. Admiral, do you recall receipt of any instructions about this time, that is 27 November, with respect to the relieving of the Marines at Wake and Midway and perhaps other outlying islands?

A. I recall that, at some time, not a great while before the commencement of war, there was a suggestion that it might be advisable to relieve the Marines at those places, and being present at a discussion that included, among others, Admiral Kimmel, General Short, and Admiral Bloch. It was the unanimous opinion that it would be highly inadvisable to do so, particularly at the critical time that the proposal was made, and they were not relieved. There was, at that time particularly, a discussion as to the advisability of using some of the fighter aircraft (I believe it was only fighter aircraft, as I recall now) from Army forces on Hawaii. After considerable discussion as to the methods of getting them there, the difficulties of their upkeep, the virtual impossibility of withdrawing them, etc., they were not sent. I believe

that some tests were made in having some of them fly off carriers because it was believed they could be delivered in that fashion. It was suggested, during the discussion, that the most effective fighters should be sent to that area because there was far greater likelihood of their being usefully employed than there would be from Oahu. I mention this last fact merely as indicative of the fact that the senior officers, Army and Navy, afloat and ashore, gave no indication at that time of anticipating an air attack on Oahu. Incidentally, the War and Navy Departments were proposing considerable reduction in defenses of Oahu in order to strengthen Midway and Wake. At that time, only six Army B-17's on Oahu were operable.

[247] 82. Q. However, did it occur to you that in view of that tenseness of situation, that the proposal as received from Washington was badly timed?

A. Yes, sir, that was why we felt it was highly inadvisable to make any change in the arrangements there, whatever merits the proposal might have had otherwise. Nonetheless, it was agreed, between General Short and Admiral Kimmel, that the former would organize several defense battalions for use on outlying islands and would hold several pursuit squadrons in readiness for such employment.

83. Q. Do you recall if the proposal, which, incidentally, bears the same date as this dispatch concerning which you are testifying, in any way vitiated the effect of the statement that the dispatch was a war warning?

A. No, sir, I did not feel that that vitiated the other dispatch. I rather felt that it had in mind making available to the Commander-in-Chief Marine defense battalions for utilization in captured positions in the Marshalls that might be badly needed and might not otherwise be available.

84. Q. Admiral, would you say that there was a doubt in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief and the members of his Staff as to what the Navy Department intended by its directive of 27 November to execute defensive deployments, etc.?

A. I believe that the conclusion reached here was that primarily the Department wished to appraise use of their belief that the war was imminent, that we should continue to maintain our security arrangements, but was cautioning us not to take any disposition that might be regarded as an overt act, such as exposing forces as far as the Gilberts or the close approaches to the Marshalls. It seemed to us that they might have thought that in our enthusiasm to strike as promptly as possible we might advance forces to a position that would be regarded as threatening and thus destroy any remote chance of retaining peace. We were not so uncertain as to ask the Department for a clarification.

85. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch dated November 28, 1941, which is Exhibit 9. Do you recall having seen that at the time of its receipt by the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Yes, I remember seeing this dispatch.

86. Q. Did the directions contained therein, with reference to being prepared to carry out certain tasks, appear to you to be inconsistent with your view as to the previous dispatch of November 27?

A. No.

87. Q. Was this dispatch, Exhibit 9, the basis for any change in the existing plans at the time of its receipt?

A. No, I think not.

88. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch of December 3, 1941, Exhibit 11 before this examination. Did you see that at the time of its receipt by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. Yes, I remember this.

89. Q. Will you please state what significance you attached to this dispatch at the time?

A. I felt that it was the best indication which had come to our attention that we would be involved in the war with Japan, from the very beginning.

90. Q. Can you state any significance attached to this dispatch by Admiral Kimmel?

A. No, I don't recall any specific expression of opinion from him with regard to this dispatch.

[248] 91. Q. Admiral, I'll ask you a somewhat hypothetical question. Had you foreseen the full power of that Japanese carrier raid, which was made on 7 December, what measures, other than those taken, were open, insofar as the distribution of the battleships was concerned?

A. We would certainly not have had them in port. Had intelligence, chance contact, or search have located the enemy forces, it seems highly probable that we would have concentrated our battleships at sea and had them with attendant light forces disposed to the westward with the expectation of using them against any enemy forces that could be reached. As a security measure, they certainly would not have been in port.

92. Q. The battleships appear to have constituted the primary target for the Japanese. Actually, what would have been the most profitable target in and around Pearl Harbor for the Japanese to have attacked?

A. The oil tanks. The Japanese apparently, from the nature of their attacks, determined, from the very beginning, to at least temporarily immobilize our Fleet. Everything would have been completely immobilized if they had destroyed the oil in Pearl Harbor and would have remained immobilized for a long period of time. If, in addition to that, they had destroyed the shops and the dry docks, our capabilities of waging war in the Central and Western Pacific would have been nullified for a very long period of time.

93. Q. Did you, at any time during your incumbency as War Plans Officer to Admiral Kimmel, question, in your own mind, the advisability of continually basing the Pacific Fleet on Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, sir, I frequently did but always came back to the conclusion that if, in the existing international situation, the responsibility were my own, that I would have based them here. There is a considerable divergence of opinion in that regard and it may be idle to go into the pros and cons of it. I express only my own conclusions.

94. Q. However, will you, briefly, express those pros and cons?

A. Among other things, Pearl Harbor has but one entrance. If a considerable portion of the Fleet were in Pearl Harbor and that entrance should be blocked, it would have taken a very long time to clear it. Whatever units were in here would have been immobile and there

would have been no other suitable base in the Central Pacific in which to base our Fleet. Operating for a considerable period here, habitually, would make it certain that the Japanese could concentrate considerable number of submarines in one relatively small area. If they were boldly and skillfully used, they would have found numerous opportunities to inflict serious damage. Those are the two major objections to basing the Fleet here. Such matters as deterioration and morale, strain on logistics, and matters of that nature could be overcome. The advantages of basing it here were that it would be a week's steaming nearer the area of operation. The development of schemes for ingress and egress, and for berthing and servicing and the repairing of the Fleet, would be developed to a degree that would never be accomplished unless large numbers of ships were based here for prolonged period. In other times, temporary expedients had been arranged for temporarily berthing the Fleet and for giving limited services; but this area, until the Fleet was actually maintained out here, had never been developed as a real Fleet base.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

[249] The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 5:35 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[250] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

MONDAY, APRIL 3, 1944

TWENTIETH DAY

PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The examination met at 9:15 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the nineteenth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows: This is a board acting under a precept by the Secretary of Navy to record testimony, under oath, surrounding the facts pertaining to the incident of 7 December 1941, comprising the attack on Pearl Harbor. The purpose is to record testimony which might otherwise be lost and be unavailable at some future time, when it may be needed and perhaps used in legal proceedings; or for other purposes. It is necessary for witnesses to testify from facts known to them on or before 7 December 1941, insofar as it is possible to do. I ask them to make every endeavor to that end. I give full opportunity to verify testimony and interpret that liberally to include amendments, as well as corrections; this I feel it necessary to do because of the great amount of elapsed time since those events. There is a significant phrase in the precept—"pertinent to the facts." It has been the experience that interpretation of that phrase is required, which I have to do inasmuch as facts come out in testimony that point back to other facts which, at first, might not appear to be pertinent. You are called as a witness whom I consider to be in possession of such facts.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Richmond Kelly Turner, Vice Admiral (Temporary Grade), United States Navy, in command of the Amphibious Forces of the Pacific Fleet.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. I was the War Plans Officer for the Chief of Naval Operations.

3. Q. How long previously had you been so detailed?

A. I reported to that duty on October 25, 1940, having come from command of the U. S. S. ASTORIA, then a part of the Hawaiian Detachment of the Pacific Fleet.

4. Q. Were you, particularly during 1941, closely associated with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, even beyond the association which the preparation of formal war plans called for?

[251] A. I was. I considered myself one of Admiral Stark's principal advisers. We were close personal friends, as well as closely associated officially.

5. Q. What was the official designation of the Department's basic war plan which was current during the latter half of 1941?

A. WPL-46; Rainbow 5, it was known as. That war plan was a joint plan between the Army and the Navy. It had its basis in an international agreement with the British Army, Navy, and Air Force. The conversations with the British leading up to preparation of that plan were held in February and March of 1941. It was a world-wide agreement, covering all areas, land, sea, and air, of the entire world in which it was conceived that the British Commonwealth and the United States might be jointly engaged in action against any enemy. On the conclusion of that agreement with the British, the WPL-46 was prepared after a great many talks with the Army and was approved by the Joint Board, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and by the President. The Navy issued their form of that war plan in May of 1941, and it is my recollection the Army form of it was issued about August.

6. Q. Did WPL-46 contemplate any Allies, other than the British Empire?

A. It contemplated associated Powers, including the Netherlands East Indies, and such colonies of British Allies as were still in the war, for example, the Loyalist French Colonies.

7. Q. Against what prospective enemy nations was the plan intended?

A. It was intended against the Axis Powers: Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Powers that were allied with those principal Powers. It did not include any particular participation for the purpose of the plan by the Government of China. It did not include any association by Russia, as it was prepared and promulgated before the Russians were at war with Germany. After its promulgation, the War and Navy Departments made several tentative efforts to bring Russia within the scope of this or a modified plan. During the Fall of 1941, the Joint Board prepared some tentative bases for military conversations with Russia. The representatives of the Joint Board on two or three occasions discussed with the Russian military representative in Washington the question of making a common war plan, but nothing ever eventuated from those conversations during the time I remained in Washington.

8. Q. Did the plan, as put into effect, envisage alternative combinations of enemy nations?

A. It did. Without referring to the plan to aid memory, I believe it envisaged war in which either Germany and her European Allies were the sole enemies, or in which Japan was also engaged. The main basis of the plan, however, was a global war in which both Germany and her European Allies and Japan were at war with United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies. It was

agreed that if war was initiated by Japan, Germany would be brought in by offensive action against her by the United States.

9. Q. Then, during the period immediately preceding the issuing of WPL-46, I understand you to say that there was in the minds of your organization that the most likely combination of enemies would include Japan?

A. Yes, sir.

10. Q. In either or both of the alternative enemy combinations, what attitude, defensive or offensive, did the plan contemplate over the Pacific Ocean Areas?

A. The plan contemplated a major effort on the part of both the principal associated Powers against Germany, initially. It was felt in the Navy [252] Department, that there might be a possibility of war with Japan without the involvement of Germany, but at some length and over a considerable period, this matter was discussed and it was determined that in such a case the United States would, if possible, initiate efforts to bring Germany into the war against us in order that we would be enabled to give strong support to the United Kingdom in Europe. We felt that it was incumbent on our side to defeat Germany, to launch our principal efforts against Germany first, and to conduct a limited offensive in the Central Pacific, and a strictly defensive effort in the Asiatic.

11. Q. At about what date was the Contributory Plan of the Commander, Pacific Fleet, approved by the Navy Department?

A. It was about September. Referring to the plan, it appears to have been distributed on July 21. As I recall it, there was some correspondence concerning some of the features, but I believe it was during September that it was finally approved by the Department.

12. Q. Was that interim correspondence cause by any particular disagreement on the part of your own organization with what had been advanced by Admiral Kimmel?

A. No essential disagreement whatsoever. The delay, as I recall it, was due, principally to technical reasons and time required for a careful review of the plan by various agencies in the Department.

13. Q. Do you recall Admiral Kimmel having in any way expressed disagreement with the defensive versus the offensive attitudes which were laid down in the basic plan, WPL-46?

A. So far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned, his part in the plan was not defensive. It required a limited offensive through the Central Pacific islands. It was realized that Admiral Kimmel did not have at hand all the material and men and organizations to proceed immediately with a strong offensive to the Gilberts or the Marshalls. The Navy Department was making every effort to try to set up base materiel and organizations that would permit Admiral Kimmel, in the course of a comparatively short time, to initiate such an offensive. Admiral Kimmel, whether in writing or orally, I don't recall, expressed the view that he did not have the forces suitable for conducting an offensive in the immediate future. There was no disagreement in the Department with such a view. We felt that the first part of the war in the Central Pacific would be largely naval and air, and that some time would elapse before we could seize and hold island territory. But it would be a grave error for anyone to get the idea that the war in the Central Pacific was to be purely defensive. Far from it.

While the Navy Department believed that our major military effort, considered as a whole, should initially be against Germany—that view, I may add, was also held by the War Department—we were all in agreement that the principal naval effort should be in the Pacific. The British Government did not hold such a view. They felt that our principal naval effort ought to be in the Atlantic and in the Asiatic. The United States believed that our strongest naval concentration and naval effort ought to be in the Central Pacific.

14. Q. Other than as you have just testified, were there any other considerations lying behind the transfer of a considerable detachment of Admiral Kimmel's forces to the Atlantic, which step was somewhat concurrent with the date of issue of WPL-46?

[253] A. In May of 1941, decision was reached jointly with the British Government to occupy the Azores. The force which was withdrawn from the Pacific at that time consisted of some Marine troops and transports, one or two carriers, I think a division of cruisers, some destroyers, and, as I recall, three battleships. Something like that was withdrawn from the Pacific for the purpose of supporting the occupation of the Azores. That project was abandoned and the occupation of Iceland by American troops was substituted. Some of the forces which were withdrawn for that purpose were then returned to the Pacific. The Department consistently made every possible effort to set up, in all of the theatres, the exact distribution of force which is set forth in WPL-46, and, at the time of the outbreak of war, substantially the forces established in that volume were present in all of the theatres.

15. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel make any particular protest against the transfer of that detachment from his command?

A. I recall no official protest. He did not approve it. As a matter of fact, he was not at once informed of the reasons for it. As I recall it, he asked to have those vessels returned as soon as they could be spared from the Atlantic. He felt that his strength here was none too great. That opinion was also held by the Department. There are two points that I would like to mention. In the first place, as you have said, I do not have at hand records of the correspondence which passed between the Department and Admiral Kimmel prior to December 7. As an assistant to Admiral Stark, I presented what Admiral Stark considered to be the principal papers in that case to the Roberts Commission and they can be found in the transcript of proceedings of that Commission. I remember most of those letters and dispatches, but am none too sure about the exact contents of each nor the dates. The second statement which I believe is pertinent is that the feeling by Admiral Stark and by all members of the Department with whom I ever talked was that of a very complete loyalty to the principal Commanders-in-Chief, who were Admiral Hart in the Asiatic, Admiral Kimmel in the Pacific, and Admiral King in the Atlantic. I know Admiral Stark felt and I know I felt, that war was coming and we had, in those three officers, the best possible selection of officers in the Navy for the sea commands. The Department made every effort possible to hold their hands up, and such adjustments as had to be made between the three Fleets, due to many reasons, were considered at length and very carefully before they were made. But I believe that that feeling of essential loyalty ought to be recorded, as

well as Admiral Stark's policy of avoiding minor directives and interferences with the Commanders-in-Chief. He was especially careful, at all times, to give them as full a scope of action as it was possible to give.

16. Q. Both parts of that statement are considered to be entirely pertinent. There can well be added to the record the general belief throughout the forces in the field that such trust and confidence obtained throughout the period leading up to the war. There was the fact that we contemplated Allies, if we became engaged in the war. The examination returns to the incident of that transfer of forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic. As you recall the innermost opinions held by you and your associates, was that transfer in accord with your own conceptions of what the situation demanded or was it somewhat overinfluenced by the British insistence?

A. The decision was made after a great deal of discussion. Of course, there were differences of opinion, but the Department was entirely loyal to that decision. The British did not insist too greatly. In fact, the expedition was cancelled at the request of the British when they became [254] convinced that the Portuguese would resist the seizure of the Islands.

17. Q. It is in previous testimony that there was, some time during the Summer of 1941, a temporary detachment of surface vessels toward Australia. Did that have any particular part in the overall picture which was confronting the Navy Department?

A. That detachment went to Australia for the purpose of indicating to Japan solidarity between the United States and the British Commonwealth, and to indicate to Japan that if British interests were attacked that the United States would enter the war on the side of the British. Admiral Stark kept the Commanders-in-Chief informed, to the best of his ability, as to the international political situation and the probabilities of the future. While the Government could not guarantee that we would enter the war if Japan attacked Great Britain, they fully believed that we would do so. In our conversations with the British, we never could make a firm commitment that at any particular time the United States would enter the war, for the reason that unless we were attacked first, the Executive Department did not have the power to put the Country into war. Conversations were held in the Far East with the Dutch and the British authorities, and joint plans, not too definite in nature, were drawn up, but we never could be sure that if the Netherlands East Indies or the British were attacked the United States would surely come into the war.

18. Q. During June and July, 1941, formal action was taken by our Federal Government to freeze Japanese credits. At that time, or afterward, did your organization make a reestimate of the international situation in the light of the probability that the Japanese would be badly squeezed in obtaining strategic materials and so forth?

A. The possibility and consequences of action of that nature by the United States Government against Japan were thoroughly considered during our conversations with the British and during our preparation of WPL-46. We felt that that action was going to come sooner or later. We also felt, and I believe that the War Department felt the same way, that action of that nature would almost surely result in

war with Japan within a comparatively short period of time. While the subject of economic sanctions was discussed, we felt that there was no necessity for making any change in our planning.

19. Q. Then was it the case that such circumstances had really been included in the situation estimate which laid behind WPL-46 in the first place?

A. Yes.

20. Q. Did it occur to you, during 1941 or previously, that the Navy Department's general method of preparing, and of the administrative handling of its war plans, including keeping them in touch with events and developments, was in any way defective?

A. I shared the opinion with many others that the war plans which were in existence during 1940 were defective in the extreme. They were not realistic, they were highly theoretical, they set up forces to be ready for use at the outbreak of war, or shortly after, which could not possibly have been made available, and they were not kept up to date. When I went as War Plans Officer in October of 1940, I was shocked at the state of the war plans. There was the feeling then in Washington, which I did not share, that war with Japan might eventuate at any moment, and there was no plan for war with Japan. Immediately after my arrival and after a thorough discussion of the matter, we initiated the preparation and issue of WPL-43, Rainbow 3, which was a Navy Department War Plan not concurred in by the War Department. This [255] called for a war with Japan alone, and with an entirely defensive attitude in the Atlantic. That plan was issued about January of 1941. We felt that it would be implemented by the War Department if war should eventuate. It must be understood that a war plan issued by the Navy Department, or by the Government, is principally a mobilization plan for placing in the hands of the Commanders-in-Chief the forces with which they are to initiate war and to give those Commanders-in-Chief general directives as to the strategic attitude which they should pursue. Rainbow 3 was, to all intents and purposes, and so far as the Pacific is concerned, approximately the same as Rainbow 5. Rainbow 3 did contemplate association with the British and the Netherlands East Indies on the Far East, but it did not go so far in that regard as Rainbow 5. Rainbow 3 was an interim plan. It was necessary, we all felt, to get out a war plan which the Government could carry out. Therefore, every effort was made to strip from the previous plans the unrealistic features, and to give to the new plan forces which could be provided and tasks which could probably be executed by Commanders-in-Chief. As soon as we issued Rainbow 3 and as soon as we issued Rainbow 5, the Navy Department immediately began moving forces to the different theatres in accord with the commitments made in those two plans.

21. Q. Then am I correct in understanding you to the effect that you did consider Rainbow 5 realistic, well described by the word "As-Is", not frozen, and sufficiently elastic insofar as developments could be seen?

A. Yes.

22. Q. Did you, during the Summer of 1941, make any special provision for keeping WPL-46 in step with changes in the general situation and with changes in availability of forces?

A. Yes, I organized the War Plans Division into sections charged with maintaining close cognizance of the different war theatres of the world, and made every effort to keep Rainbow 5 up to date. Rather extensive amendments were practically ready for issue when war broke out. They were not issued in the form in which prepared.

23. Q. In pursuance of that objective, or for any other reasons, were any estimates of the situation, other than running estimates, made by the War Plans Division during the period of, say, August to December, 1941?

A. None other than running estimates. I believed then, and I still believe that those are the most valuable kind of estimates. The long, formalized estimates, as used in the War College, are useful for training, but I have not found them particularly useful during war or preparation for war.

24. Q. Was there, during that period from August on, any particular redistribution of the naval forces of our respective Allies actually made or promised?

A. The British promised to set up the Eastern Fleet as contemplated by our Joint Agreement which would consist of about six battleships, two or three aircraft carriers, and some additional cruisers and destroyers. This Fleet was to be based in the Indian Ocean. Its principal base was Trincomalee with an advance base at Singapore. They actually moved the PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE and four destroyers to Singapore. En route there were, as I recall it, three battleships and one aircraft carrier additional to the HERMES at the time of the outbreak of war. Also a few destroyers and one or two cruisers. They were, so far as possible, making a loyal effort to carry out their commitments as to the distribution of forces for war. They also moved additional troops and additional aircraft to Malaya. We delivered, [256] under lend-lease, some aircraft to them in the Far East and sent groups of experts and mechanics out to Malaya to show them how to use our airplanes.

25. Q. During the same period, did our own War Department plan and effect any increase in ground or air strength in the Pacific Ocean Area?

A. Yes, as soon as Rainbow 5 was agreed to, the War Department immediately initiated steps for reenforcing the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippines. They actually moved a considerable number of airplanes to the Philippines and considerable additional troops. They also initiated a very greatly accelerated training of Philippine soldiers and, during the Fall of 1941, undertook what was essentially a mobilization of the Philippine Army.

26. Q. Was your organization kept in touch and frequently consulted concerning other than the basic considerations leading to those steps?

A. We were consulted in detail every time the War Department contemplated a movement of that sort. We had prolonged discussions of ways and means. Our opinion was frequently asked as to the advisability of such and such a movement. At that time, the War Department did not dispose of many trained elements which could be moved overseas without a very bad interruption of their training program. The War Department, after June of 1941, was, I believe, as thoroughly convinced as the Navy Department that war with Germany and Japan was not far distant.

27. Q. Was your organization able to keep touch, during the latter half of 1941, with the actual ability of the Army forces, Hawaii, to meet their commitments?

A. Yes, sir, we had a very definite opinion on the subject. It was substantially the same as was held, I believe, by the War Department, that it would be highly desirable to have considerably greater strength in antiaircraft and airplanes and troops in Hawaii.

28. Q. Narrowing the examination down to the Hawaiian Area and forces therein; did the War Plans Division, through the latter half of 1941, consider that the Pacific Fleet had sufficient forces to carry out its initial tasks?

A. We were not at all satisfied with the defensive cover that was being afforded Hawaii, and continued every effort to set up defenses in outlying islands, such as Midway, Wake, Palmyra, Johnston Island, and Samoa. These places were all strengthened, air fields were built or in process of building, and we were distributing forces to those positions. The principal reason for building the defenses there was to detect and ward off enemy attacks against Hawaii, and to afford defensive cover for the sea operations of our Fleet. It was not possible, of course, to provide such a cover to the northward, and that was always recognized as a weak spot in our defense. I may say that I, personally, was not in favor of setting up defenses in Wake. It was too far removed for proper support, and was certain to fall at an early date after the war broke out unless we could have an early successful engagement with the Japanese Fleet, which seemed unlikely. The other positions were considered of great value and work was pushed on all of them to the limit of our available resources. As regards the strength of the Pacific Fleet, we felt that it was adequate for the tasks assigned to it, although we would have been happy to have had greater strength.

29. Q. Did you consider the Fleet's logistics support to be adequate?

[257] A. We believed it to be adequate for the initial Fleet operations, such as I have mentioned. We did not consider that it was adequate for an early offensive movement for setting up bases in the Marshalls. We did not have the units assembled for setting up such bases and we did not have the shipping to support the Fleet at an advance base, but we believed that we could obtain those forces within a reasonable time after the outbreak of war. That estimate, I believe, has been proved sound by events. We have provided far greater logistics support in the Pacific Ocean than I would have believed possible before the outbreak of war. I refer to our tremendous logistic effort in the South Pacific immediately following the outbreak of war.

30. Q. During the period of preparation of basic Rainbow 5, was it the opinion in your organization and among your associates that if war with Japan eventuated, it would be at our initiative or at that of the Japanese?

A. Always at the initiative of the Japanese. We did not believe it politically possible to initiate war against the Japanese. I, personally, did not believe it politically advisable.

31. Q. And did those opinions endure throughout 1941 up until 7 December?

A. Yes, sir.

32. Q. Please state the methods of liaison with the State Department which were in effect from the summer of 1941 onward, or even

previously, through which you kept in touch with developments in the diplomatic and political fields, and including also the economic field, insofar as it was pertinent.

A. The Chief of Naval Operations had a close personal association with the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State. He consulted them frequently and they consulted him, I might say invariably, before making any particular diplomatic move. In the Office of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Central Division was appointed as liaison officer with the State Department. He visited the State Department and discussed problems with them practically every day. There was a weekly meeting in the State Department conducted by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, usually attended by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of the War Plans of the Army, Chief of War Plans of the Navy, the Chief of the Central Division of the Office of Naval Operations, an officer of the General Staff not in the War Plans Division, and two or three representatives of the State Department. The matters discussed at these meetings usually related to events in Western Hemisphere countries. The Army was building a lot of air fields in the Caribbean and South America. The Navy and the Army, both, had sent missions to those countries, and at the meetings with the Under Secretary it was chiefly American affairs that were discussed. Occasionally, possibly once a month, the Secretary of State would hold a conference with representatives of the War and Navy Departments, and at these meetings events outside of the Americas were discussed. From time to time the Secretary of State would call individuals from the War and Navy Department to discuss particular aspects of world events. There were other unscheduled conferences between the State and War and Navy Departments. I participated in a great many such conferences. From time to time, informal memoranda were exchanged between individuals of the State and Navy Departments or exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Chief of Naval Operations. I would say that relations between the State and War and State and Navy Departments were very close and were characterized by good feeling.

33. Q. Is it your impression now that much transpired in those relationships with the Department of which no official record was kept and which rests now only in the minds of individuals?

[258] A. I don't know what records the State Department kept. The Navy Department representative, the Liaison Officer, usually prepared notes of formal conferences which he put in the files. I kept no notes whatsoever.

34. Q. Was it your impression that there were relationships, conferences, and so forth, on the part of State Department and Army officials in which our representatives had no part?

A. There were such conferences but, I believe that we were kept fully informed as to the general features of any such conferences.

35. Q. Insofar as your own participation was concerned, did you gather the impression that State Department officials had a correct realization of the naval and military potentialities on our side and that they kept their own actions in step therewith.

A. I think any broad generalization in an answer to that question could not fairly be made. There were individuals in the State De-

partment who had an unrealistic point of view, in my opinion, just the same as there were individuals in the War and Navy Departments who had an unrealistic point of view of the world situation. I'll say that on the whole, I have no complaint nor criticism of the attitude of the State Department.

36. Q. In continuance of your testimony concerning the attitude of certain individuals, will you go further as respects the individuals who specialized in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

A. I encountered the opinion, held alike by some people in the State Department and in the military service, that we could bluff Japan. I have been fortunate enough to have been associated with the Japanese on several occasions and had made a considerable study of the Japanese character and life and history. I was always of the opinion that you can not bluff the Japanese and that that is not the way to deal with them. But I believe that I, prior to the war, was in a very small minority in that view, so that I can not say that I criticize anyone for holding such views.

37. Q. Do you recall if it was represented to the State Department, at any time in 1941, and particularly upon the decision to build up Army forces in our holdings in the Pacific, that the element of timing in diplomatic and political moves was highly important?

A. That factor was thoroughly considered in every diplomatic and military move that was made, so far as I recall. The matter would be discussed as to whether this was the time to do a certain move or some other time. That was always present. There were sometimes disagreements as to timing.

38. Q. As an example, and in order to be more specific, was our own potentiality in the Pacific properly considered when the date for freezing the Japanese credits was decided upon?

A. It was considered. The State Department was kept well informed as to our strength and advised as to what we could do. What considerations lead to that decision at that particular time, I'm not aware, because I was informed of it after the decision was made and did not participate in any discussion of it in advance.

39. Q. Admiral, will you make a general statement as to the adequacy and reliability of the intelligence furnished concerning Japan in all fields through 1941 for the necessary purposes of the War Plans Division?

[259] A. Of course, we never have enough intelligence. It is particularly true that, as is well known, correct intelligence concerning Japan is very difficult to obtain. However, I think our intelligence regarding Japanese activities and intentions was quite good. In general terms, it was adequate for the preparation of war plans and for the direction of affairs. I believe that the Chief of Naval Operations, during the greater part of 1941, had a very realistic and sound concept as to Japanese general intentions. We received information from undercover sources that was of great value. Those who have studied the Japanese and had realized their character and reactions could draw conclusions, usually sound, from public statements, actions of their diplomats, actions of their Government, which were valuable in estimating their intentions. From these various sources, I became convinced, even before going to the Department, that war with Japan was inevitable within the next year or two. I did not believe that

war was imminent with Japan, unless precipitated by some incident, until the time it occurred. I did believe, from the fall of the Konoze Cabinet, which, I believe, was in June or July of 1941, that matters then were definitely in train for an attack by Japan on the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies. During November of 1941, I believed that the attack would be made by Japan about the last day of that month, but during the last ten days of November, I became convinced it had been postponed for a few days. The attack of December 7 came as no surprise whatsoever to me, nor to the Chief of Naval Operations.

40. Q. Were you, however, surprised that one of the objectives of the Japanese attack was Pearl Harbor itself?

A. Not in the least. I had originated a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War in January of 1941 concerning the defenses of Hawaii, in which an air, sea, and submarine attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor was set forth as one of the most probable forms that the initiation of war with Japan would take. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, about that same time, wrote letters to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commanding General in Hawaii, pointing out these features and asking that steps be taken within the power of those officers to be prepared for such an attack. Those letters were not intended to be construed as indicating an immediate attack, but they attempted to initiate rather long-range preparatory plans.

41. Q. Through 1941, and particularly during the months which saw the increase of tension with Japan, was your organization much concerned and worried as regards the security of units of the Pacific Fleet, as based in Hawaiian waters? I mean, in particular, security against surprise attack.

A. That factor was never absent from our consideration of the problems of war with Japan. We endeavored to do what we could with other parts of the Department, and with the Commander-in-Chief, to push measures that would insure adequate security. The letters and dispatches on that subject initiated by my office are not many because we felt, and it was the Chief of Naval Operation's policy, not to nag on matters of that sort. The problem was put where it belonged, in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief.

42. Q. In those intra-office discussions, was a surprise attack through the air particularly in your mind?

A. We felt that would probably accompany any attack unless such attacks were confined solely to submarines. Attacks by submarines were, of course, an almost certainty, and might well have been the only form of attack.

[260] 43. Q. While holding that frame of mind, during that crucial period, did you also have in mind the actual state of readiness of Army forces, Oahu, for repelling carrier raid?

A. Yes. On several occasions, we went over in detail the exact forces the Army had available, both anti-aircraft and air, their distribution, and whether or not they were deployed in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor permanently. I am sure there is considerable correspondence in general terms on that subject, but I do not remember whether or not we specifically asked the War Department to deploy their anti-aircraft guns permanently in the immediate vicinity of

Pearl Harbor. I know that we asked them orally to keep their principal anti-aircraft force deployed around Pearl Harbor, and my impression is that they carried that out. We knew that the three inch anti-aircraft gun was not a very able weapon, but the new ninety millimeter and the Army thirty-seven millimeter and the fifty calibre guns were either not available then or available only in small numbers. I believe that the War Department did everything that they could to meet these requests.

44. Q. Were you cognizant of the state of training and readiness of the Army air forces, Oahu, for repelling or interfering with an air raid?

A. No. We knew the types of planes they had had here were of the older models and not particularly valuable in combat. In order to correct that quickly, in the latter part of 1941, we made, I think, two carrier trips from the Coast carrying the later types of Army pursuit planes. They were newly formed organizations and we did not expect their training to be of a very high order. The purpose of those trips by carriers and the purpose of the Army transfers of the later types of pursuit planes and bombers in the latter part of '41 was to deal with exactly the situation that occurred.

45. Q. Did you have knowledge of the state of readiness of the Army's radar equipment and organization?

A. In general terms, yes. When I went to War Plans, the Army had, under manufacture, eight or ten large radar installations of a permanent type. The priority at that time of assignment was, first to Panama, and, I think, second on the West Coast of the United States. On our recommendation, they changed that priority to first, I think, the Philippines, and, second Hawaii; or it may have been the other way. I'm not too certain about that. The first may have been Midway, but the Philippines, Hawaii, and Midway were placed by the War Department very high on the list. Now the installation, the permanent fixed installation in Hawaii, I do not believe was completed at the time of Pearl Harbor, but it was being pushed hard. The Army had, however, moved out here, quite recently to that date, several sets of the mobile type of radar, and we knew that these were being operated.

46. Q. But you did not know anything specific about the relative inefficiencies of the operation; is that correct?

A. That is correct. I knew nothing whatever about radar except what it was intended to do.

47. Q. Continuing as regards the security of units of the Fleet against surprise attack while in Hawaii, and specifically Pearl Harbor, were there, during the months leading up to the war, any specific considerations in your organization as to the advisability of continuing to base the Fleet in Hawaiian waters; if so, please state them.

A. Consideration was given to withdrawing the Fleet from the Base in Hawaii to California throughout the entire time I was in the Department, [261] until a very short period before Pearl Harbor. There were several factors that entered into that consideration. One was political, whether or not the presence of the Fleet here would be more likely or less likely to bring on war with Japan. Another consideration was the welfare of the crews of the ships; the men did not like Hawaii, and there was a certain amount of discontent

among them in not getting back more frequently to the States. Another was the upkeep of the Fleet. Another consideration was its safety in case of attack. I suppose the matter was discussed rather exhaustively a dozen times, and each time the decision was made to leave the Fleet here. For some time previous to the attack, the use of the anchorage at Lahaina Roads had been abandoned on the initiative of the Commander-in-Chief, because it was felt to be too exposed, both against submarines and against air attack. It was believed that when the Fleet was not at sea, Pearl Harbor offered better protection than any other place in that vicinity.

48. Q. Then you do not recall any occasion on which decision to withdraw from these waters to the Coast, for security reasons only, came anywhere near to being reached?

A. No, sir.

49. Q. Sir, was the estimate that you stated a few minutes ago that you considered a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor a strong possibility shared by the Chief of Naval Operations and his other senior assistants?

A. Yes, because they approved the letters that we drew up, without any question. They made some improvements in the letters, but the Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, as well as my own assistants, all believed that the letters were entirely sound.

50. Q. What was the understanding in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as to the estimate prevailing in the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as regards the possibilities of air surprise attack on Oahu?

A. We believed that he held exactly the same views that we did. What his attitude was towards the imminence of such an attack, I have no idea, but the fact that he, himself, had abandoned the use of Lahaina Roads indicated that his attitude toward attack was entirely correct.

51. Q. Did you feel, at that time, that all necessary steps were taken to apprise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet of the apprehension of the Chief of Naval Operations as to a surprise air attack on Oahu?

A. There was no specific warning sent out against attack on the Fleet here at the time the war warnings were dispatched. The only measures that we estimated specifically the Japanese would take were the general forms of his major attack, which was on Malay, the Philippines, and possibly Borneo, initially. That is, it was the major movement with which we were concerned in the Department. It was against policy—rightly so, I believe—to be too specific in details as to tactical matters. The idea was that we would give the Commanders-in-Chief general tasks, provide them with full information, and assign to them forces adequate for executing those tasks. We looked to the officers in the field to decide all tactical matters and methods. We did not wish to hamper them with detailed instructions concerning matters within their own fields of action. This was particularly important in the case of the Pacific and Asiatic Commands, which are so far distant from Washington that the officers there can never be adequately advised as to events and conditions.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

[262] Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that

his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the eighteenth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Commander Granville C. Briant, U. S. Naval Reserve, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the nineteenth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:03 p. m., adjourned until 9:15 a. m., tomorrow.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

TUESDAY, APRIL 4, 1944

TWENTY-FIRST DAY

PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The examination met at 8:15 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twentieth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Richmond Kelly Turner, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examined by the examining officer (Continued):

52. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch dated 16 October, which is Exhibit 6 in the testimony before this board. Did you have any part in the preparation of that dispatch?

A. I prepared the original version of the dispatch. It was discussed with the Army. I think the discussion took place at a joint board meeting, as well as informally between the Staff representatives. I also prepared the final form which is this dispatch. There was no substantial change in the wording, except that, in my original form of the dispatch, instead of [263] saying, "There is also a possibility that Japan may attack Britain and the United States," I made it a good deal stronger than that. I do not remember the exact wording; I think it was "a distinct probability Japan will attack Britain and the United States in the near future". Anyway, that was the meaning. That was felt by the Joint Board to be too strong a statement, and it was modified to the final wording.

53. Q. Do you recall that consultations with State Department officials preceded the sending of this dispatch?

A. I did not participate in any consultations with the State Department concerning this dispatch. As I recall it, the dispatch was shown to the Secretary of State and was discussed by him and the Chief of Naval Operations. It also was discussed by the Chief of Naval Operations with the President. I do not believe it was presented to a Cabinet meeting. In fact, I'm sure it wasn't; but I have the strong

impression that the President discussed its general features with the Secretary of State before it was sent.

54. Q. The next document which the board has in evidence bears the date of 24 November and is of somewhat similar tenor (indicating Exhibit 7). The intervening period is thirty-nine days. Do you recall any action by the Navy Department, any directives and so forth, of major import concerning the situation of the Pacific Fleet during that interim?

A. I don't recall any additional directives. The Navy Department and the War Department increased their efforts to get additional strength here in the Central Pacific and in the Philippines during that period. The situation was discussed at regular and at several special meetings of the Joint Board, and action was agreed to along several lines of effort by the Departments.

55. Q. Following your mention of Army efforts, do you recall any embarrassment coming upon the Navy Department, or its forces in the Pacific, incident to a very high estimate of numbers of B-17's which were to be ferried across the Pacific?

A. I don't recall any embarrassment. We made every effort and sent out directives to hasten the completion of the air fields at Midway and Wake, and we had to send additional men out there, in order to hasten completion of Navy airfields for use by the Army in ferrying planes to the Philippines. That took some of our shipping. The Army asked us to provide shipping for the fields at Canton and Christmas Islands, but we were unable to provide it for Christmas. We did provide some for Canton. Those fields had been started on my recommendation after talking to General Arnold. I told him we would lose Wake right away as soon as war broke out and if he wanted to get planes to the Philippines an alternative route ought to be provided via Australia and Pacific Ocean islands farther to the rear. That conversation took place at Argentia, during the Argentia Conference. The Navy was always heartily in favor of sending the planes to the Philippines, and we did what we could to assist the Army.

56. Q. Do you recall disappointment because the magnitude of that air reenforcement was very much less than what was projected?

A. Yes. The Navy Department was constantly urging the War Department to do all they possibly could in the way of getting additional strength in the Philippines. I will say that the War Department was also in favor of it. I think they sent out everything they could. I would like to add the following as a partial answer to a previous question regarding major steps that the Navy Department took which affected the Pacific situation. It was [264] at about this time that the Navy Department shifted all merchant and military shipping out of the Central Pacific, and sent it down south of New Guinea. It was also about this time that a directive was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to withdraw the Marines from China. The exact date of that dispatch, I do not recall.

57. Q. Do you recall if Mr. Kurusu's mission to Washington caused any particular change in opinions in your organization during this period of thirty-nine days?

A. His mission intensified our belief, already strong, that Japan was playing for time and was going to make an attack in the near future. The Kurusu mission seemed almost proof positive, had we not had proof already.

58. Q. Returning to the dispatch of 16 October. Do you recall approximately what steps Admiral Kimmel took to carry out the directive for a preparatory deployment?

A. He sent additional troops to the outlying islands and some fixed anti-aircraft guns and troops to Wake. He could not put the entire garrison in at Wake because of the large number of civilian workmen there, so he only sent a part of them out at this time. Then, just as war was breaking out, he dispatched another contingent to Wake, and he established an anti-submarine patrol in the Hawaiian Islands. I think he increased his air patrol, and he issued some orders to our own submarines, but I don't remember what they were. Our impression was that he was taking the necessary precautions. We had no doubts as to the readiness of the Pacific Fleet.

59. Q. During the aforesaid interim period of thirty-nine days, were the Department's directives concerning deployments ever rescinded?

A. No, sir.

60. Q. I pass you a dispatch dated 24 November, which is Exhibit 7 in this testimony. Did you have any part in the preparation of that dispatch?

A. I prepared this dispatch. It went through approximately the same processes as the October dispatch.

61. Q. Do you recall any particular collaboration of organizations, other than Army and Navy, in the preparation of that dispatch or which were in its background?

A. There were frequent conferences with the State Department during this period and frequent conferences between the Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Army, and the President. The Office of Naval Intelligence was in close touch with the Army Intelligence Service and with the F. B. I. concerning preventative measures being taken in the United States and in the Hawaiian Islands. I've forgotten just when the Coast Guard was taken over. I know there were conferences with the Coast Guard and the Treasury Department during this time in order to fit them into the deployment. I understood the situation was discussed several times in Cabinet meetings, and I believe that there were several conferences on the subject between the Cabinet officers most directly concerned.

62. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch of 27 November, which is Exhibit 8 in this testimony. Did you also have a part in the preparation of this dispatch?

A. The preparation of that dispatch followed approximately the same course as the other two. I prepared the original dispatch. It was considered by the Joint Board and was taken up with the State Department and [265] the White House. There were some few changes made in it until it took this form. As I recall, we were informed by the Secretary of State, at a small meeting at which I was present, that the State Department has no further hopes of composing matters with the Japanese. The Secretary of State requested advice from the Military Services as to any further steps that his Department might make. It was apparent, from the talks that were going on between the State Department and Mr. Kurusu, as well as from information received from intelligence sources, that the Japanese were killing time preparatory to an attack. We could not estimate the exact time that the attack would be made, but we knew of troop movements and naval movements in the Far East toward the South.

It was at about this time that our search planes first picked up some of the Japanese ships moving along the coast of Indo-China. I think it may have been after the date of this dispatch that we instituted plane search of the China Sea, but we were conscious of definite amphibious movements being made before the dispatch we are discussing was sent. The radio traffic, during the first half and middle of November, had been very heavy on the part of the Japanese, and suddenly it almost stopped some time between the 20th and 25th of November, as I recall it. Very little traffic was then sent out. That convinced us that the Japanese Fleet had put to sea. I was concerned, and had been through this entire period, over whether or not Japanese traffic analyses were being made by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and I brought the subject up several times with the Director of Naval Communications and with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. I was assured, each time, that the Commander-in-Chief was getting everything that we were getting in Washington, and was making proper traffic analyses here. Japanese radio traffic analyses were under the cognizance of the Director of Naval Communications, and I am not very familiar with the exact methods employed, nor of the distribution which was made of their deductions. The Director kept War Plans fully informed as to these deductions.

63. Q. In the discussion over the dispatch as you first drafted it, do you recall anything in particular as regards the phrase "war warning"; particularly discussion on what steps those words might lead the Pacific Fleet to take?

A. The words "war warning" were my own words and seemed to me to express the strong conviction on the part of the Department that war was surely coming. We expected all military services and outlying detachments to act in every way as if we were actually at war, except making attacks on the enemy, if encountered, or initiating movements against enemy forces.

64. Q. Will you, similarly, state what, in particular, the Department had in mind in the use of the words in this dispatch concerning "a deployment"?

A. It will be noted that the dispatch orders a defensive deployment. We expected all war scouting measures to be undertaken, submarines to be sent out to protect our Fleet and territory against enemy naval forces; we expected the carriers with their protective vessels to put to sea and stand in readiness for war; we expected, in the Asiatic, the movement of ships to be made to the South in accordance with the plan agreed on. We expected a high degree of readiness on board ships against attack of any form; and on shore, we expected a high degree of readiness of defensive troops, including anti-aircraft. The dispatch was prepared jointly with the Army. We expected a deployment of the Army on shore appropriate with a defensive state of readiness, such as manning the coastal guns, and moving troops out to their deployment positions for defense of territory.

[266] 65. Q. Do you recall any discussion, during the preparation of this dispatch, over inclusion of a directive to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to report what means he was taking incident to this dispatch?

A. We saw the Army dispatch requiring a report as to measures taken before it went out, but the Chief of Naval Operations and his

advisers, so far as I can recall, did not even consider sending out such a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

66. Q. Or the inclusion of such a directive in this dispatch itself?

A. No, that is a point I do not recall coming up.

67. Q. Do you recall any discussion over the advisability of sending a naval operations officer of authority to Pearl Harbor in order to insure a meeting of minds?

A. No, sir. An inspection procedure of that nature was never considered, so far as I recall, at any time while I was in the Department. We had, in circulating war plans or agreements with the British, on one or two occasions, sent an officer to Hawaii and to Manila to go over the papers with the Commanders-in-Chief to insure that those officers thoroughly understood the Department's intentions and desires, but I heard no suggestions that an officer be sent out here to check on what the Commander-in-Chief was actually doing.

68. Q. It appears, from previous testimony, that the Department sent C-in-C Pacific another dispatch on 26 November, which originated some hours earlier than the other dispatch, and which preoccupied the High Commands in Oahu. It concerned the substitution of Army air and ground troops in outlying islands as then garrisoned by Marines. Do you recall that dispatch (showing Exhibit 12)?

A. Yes, I recall this dispatch and I am sure it was prepared in my office.

69. Q. Did it occur to you that the timing of these two important dispatches, sent on the same day, was not altogether desirable?

A. No, sir. In fact, the purpose of the dispatch was to strengthen Midway against attack, and while this dispatch probably took several days in preparation, I think we wouldn't have considered it a part of the war warning series but rather a part of the materiel preparation matters, on which dispatches were going out practically every day. I've never had the thought that this would have done anything except more or less reenforce the idea of complete readiness. The fact that the planes had to be taken on an aircraft carrier indicated the necessity for speed.

70. Q. Did the dispatches in question (Exhibits 12 and 13) contemplate exchange of ground troops? I understand from your testimony that you did not consider that the quite extensive administrative measures necessitated by such shifts in forces would get in the way of larger considerations; is that correct?

A. This dispatch does not contemplate the exchange of troops, but merely exchange of ground crews and personnel of the airplane squadrons. The dispatch, Exhibit 13, contemplates reenforcement by infantry units of Marine defense battalions in position in the outlying islands. There was never any intention to relieve the Marine defense battalions, but they needed infantry reenforcement for proper security. Both of these dispatches, in my opinion, relate to a part of the immediate war measures which the Department considered essential. Administrative requirements for moving these forces to the forward positions were necessary. I consider the [267] dispatches relate to a movement which would add considerable strength to our defensive position in the Hawaiian Islands. I foresaw no administrative difficulties that would interfere with a proper defensive attitude of the Fleet and of the Army forces in Hawaii.

71. Q. Referring back to your testimony to the effect that you expected the Pacific Fleet to take up positions in readiness as a part of their reaction to the phrase "war warning", and so forth; do you recall if the logistic requirements which would be thereby entailed had ample attention in your minds at that time?

A. The Fleet actually had put to sea prior to this time, and they were then operating in about three or four task forces, and alternating in Pearl Harbor. The amount of fuel in Pearl Harbor was a constant matter of concern to War Plans and other agencies of the Navy Department. We felt that the logistic position out here was secure enough to execute those movements which we had in mind. I have never heard that it was not reasonably adequate.

72. Q. But if in consequence of such an understanding on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, his task groups had been at sea for several days prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities, would they not have had to return to port for refueling?

A. I don't remember whether or not there were enough tankers here at that time to keep the Fleet at sea continuously without returning to port. My impression is that there were enough. The rotation of the task forces in Pearl Harbor was not brought to my attention or the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations until after December 7.

73. Q. Under the Department's directive as contained in Exhibit 8, the deployment was stated to be in preparation for carrying out the assigned tasks in the war plans. Did it occur to you, while framing that dispatch, that the result might well be the assemblage of the entire Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor in preparation to jump off on the initial movement which the plans called for?

A. There was no question about an immediate amphibious movement. The only thing which was possible, the only tasks of the war plan which were possible were defensive movements and raids against enemy outlying positions, and the immediate matter was the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and our outlying islands. The place to defend them for the Fleet was at sea.

74. Q. However, the first task imposed upon the Pacific Fleet, though in the nature of a raid, required heavy forces and a blow projected at a long distance. In that view, would it have been unfair to expect that the Commander-in-Chief would assemble all three of his task forces in Pearl Harbor in preparation therefor?

A. The wording of the dispatch relating to that matter is as follows: "Execute appropriate deployment preparatory to carrying out the defensive tasks only assigned in WPL-46." That appears to me to be clear and to rule out, for the time being, any immediate preparation for an offensive move.

75. Q. Referring to my question regarding a directive to the Commander-in-Chief to state what measures he was taking, did you receive any report of action by Army forces, Oahu, which contained any indication that the actions taken in consequence of the 27 November dispatch had not been what was contemplated when they were sent?

[268] A. I remember a dispatch being received by the War Department from General Short reporting the measures being taken in compliance with the War Department's directive. A copy of that dispatch was sent to me by the War Plans Officer of the General Staff.

I did not discuss the dispatch with the War Plans Officer of the General Staff. The impression made on me by the dispatch was that the Army was taking satisfactory dispositions, and since the dispatch seemed satisfactory to the War Department, I did not pursue the subject further. The dispatch did not create any impression on me that full and appropriate defensive deployments were not being made by the Army.

76. Q. I show you a dispatch from OpNav, which is Exhibit 11 before this examination. Do you recall having prepared it or having seen it at the time it was sent?

A. I saw it before it was sent. It was sent by Naval Intelligence.

77. Q. Did the information therein cause thought within your organization and among your associates as to the advisability of any further warnings or instructions to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. No, sir. The fact that this was going out in this manner was considered all that was necessary to insure that the Commanders-in-Chief and the Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts thoroughly understood the urgency of the situation. In this connection, the Navy Department sent out orders to outlying islands and positions in China to burn all codes except such as were immediately essential; for example, to the ships in the Chinese rivers and to our stations in China, we sent orders to burn all except a single code and that was to be destroyed immediately in case of attack. We sent orders to Guam and orders to the Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts concerning the same subject. Most of these dispatches, or at least several of them, were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for information. The fact that we considered it necessary to burn codes was considered by the Department as an additional advisory warning to the Commanders-in-Chief.

78. Q. Admiral, did you feel that this dispatch of 3 December would create in the minds of the recipients an impression that the attack was coming in the Western Pacific rather than any possibility of an attack on Oahu, since it does not mention Honolulu as one of the points where codes were to be destroyed?

A. It is impossible for me to understand how anyone could receive such an impression. The enemy codes at Washington and Manila were to be destroyed, which definitely indicates war against the United States. Once the United States and Japan are at war or approaching war, then war-like actions may occur any place. Such an impression as you mention might have been created if neither Washington nor Manila had been included in the dispatch.

79. Admiral, do you recall anything other than what you have already testified to in the way of directives, warnings, and so forth, which were sent to Admiral Kimmel from, say, 25 November onward?

A. No, sir.

80. Q. Can you explain why the various dispatches from 24 November onward were in minor disagreement as to the actual objectives at which a Japanese surprise attack might be sent?

[269] A. I can not see the disagreement you mention. Exhibit No. 8 mentions several possible objectives of an amphibious expedition. Included among the possible objectives is the Kra Peninsula. Exhibit No. 10, which is a report of what the British Mission in Washington had been told by their Government, mentions an am-

phibious expedition against the Kra Isthmus. Therefore, I see no essential difference.

81. Q. Sir, in the months preceding the chain of dispatches that appear in evidence in this examination, do you recall any other repeated warnings that war was imminent, might happen any day, or words to that effect, contained either in correspondence or dispatches with Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. I recall no official dispatches or official letters which gave repeated warnings. There were many official letters and dispatches, and there was personal correspondence between Admiral Stark and the Commander-in-Chief in which an effort was made to keep the Commanders-in-Chief constantly advised on the diplomatic situation and on the general thoughts and attitudes of the Department concerning the possibility of war, and also concerning the prosecution of measures in preparation for war. I recall nothing in the several months before Pearl Harbor except this series of dispatches which might indicate that the Department thought war might break out any day. I saw most, if not all, of the personal correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commanders-in-Chief and was permitted to comment on them prior to their dispatch. If there had been any such thing in his personal correspondence, I certainly would have recommended its deletion. Admiral Stark's opinion and mine on the situation were very close together from the Spring of 1941 on.

82. Q. There is some testimony to the effect that the repeated warnings to the Pacific Fleet were ineffective and that such repetition had one undesirable result wherein the recipients got into the frame of mind which I can most briefly describe as the "cry of 'wolf'" of the fable. Did it occur to you, on about, say, 27 November, that the Department could well put in effect certain portions of Rainbow 5 and thereby most certainly insure that proper steps would be taken by the Pacific Fleet?

A. I frequently heard that criticism made. I do not consider it in the slightest degree justified. I'm speaking now of the "cry of 'wolf'", 'wolf'". So far as I know, there was only one dispatch that was a specific warning for war. The other dispatches relate to preparatory measures and were intended to keep the Commanders-in-Chief fully in touch with the situation as the Department saw it. The Department would have been, in my opinion, most derelict, had it permitted the war to approach closely without letting the Commanders-in-Chief know that it was convinced that war was coming. That exact feature of keeping from alarming the people at sea by frequent alarmist letters and dispatches was constantly kept in mind, and there were several occasions on which there were recommendations from one or another officer in the Department to send out preparatory warnings, but these were resisted until the approach of war was clear. As to putting in effect part of WPL-46, a careful study of that document will show that its mechanism does not permit such a step to be taken. It would be a very complicated procedure if properly done and would require considerable study on the part of the Department and the recipient of such messages, in order that the Commanders-in-Chief could see what the Department's ideas were.

I think nothing could be clearer than to start a dispatch by saying, "This is a war warning," and indicating the enemy and his probable major movements.

[270] 83. Q. Inasmuch as you have stated that WPL-46 did not lend itself to partial execution, would it have been practicable to have declared a mobilization over certain areas, notably the Pacific west of our Pacific Coast?

A. The fact is that the Navy had been mobilized for months, so far as its internal arrangements were concerned. Additional mobilization would, I believe, have accomplished nothing valuable, particularly as the powers that accrue to the military services on the outbreak of war, regarding to seizure of property and persons and regarding the interference with civilian activities, can not be undertaken in peacetime. The organic law of the Territory of Hawaii, I understand, permits martial law to be declared or to be requested by the Governor under certain conditions. That could have been done in peace provided those conditions existed, but would have been necessarily entirely public and would have created a state of mind in the civilian population and among the civilian officers of the Government that I believe would have had serious repercussions against the military. It must be remembered that very few people really believed war with Japan was imminent. Any public declaration, such as is necessary for establishing mobilization, would have been the one sure way of insuring war, and I'm positive that had such a move been made, the Government and the military would have been most severely criticized. We do not have the mobilization system which exists in military countries, and it is my opinion that mobilization by the United States could not legally be effected until a state of war exists. WPL-43 and WPL-46 were drawn up after considerable study of the question with the idea that mobilization prior to war is not practicable for the United States.

84. Q. I show you a document which is in testimony as Exhibit 5. Were you familiar with it prior to 7 December?

A. I had read it at the time it was approved by the Navy Department during the Summer of 1941.

85. Q. Could that plan, which provides for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, have been made effective at any time during the few days prior to 7 December?

A. To a very considerable extent that plan was already in effect prior to December 7, 1941. About the only thing that was not in effect were matters relating to the commission of acts of war. The machinery for cooperation between the Army and Navy had either been set up or was in the process of setting up for some months prior to the outbreak of war. I do not believe that it would have been useful to have placed this plan in effect. Rather, I'm inclined to think that it would have confused the issue.

86. Q. If you can recall, will you please state what constituted Admiral Stark's principal preoccupation and worry during November, '41, and up to 7 December.

A. I don't believe there was any one outstanding matter, other than the imminence of war. We were in a position where the military services strongly believed that we should have been in the war against Germany some months before. We were escorting convoys in the Atlantic, patrolling against German and Italian submarines and ships.

We had troops in Iceland. There were many problems in the Atlantic which required solution and action by the Chief of Naval Operations. There was the tremendous question as to manufacture of materiel and the expansion of the Navy. We had been unable to get the [271] funds or the authority to expand the Navy as much as we believed it should have been expanded, and that feature was always near the top of Admiral Stark's thoughts. There were the situations here in the Pacific and in the Asiatic which also were considered. Admiral Stark's thoughts were all about the close approach of war, and constantly in his mind was getting our forces into as complete a state of readiness as possible. We had established in Washington, since about April 1 of 1941, a British Military Mission, which grew to large proportions. That Mission had to do both with strategic matters and with the provision of lend-lease materials to Britain and other countries. Machinery for handling such materials was in process of expansion, but all during the Fall, a good deal of Admiral Stark's time was taken with talks with the British on strategic and lend-lease matters.

87. Q. During your incumbency as head of the War Plans Division, did you engage in any negotiations which looked toward the substantiation of the principle of unity of command for the joint action method which had been agreed upon for some years?

A. That had been discussed at great length with the Army and, to some extent, with the British. We never could find, and there has not yet been found, a general formula for unity of command applicable to all cases. We struggled with the problem and solved it in certain cases in WPL-46, as that document provides for a virtual unity of command between the British and our Army and Navy in certain cases, but we had never been able to get a satisfactory formula with regard to the Fleet and troops on shore.

88. Q. Admiral, in the months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, was thought given in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to the vulnerability of the Fleet units in Pearl Harbor to attack by torpedoes dropped from aircraft?

A. That apprehension existed in the Department prior to the time I went there as War Plans Officer. I had gone there from duty on a ship based in Pearl Harbor, and while here, I always felt that our ships were defenseless against such an attack, if it could be successfully made. As I recall it, the proposition of using anti-torpedo nets was put up to them out here first during the Summer of 1940. We again put it up to them in January of 1941 amongst other measures which we considered desirable for protection of the Fleet while in port. The use of anti-torpedo nets around ships in the Harbor was rejected by the authorities here in Hawaii, whether by the Commander-in-Chief or the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, I'm not certain at this time. I'll say this, that the Bureau of Ordnance sent out a letter while that matter was under consideration stating rather categorically that, in their opinion, the water in Pearl Harbor was too shallow to permit the dropping of torpedoes, and, unquestionably, that influenced the authorities here in determining not to use nets. I, personally, never accepted that opinion of the Bureau of Ordnance, because I see no reason whatsoever why torpedoes can not be made to drop in shallow water and run without a deep dive. We

now know that it can be done. That letter was changed, I think, in June, 1941, by the Bureau of Ordnance who sent then information substantially to the effect that they then believed that the Japanese had torpedoes that could be dropped from planes without diving, and it was possible to run them in thirty feet of water, as I recall the figure. Whatever the depth, it was indicated that it was possible to make successful drops of torpedoes from airplanes in Pearl Harbor. The subject of nets was then again taken up, but the manner of taking it up, I don't recall, because it was handled in another division of Operations and not [272] by War Plans. The Department was providing a good deal of anti-torpedo nets and I believe it could have been made available out here in time. The feeling, generally, in Operations, was that nets ought to be provided.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 11:50 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 1944

TWENTY-SECOND DAY

PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The examination met at 9:15 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer.
and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-first day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the eighteenth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examination then, at 9:18 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[273] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1944

TWENTY-THIRD DAY

U. S. S. IOWA.

The examination met at 10:50 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-second day of the examination until such times as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Record Page 250.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. John L. McCrea, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. IOWA.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year 1941?

A. Until May of 1941, I was attached to the War Plans Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, but was actually doing work for Admiral Stark on a variety of subjects as directed by him. I regard the work which I did for him largely as that required of an Aide. In May, 1941, I was given orders to report to Admiral Stark as Aide.

3. Q. Captain, I will ask you a rather general question, setting forth the various points upon which I believe you are able to testify. The question will not be in any way complete and you need not confine yourself to the points as set forth, which are as follows: The closeness of your association with Admiral Stark to indicate your acquaintance with the matters of major import which were in his mind; anything out of the ordinary which you recall as regards the background and the preparation of the War Plan current in 1941 (WPL-46); discussions as regards probability of the location, in the Atlantic or Pacific, of the war which the plans envisaged; any discussion concerning the appropriateness of Admiral Kimmel's contributory plan WPL-46; any considerations lying behind the transfer of considerable detach-

ments from the Pacific to Atlantic Fleet in 1941; any discussions or information gained incident to our Federal Government's action in June and July in '41 which lead to freezing Japanese credits, thereby making it difficult for them to obtain important materials; any discussions as concern the participation of the Allies which WPL-46 envisaged (particularly any redistribution of the British naval forces which might affect the situation in the Pacific); any discussion or knowledge which may have been in the background of the Navy Department's negotiations with the War Department concerning the readiness of the Army to meet its commitments in Hawaii. Beginning about September, [274] 1941, any pertinent facts in your recollection as to the background of the various dispatches sent to the Pacific Fleet indicating the imminence of hostilities with Japan; any facts within your recollection concerning the discussions, conferences, and negotiations with the State Department concerning our relations with Japan; any discussion or opinion which you heard expressed concerning the probability of Japanese attack against us, points at which such attack might be directed, and the character of such attacks; discussions during 1941 concerning the advisability of continuing to base the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters—particularly as regards the security aspect; discussions or opinions expressed incident to Mr. Kurusu's appearance in Washington as a part of the Japanese Embassy; discussions concerning the use of Army troops in the outlying islands (Midway, Wake, etc.) occurring as the Japanese situation grew very tense in late November. It is in previous testimony that the Pacific Fleet received so many warnings of the imminence of hostilities that the effect was somewhat vitiated, and various witnesses have stated that in the minds of many at Pearl Harbor, it amounted to the cry of "wolf". State anything which you recall bearing upon that aspect; any discussion which you recall concerning the phrasing of those various dispatches, and whether or not consideration was given to putting certain war plans in effect wholly or in part; any discussion concerning the adequacy and correctness of WPL-46 as the tense situation grew in the few weeks prior to 7 December; include also what you can remember concerning Admiral Stark's and Admiral Ingersoll's preoccupations during the few weeks preceding the war, insofar as they seemed to you to affect those officers' mental attitudes.

A. At the outset, I should say that I have available no records from which to refresh my memory. It, therefore, must follow that my present recollection of matters, which happened some three years ago, will probably be incomplete and in error in certain details. In order that a more complete understanding may be had of my relationship with Admiral Stark during the critical pre-Pearl Harbor days, I believe it in order to state the nature of this relationship. I reported for duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in October, 1940. I was assigned to the War Plans Division for purposes of record, but to do special jobs for Admiral Stark. In general, my work consisted in assembling for the Admiral, in brief form, reports on matters he had under advisement. My job carried me into all the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department where my contacts were generally on a personal basis. Where cognizance overlapped between Bureaus or Offices, I endeavored to get the composite picture. I attended all of Admiral Stark's formal conferences and many of his

informal ones. On the other hand, he held many conferences with officials and officers in the Navy Department and with officers of the War Department which I did not attend. About the middle of November, 1940, Admiral Stark informed me that he was going to send me to Manila to take out to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, the revised War Plans which were then being prepared in the War Plans Division. I was told that I would also deliver a copy of the same plan to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. Admiral Stark directed that I keep in close contact with Vice Admiral (then Captain) Turner (who had reported for duty as Director of War Plans about the middle of October, 1940), in order that I would be familiar with the background and considerations upon which these plans were based. This I did. In late November or early December, Captain (then Commander) V. R. Murphy, U. S. Navy, War Plans Officer for the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, arrived in Washington in connection with his official duties. As the revised plans (I think this plan was officially known as Rainbow 3, and I shall refer to it as such hereinafter) were nearing completion, a number of conferences were held by Vice Admiral Turner which were [275] attended by both Captain Murphy and myself. Free and open discussion was held and "background" notes were made by me in the hopes that I might be able to anticipate questions that might be put to me by Admiral Hart upon delivering the plans to him. Captain Murphy's presence at these conferences on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, relieved me of any responsibility with regard to that officer. On 13 December 1940, I left Washington with copies of Rainbow 3 for the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet. I fell in with Captain Murphy in San Pedro and proceeded by air to Pearl Harbor where I was under orders to report to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, for temporary duty. I continued my trip, leaving Pearl Harbor 1 January 1941, arriving Manila 6 January. Almost daily discussions were held with Admiral Hart and his Staff during the next ten days in connection with these plans. I was delayed in Manila awaiting the return of Rear Admiral (then Captain) Purnell from Batavia where he had gone to confer with the Dutch, in order that I might take back to Washington with me the results of his conferences. At Admiral Stark's direction, while in Manila I called on the U. S. High Commissioner, Francis B. Sayre, and General Douglas MacArthur. I acquainted these officials with Admiral Stark's anxiety about the Far East. They, in turn, discussed with complete frankness their own views on the situation. Briefly, the High Commissioner was optimistic and hopeful that hostilities could be avoided. General MacArthur thought war "inevitable". I left Manila about 18 January 1941, arriving in Pearl Harbor a few days later where I reported to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet (Admiral Richardson). Prior to my departure from Manila, I received a dispatch from Admiral Stark directing that I contact Admiral Richardson's prospective relief, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel. I had made many notes while in the East with reference to conditions, personalities, situations, views, etc., etc., and I discussed these matters at a conference, as I recall it now, attended by Admiral J. O. Richardson, Rear Admiral Kimmel, Rear Admiral S. A. Taffinder, Captain W. W. Smith, Captain W. S. De-

Lany, and Commander Murphy. After this conference, Admiral Richardson gave me certain items which he wished me to take up with Admiral Stark. Admiral Kimmel did likewise. Upon my return to Washington, I told Admiral Stark of the shape my notes were in and told him that I would prepare a formal report on the subject of my trip. He directed that I not prepare a formal report but to submit my notes to him informally. This was done. I have a copy of that report among my personal papers at my home in Washington. One item stands out in my mind with reference to my second visit to Pearl Harbor. The day I left Pearl Harbor, I was in a boat with Rear Admiral Kimmel. He directed that I take out my notebook and record substantially as follows: "Tell Admiral Stark that the Army must realize the shortcomings of the air defenses of Pearl Harbor and get busy and do something about them. Tell Admiral Stark further that I'm not going to get obsessed too much with any one item. Everything indicates that the Army and I will get along well together, but we have not yet gotten down to cases, but, in any event, I repeat they must strengthen the air defenses of Pearl Harbor. I expect to take up with the Army the cooperation of Army and Naval aircraft. I want the Army to feel free to use our fields and I would like to have our land-based planes get experience in using the Army facilities." After the attack on Pearl Harbor, I recalled the vigor with which Admiral Kimmel had remarked to me about the inadequacy of the Army's air defenses of Pearl Harbor that day in January, 1941. After my return to Washington, I continued to work on special projects for Admiral Stark. From time to time the Admiral complained that my office was too far distant from him and that he wanted me more available to him. Rearrangement was finally made of office space and in [276] May I was moved up to the "front office." At the same time, I was issued orders by the Bureau of Navigation to report to Admiral Stark for duty as Aide. There was no appreciable difference between the duties that I performed as Aide to Admiral Stark and the ones that I had been performing under my previous set of orders. Among the many things which I did for Admiral Stark, I prepared rough drafts of answers to personal mail which he received from officers in the field, particularly from Admirals Hart and Kimmel. These officers, being at a distance, wrote rather frequently to Admiral Stark. Many of the items which they mentioned in their letters required that contact be made with the various Bureaus and Offices in the Navy Department. This I did. The drafts of the answers to these letters were always placed in Admiral Stark's hands for revision as he thought necessary. These letters took in a wide range of subjects, the general tenor of which had to do with the preparation of the respective Fleets for war. After Admiral Stark had finished revising the drafts of the letters I had prepared for him, they would be put in smooth form and returned to the Admiral for signature. Upon their return to me for mailing, I invariably noticed that he had included something in the way of a postscript to the effect that "Time is short.", "War may come tomorrow or it may not come for months.", "No one knows when the blow will come or from what direction.", etc., etc. Naturally, certain events occurring in the Summer of 1941, of interest to the office, fix themselves in my mind more clearly than do others. Among them, the GREER incident, which

took place, as I recall it, in early September. There had been sinkings of our merchant ships in the Atlantic, notably the **ROBIN MOOR**, and ships under Panamanian registry in which operators in this country had an interest. The building program was under almost daily discussion. The Congress was demanding a report from the Navy Department on the **GREER** incident. Everything possible was being done to put Midway and Wake into operation as effectual staging points for our aircraft to the Far East. Reenforcements and materials were being sent to the Far East. Harbor improvements were undertaken in Guam. The Marines were withdrawn from Shanghai. We were trying to get authority from the Congress to arm the merchant ships. Aid to Great Britain and Russia was under study, etc., etc. The Cabinet change in Japan, which occurred about the middle of October, 1941, created very much of a stir in the office. Everyone sensed that war was not far off. I recall that following that change, a dispatch was sent to the various Fleet Commanders to the effect that the Cabinet changes pointed the fact that war with Japan was a definite possibility. As I recall it, Mr. Kurusu arrived in Washington early in November, 1941, ostensibly on a peace mission. It was known, however, to us that the Japanese were pressing to the southward along the Asiatic mainland. It seemed only a matter of a short time until Japan would be in a position to strike at the Kra Peninsula. Negotiations in Washington with Japan's diplomatic representatives were gradually breaking down. On 27 November 1941, a dispatch was sent to all Fleet Commanders which opened up with a statement more or less reading as follows: "This is a war warning." The dispatch then went on to state that while war might be expected at any point, it seemed more probable that it would take place in an attack on the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula. An earlier dispatch had mentioned Guam as a possible point of attack by Japan. There was discussion, as I recall it, as to whether or not the opening sentence, set forth above, should be included in this dispatch. I recall that Vice Admiral Turner was firmly of the opinion that it should be included; that he felt that the seriousness of the situation warranted this language. To this, Admiral Stark agreed. The wording of that dispatch left a profound impression with me, because I [277] remember the thought flashing across my mind that it was a strong statement to make; that it went the whole way, and that if nothing eventuated, confidence in the Navy Department's estimate in future matters might suffer in consequence. I further recall that when the attack on Pearl Harbor did occur, I felt how correctly Vice Admiral Turner had interpreted events and that his foresight had been of a particularly high order. Three or four days before Pearl Harbor, as I recall it, another dispatch was sent from the Navy Department to the Fleet Commanders to the effect that Japanese diplomatic officials in London, Manila, Hong Kong, etc., had been given orders to destroy all their codes and secret papers. With that, everyone in the office felt that war was a matter of a few days. I have given the above background in order that it may be available in evaluating the answers which I shall give with reference to the questions just put to me. I feel that my relations with Admiral Stark during the period in question were reasonably close. We discussed, from time to time, in the office, in his home, and

elsewhere, the proximity of war. I retain the impression that during the Summer and Fall of 1941, he felt war was "just around the corner". I also retain the impression that he was doing everything in his power to push all matters having to do with getting the Navy ready for war. The hurrying of new construction ships, planes, etc., came under his particular scrutiny. Turning now to specific answers to the questions put: (a) I do not recall the background and the preparation of the War Plan current in 1941 (WPL-46). It must be remembered that I was not then attached to the War Plans Division, and that any knowledge that I might have of such a plan would be only incidental. (b) I know of no discussion concerning the appropriateness of Admiral Kimmel's Contributory Plan, WPL-46. (c) I do not recall any discussions concerning the participations of the Allies which WPL-46 envisaged with reference to the redistribution of British naval forces which might affect the situation in the Pacific. (d) I recall no discussions concerning the adequacy and correctness of WPL-46 as the tension grew in the few weeks prior to 7 December 1941. (e) I do not recall details of discussions with relation to the transfer of detachments from the Pacific to the Atlantic Fleet in 1941, although I do know such discussions were held. (f) I do not recall any discussions or information incident to the Federal Government's action during the summer of 1941 which led to the freezing of Japanese credits. (g) I do not have any knowledge as to the Navy Department's negotiations with the War Department concerning the readiness of the Army to meet its commitments in Hawaii. I do know, however, that those matters were under discussion from time to time. (h) I do not have direct knowledge of any discussions, conferences, or negotiations with the State Department concerning our relations with Japan. Such conversations would come under the purview of the Central Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. (i) I do not recall any discussions or opinions expressed concerning the probability of a Japanese attack on us or the point of attack. I might add that I think that most naval officers thought that war with Japan, if and when it came, would come without formal declaration and very little notice. I retain the impression that the general thought was that Japan would strike either in Guam, the Philippines, or the Kra Peninsula. (j) I do not recall any discussions during 1941 concerning the advisability of continuing to base the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters, particularly as regards the security aspect. (k) I do not recall any discussions or opinion expressed as to Mr. Kurusu's appearance in Washington as a part of the Japanese Embassy. (l) I do not recall any discussions concerning the use of Army troops in the outlying islands (Midway, Wake, etc.) as the situation grew tense in late November. (NOTE: The fact that I do not recall the discussions referred to above does not in any way preclude their having taken place. On the contrary, [278] I know that Admiral Stark was in daily contact with those under whose jurisdiction such discussions would naturally come.) (m) As I look back on it now, I do not believe that so many warnings were issued to the Fleet that these warnings could be regarded as the cry of "wolf". It seems to me that matters got progressively worse during the Summer and Fall of 1941, and that warnings were issued accordingly. I am not insensible, however, to a confused state of opinion that appeared in the public press

from day to day. As a naval officer, I am also not insensible to the fact that "standing by" is very difficult. If officers in the Fleet got the impression that "wolf" was being cried and that the number of warnings being sent were too numerous, the thought I have in the matter is that those in the Navy Department whose job it was to evaluate the situation thought things were rapidly and progressively approaching a serious state. This proved to be the case. (n) As I look back at it now, the entire year of 1941 was devoted wholeheartedly by everyone in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations with whom I came in contact to getting ready for war. Everyone seemed to feel that war was in the immediate offing; that there was little that could be done to stop it. On the other hand, everyone was hopeful that in some manner war could be avoided. By the Fall of 1941, while our position with respect to Japan was growing more tense, it must be remembered that no warlike actions had been taken by Japan against us in the Pacific, whereas in the Atlantic our merchant ships were being sunk and relations with Germany were rapidly approaching the breaking point. In other words, the Atlantic problem was already with us. (o) I do not recall that Admiral Stark and Rear Admiral Ingersoll were preoccupied with any matters aside from those in hand during the few weeks preceding the war. Because of the nature of my duties, I came in closer contact with Admiral Stark than I did with Rear Admiral Ingersoll. However, it is my distinct impression that both of these officers felt that war with Japan and Germany was only a matter of a short time. I retain the decided impression that in the year preceding Pearl Harbor, both of these officers were doing their utmost to strengthen the naval service in every respect against the day when war would become a reality.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 11:45 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[279] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

SUNDAY, APRIL 9, 1944

TWENTY-FOURTH DAY

HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDER AIRCRAFT
SOUTHERN PACIFIC FORCE.

The examination met at 9 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-third day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Record Page 250.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Will you please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, U. S. Navy, Commander Third Amphibious Force, South Pacific Force.

2. Q. Admiral, will you please state the duties you performed during the calendar year 1941.

A. From January 1 to January 30, I was Chief of Staff to Vice Admiral Andrews, then Commander of the Hawaiian Detachment and of the Scouting Force. From January 30 to September 26, I was in command of the U. S. S. MISSISSIPPI. From October 15, I think, until the conclusion of the year, I was director of Naval Intelligence.

3. Q. What were your relations with the Chief of Naval Operations during the time that you were Director of Naval Intelligence?

A. I was head of the Division of Naval Intelligence which was under the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

4. Q. Admiral, this examination is endeavoring to get all testimony available with respect to matters pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Testimony covering radio and other combat intelligence has been obtained, but very little has been recorded concerning matters coming under your cognizance as Director of Naval Intelligence. It is expected that the local situation in Hawaii will be covered by the then District Intelligence Officer and possibly others.

Admiral Kingman is also expected to testify. Will you please state any matters of which you have knowledge and which you believe should be recorded and preserved as pertinent to the attack.

A. At the risk of mentioning basic and earlier matters which might not be pertinent, I should like to sketch out the organization of Naval Intelligence, [280] its relationships within the Department, its activities both in the foreign field and in the domestic field as applicable to the Japanese phase, and the actual events, which, to my recollection, occurred. When I assumed duties as Director of Naval Intelligence, I found that the organization of that office, under the Chief of Naval Operations, was divided into three main branches, with certain subsidiary branches: The Foreign Branch, the Domestic Branch, and the Administrative Branch. The Foreign Branch was headed by Captain W. A. Heard. Within that Branch was the Far East Section headed by Captain A. H. McCollum, assisted by Commander E. Watts and Colonel R. A. Boone of the Marine Corps (all present ranks). Boone now is Intelligence Officer for ComSoPac. Watts is Executive Officer of the APPLACHIAN. McCollum and Watts were Japanese experts by virtue of duty there and subsequent assignment; and Boone was a specialist on China. In the Domestic Intelligence, Captain Kingman—then Captain Waller, date of relief about December 15, I believe, so that Kingman was in charge up to December 7. That contained one division which covered foreign suspects and members of suspected societies, whether foreign or native. Commander Hartwell C. Davis, now Intelligence Officer of the Thirteenth Naval District, was a Japanese expert and was in charge of the Japanese Section. Reverting now to the Foreign Intelligence activities; at the time of my taking over or shortly thereafter, the Japanese-American conversations which had been held intermittently since the preceding Spring, were reopened. A book of radio intelligence was shown to the State Department, the White House, Chief of Naval Operations, Director of Naval Intelligence, Director of War Plans, and the Secretary of Navy, daily or skipping a day if nothing pertinent was at hand. Other sources applicable to Japanese intelligence were the Naval Attaché information, reports of the naval observers, a consul form of Naval Attaché radio direction finder reports, and contacts which the Domestic Branch thought might be of interest to the Foreign Branch in order to complete the picture of Japanese activities. Such information as we obtained, beyond that radio intelligence distribution I have just mentioned, of the nature of basic or static information, was compiled by Naval Intelligence and issued to a wide circulation, including Commanders-in-Chief of Fleets, and in general Flag Officers, as well as to the offices in the Department interested. This information was contained in the monograph on Japan, which was revised from time to time, in papers describing the organization of the Japanese Fleet and Air Force as discovered by observers, notes which were all too inadequate, however, in view of the strict secrecy maintained by the Japanese general O. N. I. reports from Naval Attachés with respect to fortifications, trade connections, and so on, and the characteristics of principal naval officers, as information of their appointment was received and insofar as we had data on them. This basic information was circulated by means of a mechanism set up and functioning for some years. There was

not, however, any mechanism established nor effective for the dissemination of information of the type of combat intelligence, which is to say, the immediate movement of enemy ships, fleets, and forces. I had been concerned for some time, during my tours of sea duty and my regular line contact with intelligence requirements, although I had never in any sense been under the Office of Naval Intelligence, with the lack of organization, both in the Fleet and in the Navy Department, for combat intelligence. This would be, I thought, particularly important in time of war and it was one of my concerns when I became Director of Intelligence, to endeavor to improve that or the framework of it, so as to be better prepared in the Fleet and ashore for the collection and dissemination and analysis of combat intelligence. Such combat intelligence as we received, by means of flash reports and direction finder and otherwise, was compiled and analyzed, but it was not a function of the organization of Naval [287] Intelligence to disseminate this information to the Fleet, but rather to report it to the departmental agencies for such analyses as they cared to make, and for dissemination by them. In pursuance of this, for some months prior to December 7, and, in fact, I think, prior to my arrival, the Japanese Section had prepared, daily, an analysis of the situation of Japanese-American relations and of the movement of Japanese forces insofar as we were aware of them. These daily situation reports were held very secret and their circulation was limited to Chief of Naval Operations and Director of War Plans, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and the head of the Foreign Branch. They were compiled by Commander Watts and checked and issued by Captain McCollum.

NOTE: The examining officer has identified the memoranda mentioned by the witness as being ones now on file in the Far Eastern Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department. The series of memoranda, titled "Japanese Fleet Locations", are classified "Secret" and the file presently available indicates that said memoranda were issued approximately once a week, rather than daily. The series of memoranda titled "United States-Japanese Negotiations" are classified "Secret", are addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, and were issued almost every date. The last of this series bears date of 24 October 1941. The examining officer is advised by officers then on duty in the Far Eastern Section that the written memoranda on this subject were discontinued on 24 October 1941, and that between that date and 7 December 1941, this subject was covered by an oral report each morning by Captain McCollum, the Chief of the Section, to Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Naval Intelligence, who, in turn, reported the information orally to the Chief of Naval Operations.

A. (Continued) I had found that there was a policy in the Department extending, I understood, from War College practices, that Intelligence was responsible only for the collection of information and the supply of data to the operational agencies and was not required to develop, as I believe is the Army practice, the estimate of the situation from the enemy point of view. I felt that the Naval Intelligence, with its experienced personnel in the various fields, could clearly contribute something in an analysis of the enemy or of prospective

enemy intentions; and I consulted Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Operations, who confirmed the Navy practice that Intelligence would supply the data but that the Operational side, and particularly war plans, should make the analysis of enemy intentions. I said, however, that with his permission I would have such an analysis prepared from day to day and periodically summed up, say weekly, and submit it along with our daily situation for such value as might be ascribed to it or derived from it by the Operational agencies. With respect to the relationship of the Director of Naval Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations, contact was usually through the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, but there was every access to the Chief of Operations himself, and, on occasions, when news of importance appeared, particularly toward the end of the period prior to December 7, Captain McCollum would go direct with me, if I were at hand, or alone if not, to Admiral Stark and tell him what news he had and what conclusions he had reached. There was no scheduled conference with the Chief of Naval Operations in which I, as Director of Naval Intelligence, sat, but I had every access to him. I recall at least two occasions, presumably at the end of November and early December, when the information that I brought down as described, along with Captain McCollum, interested the Chief of Operations to the extent of calling in some of his principal subordinates, [282] such as Rear Admiral Turner, Admiral Ingersoll, and perhaps the Director of Communications, to hear the news, and, in brief, to discuss its implications, but I do not recall that at those or any other meetings which I attended, there was discussion of measures to be taken or information to be sent out. On the latter point, however, I may mention, at the risk of momentarily going too far ahead chronologically, that early on the morning of December 7, at such a meeting as I have described, Admiral Stark decided at once as to information which should be sent to Pearl Harbor and departed to consult with General Marshall. Returning to the narrative of events as seen from the Office of Naval Intelligence viewpoint, we had of course followed the development of the very critical stage of the negotiations as evidenced by our information from the State Department and otherwise of diplomatic notes which had been exchanged. We noted a stalemate apparently between the Japanese and American viewpoints; Kurusu's arrival in mid-November, I believe; the United States' statement of policy about November 25; and we learned later, although I do not know that we were specifically informed, as to the war warning which was sent out to the Fleet in late November. With regard to the information we had of the development of the crisis, aside from these dispatches, we had noted the Japanese agreement with Indo-China for the introduction of a minimum of troops; we had noted the apparent violation of that agreement by the introduction of many more troops, and their apparent movement toward the China border, and had concluded that Japan was about to attack China from the South. Later, we had news of the sighting of a transport convoy just off the Central Chinese Coast, the evidence of movements into lower Indo-China, the lack of evidence of enemy movement in the vicinity of the Philippines, reports of the concentration of transport troops in Cam-rank Bay, indications of the radio silence of some, if not all, of the main Fleet, and the consequent doubt as to their location. We had

come to the conclusion that the occupation of southwestern coast of Indo-China, Kampot, and possibly Bangkok, or lower Siam on the Malay Peninsula, was the immediate objective of the Japanese. I had understood, from a source which I do not recall, that there was a tentative agreement that the American and British would consider any movement beyond certain geographical limits in Southeast Asia as a *casus belli* for England and as a matter of grave concern for the United States. These limits, as I recall, were 100 degrees longitude and 10 degrees North latitude. At that time, in our fortnightly summary of international news, issue of December 1, which was intended rather as current information than as specific war warnings, since that was the function of the operational side of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, we had put in a note to the following effect: "Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are under way for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and Northern China coast ports headed South, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the South appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date, this task force, under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the combined air force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers. The equipment being carried South is a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable number. Activity in the Mandates under naval control consists not only of large reenforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions, but also of construction material with [283] yard workmen, engineers, etc." This bulletin was sent, in the same manner as the basic reports I have mentioned, to a fairly wide distribution, including all Flag Officers Afloat. It was sent out by air mail December 1. I do not know the actual date of its receipt in distant portions of the Fleet, and I do not recall that I checked. It was intended, as I stated, as a compendium of current intelligence information. Either this specific text, or the information contained in it, was discussed with Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner, either individually or both together, I forget. I believe, however, together, in Admiral Stark's office. Admiral Turner was of the opinion, although there were no specific evidences, that the Japanese would launch an attack on the Philippines coincident with or shortly thereafter their indicated activities to the southward. I did not draw a direct conclusion to that effect but believed it possible. Admiral Turner's opinion was obviously correct. This item was the product of Captain McCollum and the Japanese Section and was included in the entire bulletin, which covered other items of current naval interest. I believe that a full set of the daily situation reports as rendered to the offices I mentioned, plus of course a file of the bi-weekly

bulletins, will be available in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and if not in the general files the bulletins can be located in the Japanese Section. In the latter days, we received several reports of evidences of Japanese burning codes in Hawaii, notably, and also, as I recall, in Southeast Asia. We had some indication that instructions had been sent out to Japanese official agencies in Allied capitol and ports to destroy their codes. We presumed that this related to diplomatic codes and indicated the imminent severance of diplomatic relations, with the possible reaction of the seizure of the physical properties of the Japanese posts in the Allied countries. Mindful that there might be further implications of possible offensive action coincident with or following the breakage of diplomatic relations, we prepared a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, and the Commandants of the Naval Districts at Hawaii and the Philippines, stating that such instructions had been given Japanese agencies. This dispatch was referred to and released by Admiral Ingersoll on December 3. This actual intention was followed by physical evidences, such as I have mentioned, of unusual smoke from one or more Japanese agencies, particularly at that in Honolulu.

5. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch, which is Exhibit 11 before this examination. Can you identify this dispatch?

A. I remember this dispatch as the one I just mentioned.

6. Q. Will you please proceed, sir.

A. Returning now to the question of domestic intelligence, our office in the section devoted to foreign nationalities—I think we called it the “Counter-Espionage Section”—attempted to develop charts indicating the ramifications of all seditious organizations and societies, whether foreign-born, of foreign extraction, or even purely American. Perhaps the organization of the Domestic Branch might be mentioned here. In each Naval District, there was a District Intelligence Officer, who was defined as an Aide on the Staff of the Commandant of the District. His administrative control was vested in the Office of Naval Intelligence and his civilian employees were paid through that office, but his command relationships were direct to the Commandant of the District, and, in fact, some District Commandants objected to anything in the nature of instructions emanating from the Office of Naval Intelligence to these District Intelligence Offices. However, these objections did not seriously impair our functions of using these District Intelligence Offices and their organizations of assisting officers and so-called [284] “agents”—really a higher type of detective—in collecting and reporting a vast amount of information on these societies, their activities, the principal and subordinate members, and on the general foreign population as a whole. This, of course, paralleled the Army and F. B. I. organizations, each of which had District offices reporting in to the Central Office. By informal agreement, the major load of Japanese supervision was accorded to the Navy because of our long interest in that field; the then belligerent nationalities to the Army; and subversive American organizations, such as the Communist Party was then thought to be, in the province of F. B. I. There was, however, a constant interchange and close relationship between all three organizations and the data obtained by any was made available to all. In addition, there was a weekly meeting, inspired by Presidential instructions, between Mr. Hoover, General Miles, then

head of M. I. D., and myself, at which we discussed relationships between the several investigatory services and any conflicts of jurisdictional practice that might arise, as well as measures of cooperation both in head offices and in local offices. I mention this conference because I shall allude to it later. The collection of all this data was intended to facilitate laying hands on and sequestering the suspicious characters at such time as the President might declare an emergency or might authorize that action. We understood, from inquiries of Mr. Hoover at these conferences, that the Attorney General, whether on instructions from the President, or not, would not permit any arrests on suspicion, even of aliens, unless authorized by the President, since it was understood to be against the law. In consequence, we ticketed our suspects in three classes, designated by colored cards, which facilitated ready reference in case of need. One type were those actually dangerous; one potentially dangerous; and a third were those suspected but not definitely belonging to either the first two classes. We endeavored to keep a running record of the location of these individuals so that progressively, from the most dangerous class on, we might, if and when authorized, take them into custody. This actual taking into custody was to be performed, and was subsequently performed rapidly and efficiently after December 7, by the F. B. I. and Federal civil authorities, with the assistance as required of the Naval and Military Intelligence Officers, but the civil officials would make the actual arrests and would retain custody of those taken until further arrangements might be made. Among the District Intelligence Officers, there were two whose field was particularly concerned with the Japanese: Commander Ringle, who is now Chief of Staff Officer to Rear Admiral Ainsworth over in Purvis Bay, Assistant District Intelligence Officer at San Pedro, for the West Coast and for Hawaii, Captain Mayfield. The principal Japanese population of the United States was located on the West Coast and Hawaii. A large number of cards of the three classes were at hand as to suspects in these territories. My recollection of the West Coast is entirely indefinite. Of Hawaii, I roughly recall from 300 to 500 in the dangerous class; some 500 in the potentially dangerous; and 2,000 in the general suspect, although Captain Mayfield can check this. Among the dangerous class were the quasi-consuls, who were not fully accredited as such, to my recollection, but had some semi-diplomatic status as assistants to the Consul in Honolulu. Their status was somewhat different from the normal civilian, whether alien or American, in that they were actually agents of foreign governments and hence required, under a recent law, to register, under penalty of criminal prosecution. The District Intelligence Officer, in connection with the local F. B. I. and civil authorities, was greatly concerned with the activities of these quasi-Consuls and recommended to the Commandant that they be prosecuted for failure to comply with the law cited.

[285] In November, the Commandant, taking up this recommendation from the District Intelligence Officer, which was made to him rather than to the Office of Intelligence, as it was a matter of command relationship, recommended to the Department, that these men be immediately prosecuted, but that he understood that despite a similar recommendation of the District Attorney, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had urged the War Department

that their prosecution be withheld in order not to disturb cordial relations between the Japanese and Americans. Admiral Bloch, the Commandant, said that he understood that the Department of Justice had directed the District Attorney not to prosecute the cases, presumably because of the War Department. We were not too happy about this situation and pursued it by further inquiry and finally drafted a letter, which was dispatched by Admiral Ingersoll to Admiral Bloch on December 6, stating that the Secretary of War had recommended that these agents should be warned to register and should be given a limited time to do so on penalty of prosecution on failure. The War Department suggested approximately one month as such a time, on the recommendation of the Commanding General of Hawaiian Department "because of the latter's campaign to enlist the loyalty of persons of Japanese parentage". This letter notes that "further investigation is being made to determine what action has been taken by the Department of Justice on this recommendation of the War Department". Obviously the next day the situation became such as to permit the immediate arrest of all these agents, as well as other suspects. This letter was drafted in the Domestic Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence by Commander Hartwell Davis, to whom I have referred, and his information was obtained through his contacts with the F. B. I. who are under the Department of Justice, who could, and doubtless did, disclose the precise status of the matter at that time. During this critical period, we understood, whether by formal instructions or otherwise, that the State Department and the President were desirous of maintaining cordial relations with the Japanese insofar as practicable and not to give rise to any incident which might impair the success of the current negotiations. Aside from actual arrests of suspects, there were, however, some counter-espionage measures which could be and were taken by the intelligence forces under the District Intelligence Offices, such as limitation of the activities of fishing boats, inspection of radios, a constant observation of dangerous suspects, and of society meetings, with a view to counteract any activities, whether sabotage or otherwise, that might be indicated. There was some fear, how well based I do not recall, that public and particularly naval installations on the West Coast and in Hawaii might be damaged by concerted sabotage at a prearranged signal or time, and particular attention was paid at meetings and by information obtained by agents in conversation and otherwise to detect and counter any such moves. I do not recall that any large scale sabotage organization or plan was ever developed. There were, however, very serious limitations upon our activities. We were not allowed to censor the mail nor were we allowed to obtain copies of dispatches sent by Japanese diplomatic agents. The District Intelligence Officer of Hawaii had sought, both from the Commandant and from United States authority, to obtain copies of such dispatches from the local cable companies, but had been advised by the District Attorney, on instructions, I understand, from Washington, that the law did not permit interference even by Federal authorities with the confidential nature of messages entrusted to common communication carriers. There had been for some time a censorship agreement within the Army and Navy Departments wherein, on emergency when authorized by the President or in war, the censorship of communications outside the limits of the United States would be

divided, in that the Army would censor all mail and the Navy would censor land lines, radio, and cable. Internal land wire was to be the [286] province of the Army and internal mails were not, as I recall, to be censored until later developments might require it. A skeleton organization was erected in both Departments, that in the Navy Department being under Naval Intelligence, with a view to their being able to function at the drop of a hat, and to continue under military control until such time as a Director of Censorship was appointed by the President. This preliminary organization was considerably hampered by difficulties in obtaining funds for offices and telephones and civilian assistants, and by the difficulty of securing sufficient Navy personnel, whether reserve officers or enlisted, in order to build up a nucleus. At any rate, there was no authority for its functioning before December 7, and perhaps the organization is not pertinent. Despite the limitations on obtaining copies of cable messages, the District Intelligence Offices in Hawaii had arranged to tap the long-distance telephone and kept a record of the radio telephone conversations with Japan. As I recall, however, it was only in the last few days before December 7 that this was done. In general, the conversations appeared innocuous and were from civilian sources to supposedly civilian recipients in Japan. There was one very suspicious telephone conversation, however, on the afternoon of December 6, from a doctor in Hawaii to his nephew in Japan, or vice versa, concerning vegetation in Hawaii, mentioning different sorts of flowers and trees, the weather, and mentioning numbers of certain plants, as I recall. This conversation, after translation, was placed on the wire in Hawaii that night but was not received in Naval Intelligence until later on December 7, after the actual attack had occurred. This conversation and the probable contents of the cable dispatches which we had not been allowed to intercept constituted, as I recall, the only important information of any Japanese intelligence activities in Hawaii. Undoubtedly, much was contained in the mails, to which we had no access. There were rumors of unexplained flashing lights and illicit radio stations, but prior to December 7, investigation of most of these reports had disproved them, although of course some may have been correct. With regard to the internal organization of the Intelligence organization as the crisis developed, the normal peacetime routine was the maintenance of a twenty-four hour watch in the Domestic Branch and one in the Foreign Branch, in order that inquiries might be looked up and taken care of and, more particularly, any emergencies arising could be handled immediately, either by contact with other agencies or by notifying me or the Assistant Director, and likewise notifying the watch officer of the Chief of Naval Operations and operational agencies. Some two weeks or ten days before December 7, however, I posted a special twenty-four hour watch in the Japanese Section alone, as well as the one covering the whole Foreign Branch, and, shortly before December 7, set up a watch of the heads of the three Branches and the Assistant Director to be in the office throughout the twenty-four hours, although it was a "sleeping watch." In case of any information received in the Navy Department from Naval Attaches or observers, or elsewhere, it was normally routed by the Communication Division to both the Naval Operations watch officer and to our watch officer, but the latter always

checked with the Operations watch officer to make sure that he had received the same information that was then available to O. N. I. On more important matters, when I was called, I indicated what action appeared desirable at the moment and also inquired whether the message had been reported to Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Stark, directing our watch officers not only to make sure that CNO watch officer had it but that it had actually been transmitted by the latter. On occasion, but rarely, and I do not recall specific incidents, I called up Admiral Ingersoll myself and, once or twice I believe, Admiral Stark, but in general the liaison in the lower levels appeared adequate.

[287] 7. Q. Admiral, would you please develop your statement further to cover information available to the Office of Naval Intelligence with respect to the efficiency and capabilities of the Japanese Naval Air Force, covering also information which was furnished to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and other Commanders in this respect.

A. My recollection is very indefinite. I know that we were aware of the number of Japanese carriers and of the general plane-carrying capacity and characteristics of these ships, and of the general organization of the Japanese air force. I do not recall any specific issue to the Navy nor the recipients thereof on this subject, but I presume that in accordance with the mechanism I have outlined, such information as we obtained was included in the original monograph and subsequently supplied from time to time in the form of the briefs of Naval Attaches' reports and the individual papers which were distributed to the principal commands, including the Commanders-in-Chief of the Fleets. These reports were fragmentary, and perhaps might not have received the attention of a well digested summary brought up to date, which, from time to time, were issued on various subjects. But of the last such summary of Japanese air in general or naval air in particular, I have no recollection. It no doubt can be located in the Japanese Section of the Foreign Branch and in the General Files of O. N. I.

8. Q. Admiral, did your information include the status of training and the preparedness for war of the Japanese naval air force?

A. Very roughly, because of the secrecy of the Japanese training operations and general preparedness.

9. Q. Had any evaluation of this material been made so as to bring out the capabilities of the Japanese naval air force to conduct such an attack as they did conduct on the 7th of December, 1941?

A. I don't know that any specific evaluation of their capabilities had been done although it was well within the concept of any naval officer that carriers and carrier aircraft, if permitted to come within aircraft range, could conduct such an attack. We had, somewhat unwisely, in our general thoughts as naval officers and not as my job as Director of Naval Intelligence, conceived that the aircraft searches made out of Pearl Harbor would be adequate to detect any carrier force before they could achieve a raiding position. Very probably the mere detection of this carrier force would not result in an attack upon it until further decisions were made in Washington, but precautionary measures in the Hawaiian Islands could be taken. Answering your question specifically, I do not know that any definite analysis of the number of planes which might attack Pearl Harbor

or the number of carriers which might participate in such a raid was made.

10. Q. Admiral, do you recall if you, personally, were greatly surprised over the form and power of the surprise attack which did occur on 7 December, when you first heard of it?

A. My recollection is that I was astounded that an attack had gotten in undetected, whether by picking up the ships or by intercepting the planes, by search operations from Pearl Harbor, and I was amazed at the results of the attack, but I do not recall that I was surprised that an attack in such force *could* be made by a Navy of the type that we know the Japs to have. The subsequent information as to the nicety of planning and execution of the air attack surprised me, although I appreciated that with the open avenues for communication I've mentioned, espionage as to our Fleet movements were simple, but I had not appreciated the thoroughness of the Japanese naval planning evidenced.

[288] 11. Q. But do I understand you correctly as not being surprised over the fact that the Japanese did venture a carrier raid?

A. No, sir. I was surprised in the fact of the raid itself but not in the force of the raid as it developed. I was surprised that the Japanese dared to come within presumably certain interception range of our Fleet and over Hawaii-based airplanes, because I fancied that they would expect to be picked up and challenged either before or after the attack, and would be destroyed or suffer severe losses.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer introduced W. A. Steveley, Chief Yeoman (Acting Appointment), U. S. Navy, as reporter, who was duly sworn.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Aubrey W. Fitch, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, serving as Commander Aircraft, South Pacific Force.

2. Q. Were you Vice Admiral Bellinger's predecessor in command of Patrol Wing Two?

A. Yes, sir.

3. Q. Between about what dates were you based in Pearl Harbor in that capacity?

A. In early June, 1940, I relieved Rear Admiral Arthur L. Bristol, in command of Patrol Wing Two, then based at Ford Island, Pearl Harbor. I remained in command of Patrol Wing Two until relieved by Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger in late October, 1940.

4. Q. During that period, did it occur to you that the patrol planes of your command might be called upon to assist, through air reconnaissance, the forces regularly assigned for the defense of Oahu?

A. Yes, sir. I can best bring that out by describing, briefly, what I considered my duties in administering the command that I had at that time. During the Summer and early Fall of 1940, the training of the Wing and our efforts toward the development of the bases at Keehi Lagoon, Kaneohe, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Canton, were directed primarily towards the perfecting of methods for using patrol planes to give early warning of the approach of Japanese forces to Oahu. It was easily demonstrated that with any number of planes that would probably be made available to us, no adequate warning of [289] the approach of a high speed force could be guaranteed from Oahu bases. Therefore, the efforts of all of us were devoted to: (a) Increasing the war effectiveness and endurance of available material and crews; (b) The development of Western island bases and the formulation of plans for their use to provide distant searches in conjunction with planes based at Dutch Harbor; (c) Efforts to obtain a material increase in the size of the Patrol Wing in Hawaii. Off-shore patrol plane searches were instituted as a routine from Pearl Harbor. The search Plans and Orders used were changed at rather frequent intervals by higher authorities. All of these plans were necessarily unsatisfactory compromises, primarily because the personnel, material and bases available were inadequate to provide protection for all possible contingencies. At least partly as a result of this condition, the searches ordered in 1940 varied from short periods of maximum effort to times when the only search consisted of short dawn anti-submarine sweeps in areas where Fleet units expected to operate.

5. Q. Admiral, a hypothetical question based upon not only your aforesaid experience in Hawaiian waters but your very long experience with patrol planes, particularly for reconnaissance purposes: We will say eighty long-range planes available and employed to the limit of endurance of material and personnel over, say, a two weeks period; give me your estimate of the chances which such reconnaissance from Oahu would have had of detecting the attack made by the Japanese of 7 December.

A. We, at that time, if my memory serves me correctly, figured that approximately double that number of planes would be necessary to maintain, for more or less extended periods, an effective search. With eighty planes available whose performance equals or betters the Catalina, under the conditions stated, and searching only the most probable sectors, a search plan could be evolved which could be reasonably expected to be fifty per cent effective in detecting an enemy attack.

6. Q. Admiral, I am aware that in the few weeks preceding 7 December 1941 you were actually stationed at San Diego. While there, and at any time from August, 1941, onward, did it occur to you that there was any great probability or even possibility that the Japanese would venture their carriers in a surprise raid upon Oahu?

A. During the time that I was in command of Patrol Wing Two, that is, from early June, 1940, until late October, 1940, the efforts of the Wing were directed toward being as ready as possible for any possible contingency. Since the only potential enemy in the Pacific was Japan, the general possibility of Japanese attack was naturally the background for this work. At that time, it appeared possible but not immediately probable. In direct answer to the question, in the period

from November, 1940, until immediately before the Japanese attack on Pearl, I was in command of Carrier Division One, based at San Diego, and during this time was concerned primarily with an intensified training program. I do not remember of any occurrence or instance which required an expression of opinion on my part as to the possibility or probability of a Japanese air attack on Hawaii. However, I still felt, knowing what was in the process of development as far as air was concerned in the Hawaiian Islands, that a surprise attack was possible, but I still did not think it probable.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of [290] the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. George VanDeurs; Captain, U. S. Navy; Chief of Staff, Commander Aircraft, South Pacific.

2. Q. Captain, will you please state the duties performed by you in Hawaiian waters during your tour of duty there which preceded 7 December 1941.

A. I commanded a patrol squadron in Patrol Wing Two from June, 1939, until August, 1941. In addition, I performed various additional duties with the Patrol Wing Staff. From some time in October, 1940, until January, 1941, I acted as Chief Staff Officer and Operations Officer for Admiral Bellinger. Shortly after that time, I served as a member of a joint Army-Navy committee convened to consider the problem of air command in the Hawaiian Area. Thereafter, I acted as an aide or assistant to Admiral Bellinger during further protracted discussions on this matter with Army Air Corps representatives. I left the Hawaiian area in August, 1941.

3. Q. Captain, as a part of those joint duties with the U. S. Army representatives, did you participate in the preparation of a full Estimate of the Situation which was dated about 31 March, 1941, and ultimately signed by Admiral Bellinger and by General Martin?

A. Yes, sir.

4. Q. Please give, briefly, your actual participation in that estimate.

A. I, personally, made certain studies and prepared the original draft of that estimate and submitted it to Admiral Bellinger. After some discussion, with both Admiral Bellinger and the Army representative, I prepared the final draft in the form in which it was eventually signed.

5. Q. Then, actually, was the aforesaid estimate very largely your own personal work?

A. Yes, sir, that is correct.

6. Q. In that estimate, in setting forth the Courses of Action open to the Japanese, did a surprise carrier raid in force appear with prominence?

A. As I remember it, it was the most probable course of action in the estimate.

7. Q. Prior to your departure from Pearl Harbor in August, 1941, about how many years' experience had you had in patrol plane organizations?

A. Roughly, about five years in patrol planes.

[291] 8. Q. Captain, in view of your long experience in that type and of your particular duties in Hawaii, as shown by your testimony, I shall ask you a somewhat hypothetical question: Assume about eighty long-range planes available and used for reconnaissance to an extent which approached the endurance of personnel and material over a period of, say, two weeks; under a reconnaissance plan feature only the most probable sectors through which Japanese attack would have been foreseen, please give your estimate of the chances that would have existed for detecting the 7 December, 1941, Japanese carrier raid, prior to their launching their planes.

A. If there were eighty crews trained to Navy standards for overseas work, the planes performance was equal to or better than the PBY, and they were operated as stated in the question, I would estimate the chances of detecting the Jap force prior to their launching on 7 December at about forty per cent.

9. Q. Reverting to your testimony concerning the estimate of the situation of 31 March—From, say, October, 1941, onward, do you recall any opinions which you may have expressed, or even any thoughts which you may not have expressed, as to the probability or even possibility that a Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor would take the form which actually eventuated?

A. I don't remember any such expression of opinion by me after the completion of my work in Pearl. But by the time I had completed my work on that estimate, I was convinced that a surprise carrier attack on Pearl would be one of the opening moves of a Japanese war. I also believed that we would eventually fight a Japanese war.

10. Q. I understand from that, that when you heard of that attack you were in no way in a surprised state of mind?

A. The only surprise was the date.

11. Q. Were you surprised by the power and efficiency which the Japanese naval air showed in the execution of that attack?

A. No, sir, not particularly. Probably because the full extent of the damage only became known to me gradually over a long period of time.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:05 p. m., took a recess until 4:15 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened at Camp Crocodile, Guadalcanal, British Solomon Islands.

Present: The examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

[292] No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twenty-fourth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 4:20 p. m., adjourned until 8:15 a. m., tomorrow.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

MONDAY, APRIL 10, 1944

TWENTY-FIFTH DAY

HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDER AIRCRAFT,
SOUTHERN PACIFIC FORCE.

The examination met at 8:15 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-fourth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Vice Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twenty-fourth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Captain George VanDeurs, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twenty-fourth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examination then, at 8:20 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[293] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 12, 1944

TWENTY-SIXTH DAY

HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC
AREA AND SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE.

The examination met at 2:15 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the twenty-fifth day of the examination until such
time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed
with the examination.No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface
to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. William F. Halsey, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commanding South
Pacific Force and South Pacific Area and Third Fleet.

2. Q. Sir, what duties were you performing on 7 December 1941?

A. I was Commander Aircraft Battle Force and Commander Task
Force Two.3. Q. Sir, how long had you been attached to the Pacific Fleet and
in what capacity during 1941?A. During the entire year of 1941, I was in the Pacific Fleet as
Comairbatfor. I assumed that command in June, 1940.4. Q. Sir, will you state, in general terms and as best you can recall,
the periods during which you were in Pearl Harbor between the
middle of October and the 7th of December, 1941.A. I should say one-third of the time. I was at sea approximately
two-thirds of the time. Prior to November 28, 1941, we had been
in port for a normal period. When I left with my task force that
morning, I did not let anyone know where we were going until we
were clear of the harbor. At this point, I peeled off the battleships
and destroyers that were not to accompany us. I went off to the
westward and sent them off to the southward and eastward.5. Q. Sir, on what date did you leave Pearl Harbor prior to De-
cember 7?

A. The last date I left prior to December 7 was 28th of November.

6. Q. Admiral, how would you describe your relations with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the latter half of 1941 with regard to the frequency with which he consulted you and other senior officers of the Fleet; the consideration that he gave to the advice that you and other Flag officers gave him in formulating his decisions?

[294] A. On return from sea, I would usually fly into port from my carrier Flagship and report immediately to Admiral Kimmel's office. We would have long discussions on the events that had taken place during the period at sea, and he, in turn, would tell me what happened in Pearl, the messages that he had received, the efforts he had been making to straighten out the personnel and materiel situation, what he was doing to try to instill cordial relations with the Army, his personal relations with General Short, and other members of the Army forces. I do not remember whether he held any actual conferences at that time. There were always a number of Flag officers in his office and we had a free and open discussion. As far as I know, I was kept absolutely au courant on everything that was going on. My advice was asked and in some cases it was taken and in some cases it was not. This merely represented a normal difference of judgment between two people. I saw Admiral Kimmel very frequently in a private way. We were close personal friends. I talked to him on these occasions probably more freely than at any other time. Our personal and official relations were extremely close.

7. Q. Sir, were his conferences with you mainly along the lines of tactical exercises and training of the Fleet, or did they touch on such questions as the security of the Fleet when in port?

A. All subjects. The principal worries at that time were the materiel conditions, the very heavy turn-over in personnel, the question of balancing security against training and how far he could afford to let his trained men go and still have his Fleet ready for instant action. He was constantly going over in his mind how far this should go. I know that he was very much against the transfer of so many trained men and the influx of so many recruits under the conditions that faced us.

8. Q. During the latter half of 1941, what did you consider the primary mission of the Pacific Fleet?

A. To prepare for war against Japan.

9. Q. Do you feel that Admiral Kimmel was of like opinion, that he considered that the primary mission of the Fleet?

A. Absolutely.

10. Q. What were the primary tasks assigned in the War Plans then extant to the Pacific Fleet?

A. I have forgotten the details. The War Plans directed a raid on the Marshall Islands and we played it on the game board before the war. Curiously enough, my first offensive action, after the start of the war, was the bombing of Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands. This had been proved impossible on the game board.

11. Q. Admiral, what was the condition of personnel of the Fleet during the latter part of 1941 as regards their experience?

A. It was a little bit less experienced than one normally has in peace times, because of the fact there was a great deal of new construction going on and we were required to transfer a large number of key personnel to man this new construction.

12. Q. Was much emphasis placed on the training of the Fleet at that time?

A. The Fleet spent approximately two-thirds of its time at sea and during this time we were running under war conditions as regards darkened ship, anti-submarine protection, and so forth. The whole period of ten days at [295] sea was spent in training of personnel in combat duties and the perfection of inter-type tactics.

13. Q. Did you feel that the training of the Fleet was emphasized to an extent that preparedness to carry out war tasks was relegated somewhat to the background?

A. You cannot carry out your war tasks unless your men were trained to fight. In your training, you serve a double purpose: You make fighters out of green men and you add security to your Fleet.

14. Q. In the training schedules, was it your impression that the programs were directly contributory to training for the initial war tasks which might face the fleet?

A. Absolutely.

15. Q. Sir, in general terms, would you tell what transfers of units of the Fleet were made from the Pacific Fleet to other areas during the latter part of 1941?

A. There were three battleships, one carrier out of the four we had, and a number of cruisers and destroyers, the exact number I do not remember. This produced a decided weakening of the Pacific Fleet and left it, according to my recollection, less strength than the Japanese Fleet.

16. Q. Did you feel that these transfers incapacitated the Pacific Fleet for carrying out the tasks assigned to it in the war plans?

A. I felt that it militated against our chances of success in carrying out these plans.

17. Q. Sir, do you know what Admiral Kimmel's reaction was to the transfer of these units of his Fleet?

A. I remember very distinctly that he was very much against the transfer; he deplored it.

18. Q. Do you recall what steps he took to call that to the attention of higher authority?

A. I am not certain on that, but, as I remember it, there was an exchange of rather heated dispatches on the subject.

Note: Upon his return to Washington, the examining officer caused a search to be made of the files of dispatches between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the year 1941, in the Office of the Director of Naval Communications, Navy Department, and was unable to find any dispatches fitting this description.

19. Q. During 1941, what was your estimate as to the suitability of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor rather than on the West Coast of the United States?

A. Based on the fact that I thought that the Japs would strike without declaration of war, I thought the closer we had the Fleet to the Japanese the better off we were. I believed that Pearl Harbor was the second best place and Manila the first place.

20. Q. Sir, do you know what Admiral Kimmel's estimate was along those lines as to the wisdom of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor?

A. No, I do not remember. I knew there had been some discussion about Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel's point of view on the subject. I've forgotten the exact status of it.

21. Q. Did you ever recommend to Admiral Kimmel that the Fleet be moved to Manila as you suggested in your previous answer?

A. I do not remember so doing.

[296] 22. Q. Do you recall, from your close association with Admiral Kimmel, whether or not he was so much preoccupied in his daily problems of training, keeping up materiel, that he did not give sufficient thought to the international situation, the possible imminence of hostilities, and was thus preoccupied about the wrong things?

A. I distinctly know that the international situation was constantly before us and constantly being discussed, as were the probabilities or possibilities of an attack. There was a continuous flow of messages from many sources which might be called "wolf" messages. There were many of these and, like everything else that's given in superabundance, the senses tended to be dulled, but the possibilities of the international situation were constantly before our minds during our working hours.

23. Q. Sir, I hand you a copy of a dispatch dated 16 October 1941, which is Exhibit 6 before this examination. Do you recall the approximate time that you first saw this dispatch?

A. I believe I saw this dispatch soon after its receipt.

24. Q. Do you recall any conferences that Admiral Kimmel had with his Staff or with Army officials at which you were present at which this dispatch was discussed?

A. I am sure that I, personally, discussed the dispatch with him and members of his Staff, but I can not be sure of any general conference on the subject.

25. Q. Sir, at that time, what was your interception of the wording "preparatory deployments" in this dispatch?

A. I believe that was taken up and it was decided that the task forces at sea and in port were acting in a preparatory deployment, ready to go in case the order was given. Submarines were sent to the Far East, as were B-17's. This took away a lot of our attack force from Hawaii. Submarine patrols were established at Midway and Wake, and again the question of air fields on Midway and Wake was brought prominently forward. The question of placing combatant planes in both Midway and Wake was brought to the front. The only planes available for use in Midway and Wake were sent; that is patrol planes. This further weakened the reconnaissance from Hawaii.

26. Q. Admiral, in your own estimation, insofar as you can recall, were those the proper measures and dispositions for the Commander-in-Chief to take in consequence of that dispatch of 16 October?

A. Yes. In addition to that, a great effort, I remember very distinctly, was made to get ground armament to the outlying islands. Guns and ammunition were taken, on Admiral Kimmel's own initiative, and placed in these islands. Just where they came from, I've forgotten at this moment. I remember there was a great deal of talk about that and the question of authority for placing them in the outlying islands. Admiral Kimmel took the authority and placed them.

27. Q. Do you recall that some weeks elapsed between the dispatch of 16 October and any further dispatches of a warning nature?

A. I believe so. This particular dispatch, I remember, was taken very seriously by everybody—the war warning—and, to the best of my recollection, it was some time before we began to be bombarded with dispatches.

28. Q. During that period of some weeks, did it occur to you that you had a right to expect something further from the Navy Department indicating whether they wished the preparatory deployments continued or that they should really rescind that directive?

A. As I remember, that very point was discussed time and time again, and [297] the point was also brought up that they should give us more information or rescind the directive.

29. Q. Sir, I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, and other addresses, dated 24 November, 1941, which is Exhibit 7 before this examination. Do you recall when you first saw that dispatch?

A. I believe I saw this dispatch very shortly after its receipt and it caused a tremendous amount of figuring on where the Japs were likely to strike. Because of Guam and Philippines being mentioned in the dispatch, we probably thought more along those lines than of a surprise attack on Hawaii.

30. Q. Admiral, did you feel that this dispatch, in effect, continued the directive of the previous dispatch in regard to deployments?

A. That is a very difficult question to answer. I would say that we felt, during this whole period, that we were subject to imminent war, and that the measure that had already been taken was sufficient at that time, with the means at hand.

31. Q. Sir, do you recall being present at any conferences that Admiral Kimmel or members of his Staff had with their opposite numbers of the Army after the receipt of this dispatch or at which this dispatch was discussed?

A. There was one conference that I recall very well. That happened on the 27th day of November. I believe there were preliminary ones before that conference and that it came to a head that day. The decision was made to send fighting planes to Wake. The field was just then ready for use.

32. Q. Sir, I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, dated 27 November, which is Exhibit 8 before this examination. Do you recall when you first saw that dispatch?

A. I probably saw this dispatch at the conference that took place on the morning of the 27th of November. I might add that I was with Admiral Kimmel from about nine o'clock that morning until about six o'clock that evening.

33. Q. Sir, at that time, what was your interpretation of the sentence in this dispatch which reads to the effect that certain deployments were to be carried out?

A. I'm afraid at that particular time I didn't give much thought to that sentence. I had a very precise task given me to carry fighter planes for the defense of Wake Island, where the air field was just about ready. There was a discussion in which General Short, General Martin, and some other Army officers, and Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Brown, Admiral Bellinger, and possibly some more, and I took part. It centered

on what planes should be used for this purpose. I remember very distinctly General Martin proposing that we use some of the old combatant Army planes because those were the ones we could afford best to lose. General Short countered with the proposition that if we are going up against the Japanese we wanted the best we had instead of the worst and we would use the best Army planes. I then brought out the fact that I had been informed that the Army was not allowed to fly their pursuit planes farther than fifteen miles from the coast for reasons of security of personnel. General Martin stated this was a fact and immediately, because of that and their lack of experience of flying over water, it was decided to send either Navy or Marine planes. The Marine planes were finally selected and for security reasons it was necessary to get those planes on board the ENTERPRISE at sea the next day without anyone knowing where they [298] were going. This required a tremendous amount of planning and subterfuge before we hit on a scheme for flying these people aboard. We told them they were going out for two or three days' maneuvers. At the same time, to show the Army that it was possible to fly Army fighter planes off carriers, it was arranged to take two Army fighter planes aboard from the dock and fly them off at sea to land in Honolulu. This again required much planning so as not to excite people and break the security. We worked over this until about six o'clock in the evening before plans were completed. We sailed the next morning. I was probably too fully occupied that day to think much about that sentence.

34. Q. Do you recall that the Army participation in outlying island defense was the subject of a dispatch of 27 November, other than the one before you?

A. I recall there had been some discussion of Army units going to outlying bases and that Admiral Kimmel had looked on outlying bases as part of the Fleet, and, for that reason, he wished to confine the forces ashore to Marines and naval personnel, insofar as practicable. It soon became evident that such a process could not be carried out and certain bases, according to my recollection, were finally picked out to be garrisoned by Army forces.

35. Q. Admiral, do you feel that the dispatching of Marine planes to Wake was a consequence of this dispatch that you have had before you or had that been decided before the dispatch arrived?

A. I believe it was precipitated by this dispatch and the fact that the air fields were just ready at that time. In other words, it was a hurry-up move. One more reason for that was the fact that my task force was due to proceed to sea on the 28th of November and in order not to violate security, they wanted to make it appear a perfectly natural move.

36. Q. In other words, under the published employment schedules, you were due to go out on the 28th?

A. Exactly.

37. Q. Sir, on the mission to Wake Island, what were your orders in the event of sighting Japanese forces?

A. I believe I got the finest orders that were ever given to a man. I waited until the conference was over and I asked Admiral Kimmel, "How far do you want me to go?" He said, "Use your common sense."

38. Q. Admiral, had you discussed with Admiral Kimmel the matter of safety of the outlying islands, Wake, Midway, Johnston, and so forth, in the event of war with Japan?

A. Many times.

39. Q. Would you please state his feelings in the matter. Was he seriously concerned therewith?

A. He was very seriously concerned over the matter. He felt the personnel and materiel was entirely inadequate for the task imposed. Very shortly before, say, sometime in the early Fall, General Price of the Marines, who was at that time in command of the Marines on the West Coast, I think, which included the Hawaiian Department, came out. Admiral Kimmel, in my presence, asked him to make a very thorough study of the defenses of Midway and Wake while he was there; told him about his grave doubts as to our ability to defend them with what we had; and asked for his advice and assistance on anything that could be done to improve the defenses. He stressed, particularly, that it must be done with what we had or what we might take from the common pool. It was a constant source of worry.

[299] 40. Q. Do you recall any plans that Admiral Kimmel had for using Fleet units in the event of hostilities to aid in the protection of these islands?

A. I do not recall any plans but I am quite certain that he would not have split his Fleet and let it be taken in detail by sending a portion out to a given island. He might have sent the whole Fleet out. I say "the whole Fleet"; I mean a sufficient task force.

41. Q. As regards our commitment of considerable forces, including troops and planes on Wake, do you recall any disagreement between Admiral Kimmel and the Navy Department?

A. The Navy Department had specified a certain garrison of troops for Wake and I believe Admiral Kimmel enlarged the garrison out there, strengthened the garrison, without authority from the Navy Department. I also believe that the placing of the twelve Marine fighter planes was done on his own initiative.

42. Q. Admiral, reverting to the wording of the dispatch of 27 November, do you recall your own reaction when you read the words "war warning"?

A. I remember very distinctly my reactions to that whole day. I was very serious about it and probably shaking a little bit. I felt that we were going to be in a fight before I got back to Pearl. The words "war warning" probably had some effect on my feelings.

43. Q. Did you have time, on that day, for any thought concerning the security of Oahu, Pearl Harbor, and so forth?

A. No, sir, I was entirely surrounded by thoughts of my own task force, getting out without people knowing what I was doing.

44. Q. As regards your own task force, upon putting to sea, did you institute any security measures advanced over those which had been in effect while at sea for some time previously?

A. Immediately on clearing the channel, I diverted the battleships, three in number, cruisers and destroyers, under Admirals Draemel and Kidd, and told them to carry out exercises in a certain area. I then headed West with the remainder of my task force. As soon as we were out of sight of the remainder of the task force, I sent a signal

to put war heads in all torpedoes; to regard any submarine seen as hostile and sink it; armed the planes with bombs; gave orders to shoot down any plane seen in the air that was not known to be one of our own. We went into Condition 3, as I remember it, and kept that the entire way out until we got close to Wake and then I went into Condition 2. In other words, I tried to make full preparations for combat. I also ordered ready ammunition for all guns. I might add one other thing. I carried out morning and afternoon searches to three hundred miles, as I remember it, for any sign of hostile shipping. I kept a combat patrol over the ships at certain times.

45. Q. Admiral, referring back to your answer a few minutes ago, that you felt that on 27 November the United States and Japan would be at war before you returned from your mission to Wake, did you have an opportunity to communicate that feeling to Admiral Kimmel, and, if so, do you recall his reaction to your expressions?

A. I did not intend to convey the idea that I thought they would be at war before I got back, but I felt that there was a very grave possibility that I might be attacked or attack before I returned. I thought it might precipitate war.

46. Q. Did you have an opportunity to express that opinion to Admiral Kimmel before you sailed?

[300] A. Insomuch as I asked him how far I should go, I think I expressed my opinion.

47. Q. Did he give his reaction to your expression?

A. It was perfectly understood by me when he told me to use my common sense.

48. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, and other addressees, dated 3 December, which is Exhibit 11 before this examination. Did you have any information of the receipt of this before December 7?

A. I did not see it.

49. Q. Admiral, I'll ask you a hypothetical question. If you had seen this dispatch on 3 December, what would have been your reaction to it?

A. It would have been cumulative information that had been progressing for months that we were about to have a fight.

50. Q. Would this dispatch have indicated to you that the beginning of hostilities was extremely imminent?

A. Not necessarily, in view of all the other dispatches that had been coming in and the various personal letters, O. N. I. Bulletins, and various things.

51. Q. Admiral, after you sailed with your task force on November 28, 1941, did you receive from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or higher authority, any additional warnings or instructions with respect to the security of your task force or similar directive?

A. I did not. I considered that Admiral Kimmel had faith in what I was doing and he didn't consider any further instructions than the ones he had given me were necessary.

52. Q. Did you receive, officially, any additional information with respect to the international situation or other intelligence?

A. Nothing official that I recall. However, we were naturally reading the press and we had some garbled message about the Japanese Fleet being near Palau. That came, as I remember it, in a press dispatch.

53. Q. Sir, in addition to these warning dispatches that were received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, what other sources of information did he have as regards the possibilities of a surprise attack, or the movement of Japanese vessels, or the general international situation, that would cause him to feel concern for the safety of his Fleet in Pearl Harbor?

A. Everyone that came through Honolulu of any importance from the Far East was always interviewed by Admiral Kimmel or some of his Staff, usually by Admiral Kimmel, himself. There were letters being passed back and forth at all times between Washington and Admiral Kimmel, and it is my impression that there were certain O. N. I. and intelligence information coming out. Just how that arrived, I'm not quite sure, whether it came in dispatch form, or not.

54. Q. Sir, did you feel, at that time, that the sum total of the Commander-in-Chief's intelligence reports was at all adequate? In other words, did you feel that the Commander-in-Chief was fairly well informed as to what the Japs were doing or did you feel that you were operating in the dark there?

A. I did not feel that we were well informed on what the Japs were doing and I felt that we were operating in the dark. I had the personal feeling, entirely personal, that they knew a lot more in Washington than we knew out there and that we should have been informed.

[301] 55. Q. Do you recall any discussions that you had with the Commander-in-Chief along that line, whether any steps were being taken to improve the situation?

A. I recall, vaguely, discussions along that line and damning them for not letting us in on the information. I believe Admiral Kimmel said he would demand or had demanded that they give him more information.

56. Q. Sir, in your discussions with the Commander-in-Chief and members of his Staff, do you recall that any particular consideration was given to the recent history of the Axis Powers of indulging in surprise attacks?

A. We, of course, were all cognizant of the Jap's attack on the Chinese and again on the Russians, and we felt sure that they would pull something like that, but we thought it would take place in the Far East rather than Honolulu, except by submarines, which was the gist of the conversation. We underestimated their ability to operate carriers, or we did not give it enough consideration.

57. Q. Do you recall, personally, being particularly impressed by what you had heard of Yamamoto's characteristics?

A. Yes, I remember we credited him with being probably a very good fighter and having a great dislike for the Americans.

58. Q. Did you know, at the time, of his long connection with the Japanese naval air build-up?

A. Yes, I believe I did. I'm not sure.

59. Q. Sir, what was your estimate, during the three months preceding 7 December 1941, as to the probability or possibility of a surprise attack by the Japanese on the Fleet based at Pearl Harbor?

A. My estimate was that they would probably attack by subs off Pearl Harbor and throw the weight of their main attack into the Philippines or down the South Coast of China towards Malaya.

60. Q. Sir, can you amplify that just a bit, going into the reasons behind that estimate or the considerations upon which that estimate was based?

A. It was based on the fact that they had a strong Army near at home, that they needed oil, they probably needed rubber, that these were close aboard where they could easily exploit them and they could exploit any attack that they made. That they could not, thank God, or did not, exploit a successful attack on Pearl.

61. Q. Did you know at that time whether or not Admiral Kimmel's own estimate was similar to yours?

A. I believe that was the general feeling amongst nearly every one there.

62. Q. Was this a subject of frequent discussion among members of his Staff and the Flag officers of the Fleet?

A. It was a subject of discussion by all hands around there.

63. Q. In addition to the answers that you have made to the last three questions, can you give any other reasons why the senior officers in Pearl Harbor were not more apprehensive of a surprise air attack there? The particular significance lies in a Joint Estimate by Army and Navy Air Officers made back in March, 1941.

[302] A. The question of an air attack on Pearl was always at the forefront of everybody's mind. I merely say, in my own personal opinion, I did not think an air attack was coming. I thought it would be a submarine attack. There was constant drilling in air defense and tracking, both day and night, in port and at sea. If it was in port, all types of Navy and Army planes were flown over the Fleet for recognition purposes. Attacks were sent in against Pearl from carriers a hundred or hundred and fifty miles at sea, for purposes of drill and anti-aircraft defense. Sleeve and drone firing, of course, was always taking place. There were constant drills with such radars as we had at that time in tracking planes. We had no means of determining the altitude of a plane from radar in those days. I, personally, used a squadron of planes, flying them from a carrier, a distance of a hundred miles on one air level, bring them up a thousand feet, and fly them back. I did that from 1,000 feet to 20,000 feet to see if they could determine some method of finding their altitude. We finally did get a very rough method. Using curves, we could pick out the plane's altitude, but that was predicated on the fact that he was flying at the same level. It was very rough. The point I'm trying to bring out is that we were all very conscious that we were going to be attacked, either at sea or in port, and constant drills were held day and night on account of this. I felt that with the radar protection we had, that any attack coming in would probably be picked up. As we all know, it was picked up and did not get to the proper authorities.

64. Q. Prior to your going to sea on 28 November, were you particularly in touch with the state of development and efficiency of the Army's radar system?

A. We were a bit perturbed about the Army radar equipment because, at that time, there had been a very close cooperation and almost unity of command between the Army and the Navy. This was insisted upon by Admiral Kimmel, and we felt that possibly they weren't using the best methods in plotting radar. We had had a great deal

more experience with it than the Army. I discussed it with Admiral Kimmel and I believe it was at his direction that I sent my communication officer, who, at that time and still is, one of the best radar practical men—not a technician—we have in the Fleet, to work with the Army. Again, to the best of my recollection, he made some very valuable suggestions which were adopted.

65. Q. Did he happen to report to you that the Army was very backward in their preparations with radar?

A. He did.

66. Q. Do you recall that estimate, mentioned just previously, having been the subject of discussion between senior officers at any time during the months preceding 7 December (the Army and Navy Air Estimate of March 30, '41)?

A. My recollection is poor on that subject, but I feel quite certain that it was discussed.

67. Q. Admiral, in answer to an earlier question, mention was made of the employment schedules of units of the Fleet based at Pearl Harbor. Do you recall approximately how often those were published and disseminated?

A. I'm not sure whether it was monthly or quarterly; quarterly, I think.

68. Q. Do you recall the classification that was given to these schedules and how wide a distribution was made?

A. No, but it had a fairly wide distribution until the word went around that people were talking too much in Honolulu. Again my recollection is a little faulty, but I think one or two officers were threatened with court martials because their wives knew too damn much.

[305] 59. Q. Was the distribution limited after that situation was brought to light?

A. I think so, very decidedly. I remember, very distinctly, Admiral Kimmel got out a very strong letter or order on the subject, and after that things tautened up very considerably.

70. Q. What was your own reaction to the wisdom of publishing and giving fairly wide circulation to these employment schedules?

A. I never had any particular reaction to it. I never trusted, and do not today trust, any of the people of Japanese descent who are in the Hawaiian Islands. Anyone from anywheres in the neighborhood of Honolulu can see the Fleet coming in and going out. By using a little deduction, they could figure out what was going on. I don't think these employment schedules had very much to do with it. As a matter of fact, both sides of the entrance to Pearl Harbor were lined with Japanese every time we went in and out. I say "lined", there were a few of them always playing around.

71. Q. Sir, do you know whether any consideration was ever given to the point that the publication of the employment schedules would give notice quite far in advance of the presence of units in Pearl Harbor which might be of great value to the enemy?

A. They undoubtedly would, but I had not given that any consideration at that time.

72. Q. During the few days in late November, while your task force was in Pearl Harbor, do you recall any conversation or did you give any thought yourself toward a departure from the scheduled employ-

ment by virtue of which all fleet units would have been out of Pearl Harbor?

A. I do not and I did not.

73. Q. Admiral, upon what branch of the Armed Services of the United States did the primary responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor rest?

A. The Army. However, by direction of Admiral Kimmel, the Commandant of the Fourteenth District was made a semi-task force commander under the Army and controlled the Fleet anti-aircraft batteries and defenses of the Fleet within Pearl. I might add, after reading the order (Exhibit 4), the Commandant of the District exercised this control through the Senior Officer Present Afloat, excluding the Commander-in-Chief.

74. Q. Admiral, during the months immediately preceding 7 December 1941, what was your own estimate as to the ability of the Army to fulfill its commitments to protect Pearl Harbor against air attack?

A. I did not think they had the proper equipment or enough of equipment to defend it.

75. Q. Sir, could you elaborate on that just a bit as to the specific deficiencies that existed at that time?

A. I did not think their anti-aircraft artillery was of the proper calibre or in sufficient quantity to properly protect Pearl Harbor. We were all short of fighting planes, including the carrier-based planes, and Army pursuit planes.

76. Q. What thoughts had you as regards the efficiency of the Army to properly use such equipment as they did have?

A. I had no direct knowledge of their efficiency, but I had seen them, [304] watched them, in other places, and I thought they could use the equipment they had efficiently.

77. Q. You have testified as regards your knowledge of the defensive qualities of the Army radar system. Will you, similarly, cover what within your recollection you estimated the efficiency of the Army pursuit on Oahu?

A. The old time Army pursuit pilots on Oahu were undoubtedly very good. There were a number—and I do not know the exact percentage—of brand new pilots who had just completed basic training and were in Oahu in a semi-training status at that time. These pilots had to be depended upon for part of the defense.

78. Q. Admiral, did the Army have on Oahu anything that resembled what we now know as fighter direction?

A. They were attempting to establish it. I'm a little bit balled up; I don't know whether it happened before or after December 7. I know they were trying to get going. To the best of my recollection, I believe they were attempting to assemble something resembling our fighter direction. We used our planes and carriers to train them.

79. Q. Did you, at the time, consider that the system would have been effective in repelling an attack?

A. Probably not.

80. Q. Admiral, prior to 7 December, what information did you have as to what distance aerial reconnaissance was being carried out around Oahu?

A. I was cognizant of the daily plan for reconnaissance. This came out each day showing sections covered by the Army and sections covered by the Navy and the type of plane that was covering. I was also cognizant of the fact that the search planes available were limited in number, had been run very hard. It became a question, and a very serious question, and occasioned many discussions between Admiral Bellinger and Admiral Kimmel whether they should use a plane continually and keep a full coverage and have them all go to pieces at once, or put out the best partial covering they could and keep the planes in shape so that they could be used in case of necessity. Attempt was made to provide two full crews for each plane and the plane was put on a six-days basis. They ran for six days, no Sundays and holidays were counted, and one day off for upkeep and repair by the crew. The only long-distance Army bombing planes we had were the B-17's, and most of them had been flown out to the Philippines. As a matter of fact, we had practically none left, as I recollect. The other plane the Army was using for reconnaissance was a B-18, which was very slow and very limited in its search area. As a consequence of this, instead of having a perfect 360 degree search that we should have had, the search was limited to certain sectors thought to be most dangerous and a form of rotational search was put in those sections with the planes that were available. The Fleet operating areas were searched daily.

81. Q. Admiral, I hand you Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter, 2CL-41 (Revised), which is Exhibit 4 before this examination. Were you familiar with that in the months preceding 7 December?

A. Yes, sir.

82. Q. Sir, at that time, did you consider this an adequate security plan?

A. I did.

83. Q. Was this plan being fully carried out as stated in the letter immediately prior to your departure on 28 November?

[305] A. To the best of my knowledge, yes.

84. Q. Sir, when your task force was in port, immediately prior to your departure on 28 November, did you feel that your force was reasonably secure in Pearl Harbor?

A. I did.

85. Q. Admiral, what was the location of your task force at the time of the attack on the morning of 7 December?

A. We were returning from Wake and some 150 or 175 miles from the entrance to Pearl.

86. Q. Were your planes still aboard your carrier at that time?

A. No, the planes had been flown off at various positions. First, a scouting flight for sixty degrees, as I remember, on either bow; that was followed up by other planes to return to land at Ford Island. I think we flew them off 200 or 250 miles at sea. I had some planes left on board.

87. Q. What was the first information you received of the Japanese attack?

A. I had left the bridge for the first time since we had departed Pearl Harbor, gone down and taken a nice bath and shave, and was sitting

down to a comfortable breakfast. They brought me a message that read: "AIR RAID. THIS IS NOT A DRILL." My first impression was that my own planes were being attacked because I had sent them in without any notice. I had not broken radio silence since we left Pearl. They tried to persuade me differently and until the second message came in, I didn't believe them.

88. Q. What action did you take upon receipt of those messages; did you make an attempt to communicate with your planes?

A. The planes, I knew, had landed or were landing at that time. There was no necessity for trying to communicate with them. Depending upon where the attack had come from, they were probably better placed at Pearl Harbor than they would be with me for attacking the enemy. My recollection is that I sent a request in that if not needed, my planes be directed to join me.

89. Q. Can you make a statement as to what part the ENTERPRISE planes took in the hostilities on that date?

A. I can give you a very vivid description that was given me by my Flag Secretary, who is an aviator. He was riding in a rear seat with the Group Commander and as they approached Pearl he saw all the anti-aircraft in the air. His first impression was, "My God, the Army has gone crazy, having anti-aircraft drill on Sunday morning." They got in a little bit closer and he said he saw a plane playing around and he thought, "Here's one of these fresh, young Army pilots coming down, playing around, breaking orders." He said just at that time he happened to be looking at the wing and saw a piece of the wing begin to fly off. Just then the plane went by and almost took his head off. He looked up and saw a red ball on it. Then he tried to unlimber his gun and couldn't get it unlimbered. They then went through the damnest amount of anti-aircraft fire and bullet fire that he had ever seen, before or since, and finally got in to the field at Ford Island. Nearly all the ENTERPRISE planes had a similar experience. Some few shot down Jap planes and some few were shot down.

90. Q. Were any of your planes lost, other than by enemy action?

A. Quite a number of them were shot down by our own anti-aircraft fire.

[306] 91. Q. Admiral, was any investigation convened to determine the facts surrounding the shooting down of our own planes by our own gun fire?

A. No investigation, insofar as I know, was called, nor was any necessary. In time of war, you don't have time to go into formal investigation in an affair of that kind, where the reason was so perfectly apparent to anyone. After going through the bombing they had, they were all triggerhappy and shooting at anything that came in.

92. Q. Were you greatly surprised when you learned how ineffective the Army opposition to the attack on 7 December actually was?

A. I don't know if I gave the matter any great consideration, as I was fairly busy from that time on for about six weeks. However, I was always dubious of the ability of anti-aircraft to prevent an attack coming in. It was not until I came down here and saw the effects of the ninety millimeter batteries, when properly handled, and afterwards the effects of the new armament that we have on our ships today, that I believed that anti-aircraft could be effective. I'm convinced

that it is effective now. The talk at that time was principally about the number of planes that had been shot up on the ground, been caught flat-footed, and the good work that the few pilots who got in the air had done. Looking back on it, I probably was surprised at the ineffectiveness of the whole defense.

93. Q. Admiral, while you were last in port, prior to 7 December, or at any time previously, did it occur to you that the Fleet should be protected by anti-torpedo baffles while berthed in Pearl Harbor?

A. It did. I was strongly in favor of having them.

94. Q. Do you recall whether their absence was due to the opposition of any Commander toward having them in the water or was it because of the unavailability of the material?

A. My impression was that it was due, principally, because of the unavailability of the material. There undoubtedly was opposition on the part of some because it certainly slowed down mooring and slowed down the sortie, unmooring.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: One of the most vivid recollections I have of events prior to 7 December 1941 were the unceasing requests by the Commander-in-Chief and his subordinate commanders for personnel and materiel, with very little apparent results. Admiral Kimmel was insistent that there should be the closest cooperation between the Army and Navy. He, personally, spent a great deal of time socially with General Short. In golf, and other forms of exercise, I was present on many occasions when this took place. This enabled them to discuss things in an informal way, and by getting to know each other they were better able to understand the other man's thoughts. At this time, there were many Army officers that went to sea with the task forces to obtain a first-hand knowledge of what the Navy was doing. At the same time, many naval officers went on maneuvers with the Army. There were many training directives issued by the Commander-in-Chief in an effort to [307] make the Fleet a potent force and ready for any emergency which might arise. Ships were shorthanded; trained personnel not available. There was, at this time, a continuing influx of new material into the Fleet which required specialized training for efficient operation. As a result, many training schools were locally established in order to maintain the efficiency of the Fleet. There was a constant effort on the part of the Commander-in-Chief and Commander Aircraft Battle Force to obtain a sufficient number of aircraft to keep the carrier complements continually filled and to permit establishment of training and replacement squadrons. This was not successful. Many requests were also made for the Department to develop new aircraft which was so vitally necessary for carrier operations in the face of possible enemy opposition. I have seen statements that task force organizations were changed radically after the 7th of December, 1941. The task force I took with me to Wake remained practically intact under my command

for six months after that date. The LEXINGTON Task Force, u Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. Navy, was of similar constitu This Force was ferrying fighter planes to Midway, and at se December 7, 1941. From December 7, 1941, until the present Task Forces of the Pacific Fleet are fundamentally the same. A power is given by fast battleships and new cruisers, both sadly lac in the early days.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 5:05 p. m., adjourned until 10 : tomorrow.

[308] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 1944

TWENTY-SEVENTH DAY

HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC
AREA AND SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE.

The examination met at 10 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

The examining officer introduced Peter Urrutia, Chief Yeoman, U. S. Naval Reserve, as reporter, who was duly sworn.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-sixth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Irving H. Mayfield, Captain, U. S. Navy, serving as Chief of Staff to the Deputy Commander, South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year 1941?

A. From March 15, 1941, until the end of the year, I was District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District.

3. Q. Captain, what previous experience had you had in intelligence work?

A. None, except about two weeks temporary duty in Washington prior to proceeding to the Fourteenth Naval District, and something slightly more than two years as Naval Attache in Chile.

4. Q. Will you please state the organization of the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, as you found it upon reporting for duty.

A. Upon reporting for duty, the organization consisted of approximately thirteen persons, of whom two were women, and we occupied office space on the sixth floor of the Young Hotel Building, Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii.

5. Q. Did you at that time consider this force to be adequate for performing the duties prescribed?

A. I did not.

6. Q. Will you please outline developments in the office during your incumbency?

A. About one month after taking charge, I completed a survey of the District from the point of view of intelligence organization and submitted this survey with my recommendations for enlargements and opening of branch offices; other [309] similar details in connection with the organization to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. To the best of my recollection, this report was dated about April 22, 1941.

7. Q. Will you please state what action was taken in this respect; in regard to your recommendation?

A. The Commandant made a report to the Navy Department inclosing my report to him, and recommending certain additions as to personnel and material to be made as soon as practicable, and that thereafter the organization should proceed in an orderly fashion.

8. Q. By the Fall of 1941, had the organization of your Department been improved to the extent that you were satisfied as to its sufficiency?

A. It had not.

9. Q. Was any further action taken, or were recommendations submitted to improve the situation?

A. Constant requests were made for additional personnel and material, principally personnel. It was necessary, at that time, to obtain permission in many instances from the Navy Department before naval reserves actually enrolled for intelligence duties could be ordered to active duty. The procurement quota assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District was far less than the estimated complement, so that many of the personnel for the organization had to come from the mainland; many of the personnel supplied, both from local sources and from the mainland, were totally without training and many without any experience in intelligence work. It was necessary to take the most experienced and use them as instructors. In addition to recruiting and organizing a strictly intelligence organization, I was charged with recruiting, organizing, and training all personnel for radio and cable censorship. It is my considered opinion that the organization did not reach a satisfactory degree of efficiency until some months after December 7, 1941. This was due to consistent accessions of new and untrained personnel who had to be sent to a constantly expanding organization, which at the same time was endeavoring to carry a heavy load of intelligence work. I believe that the exact figures of the space occupied, and personnel of the various ranks and ratings are available in the District Intelligence Office in Honolulu.

10. Q. Captain, will you please tell us of the relations between your Department and the other investigating agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Army Intelligence of Hawaii, during your incumbency as District Intelligence Officer?

A. The three intelligence organizations were very cooperative, and during my entire tour of duty as District Intelligence Officer, the relationship and spirit of cooperation between the three organizations was excellent, the military intelligence, in my opinion, had far more personnel difficulties than Naval Intelligence. They had fewer men, and greater difficulty in expanding. The F. B. I., similarly, was short-handed. The heads of the three organizations met at least once a

week and were consistently exchanging visits between the regular meetings. The agents, both civilian and commissioned, were free to consult with the agents of the other organizations. My files were always open to an agent of either of the other two organizations, and we had no reason to believe that their files were not equally accessible to the men of my organization.

11. Q. Captain, similarly, will you please outline your relations with [310] the Intelligence Organizations of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and the other naval intelligence organization present in Hawaii?

A. The personal relationship between me and the Fleet Intelligence Officer was always cordial and cooperative. I considered it my duty to give every aid and assistance to the Fleet Intelligence Office that he might require. The Intelligence Organization under Commander Rochefort also received from my organization every possible assistance. I supplied him with personnel whenever he desired them, endeavoring to send to him only people, both officers and men, who would suit his needs, and this was done after careful study and selection.

12. Q. Captain, did you have information or indications prior to the launching of the attack that the Japanese contemplated any type of move against the United States in Hawaii?

A. None.

13. Q. The examining officer desires to have in the record information as to the possible sources which may have been used by the Japanese to obtain and to transmit to Japan, or to the Japanese Military and Naval Services, information regarding the Fleet and shore installations in Hawaii. Please state as well as you can remember what information you had prior to the attack, with respect to such sources.

A. It was possible for any person from innumerable points to observe the entrance or departure of any vessel into Honolulu or Pearl Harbor; the Japanese Navy tankers which entered the Port of Honolulu could observe any Fleet operations or arrivals or departures of the Fleet, and officers and crew were frequently entertained by the Consul General of Japan and other Japanese residents in the Island of Oahu. They were not restricted in taking automobile tours to points of interest, or trips around the Island. The road around Pearl Harbor was close to the water line and, at many points, the ships in Pearl Harbor and locations, the state of repair, or any other points of interest could easily be observed from the road. There were many points on slight elevations near Pearl Harbor from which constant observations could have been maintained. There were many points of greater height, at a greater distance from Pearl Harbor, where constant observations with binoculars could have been maintained and photographs taken. The Japanese freight and passenger lines making Honolulu a port of call could easily have brought in material or agents, or could have removed personnel or agents. The only inspections of which I am aware were the customary public health and customs inspections. The Consul General or a member of his Staff could visit these vessels, as could other visitors. The Master of the vessel and his officers were at liberty to call on the Consul General at his office or residence as they desired. I was aware that couriers were passengers on these liners. I know of specific instances which are a matter of record in the files of the District Intelligence Office where parties from

vessels were taken on tours by the Consul General or members of his Staff, but I have no exact knowledge of any individual agent or document that entered Honolulu or left therefrom.

14. Q. Would you please state what you knew at the time of the activities of the Japanese Consul General and his Staff which may have been connected with the obtaining of intelligence and forwarding such information to Japan?

A. It is my belief, which I can not substantiate by actual facts, as the tenseness of the diplomatic situation between the United States and Japan increased that the efforts of the Consulate General to obtain and forward information to Japan increased. There were many Japanese societies and organizations whose reason for existence, at least on the surface, were [311] purely cultural or social. These societies numbered about fifteen hundred. The Japanese Consul General, in my opinion, endeavored to keep in touch with these various societies and Japanese Language schools for the purpose of keeping them tied to Japan as closely as possible. I believe that he did use the consular agents, of which there were some two hundred and fifty in number throughout the Territory. The ostensible use of the consular agents was for the purpose of registering births for the Consul General and the matters concerning citizenship.

15. Q. Were copies of the messages transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General by cable or radio made available to your organization?

A. They were not, until after the visit of Mr. Sarnoff of the Radio Corporation of America. The Japanese Consulate General sent its traffic using the various communication companies alternately. The Mackay Radio Company, according to my recollection, handled the traffic during the month of November; traffic was switched to the Radio Corporation of America as of December 1, 1941. Thereafter, I was able to obtain all of his traffic from R. C. A., but since it was all in code and I had no reading organization, it was necessary to submit this traffic to another organization to be read.

16. Q. Were any of these dispatches read before the attack on 7 December?

A. That I can not answer definitely, since there would be no reason to send me copies of the messages that had been read, unless they had some intelligence value.

17. Q. Captain, did you learn the contents of any of these messages at any time subsequent to the attack?

A. Yes.

18. Q. Will you please state the contents of such messages as you learned them subsequent to the attack?

A. Subsequent to the attack, to the best of my recollection—the first one was received by me on the 11th of December. Considerable information as to plans for reporting dates of arrivals and departures, and, in general, movements of the Fleet and other military forces, were to be made by the Consulate General, and the contents of the dispatches read indicated that certain reports were made. Many of us endeavored to take all these reports and compare them with the actual movements of ships of the Fleet. The reports made in many instances did not correspond with the actual movements, leading me to a possible supposition that they had been made carelessly or else on

observation of agents not very conversant with the types of ships of our Navy.

19. Q. Captain, you have mentioned certain consular agents who were active in Hawaii; do you recall any action that was initiated there to subject these agents to control or prosecution?

A. Yes.

20. Q. Will you please state what transpired in respect thereto.

A. For some years, the Office of the District Intelligence Officer had been collecting data on Japanese consular agents. On organization of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, this information, together with all other information desired by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was given to that organization. The personnel of the District Intelligence Office, prior to 1940, consisted generally of one officer and one chief yeoman. With this small force, the amount of data collected could not be properly studied or [312] even methodically filed. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, with such assistance as my organization was able to give, collected information as to the known existence of approximately two hundred and fifty of these consular agents. It was the desire of the acting U. S. Attorney to prosecute these men as being agents of a foreign government who had failed to register as such. As District Intelligence Officer, I conferred with the Commandant, and with his knowledge and at his direction attended meetings that were held and recommended that some or all of these agents be brought to trial. These meetings were attended, as a rule, by the Acting U. S. Attorney, the Special Agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Honolulu, the head of the Military Intelligence, and myself as the District Intelligence Officer. It was my recommendation that at least a group of perhaps twelve or fifteen be brought to trial. Admiral Bloch, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, made official recommendation to the Navy Department that these consular agents be prosecuted. The Special Agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Acting U. S. Attorney also desired to proceed with the prosecution of these consular agents. The Military Intelligence Officer stated that the Army did not deem it wise to proceed with the prosecution; the main reason given being that at that time they were attempting to proceed with their policy of encouraging and promoting racial harmony, and felt that such a prosecution would be harmful to the policy of racial harmony. The matter was referred to the War Department and I believe to the Department of Justice, though I am not certain of the reference to the Justice Department, and the decision reached in Washington as passed to me by the Acting U. S. Attorney was that prosecution would not be proceeded with because of the objection by the War Department.

21. Q. What, if any, evidence did your Department uncover as to the use of Japanese fishing boats in intelligence work?

A. To the best of my recollection, there was never a definite incident of proven espionage on the part of these fishing boats, though I believe it to be definitely established that many of the fishermen had gone to school in Japan to learn fishing methods, and it is my personal conviction, unsupported by facts, that information they obtained from personal observation, including hydrographic data, was forwarded to Japan.

22. Q. Did searches of any of these boats disclose any special radio or other equipment located in them that might have been used for this purpose?

A. Not to my knowledge.

23. Q. Prior to the attack, what information did you have as to the use of amateur or other radio transmitters to convey information to Japanese agencies?

A. I had no exact information that such amateur transmitters or receivers were used. There were, however, a number of amateur stations in the Territory of Hawaii, licensed by the Federal Communications Commission. There was one in particular near Pearl Harbor. Complete information on this station is available in the files of the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District.

24. Q. Captain, what information did you have prior to the attack with respect to the use of Japanese Language commercial radio broadcasts from local stations in Hawaii in connection with espionage or intelligence?

A. There were regular programs broadcast from the commercial broadcasting stations in the Territory in the Japanese Language. My office, from time to time, made spot checks of these broadcasts, but never did we find any information that we considered as improper information to broadcast. We had neither. [313] the personnel nor the equipment to maintain a constant check, nor did the District Communication Officer have sufficient personnel or material to record and check these broadcasts continuously.

25. Q. What information did you have prior to the attack, with respect to the use of the trans-Pacific telephone system in transmitting information to Japan; military information to Japan?

A. The trans-Pacific telephone was available to the Japanese in the same fashion as to any other person who was willing to pay the toll. So far as I am aware, these conversations were not recorded or censored. I have no exact or personal knowledge of any harmful information transmitted over this circuit, but I see no reason why it could not have been used if the Japanese desired to do so.

26. Q. Keeping in mind these several matters which we have just been discussing, will you please outline the authority vested in you, or in the Commandant, to take measures to control or to in any way supervise these various sources of supplying information and any action taken by you under such authority?

A. According to my understanding, neither the Commandant nor I, as District Intelligence Officer, had any authority to exercise any control over any of the means by which information could be received in the Territory of Hawaii, or sent from the Territory. The only Federal control or supervision was that normally exercised by the representatives of Public Health, Immigration, Customs, and the Federal Communications Commission. My authority over civilian population extended only to those in the employ of the naval establishment and their families. Any information that I might have obtained indicating espionage on the part of persons beyond my jurisdiction I supplied to Military Intelligence or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, whichever might have investigational jurisdiction.

27. Q. Were you at the time satisfied with the methods used, and the action taken, by these other agencies on recommendations made by you?

A. Yes. It is my conviction that both of the other agencies did their best, considering their limitations as to personnel and equipment, principally personnel.

28. Q. Captain, during the period from about the middle of October, 1941, until the attack, were you furnished with any information which the Commandant of the District received from Washington sources with respect to the international situation, particularly the tense situation in the Pacific, to aid you in carrying out your intelligence duties?

A. Not to the best of my recollection, though I might say that I do not believe that such information would have enabled me to do more than I was then attempting to do with the means available to me.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

[314] Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer.

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. John Henry Newton, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, Deputy Commander South Pacific and South Pacific Area.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. On or about February 1, I was given command of Cruisers Scouting Force and continued as Commander Cruisers Scouting Force during the remainder of that year.

3. Q. About what was the magnitude of that Command?

A. I had three divisions of heavy cruisers, four cruisers to each division.

4. Q. Did you consider it a large and important Command?

A. I did.

5. Q. Who was your immediate superior in command?

A. The Commander Scouting Force, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown.

6. Q. Then as I understand it, there was one and only one echelon of command between you and Commander-in-Chief?

A. That is correct.

7. Q. Admiral, did you command an expedition which went into southern latitudes during the early part of 1941?

A. I did.

8. Q. Will you give a brief narrative, covering the forces used, their movements, and in particular your instructions, formal or otherwise, prior to beginning that expedition.

A. About the middle of March, while at sea in the operating area, I was directed to return to Pearl Harbor in the CHICAGO, and upon arrival was met at the buoy by an officer detailed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to inform me that I was to prepare a division, consisting of four cruisers, and one squadron of destroyers, for special service. The division of cruisers consisted of the CHICAGO, PORTLAND, SAVANNAH, and BROOKLYN. The squadron of destroyers, I can't recall the number, but it was commanded by Captain Mark Bowman; I believe it was Squadron Three. The squadron consisted of nine destroyers. My verbal instructions were that I would fill to capacity with every type of stores considered necessary for service which might keep me away from Pearl Harbor for an indefinite time. Also that this matter was to be considered highly secret and no word of any kind was to be permitted to get out regarding the sailing of this secret force. I immediately contacted Rear Admiral Theobald, who was Commander Destroyers Battle Force, and told him that I considered it necessary that destroyers immediately be checked to see that they had a maximum allowance of depth charges, that they put on war heads, [315] and get rid of exercise heads, and anything that was not considered necessary for war service. He said that he would issue the necessary instructions to his Squadron Commander. I contacted each Captain and told him of the secret instructions I had received and that I would leave it up to him to see that his ship was in all respects ready for war and for distant service, and to safeguard to the limit leakage of any information or conjecturing on the part of anybody of our possible destination, as I did not know that myself. I saw the Commander-in-Chief before the Fleet departed on an exercise of which I was to sortie with. He showed me the dispatch regarding the detail of a force that I was to command and said he had no information except what was contained in this brief dispatch, that I would proceed to Samoa and await further instructions. He could give no information as to my probable ultimate destination. I was furnished a tanker, the SANGAMON, to accompany, and in case my orders, after arrival at Samoa, were such that the SANGAMON would not accompany me, I would, after fueling from her, have her supply what fuel was necessary for Samoa and return to Pearl Harbor. I sortied with the Fleet and, in accordance with previous verbal orders, I peeled off and headed for a rendezvous which I had given verbally to SANGAMON, Captain Bowman, the Squadron Commander, and each of the cruiser Captains. We proceeded from this rendezvous maintaining complete radio silence, and arrived at Samoa about one week after our departure. I did not inform Samoa by radio of my arrival but sent a plane in with my Staff Aviator to acquaint the Governor with the fact that I would arrive about one o'clock that day with a cruiser force, accompanied by the destroyers, and that I wanted to make sure no radio dispatch of my arrival was sent until I had seen him. We received orders the night of my arrival, as I recall, to split my force, sending two cruisers to Auckland, accompanied by one division of destroyers, and for me to take the other two, namely, the CHICAGO and PORTLAND, accompanied by the Squadron Commander and the other division of the squadron, to Sydney. The night before arriving, I sent a dis-

patch to the Sydney authorities saying that I would be off the entrance at six a. m. the following morning. This was necessary in order that entrance to the harbor would be provided for and that I would have the necessary pilot available who would be familiar with the mine fields. I remained in Sydney for three days and sailed at the end of that time for Brisbane, where I remained for three days, and then sailed for Suva, from which port, after a two day stay, I sailed for Pearl Harbor. The division that went to Auckland had orders, upon departure from that port, to proceed to Tahiti and, after a two day visit there, to return to Pearl Harbor. I never received any information after my return as to the purpose of this trip, except I gathered that it was a trip desired by the State Department. I learned in Sydney that the State Department had notified the chargé that we would arrive and that it was to be kept highly secret and only the highest officials informed.

9. Q. When you received your instructions from Admiral Kimmel, did it occur to you as unusual that an official carrying his responsibility was wholly uninformed as to the purpose of the voyage?

A. I was assured that he had no information or idea as to the purpose of this voyage, other than contained in the brief dispatch which said to send this force to Samoa and await further instructions, because he told me so.

10. Q. Insofar as you know, did Admiral Kimmel ever learn the purpose of that long voyage to southern waters?

A. If he did, he never informed me as to the purpose.

11. Q. Was curiosity expressed in Auckland or in Sydney as to the purpose of the visits there?

[316] A. The authorities were agreeably surprised, and I tried to convey the impression that we were making a good will trip.

12. Q. Admiral, during that long voyage outward, do you recall that your state of mind would have been better had you not been in such great uncertainty concerning the purpose of the voyage?

A. No, I had an idea that we were going to wind up on the Asiatic Station and I put in a system of training, both day and night, that would fit us for any eventuality.

13. Q. During the voyage, did you maintain a high degree of battle readiness in all ships?

A. We did. We were in a condition watch the entire trip, day and night, and at night we cruised without lights.

14. Q. Do you recall if you, in fact, did consider it a valuable training cruise?

A. I consider it one of the finest battle training cruises possible.

15. Q. Admiral, can you recall the specific dates which comprised your last period in Pearl Harbor, prior to 7 December?

A. I had been in Pearl Harbor in my Flagship from about 27 November, 1941, until the morning of 5 December, when I went to sea.

16. Q. Do you recall what your particular personal employment was during that period?

A. I was in command of a task force, temporarily, as the Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Brown had departed about 4 December in the INDIANAPOLIS to make a cruise to Johnston and Palmyra Islands to investigate landing craft conditions, in company with several Marine officers who were interested in amphibious operations. My personal employment was as Commander Cruisers Scouting Force.

17. Q. Other than your usual duties as the type commander of cruisers, did you have any specific duties while in Pearl Harbor during that period up to Admiral Brown's departure?

A. I did not.

18. Q. Prior to Admiral Brown's departure, say, fairly immediately before it, did you receive from him any particular information concerning the international situation or any specific direction about it?

A. I did not.

19. Q. In general, during the few weeks prior to 7 December, '41, was it customary for Admiral Brown to bring you into conferences during which he set forth such information as he had obtained concerning the international situation, possible imminence of hostilities, and so forth?

A. There may have been one or two conferences where precautionary measures might be stressed of preparing for what might happen, but, as I recall, we had all thought, for six months, that the situation was tense and each type commander had taken precautions to get his own type of ships ready for war, and I do not recall that there was any difference in this preparation immediately preceding 7 December than there had been a month before.

The witness was duly warned.

The examining officer then, at 12 o'clock noon, took a recess until 1:15 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

[317] Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Vice Admiral John Henry Newton, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examination by the examining officer (continued):

20. Q. Admiral, going back to your presence in Pearl Harbor during periods preceding the one which ended on 5 December; do you recall having seen this dispatch, which is Exhibit 6 before this board, dated 16 October; or having been informed of the contents thereof?

A. I never saw nor was I informed of the contents of such a dispatch.

21. Q. And yet you were the Commander of the most powerful unit under Commander Scouting Force, were you not?

A. I was.

22. Q. During the period between 16 October, the date of this dispatch and, say, the middle of November, '41, do you recall being informed by Vice Admiral Brown concerning any other warnings or instructions mentioning preparatory deployments and so forth?

A. I do not recall having received any such warnings or instructions.

23. Q. Admiral, I hand you three dispatches, Exhibits 7, 8, and 11, what are in evidence in this record, all of which were from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief. Do you recall ever having seen any of these dispatches or having been informed by Admiral Brown or anyone else of their content?

A. I never saw nor heard of such dispatches before December 7, '41.

24. Q. During that period, 26 November to 5 December, did you hear anything which indicated the rapid growth in the danger of the situation vis-a-vis Japan?

A. I did not, except what came in the press.

25. Q. Do you recall that a task force with Admiral Halsey in command went to sea early during your last period in port prior to 7 December?

A. I recall that it left about the same time as I came in port, or shortly after my arrival in port.

26. Q. Were you informed, prior to your own departure about 5 December, where Admiral Halsey's Task Force was and what was its mission?

A. I was not informed.

27. Q. What directive or order did you receive prior to your departure for sea on or about 5 December?

A. I was directed to proceed to a point, as I recall, about 300 miles, bearing 130 True from Midway, and arrive at that point and have the squadron of planes destined for Midway be ready to proceed in their flight from that point to Midway and guarded in that flight by planes that would meet me for this purpose.

[318] 28. Q. What ships did you have under your command?

A. I had the LEXINGTON, CHICAGO, my Flagship, the PORTLAND, and five destroyers, one of which was the destroyer leader and squadron Flagship PORTER. I do not recall the division number.

29. Q. Upon your departure on that mission, or during it, up to 7 December, did you have any knowledge or intimation which led you to suppose your mission to be other than a somewhat routine build-up of the forces on Midway?

A. I considered this mission solely one to reenforce Midway, but inasmuch as my orders said that upon completion of this duty to return to operating area and resume normal operations, that there was no special significance attached to it other than reenforcement.

30. Q. Do you recall having any particular concern over the fact that the mission was advancing your force over a thousand miles toward Japan?

A. I considered that I was going into waters that had not been frequented by our ships for some time and, as there might be more danger from submarines than we had considered in the past, I set a speed of 17 knots in day light and zig-zagged. Also, I had scouting flights made by planes to cover our advance.

31. Q. Were those measures something of an increase over normal security precautions of our forces at sea?

A. They were in that during our time in the operating area we carried on normal operations in connection with training, such as target practice, submarine operations, and, therefore, did not keep a patrol of our own planes as this was covered, I figured, by planes from the base at Pearl Harbor.

32. Q. Did the LEXINGTON have on board her regular complement of planes in addition to the squadron which you were transporting to Midway?

A. As far as I recall, she had her full outfit of planes, plus the additional squadron for Midway.

33. Q. At any time during the outward voyage, did you arm the planes with guns, torpedoes, machine gun ammunition, and so forth; or direct warheads installed by destroyers?

A. I did not, to the best of my recollection. I gave no special orders regarding arming of planes or making preparations for war other than had been routine.

34. Q. Admiral, I will ask you to give a brief narrative of what actually occurred with your Task Force from the time you went to sea on 5 December until you heard of the surprise attack made on 7 December.

A. I proceeded to sea on the morning of 5 December and headed for the designated point and arrived to within about fifty miles of that point about 0813 on the morning of 7 December, when we received the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor. I estimated that I would receive orders to intercept the enemy, which I felt must be to the Northward of Oahu, inasmuch as approach on Pearl Harbor from any other direction would probably have disclosed their presence by passing through or near our normal operating areas, which were to the Southward of the Islands. I signalled the LEXINGTON that the flight to Midway was canceled as I assumed that Midway had probably been attacked as well as Pearl Harbor. I also sent my position to the Commander-in-Chief and told him I had canceled the Midway flight. Sometime during that morning, [319] after I had sent this dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief, I received a dispatch from him to report to Admiral Halsey, who, I believe, had Task Force Eight.

35. Q. Did you know of the composition of Task Force Eight?

A. I did not.

36. Q. And I understand from your previous testimony you did not know where it went and, consequently, could have no idea where it was at the time; is that correct?

A. I will say that I knew normally that Task Force Eight had the ENTERPRISE as Flagship of Admiral Halsey, but I could not be sure what it consisted of at this particular time, as the Task Force might be changed in its composition from time to time due to vessels undergoing overhaul. I did not know what vessels Task Force Eight consisted of nor where it was located on the 7th of December.

37. Q. Nor where it had been?

A. Nor where it had been.

38. Q. Please proceed with the narrative, Admiral.

A. When I received orders to report to Admiral Halsey, I immediately realized that he might not know where I was, as I had not included him in my report of my position after I received news of the bombing of Pearl Harbor. I, therefore, sent him a dispatch giving my position. My message evidently crossed his telling me to join him in the vicinity of Oahu, and I realized that something had to be done about this as I was about 700 miles distant from him. However, I took a course for Oahu, taking me back South of the chain of reefs and took up a speed, as I remember, about twenty-five knots, standard for the Task Force. About 1000 or 1100 that morning, I received a message from Admiral Halsey to the effect that I was to assume enemy carriers about 200 miles South of Oahu at that time and retiring on the Marshalls. My orders were to intercept and destroy. I, thereupon, changed course to take me to the east-

ward of Johnston Island and attempt, that afternoon, to contact enemy by planes and to make an attack by planes that afternoon in order to slow him down so that I could make physical contact during the night or the following day. I was in communication during all of this day with the INDIANAPOLIS and kept her informed of my movements as I expected to be joined by ComSoFor sometime early the following morning. We launched search planes from cruisers, using cruiser planes for the search on the flank, and carrier planes for search ahead, and proceeded on approximately a southeasterly course at a speed of about twenty-six knots. Our search results were negative. The INDIANAPOLIS appointed a rendezvous and we joined the morning of the 8th, and, as I recall, the search for the enemy was called off in that vicinity as the authorities at Pearl had gotten information which led them to believe that the attack had not been from carriers well to the Southard, but from the Northard. After the morning of the 8th, Admiral Brown had command of the force until our return to Pearl Harbor during the forenoon of the 13th or 14th.

39. Q. Were there any events which were particularly pertinent during that period, 8 to 13 or 14 December?

A. None except we carried on air patrol looking for any enemy forces in our area. We fueled cruisers and destroyers from a tanker and we had several scares due to erroneous reports of enemy forces which turned out to be false. The PORTLAND was bombed by one of our own planes from Pearl Harbor, but [390] fortunately, the bombs hit well astern. This plane reported the PORTLAND as an enemy carrier and the PORTER, who was guarding her while she recovered one of her planes, was reported as an accompanying cruiser.

40. Q. Reverting to the forenoon of 7 December, at which time it was your assumption that the Japanese carrier force was to the Northard; what were your intentions as regards to the use of your Task Force had you been left free to act?

A. My orders to the carrier was to prepare all planes immediately for action, as soon as I received word of the Pearl Harbor bombing. I had planned, if the enemy was reported to the Northard, to cross the shoals, which had plenty of water between the adjacent islands near me, and attempt to intercept the enemy at daylight the following morning by scout planes and immediately follow up with an attack by bombers.

41. Q. Did the LEXINGTON, at the time, possess normal or more than normal power of air attack?

A. She had more because she had the additional planes that were destined for Midway.

42. Q. On your own assumption that the enemy was to the Northward, did the Fleet have any other detachments at sea which were as favorably placed for an attack as was your force?

A. I'm such there was no other detachment as favorably placed as mine.

43. Q. Admiral, in view of your importance in the command echelons of the Pacific Fleet and, more particularly, because of the duties assigned you on or about 5 December, do you recall if you thought at the time that you were adequately informed and sufficiently in the confidence of the command echelons above you?

A. I felt at that time that I probably had been furnished as much information as necessary for me to know, as I didn't realize until sometime afterwards that the dispatches that I saw had been received prior to my departure. However, I believe that the contents of those dispatches had probably been made know to the Task Force Commanders, and I became a Task Force Commander with the LEXINGTON and the two cruisers I have mentioned due to a sudden change in which Commander Scouting Force took the INDIANAPOLIS to go on a special trip to Johnston and Palmyra Islands. I have since thought that he, Vice Admiral Brown, had information that I should have had when I took charge of this Task Force.

44. Q. Do you recall if, when you were being passed a formal order governing your mission to Midway, you saw any of Admiral Kimmel's Staff who might well have ascertained if you were properly informed?

A. I saw Admiral Kimmel's Chief of Staff almost daily, as he lived in an adjacent apartment to where I lived, but he never mentioned any dispatches or secret information that had been received. I saw no others of the Admiral Kimmel's Staff who disclosed any secret information to me.

45. Q. And you had no conference with the Commander-in-Chief or any other high commander just before your departure or prior to 5 December?

A. As I recall, I saw Commander Scouting Force on his Flagship and he told me the purpose of his taking the INDIANAPOLIS to Johnston and Palmyra Islands and gave me a general idea of what he was going to do and when I might expect him back in the area for operations.

[321] 46. Q. At the time, did Admiral Brown know of your mission to Midway?

A. I am not sure, but I imagine he did.

47. Q. But it was not the subject of conversation between you on that occasion?

A. Not that I recall. There was nothing about my mission other than to proceed to a point, get rid of some planes, and return to the operating area and resume normal training operations.

48. Q. Do you recall the date of your receipt of your formal order and from whom it was issued?

A. I do not recall the date, but I believe it was about one day preceding my day of departure. I am not sure whether the Task Force Commander, Vice Admiral Brown, signed these orders or whether they were signed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Note: The examining officer identified the directive for this task in the files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as CinCPac secret dispatch 040237 of December, 1941, addressed to Comtaskfor 3, ComFourteen, and ComPatWing 2, information to Combatfor, Combasefor, Comairbatfor, and LEXINGTON. The examining officer was unsuccessful in ascertaining in what form this directive was passed from Comtaskfor 3 (Vice Admiral Brown) to the witness. The communications files of Comtaskfor 3 were transferred from his then Flagship, the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS, to the U.S.S. LEXINGTON, in January, 1942, and said files were presumably lost when the latter vessel was sunk in action during 1942.

49. Q. Admiral, a somewhat hypothetical question: From what you subsequently learned of the area from which the Jap carriers launched their attack, what would have been the probabilities that you would

have been able to put in an air attack on those carriers had you been left free to act or if you had been directed to attack to the Northard?

A. I think it might have been possible to have made contact by plane and possibly to have delivered a bombing attack. Of course, I don't know what course the enemy retired on after the bombing, but I understood that their carriers launched the Pearl Harbor attack from a point about 200 miles due North of Pearl, and I figured that they would retire, if they had not already bombed Midway, to a point to the Northard of Midway which would clear them of scouting planes picking them up from Midway.

50. Q. Then you would have launched your own air search from a point well to the Northard of the line Midway to Oahu?

A. I would. I could have gotten to a 0600 position, which would have had me well to the Northard of the Hawaiian Islands-Midway line, and to the westward of the enemy's best possible position.

51. Q. And would your fuel supply have permitted those movements?

A. It would, as I was fully fueled upon departure from Pearl and had been at sea only two days where speed, up to the morning of the 7th, had not been in excess of about seventeen knots.

52. Q. Admiral, do you recall the reasoning under which you arrived at the assumption that the Japanese carriers attacked from the North?

A. I do. I felt sure that the Japanese had a better chance for coming in with a force from the Northard without being observed than from any other direction because all ships to and from the Asiatic Station, for sometime preceding 7 December, had been routed by a Southerly route. I believe the [322] only traffic to the Northard was between Pearl Harbor and Midway. Also our training grounds were all to the Southard of the Hawaiian Islands, extending as far as two hundred miles South. We very seldom had exercises which took us to the Northard of the Isles. I felt sure the Japanese were fully cognizant of this. I was greatly surprised when I received the word to assume Japanese carriers to be two hundred miles South of Oahu and felt that my reasoning was faulty.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I would like to add, at this time, that all hands had felt a gradual tautening of the situation for a period of several months preceding Pearl Harbor. Ships were not allowed to anchor in exposed positions and ships engaged in training exercises were cautioned to transfer observing parties prior to leaving port and to take all precautions not to stop or slow down in the operating areas unless absolutely necessary. We felt that a surprise might come and, for this reason, that we could not take chances of stopping in the area or taking speeds that would make it easy to have submarines make a successful surprise attack on us, especially at night. My ships were better fitted than most regarding radar. The NORTHAMPTON, CHICAGO, and PENSACOLA were all fitted

with the CXAM. We kept this manned at night, usually for exercise in the early hours of evening and training but made frequent sweeps to make sure that our area was clear. I believe that the majority felt that the submarine menace was our greatest menace.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Admiral William F. Halsey, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twenty-sixth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 2:35 p. m., took a recess until 5 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Captain Irving H. Mayfield, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twenty-seventh day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Vice Admiral John Henry Newton, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously [323] taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twenty-seventh day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examination then, at 5:10 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[323] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

SATURDAY, APRIL 15, 1944

TWENTY-EIGHTH DAY

PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The examination met at 1:30 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-seventh day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. William B. Stephenson, Lieutenant, U. S. Naval Reserve, attached to the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. Q. When were you called to active duty as a Naval Reserve Officer?

A. 23 June 1941.

3. Q. Please state the duties performed by you during the calendar year 1941 after you were called to active duty.

A. Until approximately 1 July 1941, I was in doctrination status, and from and after approximately 1 July 1941, I was designated as head of Section B7J, which, in Naval Intelligence parlance, at that time, meant the Japanese Counter-Espionage Desk of the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District.

[324] 4. Q. In performing your duties in connection with counter-espionage in Hawaii, did you have occasion to handle matters concerning certain consular agents who, at that time, were in the Territory?

A. I did, sir.

5. Q. Please outline such information as you have relating to those agents.

A. The so-called "consular agents" are what the Japanese call "toritsuginin". I am informed by competent Japanese translators that this term literally means "agent man", or "intermediary", or "come-in-

between man". That is a literal Japanese interpretation of that term, but, for sake of consistency, I will refer to them as "consular agents". These consular agents operated as such in the Hawaiian Islands for fifteen or twenty years before the present war. Their functions were to assist resident Japanese aliens and citizens of the United States to fill out written report forms required to be made periodically by Japanese national law. The average Japanese in Hawaii, being fairly illiterate, was unable to accomplish these forms by himself, and, in the furtherance of Japanese extraterritorial control over its residents abroad, the Japanese Consulate General of Honolulu appointed or recognized certain literate Japanese in the community as consular agents to assist other residents in filling out the prescribed forms. As of the year 1941, there were approximately 240 such consular agents actively engaged in their duties in the Hawaiian Islands and residing on all principal Islands of this group. The consular agents were largely drawn from Japanese priests, Japanese language school teachers, and Japanese hotel keepers. These consular agents were recognized by the Consulate in two ways. Up until 1939, the Consulate annually released to the Japanese press of these Islands a list of recognized consular agents. Second, the Japanese Consulate General provided these agents with certificates certifying their apparent official connection with the Consulate. These agents held themselves out to the public as such and they should not be understood to be in any sense secret espionage agents, insofar as their routine consular duties were concerned. However, in counter-espionage work here, it was recognized by the District Intelligence Officer and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that this group of 240 or more consular agents provided a substantial reservoir of information-collecting agents who could just as well be used by the Consul for economic, political, and military espionage purposes. It was known before the war that for a number of years some consular agents did render economic survey reports to the Consulate. In one instance, and only one instance, that occurring in June, 1940 (and officially reported in the files of the District Intelligence Office), it was learned from a most reliable informant, whose accuracy has since the war on this point been fully established, that one consular agent on the Island of Maui, whose residence overlooked Lahaina Roads, was requested by the Japanese Vice Consul to report on the presence of the United States Fleet at Lahaina Roads and report the fact of its departure when and if it departed. It was further reliably established that such a report was made by this consular agent to the Japanese Vice Consul. Outside of that one instance, there was no information in the files of the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District, that clearly indicated any prewar espionage of the consular agent group. However, the potentialities of the agents to engage in espionage and the fact that one, in June, 1940, did so, was believed to be reasonable basis for such investigation of these men as could be made within limitations of personnel and facilities available. Investigation of individual cases, up until the start of the war, revealed no further espionage activity apparent. Perhaps the most significant question facing the United States Government with relation to these consular agents in 1941, was the question whether prosecution should be instituted against the consular agents for their having failed to register as the agents of a foreign [325] government, as required by Act of Congress, 8 June 1938, as amended 7 August 1939.

Following the discovery of the June, 1940, espionage incident involving one consular agent, the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted numerous investigations of individual consular agents. Their reports were sent forward to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington and eventually reached the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. I may state, parenthetically, that my testimony on this point is predicated upon a review of files of the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District, and of the United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii. On 22 May 1941, the United States Attorney General wrote the District Attorney asking the latter's views with reference to whether these consular agents should be prosecuted. The District Attorney conferred shortly thereafter with representatives of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On 4 June 1941, the District Attorney wrote the Attorney General the result of his conference with these representatives and the files of the District Intelligence Office contain a copy of the District Attorney's letter to the Attorney General of that date.

6. Q. Have you a copy of the letter which appears in the files of the District Intelligence Office in your possession?

A. I do, sir.

7. Q. Will you please present it?

The witness produced a copy of the letter and it was offered in evidence by the examining officer, copy received and appended marked "Exhibit 32 (1) and (2)".

8. Q. Will you please proceed with your statement.

A. The correspondence running between the District Attorney and the Attorney General reveals that the Attorney General, several times up to and including 18 September 1941, asked the District Attorney for further detailed statements of the District Attorney's views in this matter. That correspondence shows that the District Attorney conferred again with the Assistant Chief of Staff for G-2, Hawaiian Department, and in one instance, personally, with Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding that Department. The District Attorney persisted in his views, as stated in Exhibit 32, that these consular agents should be prosecuted. He made no further reference, however, to the continuing opinion of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as expressed through the District Intelligence Officer, that such agents should be prosecuted. That correspondence does not reveal further conferences with the District Intelligence Officer, but, on the basis of my personal recollection, I may state that at a time I believe to have been late in September, 1941, Captain I. H. Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer, in conversation with Lieutenant George P. Kimball, U. S. N. R., and myself, stated that he had had occasion to discuss the consular agent question again with the Commandant and with the United States District Attorney, and that the Commandant's and his own view was unchanged, that is, they both considered prosecution of these agents in order and required by law. The correspondence I have referred to shows, and it was the statement of the District Intelligence Officer to me at the time these conferences were current, that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, took the position that he was responsible for internal security in the Hawaiian Islands and that the

arrest and prosecution of several hundred Japanese consular agents would be detrimental to the development of the program [326] of the Army then in progress, which program was calculated to convince the local Japanese that they would receive the utmost fair treatment in the event of a crisis here, in return for their loyalty to the United States. I noted from the correspondence a letter of the Attorney General to the District Attorney, dated 2 August 1941, inclosing a photostatic copy of a letter from the Secretary of War to the Attorney General, the Secretary of War's letter being dated 25 July 1941. In this photostatic copy, the view of the Secretary of War was expressed that he concurred with the view of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, that prosecution of the consular agents would be unwise for the reasons stated. There were no prosecutions of these consular agents instituted prior to the war.

9. Q. Please outline other sources available to the Japanese in the Hawaiian area for obtaining information which came to your attention prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

A. Counter-espionage study in the Hawaiian Islands was based on a number of assumptions as to the probable source of Japanese espionage. Suspected and known sources were investigated as soon as possible and as fully as possible. Investigation was done concurrently by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the District Intelligence Officer by virtue of a Presidential directive giving those two services concurrent jurisdiction in the Japanese field. The files of the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District, contained considerable information gained by investigation from 1935 until the outbreak of war, and from this reported data, as it developed before the war, the counter-espionage section of the District Intelligence Office, in which I was responsible for the Japanese Section, felt that there were, among many, the following important sources of Japanese espionage information here: (1) The overt and secret activities of the accredited Japanese Consular officials; (2) The officers and men of visiting Japanese naval vessels, and, to a lesser degree, the crews of Japanese merchant vessels; (3) Local residents, chiefly Japanese but not necessarily exclusively Japanese, who, because of loyalty to Japan or other consideration, were willing to give information to Japan detrimental to the United States; (4) Visiting Japanese passing through or temporarily sojourning in the Territory of Hawaii; (5) The public press. I will attempt to elaborate on each one of those sources. It was an operating premise of counter-espionage that Japan must be using its Consular officials in Hawaii to gather military information. The incident of June, 1940, wherein the Vice Consul requested military information of a consular agent, to cite a specific example, supports the correctness of this assumption. However, in operating against the Consulate, counter-espionage agents were at a decided disadvantage. They could do nothing at the critical times following 27 May 1941, to impair the negotiations being carried on by the State Department. This meant, in effect, that only the most limited physical surveillance of the Consulate could be maintained and it was fully recognized that within the limitations imposed by national policy, counter-espionage could not be too effective against the Consulate. The Consulate was in a position to effect daily contact and consultation with the most pro-Japanese organizations in the Territory, including the Japanese press, the

NYK line, the Japanese banks, the Japanese language schools, and Japanese religious groups. It was believed, prior to the war, that the Consulate took full advantage of this liaison and, in effect, extended its information-gathering activities to the farthest corners of the Hawaiian Islands through the Japanese business, religious, and educational groups that he contacted. This group of suspected collaborators (newspapermen, priests, school teachers, merchants, etc.) of the Japanese Consul numbered well over a thousand persons, most of them aliens. Surveillance or other investigation of all of these persons was virtually impossible with only thirty or forty F. B. I. and Naval Intelligence investigators [327] available. Another important source of information, both from the standpoint of its collection and its transmission to Japan, was believed to have been in the activities of visiting Japanese naval personnel. Naval training squadrons of the Japanese Navy made periodic visits to the Hawaiian Islands for training cruises, the last of which was in the Fall of 1939. In addition, Japanese naval oil tankers, which regularly plied between Japan and California, regularly stopped in Honolulu. There is very strong evidence, though not conclusive, that it was a regular practice for the Japanese tankers to leave personnel behind in Honolulu and for these personnel to return to Japan on a succeeding tanker. The clear implication of this practice, which was reasonably established by tallying the total number of Japanese leaving and boarding a tanker while in port, was that personnel left behind were left here for espionage purposes. It was also believed that these personnel were brought to Hawaii with the farsighted view in mind of making them personally familiar with the Island of Oahu, and thereby more valuable in the future. Parenthetically, it may be noted that several of the personnel of Japanese midget submarines, which were in these waters prior to and at the time of the attack of 7 December 1941, are now known to have visited Honolulu prior to the war as midshipmen or enlisted men on Japanese naval training vessels. Full reports of the activities of visiting Japanese naval personnel, insofar as they could be determined, were made promptly to the Navy Department by the District Intelligence Officer. As early as 1938, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, strongly urged the Navy Department to attempt to induce the State Department to permit no more visits of Japanese public vessels to Hawaiian ports. The last Japanese naval oiler called at Honolulu in 1940. The crewmen of merchant vessels, particularly the NYK passenger liners, were also quite active in sight-seeing and photographing activities on the Island of Oahu, as were the Japanese naval personnel before them. These men were thus in a position to gain visual impressions of our most vital defense installations and of Pearl Harbor, and return to their ships and immediately record in writing what information they had gained a few hours previously. Information thus recorded was beyond the efforts of any United States agency to control or prevent from reaching Japan. Efforts were made by the District Intelligence Officer to secure the assistance of other Government Departments through their local representatives in Honolulu to restrict, insofar as possible, the shore leave of Japanese merchant crewmen. When the **TAIYO MARU**, the last Japanese liner to call at Honolulu before the war, was in the port of Honolulu, from the morning of 1 November 1941 until the

evening of 5 November 1941, the Customs authorities did restrict shore leave privileges of all personnel of the TAIYO MARU except those certified by the Master of that vessel to be ashore in the interests of maintenance and operation of the vessel. The District Intelligence Officer, at the same time, was active in his efforts to prevent mail being carried out of the United States on the TAIYO MARU on that voyage. Upon representations made to the Postmaster General in Washington, through channels of which I do not have knowledge, an order was made and enforced that no United States mail, other than second class matter, could be taken from the United States by the TAIYO MARU on that voyage. However, the effect of this counter-espionage measure probably was diminished in that public notice was made of the fact that the TAIYO MARU would not carry first class mail. In cooperation with Customs authorities, searches were effected of the persons and baggage of all persons leaving Honolulu on the last voyage of the TAIYO MARU, in an effort to prevent the transmission to Japan of any vital intelligence. Further, no visitors from shore were allowed aboard the vessel, and the departing passengers, once aboard the vessel, were not allowed back on the dock. Thus, in general, with reference to this particular vessel, the most stringent security measures possible under [328] the law were taken and it was only in his instance, and this instance alone, that the measures so highly desired by counter-espionage agencies in Hawaii were realized.

10. Q. Did you think, at the time, that those measures were effective, in case there was a determination of an adequate prior preparation on the part of the Japanese spies here to get word back home by that ship?

A. It was our view—and by “our view”, I mean the view of the District Intelligence Officer, as I heard him express it—that the measures taken were the very best we could do to prevent information reaching the enemy aboard the TAIYO MARU. It was realized, however, that there were two serious loopholes, even as regards the TAIYO MARU: (1) The fact that departing passengers could take with them such information as they might remember in their minds; (2) That such information as might be placed in a sealed Consulate pouch and delivered to the TAIYO MARU for passage to the Japanese foreign office could not be examined. It, therefore, boiled down to this, that the measures taken would tend to force the Japanese espionage system here to send more information through Consular channels and, second, in all likelihood, prevent the transmission of bulky pictorial or physical intelligence. At that time, the Island of Oahu was experiencing considerable construction of military and naval installations. For example, the underground fuel storage depot at Red Hill, and several auxiliary military landing fields, in which connection, I think it is perhaps pertinent to observe that the only effective fighter plane resistance put up against the Japanese on 7 December 1941 came from certain Army pursuit planes based at a newly constructed emergency landing field. I am informed that this landing field was constructed, although not fully completed, after the departure of the TAIYO MARU. Charts of the Island of Oahu recovered from Japanese aircraft shot down on 7 December 1941 failed to show the existence of this emergency or auxiliary landing field, at, I believe, Mokuleia.

Insofar as my knowledge of the military and naval installations as of 5 November 1941 is concerned, I believe that the charts of this Island used by the Japanese attacking aviators were fairly accurate as to information dated prior to 5 November 1941, but did not contain information of later date except for data on vessels in Pearl Harbor. The third type of source I believe I mentioned was to be found in the loyal individuals believed to be chiefly Japanese who would aid Japan in securing military information. I have been careful to note that the District Intelligence Officer never assumed that this group of individuals would necessarily be all Japanese. The District Intelligence Officer, for example, was the only officer, to my knowledge, who, at a time a year or more before the war, saw the possibility that Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, a resident German alien, might be a Japanese espionage agent. Kuehn was generally regarded in Honolulu as a suspicious character and loosely characterized a Nazi spy, but, from the functional standpoint, the District Intelligence Officer realized that Kuehn might be acting for Germany or Japan, or both, and the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington was so notified. This is merely given by way of example; however, it was a fact that our best estimate was the large majority of individual spies or information-gatherers would be found among the Japanese. The Japanese population, as of the date of the outbreak of war, was approximately 160,000, about 37,500 of whom were aliens. In the neighborhood of fifty per cent of the 122,500 citizen Japanese also possessed Japanese citizenship and were, therefore, dual citizens. Specific subversive activities of these individuals were difficult to detect but some were detected prior to the war. For example, the Japanese community openly solicited and subscribed to Japanese war bonds to finance the Japan war effort against China. Japanese residents of the Island of Hawaii openly [329] subscribed sufficient money to buy a military airplane for the Japanese Navy, which airplane was presented in Japan by a loyal representative of the Hawaii Island Japanese and was christened by the Japanese Navy "The Spirit of Hawaii". The Japanese residents, right down to the youngest school children, saved and collected tin foil, lead foil, and other valuable salvageable material which was systematically collected and then transmitted to Japan on Japanese naval vessels or other ships. Not publicly, the Japanese Government solicited local residents, who were in a position to do so, to purchase valuable machine tools for shipment to Japan and this was done as early as 1938. The District Intelligence Officer had contemporary knowledge of these activities through informants. Loyal residents made periodic trips to Japan as they were able to do, and it was always suspected that when in Japan they must have been interrogated as to their knowledge of the defenses of these Islands. The lack of adequate restricted areas and the geographical constitution of the Island of Oahu, made it possible that any Japanese resident here would have a wealth of information concerning military and naval installations here. There was no way the counter-espionage agencies could prevent local residents transmitting that information, if they were in Japan as travelers. Similarly, until the departure of the last Japanese vessel, 5 November 1941, there was no power to supervise the mails and such information could have been transmitted in that

manner. Local residents were hand-picked for their information and then patronized and solicited by the Government of Japan in any of many ways. Local residents were freely invited to call aboard visiting Japanese naval vessels, at the docks in Honolulu and at out-ports, and the disaffected persons among those local residents, we assumed freely gave such information as they had at their command. I do not wish it to appear that my detailing of the activities of local Japanese residents is full and complete. I think that that suffices to give a broad view of what those activities were. Visiting Japanese, or, for that matter, any visitor whatsoever, who passed through Honolulu on a trans-Pacific voyage or who stayed here a few days, could, in the space of a very few hours, tour Oahu by taxi cab readily available at the dock, and gather a wealth of information concerning the defenses of this Island. It is known that certain visitors passing through here did that, including Japanese naval officers who were traveling in civilian clothes on NYK liners. On several occasions, these visitors were trailed by agents of the District Intelligence Office and almost invariably they would drive from downtown Honolulu to Aiea Heights overlooking Pearl Harbor, thence around the public highway encompassing the lochs of Pearl Harbor, then to Waianae, which was considered one of the three most vulnerable landing spots on the Island of Oahu. On occasions, visitors also called at the Japanese Consulate General. These activities, whether by visiting Japanese naval personnel, civilians, or non-Japanese, were wholly without our capacity to prevent. In closing my discussion of sources, I include the local press, including the two leading dailies of Honolulu. For approximately the first half of 1941, the District Intelligence Officer also supervised Public Relations and, therefore, relations with the press, for the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. It was found that in many instances one of the leading Honolulu newspapers, "Honolulu Star Bulletin", would not cooperate fully in withholding news of interest to the national defense, which, because of the inadequacy of our laws, could not be legally suppressed. It was known that the Japanese Consul General subscribed to six copies per day of the Honolulu Star Bulletin and he regularly analyzed and clipped this paper. I recall one incident when the floating drydock was brought to the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor early in 1941 and a local newspaper, the "Star Bulletin", I believe, went out of its way to take a photograph of the drydock while off port and publish it in the newspaper. The Japanese Consul General [330] at Honolulu is known to have transmitted information of one kind or another to Japan in the performance of his duties. He used facilities of the international mails, the Commercial Pacific Cable Company, Radio Corporation of America, Mackay Wireless, and, I believe, Globe Wireless. In addition, the Consular pouch was transmitted manually from a representative of the Consul General to Japanese naval commanders when naval vessels were in port, or to Masters of commercial Japanese vessels when they called here. The Consular pouch was also carried, at times, by couriers plying between Tokyo and Washington. In addition, there was available, although proof of its use is lacking, any trustworthy local resident returning to Japan on any vessel as late as the TAIYO MARU, 5 November 1941, who could have been deputized by the Consul to act as a courier.

11. Q. What was your occupation prior to coming on active duty with the Navy?

A. I was an attorney at law, practicing in all the courts of the Territory of Hawaii?

12. Q. How long had you been practicing law?

A. Since November, 1938.

13. Q. Will you please now outline the authority of the District Intelligence Officer to control espionage by the Japanese and such action of a counterespionage nature as was taken under these powers prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

A. The District Intelligence Officer, as a member of the Commandant's Staff, but having certain direct responsibilities to the Chief of Naval Operations in the professional field of counter-espionage, had no authority whatsoever to invoke practical counter-espionage measures. His investigative jurisdiction was complete insofar as investigations of naval personnel or investigations on area under control of the Navy Department was concerned, but even in that field he had only the power to recommend, through the Commandant or through appropriate commanding officers, action to be taken. So far as civilians were concerned, and therein we believe before the war lay the greatest danger in the espionage field, the District Intelligence Officer had concurrent investigative authority with F. B. I. in cases involving Japanese persons, but espionage by other than Japanese was to be investigated only by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In any event, the District Intelligence Officer, if he investigated Japanese in the general civilian population, had no power whatsoever, nor did, for that matter, anyone in the Navy Department have power to take active steps to invoke counter-espionage measures. Prosecuting espionage agents was never considered an adequate answer to Japanese espionage, and even insofar as prosecution was concerned, that lay entirely with the United States District Attorney. Active counter-espionage encompasses such matters as supervision of communications, registration of aliens, erection of physical barriers and pass systems at vital installations, as well as under-cover investigation and neutralization of suspected agents. To a large degree, the affirmative steps that might have been taken to deny information to Japan before the war lay within the province of other government agencies or were wholly illegal under our system of law. As I previously noted, one of the most compelling restrictions on counter-espionage activity was the fact that the State Department was engaged in crucial negotiations whose ultimate success must not be endangered by open measures that might have been taken against the Japanese Consulate General here. Just to give one very good example, but very relevant to the success of the attack on 7 December 1941, the Japanese Consulate was believed, and on the basis of information acquired after the attack is known, to have been sending intelligence to Japan by encrypted messages filed [331] with the commercial communication companies in Honolulu. There was no authority in any of the counter-espionage agencies to examine or supervise, in any way, this Consular traffic. It is known, on the basis of information acquired after the war, that the Consulate used commercial communications facilities for the transmission of vital intelligence from and after 3 December 1941. After the beginning of the war and starting approximately at 1100 on the 11th of December 1941,

I was engaged at length in an investigation and analysis of certain information transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General to Japan prior to the war. The purpose of this investigation was not to reconstruct a historical account but to determine whether any vestiges of the pre-war Japanese espionage system possibly remained to operate during the period of war. For reference, I may state that this investigation, in its first stages, including extensive analysis of the available Japanese intelligence traffic of December, 1941, was written principally by myself and submitted over the signature of the District Intelligence Officer to the Office of Naval Intelligence. These reports were carried under the caption "Japanese Consulate Honolulu—Espionage Activities of." The first two reports were dated 9 February 1942 and 14 February 1942, and five copies of each were transmitted to the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, D. C. Subsequent reports, under the same title but dealing with different phases of the Consulate's espionage activities, are also on file in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington. For additional information on the pre-war espionage activities of the Consulate, I would also refer to the District Intelligence Officer's secret "An Analysis of the Japanese Espionage Problem in the Hawaiian Islands," dated 20 April 1943, available in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington. Paragraphs 81-106 thereof briefly outline the type of information collected by the Consulate, personnel used, and methods of collection, evaluation, and transmission of such information.

Note: The examining officer has identified the reports mentioned by the witness as being ones on file in the following locations: (a) Two reports titled "Japanese Consulate Honolulu—Espionage Activities of", dated 9 February 1942 and 14 February 1942, on file in General Files of the Office of Naval Intelligence (Op 16-A-7), Navy Department, in the case history jacket of Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, File No. 3919; (b) Report titled "An Analysis of the Japanese Espionage Problem in the Hawaiian Islands", dated 20 April 1943, on file in the Counter Intelligence Branch (Op 16-B-7), Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.

14. Q. What was your opinion, say, during the Fall of 1941, with respect to the adequacy of the security afforded to vital military information in Hawaii under the intelligence set-up as you have outlined it?

A. I'll have to answer this in two phases. I believe that the quality of attention devoted to the problem by the District Intelligence Officer and Federal Bureau of Investigation was quite satisfactory, but the quantity woefully insufficient. By that I mean, as I have said earlier, there were insufficient personnel, and more so, insufficient trained personnel, to cope with the espionage problem. The second phase, namely, the physical safeguarding of information concerning various military and naval installations by the Commanding Officers, I can merely state that no outstanding examples of lack of physical security whereby information might have been compromised came to my attention. The most vital information was before the war conceived to be the information concerning Fleet movements insofar as presence of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor or the entry or departure of Fleet units from Pearl Harbor was concerned. Except as to Fleet units that might depart under cover of darkness, there was virtually no security that could be afforded Fleet movements. Aiea Heights, overlooking Pearl Harbor, and Pearl City Peninsula, jutting into

Pearl Harbor, and being within two hundred yards of a new carrier berth, were areas both populated by Japanese, among them suspects. Nothing could be done to remove them from these areas in the absence of conclusive legal evidence that would sustain an espionage prosecution. In [332] addition, any businessman in Honolulu, whose office happened to look to seaward, could see vessels passing by, and those on the fourth and fifth stories of certain buildings could, with the naked eye, assuming the usual good visibility, determine the numbers and types of battleships, cruisers, and aircraft carriers entering or leaving Pearl Harbor. Thus a fairly accurate count of the number of vessels in Pearl Harbor at any given time of day could be made from Aiea Heights and Pearl City, and entries and departures be observed from even downtown Honolulu as well as more proximate localities on the beach.

15. Q. Did any means of adding to the security of ships' movements occur to the personnel of the District Intelligence Office at that time?

A. Realizing the impossibility of preventing the collection of this vital information, we early worked on the premise that our job should be to try to detect the means whereby it was being transmitted to the effective enemy destination, namely, Japan. As I have previously outlined, various public and private means of communication, not subject to official supervision and so manifold as to be impossible of total regulation, were available to Japanese espionage for transmission of this information. It was unnecessary for the Japanese to resort to anything so romantic as illegal radio transmitters in the hills or anything like that.

16. Q. Had you any information prior to the attack concerning the use of Japanese-manned or controlled fishing vessels in espionage?

A. For many years, the Japanese sampan fleet in Hawaii was openly suspect. It was almost entirely manned by Japanese aliens, many of them known to be ex-Japanese naval enlisted men. It was known that many of the crewmen had entered the United States illegally, that these sampans had, to some extent, assisted in the smuggling of narcotics, and it was rumored, but never proved, that they sometimes contacted Japanese submarines off these Islands. Numerous reports were received from Commanders afloat concerning the presence of Japanese fishing sampans proximate to Navy units engaged in target practice or tactical maneuvers. However, it was never satisfactorily established that these meetings were other than innocent coincidences. The normal fishing grounds which these sampans plied, extended, in some instances, hundreds of miles off Oahu, and it was recognized that perhaps, in effect, the Fleet units were "trespassing" on fishing grounds which the Japanese sampans had long used. However, it was recognized, but without any power available to limit their operations, that these sampans could be used to reconnoiter Fleet units at sea and also to establish to what extent, if at all, air and surface patrols operated from Oahu. No evidence that any sampan crewmen gathered vital intelligence and transmitted it to Japan has ever been found.

17. Q. Will you state what information you had prior to 7 December or that you learned thereafter concerning other intelligence sources which operated in Oahu, other than that which funneled through the

Japanese Consul here, during the week immediately preceding 7 December?

A. No information has come to the attention of the District Intelligence Officer to indicate that any intelligence was transmitted from here to Japan in the last week before the war except that which was transmitted by the Japanese Consulate. However, there was one suspicious fact that came to the attention of F.B.I., G-2, and the District Intelligence Officer immediately preceding the war that may have been a transmission of intelligence. On 4 December 1941, the editor of the most militaristic daily newspaper in Tokyo wired his local correspondent in Honolulu, Mrs. Motokazu Mori, that he wished to interview, by trans-Pacific radio-telephone, some prominent Hawaiian Japanese with respect to the conditions in Hawaii, and the editor requested that Mrs. Mori arrange for such an interview. Mrs. Mori was unable to secure any prominent local Japanese who would permit himself to be so interviewed and so, when the Tokyo editor placed a call on 5 December 1941 to Mrs. Mori at Honolulu, she asked her husband, Dr. Motokazu Mori, to permit himself to be [§§§] interviewed. At the time this trans-Pacific telephone call was made, a confidential source furnished the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Honolulu with a transcription of the telephone conversation. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the facts I have just related about this incident were not fully known until after the war started. However, it was known on 6 December 1941 the following had occurred: About 1400 on 6 December 1941, the duty officer at the District Intelligence Office was apprised by representative of F.B.I., Honolulu, that F.B.I. had a written transcript of the telephone call of Dr. Mori and the Tokyo editor and that the same was available for inspection by the District Intelligence Officer, or his representative. The Duty Officer, Lieutenant Commander—then Lieutenant—Denzel Carr, U.S.N.R., and Lieutenant George P. Kimball, U.S.N.R., head of District Intelligence Office, Counter-Espionage Section, immediately communicated with Captain Mayfield at his quarters, Pearl Harbor, and advised him they believed the matter of sufficient importance that he should return to his office and then confer with F.B.I. Captain Mayfield returned to the District Intelligence Office, discussed the matter with Lieutenants Carr and Kimball, and then proceeded to F.B.I. Office, where he examined the transcript, discussed its import with Mr. Robert L. Shivers, local F.B.I. head, and Lieutenant Colonel G. W. Bicknell, in charge of G-2 counter-espionage activities. An examination of this transcript, both by Captain Mayfield and Lieutenant Carr—Lieutenant Carr being an internationally recognized language scholar and very proficient in Japanese—impelled these two officers to the conclusion that the original transcription of this conversation should be examined immediately by Lieutenant Carr in order to study any possible hidden meanings in the conversation that might be concealed in the inflections of the voice, this conversation having been in Japanese. Lieutenant Carr stated, at that time, that certain of the passages, as translated by the F.B.I. translator, appeared somewhat incongruous in the Japanese speech, that he, personally, felt he should examine the whole recording. Lieutenant Carr wished to do this immediately but F.B.I., for some reason, stated the recording would not be available for his study until 1000 on 7 December 1941. Lieutenant Carr, sometime after

the attack, was allowed to listen to the recording and he was unable to conclude therefrom that it did contain military information in any hidden form. Lieutenant Carr subsequently participated in an intensive interrogation of Dr. Mori and Mrs. Mori and was of the opinion, which was concurred in by interrogators of the other Government agencies present, that the Moris were absolutely blameless and wholly surprised by this so-called trans-Pacific telephonic interview. A study of the transcript itself, which is available in the Office of Naval Intelligence, will show that there was an open conveyance of some military information in this telephone call. For example, the reference to the presence or absence of planes in the sky and armed force personnel on the streets of Honolulu, Dr. Mori having answered directly questions put to him by the Tokyo editor. I, personally, believe it unlikely, from my extensive study of this incident, that it was a calculated transmission of information from Honolulu to Japan, because other, more efficient, more concealed methods of transmission, namely the use of encrypted dispatches by public communications, were open to the Consulate.

18. Q. Reverting to your testimony concerning the refusal to prosecute the Japanese agents for nonregistration, did that failure to get results, in a step which your office felt should have been taken, adversely affect the esprit of your office and reduce its efforts in other directions?

A. I feel that I can state categorically that the failure to prosecute these consular agents did not adversely affect the esprit of the District Intelligence organization and its operations, principally because the matter was one of policy, not generally known in the organization, and because there [334] were so many other unsolved problems, possible leakages, to be worked on continually.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I think it should be added, in conclusion, that the Commandant authorized the District Intelligence Officer to deal directly with the Fleet Intelligence Officer on all matters conceived to be of importance to the Fleet in the interest of speedy transmission of information to the Fleet. To my knowledge, in every instance where the District Intelligence Officer secured information of possible value to the Fleet, that was immediately transmitted, generally by Captain Mayfield personally calling on the Fleet Intelligence Officer. It was recognized that there was some possibility that local events and happenings in the espionage field might provide some clue, however remote, as to the prospective enemy's intentions, and in this respect the Commandant was most liberal in allowing free flow of information. However, there was a general feeling in the District Intelligence organization, which, at that time, included a section whose responsibilities have since passed to the District Security Officer, that the Commandant, namely, Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, was not security conscious, nor was he too mindful of the en-

emy espionage potential here. I can state, from personal recollection, that on many occasions before the war, this apparent attitude of the Commandant was the cause of minor depression amongst officers in the District Intelligence organization. This was particularly apparent with regard to the Commandant's attitude toward physical security measures that the Security Section of the District Intelligence thought were necessary to the safeguarding of both the physical plant and information available in the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor. I can, however, cite no causal connection between the Commandant's apparent attitude and the success of the Japanese attack here.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 4 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[335] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

MONDAY, APRIL 17, 1944

TWENTY-NINTH DAY

PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The examination met at 9:28 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer and his counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-eighth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral Charles H. McMorris, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the nineteenth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Lieutenant William B. Stephenson, U. S. Naval Reserve, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twenty-eighth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Rear Admiral Howard F. Kingman, U. S. Navy, Commander Battleship Division Two.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year 1941?

A. I returned from duty on the Asiatic Station to duty at Navy Department, Washington, May, 1941. Upon my arrival in Washington, I was assigned to duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence as head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch. I remained on this duty until early in October, 1941, when I was assigned the duty of Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence under Captain T. S. Wilkinson. I continued on this duty throughout the year 1941.

3. Q. Admiral, while you were serving as Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, did your duties in any way bring you into contact

with the activities of the Intelligence Offices of the several Naval Districts?

A. As Assistant Director, I had no direct contact or supervision over the administration or activities within the several Naval Districts' intelligence organizations.

4. Q. Prior to that time, while you were the head of the Domestic Branch, will you please outline your relations in connection with the District Intelligence Offices?

[336] A. The officer in charge of Domestic Intelligence Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, sometimes referred to as Branch "B", has direct control and supervision over the activities of the several Naval Districts' intelligence organizations within the continental limits of the United States. In this capacity, the head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch does have a general good over-all knowledge of what is being done in the intelligence field in the several Districts. The Office of Naval Intelligence did not, however, during the period in question, attempt to issue detailed instructions or control the details of operation within each Naval District. The policy of O. N. I., at that time, was very definitely set forth to the effect that each District Commandant would execute the general policies established by O. N. I. and carry out the broad directives in such manner as the Commandant felt best suited the organization within his District.

5. Q. Admiral, will you please extend the answer to the previous question so as to set forth relations between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the District Intelligence Office of the Fourteenth Naval District (Honolulu).

A. The intelligence organization in the Fourteenth Naval District being far removed from Washington, had a somewhat different status from those District intelligence organizations within the continental limits of the United States which could be more easily controlled and directed from Washington. Consequently, the details of administration with regard to "investigative activities" within the Fourteenth Naval District were left more to the direct control and supervision of the District Commandant than was done in those Districts which were closely connected to Washington.

6. Q. Admiral, do you know of any expression by the then Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District of his views with regard to any of the activities of the District Intelligence Office of that District during 1941?

A. I recall that the District Commandant was somewhat concerned about the "investigative activities" being carried on by some of the inexperienced personnel on duty at that time in the Fourteenth Naval District's Intelligence organization. I believe that the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District mentioned this matter and stated to the Navy Department the fact that he was somewhat concerned in regard thereto. To the best of my memory, this matter was covered in a personal letter from the Commandant to the Chief of Naval Operations.

7. Q. Admiral, where do you believe this letter to have been filed?

A. I could not say because I believe this letter was a personal letter to Admiral Stark and I have no knowledge as to where or how he filed his personal correspondence. This letter was shown to me by the

Director of Naval Intelligence at that time, Captain A. G. Kirk, and I recall having made a pencil memorandum in regard to the particular paragraph in question. I believe that this memorandum could be found in the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Branch "B".

Note: The examining officer caused a search to be made of the files of the Domestic Intelligence Branch (Branch "B") of the Office of Naval Intelligence, but was unable to locate the pencil memorandum mentioned by the witness.

8. Q. Admiral, at the time that you were the head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch, did you have any information relating to the activities of certain persons known in Hawaii as "consular agents"?

A. None whatsoever that I can recall at this time.

9. Q. You do not then recall certain recommendations with respect to the prosecution of such agents under the law requiring agents of alien governments [337] to register with the State Department?

A. I can recall nothing of a specific nature in regard to this matter having been undertaken in the Fourteenth Naval District. However, I do recall that the whole matter of consular agents in all Districts was a matter of discussion at one of the joint intelligence meetings held in Washington. The heads of the three intelligence agencies, namely, M. I. D., O. N. I., and F. B. I. constituted the membership of these meetings. The minutes of these meetings are filed in all three departments or offices and should be found in any one of them without difficulty. Copies were given to O. N. I. and F. B. I. and any one of them should have them. Perhaps Captain Waller, who relieved me as the officer in charge of Branch "B" could give further information on this subject.

Note: The documents mentioned by the witness have been identified by the examining officer as being titled "Minutes of Inter-Departmental Intelligence Conferences", now in the custody of the Head of the Counter-Intelligence Branch (formerly Domestic Intelligence) of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 11 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[338] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 1944

THIRTIETH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-ninth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter, dated 5 April 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, from Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the transcript of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the testimony given by him on the seventeenth day of the examination was correct, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 33".

The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter, dated 5 April 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, from Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the transcript of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the testimony given by him on the twentieth and twenty-first days of the examination was correct, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 34".

The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter, dated 6 April 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, from Captain John L. McCrea, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the transcript of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the testimony given by him on the twenty-third day of the examination was correct, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 35".

The examining officer read and introduced a copy of a letter, dated 24 April 1944, from Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, informing him of the reconvening of the examination in Washington, D. C., appended hereto marked "Exhibit 36".

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. William E. G. Taylor, Commander, A-V(T), U. S. N. R., attached to Commander, Fleet Air, Quonset, Quonset Point, Rhode Island.

[339] 2. Q. Were you born and brought up in a family of the armed Services?

A. Yes, sir. I was born at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. My father is Colonel James G. Taylor, U. S. Army, Retired.

3. Q. What was your college education?

A. My college education consisted of two years of aeronautical engineering at New York University.

4. Q. State, briefly, the circumstances surrounding your first connection with the naval service.

A. During the second year of my college, I had a particular desire to get into the flying end of aviation rather than the technical end, and applied for flight training, was accepted, went through flight training in 1926 at Hampton Roads, Virginia; completed flight training and was commissioned an Ensign AF, U. S. N. R., in March, 1927.

5. Q. Did that course of training make you a full-fledged naval aviator?

A. Yes, sir, I was designated a naval aviator on the completion of the course.

6. Q. State, briefly, your duties and experiences in naval aviation subsequent to that acceptance.

A. On July 1, 1927, I was ordered to active duty as a pilot in the Fifth Fighting Squadron, later attached to the U. S. S. LEXINGTON, and I served one year's active duty with the Fleet. On the completion of the year's duty, at the end of the year, I was ordered to inactive duty, was then asked to transfer to the Marine Corps Reserve as an instructor, during the period when the Marine Corps Reserve was building up an aviation reserve.

7. Q. When was that?

A. I resigned my commission as an Ensign in July, 1928, and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve the same month. I served as instructor at Pensacola as an officer in charge of the Marine Corps Reserve Aviation Unit at Squantum, Grosse Isle Field; served a period of duty at Quantico. Most of this period of active duty was as an aviation instructor. In 1934, I was ordered to inactive duty.

8. Q. During these years in the Navy and the Marine Corps, which I understand totaled about seven years, were you specialized in any particular type of aircraft?

A. Yes, I specialized in fighter aircraft.

9. Q. What was your rank when you were placed on inactive status in 1934?

A. Captain, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve, sir.

10. Q. Do you know why you were transferred to the inactive list at that time?

A. No, sir, I do not. I was given to understand that the Marine Corps Reserve, which was limited in its funds for training, wanted to increase the number of officer instructors by ordering senior officers to inactive duty and taking on new Second Lieutenants.

11. Q. Following your placement upon inactive status, in what pursuit or occupation did you engage?

A. After I was ordered to inactive duty, the first occupation that I took up was as manager and flight instructor at the Aviation Country Club in [340] Hicksville, Long Island. I remained at this work for approximately two years and left to take a job as pilot with United Air Lines. I was with United Air Lines about nine months. I next became a pilot for an oil processing company in New York. I remained at this job until 1938 when I left the job and went to England.

12. Q. While in the employ of the United Air Lines, what were your actual duties?

A. I was employed as a co-pilot.

13. Q. On what run?

A. On the run between Chicago and New York, sir.

14. Q. What were the circumstances and reasons for your going to England in 1938 and what was the approximate date?

A. I sailed for England in mid-July for the purpose of attempting to get into the Royal Air Force if war were declared. As it appeared that war would not be declared by mid-August, I returned to the United States.

15. Q. How long did you remain in the United States?

A. I remained in the United States until August, 1939, when I again went to England to join the Royal Air Force. I was put in touch with Royal Air Force officers and British Naval Air Officers by the Naval Attache, London. The Royal Air Force was non-committal or would not commit themselves to accepting me until war was declared. The British Navy signified their willingness to accept me as a Sub-Lieutenant, R. N. V. R., even before war was declared. I sent my resignation as a Captain of the Marine Corps Reserve back to the United States via the American Naval Attache, London, on 1 September 1939. I was commissioned a Sub-Lieutenant in the R. N. V. R. about 4 September 1939.

16. Q. Upon accepting that commission, what became your employment in the British Navy?

A. I was first sent to the Fleet Air Fighter Training School at Donibristle, Scotland, following which I was sent to the Mediterranean in H. M. S. ARGUS for carrier qualifications. Upon completion of carrier qualifications, I was ordered to Scapa Flow to a Fleet Fighter Squadron whose function was the defense of the Fleet in Scapa Flow.

17. Q. About what date was that?

A. That was about November or December, 1939. My squadron remained at Scapa Flow until the beginning of the Norwegian Campaign, which, I believe, was March, 1940, when we were attached to H. M. S. GLORIOUS and H. M. S. FURIOUS; we made four trips between Scapa Flow and the Norwegian Coast. We returned to Scapa Flow at the end of the Norwegian Campaign in June, 1940.

18. Q. During that period, while based ashore at Scapa Flow, or on those two British carriers, what actual active service did you have in the air?

A. My service consisted mainly of attempting to intercept occasional German reconnaissance aircraft while I was at Scapa Flow. We had three dusk and night raids on the Fleet in Scapa Flow. At sea, in H. M. S. FURIOUS and H. M. S. GLORIOUS, we formed the combat air patrol. Approximately four or five days of our entire time was spent intercepting bombers sent out from Norway to bomb the Fleet.

19. Q. Did you make full interceptions and engage in combats?

A. Yes, sir.

[341] 20. Q. Will you state it briefly?

A. During the night raids at Scapa Flow, most of the raids were over land by the time we were sent up to intercept. Due to darkness, we made very few interceptions. At sea, however, we had a great many interceptions with the bombers that came over. As there were twenty-four hours a day of daylight off the Norwegian Coast at this time, we had continual interceptions for approximately thirty-six hours. The bombers were sent out singly at intervals of approximately three to five minutes.

21. During those operations, was your unit, while in the air, commanded by agencies of the character which later become known to us as "fighter direction" agencies?

A. Yes, sir.

22. Will you describe, briefly, what you knew of the composition and effectiveness of those agencies as they were then operating?

A. Based ashore at Scapa, we were controlled by the Royal Air Force Fighter Command Operations Control. We were never given any information as to how the Fighter Operations received its enemy information, but from the size and general make-up of the radio towers, we more or less guessed that information was received by advance electronics. We knew that there was a network of radio or radar stations along the Coast of England which kept a continual watch for hostile aircraft and reported to a system of Royal Air Force Fighter Command Operations rooms. At sea, we were controlled by what was known as an "anti-aircraft cruiser." We had heard of anti-aircraft cruisers from a Fleet Air Arm Fighter Squadron in the Shetlands which had been controlled by H. M. S. CURLEW. H. M. S. CURLEW was in the task force during the Norwegian Campaign and it was H. M. S. CURLEW which controlled all fighters during operations off the Norwegian Coast. The interceptions were accurate except for height. However, the visibility was good enough so that the error in height made little difference in actually accomplishing interceptions.

23. Q. Did you then consider that the fighters of your unit were being effectively directed while they were in the air?

A. Yes, sir, very effectively.

24. Q. Were the results accomplished against the enemy aircraft considerable?

A. We were able to keep all of the German bombers from closing in our Fleet. No ship was bombed or even did we have a near miss during that period. However, our aircraft were not fast enough to chase German bombers. The German bombers turned away and jettisoned their bombs before we intercepted them.

25. Q. Did you know whether or not the anti-aircraft cruiser from which you were commanded in the air, obtained its enemy information through some form of electronics?

A. I did not know what method the anti-aircraft cruiser was using, but the general assumption was, amongst my contemporaries, that the same type of equipment that was used ashore was being used aboard ship. We could see a special antenna on the foremast which we assumed had something to do with her detecting system.

26. Q. How many fighter aircraft were in your squadron and about how many did the GLORIOUS and FURIOUS carry when off the Norwegian Coast?

A. There were twelve aircraft in my squadron; there were also six aircraft of one other squadron attached. The ARK ROYAL had one twelve-plane fighter squadron, which was actually a dive bomber squadron.

[342] 27. Q. What did you think, at the time, of the ability of those aircraft carriers as regards handling planes?

A. By comparison with American carriers, the British carriers carried very few aircraft and operated them more as single aircraft than as a large striking force. The British Navy had just taken the Fleet Air Arm over from the Royal Air Force three months before war was declared. The Fleet Air Arm was in pretty desperate condition, both as regards pilots, numbers of aircraft, and types of aircraft, but with what they had, it was my opinion that they did an excellent job.

28. Q. Did it occur to you at the time that the results obtained under those conditions were considerably promoted by the method of command and control of the aircraft while in the air?

A. Yes, sir, it was my opinion that without the type of fighter direction and control that we had, we would never have been able, with the few number of aircraft we had, to intercept more than approximately one-tenth of the number of bombers which came over.

29. Q. As result of those experiences, did you make any reports, official or otherwise, to U. S. naval representatives in Britain?

A. Yes, sir. I became very much interested in the method of control; did everything within my power to get as much information on how control was accomplished, and made periodic reports to the Naval Air Attache, London.

30. Q. Subsequent to the service which you have just described, what constituted your next activities?

A. At the end of the Norwegian Campaign, at the suggestion of my Squadron Commander, I went to Admiralty, while on leave, and offered to return to the United States in an attempt to get faster fighter aircraft which could be used by the Fleet Air Arm. As a result, I was sent back to the United States. By the time I reached the United States, France had fallen and I located a cancelled French contract for the first F4F Grumman fighters. I spent approximately six weeks having these fighters converted for British shipboard use and arranging for shipment back to England. I then returned to England and worked for the month on getting the aircraft reassembled and shipped out to fighter squadrons. During this month, the Royal Air Force was forming an Eagle Squadron made up of American volunteers and had asked the British Navy for my services as squadron commander. At

the end of the month, the Air Ministry and Admiralty reached an agreement and I was transferred to the Royal Air Force. This transfer was effected on 2 October 1940. I was sent to a Royal Air Force Fighter Operational Training unit for three weeks, at the end of which time I was ordered, at my own request, to 242 Fighter Squadron, stationed at the Royal Air Force Station at Duxford. I asked to be sent to 242 Squadron before taking over 71 Eagle Squadron because I wanted to get some operational experience in an active air force squadron before forming my own.

31. Q. Give a brief summary of your operational experience while attached to R. A. F. Fighter Squadron No. 242.

A. During the four month period I was attached to 242 Squadron, I participated in four or five actual interceptions against hostile aircraft, flying wing on the Squadron Commander. Although we saw numerous hostile aircraft during these operations, we were never ordered to attack. The actual attacks were to be made by other squadrons which were also in the air. The greater part of my time in the 242 Squadron was spent learning current tactical information and learning the organization of R. A. F. squadrons.

[343] 32. Q. State, briefly, the result of your observations of the R. A. F. Fighter Command during the most important periods of the so-called "Battle of Britain".

A. At the beginning of the Battle of Britain, the Royal Air Force Fighter Squadrons were well dispersed. Their fighter direction control system was well organized. Squadrons were tactically made up of only sections sent up to intercept sporadic raids. At the beginning of the Battle of Britain, large numbers of aircraft came over in an attempt to wipe out the fighter defense of the Royal Air Force and the early squadron organization was not capable of coping with large raids. However, within a remarkably short time Fighter Command managed to reorganize, tactically, their fighter force into squadrons and wings capable of intercepting large raids and inflicting considerable damage on the enemy bombers and fighters. It was generally accepted that the major reason for the success of the Royal Air Force fighters over the German raids was due to the magnificent fighter direction control. My own participation in these raids was only towards the end or in an occasional raid of not over forty or fifty German bombers escorted by fighters that came over to bomb the London docks or to bomb ships of convoys in the Channel. In every case, we were directed by the controller at our home station who was able to give us accurate information and direct us to the incoming raids. He was able to give us approximately the number of aircraft we could expect to run into and would put us in an advantageous position for an attack. At the end of attacks, when pilots were lost in bad weather or in good weather, the controller was always able to bring the lost aircraft home to its base or to another base. The question of navigation in fighters never came up. The entire navigation of aircraft, both going up, making interceptions, and returning, was done by controllers in an underground operations room. I became extremely interested in the entire controlling system, spent a great deal of time in various sector operation rooms, group operations rooms, and fighter command operations rooms, trying to learn as much about the British method of interception as possible. I made frequent reports of what I had learned to the American Naval Attache, London.

33. Q. During that period, Autumn of 1940, did you become cognizant of any officers of our own Army who were having similar opportunities for learning the British system?

A. Yes, sir, both the American Army and the American Navy had a large number of observers who were studying the Royal Air Force system.

34. Q. Would you say, from such observation, that both the War Department and Navy Department became somewhat fully informed concerning the R. A. F. Fighter Command apparatus and operation in handling their interceptor fighter aircraft?

A. My impression at the time, and later, after I returned to the United States, was that all of the information was made available to the American Army and American Navy observers but it did not appear that these observers brought back the full importance of method of the Royal Air Force intercepting system.

35. Q. At about what date would you estimate that Army and Navy officers directly detailed for the observation of that system became sufficiently cognizant of it to make adequate reports on the same?

A. I know that a special Army Air Corps group of observers were at Fighter Command in October or November, 1940, specially studying the Royal Air Force fighter direction system.

36. Q. Did you think that they had full opportunities for observation and were given all the so-called "secrets"?

[344] A. I believe that the Army mission was given all of the information necessary to understand and duplicate the British system.

37. Q. Upon what do you base that belief?

A. I base the belief on the fact that the Army observers were actually in the operations rooms at Fighter Commands, at groups, and the various sectors. They were permitted to talk to fighter squadrons who were employing the fighter direction system. I do not know that they were permitted to see the actual radar sets, but I was told, however, that special Army tactical officers had been permitted to see the actual radar stations along the coast.

38. Q. Did you, yourself, become acquainted with the British radar apparatus and with its technical operation?

A. I was given a very good basic understanding of the function and limitations of the radar equipment, but I had never actually seen a British radar system until after I had resigned from the Royal Air Force.

39. Q. In addition to the representatives of the United States Army Air Corps, were similar bodies of naval aviators also given opportunities to learn the British fighter direction system?

A. I did not hear of any naval observers studying either the Royal Air Force or British Navy Fighter Direction System until late Spring of 1941.

40. Q. Did you, during 1940, make any reports, formal or otherwise, which may have reached the Navy Department and particularly describing the British radar apparatus and its operation?

A. Yes, sir, I made a full report of all of the operations that I had been engaged in and of all the information that I had picked up in England to several groups of officers in the Bureau of Aeronautics. I particularly sought out the officer who was, at that time, in charge of radar development in the Bureau of Aeronautics to give him what in-

formation I had on the British Fighter Direction System. I was told that the U. S. Navy had radar either in our ships or being developed for shipboard use. I could arouse no interest in the use of this radar for fighter direction.

41. Q. At about what date did you complete the assembling and training of your own squadron and where did it then become stationed?

A. 71 Eagle Squadron completed its training and became operational in January, 1941, at Kirton Lindsey, Lincolnshire, on the East Coast of England, and we were immediately ordered to Martelsham Heath where our main function was the defense of convoys going to and from the Thames and Humber Rivers.

42. Q. What kind of planes did you have?

A. We were originally equipped with Hurricane fighters and, later, were reequipped with Spitfires.

43. Q. Give a brief resume of your experiences while in command of the Eagle Squadron, operating under the R. A. F.

A. From the time that we became operational, in January of 1941, until July of 1941, our squadron stood a regular fighter watches on the Southeast Coast of England. Our combat work was mainly the protection of convoys off the Coast and making interceptions on any hostile aircraft which came over. During this period, there was very little German activity except at night. During the moonlight periods, we sent up four planes of our squadron to join the night fighter defense. Having no radar, our night work was ineffective. Up until this time, the only type of radar that was functioning in England [345] was the seaward-looking radar. All overland direction of fighters was done by radio direction finding on the fighters. All of the hostile aircraft positions were reported by visual observers. Radar interceptions overland were, therefore, almost impossible except with the aid of searchlights or airborne radar. This was approximately the period during which the R.A.F. was building up an improved system for interception of enemy planes overland and at night.

44. Q. What were the circumstances of the termination of your services in the Royal Air Force?

A. In July, 1941, I was called to Group Headquarters and told that because of my age, I was going to be made a Wing Commander and put in command of a fighter operational training unit. I was disappointed in losing my squadron and asked to be allowed to go back either to the British Navy or to return to the American Navy. The American Naval Attache had been, for the past year, asking me to return to the American Navy for the purpose of working on fighter direction. I was allowed to go to London to talk to the American Naval Attache, who sent a dispatch to the Navy Department, Washington, advising them that my services were available. In approximately two weeks' time, my commission and orders to duty to the Bureau of Aeronautics in Washington were received in London. I was commissioned Lieutenant Commander, A-V(S), U. S. N. R., in London in the month of July, 1941. However, as there was no immediate transportation back to the United States and as the Naval Attache wanted me to collect more information on radar equipment, I was given a special assignment to visit several radar stations. I was given every opportunity to thoroughly inspect the most modern

radar stations in the South of England and all of my questions were answered willingly. In August, in about 15 August 1941, I was returned to the United States by Clipper and reported to the Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics.

45. Q. Upon your arrival in the Navy Department, did it occur to you that you were being looked upon as an expert in the utilization of radar for purposes of command and direction of airborne aircraft?

A. Only by a very few officers. The vast majority of officers in the Bureau of Aeronautics seemed to consider fighter direction of very little importance.

46. Q. Did those who seemed to realize its importance appear to look upon you as expert in that specialty?

A. Yes, sir.

47. Q. From your experiences, soon after you returned to Washington, did you find anyone else whom you considered, at the time, as equally expert as yourself?

A. There were several officers in this country who had been in England studying both the Royal Air Force and the British Navy method of fighter direction who were, at that time, setting up fighter direction schools at Norfolk and at San Diego. However, it was apparent that their brief period of observing in England did not give them nearly the full picture of what fighter direction involved.

48. Q. Then you found no one who had the breadth of experience in that line which you had enjoyed?

A. No, sir.

49. Q. Please state, briefly, the duties which you came to perform upon your return to the United States.

A. I was sent out on temporary duty in the YORKTOWN, RANGER, and WASP in September, 1941, to lecture to the fighter squadrons on combat tactics and fighter direction to pass on to the ships' officers what information I had on [346] the use of search radar for fighter direction purposes, and to learn what I could of what each ship contemplated as a fighter direction organization. I completed this duty in approximately one month's time and returned to Washington.

50. Q. Did that brief assignment with the carriers in our Atlantic Fleet acquaint you with the capabilities of the radar installations which you found on board those ships?

A. Yes, sir. There was radar only aboard the YORKTOWN at that time.

51. Q. At the time, what was your judgment as to the performance of that radar as compared with those which you had recently seen in Britain?

A. It was my impression that the radar equipment aboard the YORKTOWN was superior to any radar equipment used in the British Navy and at least as good as the Royal Air Force shore-based search radar.

52. Q. What did you find as to the comparative ability of the radar operators?

A. The radar operators were largely under training, but the main radar enlisted man and the main radar officer aboard ship were both very well trained and versed in the operation of the equipment.

53. Q. Next, following that detail, what became your duties?

A. I was given temporary duty orders to report to Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, for temporary duty. My duties were to be the same as they had been on the East Coast carriers. I joined the U. S. S. LEXINGTON at San Diego and lectured the fighter squadrons and spoke to the ship's officers en route to Pearl Harbor in early October, 1941. On my arrival at Pearl Harbor, I found the ENTERPRISE was at sea. I, therefore, reported to the Air Officer on CinCPac's Staff. When the ENTERPRISE returned in early October, approximately three days later, I reported to Admiral Halsey. Admiral Halsey instructed me to report to Admiral Kimmel for such use as he wanted to make of me. Admiral Kimmel questioned me while I was at Pearl Harbor. He also instructed me to lecture to the fighter squadrons of the Army Air Force. Admiral Kimmel's Staff made arrangements for my lectures at Wheeler Field. I made a series of four lectures to all of the fighter squadrons at Wheeler Field.

54. Q. Upon completing those lectures, what became your duties?

A. On completion of the lectures to the Army Fighter Squadrons, I lectured to the pilots and ship's officers of the U. S. S. SARATOGA and I then reported to the U. S. S. ENTERPRISE. I went to sea in the U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, lectured to the squadrons attached to her, also had an opportunity to observe their method of fighter direction. The ENTERPRISE's fighter direction had gone much further than any other ship. The ENTERPRISE's fighter direction was considerably behind the British methods. This was so because the fighter system had been improvised by the Staff Communications Officer with little information to work on.

55. Q. Then you found the ENTERPRISE considerably advanced over the other carriers in the utilization of radar?

A. Yes, sir.

56. Q. As regards the radar equipment and its actual operation, will you state the conditions which you found on the various carriers of the Pacific Fleet?

[347] A. The ENTERPRISE had had their radar aboard a considerable time and had been able to calibrate the radar equipment and train to a certain extent one or two fighter director officers. The SARATOGA had no radar. The LEXINGTON, on which I came out from San Diego, had just had her radar installed and was just learning to use it. In all ships equipped with radar, the radar installation had been very recent and all hands were going through a training period in the operation and utilization of the equipment for fighter direction.

57. Q. Was it the same variety of equipment which you found in the carriers in the Atlantic and which you have stated was very good for its kind?

A. Yes, sir.

58. Q. Following that period at sea in the ENTERPRISE, what was your next duty?

A. While I was at sea in the ENTERPRISE, a dispatch was received from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, stating that my services were requested by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, for technical purposes. Upon our return to Pearl Harbor, I was instructed to report to the Acting Commanding Officer, Interceptor Command, to assist in an advisory capacity in setting up the Army Information Center at Fort Shafter.

59. Q. Did you have reason to believe that either the Navy or the Army, or both, in the Hawaiian Area, were looking upon you as expert in that specialty?

A. Yes, sir. A very few officers in both the Army and Navy seemed to feel that I was an expert on fighter direction and the utilization of radar.

60. Q. Was that because the installations and the use of it was so new that very few officers knew anything about it?

A. Yes, sir. That was true generally in both the Army and Navy. The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 12:10 p. m., was adjourned until 11 a. m., tomorrow.

[348] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, APRIL 27, 1944

THIRTY-FIRST DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 11:20 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirtieth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Commander William E. G. Taylor, U. S. Naval Reserve, the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examination by the examining officer (Continued):

61. Q. Please give a resume of your experiences while thus loaned to the United States Army, Hawaiian Department, including your relations with Army officials, and with Navy officials as well if such occurred, covering also radar apparatus, ability to use same, communications from the radar stations, and so on.

A. I was instructed to report to the Interceptor Command at Wheeler Field and reported to find the Commanding General of the Interceptor Command was in the United States. The Acting Commanding Officer requested me to work in an advisory capacity with his Operations Officer and assist him in expediting the completion of the air warning system. During the first week in November, we inspected all of the installations and plans for the air warning system and I found these facts to be true: (1) Construction and maintenance of the air warning system was a Signal Corps function directly under the cognizance of the Chief Signal Officer, Staff of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. This Command appeared to have little conception of the vast function of the air warning system and exhibited very little interest in expediting its installation. At no time before December 7, 1941, did this Command furnish either the authority or impetus badly needed to get the work or organization properly started. (2) The actual operation of the air warning system—that is, the evaluation and dissemination of radar information and the control of fighter defense—was under the Interceptor Command. The

Interceptor Command fully realized the importance of the air warning system. Although the officers concerned were not fully informed of its complicated functions, they were willing and eager to take advice and lend all assistance in their power to help complete its installations. They seemed relatively impotent, however, in getting assistance needed from the Commanding General's Staff. (3) One Captain of the Air Corps and one Captain of the Signal Corps had been through the Air Warning School at Mitchell Field, New York. It was with these two officers that I worked. Both were capable and energetic. They worked twelve to fifteen hours a day, seven days a week, in an attempt to speed up completion of the air warning system. (4) The air warning [349] equipment and communications system were largely field or mobile equipment and the entire system was temporary. However, with the exception of the ground-to-air and air-to-ground radio equipment, the system was adequate to serve its purpose as was later proved. (5) There were only five Army mobile radar equipments in the Hawaiian area. These equipments had been in Oahu about three months. The five sets were installed and, in my opinion, as well sited as terrain would permit and were the absolute minimum needed to cover the entire seaward search for the Island. The radar equipment itself was inferior to any I had seen before. The deficiency in the equipment, however, was due to crude mechanical construction rather than to any electronic fault. This made the operation of the equipment difficult and slow, with the result that the reported azimuth readings were frequently very inaccurate and the reports were slow in coming in. The equipment had a reliable range of eighty to one hundred miles. A "dead" area existed through a fifteen mile radius from the equipment. It was, therefore, impossible to pick up aircraft plots within the first fifteen miles off shore. At each radar station, there was at least one officer or sergeant well trained to operate and maintain the equipment. In addition, there were seven or eight other enlisted operators under instruction at each station. All stations were under-manned for twenty-four hour operation. At the time of my inspection, either commercial or Signal Corps field telephone lines had been installed between the radar stations and the Information Center. (6) The Information Center itself had been planned on an Area Command scale similar to the Boston or New York Information Centers and was too large in scope to effectively handle raids on the small Island of Oahu. The building was a temporary, wooden building and had just been completed at the time of my inspection. The communications equipment was mostly field telephone equipment of the type developed during the last war. Positions had been provided for controllers and liaison officers, but liaison command lines had not been installed. These were not installed, primarily, because the activities at which the liaison command lines were to terminate were uninformed as to the purpose concerning the air warning system and because the Commanding General had not taken the steps to coordinate these activities with the air warning system. The Signal Corps had furnished sufficient plotters to man two watches only. These were just starting their training at the time of my inspection. There were no controllers or liaison officers available at this time and no provisions had been made to provide them. (7) The anti-aircraft batteries had installed a command post but no liaison had been established

between the anti-aircraft command and the Information Center. (8) No attempt had been made to secure control of the anti-aircraft guns of ships in harbor. (9) No liaison had been established between the searchlights and the Information Center. (10) No attempt had been made to disperse the fighter squadrons at Wheeler Field. (11) No automatic aircraft recognition system was installed which would identify all types of aircraft. (12) No aircraft approach lane system had been planned. (13) No system for identifying aircraft approaching Oahu by reports from parent aviation activities had been organized. (14) No visual observers reporting system had been organized. The foregoing is a summation of conditions found at Oahu during my inspection about 1 November 1941. These were reported by myself and the Interceptor Command Operations Officer to the Staffs of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District; Commander, Patrol Wing Two; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force and Bomber Command, prior to November 15, 1941. By December 7, 1941, all telephone communication lines had been installed with the exception of the Civilian Air Raid Precaution Command lines, and the command lines from the Information Center to five fighter squadron dispersal points at Wheeler Field. Direct command [350] lines were installed from Liaison position in the Information Center to the various Army and Navy commands and activities. The civilian line had not been completed due to the fact no air raid center had been set up in Honolulu. The command lines to the fighter dispersal points were not completed, due to switchboard complications at Wheeler Field. Two fighter squadrons were dispersed, one at Bellows Field and one at Halienua Field. The dispersal of the remaining fighter squadrons was awaiting installation of command lines. An excellent liaison had been established between the Army anti-aircraft batteries (three and five inch) and searchlights. About 15 November, I was instructed by CinCPac's Staff to request control of anti-aircraft guns of ships in harbor from Com 14. This request was refused by Com 14 on the grounds that "No Army organization would control guns on any naval vessel. If anything comes over, we will shoot it down." However, this control was voluntarily turned over to the Information Center on December 9, after ships' guns had shot down U. S. S. ENTERPRISE aircraft. At the same time, I was also instructed by CinCPac to request naval liaison officers for the Information Center from Com 14. His Chief of Staff informed me that these liaison officers should come from the Fleet. I was referred to Commander, Patrol Wing Two. I was told by Commander, Patrol Wing Two, that no liaison officers were available in that Command. I returned to CinCPac and reported my failure to obtain naval liaison officers. CinCPac's Operations Officer informed me that he would take steps to find some. These officers did not report to the Information Center until December 8. I was further instructed by CinCPac to confer with Commander, Patrol Wing Two, in order to establish an aircraft identification system and aircraft approach lanes to Oahu. A conference was held at the Information Center, between November 15 and 20, at which officers from all flying activities were present to discuss these matters. It was decided by the aviation activities concerned that these systems would not be put into effect until war was

declared, because it was felt that activating these systems prior to that time would complicate crowded flying conditions and hinder flying training. The Army stated that movements of aircraft from the United States to the Southwest Pacific were secret, and it was, therefore, not desirable to report those movements at that time. It should be noted that without an aircraft movement reporting system to the Information Center, it was impossible for the Information Center to determine whether radar reports were of friendly or of hostile aircraft. CinCPac's Operations Officer stated, however, that their Operations Office was prepared to report the movements of aircraft under their cognizance at any time this information was requested. Some doubt existed as to whether the Signal Corps' (Hawaiian Department) or Interceptor Command should furnish controllers. As no controllers seemed to be forthcoming from the Hawaiian Department, Interceptor Command decided to use Squadron Commanders as controllers at the Information Center. These officers were heavily occupied with training their squadrons and were seldom available for controller training. However, no other source of controllers seemed to exist. Bomber Command, G. H. Q., and G-2 liaison officers were not made available until several days after December 7, when their importance at the Information Center was finally realized. Interceptor Command had taken the initiative in the training of Information Center plotters. This training was progressing satisfactorily when, during the last week in November, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ordered that the radar stations would operate only between 0400 and 0700. I was informed that the decision to limit the operating hours was made to prevent breakdown of the radar equipment from prolonged operation. Training which had been conducted from 0800 to 1700 daily only, due to the shortage of radar operators and plotters, was necessarily limited to the hours of 0400-0700 by the order. The Information Center, therefore, virtually ceased to function except during those hours. I informed CinCPac's Operations Officer of the situation as it existed on or about 1 December and was told that in view of the [351] of the failure of the responsible commanders to take action to provide necessary personnel and to activate the Information Center on a twenty-four hour basis, he would initiate a letter requesting the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to take action immediately. I do not know whether this letter was ever written, or not. However, no action was taken up to December 7. On the morning of December 7, I was informed, by the telephone operator of the hotel in which I was staying, that all naval officers were instructed to report to their ships immediately. I reported to the Information Center between 0800 and 0830 to find considerable confusion in progress. The duty controller was a Squadron Commander who had stood his first training watch during the 0400-0700 period that day. Through no fault of his own, he was almost totally unable to cope with the situation. The Interception Command Operations Officer had reported before my arrival, and was doing his utmost to get the Information Center organized. Sentries, mess cooks, and telephone linesmen were pressed into the liaison positions to man the telephones. As they were untrained, it was impossible for them to interpret and report the current situation to the activities requesting information. Someone had removed the large scale overlay chart of

the Islands from the plotting table. The scale of the plotting table chart was too small for plotting, with the result that the plotting table was covered with a confusion of plots too numerous and large to evaluate properly. The Operations Officer was doing the best job possible under the circumstances to control the few fighters which were air-borne. During this time, I was occupied in an attempt to keep all of the interested activities as well informed as possible over the many liaison command lines. I should like to state here that several traced records were kept of the many plots which appeared on the plotting board. After the raids on December 7, these tracings were studied in an attempt to determine exactly where the raids had come from, and in what direction they had returned. As a flight of Army B-17 bombers had arrived almost simultaneously with the first raid, and as there were a considerable number of friendly aircraft in all areas, it was only possible to reconstruct an estimated plot of what had occurred. This plot was not completed until nearly forty-eight hours after the raids. However, it is my understanding that this plot was shown to the Secretary of the Navy during his visit as evidence that all information was received in an orderly manner by the Information Center during the raids.

62. Q. Referring to your statement concerning the fifteen mile "dead area" around Oahu, was there any visual system to supplement that weakness in the radar coverage?

A. After December 7 only, sir.

63. Q. Will you please elaborate your statement concerning what seems to have been a dual responsibility as between the Army Signal Corps and the Army Air Corps covering the installation of the complete warning system?

A. Where it was the Signal Corps' job to expedite the completion of the Information Center, the full initiative for expediting this work was taken on by Interceptor Command. The Chief Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, seemed to attach very secondary importance to the completion of the Information Center, both as regards providing materiel and trained personnel.

64. Q. Which organization had the responsibility for the supply of personnel in the first place?

A. It was my impression that the Signal Corps had the job of furnishing all personnel for the Information Center.

[352] 65. Q. What, as regards the installations and operators of the remainder of the system outside of the Combat Information Center?

A. The Signal Corps equipment was field equipment but satisfactory; personnel for installing communication lines were well trained, capable, and in sufficient numbers; the radar operators and maintenance men at the radar stations were too few in numbers and were not fully trained even up to December 7.

66. Q. Was all that a responsibility of the Army Signal Corps?

A. Yes, sir.

67. Q. You have stated that you obtained no liaison officers for the Information Center from the Navy. How many did you ask for?

A. I asked for six. On December 8, I received ten who were survivors from the CALIFORNIA.

68. Q. Other than the failure of the Naval District to supply liaison officers, did you experience other lack of cooperation from that organization?

A. I can not remember receiving any active cooperation from Fourteenth Naval District, at any time, prior to December 7.

69. Q. In your estimation, at the time, what additional cooperation or measures were required of the Naval District?

A. The Commander-in-Chief's Staff pointed out to me that according to the war plans, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, had the responsibility of the defense of Oahu, and I was, therefore, instructed to report to him for any assistance needed to activate the Information Center.

70. Q. What assistance did you ask for?

A. Other than to ask for liaison officers, I requested that control of the anti-aircraft guns in naval vessels in the harbor, which were directly under his control, should be held by the Information Center. I asked that some action be taken to identify aircraft approaching Oahu. At the Commander-in-Chief's Operations Officer's suggestion, I asked him to initiate a letter to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to expedite putting the Information Center on a twenty-four hour basis.

71. Q. Did you, at any time during the period during which you were loaned to the Army, report to the Commander-in-Chief, or his representatives, of the unreadiness of the warning system in general or of the Information Center in particular?

A. Yes, sir. A full report concerning the readiness of the Army Air Warning System was made to the Commander-in-Chief's Staff immediately after my initial inspection. On about 1 December, I reported to CinCPac's Operations Officer that Information Center personnel were still not forthcoming, and that the operating hours had been limited to 0400-0700 daily. During the entire period of my duty at the Information Center, I made frequent visits to CinCPac's Office and conferred with his Chief of Staff, Operations Officer, Air Officer or Communications Officer.

72. Q. Did you make those reports in such form and with such emphasis as to convey the thought that little could be expected in the way of information concerning a surprise air attack?

A. Yes, sir, I did. I feel quite sure that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's Staff fully realized the situation.

[353] 73. Q. During your association with the Army, what did you gather was in the minds of the Army fighter command as constituting their primary mission while based on Oahu?

A. It is my distinct impression that the Interceptor Command believed that they were charged with operating the air warning system, once it was completed, and furnishing the fighter defense for the Hawaiian Islands.

74. Q. Do you mean that the conception of that part of the Army Air Force, Oahu, was that their primary mission and purpose was repelling air attacks upon the installations on that Island?

A. No, sir, I do not. The Army Air Force was broken up into two commands. The Army Interceptor Command which had their fighters, I believe they considered their primary mission to repel enemy air attacks.

75. Q. Based upon your experiences in England, what was your estimate in those days as to the ability of the number of fighter planes based on Oahu to repel a heavy air raid if they had been properly handled in the air?

A. I believe there were sufficient numbers of fighters at Oahu to repel the number of aircraft that actually attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7.

76. Q. Was the quality of those fighter planes good enough for the purpose?

A. The quality of the P-40 fighter plane was not sufficient to outperform the Japanese fighter aircraft, but the performance was sufficient, I believe, to break up, to a large extent, a raid of the sort that came in on December 7.

77. Q. If you had any opportunity to estimate the quality and state of training of the fighter pilots, please give the conclusions which you reached at the time.

A. As I remember, at least fifty per cent of the fighter pilots in Interceptor Command were well trained; the other fifty per cent were green pilots who had just been received from the United States.

78. Q. Does that answer mean that only half of the Army fighter aircraft could have been ready to combat the attack of 7 December?

A. No, sir. All aircraft in commission could be ready, as far as the pilots were concerned. I meant that approximately half of the pilots were well trained fighter pilots. The other half had not had sufficient squadron tactical training to be "experienced" fighter pilots. Pilot training was being pressed.

79. In your recollection, what actual opposition did the Army fighters bring to bear upon the Japanese air attack?

A. I was never told the actual number of Army fighters that took the air, but I was under the impression that between ten and twenty Army fighters were airborne and engaging the Japanese more or less on their own.

80. Q. Did that number get into the air in time to effectively oppose the attack?

A. No, sir.

81. Q. About how many did?

A. I have no idea how many actually got into the air, sir.

82. Q. Were the ones which were in the air in any way directed by the Interceptor Command officer on the ground?

[354] A. They were not actually directed. The Operations Officer informed the fighters in the air by radio of the situation, as well as he could interpret it. In discussions with Army pilots who did engage the Japanese, I learned that there were so many Japanese aircraft in the air that they did not need fighter direction from the ground to find them.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:30 p. m., took a recess until 3:50 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Commander William E. G. Taylor, U. S. Naval Reserve, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirtieth and thirty-first days of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examination then, at 3:52 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[355] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

SATURDAY, APRIL 29, 1944

THIRTY-SECOND DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:35 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-first day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. L. F. Safford; Captain, U. S. Navy; Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year 1941?

A. I was the officer in charge of the Communication Security Section of Naval Communications. The word "Communication Security" was a covering title to most Communication Intelligence, although we also performed security duties in the design and preparation of naval codes and ciphers and general communications security duties; that is, surveillance over their use.

3. Q. How many units were there in that organization and where were they located?

A. There were three main radio intelligence units. One in the Navy Department with subsidiary direction finder stations and intercept stations along the Atlantic Seaboard and in the Atlantic Ocean. The second in size was located at Pearl Harbor with subsidiary intercept stations and direction finder stations in Oahu, Midway, Samoa, and Dutch Harbor. The third was located on the Island of Corregidor in the Philippines with intercept and direction finder station there and a small intercept and finder station on the Island of Guam. There had been an intercept and direction finder station at Shanghai, but it was evacuated to Corregidor in December, 1940.

There were also intercept and direction finder stations on the West Coast of the United States. The West Coast intercept stations fed their traffic directly into Washington; the direction finder stations were coordinated and controlled by the Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

4. Q. Were the three units somewhat specialized in their duties?

A. Yes.

5. Q. To what special branch of intelligence were the duties of the main station in Washington confined?

[356] A. To naval operations in the Atlantic Ocean and to the plans and intentions of foreign governments. In addition to the foregoing duties, the Washington Unit had another important function: Training personnel for the other units so that they would be able to "pull their weight in the boat" when transferred to duty overseas. For this reason, the Washington Unit had, at this time, the most experienced personnel (some with over ten years of C. I. duty) and the least experienced (ninety per cent with less than one year of C. I. duty). The Washington Unit had been standing continuous watches since February, 1941.

6. Q. To what special branch of intelligence were the duties of the main station at Pearl Harbor confined?

A. To the dispositions and plans of naval forces in the Pacific Ocean and to surveillance over Japanese naval communications. We expected that this would prevent the Fleet being surprised as the Russians had been at Port Arthur. These duties were prescribed in the current War Plans (WPDNC-8: Appendix IV; Art. 4-25) approved March, 1940, and by dispatches and letters of instruction issued by the Chief of Naval Operations. These duties did not include surveillance over Diplomatic communications of any sort. The personnel of this Unit had about four or five years of C. I. experience on the average. The officers included our best, and six or seven had had previous C. I. duty in the Asiatic C. I. Unit.

7. Q. To what special branch of intelligence were the duties of the main station at Corregidor confined?

A. The Asiatic Unit was at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet to use as he saw fit. During 1940 and early 1941, this Unit was mostly concerned with Japanese Diplomatic communications, but in October or November, 1941, it shifted its main attention to Japanese Naval communications. The personnel of this Unit had about two or three years of C. I. experience on the average, and the officers were young, enthusiastic, and capable.

8. Q. Were all three units kept in close touch with the results which they, individually, obtained?

A. Yes, sir, as far as it pertained to the technical work they were doing, but not otherwise.

9. Q. Was the unit at Pearl Harbor kept fully informed of the aforesaid results obtained by the Washington Unit?

A. Only as regards the operations of the Japanese Navy in the Pacific Ocean, with one important exception: On December 1, 1941, the Director of Naval Communications released OpNav Secret 011400; *Urgent*, to CinCAF and Com 16; *Priority* to CinCPac and Com 14; indicating that the Japanese were planning landing at Kota Bharu in Malaya.

10. Q. Did you consider that you, yourself, were kept fully informed of the results obtained by the units in Fourteen and Sixteen Districts?

A. Yes, I was kept informed of important developments by radio, and of details weekly, by air mail.

11. Q. During November, 1941, did you obtain, from the units in Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts, estimates covering the organization and distribution of the Japanese naval forces?

A. Yes, sir, we did on November 26. The message from Com 14 was the Pearl Harbor estimate as to the current organization and distribution of the Japanese Fleet with particular reference to recently organized task forces which were [357] suspected to be employed in the invasion of Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, plus a suspected covering force of submarines and one carrier division in the Japanese mandated islands. This was a summation of results obtained during the month of November, 1941.

12. Q. At approximately that date, or perhaps somewhat later, did you obtain a similar estimate from the unit in the Sixteenth Naval District?

A. Yes, sir, we did.

13. Q. Please state, very briefly, any respects in which the two estimates differed.

A. Com 16 disagreed with the estimate that carriers and submarines in force were in the mandated islands. Com 16's report placed one carrier division as operating in the South China Sea and the remaining carriers in Japanese home waters; and further added "evaluation considered reliable".

14. Q. What is the date of that estimate from the Sixteenth District unit?

A. That was the same date, November 26, 1941. It was sent twelve hours later than the Fourteenth District's dispatch.

15. Q. Do you recall what impression prevailed in the Washington unit as regards the disagreement between the other two?

A. We believed that the Sixteenth District unit was correct in their estimate.

16. Q. Did you advise the Fourteenth District unit to that effect?

A. No, sir, we did not. On November 24, a dispatch from the Director of Naval Intelligence to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; information Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; stated that Sixteenth District's intercepts were considered most reliable and requested that other reports be submitted to Com 16 for action, OpNav for information; and after combining all incoming reports, Com 16 forward reports to OpNav, info CinCPac. From this, we believed that both Commanders-in-Chief understood that we gave more weight to Com 16's reports than to Com 14's reports. The Department's directive was based on geographical considerations rather than ability of personnel or efficiency of the units.

17. Q. Did your unit, as engaged upon its specialized endeavor, obtain, during November and December, any definite information which indicated the objectives which the Japanese were preparing to attack?

A. Yes, sir.

18. Q. Please give, chronologically, with particular reference to dates, a brief summary of that information.

A. Going back to the late Spring of 1941, on May 22, we received positive proof of Japanese plans for the conquest of Southeastern Asia and the Southwest Pacific. On July 24, a high authority in Japan directed the withdrawal of merchant shipping from the Northeast Pacific, Southwest Pacific, and Indian Ocean. On September 4, we received information indicating Japan's determination to carry out her program of southward expansion and to expell the United States and England from China, Southeast Asia, and the Southwest Pacific. On October 15, we received unexpected confirmation of Japan's plans and intentions of the conquest of Southeastern Asia. In October, 1941, the Japanese Consuls were directing and advising the evacuation of Japanese Nationalists from the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Philippines, Hawaii, America, and Europe. By October 28, this was in full progress. On November 4, we received important information that the internal situation in Japan, both [358] political and economic, since the American embargo, had become so desperate that the Japanese Government had to distract popular attention by a foreign war or else by bloodless diplomatic victory. On November 12, we received important information that the Japanese Government regarded November 25 as the dead line for negotiations then being conducted between the Japanese and American Governments to end. November 17, we received information from a very reliable source that Japan had no intention of attacking Russia in Siberia or she had changed her plans, if such intention ever existed. At one time, when it looked as if Moscow would fall, there were indications from several sources that Japan would invade Siberia. On November 24, 1941, we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds. On November 26, we received specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States. On December 1, we had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States, and, from two of them, that Japan would maintain peace with Russia. On December 4, 1941, we received definite information from two more independent sources that Japan would attack the United States and Britain, but would maintain peace with Russia. At 9:00 p. m. (Washington time), December 6, 1941, we received positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States, at a time to be specified thereafter. This information was positive and unmistakable and was made available to Military Intelligence at this same time. Finally, at 10:15 a. m. (Washington time), December 7, 1941, we received positive information from the Signal Intelligence Service (War Department) that the Japanese declaration of war would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m. (Washington time) that date. 1:00 p. m. Washington time was sunrise in Hawaii and approximately midnight in the Philippines, and this indicated a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor in about three hours. Kramer appended a note to this effect to the paper sent over from S. I. S. before presenting it to the Secretary of the Navy. I do not know whether or not a copy of this note was appended to the paper given to Admiral Stark.

At this same time, information was also received indicating that Japan was about to commence hostilities against the British Empire. This information was sent over to S. I. S. immediately.

19. Q. Going back over that series, to what officials did your unit transmit the information concerning which you have just testified?

A. My unit transmitted information directly to Signal Intelligence in the War Department and to Naval Intelligence representative (that is, Commander A. H. McCollum, head of the Far Eastern Section, or Lieutenant Commander A. D. Kramer, attached to the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence but actually working in the Communication Intelligence Unit). The further distribution of information within the Navy and to the President normally was undertaken by Kramer in his status as a subordinate to McCollum. Information was distributed daily, as a matter of routine, to the President, to the Secretary of the Navy, to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of War Plans, the Director of Naval Communications, and, of course, the Director of Naval Intelligence. Within the Army, the Signal Intelligence Service, our opposite numbers, gave information to G-2, or Military Intelligence, and Colonel Bratton, head of the G-2 Far Eastern Section, distributed the information to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Director of War Plans, and, of course, to the Director of Military Intelligence. On special occasions, information was disseminated at night or whenever it came [359] in. There was a direct exchange of information between S. I. S. and the Navy Department C. I. Unit; also between O. N. I. and M. I. D.

20. Q. Was the foregoing information communicated to officials in the State Department?

A. It was always given to Secretary Hull and sometimes given to Under Secretary Sumner Welles. In the Spring of 1941, the information had gone further but, after a leak to the German Embassy, it was restricted to Secretary Hull and Secretary Welles.

21. Q. Is there any documentary report which shows the date and hour of delivery of the foregoing information to various officials?

A. There is no documentary evidence.

22. Q. Are you able to state, from memory, the date and hour on which the important information, say, from 1 December onward, was transmitted?

A. I can, from my recollection of Lieutenant Commander Kramer's verbal reports to me.

23. Q. Please give what you recall as regards those dates and hours.

A. The information on December 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, was disseminated about eleven a. m., within the Navy Department and was then given to the Naval Aide to the President who took it over to the White House, some time in the early afternoon. The "Winds Message" was given a special distribution shortly after eight a. m. on December 4, 1941, and was also included in the routine distribution. The information received late on December 6 was highly important and was distributed as a rush job by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who left the Navy Department in an official station wagon shortly after nine p. m., and who had reached his last official by eleven p. m. Kramer returned to the Navy Department about one a. m. in the morning to see if there was any further information and then went home.

He came down the next morning in time to give Admiral Stark written information at the Admiral's nine o'clock conference. Much of the December 6 information was distributed over the telephone by Admiral Wilkinson and by Secretary Hull. The following officials were given this information that night: President Roosevelt (via the White House Aide), Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, Rear Admiral Turner, Rear Admiral Wilkinson, Rear Admiral Beardall. Lieutenant Colonel R. S. Bratton, U. S. Army, was given the same information at nine p. m. for dissemination to War Department officials, and we did not know any more, except that he got a copy over to Secretary Hull by ten o'clock. As regards information on the 7th, the same officials had this information by eleven a. m.—some sooner.

24. Q. Was any of the foregoing information, under dates of November and December, 1941, disseminated by the main Washington unit direct to the corresponding unit in Fourteenth Naval District?

A. No, sir. That was not permitted by a written order then in force; but there was one exception. On the 3rd of December, I prepared OpNav Secret Dispatch 031855, which was released by Captain Redman, the Assistant Director of Naval Communications. A similar dispatch was released by Admiral Wilkinson and filed at 031850. Admiral Wilkinson's message is referred to in the Roberts report. Before drafting my message, I called Commander McCollum on the telephone and asked him, "Are you people in Naval Intelligence doing *anything* to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet?" And McCollum replied, "*We* are doing everything *we* can to get the news out to the Fleet." McCollum emphasized both "*we*'s". In sending this information, I was overstepping the bounds as [360] established by approved war plans and joint agreement between Naval Communications and Naval Intelligence, but I did it because I thought McCollum had been unable to get his message released. OpNav 031855 was addressed to CinCAF and Com 16 for action, but was routed to CinCPac and Com 14 for information. It was written in highly technical language and only one officer present at Pearl Harbor, the late Lieutenant H. M. Coleman, U. S. N., on CinCPac's Staff, could have explained its significance.

25. Q. Did the unit in the Fourteenth Naval District have any material from which they could have gained this information through their own efforts?

A. No, sir, they did not have the material and they could not possibly have gained this information.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: The C. I. Unit in Washington had no authority to forward to the C. I. Units in Pearl Harbor or Corregidor, or to the Commanders-in-Chief direct, any information other than technical information pertaining to direction finding, interception, and so forth. The dissemination of intelligence was the duty, responsibility, and privilege of the Office of Naval Intelligence as

prescribed in Communication War Plans approved by the Chief of Naval Operations in March, 1940. On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the "Winds Message", and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent. Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p. m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, "What do you think of the message?" Admiral Noyes replied, "I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief." Admiral Wilkinson stated, "I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man, with a lot of things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair to the Commander-in-Chief that he be given this warning and I intend to send it if I can get it released by the front office." Admiral Wilkinson then left and I left a few minutes later. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I thought that this warning message had been sent, and did not realize until two years later, when I studied the Roberts report very carefully, that McCollum's message had not been sent. In order to clarify the above statement and my answer to a previous question, it is necessary to explain what is meant by the "Winds Message". The "Winds Message" was a name given by Army and Navy personnel performing radio intelligence duties to identify a plain-language Japanese news broadcast in which a fictitious weather report gave warning of the intentions of the Japanese Government with respect to war against the United States, Britain (including the N. E. I.), and Russia. We received a tip-off from the British in Singapore in late November, 1941, which was immediately forwarded to the Navy Department by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, with an information copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. We also received a tip-off from the Dutch in Java through the American Consul General and through the Senior Military Observer. The Dutch tip-off was handled in routine fashion by the coding rooms of the State [361] Department, War Department, and Navy Department. The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the "Winds Message" when it should be sent, and this was done. From November 28 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo broadcast schedules were monitored by about 12 intercept stations, as follows: N. E. I. at Java; British at Singapore; U. S. Army at Hawaii and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corregidor, Hawaii, Bremerton, and four or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept stations in the continental United States were directed to forward all Tokyo plain-language broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran up bills of sixty dollars per day for this material alone. The "Winds Message" was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941 (Washington time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propagation was such that the "Winds Message" was heard only on the East Coast of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations that were listening for it. The other nations and other Navy C. I. Units, not

hearing the "Winds Message" themselves and not receiving any word from the Navy Department, naturally presumed that the "Winds Message" had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese Government was still deferring the initiation of hostilities. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the British at Singapore, the Dutch at Java, and the Americans at Manila were just as surprised and astonished as the Pacific Fleet and Army posts in Hawaii. It is apparent that the War Department, like the Navy Department, failed to send out information that the "Winds Message" had been sent by Tokyo. The "Winds Message" was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch. There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message really meant because it came in a different form from what had been anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who came down that evening and identified that message as the "Winds Message" we had been looking for. The significant part of the "Winds Message" read: "HIGASHI NO KAZE AME. NISHI NO KAZE HARE. The negative form of KITA NO KAZE KUMORI". The literal translation of these phrases is: "EAST WIND RAIN. WEST WIND CLEAR. NEITHER NORTH-WIND NOR CLOUDY". The meaning of this message from the previously mentioned tip-off was: "War with the United States. War with Britain, including the N. E. I., etc. Peace with Russia". I first saw the "Winds Message" about 8:00 a. m. on Thursday, December 4, 1941. Lieutenant A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., came into my office with a big smile on his face and a piece of paper in his hand and said, "Here it is!" as he handed me the "Winds Message". As I remember, it was the original yellow teletype sheet with the significant "Winds" underscored and the meaning in Kramer's handwriting at the bottom. Smooth copies of the translation were immediately prepared and distributed to Naval Intelligence and to S. I. S. in the War Department. As the direct result of the "Winds Message", I prepared a total of five messages, which were released between 1200 and 1600 that date, ordering the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers by certain activities on the Asiatic Station. As a direct result of the "Winds Message", McCollum drafted the long warning message, previously referred to, which was disapproved by higher authority, but which the Navy Department C. I. Unit believed had been sent. Both Naval Intelligence and the Navy Department C. I. Unit regarded the "Winds Message" as definitely committing the Japanese Government to war with the United States and Britain, whereas the information of earlier dates had been merely statements of intent. We believed that the Japanese would attack by Saturday (December 6), or by Sunday (December 7) at the latest. The following officers recall having seen and having read the "Winds Message": [362] Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant (jg) F. L. Freeman, U. S. N. The following officers knew by hearsay that the "Winds Message" had been intercepted but did not actually see it themselves: Commander L. W. Parke, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R., Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N., and Major F. B. Rowlett, Signal Corps Reserve. The follow-

ing officers should have some recollection of the "Winds Message": *U. S. Navy*—Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Captain A. H. McCollum, Colonel R. A. Boone (U. S. Marine Corps), Commander G. W. Welker, Commander A. D. Kramer, Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, and Ship's Clerk H. L. Bryant. *U. S. Army*—Brigadier General T. J. Betts, Colonel O. K. Sadtler, Colonel R. S. Bratton, Colonel Rex Minckler, Colonel Moses Pettigrew, Colonel Harold Doud, and Lieutenant Colonel R. E. Shukraft. The "Winds Message" was last seen by myself about December 14, 1941, when the papers which had been distributed in early December were assembled by Kramer, checked by myself, and then turned over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission, according to my understanding at the time. Further information as to Pearl Harbor's estimates of locations of Japanese forces in early December, 1941, may be found in the monthly report of Station "H"—in the "Chronology" which was prepared daily and forwarded weekly by air mail. This information was, of course, prepared by and currently available to the Pearl Harbor C. I. Unit but was not received in the Navy Department until a delay of about two weeks.

Note: The examining officer has identified the documents mentioned by witness as being C. I. Station "H" "Chronology" for December 1–December 6, 1941, inclusive, now on file in Communication Intelligence Section (Op 20G), Office of Director, Naval Communications, Communication Annex, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., to which is attached a summary of more important extracts, made by the witness under examination.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 11:37 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[363] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, MAY 3, 1944

THIRTY-THIRD DAY

HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER.

The examination met at 4:30 p. m.

Present: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer.

The examining officer introduced Rose Mullen, civilian, as reporter, who was duly sworn.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-second day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Will you give your name, rank and present station?

A. Herbert F. Leary, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commanding Eastern Sea Frontier, stationed at 90 Church Street, New York.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. In January, 1941, I was detached from duty as Director of Fleet Training in Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., and ordered to command the Cruisers, Battle Force, relieving Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel. I relieved Admiral Kimmel on 1 February 1941 and remained in command of Cruisers, Battle Force, until 1 February 1942 when I left for Australia to become Commander of the Anzac Force in the Southwest Pacific.

3. Q. Admiral, during the Autumn of 1941 what officers were your immediate superiors both in administrative activities and in operational activities?

A. As a Type Commander of the Light Cruisers of the Battle Force, my immediate superior was Vice Admiral Pye, the Commander of the Battle Force, who in turn was immediately under Admiral Kimmel, the Commander-in-Chief. These officers were both my administrative and operational commanders.

4. Q. Then during your periods at sea were you always in Admiral Pye's Task Force?

A. Not always. The Task Forces for the various operating periods were varied and I served under various Task Force Commanders.

But I should say that the majority of the time I was under Admiral Pye.

[364] 5. Q. Do you recall the approximate inclusive dates of your last stay in Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December 1941?

A. My Task Force entered Pearl Harbor on November 28, 1941, and did not leave again until after the attack.

6. Q. Prior to that entry on 28 November, about how many days were you at sea?

A. One week. We left Pearl Harbor on November 21 for Fleet maneuvers.

7. Q. Who was your Task Force Commander during that week?

A. Admiral Pye.

8. Q. Admiral, a general question. I understand that you were in what might be called the third echelon of the command in the Pacific Fleet. As such, did you have opportunities to observe the general relations between the Commander-in-Chief and the Commanders of the echelon above you as well as of your own echelon?

A. Yes. Whenever the ships were in port I was invited to attend the daily conferences which the Commander-in-Chief held with his immediate subordinates and, in my opinion, there was complete and free interchange of information and opinions among the higher naval command. I did not attend these conferences as a regular member but, when other duties permitted, my natural interest caused me to be present.

9. Q. What was your opinion as to the correctness and adequacy of the information distributed incidental to those relationships between the highest officers of the Fleet?

A. In my opinion, based on my intermittent observation, I should say it was as full and free as could be possible. At these meetings, Admiral Kimmel frequently read extracts from personal letters received from the Chief of Naval Operations and other officers, commented on them, and stated what action he was taking in regard to various matters and included a daily intelligence presentation by his Fleet Intelligence Officer, in which were presented all the facts as he saw them.

10. Q. In addition to the information which you gained at the Commander-in-Chief's conferences when you attended them, was important information, particularly as regards the situation vis-a-vis Japan, imparted to you by your immediate superior?

A. No, except in a general way. I had frequent, almost daily, contact with Admiral Pye and we naturally discussed the situation as it appeared to us.

11. Q. Do you recall having seen or heard discussed a dispatch from the Navy Department about 16 October, in which was set forth the seriousness of the situation then current and which contained a directive concerning precautions to be taken by the Fleet? (Indicating Exhibit 6)

A. No.

12. Q. Upon your return to port 28 November 1941, did you see or were you told of certain dispatches from the Department received during the three or four days preceding, which contained warnings and at least one directive?

A. No. I do not remember any specific directives which were called to my attention on arrival in port.

13. Q. Did you, at any time between 28 November and the date of the surprise attack, become aware that the Navy Department had sent the Commander-in-Chief a dispatch which amounted to a war warning?

[365] A. No. To the best of my recollection, the conditions existing in port at this time were roughly as they had been on the preceding period in port.

14. Q. Do you recall if you were called upon to increase in any way the security precautions which had before then been in effect while the ships were in Pearl Harbor?

A. No. To the best of my recollection, the security conditions existing on my ships were the same as on the previous stay in port.

15. Q. Admiral, you mentioned that your duty prior to beginning the cruise in 1941 had to do with Fleet Training. Will you briefly describe your responsibilities and your authority while engaged on that duty?

A. As an Assistant to the Chief of Operations in charge of Fleet Training, it was my duty to carefully scrutinize and analyze the reports received from the Fleet as to the proficiency of the ships in gunnery, engineering, communications and damage control; to publish results of these studies and to promulgate to the Fleet general directives which would increase efficiency in the above branches.

16. Q. Then, were you, in effect, the Navy Department's Director of Training of all forces at sea?

A. In a general way, yes. The schedules governing the time allotted to training were made out by the Fleet Commanders and the Department (Office of Fleet Training) merely checked these as to the general adequacy of time allotted and the covering of all different forms of training required.

17. Q. During the Autumn of 1941, while our relations with Japan were becoming steadily worse, did you, as an officer who had been intimately concerned with training, ever give consideration to the balance which the Fleet was maintaining between the necessities for training and those for security measures?

A. Yes. This was a subject of constant concern and frequent discussion between the officers in high command in the Pacific Fleet. Due to the large numbers of new men being trained and the constant demands made upon the Fleet to furnish experienced officers for other duty outside of the Fleet, the question of training was always a paramount one. There were frequent discussions on this in regard to the cycle of operations, whether the Fleet should be sent to sea as a unit; divided into two parts with one half in port; or divided into three groups for operations and training. There were advocates for all three schemes and the question of security was always considered, but the prevalent opinion in the Fleet among the higher command, as I sensed it, was that the situation permitted of emphasizing training at the expense of security at this time. It was not possible to carry out the required training and maintain entirely satisfactory security measures.

18. Q. Admiral, do you recall that you gave any considerable thought, during the few weeks prior to 7 December 1941, to the possibilities, or even probabilities, of a surprise attack by the Japanese?

A. In a general way, yes, but I think that we all felt that the contingency was remote and that our Intelligence Service would give us adequate warning if an attack were imminent, or that a declaration of hostilities were apt to occur. We all realized that Washington was in telephonic communication with our Commander-in-Chief.

19. Q. Do you recall having given thought or, shall we say, even speculation as to the form in which a Japanese surprise attack might be made?

[366] A. Yes. We had discussed this matter and I think everyone more or less realized that a surprise attack would be an air attack.

20. Q. Was that your own estimation—that it would be made by air rather than by some other weapon?

A. Yes.

21. Q. Do you recall having been in any discussion in which you put forward that opinion?

A. I do not remember that we had any specific discussion exactly along those lines. The Fleet was, as I have previously stated, mainly engaged in training, perfecting materiel devices—in other words, general preparation—and, as I have stated, the feeling strongly existed that the Fleet would have adequate warning of any chance of an air attack; in other words, of a beginning of hostilities.

22. Q. Were you during that period prior to December 1941 in any way in touch with the Army's potential ability to repel a surprise attack upon Pearl Harbor?

A. No, and I was quite surprised to learn after the attack that the Army anti-aircraft guns were not in position. I had no information as to the disposition of the Army Air Force available in the Hawaiian Islands. I had a general impression that there was very little air support for the Fleet available and also that the Navy Air was inadequate for a complete coverage of the waters around Pearl Harbor.

23. Q. Admiral, as a Type Commander of all the light cruisers of the Fleet, do you recall any particular dissatisfaction which was in your mind concerning the Department's action in keeping your ships up to date, in supplying them with ammunition, other war materials and with proper personnel?

A. Yes. There was frequent and emphatic disagreement with the Department's actions and a great deal of correspondence on this subject. The ships were being constantly depleted of trained personnel and requests made for equipment were being inadequately supplied and frequently with the information that we would be supplied after the demands for vessels in the Atlantic had been met. The cruisers of the Battle Force normally consisted of two divisions of light cruisers, but one division was detached from the Fleet and sent to the Atlantic prior to Pearl Harbor. This, along with other indications, left me with the impression that the situation was not considered critical in the Pacific Fleet at this time.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement:

Yes, I would like to submit the following additional comments. Admiral Kimmel was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet on 1 February 1941 and met with general approval of the Fleet officers and came, I understood, as the result of personal observations by Secretary of the Navy Knox during a [367] visit which he made to the Fleet and his subsequent opinion that Admiral Kimmel was more alive, on his toes and energetic in preparing his ships for action than any other Commanders in the Fleet. Although not belonging to the higher echelons of command in the Fleet at this time, I know that Admiral Kimmel immediately called conferences of responsible officers to provide additional security for the Fleet while at sea and in Pearl Harbor; that he initiated steps to obtain closer cooperation with the Army and particularly with the Army Air Force in Hawaii. The results of his efforts were a better organization and division of duties as between the two services. He also realized the impracticability of handling the Fleet from a vessel at sea and was our first Commander-in-Chief to move his organization and staff to buildings in the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor and set up a command organization which still exists, although greatly amplified since his time. It was evident to all Flag officers in the Fleet that he immediately made vigorous and determined efforts to obtain personnel, planes, guns, ammunition, bombs and additional ships which were all badly needed at this time. He also initiated a training program for aircraft and all types of ships to more closely fit them for the war effort and these programs were placed in effect and had the effect of increasing the training and effectiveness of the Fleet for action. He issued an order requiring our Naval Air Squadrons to land and be serviced on each Army airfield in the Hawaiian area and required an extension of the same services to Army aircraft landing on Navy fields. This had never been done previously. As far as my knowledge goes, the warnings received immediately prior to December 7, 1941 were of the same character and urgency as previous warnings and their effect was minimized by reason of repeated false alarms and by the inference derived from Departmental action that it was more important to equip and supply Naval units in the Atlantic at this time. I believe that Admiral Kimmel made unusual efforts in his desire to keep his principal subordinates fully informed of the situation as it developed and that he constantly sought advice and counsel from his principal subordinates; that he conferred frequently with General Short and that he was throughout his period of command on the best of terms with General Short and that he deliberately cultivated such a relationship, realizing its importance. It was my opinion, on relieving Admiral Kimmel, that his command was the best trained unit in the Fleet and that he had shown more energy and initiative in developing organization and practices to increase war-time efficiency of his ships than any other Type Commander then in the Fleet. I believe that the Fleet at war now shows the effect of training, organization and practices instituted during his term as Commander-in-Chief. This is particularly true as regards the development of practices in regard to damage control, and was splendidly evidenced in the case of the U. S. S. BOISE in her action with the Japanese fleet. I left Pearl Harbor for Australia on 1 February 1942. Up to the time of my

departure I believe that in general the security, training and organization orders issued by Admiral Kimmel were in general permitted to stand or were reissued without major change by his successor. I believe that the factors which determined the state of readiness in effect at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 were the result of the information which had been received by the high command at that time and that the general opinion was that the main threat to be feared was one of sabotage and that no direct attack upon the Fleet was considered to be imminent. I believe that undoubtedly had the high command been made aware of any imminence of attack from without that additional steps would have been taken to secure a more advanced state of readiness on December 7.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 6 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[368] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1944

THIRTY-FOURTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:45 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-third day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Captain J. B. Earle, U. S. Navy, attached to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as Director of Naval Instruction.

2. Q. What duties did you perform during the calendar year 1941?

A. I was Commander, Destroyer Squadron Five, of the United States Fleet until the 9th of June, '41, when I reported for duty as Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District.

3. Q. Captain, I show you a document which is Exhibit 5 before this examination. Do you identify it as one which you were familiar with in 1941?

A. Yes, I believe that that is the document that I saw after I reported.

4. Q. Referring to paragraph 5 of that document, Exhibit 5, it is noted that the Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District, is a member of the Joint Planning Committee established by the document. While you were Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District, did you serve on that Committee?

A. To the best of my knowledge, I did not serve formally on the Committee, but the Chiefs of Staffs acted informally as members of the Planning Committee with subcommittees appointed doing the majority of the detail work.

5. Q. Were you familiar with the work covered by these subcommittees at that time?

A. I do not recall at this time any particular problem that was handled by a subcommittee, but the War Plans Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District was continually working with the corresponding officer, personally, in the Hawaiian Department to bring up to date and to keep up to date the various Joint War Plans in the Library.

[369] 6. Q. Were you, at the time, kept advised of the various plans which were being considered by the War Plans Officer and the Army?

A. Yes, I think I can say I was.

7. Q. Were you, at the time, familiar with the relationship, cordiality, and so forth, between the Navy planners and the Army planners?

A. My recollection is that the preliminary plans were always easy to prepare, but that it took considerable time after they were prepared, more or less to our satisfaction, to get them finally approved by the Army. This more or less peacetime attitude underwent gradual changes as the impression was received that war was possible. What I'm trying to say is that when I first went there, though everything was proceeding at considerably accelerated peacetime manner, that as the various warnings were received that trouble was brewing, it became easier to get joint agreements and the joint action came more rapidly.

8. Q. Captain, in the period preceding the attack, was this plan, Exhibit 5, in full effect?

A. No, this was a plan prepared for execution at such time as it was found necessary. Some provisions were in effect, such as the planning parts, but the general overall plan was not in effect.

9. Q. Were you, prior to the attack, familiar with the aircraft warning net which was being established by the Army?

A. No, I was not. I knew that the Army was planning for such a net, but I had no information of the details.

10. Q. Captain, I show you a document, which is Inclosure "B" to Exhibit 22 before this examination, and which is annex No. VII to the JCD Plan, Exhibit 5. Were you, in the period preceding the attack, familiar with this document?

A. Yes, I recall this document.

11. Q. You will note that paragraph 11 of this document deals with the aircraft warning service to be established by the Army. This paragraph calls for the Army to expedite the installation of the warning service and for the Navy to endeavor to give warning of hostile attacks until such time as the Army system was in operation. Do you recall at any time prior to the attack that this matter was discussed or considered by the Planning Officers of the Army and Navy, either individually or collectively?

A. No, I do not recall.

12. Q. Do you recall any endeavor on the part of the Navy, the Fourteenth Naval District, to carry out its commitment to render temporary service?

A. No, I don't recall that anything was done primarily because the District had nothing to do it with except possible by the use of Fleet radar on the ships of the Fleet and, so far as I know, no steps were taken to provide for their use.

13. Q. In paragraph 6 of this document, which also deals with the aircraft warning service, reference is made to the use of Navy liaison

officer in connection with the dissemination of information. Will you please state anything within your knowledge with relation to the detail and training of such officers of the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. I have a vague recollection of some talk with a Fleet radar officer on the question of assignment of District personnel to the Army warning net, but, at that time, the District had no aviation personnel and my recollection is that he was told that as soon as we could get somebody who was qualified, we would be glad to turn him over to the Army.

[370] 14. Q. Do you recall any consideration that was given, prior to the attack, to plans for the utilization by the Navy of information obtained by the Army warning net?

A. Yes, I do. There was a hook-up between the Army Warning Service and the District Operation Office, so that air raid training could be conducted. In other words, the Army would prearrange when we would have a drill, an air drill, and the information would come down from the warning system, but whether we ever received anything else but the training material, I can not recall.

15. Q. Do you recollect any plans that were made prior to the attack for establishing communications between the Army warning net and the Naval District?

A. Oh, yes, my recollection is that we had telephone communication, and I'm not sure, but possibly teletype.

16. Q. Prior to the attack, were personnel available to man this communication system?

A. Yes, we had officers with necessary enlisted personnel on watch in the Operations Office and Communication Office of the District to handle such communications.

17. Q. Do you recollect any request during November 1941 from the officers designated to establish this warning net for assistance from the Commandant in obtaining the placing of the net on a twenty-four hour operational basis?

A. My recollection is that we were all concerned about the situation, but whether any definite steps were taken to ask the Army to put it on a twenty-four hour basis, I can't say.

18. Q. Captain, the plan, JCD, or Exhibit 5, provides that the Army furnish an in-shore air patrol. Was such a patrol maintained in the period just prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I doubt it. We had, as I recall, drills, which included a problem of ships approaching Hawaii, and during these drills there was a coordinated operation of the Army and Navy, but, to the best of my recollection, this was only done during drill. I do seem to recall that there was a certain amount of in-shore patrol aircraft work done for some short time prior to December 7, but, to the best of my recollection, it was done by the Navy.

19. Q. Were you, at that time, familiar with the aircraft available to the Army to conduct such patrol?

A. No.

20. Q. Captain, referring again to this document, Inclosure "B" to Exhibit 22, in paragraph 8, and also Inclosure "A" to that Inclosure, reference is made to a plan for Aircraft Departure, Approach, and Recognition Procedure. Will you please state anything you know with respect to such plan; whether one was established, or not, prior to December 7.

A. It is very hard to recall, but I don't think so. There were detailed procedures in effect, either shortly after or possibly shortly before, but I doubt whether they were in effect before December 7.

21. Q. Do you recollect any consideration of such a plan that occurred just prior to December 7; discussions, conferences, etc.?

A. I do not recall any.

[371] 22. Q. Paragraph 9 of Inclosure "B" of Exhibit 22, provides for further investigation and study as to the practicability of the use of barrage balloons in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Do you recollect any such further investigation and study being made prior to December 7?

A. I recall that a barrage balloon plan was made for Pearl Harbor and the vicinity, including a chart showing the locations, and it was approved by the Army and Navy, but whether the balloons got out there before December 7, I don't recall.

23. Q. This document, Captain, is Exhibit 4 before this examination. Where you familiar with that in the period leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes.

24. Q. It is noted that that letter provides that the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should make arrangements with the Army for the placing of Army aircraft guns for the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack. Will you please state any knowledge which you have with respect to the making of such arrangements?

A. As I recall, preliminary studies were made and plans were prepared, but I do not recall that it got much further than the planning phase, except for holding communication drills in connection with air raid drills.

25. Q. Do you recall any occasion prior to the attack, on which the guns were actually placed in the selected locations for drill or training purposes?

A. I seem to recall that they were brought in for drill purposes, but I can not be definite on this point.

26. Q. This document, Exhibit 4, also provides for the Naval Base Defense Officer to have charge of coordinating Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense. It sets out specific methods by which this was to be done. Will you please state anything within your knowledge with respect to what was done in compliance with this directive?

A. The anchorage area was divided up into sectors and the Fleet was required to keep the Naval Base Defense Commander informed of who was the Sector Commander in each sector. Instructions were issued regarding the use of signals for "open fire" and "cease firing"; communication plan was worked out and drills were held. In addition, it is my recollection that the various conditions specified were used for some time prior to December 7.

27. Q. Was any plan adopted for coordinating Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the anti-aircraft fire of the Army in the Pearl Harbor area?

A. I can recall no plan.

28. Q. Do you recall any consideration being given to such a plan of coordinating anti-aircraft batteries of the two Services?

A. I am sure the consideration was given and probably informal conferences, held, because we all realized it to be a very serious prob-

lem; but so far as recalling whether any definite action or any definite results were obtained, I can not say.

[372] 29. Q. Were you, in late November, 1941, familiar with the location and the status of Army anti-aircraft batteries intended for the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. I knew in general where the fixed guns were located, but I had no knowledge of any mobile anti-aircraft batteries.

30. Q. Captain, were you familiar with the series of war warning dispatches which you received during October and November 1941?

A. I was familiar with several that came in. Whether I saw all of them, I don't know.

31. Q. Do you recall any discussions with the Army, based on these dispatches, which contemplated the placing of the Army anti-aircraft defenses in a higher degree of readiness to repel an attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. I do not.

32. Q. Was any request made by the Naval Base Defense Officer, so far as you know, prior to the attack, for the Army to place its mobile batteries or otherwise prepare for repelling an air attack?

A. I have no knowledge of any such action, if any was taken. We were not, at that time, checking up on the Army and trying to find out what steps they were taking. It was assumed that they were in full knowledge of the situation and that they were taking all practicable steps.

33. Q. At the time, were you familiar with the fact that during the week preceding the attack the Army was only alerted against sabotage?

A. Yes. There has been, however, so much said about that since the war that I'm a little doubtful. However, I do recall that there was some conversation about the valuation and urgency of the messages which the Army and Navy were getting. By that, I mean that to some, it appeared that there was considerable difference of opinion higher up as to just what the emergency was. My recollection is that the Army instructions were so worded as to indicate that although war might be possible, yet no steps were to be taken to unduly alarm the inhabitants of Hawaii.

34. Q. Captain, I show you a dispatch dated 27 November 1941, which is Exhibit 8 before this examination. Were you familiar with this dispatch at the time it was received at Pearl Harbor or shortly afterward?

A. I think I can recall having seen that dispatch. I do not recall when I saw it.

35. Q. Referring again, Captain, to this document, which is Enclosure "B" to Exhibit 22, it provides for the use of Marine defense battalion AA batteries in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Will you please state anything you know of any plans that were made for such use of Marine defense battalion batteries.

A. My recollection is that plans were made, but I, again, am not certain whether they were really put in operating condition before December 7 or shortly after.

36. Q. The same document, Enclosure "B" to Exhibit 22, provides for establishing a Harbor Control Post. You will find that in paragraph 14 and also in Enclosure "B" to the Enclosure. Will you please

state what was done about establishing such a post prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and its status just prior to the attack?

[373] A. We had, what was called at that time, a Harbor Control Post in the Operations Office of the Fourteenth Naval District. This Post consisted of an officer on watch, with enlisted personnel, to man a special telephone board and teletype system. I believe that there was a coast artilleryman on watch there, but I'm not certain on that point. Later, this Joint Operations Officer, Harbor Control Post, was expanded and covered all the details envisaged in Enclosure "B" to Annex VII, JCD.

37. Q. Will you please stated the purpose of this Control Post?

A. This Control Post, as then established, was, to the best of my recollection, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised), which assigned certain duties to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as the Naval Base Defense Officer.

38. Q. Was the officer who manned this Post authorized to act as the representative of the Naval Base Defense Officer in performing his duties?

A. It is my recollection that at the time he could give orders direct in emergency, but that if no emergency existed, he would refer to the Commandant or Chief of Staff before he issued direct orders.

39. Q. What officers stood watch at the Harbor Control Post?

A. Officers were detailed from the various Departments of the Fourteenth Naval District and the Naval Yard.

40. Q. What qualifications were required of officers before they were designated for this watch?

A. Some were reserve officers, but effort was made to place officers on this watch who would be considered as reliable. In many instances, it is possible that they did not have long experience in the Navy.

41. Q. What instructions were issued to these watch officers to guide them in performing their duties?

A. I don't recall the detailed instructions that were issued. They were given a routine to follow. They were kept informed of the number of ships in the harbor and of all movements of ships, prospective as well as past movements; they were kept informed of the situation as it existed except when it was built on secret information which could not be given to them.

42. Q. What assistants were provided the watch officer at the Harbor Control Post prior to the attack, insofar as you recollect?

A. I recall he had only one man on the telephone board and possibly a messenger; I'm not sure.

43. Q. Captain, will you please outline the established procedure for the operation of the harbor gate in Pearl Harbor and Honolulu Harbor in effect prior to the attack on December 7.

A. At Pearl Harbor, as I recall, the gate was kept closed at night, except when naval vessels were going to have to use that channel at night. In that case, the gate was left open for those ships to use. Whether the gate was opened and closed after each ship, I do not recall, but my belief is that it was. In daytime, the net was left open probably for considerable length of time, as there were large numbers of ships passing in and out, but I'm not certain whether it was closed at that time after each ship in the daytime. As I recall, the handling

of the gate at Pearl Harbor, before December 7, was in the hands of the Captain of the Yard, and I'm not certain as to any details. At Honolulu, the senior Coast Guard Officer was in charge, and, so far as I know, opened and closed the net for each ship, day and night.

[374] 44. Q. In your capacity as Chief of Staff, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, would not the operation of anything as important as the gate at Pearl Harbor be directly under your purview?

A. I can't see why the Chief of Staff of the Naval District should have been required to handle such a detail as opening and closing the gate into Pearl Harbor. However, after December 7, 1941, the Harbor Control Post assisted the Captain of the Yard in operating the gate until the Navy Yard was able, later, to take complete control again.

45. Q. Captain, can you state how the Japanese submarine got past the net into Pearl Harbor on the early morning of December 7, 1941, prior to the attack?

A. It is my recollection that the gate had been opened to let some vessels out, either minesweepers or some other type, and that it had been left open to let the ANTARES in, which was scheduled to come in early that morning.

46. Q. How far below the surface was the lowest element of the gate?

A. I'm sorry, I do not know.

47. Q. Did it occur to you, after you became aware that a Jap submarine had been in the harbor, that it may have entered by passing under the lowest element of the gate?

A. That point came up shortly after December 7 and it was said at that time that there was sufficient water in the center of the channel, under the net, to permit a small submarine to enter even though the gate were closed. However, either at that time or shortly after, the impression was given that one of these small submarines could not be expected to go under the net because of its buoyancy. In other words, the impression was given that they had to stay fairly near the surface in order to keep going.

48. Q. Captain Earle, do you know whether more than one Jap submarine got into the harbor on the morning of December 7, and, if so, whether the one that got in, or more than one, was destroyed?

A. So far as I know, only one got in and that was the one that was rammed and sunk in the harbor. There were, however, many reports of Japanese submarines in the harbor. Every can and bit of floating refuse was picked up as a sub.

49. Q. Captain, the Plan JCD, which is Exhibit 5, in paragraph 17 (i) and 18 (1) provides for establishing a joint system of land communications by the Army and Navy for use in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Will you please state what you know of the status of this communication system prior to the attack.

A. All naval stations were connected either by telephone or radio. There were teletypes which also went to all those on Oahu. The Army stations were connected by telephone. They eventually became connected by teletypes. But whether that was done before December 7 or after, I am not certain.

50. Q. Do you recall whether or not there was a joint communication plan in effect prior to the attack?

A. I think that there probably was, but I can not say definitely.

51. Q. Captain, were you familiar with the activities of the District Intelligence Office in the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. Yes, sir.

[375] 52. Q. Will you please state your impression at the time as to the effectiveness of this office in performing its duties?

A. So far as I know, it was a satisfactory office. In other words, I had no reason to believe that it was not.

53. Q. Did you know at the time the views held by the Commandant, Admiral Bloch, with respect to the activities of the District Intelligence Office, in, say, the six months preceding Pearl Harbor?

A. So far as I know, Admiral Bloch was satisfied with the Intelligence Office.

54. Q. How closely were you kept in touch, in November, 1941, and early December, with the results which were obtained by the unit headed by Lieutenant Commander Rochefort?

A. I knew nothing of the results obtained from their activities.

55. Q. Captain, during the latter half of 1941, how frequently were air raid drills conducted in the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. My recollection is that not oftener than every three or four weeks.

56. Q. Did you, at the time, consider that this number of drills was adequate to prepare the District for defense against air raid?

A. My Operations Officer and I discussed that point several times and though we felt that additional drills might be desirable, yet we didn't succeed in getting any more; just why, I don't recall, probably because of the general feeling that these big drills took up too much time.

57. Q. What major deficiencies were noted during the air raid drills late in 1941?

A. I do not recall any specific deficiencies, except that there was some difficulty in communications and in the ability of the air groups to find their targets, and the failure of other shore establishments to comply with the air raid drill instructions to man all stations.

58. Q. What do you mean by "other establishments"?

A. I mean the other naval stations on the Island of Oahu. We even extended the drill, sometimes, to Maui, in order to make sure that they were coordinating their action with the movements on Oahu.

59. Q. What corrective action was taken in connection with these deficiencies that you have outlined?

A. Other than general discussion, I recall no definite steps. In these discussions, necessary corrective action was indicated.

60. Q. Did you consider, just prior to December 7, 1941, that the difficulties had been ironed out and that the Fourteenth Naval District was effectively prepared to meet an air raid in the event of war?

A. I can't say that we were effectively prepared to meet an air raid. What we felt was that we were improving the system available and that if there were enough planes and ships and guns available, that the defense would be acceptable. In other words, we were playing with what we had.

61. Q. Did you, at that time, consider that your air raid defense system was as effective as it could be made with what you had available?

A. Yes, we thought that with what we had available, it was pretty good.

62. Q. Did Fleet units present at Pearl Harbor take part in these air raid drills?

[376] A. Oh, yes, they had to man their guns and signals were sent to the various Sector Commanders and ships. We also used target planes so that they could actually point their guns at planes going and coming over the Pearl Harbor area.

63. Q. Was their participation in these drills satisfactory to you and the Commandant?

A. We only knew whether it was satisfactory, or not, depending upon the communications, whether the signals were answered, or not, whether the reports were received from the Sector Commander, or not, showing the number of ships that he had available. We had Harbor Control vessels in the harbor but, so far as I know, no report was ever received indicating whether the ships, themselves, were efficient in this problem.

64. Q. Were air raid drills held in which the Army units on Oahu participated?

A. So far as I know, they participated, but we had no way of checking up. In other words, I can recall having seen Army units of mobile anti-aircraft coming into the Navy Yard, but whether this was before or after December 7, I do not recall.

65. Q. Insofar as you were able to observe, was the coordination between the Army and Navy units, during such joint air raid drills, satisfactory?

A. Yes, except in minor cases. By "minor", I mean failures of communication, and somebody not getting the word.

66. Q. Were efforts made to straighten out these minor difficulties?

A. Yes.

67. Q. Captain, when did you first learn of the submarine contact off Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December?

A. About seven-ten in the morning.

68. Q. Did it occur to you at that time that the presence of the submarine might indicate that an air attack was imminent?

A. Not the slightest. It is interesting to note, however, that we had based some of our plans upon that very contingency.

69. Q. What was your reaction to this information?

A. My reaction was that the enemy had decided to be a little more active with his submarine campaign, or that the WARD, who had made the report, was making another mistake. We had had, on the average, ten or fifteen reports of submarines sighted in that area in the several months preceding Pearl.

70. Q. What action, based on this contact, did you take?

A. I told the Watch Officer to be sure and get the dispatch verified, to notify the Commander-in-Chief's Watch Officer immediately, and to get hold of Commander Momsen, our Operations Officer, and give him the information, and then I called Admiral Bloch and told him what the report was, what I had done, and we discussed the matter over the telephone for, I suppose, five or ten minutes to try to decide what was the reliability of this word and what steps should be taken.

As the matter had been referred to the Commander-in-Chief, we decided that we would wait further developments.

71. Q. During your telephone conversation with Admiral Bloch, did the possibility that an air attack might be indicated by the presence of the submarine receive discussion or consideration?

A. No.

[377] 72. Q. Captain, a portion of this Exhibit 22 (Enclosure C), concerning which you have been questioned, is a joint estimate of the situation, under date of 31 March, 1941, signed by Admiral Belinger and by General Martin. It contains, under the heading "Possible Enemy Action" a statement to the effect that the most likely form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. Were the opinions thereby expressed by aviation officers very much in your mind during the weeks and months preceding 7 December '41?

A. Yes, we considered this point, but, somehow or other, we always felt that "it couldn't happen here", and that this estimate which you have referred to was one officer's opinion—a very valuable officer—and that while it could happen, that we didn't believe the Japanese would take that chance.

73. Q. Captain, under the provisions of 2CL-41 (Exhibit 4), was there, on the morning of December 7, 1941, a large number of battleship anti-aircraft guns so placed that they bore upon the sector through which the Japanese torpedo planes attacked?

A. A great many torpedo planes attacked from the sector up over the channel to the submarine base. These battleships were, therefore, in a position to use their anti-aircraft guns against them. I did, however, see a number of planes attacking from the housing area to the northeast, and the battleships' guns would not have been well placed for that attack.

74. Q. But is it true that a considerable proportion of the Japanese torpedo planes attacked from the southeast?

A. It is true.

75. Q. Is it also true that there were a great many battleship anti-aircraft guns emplaced so that they could bear on that attack?

A. Yes.

76. Q. In view of the well-known vulnerability of torpedo planes making close attacks of low altitudes, to what do you ascribe the fact that this large mass of guns failed to stop most, if not in fact nearly all, of the torpedo planes coming in from the southeast?

A. Surprise.

77. Q. About how long after the initial appearance of Japanese planes did the torpedo planes attack from the southeast?

A. I don't know. The first thing I saw was low-level torpedo planes at about 7:50.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I regret to note that in a great many instances my testimony has been vague and indefinite.

In explanation, it is desired to call attention to the fact that not only has a great deal of time elapsed since the attack on Pearl Harbor, but that I remained on duty as Chief of Staff of the Fourteenth Naval District, later, also, becoming Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier and Assistant Commandment of the District, until I was detached in May, 1943. I, therefore, find a [378] tendency on my part to recall related events after Pearl Harbor much clearer than I do those before.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:03 p. m., took a recess until 4:05 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Captain J. B. Earle, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirty-fourth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examination then, at 4:08 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[379] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

FRIDAY, MAY 5, 1944

THIRTY-FIFTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9 : 45 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-fourth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Sir, will you state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Wesley A. Wright; Commander, U. S. Navy; duty at the Navy Department.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December 1941?

A. I was Assistant Communication Officer on the Staff of Admiral Kimmel, on temporary duty with the Fourteenth Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit.

3. Q. Please state, briefly, what experience you have had with Combat Intelligence work, particularly with regard to detection and location of enemy ships by instrument.

A. Actually none in the traffic analysis field, which includes the location of forces by instruments. However, I had had, at that time, about nine years' experience in other closely related branches of Communication Intelligence work.

4. Q. Sir, will you make a brief statement on the means of detection and location of enemy ships that were available to CinCPac on the morning of 7 December 1941, including in your answer the general opinion among communication officers as to the relative merits of the different instruments you describe?

A. The Fourteenth Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit had available a small DF net, consisting, as I remember, of two DY's, one DT, and one large CXK on Oahu; a DY on Palmyra, and

one on Midway. I feel that I am not a very good witness for the question because, as I stated before, my experience has been largely in other C. I. activities. Commander Williams, who has been ordered to duty here, was handling the traffic analysis end of the job, and, I believe, can answer this question much more satisfactorily.

[380] 5. Q. Can you answer the last part of the question, on the general opinion of the communication officers as to the relative merits of the DY and CXK?

A. Yes. The DY's and the DT's are such smaller instruments and they are capable of much quicker manipulation. As a consequence, a bearing can be obtained on a short transmission much more readily and with an experienced operator satisfactory bearings can be obtained. The CXK is a much larger and much more difficult instrument to operate, but, on a long transmission, it is likely to give you a more satisfactory bearing in that it has a unilateral feature which will determine the hemisphere of the bearing almost without doubt.

6. Q. Is it practicable to obtain unilateral bearings on a DY or DT?

A. It is my belief that, with experienced operators, it is practicable to obtain unilateral bearings on a DY and also on a DT. In general, of course, we hope not to have to depend upon a single instrument. If a small net is available the necessity for unilateral or "sense" determination is not as important.

7. Q. Sir, on the morning of 7 December, were the DY operators at Pearl Harbor qualified to report unilateral bearings from the DY?

A. Yes, in my opinion, the operators were qualified to report unilateral bearings.

8. Q. Under the circumstances obtaining on Oahu on 7 December, what instrument of the various ones available would be the most reliable for determination of a bearing of the Japanese carriers, if they were transmitting freely enough for obtaining results?

A. I should think that if enough bearings were obtainable the CXK would be the better instrument. I say "enough bearings" because with any DF instrument, any one bearing is likely to be considerably in error.

9. Q. Sir, where were you at the time of the attack on 7 December, and what was your station for the remainder of the morning?

A. I was in the Mess Hall at the Submarine Base, that is, the Commander-in-Chief's Staff Mess, at the time of the attack. Commander Williams was eating breakfast with me. I directed that he immediately get over to the Communication Intelligence Unit in the Administration Building, Navy Yard, find out as much as he possibly could about the composition and location of the attacking force, and telephone the information to me at Commander-in-Chief's headquarters in the Submarine Base Administration Building; I immediately went there and made telephone contact with the Communication Intelligence Unit. I remained in this building for the remainder of the morning.

10. Q. Will you give a brief narrative account of reports received, regarding the location of the Japanese ships from which the aerial attack was launched, at the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Headquarters, including in your answer an account of what information was disseminated by the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters to the United States forces that were seeking out the enemy ships?

A. We were primarily interested in learning as much as we could of the composition and the location of the attacking surface forces. In general, the information coming over indicated that there were at least four carriers, including the AKAGI and KAGA, by identified radio calls. The bearings [381] obtained on this force seemed to indicate that they were nearly due South, distance pretty well undetermined, but estimated in the neighborhood of between 250 and 300 miles. Conflicting reports were coming in from other sources, one of which stated that the carriers were sighted close to Oahu. This was questioned at length by the Fleet Intelligence Officer and the Fleet Communication Officer. During this time, I found out that no bearings were being received from Lualualei where the CXK was installed, and also found out that the Army megga telephone line between the Fourteenth Naval District Administration Building and Lualualei was out of commission. I suggested to the Fleet Radio Officer that contact could be established by radio. This was done and at least one bearing report came from this source. I remember distinctly only one bearing being called to my attention by the Fleet Radio Officer. This bearing was in direct conflict with the previous evidence that the force was to the South. The bearing received, as I remember it, was almost exactly due North, either 359, 000, or 001. The latter half of the question, as to how much of this information was transmitted to our own forces, I am unable to answer.

11. Q. Am I correct in understanding that you have no information as to whether or not this CXK bearing was sent out to any of the searching forces?

A. My understanding is that it was not, but I believe that that knowledge has come to me subsequently.

12. Q. Sir, in your previous answer, you stated that all of the earlier reports prior to the receipt of the bearing from Lualualei indicated that the force was due South. Can you give any explanation of why the reports all took that trend?

A. It is my belief that an early arbitrary assumption that the surface forces were actually to the southward affected all of the subsequent reports.

13. Q. Sir, you also stated in that answer that there was a report in that the carriers had been sighted South. Can you give any further information as to the source of that report and its evaluation by the officers on duty at CinCPac Headquarters?

A. I believe I stated that the report was pretty definitely discounted by the Fleet Intelligence Officer. He brought it to my attention and made the statement that he thought it was an erroneous report.

14. Q. What evaluation was given to the CXK bearing that you received from Lualualei?

A. I'm afraid I can only answer that from my own reaction. I was a little disturbed, but felt it was probably an erroneous bearing, and when it was called to my attention by the Fleet Radio Officer, I requested that, if possible, we get some more bearings from the CXK to substantiate that.

15. Q. Was that done?

A. It was attempted but I don't believe we received any more bearings.

16. Q. Can you state to whom the information of the CXK bearing to the North was passed?

A. It was passed by me to the Fleet Intelligence Officer, then Lieutenant Commander Layton, and I assumed it was further passed by the Fleet Radio Officer to either the Chief of Staff or to the Admiral, himself.

[382] 17. Q. Do you have any definite information as to whether the CXK bearing went to higher authority, other than the Radio Officer and Intelligence Officer?

A. Nothing definite; no. In addition to that, I did report this bearing to Fourteenth Naval District Unit.

18. Q. Sir, with regard to the various reports that were coming from the DY unit and one report that you mentioned from the CXK unit, can you give the approximate or relative times at which they were received, and was the source of the bearing called to the attention of all who received the information?

A. I'm afraid I can not give very definite times, but I believe that the record of the information exchanged on that day will show the times. My recollection is that we were getting the first bearings at about eight-thirty, Hawaiian time, and we continued to get bearings until afternoon.

19. Q. Do you know at approximately what time within that period this CXK bearing came in?

A. I'm afraid I cannot give a positive answer. As I remember, it was after the second dive bombing attack, which should have been in the neighborhood of 11:15. I think that can be checked by the records.

20. Q. Do you have any information as to the latter part of the previous question, on whether or not the recipients of this information were fully advised as to its source?

A. They were not advised. In any DF work, the question of bilateral or unilateral nature of the bearing is left up to the operator and the DF plot to determine. They are best suited to do the job and are depended on to furnish the correct bearing.

21. Q. In other words, the officers who received this information at CinCPac Headquarters received them as bearings and not knowing that some were received on an instrument that has a bilateral feature and another on an instrument having a unilateral feature?

A. That is correct.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 10:20 a. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., tomorrow.

[383] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

SATURDAY, MAY 6, 1944

THIRTY-SIXTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-fifth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirty-second day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Charles Wellborn, Jr.; Captain, United States Navy; present station the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year 1941?

A. During the calendar year 1941, I performed duty as Administrative Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations.

3. Q. In the performance of those duties, was your association and mental touch with Admiral Stark unusually close?

A. My association with Admiral Stark was rather close. I, of course, did not know all that was in his mind, but I believe that I was acquainted with many of his thoughts.

4. Q. Had he chosen you for the position in consequence of previous and close personal acquaintance?

A. Presumably so, sir. I had served with him previously in the Bureau of Ordnance and while he was at sea commanding the light cruisers of the United States Fleet.

5. Q. Captain, the war plan which was current during the latter part of 1941 was known as WPL-46. Did your duties, during 1941, bring you into any particular contact with those charged with the preparations of that plan?

A. I frequently saw those charged with the operation of the plan but had no direct responsibility in connection with its preparation.

[384] 6. Q. Do you recall hearing any discussions between the Chief, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and officers of the War Plans Section concerning matters of major import surrounding the preparation of WPL-46?

A. I recall that such discussions were held.

7. Q. As an instance, do you recall any discussion or argument concerning the participation of potential allies in any hostilities in which we might engage in the Pacific Ocean?

A. Yes, sir. I recall participation of possible allies was discussed and there seemed to be general agreement that in a Pacific war participation of allies was almost a necessity, and that it might be expected. Allies counted upon were Britain, the Netherlands, and China. As I recall it, at that time, there was some doubt as to the participation of Russia and France.

8. Q. Do you recall any important discussions on the point as to the most probable location—that is in the Atlantic or Pacific—of the war for which the Navy was preparing?

A. The question of the probable location of hostilities was continually discussed.

9. Q. Did you hear much disagreement over the point as to which Ocean our major efforts of preparation should be directed?

A. There was discussion of that point. As I recall it, the general opinion appeared to be that the initial major effort must be in the Atlantic, while holding action was resorted to in the Pacific, since the war might quickly and irretrievably be lost in the Atlantic, whereas initial reverses in the Pacific might later be retrievable.

10. Q. Do you recall the names of any officers around Admiral Stark who disagreed with that idea, which, incidentally, is covered by a part of WPL-46?

A. My recollection is that this view was rather generally held, and I do not remember hearing anyone in a position of importance expressing directly contrary views at that time.

11. Q. Incident to that particular point, do you recall hearing any disagreement as to the correctness of the step which was taken, as a part of WPL-46, toward transfer of a considerable portion of the Pacific Fleet to Atlantic waters, which occurred during the Spring of 1941?

A. My recollection on that point is that there were insufficient forces to meet the requirements in each Ocean. Those officers primarily concerned with activities in the Pacific appeared to feel that no forces should be removed from the Pacific; those primarily concerned with Atlantic activities for the most part held the view that stronger forces were a necessity in the Atlantic.

12. Q. Confining the question to those whose ordinary duties did not confine their interests to one of the two Oceans, do you recall any disagreement?

A. I do not.

13. Q. What do you remember of discussions and arguments concerning the defensive, and particularly the security aspect as affecting our naval forces in the Pacific?

A. Pearl Harbor was not considered a one hundred per cent secure base. Efforts were made to increase its security. Operations of the Fleet were so [385] controlled that normally only a part of the Fleet was in Pearl Harbor at any one time. I recall no specific discussions on this point, however.

14. Q. Captain, will you state what you recall concerning discussions, opinions expressed, and so forth, on the very broad point of our Administration's keeping its diplomatic steps in touch with naval readiness for war, and the reverse thereof?

A. My recollection is that there was a rather complete interchange of information between the Navy Department and the State Department. My recollection is that their opinions were not widely divergent.

15. Q. Can you recall any specific incident of the State Department's making a diplomatic move against the advice of the Navy Department?

A. No, sir, I can't.

16. Q. Our Government, in June or July of 1941, instituted steps which resulted in a freezing of Japanese credits within our country, which was also participated in by our potential allies. What do you recall of discussions within the Navy Department concerning the international situation which that action would bring forth?

A. I recall that there were discussions regarding how far the United States might go with such moves without provoking warlike action on the part of Japan against the United States.

17. Q. What do you recall, in the way of discussions heard concerning more direct actions instituted by our Government which resulted in the stopping of shipments of steel scrap, petroleum products, and so forth, to the Japanese Empire?

A. The overall result of such steps was discussed, both within the Navy Department and between the Navy Department and the State Department. Generally, I believe an effort was being made to take such steps as might prevent, or render more difficult, aggressive action on the part of Japan without provoking Japan to war with the United States.

18. Q. What do you recall in the way of differences of opinions as to the probabilities on that particular point which you have just mentioned?

A. I can't recall opinions of individuals, but I do recall that it was generally felt that the stoppage of crude oil would probably result in a warlike step on the part of Japan. The consensus of opinion, as I recall, was that the stoppage of shipments of aviation gasoline, the freezing of credits, and shutting off of steel scrap were probably moves which would not provoke war.

19. Q. Were the officers around Admiral Stark all in agreement concerning the effect of depriving Japan of crude oil?

A. As I recall it, they were not entirely in agreement, but I'm not able to recall the particular shading of views held by the individual officers.

20. Q. In considering the matter, were aforementioned officers thinking mostly about shipments from this Continent or those from the N. E. I. oil fields?

A. I believe that shipments from both locations were considered in the overall thought given the problem.

21. Q. Do you recall that, following that state of mind which indicated full realization of the seriousness of the petroleum deprivation, the Navy Department particularly advised other Departments of the Government concerning our readiness to back up the action?

[386] A. I believe that the State Department at this time was generally familiar with the state of readiness of the War and Navy Departments and that this state was considered in reaching decisions regarding the stoppage of shipments of oil, aviation gasoline, and scrap, and the freezing of credits. Note was also taken of the fact that regardless of decisions on oil, gasoline, scrap, and credits, the strengthening of our military and naval forces and Japan's probable belief that this strengthening was a threat to Japan's accomplishment of her aims in the Far East might cause Japan to attack the United States before we became too strong.

22. Q. Captain, state what you recall of discussions here and opinions expressed incident to Mr. Kurusu's appearance in Washington as a so-called Assistant Japanese Ambassador.

A. There was general conjecture as to the meaning of his appearance. He obviously was familiar with the views of those who were gaining power in Japan and he was also familiar with the United States. As I recall it, it was generally felt that he was bringing the Japanese Ambassador authentic and up to date information regarding the views of the Japanese Cabinet.

23. Q. Do you recall if his appearance in Washington occasioned an easing or an increase of the general tension of officers of the most responsible mind in the Navy Department?

A. My recollection is that they did not feel that his appearance very greatly changed the tension of the situation; they believed that his appearance called definitely for very careful watching of the situation.

24. Q. Captain, please state any knowledge that you had, at any time in 1941, amounting to background of the Navy Department's negotiations with the War Department concerning the readiness of the Army to meet its commitments on Oahu.

A. The Navy Department, of course, desired Pearl Harbor to be sufficiently well defended to permit the repair and upkeep of ships and rehabilitation of crews with security and continually pressed the War Department to improve the defenses to permit this. The War Department felt that from the overall total of existing men and material, it could not assign to Hawaii all that the Navy Department desired. Particularly, the Navy Department desired better defenses against air attack, both as regards anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft. It was the Navy Department's view that there was no more important commitment the Army might have than the defense of Pearl Harbor, and this view appeared to be not completely concurred in by the War Department.

25. Q. Captain, as the situation vis-a-vis Japan became tense in the latter part of November, state what you recall in the way of

background discussions concerning the directive which went out concerning the use of Army troops and aircraft as garrisons of Midway, Wake, and so forth.

A. As I recall it, the Navy Department felt that the defense of the islands was an Army responsibility; that the small amount of Marine personnel and aviation available should be reserved for amphibious work. With this in mind, effort was made to reduce the overhead requirements of the Marine Corps. One method for this reduction was the relieving of Marine Corps units from static defensive duties. I believe that this was the background for the Navy's desire to have the Army take over the defense of Midway and Wake.

266. Q. Inasmuch as that directive was sent at nearly the same time as the [387] all important "war warning" dispatch, do you recall how it happened that the Department took the action at that particular time?

A. I do not recall any specific reason for that action having been taken at that time and also do not recall that it was connected in any way directly with the war warning.

27. Q. Did it happen that said directive concerning the substitution of Army for Marines was prepared and released by some officer who was not cognizant of the dangerous international situation?

A. I do not recall specifically, but I think it probable.

28. Q. Captain, what do you recall, as background, of discussions during 1941 concerning the advisability of continuing to base the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters? My question particularly concerns the security aspect.

A. There was much consideration and discussion on the question of continuing to base the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. There was general realization that the Hawaiian Islands did not afford a completely secure location in which to base the Fleet. It was also felt that, unless Hawaii was actually used as a base and the necessary facilities and technique developed for handling the Fleet in this area, it might be impossible to base the Fleet there in time of war. I believe there was also a general belief that the Fleet based in Hawaii might deter Japan from aggressive action. The decision to keep the Fleet at Pearl Harbor involved consideration of all of these points.

29. Q. What do you recall of discussions or opinions expressed, say, during October-November, '41, concerning the probability of a direct Japanese attack on Oahu, particularly as regards a carrier raid?

A. I recall some discussion as to whether or not, in the event of aggressive action by Japan against the United States, the attack would be made against Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, or to the Northward against Russia. Some months previous to this time, there had been discussion of a possible aircraft attack on Oahu, which resulted in a letter on this subject to the War Department. At this particular time, that is, October or November, 1941, I recall little discussion on the question of probability of a carrier attack against Oahu.

30. Q. Do you recall, during October and November, '41, an expression of opinion by any officer that a carrier raid on Pearl Harbor was to be particularly apprehended?

A. I do not recall that anyone felt that this particular type of attack was highly probable to the exclusion of attacks elsewhere, but there were individuals who felt that such an attack was probable.

31. Q. Can you recall their names?

A. Yes, sir. Admiral Turner felt that attack on Oahu was quite probable. Other officers felt that such an attack was entirely possible but appeared to regard it as somewhat less probable than did Admiral Turner. I believe that Admirals Ingersoll and Stark were in this category.

32. Q. Captain, I show you two dispatches which are Exhibits 6 and 7 as a part of this record. The first of 16 October contains a directive concerning deployments and no documentary evidence indicates other communications to CinC, Pacific Fleet, along similar lines, up to the date of 24 November. [388] As a background, please give what you remember of discussions pertinent to that point during that intervening period.

A. It is my recollection that during this period there was some personal correspondence between the Navy Department and the Commander-in-Chief, and that frequently officers moved between Hawaii and Washington and that through these media there may have been interchange of information and opinions regarding the degree of tension in the international situation between the dispatches of October 16 and November 24.

33. Q. I show you a dispatch, dated 27 November, which is Exhibit 8 in this record. Please state what you recall during the few weeks preceding this dispatch of discussions, conferences, and so forth, with officials of the State Department concerning the situation vis-a-vis Japan.

A. There was close liaison between the War, Navy, and State Departments at this time. The State Department kept the War and Navy Departments fully advised concerning developments of the discussions with the Japanese representatives and, in turn, the War and Navy Departments provided the State Department with complete information on all intelligence they obtained.

34. Q. What can you recall in the way of disagreements, between Navy and State Departments, in opinions or proposed actions during that period?

A. My recollection is that any divergences of opinion were fully discussed and that final decisions reached were generally concurred in by most of those concerned. Generally, there appeared to be no uncompromisable disagreement.

35. Q. Again referring to Exhibit 8; did you hear the conversations which were incident to eventual agreement over the phrasing of this dispatch?

A. I was present during discussion of the phrasing of one dispatch at about this time. I believe it was the message of the 27th of November.

36. Q. What do you recall of that conversation concerning the phrase which had to do with "war warning" and the other phrase concerning a deployment?

A. I recall there was some discussion as to whether or not the phrase "This is a war warning." was too strong. After discussion, it was agreed that it was not too strong and it was included in the final draft of the message. I do not recall discussion regarding the phrases concerning deployment.

37. Q. Do you recall who proposed to water down the phrase about the war warning?

A. I do not recall definitely who proposed that.

38. Q. Do you recall hearing any officer proposing, subsequent to the dispatch of 27 November, to send the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, either further information indicating that his position was likely to be attacked or any more specific directive, concerning steps which he was to take, than he had already received?

A. I know of no specific proposal along this line. Although there was considerable discussion of such things during this period, I do not recall anyone actually drafting a dispatch and submitting it to the Chief of Naval Operations for release.

39. Q. Do you recall a discussion as regards ascertaining directly from CinCPac what measures he had taken incident to the Department's directive on 27 November?

A. I do not.

[389] 40. Q. Do you recall hearing any discussion during the last days of November or early December of proposals to put war plans in effect wholly or in part?

A. I recall discussions as to the desirability of placing in effect, wholly or in part, certain war plans, but I do not recall a specific proposal that they should actually be placed in effect. In the dispatch of November 27, there was a directive which mentioned certain measures included in WPL-46.

41. Q. Reverting to my question concerning future directives to CinCPac subsequent to 27 November, and so forth, do you recall hearing any discussions as to the advisability of some very high Navy Department official proceeding to Pearl Harbor, by the most rapid transportation available, in order that there might be a direct meeting of minds?

A. I do not recall such a proposal at that time.

42. Q. Did Admiral Stark have available a method of telephonic communication to CinCPac through which he could talk things over with reasonable security?

A. He did not have any means of telephonic communication with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, which was considered secure. Voice scramblers were installed in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, but the opinion of engineers familiar with this equipment was that it offered little security.

43. Q. Can you elaborate upon the latter part of that reply?

A. Upon the occasion of the installation of the voice scrambler, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the engineer who made the installation demonstrated his ability to translate from the scrambled language into plain English parts of conversations transmitted with the use of the scrambler.

44. Q. Sir, can you give a summary or chronology of events from Saturday noon, 6 December, '41, to the time of the attack, indicating, as accurately as you can remember, the times at which CNO received various reports that gave indications of proposed Japanese action?

A. Until sometime in the evening of December 6, probably about seven or eight o'clock, the Chief of Naval Operations was in his office and I recall no particular incidents relevant to the attack of the next

day. I did not see him between about eight p. m., December 6, and the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

45. Q. Captain, did you know of information that had been received about two days before Pearl Harbor that the Japanese had used a certain code which has come to be known as the "Winds Message" indicating a definite intention to wage war on the United States in the immediate future?

A. I did not know of this.

46. Q. Do you remember anything in particular which occurred during the few weeks preceding 7 December, '41, which seemed to unnecessarily preoccupy Admiral Stark and Ingersoll so that their mental attitudes, as concerning the situation vis-a-vis Japan, were adversely affected?

A. I recall no particular preoccupations of either Admiral Stark or Admiral Ingersoll. There were, of course, the customary interruptions and matters requiring consideration, but I recall no important matter preoccupying either Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Stark.

[390] The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 12:04 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[391] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 1944

THIRTY-SEVENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 2 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-sixth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

The examining officer read orders from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, certified copy prefixed marked "D", relieving Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. Navy, as counsel to the examining officer, and orders from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, original prefixed marked "E", detailing Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve, as counsel to the examining officer. Lieutenant Whittington took seat as such.

The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter, dated 17 April 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, from Rear Admiral Howard F. Kingman, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the transcript of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the testimony given by him on the twenty-ninth day of the examination was correct, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 37".

The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter, dated 6 May 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, from Vice Admiral H. F. Leary, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the transcript of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the testimony given by him on the thirty-third day of the examination was correct, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 38".

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Walter S. Anderson, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, President of the Board of Inspection and Survey of the Navy Department.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. Early in the calendar year 1941, I was detached as Director of Naval Intelligence and took command as Commander Battleships, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet.

[392] 3. Q. Were the ships which in general suffered the heaviest damage on 7 December '41 vessels of your command?

A. Yes. The vessels of my command were among those that suffered the heaviest damage.

4. Q. In the administrative organization of the Pacific Fleet, in effect during the latter half of 1941, who was your immediate superior in command?

A. Commander Battle Force, also known as Commander, Task Force One, Vice Admiral Pye.

5. Q. Then is it correct to say that from the operational standpoint also Admiral Pye was generally your immediate superior?

A. Yes. I might add, however, there were numerous occasions when I, myself, was a Task Force Commander for purposes of operations at sea.

6. Q. Were you Admiral Pye's most important subordinate commander?

A. Yes, inasmuch as I commanded his heaviest subordinate unit and was the senior of the Flag Officers under him.

7. Q. During the latter half of 1941, from your position as a principal commander in the third command echelon, what was your observation of the relationships among the officers of the still higher command echelons, particularly as regards information of the situation vis-a-vis Japan and of the ideas of the Commander-in-Chief?

A. My impression was that relations were normal. My knowledge is not precise nor specific as to what degree of information was passed along to them, but I had no reason to believe there was not a proper dissemination of information, and I believe there was. I, personally, saw my immediate senior frequently, and the Commander-in-Chief at least weekly.

8. Q. As you recall, how much of this most important information and the ideas of the Commander-in-Chief concerning the situation in November, say, became passed down to officers in your own command echelon?

A. I knew that the Commander-in-Chief felt that he needed more resources than he had, especially aircraft, and that he was informed that it was, at that time, impracticable to provide him with what he asked for.

9. Q. Did you feel, at the time, that Commander, Battle Force, was passing to you all of the highly important and probably secret information, including the reactions of the Commander-in-Chief thereto?

A. I assumed that Commander, Battle Force, passed along whatever he thought should be passed along.

10. Q. Do you recall if you felt that Admiral Pye went far enough in taking you into his confidence?

A. I had no feeling then, nor have I now, that he intentionally denied me any information that he thought would conduce to readiness and efficiency.

11. Q. In that connection, I hand you a dispatch which is Exhibit 6 in this record. Do you recall having seen or been told of the contents of this dispatch during October, 1941?

A. I don't think I ever saw or was told about this particular dispatch.

12. Q. Do you recall whether or not the Fleet put into effect any additional security measures at sea or in port during the latter part of October or during November?

[393] A. There were a good many additional security measures put into effect in the latter part of 1941. It is difficult for me to remember the exact chronology.

13. Q. Was there, during that period, any particular increase in security measures while in Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes. In my own command, I established continuous twenty-four hour a day watch on a limited portion of my anti-aircraft battery. Provision was made by higher authority for a scheme of sector control for repelling aircraft attack and there were frequent drills using that scheme.

14. Q. During what period next preceding 7 December '41 were the battleships of your command physically present in Pearl Harbor?

A. We came in from sea some days prior to the 7th of December, and the battleships of my command were in Pearl Harbor on that day.

15. Q. Do you recall the date of your entry into port?

A. I do not.

16. Q. Can you give it approximately?

A. About 28 November.

17. Q. About how long was the period at sea next prior to that entry into port?

A. As nearly as I can remember, I would say it was five or six days.

18. Q. Admiral, I hand you four dispatches from the Navy Department which were received at Pearl Harbor either during that last period at sea or shortly after your entry into port. They are Exhibits 7, 8, 10, and 11 in this record. Please state which, if any, of these dispatches you were shown or appraised of with the date, insofar as you can recall.

A. Of these dispatches, I distinctly remember being shown Exhibit 8. It is possible that I was shown or informed of the contents of Exhibit 11; I am not quite sure. Exhibits 7 and 10, to the best of my recollection, I neither saw nor knew of.

19. Q. As concerns either Exhibits 8 or 11, but particularly No. 8, what transpired in the way of conferences, discussions, and so forth between you and the command echelons above you at the time?

A. Exhibit 8 was shown to a group of Flag officers, including myself, by the Commander-in-Chief in his office. Under the war plans in force, which I checked after leaving this office, I had no specific duties to perform. I did not know what subsequent conferences there may have been. I knew that there were two task forces at sea. I knew there was an excellent plan in existence for long-distance daily air reconnaissance. Naturally, I thought considerably about the message. I assumed that whatever was considered necessary to be done was being taken care of.

20. Q. During that conference, was anything told you concerning the mission of the task forces which you mentioned as being at sea?

A. I don't think so.

21. Q. At the time, or afterward, but prior to 7 December, were you directed to make any change in security measures as applying to your own command?

A. No, but I reviewed, in my own mind, what the situation was, trying to think if there was anything that I should do which was not then being done.

[394] 22. Q. At any time after the conference concerning which you have last testified, were there other conferences or discussions in which you engaged, or to which you listened, concerning security of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor which were instituted under the Department's directions or by estimates of the situation in the Pacific, made on the spot?

A. I don't remember being present at any regular conference resulting from this dispatch.

23. Q. Did you have any discussions with Admiral Pye during that period?

A. In a general way, I believe that he and I discussed the situation soon after we learned of this dispatch. Such discussion did not result in any decision to take any more security measures than the considerable ones we were already taking.

24. Q. Admiral, please give, insofar as you can remember, what your own impressions were, during early December, concerning the situation vis-a-vis Japan with particular attention to security features while in Pearl Harbor.

A. My ideas at the time were that there was a very grave situation as far as the United States and Japan were concerned. When I saw this dispatch (Exhibit 8), I was impressed by the fact that it was a war warning; a very serious matter. I noted, particularly, that an aggressive move by the Japanese was expected, but I noted with specific interest and some relief, as far as Pearl Harbor was concerned, that this warning did not anticipate any attack on United States territory farther East than the Philippines, and that it gave as a reason for that surmise the quantity and readiness of Japanese troops and the setup of their naval task forces. As a former Director of Naval Intelligence, it seemed to me this basis for the surmise was most important, as I knew there were methods that were pretty efficient by which we could tell pretty closely the organization of the Japanese forces and their locations. I remember thinking, "Well, we've got a pretty good idea where they are, and, being where they are, they can not visualize an attack farther East than the Philippines." My recollection is that I expected something further by way of a warning from the Department if the locations of the Japanese task forces moved in any way to indicate a threat farther East than the Philippines.

25. Q. Do you remember whether or not you gave any particular thought to the possibility of a surprise carrier raid on Pearl Harbor?

A. I remember thinking about this dispatch a great deal and I believe I must have canvassed in my mind all the various possibilities. In all my thoughts as to security, I was influenced by the knowledge, or what I thought was the knowledge, that we were maintaining a long-distance daily reconnaissance by air. Under those circumstances, it would seem highly doubtful to me that carriers could get close enough to launch planes without being seen by our air scouts. It is possible that such mental process as I went through was in more general terms than I here express, but the conclusion was about the

same. It is a little difficult, after the event, to be sure just what you thought before the event.

26. Q. Do I understand you correctly as saying that you assumed distant air reconnaissance was being maintained and that you never found that such was not the case?

A. That's correct. I had read a very complete plan for distant air reconnaissance to be carried out daily from Pearl Harbor and I knew that it had been placed into effect. I did not know that it had been discontinued prior to December 7 until after the attack on the 7th of December. I had a [395] general impression, which I believe was accurate, that there were not enough planes available to make this plan fully effective through 360 degrees of azimuth every day. I should like to add that this comment by me should not be considered as a reflection on any officer, in view of the fact that I, subsequently, learned that he had what he considered good and sufficient reasons for discontinuing this long-distance daily air reconnaissance, in making a hard choice. That is, he didn't have enough planes, in his opinion, for what he had to do then, and what he might be faced with later. With regard to this dispatch, Exhibit 8, I would like to make it clear that it was received with all the solemnity and intense interest at the time that its context manifestly entitled it to. There was nothing light-hearted about the way it was received.

27. Q. Admiral, what was the mission of the United States Army forces which were stationed in Hawaii at that time?

A. Their mission was to defend Oahu Island and, as I understand it, specifically, the naval base of Pearl Harbor. This statement I base upon common knowledge and my general knowledge of joint action by the Army and Navy.

28. Q. What did you know, in November-December, '41, as regards the readiness of Army forces, Oahu, to fulfill their mission?

A. From time to time, I observed Army forces engaged in tactical concentrations and active maneuvers which appeared to be practices against the contingency of attack. I am referring more now to ground movements than to movements in the air. As to the Army's readiness to repel air attack, my knowledge was by no means exact. I knew there were Army fields and Army planes, and I observed them from time to time exercising in the air and, as I remember it, we sometimes operated in cooperation with them.

29. Q. Did you know anything about the state of readiness of the Army's air warning net, Oahu?

A. No. It is pertinent to observe that the prevalent conception of the security of confidential and secret information, in general, visualized confining secret and confidential information to those who had some need of the knowledge in the discharge of their duties, actual or potential, should they by casualty rise to a higher command. This conception necessarily resulted in certain information not being very widely disseminated.

30. Q. Admiral, I hand you a document, Exhibit 4 in this testimony, known as 2CL-41. Were you familiar with it?

A. Yes.

31. Q. Do you recall having, prior to 7 December, '41, proposed any changes in the document as it stood on 14 October '41?

A. Yes. On more than one occasion, I recommended to the Commander-in-Chief that whenever our ships entered or sortied from Pearl Harbor that depth charges should be dropped by our destroyers, my point being that crews would learn to drop them promptly when ordered, that we would all get used to depth charges, and that if there were any Japanese submarines in the vicinity they would think their presence was known and they would then adopt a defensive rather than an offensive attitude. This suggestion was not made in writing.

32. Q. Do you recall having proposed any changes in sub-head (G) which appears on page 4?

[396] A. I may have made minor suggestions but no suggestion of any considerable importance. The plan looked good.

33. Q. During October-November, while at sea, which of the standard conditions of readiness was the Fleet maintaining?

A. There was always some condition of readiness in which a certain number of guns were manned and instantly ready twenty-four hours a day. The exact condition varied at times and also varied by day and by night. I consider that a good state of readiness was maintained at sea which would compare favorably with that maintained during actual war.

34. Q. Reverting to 2CL-41, Exhibit 4, sub-head (G) thereof; which of the three conditions was the Fleet maintaining while in Pearl Harbor during November-December '41?

A. None. That is to say, none of these three specific conditions were in effect at the time of the attack, 7 December.

35. Q. In whose province was it to make effective any one of these conditions of readiness?

A. Exhibit 4 is a copy of a comprehensive security order issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, well before Pearl Harbor, providing in great detail for the security of the Fleet, both at sea and in port. Among its many provisions, the Exhibit states, on page 4: "The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, is the Naval Base Defense Officer." It continues: "As such, he shall . . ." after stating various things, it says ". . . coordinate the Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the Base defense by (1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain", et cetera. I want to make it clear that from time to time drills were carried out with the necessary alarms, et cetera, and for such drills there must have been some condition of readiness in effect at the specific time of the drill.

36. Q. Are you certain, however, that the Base Defense Officer (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District) did not advise the S. O. E., Pearl Harbor, to continuously maintain any one of those three conditions of readiness?

A. That is a statement I, of course, could not make. I do know that there was none of the three conditions of readiness mentioned here usually maintained in port, nor was any one of these conditions of readiness in effect at the time of the attack on 7 December. I am quite clear as to this because I gave close personal attention to matters of gun and ammunition readiness and had increased, on my own initiative, the degree of gun and ammunition readiness in the battle-ships.

37. Q. Did you, on your own authority and as applying only to ships of your command, direct any specific degree of gun readiness which resulted in full readiness of any portion of their batteries during the first week in December?

A. Yes. Prior to that time, I had made effective twenty-four hour watches on two of the eight .50 calibre guns on each battleship, and that two of the five inch anti-aircraft guns on each ship should be told off each day as ready guns, their crews specially mustered and instructed with a view to manning these guns instantaneously in case of alarm. As a matter of fact, as near as I could ascertain, these guns functioned in the way it was expected they would, and one of the .50 calibre guns forward in the MARYLAND actually knocked down an approaching Jap plane; be it said upon the initiative of the instructed enlisted gun's crew when they saw the plane approaching from Ford [397] Island where it had been attacking.

38. Q. Did your directive result in the five inch guns' crews being continually at the guns?

A. No, but the directive provided that the guns should be ready with ammunition there so they could go into instantaneous action; the gun crews specially mustered, told off, instructed what their duty was, and to be in the vicinity of the guns to answer a quick call.

39. Q. That is, one set of crews in each ship had that duty for twenty-four hours?

A. Yes, as to the five inch guns, two crews had the duty. The .50 calibre guns though were actually right on the job all of the time. At the two .50 calibre guns on each ship, the watch was the strictest watch that you could contemplate. They were there all the time and had to be relieved, and all that sort of thing. The .50 calibre and those five inch ready guns led off very promptly with firing, I am told. I wasn't there until about nine a. m., 7 December.

40. How many ships of your command were in Pearl Harbor on 7 December?

A. Eight.

41. Q. What was the approximate average anti-aircraft battery of each of those ships, including machine guns above .50 calibre?

A. Their batteries were, generally speaking, eight five-inch anti-aircraft guns, 25 calibre, and eight .50 calibre machine guns. Also most of my ships had either four guns of 3"/50 calibre or four quads of 1".1. The ARIZONA and NEVADA did not.

42. Q. Admiral, which form of the air attack suffered on 7 December was most damaging to your ships?

A. Torpedo attack.

43. Q. From what direction did the torpedo planes generally come?

A. While I did not witness that attack, I can speak with assurance when I say that they came from an easterly direction.

44. Q. As the ships were disposed at their berths, was there a considerable number of the ships' guns so placed that they could have borne upon the attacking torpedo planes?

A. Yes.

45. Q. A hypothetical question: Assuming that at least one-fourth of the anti-aircraft guns' crews had been closed up, entirely in readiness for opening fire, and had known that the approaching planes were enemy and authorized to fire upon them at will; what is your

estimate of the effect that might have resulted as regards defeating that attack?

A. Judging from the experience of this war and the proved inadequacy by the events of this war of the anti-aircraft batteries of our ships as they existed at that time, I would say that the answer to your hypothetical question is that they could not have defeated the attack, nor would they have seriously diminished the attack, notwithstanding that the crews were, in my opinion, well trained crews. The experience of this war has demonstrated that the anti-aircraft batteries of ships must be many, many times greater, especially in heavy automatic guns, than they were at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. Also, it should be borne in mind that the ships on that [398] occasion were moored. They could not maneuver. We had no torpedo nets. I think it might be just as well to state here for purposes of the record a fact which those in the Navy will recognize, that there wasn't any choice as to what Commander Battleships could do in assigning specific ships to specific berths. There were just about as many berths designated as available to him as there were ships. The best estimate made as to the number of planes—not torpedo planes alone—that were shot down by battleship guns was fifteen to seventeen. As a matter of record, it is also desirable to state the Commander Battleships, while an administrative and tactical commander, did not have the say as to what battleships were to be in the Hawaiian or any other area, nor as to which ones were to be in port at any time. Those decisions rested with higher authority.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: In view of all that's been said since Pearl Harbor, and in justice to the Commander-in-Chief, I would like to say that Admiral Kimmel was obviously taking the situation seriously and was obviously most attentive to his duties as he saw them. I had a high opinion of him as an officer and a gentleman before the attack and still have. One most unfortunate impression got abroad, which was incorrect and very unfair to both Admiral Kimmel and General Short. The Roberts Commission, in making what was an observation about a particular dispatch, said that these officers had, in the opinion of the Commission, not conferred adequately as to steps to be taken following receipt of the war warning dispatch in Exhibit 8. Unfortunately, the American press mistakenly seized upon this as a statement—which it wasn't—that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not confer together properly in general. The press even spoke as if their relations were not good. I happened, by accident, to have been present, by invitation of Admiral Kimmel, at one of the conferences these officers held not long before Pearl Harbor and, of my own knowledge, I know that their relations were excellent, they frequently conferred, and the whole impression that their relations were bad and that they didn't try to cooperate, which got abroad

following the attack, was untrue and unfair to them. I'd like to make one further observation from my own standpoint. The report of the Roberts Commission, in one place, referred to a letter of the Secretary of Navy of 27 January 1941, in which was outlined the possibility of various forms of attack on Pearl Harbor. The report stated this letter was known to Admiral Kimmel, General Short, and Admiral Bloch, and then went on to indicate that nothing much about it was thought of or done by any of them, *nor by any of the junior Flag officers*. So far as I was concerned, the Roberts Commission did not ascertain whether or not I knew of the existence of this letter. The facts are, I did not.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 3:40 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[399] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, MAY 11, 1944

THIRTY-EIGHTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:40 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-seventh day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Roland Munroe Brainard; Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired; serving as senior member of the Joint Production Survey Committee under the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. I was Director of the Ship Movements Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington.

3. Q. Please make a brief statement setting forth the duties of the Ship Movements Division along functional lines as applying to movements of ships in the Pacific Ocean during, say, the last six months of the calendar year 1941.

A. The general functions of the Ship Movements Division involved preparation of the publications "Operating Force Plan", "Assignment of Vessels to Fleets and Forces", "Assignment of Vessels to Districts", assignment of home ports; and collaboration and coordination with the Fleet Maintenance Division of overhauls, schedules of Fleet activities as submitted by the Commanders of the forces afloat, these tentative schedules being submitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and circulated for the approval or modifications by the divisions under the CNO, and final approval; then returned to the forces afloat by the Chief of Naval Operations; scheduling and itinerarizing of NTS ships, the recording and accountability of ship locations in rather detailed form as the result of position reports and location

reports from the ships operating individually and from Fleet units, as reported by Fleet Commanders. During the period of my incumbency, a War Information Room was started under the late Rear Admiral F. T. Leighton for the purpose of plotting and keeping track of all combatant ships of the navies of the world. Also a section of Convoy and Routing, as now called, whose duties were the plotting [400] and as close an accountability as possible to keep track of the merchant shipping of the world. Positions of our own naval vessels also was obtained through a movement report system. Information on merchant shipping and foreign shipping and men-o-war was obtained through the various sources of O. N. I., naval observers at ports of the world, Naval Attaches, Maritime Commission, and other such sources. The acquisition of small craft was accomplished by the NTS Section which, later, grew into a sizeable division, and the assignments to Districts and Sea Frontiers was determined by the Chief of Naval Operations as set forth in the publication previously mentioned as prepared and distributed by this Division.

4. Q. As regards the assignment of important naval units in the various Fleets and Forces; were those decisions made within your Division or subject to the requirements and directives of Naval Operations' echelons above that Division?

A. They were made by higher echelons than my Division, and my Division was the recording or the agency which prepared the summarized paper of assignment of vessels to the Fleet, Divisions, and so forth.

5. Q. In that function of assignment of units, which would seem to come somewhat under policy, were you usually consulted and was your advice freely asked?

A. In the case of smaller units, District craft, and up to and including the suggestions as to the composition of destroyer divisions and their assignment, of individual ships to the Divisions, or Divisions to Squadrons; yes. In the case of larger units, cruisers, carriers, battleships, their assignment to Fleets was determined by policy plan, strategy, as well as by upper echelons.

6. Q. I show you four documents, exhibits in this examination, Nos. 25, 26, 28 and 29, which are the Employment Schedules of the last quarter of the calendar year 1941 for the Pacific Fleet. Do you recall if Naval Operations made any changes in those schedules as submitted?

A. I do not recall of any changes. It was the procedure that tentative schedules prepared by the forces afloat, submitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and reviewed by the several divisions thereof as to general features, for conflict, if any, with overhaul periods at yards, gunnery and engineering training periods, and if no modifications, or such modifications as might have been proposed by any division, be reviewed by the Chief or Assistant Chief of Operations, and approval or suggested modification returned to the forces afloat.

7. Q. Did that working method apply to the preceding parts of calendar year 1941?

A. It was the general procedure that I found in existence there and it was continued right straight through until the 7th of December, at least.

8. Q. Was Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, authorized to make considerable changes in the operating schedules as long as the ships movements were confined to the general vicinity of Hawaiian waters?

A. It was my understanding, yes, sir; he could modify, interchange periods of activity. The general, overall guiding idea was that a certain amount of training in gunnery, tactics, engineering, and other activities should be accomplished in the year. A rather general freedom of action was given to the senior Fleet Commanders.

[401] 9. Q. As applying to this particular period, October to December, inclusive, 1941, do you recall if any considerable changes were actually made by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. In the early part of the year, schedules were in general made out according to types, in making their preliminary schedules to the Commander-in-Chief. Around the middle of the year, a task organization was set up, to the best of my knowledge, by the Commander-in-Chief, himself. From about the middle of the year through the remainder of the year, it is my recollection that the units of the Pacific Fleet operated mainly and generally in task groups with the consequent greater freedom of action that that organization allowed. They were grouped with units of the various types, which made their disposition easily handled and permitted the conduct of exercises with rather considerable facility.

10. Q. In fulfilling that function of the Ship Movements Division, which kept track of the actual locations of ships belonging to the Pacific Fleet, what information was available in addition to the approved schedules of employment?

A. The movement report system was the only other means of following more in detail the location of ships than as indicated in the schedule. This was a somewhat elaborate system, including code groups and line numbers of sheets prepared in advance by the Fleet Commanders and forwarded to the interested agencies, both afloat and ashore, and, in the case of movements in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands of the Fleet units, reports were often not received until the movement had been made. A prompt report was generally received from individual ships in free route and from ships in the Naval Transportation Service under the control of the Chief of Naval Operations. The Commander-in-Chief, as I recall, was given freedom of movement to use and move ships in the Hawaiian area as he pleased.

11. Q. Then was it true that there was a considerable time lag between the actual change in location of various Fleet units and the date on which your Division was informed concerning that?

A. There was a variable time lag; yes, sir. In some cases, it was several days, and in other cases it might be a matter of hours, depending upon the radio schedule reporting the movements message and the time filed.

12. Q. For example, did the Ship Movements Division know, at the time, when a group of vessels commanded by Admiral Halsey sailed from Pearl Harbor, approximately 1 December '41, for the purpose of landing an aircraft reinforcement upon Wake?

A. I do not recall knowing of that movement before or while it was being carried out. In a recent examination of records available to me, dispatch No. 280627 CR 0750 shows the contemplation of such a

movement, but I found no indication thereon of my having seen it, and the daily movement sheets, information and address changes, from 21 November to 10 December, inclusive, show movements of the WRIGHT, but no carrier, between Pearl Harbor, Wake, and Midway.

13. Q. Reverting to your testimony concerning the "War Information Room", were you, during November and December of '41, kept in close touch with all the information available in the Department concerning locations of Japanese naval units?

A. I'm not quite sure I was. By frequent visits, I kept myself in close touch with the information received and plotted by the War Information Room, who, in turn, received their information from such sources as O. N. I., naval observers, and what was made known to them through the communications system.

[402] 14. Q. At the time, did you think that your War Information Room was receiving absolutely all Japanese information available in the Department?

A. To the best of my knowledge, they were, or should have been, by existing arrangements.

15. Q. During, say, November-December, 1941, were you a part of and in close association with the Officers of Naval Operations who assisted its Chief in the formation of policies, making large decisions on the distribution of ships, and so forth?

A. No, sir, not as a general rule.

16. Q. Did you have any particular touch with the War Plans Division during that time?

A. Yes. There were visits to my office by Captain R. K. Turner, head of the War Plans Division, and of myself to his office, and we were together generally at the Secretary's morning conference and occasional gatherings in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations of certain division heads for discussions or decisions on various matters, through I do not feel that I was in on all the higher policies.

17. Q. I hand you three dispatches, which are Exhibits 6, 7 and 8 before this examination. Were you cognizant of these dispatches, as they were sent, or did you have any part in the drafting thereof?

A. I don't recall and have not yet found indication of having any participation in the drafting of these dispatches or of having seen them at that time. The general conditions of the increasing tension with Japan, as indicated therein, was a matter of my general knowledge. As to the question of war warnings, I knew definitely of a set of war warning dispatches prepared and held in readiness to be dispatched to merchant shipping, and that, for a period of two or three weeks prior to December 7, we were restraining entry into the Western Pacific of merchant vessels and vessels of our NTS Service, in order that they might not be trapped.

18. Q. I gather from your foregoing testimony that the Ship Movements Division was primarily a record-keeping agency, and something of an information bureau, available to proper authorities as regards the location of shipping. Further, that neither your Division nor you, yourself, in person, did belong to the policy-making portion of the Office of Naval Operations or participate in broad decisions of the Office; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir. I was not in on questions of broad general policy.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously [403] taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirty-seventh day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examination then, at 10:35 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[404] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, MAY 24, 1944

THIRTY-NINTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 2 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-eighth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Captain Charles Wellborn, Jr., U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirty-sixth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Vice Admiral Roland Munroe Brainard, U. S. Navy, Retired, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirty-eighth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Comander Wesley A. Wright, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirty-fifth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows: This is a board acting under a precept by the Secretary of Navy directing the recording of testimony, under oath, concerning the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December '41. A most significant phrase in the precept is "testimony pertinent to the facts surrounding . . .", and so forth. Previous testimony points to the necessity of inquiry into the discussions, conferences, and so forth, between officials in the Navy Department and those of other Executive Departments, as regards keeping in step the Navy's state of preparedness for eventualities with the steps taken by other agencies in the political and economic fields. You are believed to have testimony on that general

subject and are accordingly called. I will be asking you to testify mainly from facts known to you on or prior to 7 December '41, influenced as little as is practicable by what you may have learned of the various subjects subsequent to that date. That is difficult and I ask you to do your best. You will be given a transcript of your oral testimony for verification, during which, if you find it necessary, you are authorized to submit proposals for changes, omissions, or additions to what you have said. I will act upon such requests when received.

[405] The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Staff, Combat Intelligence; additional duty as Director of Naval Intelligence.

2. Q. What was your station and duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. The calendar year '41, I was Director of the Central Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, and as such one of my duties was liaison with the State Department.

3. Q. Please explain, briefly, what those liaison duties with the State Department required of you.

A. The liaison with the State Department was conducted partially by me as questions arose which were of mutual interest to the War and Navy Department. So far as I was able and directed, I acted as go-between between the Navy Department and the State Department on matters which were of mutual concern. There were, necessarily, high level liaison and meetings held at which I was not present.

4. Q. As regards those meetings in which you were directly concerned, were the conferences and goings-between usually at your initiative or by specific directive in each instance?

A. Partially both. I attempted to relieve the Chief of Naval Operations of as much of the burden of liaison with the State Department as I was capable. For example, during the last month or so before Pearl Harbor, while Secretary Hull was conducting his negotiations with Kurusu and Nomura, I would, from time to time, pay a call on him to find out what had occurred in order that I might give the Navy Department fresh information.

5. Q. What official records were kept of interviews, discussions, and conferences, in which you engaged with State Department officials?

A. A "Liaison Committee" consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, and the Under Secretary of State was set up while Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations. This Committee was mainly occupied with questions other than the Far East, but occasionally questions relating to the Far East were discussed. About the middle of May, 1941, the practice of having a stenographer present to record the discussion was commenced; prior to that time I would make notes of the meetings in order to be able to follow up such matters as required action, and I believe one of Mr. Welles' assistants made a precis of the meetings. At times there were "off the record" discussions at these liaison committee meetings. I made notes of some of these "off the record" discussions. Aside from the meetings of the Liaison Committee, Secretary Hull held meetings with various officials of the Navy Department, and I maintained

liaison with Dr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department by visit and by telephone. I know of no official record of these meetings and discussions. Fragmentary notes of some are in the files of the Central Division as are such records of the Liaison Committee as are in the possession of the Navy Department. It is possible that the State Department representatives may have made notes of some of these meetings and discussions with Secretary Hull and other State Department officials.

Memo: The examining officer has identified the records mentioned by the witness as being contained in file titled "Record of Liaison Meetings and [409] some other special papers", now on file in the Central Division (Op 13) of the Chief of Naval Operations' Office, Navy Department.

6. Q. Did you, yourself, keep any informal memoranda on those discussions, and so forth, of which you have retained possession?

A. I have none in my own possession. I did keep certain memorandum. The only copies of these that I know of are in the files of the Central Division.

7. Q. As regards those discussions between officials of the two Departments, the highest echelons thereof, were you kept informed as to what transpired in the way of exchanging information and effecting agreements concerning matters in the Pacific theatre?

A. I do not believe that I was fully informed as undoubtedly there were matters which were discussed in the Cabinet, and I presume there were matters discussed in Cabinet meetings and meetings between Secretary Knox, Secretary Hull, and Secretary Stimson, which were very closely guarded.

8. Q. Now to go on with your examination, Admiral Schuirmann, I shall ask certain questions which it is convenient to base upon a State Department publication "PEACE AND WAR, 1931-1941", in which events are set forth chronologically and in a form which is suited to our present purposes.

The examining officer produced a copy of the publication titled "PEACE AND WAR, 1931-1941", and it was introduced in evidence as an aid to future readers of this record, copy appended marked "Exhibit 39".

8. Q. (Continued.) In the introduction of Chapter 12, pages 85 and 86, and headed "Principles of U. S. Policy", there is set forth that State, War, and Navy Departments agreed that in view of our military unpreparedness it was inadvisable to resort to drastic economic measures against Japan. Later on in this chapter, it appears that by early 1941 "moral embargoes" were preventing our export to Japan of many strategic commodities. Now at that time, say, January, 1941, was the Navy Department in agreement that the dispositions and war readiness of its forces in the Pacific were such as to justify the risks which, by then, had resulted from those "moral embargoes"?

A. I can not state whether the Navy Department and the State Department were or were not in agreement on these questions, because I presume that the final position of the Navy Department on such a question would be determined and expressed by the Secretary of Navy direct to the President. It is my belief that the Navy Department was consulted on these questions. The reason for this belief is that from time to time, as questions of imposition of embargoes arose,

I was either asked to ascertain Admiral Stark's views or was present at various meetings, which I cannot place by date, where his opinion on such questions was asked. I do not specifically remember the moral embargo, but I do remember that when the question of limiting imposing embargo on scrap iron and oil was under discussion, that his opinion was asked.

9. Q. Do you recall the Office of Naval Operations, or any part thereof, having been particularly concerned in estimating the Japanese reactions as those so-called "moral embargoes" were imposed?

A. No, not specifically. I believe that Admiral Stark did discuss with the War Plans Division their opinion of what the probable Japanese reaction might be, but I do not know of any formal paper being prepared on such subjects, and the discussions, so far as I remember, were general.

[407] 10. Q. Do you recall hearing discussed within the Navy Department the direct question as to whether our state of war readiness was sufficient to meet the risks that were being taken?

A. I cannot recall specific dates or who was present, but I do remember that the question of the Japanese reaction was discussed and in particular regard to the oil embargo, I remember that whenever the question was raised at meetings where I was present that Admiral Stark expressed the view that the oil embargo on Japan should not be so drastic as to force them to move into the Dutch East Indies in order to obtain oil. His idea was that a total embargo on oil would, of necessity, force them to move South or to collapse.

11. Q. Other than as you have just stated, do you recall any incident, in early 1941, when the State Department was advised by the Navy Department that its measures were out of step with the Navy's state of preparation?

A. No.

12. Q. At that time, early 1941, were the State and Navy Departments in agreement as regards the respective claims on our naval forces as between the Atlantic and Pacific theatres?

A. I do not know, but the question of the disposition of the Fleet between the Atlantic and Pacific was discussed and I believe that such differences as may have existed were reconciled. In other words, so far as I know, there was no open disagreement between the State and Navy Departments as to disposition of the Fleet.

13. Q. There was a considerable transfer of forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic Fleet during the Spring of 1941. Do you recall whether or not that step was taken incident to desires or particular urging on the part of the State Department?

A. I do not know, but I do know that the State Department generally favored the retention in the Pacific of the greater portion of the United States Fleet.

14. Q. During the late Winter and Spring of 1941, was the security of the Fleet against surprise attack while in Pearl Harbor the subject of representations by the Navy to the State Department?

A. None that I made.

15. Q. Admiral, I show you a file of correspondence between Navy and War Department, beginning with the Navy Department's letter of 24 January 1941, concerning the unreadiness of Army forces, Oahu, to defend Pearl Harbor against the Japanese attack. Do you recall

whether or not the State Department was cognizant of the situation as therein set forth and, if so, please give its reaction.

A. I'm positive that the State Department did not see this correspondence, and it is my belief that they were not fully informed of the conditions portrayed in this correspondence, although, from various discussions, they were, I believe, fairly well informed of the lack of certain equipment and personnel shortages in the Army and Navy generally.

The letter of the Secretary of Navy, dated 24 January 1941, together with the answer of the Secretary of War thereto, dated 7 February 1941, were introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the documents, they were returned to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations' Office, [408] Navy Department. A description of the documents introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 40".

16. Q. Then so far as you recall, that deficiency in the defenses of Oahu was never a factor in the conference and negotiations between State Department and Navy; is that correct?

A. I presume that that factor was taken into account by those who were given final advice on steps to be taken in the line of sanctions and embargoes.

17. Q. On pages 121 and 122 of "PEACE AND WAR", it is set forth that, after the Japanese had begun their full seizure of Indo-China, our Executive Order froze their credits and virtually stopped all of our trade with Japan. Do you recall if the Navy Department was consulted before that step was taken on approximately 26 July 1941?

A. I do not know, but I believe that it was, and the reason I say I do not know is because I know of no record to which I can point showing that this was done. However, I do remember that during that period this question was taken up by the State Department with the Navy Department.

18. Q. Do you recall any representation by the Navy Department to the State Department concerning the Navy's readiness in the Pacific as balanced against the risks of that action on 26 July 1941?

A. No.

19. Q. What to you seemed to be the prevalent state of mind in Naval Operations concerning the magnitude of such risk?

A. I can only speak from my own state of mind, which was necessarily influenced by those with whom I had contact. My state of mind was that the Japanese would go their own way in China, Indo-China, and perhaps Malaya, and put the onus of using force to stop them on the United States in the hopes that the divided opinion, political opinion, in the United States between the isolationists and those who favored United States' entrance into the war, to prevent or delay the United States from taking effective measures of force against Japan. Hence, that the United States retained the initiative to a large degree in determining the date of a war with Japan.

20. Q. At that time, late July, 1941, was the relative importance of the Pacific Theatre as against the Atlantic Theatre reexamined and, in consequence, were any new representations made to the State De-

partment concerning the distribution of naval forces or of the security of our forces based in Hawaii?

A. Not that I know of.

21. Q. The State Department paper (PEACE AND WAR) contains no mention of the extensive changes which were made in the Japanese Cabinet in mid-October, 1941. However, the Navy Department's dispatch of 16 October, which is Exhibit 6 in this record, indicates that the Navy Department considered that Cabinet change as highly important. Do you recall any discussions, conferences, between the State and Navy Departments concerning the bearing of the Cabinet change upon our situation in the Pacific?

A. I remember that the meaning of this Cabinet change was discussed with the State Department and I believe that the Navy Department received from the State Department a memorandum of the State Department's Far Eastern Division's estimate of meaning of the shift in Cabinet. I do not know whether he submitted it, or not, but, in previous cases of Cabinet shift, the State Department did inform the Navy Department of Ambassador Grew's estimate at [409] its meeting, and I believe that the State Department did transmit to the Navy Department Ambassador Grew's views. I believe that Exhibit 6 was the Navy Department's estimate, arrived at independently of the State Department. The reason for this belief is that, to the best of my knowledge, the State Department did not take as serious a view of this Cabinet shift.

22. Q. Then is it correct to say that you did not gain from the State Department any impression that the Cabinet change was an ominous portent?

A. My recollection of the impression I gained from the State Department was that they regarded the shift as more or less a reshuffling among the leaders who had long been in power and, although they regarded it as not beneficial to the United States, they did not attach to it the same degree of importance as expressed in the Exhibit.

23. Q. The document, "PEACE AND WAR", page 135, shows that on 3 November '41, Ambassador Grew pointed out to the State Department that war in the Far East was not likely to be averted by imposition of commercial embargoes. Do you recall any discussions or representations made to or by the Navy Department concerning such a view, subsequent to that date?

A. No.

24. Q. Do you recall any discussions or representations at any time during the latter half of 1941 concerning that particular view of the situation as expressed by Ambassador Grew?

A. No, no formal representation of the State Department, and unless there was some informal representation, which there may have been, I believe the Navy Department was generally in accord with the view that sanctions would not prevent the outbreak of war.

25. Q. Was there any striking of a balance as between that view and the previously expressed view that sanctions would increase the risk of war with Japan?

A. None that I know.

26. Q. On page 137, first paragraph of "PEACE AND WAR", mention is made of the withdrawal of the last armed forces of the United States from China in connection with proposals made to the Japanese

by our State Department concerning the withdrawal of their forces from China and Indo-China. Please state what you know of the background of the Navy Department's action in actually directing the withdrawal of our Marines and gunboats from Chinese territory and waters.

A. I remember this proposal but the United States and British armed forces from China were withdrawn principally because they were in jeopardy and not because of a desire to withdraw our forces as an example to the Japanese. Naturally, the suggestion to the Japanese that they undertake to withdraw all their military, naval, air, and police forces from China and from Indo-China was probably based on desire to capitalize on this action in diplomatic course. The question of withdrawal of our gunboats and Marines from China had been under discussion for since sometime during 1940. Various recommendations were received from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and the question was taken up with the State Department at various times during the year 1941. The difficulty in reaching a decision was because of a number of factors, such as the effect on the Chinese of our withdrawal, i. e., would it appear to them that we were abandoning China to its fate; the question of the effect on the Japanese, principally whether the Japanese would regard it as withdrawing from China in fear of the Japanese or whether they would regard [410] it as a step preparatory to clearing the decks for action. As the situation became more tense and upon receipt of Admiral Hart's letter of August 28, 1941, which was transmitted to the State Department on October 3, '41, the question was discussed many times with the State Department. Failing to reach an agreement with the State Department, I prepared a memorandum, dated November 4, 1941, which Secretary Knox approved, suggesting a plan for withdrawing from Shanghai, and on 8 November, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a confidential message to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, stating that the President had approved the withdrawal of Marines from China except those required for communication and custodial duties, and subject to State and Navy making a plan for orderly withdrawal whereby announcement would be made by Washington in order that civilians, nationals, and others might have prior notice. November 14, the President announced the decision to withdraw the Marines from Shanghai, and that withdrawal would begin shortly.

27. Q. What was the date of receipt of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet's letter of 28 August, in which he recommended the withdrawal?

A. It was received September 12, 1941.

Note: The examining officer identified the letter mentioned by the witness in the foregoing two answers as being one from Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 28 August 1941, Subject: Withdrawal of U. S. Naval Forces from China; classification "Secret"; and now on file in the Secret-Confidential File Room of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department.

28. Q. Between that date and 14 November, which you have just testified was the date of the action upon the recommendation, what were the principal features of disagreement which caused so much delay in action?

A. A lack of agreement as to the effect on the Japanese and the Chinese of the withdrawal, and a certain lack of agreement as to the urgency of withdrawal.

29. Q. Did the Navy Department take the position that the withdrawal should be made, or not?

A. I am not certain. There was, within the Navy Department, a certain lack of agreement as to whether or not the withdrawal should be made and in order to get a definite decision, I instigated the memorandum previously referred to of November 4, '41. At that time, there was a general agreement that the withdrawal should be made. In the State Department, I discussed this question mainly with Dr. Hornbeck. His view was that we should allow sufficient time to again notify the civilians in China to get out and that the Marines should not be completely evacuated until the civilians had been given one last chance to get out. Previous to November 4, the Navy Department had not taken a firm stand on whether or not evacuation should be made.

30. Q. Between the aforesaid dates, 12 September and sometime in the first half of November, was the State Department in opposition to the removal of the forces from China or were they inclined to acquiesce?

A. They were generally in opposition. They were in opposition as to the removal, at least we were unable to get a definite answer as to whether or not they would agree to the Marines coming out.

31. Q. The purpose of bringing in this incident is to inquire whether or not there were disagreements to the disposition of forces in the Pacific. Do you recall any other incidents during 1941 in which there was pronounced disagreement between the State Department and Navy Department as to the location and [411] disposition of forces in the Pacific theatre?

A. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

32. Q. On page 113 of "PEACE AND WAR", there is set forth with considerable prominence a report that in case of trouble with the United States, Japan planned a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor. Do you note in this document any other "information" entry in which Japanese military intentions were so specifically reported and where a locale for aggression against us was thus narrowed down?

A. No.

33. Q. If that report, by Ambassador Grew of 27 January '41, was transmitted to the Navy Department, what discussions went on concerning it and what evaluation of the contained information transpired between officials of the State and Navy Departments, or of the latter only?

A. The report was transmitted—the telegram containing the substance of the report was transmitted to the Navy Department. There was no discussion of it within the Navy Department or with the State Department, so far as I know, as the report was given a low valuation as it was repeated to a member of Ambassador Grew's Staff by the diplomatic representative of one of the South American Powers and appeared to be hearsay information which was not substantiated.

34. Q. You have testified that you are now the Director of Naval Intelligence, and so forth. In that capacity, and with the ability which that background gives you, please elaborate your answer to

the previous question to further explain the respective evaluation of that dispatch in comparison with the considerable mass of other information which must have been available.

A. The great mass of information available tended to show that the Japanese would move into Indo-China and to the southward. There was always reports that Japan would seize a favorable opportunity to attack Russia. It so happens that this report subsequently proved correct, but the report, in itself, would be given scant attention when there was nothing to substantiate it.

35. Q. Do you know if our Ambassador to Japan, or any of his Assistants, placed a particularly high evaluation upon that particular piece of information?

A. No; it was transmitted merely as a report received and without evaluation by the Ambassador or any of his Staff.

36. Q. In the light of your former close relations with officials of the State Department, can you explain why this dispatch is given so much prominence in "PEACE AND WAR"?

A. No, I am unable to explain the prominence given to this dispatch and until I searched the file, I did not remember that such a dispatch had been received.

37. Q. On about 27 November '41, what particular information did the Navy Department receive from the State Department concerning the breakdown of negotiations with Nomura and Kurusu?

A. I do not remember the specific information received, but the Navy Department was kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations.

38. Q. I show you the Navy Department's dispatch of 27 November '41, Exhibit 8 in this record. Was the information concerning which you have just testified, the basis of this dispatch?

[412] A. I believe it was.

39. Q. Did the State Department keep the Navy fully advised as to the state of negotiations for the following ten days?

A. Yes.

40. Q. During that period, was the State Department's estimate of the situation vis-a-vis Japan as conveyed to the Navy Department in accord with the statements contained on page 138 of "PEACE AND WAR"?

A. I was not present at any meeting that I recall where the Secretary expressed the element of surprise so strongly or if at all, or the probability of attack at various points. However, the particular meetings which he mentioned, I do not recall and do not know if I was present. I cannot make any positive statement that he did not make such a statement. However, on Wednesday or Thursday before Pearl Harbor, Secretary Hull phoned me, saying in effect, "I know you Navy fellows are always ahead of me but I want you to know that I don't seem to be able to do anything more with these Japanese and they are liable to run loose like a mad dog and bite anyone." I assured him that a war warning had been sent out. I reported the conversation to Admiral Stark.

41. Q. Admiral, in view of the opinion that's been expressed by some witnesses that the armed forces of the United States would have been in much better position to repel attacks at a somewhat later date than 7 December, can you say whether or not any consider-

ation was given to a policy of trying to play for more time in the negotiations with Japan?

A. I remember that, in general, Admiral Stark and General Marshall expressed the view that time played in favor of the United States, that is, any time that was gained in the outbreak of hostilities was to our benefit. The question of prolonging conversations with Kurusu and Nomura arose and the Navy Department again expressed the opinion that any time gained was for our benefit.

42. Q. Do you feel that the State Department cooperated in every way that it could to meet this desire on the part of the Army and Navy?

A. Secretary Hull had in mind some sort of *modus vivendi* which would be for a period of, say, three to six months, during which the United States and Japan would have opportunity to adjust their differences, but I have no reason to believe that this proposal ever reached the Japanese.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 4:15 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[413] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

MONDAY, JUNE 5, 1944

FORTIETH DAY

THE ROOSEVELT HOTEL,
New York, New York.

The examination met at 8:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-ninth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered, was informed of the subject matter of the examination, and was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Joel William Bunkley; Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired; Supervisor, New York Harbor.

2. Q. Sir, what duties were you performing during the last six months of the calendar year of 1941?

A. Commanding Officer of the U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, attached to the Pacific Fleet at that time based at Pearl Harbor.

3. Q. Admiral, what condition of readiness and what security precautions were being taken aboard your ship while in port in the middle of October, 1941?

A. As I remember it, we were not under any condition of readiness in port; that is, conditions one, two, or three. We had two machine guns manned at all times with about 400 rounds of ammunition at hand, and we had 50 rounds of ammunition for two five-inch guns in the ready boxes on the topside (locked, with keys in hands of the O.O.D.) and the crews of those two guns standing by. We were operating under the security order (U.S. Fleet letter #3L-40 revised, as I recall) promulgated by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, prior to October, 1941. We were also operating under Executive Order No. 41-40, U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, dated 27 December 1940, which was revised from time to time and which was a security order to prevent sabotage. This order required a Security Patrol consisting of armed roving patrols on topside and below decks in vital parts of the ship.

4. Q. Did that readiness of a portion of the battery begin to be in effect as early as October, '41?

A. Yes.

5. Q. Do you remember when you did begin to carry it out?

A. No, but some months prior to December 7, 1941.

[414] 6. Q. Then I understand that this condition of readiness in port was set sometime before 7 December. By whose order was that done?

A. By order of Rear Admiral Anderson.

7. Q. At that time, did you have any information as to what motivated that order?

A. None whatsoever except that we all thought there was a possibility of war. Like all others, I didn't, at the time, think they were going to attack Pearl Harbor. We thought possibly it would be submarine attacks.

8. Q. Were any further changes ordered prior to 7 December?

A. None that I remember.

9. Q. In other words, the condition you've just described was the condition aboard your ship on 7 December?

A. Yes.

10. Q. Your testimony to the effect that the two five-inch crews were standing by; just what did that entail in the way of readiness?

A. Originally, I believe, they were to stay in the immediate vicinity of the guns, but, later on, this was modified so that the crews merely had to be on call.

11. Q. Was it a definite watch or did it last throughout the twenty-four hours for each lot of men so detailed?

A. It was a twenty-four hour detail.

12. Q. During the period in port prior to and including 7 December, what precautions were in effect as regards watertight integrity of the ships—the closure of doors, hatches, and so forth?

A. None other than as stated in the Navy Regulations for watertight integrity in port.

13. Q. Was your ship Admiral Pye's Flagship?

A. Yes.

14. Q. Do you recall any conversations with Admiral Pye, or senior members of his Staff, concerning war warnings or anything else especially pertaining to the tenseness of the situation during the latter part of November and early December?

A. None whatsoever. I had no idea of any warnings having been sent.

15. Q. Do you recall gaining any secret intelligence or other information from which you, yourself, could estimate that a dangerous situation was at hand?

A. None whatever.

16. Q. Sir, state, as best you can recall, the consensus of opinion of officers of your rank and position there as regards the danger of an attack on Pearl Harbor, specifically an air attack on the Fleet there, during the last three months of the calendar year 1941, giving, if possible, the reasons why this opinion was held.

A. It was my opinion, and I think the opinion of most of the officers, that there was not any danger of an attack by air on Pearl Harbor at that time. It was my opinion that the attack would come in the Philippines and not at Pearl Harbor.

[415] 17. Q. While at sea during the aforesaid period, the battle-ships, I understand, did maintain conditions of readiness, zig-zag, darkened ship at night, and so forth. Did you have the feeling that those precautions were carried out as a matter of training and habituating personnel to war conditions, or because of real danger of surprise attack while at sea?

A. In my opinion, it was for both.

18. Q. And what particular form of surprise attack were you apprehending?

A. Submarine attack.

19. Q. Did you worry while at sea over the possibility of air attack?

A. No.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: On October 15, the CALIFORNIA was in Long Beach. We were ordered there for the purpose of giving leave and liberty to the officers and the crew, and had arrived there about 5 October. We had previously stopped at San Francisco for four or five days for drydocking and had let a small portion of the crew go on leave from that port. On the night of our arrival at Long Beach, I received orders from Commander Battle Force, Admiral Pye, who was on board the CALIFORNIA, to recall all men on leave and be ready to sail twenty-four hours hence. Before the expiration of twenty-four hours, I was ordered to remain at Long Beach but to be ready to sail upon twenty-four hours' notice. From that time until our departure, to the best of my memory (the latter part of October or the first part of November) we were standing by under the twenty-four hour sailing orders. A telephone watch was maintained on shore and all men on liberty had to telephone at midnight to find out if liberty would be up at midnight or at eight a. m. the following morning. To prevent sabotage we had a patrol boat, with junior officer on board, circling the ship while at anchor, to contact all approaching boats. I simply received and carried out these drastic changes of orders without being taken into the confidence of Admiral Pye as to any messages received to cause such a change of plans. The U. S. S. CALIFORNIA was Admiral Pye's Flagship.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 8:55 a. m., took a recess until 9:20 a. m., at which time the examination was reconvened in the U. S. S. VIXEN.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows: Admiral, this is a board acting under a precept of the Secretary of the Navy directing that testimony be taken, under oath, concerning the facts attending on the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

A significant phrase of the precept is "testimony pertinent to the facts" and there is available no interpretation of the word "perinent" other than my own. In examining witnesses who were at or [416] near Pearl Harbor, various testimony was obtained which indicates that there is other testimony pertinent to the facts within the knowledge of officers who were not there, particularly officers in the Navy Department, and you are called as being one of those believed to be in possession of such knowledge. This calls upon you to testify as best you can from facts which were known to you on or before 7 December 1941. That, of course, is difficult because it will be asking you to leave out what became known to you only after that date. It probably is impossible not to be influenced by things that have turned up since, but you must do the best you can to confine your testimony to what you then knew. Our procedure is informal in that we pause at any time for explanation of questions, to better define what is wanted, give opportunity for refreshing memory, consulting documents, and so on. The transcript of your testimony will be given you for verification and in that I expect you to modify your testimony, if, upon further reflection you see the necessity to do so, the object being to have the truest possible record. What you give as your first recollection, you may later realize needs amplification or even correction. I will examine you directly and then request that you submit anything else which was not brought out but which, in your opinion, is pertinent.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

[417] 1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Royal E. Ingersoll; Admiral, U. S. Navy; Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. I was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations during the entire year, except the last two or three days of that year. I do not recall the exact date on which I was detached.

3. Q. As the first and principal assistant to the CNO, what was the working arrangement between you as regards the division of the duties of the office?

A. As Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, I had no duties that pertained solely to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; that is, I did not have original cognizance of any matters. All matters for the consideration of Chief of Naval Operations were taken up with me before presenting to the Chief of Naval Operations. All matters of policy, of course, were referred to the Chief of Naval Operations. Once he had decided upon a policy, I then endeavored to carry out the details without further reference to him unless it was a question of which I thought he should know. I signed most of the correspondence except letters going to heads of other government departments or letters to Commanders-in-Chief which embodied orders to them. I frequently released many dispatches that had previously been considered by the Chief of Naval Operations after I knew they were in the form in which he wished them sent.

4. Did you feel that in matters of great import, particularly in policy, you always knew what was in the CNO's mind and were you always called in for the discussions and conferences with senior naval officers and representatives of other departments?

A. Generally speaking, I now feel that Admiral Stark kept me fully informed of all matters of which I should have had knowledge. I was usually present when conferences were held with other officers of the Navy Department or officers of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I was not always present when Admiral Stark conferred with officials of the State Department or with officials of the War Department. Frequently these conferences took place in the State Department or in the War Department and I usually did not accompany Admiral Stark for such conferences. I felt, however, that when these were over that Admiral Stark told me everything that I should know. I do not recall now anything that transpired of which I was not told and of which I thought I should have been told. There may have been conferences between Admiral Stark and the President and the Secretary of State of which he did not tell me all the details.

5. Q. As regards information, meaning information obtained by ONI and including that obtained by study of radio intercepts; were you always given all important information from those sources?

A. I don't know. I do not recall receiving any information regarding so-called "radio intelligence" obtained by analysis of traffic or analysis of traffic derived from call signs. During the later months of the year, I saw many of the messages—Japanese messages—which were received at the Navy Department.

6. Q. Do you recall daily visits by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who [418] brought to the CNO information concerning the Pacific area which was obtained by various secret methods?

A. Yes, I do. I recall frequent visits by an officer from Naval Communications, but whether I saw them every day, or not, and saw every message, I don't know. I saw a great number and saw them very often.

7. Q. When Admiral Kimmel assumed command of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, about February, 1941, the Department had already decided that that area would be the general station of the Fleet, pending further developments. Do you recall what considerations led to that decision?

A. In 1939, an advance detachment under Vice Admiral Andrews had been sent to the Hawaiian Islands to be kept there indefinitely. Later, in the early part of 1940, while Admiral Richardson was still in command, the Pacific Fleet went out to the Hawaiian area and never returned to the West Coast except units for overhaul and training. I was not in the Navy Department at that time. When I left the Hawaiian Islands in the middle of 1940, the major part of the Pacific Fleet was in the Hawaiian Islands.

8. Q. Do you recall at any time during the Winter, 1940-41, while you were stationed in the Department, any reconsideration being given to the decision to base the Fleet in Hawaii, rather than on the Pacific Coast?

A. Yes. The question of the Fleet returning to the West Coast was brought up. The decision was made that the Fleet should continue to base at Pearl Harbor, although units might be sent back to the West Coast for stripping ship, landing excess equipment, and for training. It was considered that Hawaii was the most advantageous point for the operations contemplated in case of war with Japan and also as the best point from which to cover Alaska and the Pacific Coast.

9. Q. In such reconsideration of the decision for the retention of the Fleet in Hawaii, did the question of the Fleet's security as against surprise attack ever get into the argument?

A. I do not recall that particular point, although I do know that from time to time representations were made to the War Department regarding increase of anti-aircraft protection and searchlights at Hawaii.

10. Q. Do you recall any protest by Admiral Kimmel, or any representation by him, concerning the Fleet's security as thus based?

A. I have no recollection of a protest.

11. Q. Do you recall whether or not the Navy Department was in any way influenced by the State Department in its decision to base the Fleet in Hawaii?

A. I do not know. I have no recollection that pressure was put on the Navy Department to keep the Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

12. Q. Admiral, I hand you a file of correspondence, which is Exhibit 40 in this record, which begins with a representation by the Secretary of Navy to the War Department to the effect that, within the Army's province, the situation as regards the security of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor was not satisfactory. State what you can remember of conferences and discussions between representatives of War and Navy Department, at the dates of these letters or subsequently, concerning this subject.

A. I saw the letter of January 24, 1941, from the Secretary of Navy to the Secretary of War. I do not recall having seen the reply, although I must have seen it. The only part of the reply of the Secretary of War which [419] brings up anything in my memory is the question of balloon barrages and the use of smoke. It is my recollection that the Pacific Fleet did not wish balloon barrages at Pearl Harbor, due to the interference with plane operations. I do not now recall any specific conferences on this subject except I seem to recall information being received that additional Army aircraft would be sent to the Hawaiian Islands. I also recall that we received information of the installation of radar equipment, four stations I believe being set up on the various islands of the Hawaiian group. There may have been discussions between the War Plans Divisions of the Navy and War Departments and there may have been discussions in the joint board meetings, but I can not now recall any further specific action.

13. Q. It appears (as per Exhibit 40) that, on 24 January 1941, the Secretary of Navy pointed out what were thought to be major deficiencies in the Army's readiness to meet its commitments over Oahu; in particular, deficiencies in air raid warning facilities, anti-aircraft artillery, and in opposing aircraft, which, naturally, would be Army pursuit. Did the Navy Department not further urge the Army to overcome those deficiencies, between that date and 7 December '41?

A. I have no specific recollection of any further formal representations being made to the War Department on the subject of deficiencies noted in the letter of January 24. I have recollection of a later discussion in connection with balloon barrages, which, as I recall, the Fleet did not want because of interference with the operations of Navy aircraft. I seem to recall receiving information that additional planes would be dispatched and also that aircraft detection apparatus was being installed on the tops of four mountains in the Hawaiian

group. Neither were in place at Pearl Harbor in 1939. I recall the placing of nets at Pearl Harbor, although the nets were Navy responsibility and not Army.

14. Q. Do you think that as regards those major deficiencies in anti-aircraft artillery, air warning system, and pursuit aircraft, the Navy failed to further represent the situation due to a reluctance to unduly press its sister service about something which was entirely in its own province?

A. If any reason can be given, I think that was probably the one. The defense of a permanent naval base under the province of joint Army and Navy Action was an Army responsibility. The naval base was supposed to be a position at which the Fleet could remain for repairs, for rest, for replenishment of supplies, for dry-docking, without the necessity of being in a state of readiness for action twenty-four hours a day.

15. Q. Do you recall if, within the Offices of the CNO, this state of unreadiness of the Army at Pearl Harbor was a matter of more or less constant concern and that those offices kept themselves informed on the situation, in an up-to-date fashion?

A. We knew the number of troops, the number of guns, searchlights, the number of planes, that the Army had in Hawaii. We knew when changes took place. I do not recall that we had exact information as to the actual condition of readiness in which the anti-aircraft guns, troops, aircraft detection devices, were maintained.

16. Q. Incident to the general state of readiness, along the lines pointed out in SecNav's letter of 24 January '41, do you recall any reestimate within the CNO's offices as regards the security factor for Admiral Kimmel's Fleet while in Pearl Harbor?

A. No.

[420] 17. Q. Admiral, I hand you a file which is Exhibit 22, which contains an estimate of the situation at Pearl Harbor, signed by Rear Admiral Bellinger and Major General Martin, dated 31 March '41, which, on its page three, sets forth that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. Do you recall having seen this correspondence in the Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I undoubtedly saw the letter of May 1 from the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District with its inclosure (Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan) because I have a distinct recollection of this plan being sent to other naval districts as a pattern upon which to form joint frontier defense plans.

18. Q. Did that portion of this file, to some extent predicting an air raid on Pearl Harbor, serve as an occasion for further urging the Army to improve its anti-aircraft defenses on Oahu?

A. I have no recollection that any further formal representation was made to the War Department after the receipt of this plan.

19. Q. Admiral, a considerable detachment involving battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and one carrier was, in the Spring of 1941, transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic. Will you give the considerations which led to the transfer of forces?

A. That transfer of forces was in accordance with the general concept of the war as visualized in WPL-46, that the initial major effort would be in the Atlantic. The Pacific Fleet was given defensive

tasks, with the exception of a diversion toward the Marshalls and Carolines to relieve pressure on the Malay Barrier. There were other offensive tasks against Japanese communications and shipping, but those were largely tasks for submarines.

20. Q. Inasmuch as the entire British Navy was opposed by relatively small German naval forces, why did the Department conceive it necessary to reenforce the Atlantic when there were so much more powerful potential enemy forces in the Pacific?

A. My recollection was that it was feared that the fast, heavy German ships might get past the British forces stationed in the United Kingdom and get into the Western Atlantic. At that time, there were no United States battleships, other than the very old battleships, in the Atlantic, capable of coping with the German capital ships.

21. Q. Why was the danger from the German naval ships considered to be of more moment than the danger from the entire Japanese Navy which also was a potential enemy nation.

A. With the detachment of the force from the Pacific, which was transferred to the Atlantic, there was left in the Pacific a number of capital ships equal to those in the Japanese Navy. The reason was that the center of gravity of the initial naval effort of the United States in WPL-46 was to be in the Atlantic and not in the Pacific where the role was primarily defensive.

22. Q. Was there involved in this transfer of our naval forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic any agreement with our potential ally, Britain, to transfer some of their capital ships' strength to the Indian Ocean where they would be near the Western Pacific theatre?

A. The transfer of ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic was in accordance with WPL-46, which, in turn, was based on the United States-British conversations which culminated in the plan known as "ABC-1". That plan [421] specifically stated that Germany was the predominate member of the Axis Powers and the Atlantic and European areas were considered to be the decisive theatres, and that, therefore, the principal U. S. military effort would be exercised in that theatre. U. S. operations elsewhere would be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort. It was stated in ABC-1 that the United States intended to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean area so that the British Commonwealth would be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

23. Q. It appears that we met our own commitment, as per those plans, without delay and effected the transfer of forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic in the Spring of 1941. Can you explain why it was not until November, '41, that any British capital ships arrived in the Indian Ocean and that even then it was only a small detachment?

A. No; I don't know.

24. Q. Admiral, do you recall if, in the Office of Naval Operations, there was any decided disagreement with the concept that Germany constituted the major of our potential enemies?

A. Naturally, there was a discussion of the situation that was developing and, of course, it was realized that if Japan entered the war against us that she would be a very strong foe. Nevertheless, the United States, at that time, was too weak to engage in offensive warfare in both oceans and a decision had to be made whether a major

effort would be made in one ocean or the other. It was felt that Germany was the principal enemy to be disposed of first, except to eliminate the soft member, Italy, and that after Germany was defeated all the allied Nations could concentrate on Japan. I do not recall that there was any formal representations made to the Chief of Naval Operations that his plan was not sound. At some time during 1941, the general features of WPL-46 were explained at a conference in the Navy Department at which I seem to recall that Secretary Hull, and I believe the Chairman of the Senate and House Naval Affairs Committees were present. I'm quite sure that the general consensus of opinion was that Germany should be eliminated first, after Italy, and then Japan.

25. Q. Do you recall if Admiral Kimmel expressed any disagreement with that concept or if he ever made any protest against transfer of some of his forces to the Atlantic?

A. I do not now recall any formal protest or any informal protest.

26. Q. Did you hear the matter discussed when Admiral Kimmel visited the Navy Department in the Summer of 1941?

A. No, I do not now recall any such representations being made by Admiral Kimmel.

27. Q. Narrowing the matter down to the Pacific Fleet alone, what was the prevalent opinion in OpNav as regards the readiness to carry out the mission assigned by WPL-46 to that Fleet?

A. Since the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet in WPL-46 were primarily defensive, with the exception of the diversionary trips toward the Marshalls and Carolines, it was felt that the forces assigned to the Pacific Fleet were adequate for the tasks assigned.

28. Q. What was the general logistic readiness in mid-Pacific for carrying out those tasks?

[422] A. The forces that were necessary to give logistic support to the Fleet were not available during '41 and the war plan called for the acquisition of the necessary auxiliaries to support the logistic effort of the Pacific Fleet. On the other hand, none of the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet carried it very far afield from the Hawaiian Islands until it was required to execute the tasks of the occupation of the Caroline and Marshall Islands and ultimately the establishment of a base at Truk. These operations, however, were not contemplated in the initial days of the war; only the diversionary raids against the Carolines and Marshalls.

29. Q. It appears in previous testimony that the entire Pacific Fleet, while in Hawaiian waters, was very much preoccupied in training, incident to the fluid state of its personnel. Do you recall any representations or requirements by OpNav on that subject which, during the latter part of 1941, tended to concentrate the Commander-in-Chief's thought upon that subject?

A. In order to obtain a nucleus of trained men to place new ships in commission, it was necessary for all ships in the Navy, not only the Pacific Fleet but all other ships of the Navy, to send men back to the United States for this purpose. Naturally, the raw recruits who replaced these experienced men had to be trained. That condition pertains today. Our ships are constantly engaged in training new personnel for new construction in time of war. I also recall that I think

permission was given to send ships to the West Coast in small numbers for intensive gunnery training in the San Pedro area.

30. Q. Then do I understand from your answer that this condition was fully realized in OpNav and that it was unavailable?

A. Yes, because there was no other reservoir of trained personnel with which to man new ships except the personnel of ships that were already in commission in all Fleets.

31. Q. Were you aware, during the latter part of 1941, that there had grown up in the Pacific Fleet the thought that training constituted its primary mission?

A. Until war was actually upon us, I cannot see that it had any better mission than to train its personnel for war.

32. Q. Did you sense, during the last few weeks or even days of peace, that there was a considerable preoccupation in that direction on the part of the senior officers of the Pacific Fleet?

A. No.

33. Q. It appears that on 24 July 1941, or thereabouts, the State Department effected an Executive Order which froze all Japanese credits and virtually stopped our trade with Japan. Do you recall if the Navy Department was consulted prior to taking that step and considered that it was in balance with our general situation as regards readiness for war?

A. I do not recall whether or not the State Department consulted the Navy Department before issuing that order. I do not know whether they consulted the Navy Department regarding its bearing on our readiness to wage war.

34. Q. Do you recall if there was a proper appreciation and estimate within the OpNav offices as to the probable effect of that step of 24 July 1941?

A. I do not recall any formal estimate of the results of that particular order. It was only one of an accumulative set of circumstances putting pressure on Japan.

[423] 35. Q. Incidentally, do you recall any prevalent opinion in OpNav that we could either bluff Japan or restrain her by such squeezing methods as embargoes and so forth?

A. I think that the impression in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations was that war with Japan was inevitable and the only question was when it would occur. Issuance of WPL-46 and the Staff conversations with the British all are evidence that the Navy Department considered that war with Japan was inevitable.

36. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch of 16 October, which is Exhibit 6 in this record. I have been unable to find any evidence of any opinion being expressed by the State Department to the Navy Department which set forth the gravity of the situation mentioned as created by the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet. Have you any recollection of such a representation?

A. I have no recollection of any correspondence from the State Department to the Navy Department which would have formed the basis for this dispatch.

37. Q. Do you think that this dispatch indicating the seriousness of the situation vis-a-vis Japan was, therefore, based upon a Navy Department estimate?

A. Yes, I think it was based upon an estimate made by Admiral Stark and by the Chief of the War Plans Division, then Captain Turner, that the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet would result in the situation mentioned in that dispatch. I do recall, definitely, that both Admiral Stark and Captain Turner saw the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, on several occasions at which the situation between Japan and the United States was discussed. It is quite probable that this dispatch was based on their impressions received from their conversations with the Japanese Ambassador, although I cannot state specifically that it did result from any particular conversation.

38. Q. Admiral, do you recall what the CNO meant in his directive to make preparatory deployments as contained in this dispatch of 16 October?

A. I think the preparatory deployments that would not constitute provocative action and disclose strategic intention against Japan referred more to the withdrawal of certain units of the Asiatic Fleet from the China Sea area toward the southern Philippines, rather than to any particular deployment of the Pacific Fleet, with the possible exception of sending out submarines for observation. It will be noted that the dispatch is addressed to both the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. I wish to state here, in connection with this dispatch and others which followed, that they were released by me. In all cases, such dispatches were drafted in the War Plans Division and were presented to Admiral Stark for consideration before being sent. In many cases, I am quite certain that he may have notified both the State Department and the President of his intention to send dispatches of this character. The fact that it bears my release simply means that after the original draft was presented and corrected by Admiral Stark, in order to save time and not to bother him further, I released the dispatch in the form which he had approved.

39. Q. Were you advised as to the action taken by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, pursuant to that directive concerning a deployment?

A. I do not recall any specific dispatch in response to this one stating what deployments were to be made by the Pacific Fleet. I do not recall that we expected the Pacific Fleet, as distinguished from the Asiatic Fleet, to make any important new dispositions.

[424] 40. Q. Between the date of the aforesaid dispatch, (16 October), and 24 November, I find no specific directive or informatory dispatches addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. During that period, it appears that the relations with Japan were rapidly deteriorating. Do you recall any reason why no other important communications were sent to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during that period?

A. No, I do not recall why no further dispatches were sent until November 24. That dispatch held out no hope for the betterment of conditions.

41. Q. Admiral, in late November, 1941, how well informed were you concerning the actual disposition from day to day of all forces under Admiral Kimmel?

A. At some time during 1941, the exact date I do not recall, but I believe it was quite early in '41, we established an operational plot on which the disposition of U. S. forces was plotted, and as far as we knew, the position of Japanese and German forces were plotted. The system of reporting ship movements had been placed in a confidential status and these continued to be received and plotted in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. As I now recall, we did not receive the reports of purely local movements in the Hawaiian Islands, so long as the ships remained based in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. That is, we did not receive reports of ships going out for two or three days' operations to return to Pearl Harbor. It is also possible that certain movements may have been known to us but were not shown on the operations plotting board because we did not wish, for reasons of security, to show them. I recall one or two instances in the Atlantic where ships were purposely omitted from the operations plot.

42. Q. As you recall the events of early December, 1941, were the dispositions of all of Admiral Kimmel's ships which were definitely beyond the Fleet's usual drill areas, entirely known in the plotting room in OpNav? I have particular reference to early December movements to Wake Island, Johnston Island, and Midway Islands.

A. I think these movements were known when they took place. However, I may be in error and that I now know of them from what we knew later.

43. Q. In keeping track of the dispositions of Admiral Kimmel's ships, do you recall if the quarterly schedule of employment was mainly relied upon?

A. No, the reports of movements which were received through the movement report system were relied upon.

44. Q. Did you know at the time of the Pacific Fleet's routine of going to sea in rotation for the three Task Groups into which the forces had been divided?

A. Yes. We knew that was the system under which the Pacific Fleet was normally conducting its training and upkeep.

45. Q. Admiral, do you recall, on or about the 10th of November, '41, becoming cognizant of certain dispatches which had passed between Tokyo and the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, concerning a method of reporting the exact positions of large ships of the Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor?

A. I do not now recall them. I may have seen them and forgotten. The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

[425] The examining officer then, at 11:55 a. m., adjourned until 2:15 p. m., tomorrow, in the Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

[425] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

TUESDAY, JUNE 6, 1944

FORTY-FIRST DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 2:15 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the fortieth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examined by the examining officer (Continued):

46. Q. I hand you a dispatch from CNO under date of 27 November, which is Exhibit 8 in this record. Do you recall the background of this dispatch, whether it was based upon the Navy's own estimate or on advice by the State Department, and so forth?

A. As the dispatch indicates, the reason for sending this dispatch was in the dispatch itself which refers to the number and equipment and organization of Japanese naval task forces. I do not recall any specific thing in Washington which prompted this dispatch except that it probably was an estimate based on all information, diplomatic and otherwise, that we had at the moment.

47. Q. This dispatch advises the Commanders-in-Chief in the Pacific that an aggressive move in the Western Pacific is indicated. The preceding dispatch, of 24 November, warned against an aggressive movement in any direction. Can you throw any light upon what led to the change in the information given to the Commanders-in-Chief in the Pacific?

A. The only reason that I can give now is that the character of the landing craft which were referred to in the dispatch of November 27 were such that they could not have been used other than in the Far Eastern area.

48. Q. What do you recall in the way of discussions at about this period in the offices of the CNO as to the possibility or even probability of a surprise air raid upon Pearl Harbor?

[426] A. I do not recall any discussions in the latter part of November or early December regarding the probability of an air raid on Hawaii. We did anticipate observation and possible attacks by submarines in the vicinity of Hawaii and possibly on the line of communications from the islands to the West Coast. We anticipated possible raids, either by light forces or by submarines, on the outlying possessions at Wake, Midway, and Johnston Islands.

49. Q. In drafting the dispatch of 27 November, was consideration given to the thought that mention of Western Pacific objectives only might tend to reduce the vigilance of the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area?

A. I'm sure that the drafting of the dispatch was not meant to give such an impression. The impression it was intended to give was that the events were moving in such a fashion in the Far East that the United States would become involved in war in a few days and consequently that the United States forces elsewhere in the Pacific and also in the Atlantic would find themselves at war with the Axis when the clash actually took place in the Asiatic waters.

50. Q. What action, on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was expected incident to the directive concerning a deployment as given in the dispatch of 27 November?

A. Again, this dispatch is addressed to both the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The deployment referred more to the movements which were contemplated in the Asiatic Fleet regarding the withdrawal of forces from the Manila Bay area for operations contemplated elsewhere, and the movements in the Hawaiian area were those regarding observation, the establishment of patrols, and the reenforcement of outlying positions in our own islands. It will be remembered that an earlier dispatch in October had warned both Commanders-in-Chief against taking action which would provoke war.

51. Q. When did the CNO receive a report, if any, from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, concerning the action which he had taken in consequence of the dispatch of 27 November?

A. Except that we had knowledge of the submarines who were on observation missions, I do not recall any reports of movements and I think this is correct because no departures for extended operations were necessary at that moment as long as we were not yet at war with Japan.

52. Q. Do you recall any curiosity within the offices of the CNO concerning the precautionary and security measures which Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, was taking in and around Oahu?

A. No.

53. Q. Do you know why the Commander-in-Chief was not called upon to report specifically what he was doing incident to the receipt of that dispatch?

A. I think the reason that he was not called upon to inform us what he had done was because we had knowledge that submarines were out on missions of observation, that reenforcement of Wake and Midway were contemplated, and we believed that the routine air patrols around Oahu and search patrols which had been in effect for some time, were being continued.

54. Q. In that understanding of the use of long-range aircraft in patrolling waters around Hawaii, what did you believe was being done at this particular time?

[487] A. We knew that the number of planes based on Oahu were not sufficient to maintain a complete 360 degree coverage at maximum range, twenty-four hours a day. Furthermore, the number of planes that were available could not have flown any such patrol without undue strain on the personnel and wearing out engines for which replacements were not available. Therefore, we knew that the coverage was by no means as complete as it should have been.

55. Q. Did the CNO inquire what security measures the Army forces on Oahu instituted at about this time, 27-28 November?

A. I do not know unless he asked General Marshall in regard to it. I do not recall that I knew what security measures the Army was taking.

56. Q. I hand you two dispatches from the CNO, dated 26 November, which are Exhibits 12 and 13 in this record. They preceded the dispatch which contained the war warning by only a few hours. Do you recall hearing the thought expressed that injecting a matter of this comparatively minor importance, at a time when a war warning was being sent, would tend to complicate the situation and unnecessarily detract the attention of the Commanders in Hawaii from the all-important subject of the imminence of war?

A. These two dispatches were designed to reenforce the outlying stations at Midway and Wake. We were also concerned regarding the security of Johnston Island and other United States islets in the Pacific. If anything, I think these dispatches should have accentuated the idea that these outlying positions were in danger of raids from Japanese light forces or from submarines rather than to allay suspicion of the probability of attack in the Hawaiian area. These islands were important to us at that time as staging points for transferring planes to the Philippine Islands (which were routed by Midway, Wake, and Guam), and also for the staging of seaplanes to Australia for the British and Dutch.

57. Q. Do you recall any major discrepancy between the numbers of Army planes which were actually sent on across the Pacific and the estimate which Army authorities previously gave the Navy Department as to those numbers?

A. No.

58. Q. Returning to those dispatches of 26 November, involving the movement of Army forces, either in relief of Marine units or as reinforcements thereto, in the outlying islands; was it not appreciated in the Offices of the CNO that the task amounted to entering into a rather major activity for the Commanders on Oahu?

A. Yes.

59. Q. Did it not occur then that such a directive was a complicating matter?

A. Complicating what?

60. Q. Complicating the situation for the Army and Navy Commanders in Oahu at a time when the relations with Japan were so badly strained. In other words, did it occur at the time that the directive was being issued somewhat too late?

A. The Navy Department was concerned with the vulnerability of Wake and Midway and Johnston Islands, and it deemed it essential that these positions should be reenforced.

61. Q. I hand you a dispatch from the CNO, dated 28 November, which is Exhibit 9 in this record, and which in its latter part contains a directive. [428] This dispatch went to Commander, Pacific Fleet, only as an information addressee but contained a directive concerning offensive action. Can you explain what that particular phrase in the dispatch was meant to convey?

A. This dispatch was addressed to the Commanders of the two Naval Coastal Frontiers on the West Coast of the continental United States. I do not recall that they had previously had any information specifically sent to them in regard to the gravity of the situation as regards Japan. This dispatch was intended to make them cognizant of the situation and was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information, since these two Coastal Frontiers would come under his control once we were at war. The phrase "no offensive action" undoubtedly meant that they were to take no action against Japanese merchant vessels or Japanese submarines that might be within their waters unless these vessels had committed an overt act of war.

62. Q. I hand you an informatory dispatch sent out by CNO on 3 December '41, which is Exhibit 11 in this record. Do you recall any particular significance being attached to that information in the offices of the CNO?

A. Yes. This indicated to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations that war was imminent and was a matter of possibly a very few days or maybe hours.

63. Q. Did it change the opinions of such officers in the office of Naval Operations who might, before that time, have thought that the first Japanese aggressive move would not include us?

A. It was the opinion, I believe, in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, that the first aggressive Japanese move would include us and this was only to emphasize all of the previous dispatches that war with Japan was imminent. The inclusion of Washington in this dispatch is conclusive evidence that such was the case.

64. Q. This examination contains no record of any directive, additional to that of 27 November, having been transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, up to 7 December. Do you recall any discussions in the office of Naval Operations during the ensuing period concerning the advisability of further directing the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or of providing him with additional information?

A. There may have been discussions of which I have now no particular recollection, but I'm quite certain that Admiral Stark considered that he had given the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequate warning that war with Japan was imminent.

65. Q. Did it occur to you, or to anyone else in the upper echelons of the Navy Department, that it would be well for some officer to fly out to Hawaii so that a meeting of minds would be better insured?

A. I don't recall any discussion on that point. I think Admiral Stark thought that he had given both the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic

Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet every indication that war with Japan was imminent.

66. Q. Do you recall whether or not the CNO inquired concerning what was being done with the radar equipment in the hands of the Army on Oahu?

A. As far as I know, he made no inquiry by dispatch. He may have asked General Marshall in regard to such matters and did not tell me, or if he did tell me, I have forgotten. I do not recall having any information that the Army's radar installations in Hawaii were not operating.

[429] 67. Q. What as regards inquiry concerning the state of readiness of the Army pursuit aviation on Oahu?

A. Again, I do not recall that any inquiry was made by dispatch; whether or not Admiral Stark discussed this matter with General Marshall, I do not know. I have no recollection of any information that I had that the Army air forces on Oahu were not ready to carry out their task in defending that naval base against attack.

68. Q. During November or December, '41, were you cognizant of a special code which the Japanese had arranged under which they were to inform their nationals, concerning against what nations they would make aggressive movements, by means of a partial weather report?

A. Yes, I do recall such messages.

69. Q. Do you recall having seen, on or about 4 December, the broadcast directive, thus given, indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States?

A. Yes.

70. Q. Do you know why that particular information was not sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. I do not know except it was probably supposed that the intercept stations in the Hawaiian Islands had also received this broadcast. However, it may have been because of a message sent in regard to the destruction of Japanese codes which had been sent to London and Washington which indicated that war with the United States and with Great Britain was imminent.

71. Q. Coming now to the events of the evening of 6 December, Washington time, when did you become cognizant of the receipt of a long thirteen or fourteen part Japanese dispatch which was picked up sometime on 6 December?

A. I do not recall exactly when I saw it. I think I saw it after the attack on Pearl Harbor had been made.

72. Q. Admiral, during this crucial period, from October, '41, onward, was the "Atlantic war" so much in the Navy Department's picture as to amount to undue preoccupation on the part of the CNO and yourself? I mean in particular, were you able to give affairs in the Pacific theatre the time and thought that the situation merited?

A. The undeclared war in the Atlantic had been going on for some time. We were virtually at war with Germany, although the war was undeclared. We were escorting convoys and we were making preparations for the defense of our harbors, anticipating mining operations by German submarines. We had arranged for convoys anticipating attacks by German submarines on merchant vessels in the Western Atlantic. We were not particularly concerned regarding

aircraft attacks, although a raid of one or two planes was a possibility on the Northern part of the Atlantic Coast. On the contrary, as to being preoccupied with the affairs in the Atlantic, we were far more concerned with the affairs in the Pacific than we were in the Atlantic. We felt that the war would be precipitated in the Pacific and that we would only become involved in the war in the Atlantic as the result of war in the Pacific. In addition to the testimony which I have given in regard to strengthening the positions in the Pacific, we had, for two months or more, taken steps to get our merchant vessels out of the Far East and out of the other areas in the Pacific where they could be captured by the Japanese. We began routing them far to the southward around Australia. The last vessels that went to the [430] Philippines were convoyed; also we had initiated convoys in the Pacific for important cargoes going to Australia, including pilots for the Chinese air force and similar things. Answering the question definitely, the Atlantic situation did not preoccupy our attentions to the exclusion of the Pacific.

73. Q. Was the form and power of the attack made by the Japs on Pearl Harbor on 7 December received as a decided surprise to you?

A. To me, it was. I expected that the Japanese attack against the United States would be made against the Philippines and Guam with possibly raiding attacks on our outlying small islands to the westward of Hawaii, and submarine attacks against our shipping around Hawaii, between the Hawaiian Islands and the United States and possibly on the Pacific Coast of the United States.

74. Q. Sir, do you recall whether any of the other principal advisors to the Chief of Naval Operations estimated that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was a probability?

A. It is an historical fact that Japan started her war on China and Russia with surprise attacks before a declaration of war. We expected such attacks on the Philippines and on Guam without a declaration of war. I do not recall anyone in Operations representing to Admiral Stark that the war would be precipitated by an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 3:50 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[431] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 1944

FORTY-SECOND DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 11 a.m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The record of proceedings of the sixteenth through the forty-first days, both inclusive, of the examination was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirty-ninth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter, dated 6 June 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, from Rear Admiral Joel W. Bunkley, U.S. Navy, Retired, who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the transcript of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the testimony given by him on the fortieth day of the examination was correct, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 41".

The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter, dated 9 June 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, from Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the transcript of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the testimony given by him on the fortieth and forty-first days of the examination was correct; appended hereto marked "Exhibit 42".

The examining officer made the following statement: Throughout the foregoing examination, the examining officer has attempted to limit the number of witnesses called to the minimum compatible with the necessary coverage of the subject matter designated in the precept. There are many additional witnesses within the naval service who have knowledge of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor of 7 December 1941. However, it was felt that their knowledge and opportunities for observation were the same as officers who were examined and their testimony would be cumulative, rather than productive of new information.

There are two officers within the naval service whom the examining officer would have called as witnesses in the latter days of the examination if it had been practicable so to do. The officers in question are Captain A. H. McCollum, U. S. Navy, the Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence during the latter part of 1941, and Commander A. D. Kramer, [432] U. S. Navy, then attached to the Far Eastern Section and acting as liaison officer between that Section and the Communications Intelligence Section. While it would be desirable to have their testimony in this record, it is not felt to be of sufficient moment to warrant either calling them to Washington or proceeding to their current stations, which are at a great distance.

The examining officer did not desire to call any more witnesses.

The record of proceedings of the forty-second day of the examination was read and approved, and the examination being finished, then, at 11:30 a.m., adjourned to await the action of the convening authority.

THOMAS C. HART,
Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired,
Examining Officer.

EXHIBITS OF THE HART INQUIRY

EXHIBIT No. 1 (HART INQUIRY)

Confidential

17 FEBRUARY 1944.

From: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer.

To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

Subject: Examination of witnesses for purpose of recording and preserving testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941.

Reference: (a) Precept for subject examination.

(b) Section 734, Naval Courts and Boards, 1937.

1. Reference (a) details Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, to conduct the subject examination and further provides as follows:

"In view of the fact that Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Retired, was, on 7 December 1941, serving on active duty as the commander-in-chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of Admiral, U. S. Navy, and therefore, has an interest in the matter into which this examination is being made, you will notify him of the times and places of the meetings to be had and that he has the right to be present, to have counsel, to introduce, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce matter pertinent to the examination and to testify or declare in his own behalf at his own request."

2. In compliance with the portion of reference (a) above quoted, you are hereby advised that the first meeting of the examination will occur at 0930 a. m. on Tuesday, 22 February 1944 in room 2744, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. You have the right to be present at that and subsequent meetings, to have counsel, to introduce, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce matter pertinent to the examination and to testify or declare in your own behalf at your own request.

3. It is requested that receipt of this letter be acknowledged.

/s/ Thos. C. Hart,
THOS. C. HART.

A true copy. Attest:

THOMAS C. HART,
Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired,
Examining Officer.

EXHIBIT No. 2 (HART INQUIRY)

Confidential

280 BRONXVILLE ROAD,
BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK,
19 February 1944.

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

To: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer.

Subject: Examination of witnesses for purpose of recording and preserving testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941.

Reference: Your letter of 17 February 1944.

1. Receipt is acknowledged this date of the reference.

2. As the first meeting is scheduled to be held three days from this date, I find that I shall not have time to prepare for my attendance and request that the examination be adjourned after the organization meeting.

3. Attention is invited to the fact that the stipulation between the Navy Department and me as to the conditions under which the testimony may be used, has not been submitted to me as planned.

HUSBAND E. KIMMEL,
/s/ Robert A. Lavender,
ROBERT A. LAVENDER,
Captain, U. S. Navy (Retired),
By direction.

EXHIBIT No. 3 (HART INQUIRY)

In Reply Address
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
And Refer To No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 4 March 1944.

From: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer.
To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.
Subject: Examination of witnesses for purpose of recording and preserving testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T H., on 7 December 1941.

Reference:

- (a) Examining Officer's ltr. dated 17 February 1944 addressed to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.
- (b) Reply to reference (a) dated 19 February 1944 addressed to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer, and signed by Capt. Robert A. Lavender, U. S. Navy, Retired, by direction of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.
- (c) Ltr. of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, dated 29 February 1944 addressed to SecNav.
- (d) SecNav ltr. dated 4 March 1944 addressed to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

1. The subject Examination convened at 9:00 a. m., Tuesday, 22 February 1944, of which meeting you were informed by reference (a). At the meeting reference (b) was considered by the Examining Officer who announced that the request contained therein was approved to the extent that the Interested Party, Rear Admiral Kimmel, would be afford a reasonable time to prepare for the Examination. The Examination was accordingly adjourned until called by the Examining Officer.

2. The Examining Officer is now of the opinion that a reasonable time for the Interested Party to prepare for the Examination has elapsed unless there are special circumstances of which the Examining Officer has not been advised, which would constitute reasonable basis for further delay.

3. In view of the above and the directions of the Convening Authority contained in reference (d), the Examining Officer has called for the Examination to reconvene at 9:00 a. m. on Tuesday, 7 March 1944, in Room 2744, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., at which time it is proposed to obtain and record the testimony of Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, Retired.

4. The Examining Officer intends to continue hearings on each week day thereafter and to call as witnesses during the hearings in Washington, D. C. the following members of the naval forces:

Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, U. S. Navy.
Rear Admiral W. S. DeLany, U. S. Navy
Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. Navy.
Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, U. S. Navy.

5. You are hereby advised of time and place of the meetings, as set forth above, and of the fact that you will be accorded the rights set forth in detail in reference (a). You will be further advised of subsequent meetings, at all of which you will be entitled to the rights outlined in reference (a).

[s] Thos. C. Hart,
THOS. C. HART.

A true copy. Attest:

THOMAS C. HART,

Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer.

EXHIBIT No. 4 (HART INQUIRY)

[1]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.
A2-11/FF12/
A4-3/QL/(13)
Serial 01646

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., October 14, 1941.

Confidential

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER No. 2CL-41 (REVISED)

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.
Reference:

- (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.
- (b) Cincpac conf. ltr. file A7-2(18) Serial 01221 of 8 August 1941.
- (c) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 1CM-41.
- (d) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 2CM-41.
- (e) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised).
- (f) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.
- (g) Section 3, Chapter II, U.S.F. 10.
- (h) Chapter IV, U.S.F. 10.

Enclosure:

- (A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sectors.
- (B) Measures to be effective until further orders.

1. Reference (a) is revised herewith. References (b), (c) and (d), are cancelled and superseded by this letter.

2. The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian Area, is predicated at present, on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt;

(1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.

(2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.

(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by;

(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,

(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,

(3) a combination of these two.

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part in accordance with enclosure (B) or in their entirety as may later be directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:

(A) *CONTINUOUS PATROLS:*

(1) Inshore Patrol (administered and furnished by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District).

(2) Boom Patrols.

(3) Harbor Patrols.

(B) *INTERMITTENT PATROLS:*

(1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol.

[2] (a) The limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to seaward of a circle ten miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number one which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol.

(b) Three destroyers to search twelve hours prior to the sortie or entry of the Fleet or of a Task Force containing heavy ships. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol and when a sortie and entry occur in succession the Commander entering shall furnish it.

(c) One destroyer (READY DUTY) to screen heavy ships departing or entering Pearl Harbor other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will administer the Ready Duty Destroyer for this purpose and issue necessary orders when requested by forces afloat. Such Ready Duty Destroyer shall be on one hour's notice.

(2) Air Patrols:

(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft, Scouting Force.

(b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is south of latitude 21°-20' N. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie and entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol.

(c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol mentioned therein.

(3) Daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines by Fourteenth Naval District Forces. The swept channel for Fleet and Task Force sorties or entries is two thousand yards wide between Points "A" and "X" as defined in subparagraph (C) (3), below.

(C) SORTIE AND ENTRY:

(1) Reference (h) will not be in effect in the Pacific Fleet during the present emergency.

(2) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District controls the movements of ships within Pearl Harbor, the Entrance Channel, and the swept channel.

(3) Point "A" is midway between Pearl Harbor entrance channel buoys Nos. ONE and TWO; Point "A-1" is midchannel on a line drawn 270° true from Buoy No. EIGHTEEN; Point "X" unless otherwise prescribed is three thousand yards bearing 153° true from Point "A".

(4) Zero hour is the time first ship passes Point "A-1" abeam for sortie, or Point "A" for entry, and will be set by despatch. Interval between ships will be as prescribed by Fleet or Task Force Commanders.

(5) Fleet and Task Force Commanders shall, for their respective forces:

(a) Arrange with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for times of entry and departure, berthing and services.

(b) Prepare and issue sortie and entrance plans.

(c) Clear the Defensive Sea Area promptly after sortie.

(d) When a sortie and entry occur in succession, keep entry force well clear of Defensive Sea Area until sortie force is clear.

(e) Furnish own patrols except as modified by (B) (1) (b) and (B) (2) (b), above.

(6) Units departing or entering Pearl Harbor at times other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, request authority and services as required, direct from Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

(7) Heavy ships (including 7,500 ton light cruisers) maintain a minimum speed of 15 knots when within a radius of 15 miles from the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. During approach and entry, individual units govern movements to provide for minimum time in waters adjacent to the entrance.

[3] (D) OPERATING AREAS:

(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (g).

(2) Ships, except submarines, shall anchor only in protected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului are considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and if ships are so moored as not be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

(3) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need be maintained.

(4) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or for services to other types.

(5) Submarine operations, except (4) above, shall be confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances submarine squadrons may request additional areas from the officer responsible for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian area. While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they shall maintain a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.

(6) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes, all operations of submarines other than those covered in sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) above, shall be on the surface.

(7) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, shall ensure that commanders of surface and air task forces are furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. The latter shall ensure that units concerned, including air patrols, operating under their command are properly notified thereof.

(8) Ships proceeding independently across the operating areas at night shall follow neutral zones and area boundaries where practicable. The Task Force Commander in the vicinity shall be informed of: (a) the route to be followed using point numbers on the Operating Chart, (b) time of starting route, (c) the speed of advance. The Task Force Commander shall notify vessels of his force that may be concerned.

(E) SHIPS AT SEA:

(1) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and aircraft as necessary for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the following:

(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.

(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available, priority in assignments being governed by the following:

Priority 1—BBs

Priority 2—CVs

Priority 3—CAs

Priority 4—CLs

(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to co-operate with Patrol Wings and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

(d) A concentration of own operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require.

(e) Inner air patrol for dispositions or formations, when in operating areas. Such screen shall be maintained by Task Groups, if the Task Force Commander so directs.

(f) Inner anti-submarine screens, insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

(g) Maintenance of condition of readiness **THREE** on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially directed.

[4] (h) Maintenance of material condition **XRAY**, or equivalent in all ships.

(i) Steaming darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

(j) Restricting use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.

(k) Maintenance of horizon and surface battle lookouts.

(1) Energizing degaussing coils whenever there is any possibility of the presence of magnet mines. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

(2) Ships towing targets in operating areas at night will show appropriate running and towing lights, except when engaged in exercises the nature of which requires them to be darkened.

(F) SHIPS IN PORT:

(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures outlined in references (e) and (f).

(G) DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACK:

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any other sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N. B. D. O.). As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

[5] (7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed:

Condition I—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition II—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition III—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

(8) Searchlights of ships shall not be used in event of a night attack.

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure shall be followed by the task forces:

(a) *Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.*

(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3) and (4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance).

(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea, advised.

(b) *Task Force Commander operating at sea.*

(1) Despatch striking unit. (See (E) (1) (c), above.)

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. (May utilize unit of (E) (1) (a) for this if not needed for A/S purposes.)

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines to carry out action desired of him.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

(c) *Naval Base Defense Officer.*

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit shall execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

- (3) Launch air search for enemy ships.
- (4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

(H) ACTION TO BE TAKEN IF SUBMARINE ATTACKS IN OPERATING AREA:

(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following general procedure will be followed:

Ship Attacked.

(a) Proceed in accordance with Article 509, FTP. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details addressed for action to the Task Force Commander in the operating area and for information to Commander-in-Chief, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and S.O.P.A., Pearl Harbor. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area, at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.

[6] Ships other than one attacked.

(b) *Battleships.* Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.

(c) *Carriers.* Same as for battleships, except place all aircraft in Condition ONE, armed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become available.) Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched unarmed. Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

(d) *Cruisers.* Same as for battleships, except, use one-half available aircraft (armed) for own inner air patrol. Send the second half to scene of attack (armed), to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.

(e) *Destroyers.* Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

(f) *Submarines.* Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zigzagging at best speed until directed otherwise.

(g) *Minecraft.* Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Commander.

(h) *Base Force.* If ship attacked is damaged, tugs in operating areas join her at best speed, prepared to tow, slipping targets as necessary. Report in code, positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.

(i) *Patrol Wings.* Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(j) *Shore-based Fleet Aircraft.* Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

(k) *Naval District.* Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair.

(l) *S. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor.* Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

(m) *Task Force Commander at Sea.* Coordinate offensive and defensive measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, prescribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the Task Force.

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack.

(3) It must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships

accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

[7] 4. Subordinate Commanders shall issue the necessary orders to make these measures effective.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Distribution: (5CM-41)

List II, Case 1: A, X.

EN1, EN3, NA12, ND11AC, ND11-12-13-14, NY8-10,

(A1—Asiatic, A1—Atlantic).

P. C. CROSLY,

Flag Secretary.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 4 there appears a map reflecting the Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sectors, Enclosure A., *supra*. This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 1, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hart Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Hart Inquiry.)

Enclosure (B)

Confidential

MEASURES TO BE EFFECTIVE UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 OF BASIC LETTER UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS

(A) (1)

(A) (2)

Boom—administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(A) (3)

Harbor—administered by Commander Base Force with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(B) (1) (a) (b) (c)

Furnished by Destroyers, Battle Force; Minecraft, Battle Force; and Minecraft, Base Force, and coordinated by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

(B) (2) (a) (b) (c)

(B) (3)

(C) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (6) (7)

(D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

(E) (1) (a) (b) (c) (d)

Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commander will hold one drill during each operating period, if employment permits, in the establishment of units prescribed.

(E) (1) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)

(E) (2)

(F)

The provisions of reference (e).

(G)

Entire article, except sub-paragraph 6 (b), which will be as arranged by Naval Base Defense Officer with Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

EXHIBIT NO. 5 (HART INQUIRY)

[1]

SECRET

Register No. 19

FULL TITLE: JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

SHORT TITLE: HCF 41 14ND-JCD-42

Under the provisions of AR 380-5 (paragraph 27) each recipient of this document will make return therefor on June 30, and December 31 of each year to the

Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., except that recipient of this document serving with units of this Department will account for same by means of the memorandum receipt system as prescribed in letter, this headquarters, dated June 16, 1934, file No. AG 381 Misc. (Secret), Subject: Hawaiian Department War Plans.

Navy holders of this plan will make quarterly reports as noted on Navy Distribution List, page 3.

[2] *Joint coastal frontier defense plan—Hawaiian coastal frontier table of corrections*

Change No.	Date of Entry	Signature and rank of Officer Entering Change

[3] *Navy distribution list*

Official to whom issued	Registered numbers
*Chief of Naval Operations.....	18 and 19
*Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.....	20
*Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	21
Commander Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	22
Commander Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	23
Commander Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	24
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	25
Commander Minecraft, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	26
Commander Battleships, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	27
Commander Cruisers, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	28
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	29
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	30
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	31
Commander Patrol Wing Two.....	32
Commander Submarine Squadron Four.....	33
Commander Submarine Base PEARL HARBOR.....	34
†Commander Naval Air Station, PEARL HARBOR.....	35
†Commander Naval Air Station, KANEOHE.....	36
†District Intelligence Officer.....	37
†District Communication Officer.....	38
†Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, PEARL HARBOR.....	39
†Inspector of Ordnance, NAD, OAHU.....	40

*Indicates original holders of 14ND-JCD-13.

†These holders will make quarterly reports to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who will in return report to the Chief of Naval Operations, Registered Publication Section. All others will make these reports to Chief of Naval Operations, information copy to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Annexes will be issued only to those holders concerned and will not be accounted for to the Registered Publication Section.

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¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

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[5] HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
11 April 1941

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
PEARL HARBOR NAVY YARD, T. H.,
11 April 1941.

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER HAWAIIAN
DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

SECTION I—DIRECTIVES

1. **RESPONSIBILITY.** This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is prepared under the direction of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. **BASIS.** This plan is based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW No. 1, and Section V, page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, and will constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects joint operating plans, and mobilization plans are based.

3. **METHOD OF COORDINATION.** The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9 b.

4. **PLANNING REPRESENTATIVES.** The Assistant Chief of Staff for War Planning (G-3), Headquarters HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the War Plans Officer, Headquarters FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, are designated as planning representatives respectively for the Army and Navy Commanders in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. (Par. 40 a. page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935).

5. **JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE.** A Local Joint Planning Committee is established to consist of the Chiefs of Staff, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT and FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT and such other Army and Navy Officers as may be appointed by the Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT (Section VI, page 133, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935). The Joint Planning Committee shall take cognizance of all matters affecting joint coordination in all subsidiary Plans or Projects constituting the Joint Defense Plans, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. The senior member thereof is authorized to designate such standing or special sub-committees as from time to time may be necessary.

[6]

SECTION II—DELIMITATION OF AREAS

6. **HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.** "The HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER consists of OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of OAHU".

It has been determined that the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER consists of land and sea areas bounded by arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at OPANA POINT, MAUI; KAUAI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI; LAUPAHOEHOE

¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII; KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTHWEST HEADLAND, KAHOO LAWE; LEAHI POINT, NIIHAU; LEHUA ISLAND, NIIHAU; KAILIU POINT, KAUAI; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.

7. **HAWAIIAN COASTAL ZONE.** The Hawaiian Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.

8. **HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.** The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier comprises the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER plus the areas bounded by the territorial waters of MIDWAY ISLAND, JOHNSTON ISLAND, PALMYRA ISLAND, CANTON ISLAND, and WAKE ISLAND.

9. **HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL ZONE.** The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the Hawaiian Coastal Zone plus the territorial waters of MIDWAY ISLAND, JOHNSTON ISLAND, PALMYRA ISLAND, CANTON ISLAND, and WAKE ISLAND.

10. **HAWAIIAN DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS.** WPL-8, paragraph 2201, defines Defensive Sea Areas as of two kinds. In the Fourteenth Naval District of the first kind—2201.a.1 of WPL-8—is the Defensive Sea Area of the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER approved by the Joint Board, Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy and will be made effective by proclamation. Defensive Sea Areas of the second kind—2201.a.2. of WPL-8—have been established by executive order for PEARL HARBOR and KANEOHE.

(1) **DEFENSIVE SEA AREA OF THE HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.** The Defensive Sea Area of the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER includes all waters within an area bounded as follows:

By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at OPANA POINT, MAUI; KAUIKI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI; LAUPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII; KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTHWEST HEADLAND KAHOO LAWE; LEAHI POINT, NIIHAU; LEHUA ISLAND, NIIHAU; KAILIU POINT, KAUAI; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named. This area when made effective will be given the short title—HAWAIIAN D. S. A.

(2) **PEARL HARBOR—DEFENSIVE SEA AREA.** The PEARL HARBOR—Defensive Sea Area comprises:

The area of water in PEARL HARBOR lying between extreme high water mark and the sea, and in and about the entrance channel to [7] said harbor within an area bounded by the extreme high water mark at the bearing south true from the southwestern corner of the PUULO A Naval Reservation, a line bearing south true from AHUA POINT LIGHT, and a line bearing west true from a point three (3) nautical miles due south true from AHUA POINT LIGHTHOUSE. This area is given the short title—PEARL D. S. A.

(3) **KANEOHE BAY—DEFENSIVE SEA AREA.** The KANEOHE BAY—Defensive Sea Area comprises:

All waters enclosed by lines drawn as follows: A line bearing northeast true extending three miles from KAOIO POINT, a line bearing northeast true extending four (4) nautical miles from KAPOHO POINT, and a line joining the seaward extremities of the two above-described bearing lines. This area is given the short title—KANEOHE D. S. A.

(4) **PALMYRA, KINGMAN, REEF, JOHNSTON, MIDWAY, and WAKE—DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS.** These defensive sea areas comprise territorial waters surrounding the islands from high water marks to a distance of three (3) nautical miles from these marks.

11. **OAHU DEFENSIVE COASTAL AREA.** The Defensive Coastal Area for OAHU comprises all water areas within the area of circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers and with respective radii, as follows:

KEAHI POINT—Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards.
PUU KAPOLEI—Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards.
PUUIKI STATION } Twenty-three thousand (23,000) yards.
KAHUKU POINT }

This area is given the short title—OAHU D. C. A.

SECTION III—ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Tasks and Forces

12. **CATEGORY OF DEFENSE.** Category "D", as defined in Section III, Chapter V, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.

13. The estimate of the situation applicable to the respective forces is found in Estimate of the Situation, Hawaiian Department, and Estimate of the Situation, Fourteenth Naval District, RAINBOW No. 1.

14. **TASKS.**

a. **JOINT TASK.** To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

b. **ARMY TASK.** To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

c. **NAVY TASK.** To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

[8] 15. **FORCES.**

a. **ARMY FORCES.**

The present garrison augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements from Continental United States as provided for in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.

b. **NAVAL FORCES.**

Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements as provided for in the Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.

c. **OVERSEAS REINFORCEMENTS.**

(1) Army garrisons and Naval Local Defense Forces in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER will be reinforced at the earliest possible date; to the extent practicable, this will be done prior to M-Day.

(2) M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of their respective plans prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

d. **CIVIL ORGANIZATION.** A CIVIL ORGANIZATION, under the supervision of Army authorities, and in consultation and accord with Navy authorities, to reorganize the TERRITORY OF HAWAII for war, utilizing all personnel and materiel resources of the TERRITORY OF HAWAII in assisting the military and naval forces.

SECTION IV—DECISIONS

16. **GENERAL.**

a. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to provide for the needs of the defense of OAHU in accordance with the tasks, paragraph 14 above, and submit these plans to the War and Navy Departments, respectively.

b. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the execution of the tasks given in paragraph 14 above, these plans to include initial deployment and assignment of reinforcements when received.

[9] c. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in consultation and accord with the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the mobilization of man-power and material resources in the TERRITORY OF HAWAII and their allocation to the Army and Navy forces in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER in accordance with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

d. Army and Navy subordinate tasks are assigned in accordance with Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, listed respectively, in paragraphs 17 and 19.

17. **ARMY.** The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:

a. The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.

b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18. *a.*), and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18. *e.*

i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by "Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940".

[10] *j.* An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population.

18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

a. An inshore patrol.

b. An offshore patrol.

c. An escort force.

d. An attack force.

e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS.

f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)

g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D. C. A. and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of the OAHU-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary and practicable.

h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.

i. Distant reconnaissance.

j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.

[11] *l.* In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 *i.*, a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counterespionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.

o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto.

SECTION V—MOBILIZATION

19. MOBILIZATION PLANS.

a. GENERAL.

(1) Mobilization plans to be prepared under directives of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1, will provide for the maximum possible effort to include the variant plan for the possible situation of a cutoff from the Mainland.

(2) The mobilization plans will present the detailed utilization of the man-power and material resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, as well as of the reinforcements to be received from the Mainland.

(3) Mobilization plans will provide that, where facilities do not exist for the defense of OAHU, all work possible under current appropriations will be done to prepare them so that M-Day operation will be possible.

b. *ARMY PLANS.* The mobilization plans to be prepared for the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, will provide for:—

(1) A survey in time of peace of the resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS in men, material, supply and installations and a tabulation of those of military value or necessary for the maintenance of the civil population.

(2) An allocation, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of the resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS to the Army, to the Navy, and to the civilian population in conformity with Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

[12] (3) Plan for recruitment of Army personnel.

(4) Reception and distribution of Army personnel procured by selective service.

(5) Operation of a labor pool, in consultation and accord with the Navy, for use by the Army, by the Navy, and by civilian establishments in conformity with the detailed agreements, of this document, and utilizing to the best advantage the Territorial Civilian Effort Plan.

(6) Operation and administration of martial law in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except in localities under naval jurisdiction, in event of martial law.

(7) Control and care of the civil population of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS (civil organization (Par. 15 d. above) to assist), in event of martial law.

(8) Operation or supervision, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of all civil utilities and establishments in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS vital to military effort and civil life, in event of martial law.

(9) Maintenance and hospitalization of the civil population, in event of martial law.

(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Army as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document, in event of martial law.

(11) Reception, housing or storage, and distribution of all Army reinforcements and supplies received on OAHU.

c. *NAVY PLANS.* The mobilization plans to be prepared by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, will provide for:—

(1) A survey in time of peace of the Navy requirements in man-power, material, supplies, and installations desired from local sources.

(2) Plan for recruitment of Navy personnel.

(3) Reception and distribution of Navy personnel procured by selective service.

(4) Procurement and distribution of local civil personnel needed for naval employment through the labor pool operated by the Army in conformity with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

(5) Operation or supervision of such civil utilities and establishments in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS as are assigned to the Navy, as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

[13] (6) Operation or supervision of all civil agencies in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS for the regulation of water shipping, in event of martial law.

(7) Patrol and police of water areas, to include patrol of coastal zone and protection of shipping therein.

(8) Control of harbor and coastal lights, buoys, and aids to navigation.

(9) Control of all shipping activities in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Navy as covered in Section VI, Joint Agreements, of this document, in event of martial law.

SECTION VI—JOINT AGREEMENTS

20. The details of the allocation of local resources of man-power, supply, material, and installations will be determined by joint agreement. Agreements will cover the following general subjects and such others as may require coordination from time to time:

Allocation of military and civil man-power.

Allocation of utilities and installations for furtherance of military operations.

Allocation of transportation, land and water.

Allocation of signal communications.

Allocation of material and supplies.

Allocation of food supply.

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the Annexes Nos. I to VII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this plan.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch,

C. C. BLOCH,

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

(Signed) Walter C. Short,

WALTER C. SHORT,

Lieut. General, U. S. Army,

Commanding, Hawaiian Department.

EXHIBIT No. 6 (HART INQUIRY)

TOP SECRET

16 October 1941.

From: CNO.

Action: CINCLANT CINCPAC CINCAF (ACKNOWLEDGE).

Info:

162203.

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation X If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti American X If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third adees inform appropriate Army and Naval district authorities X Acknowledge XX

EXHIBIT No. 7 (HART INQUIRY)

TOP SECRET

November 24, 1941.

From: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

Action: CINCAF CINCPAC COM11 COM12 COM13 COM15.

Info: SPENAVO CINCLANT.

242005.

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action adees to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately.

EXHIBIT No. 8 (HART INQUIRY)

TOP SECRET

November 27, 1941.

From: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

Action: CINCAF, CINCPAC.

Info: CINCLANT, SPENAVO.

272337.

This despatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an

aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46 X Inform District and Army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo Inform British X Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

EXHIBIT No. 9 (HART INQUIRY)

TOP SECRET

November 28, 1941.

From: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

Action: COM PNNCP COM PSNCF.

Info: CINCPAC COM PNCF.

290110.

Refer to my 272338 X Army has sent following to commander Western Defense Command Quote negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment X If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate message is being sent to G Two Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in United States X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers X unquote XX WPL52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific sub area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier X Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

EXHIBIT No. 10 (HART INQUIRY)

SECRET

30 November 1941.

From: OPNAV.

To: CINCAF, CINCPAC (Info).

300419.

Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition X In order to ascertain destination this expedition and for security our position in the Philippines desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt this dispatch X Instruct planes to observe only X They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked X Understand British Air forces will search arc 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across Kra Isthmus near Singora X If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur X British mission here informed X.

EXHIBIT No. 11 (HART INQUIRY)

TOP SECRET

3 December 1941.

From: OPNAV.

Action: CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, COM 16.

Info:

~~031850.~~

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents X.

EXHIBIT No. 12 (HART INQUIRY)

PRIORITY—SECRET

26 November 1941.

From: CNO

To: CINCPAC.

~~270038.~~

In order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station twenty five Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable X It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier X Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of Regular Navy supply vessels X Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents X Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies X Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines X Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary X Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations X Confer with commanding general and advise as soon as practicable X.

Copy to: War Plans Division, U. S. Army.

EXHIBIT No. 13 (HART INQUIRY)

ROUTINE—SECRET

26 November 1941.

From: CNO.

To: CINCPAC.

~~270040.~~

Army has offered to make available some units of Infantry for reenforcing defense battallions now on station if you consider this desirable X Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units X Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommend armament X.

Copy to: War Plans Division, U. S. Army.

EXHIBIT No. 14 (HART INQUIRY)

DEFERRED—SECRET

Date: 29 Nov 41.
 Originator: OPNAV.
 Action: CINCPAC.
 282054.

Arrangements described in your 280627 appear to be best that can be made under the circumstances but suggest advisability of transferring VMI from San Diego to Hawaii via Saratoga X. War Dept will instruct COMG DEPT to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes in support of Marines X. War Dept will endeavor to expedite increase of AA defenses but it is doubtful if much improvement is possible. Marine Corps will shortly receive 16 37 MM AA guns and receive ammunition in February do you desire these guns for Midway and Wake X. Request report on present defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in future X.

EXHIBIT No. 15 (HART INQUIRY)

TOP SECRET

Nov. 28, 1941.
 From: CINCPAC.
 To: OPNAV.
 Action: 12.
 280627.

Reference urdis 270040 and 270038; Wright now at Wake to discharge crews and material to operate one squadron of Marine planes. I intend afterwards to Midway to land similar items. Arrangements have already been made to send each of those places essential ground material for temporary storage of 12 B-17 Army bombers, to leave Pearl about Dec. 1st, but only 6 such planes of the 12 on Oahu are in operating condition. Shortage of Army bombs precludes any shipments to outlying bases. Bombs are now available there. These may be used by the Army in alterations. Usefulness of Army pursuit planes for insular defense is limited by their doubtful capability of operating over 20 miles offshore. It is possible but inability to land on carrier freezes them to island and flexibility dispositions is thereby curtailed. Additional anti-air defenses are needed in this area for Army & Marine defense battalions. Consider use of troop reinforcements for outlying bases inadvisable as long as Marines are available but plans are being made for such use of Army troops. A force must be exclusively under Navy command, 12 Marine fighters to be sent in carrier for Wake. Expect send other Marine planes to Midway. On Dec. 1st sending 12 patrol planes to Wake from Midway, and replace at Midway from Pearl. The feasibility and advisability of relieving patrol planes with Army pursuits will be investigated more thoroughly.

EXHIBIT No. 16 (HART INQUIRY)

SECRET

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinCPac file no.
 A16/WPPac-46(16)
 Serial 063W

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 1941

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
 To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.
 Subject: WPPac-46.

1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect prior to the receipt of such approval.

2. Attention is invited to the Introduction, Chapter III, article 0301 of the Plan concerning the preparation of supporting plans by Task Force Commanders. At the present time it is desired that the following submit supporting plans for approval by the Commander-in-Chief:

Commanders Task Forces Two, Three, Six, Seven and Nine. (Commander Task Force Nine may, if he desires, delegate preparation of the plan to the Senior Officer of that type in the Hawaiian Area.)

The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers addressed may provide for the accomplishment of such tasks as are assigned them in this O-1 Plan by including suitable measures in their O-4 or other plans, rather than to prepare separate supporting plans for this O-1 Plan. The Commander Southeast Pacific Force (Commander Cruiser Division Three) is required to submit the plan for operations of that force after its detachment from the Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations for approval.

3. Supporting Plans as required above will be submitted for approval of the Commander-in-Chief prior to 20 August 1941. After approval they will be incorporated with the Fleet Plan as annexes as prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Further annexes prepared by the Commander-in-Chief to cover operations to be undertaken in later phases of the war will be distributed when completed and approved.

5. Suitable binders for this Plan will be forwarded as soon as received by this command.

H. E. Kimmel.
H. E. KIMMEL.

[i]

SECRET

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinCpac File
A16/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 056W.

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 21, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.

Subject: WPPac-46, promulgation of.

Enclosures:

(A) Pages for WPPac-46; Reg. No. 5 including list of effective pages.

(B) Receipt form in duplicate.

1. U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46) is promulgated herewith. Holders of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Secret letter A16(R-5)040W of May 27, 1941 and the tentative Operation Plan promulgated thereby, will destroy them by burning and make report of destruction to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

2. A receipt form is enclosed to be accomplished and forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations (Registered Publications Section).

3. This publication will be handled and accounted for in accordance with the instructions contained in the Navy Regulations, the System of War Planning and the Registered Publication Manual.

4. This volume shall not be carried in aircraft, and when not in use, shall be kept in Class "A" storage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual.

5. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY PORTIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION MANUAL.

6. SPECIAL WARNING—the contents of this publication shall be given the minimum dissemination compatible with thorough preparation of the subordinate plans.

P. C. Crosley,
P. C. CROSLY,
Flag Secretary.

H. E. KIMMEL.

492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[ii] U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan Rainbow Five)

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Change No.	Date of entry	Signature and rank of officer entering change

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DISTRIBUTION LIST

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Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet	
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Commander, Patrol Wing Two	
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Commander, Base Force	
Commanding General, Second Marine Division	
Commandant, Naval Station, Samoa	
Commandant, Eleventh Naval District	
Commandant, Twelfth Naval District	
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District	
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District	
Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District	

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet is holding registered numbers 21, 24, and 44 to 60 in reserve.

SECRET

[1] U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)

WPPac-46

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[3]

SECRET

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I. NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN (RAINBOW FIVE)

0101. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) is the directive which this U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) is designed to implement in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET are concerned. As the Basic Plan is in the possession of most of the recipients of this Fleet Plan, only particularly pertinent parts of it will be repeated herein. These parts have to do chiefly with assumptions, concepts of enemy action, and tasks.

[4]

CHAPTER II. FORMAT OF FLEET PLANS

0201. This Plan follows the standard War Plan form of WPI-8 except for small variations made for the purpose of facilitating ready reference and quick dissemination on the outbreak of war. These, in brief, are as follows:

- a. In Part I the order of presentation is:

Chapter I—Task Organization.

Chapter II—Assumptions.

Chapter III—Information.

- b. In Part II are incorporated:

Chapter I —Task assigned by Basic Plan.

Chapter II—Phases; and specific tasks, arranged by phases, for accomplishing the assigned mission together with (in a few instances) decisions as to how they will be initially carried out.

c. In Part III the first three chapters each cover one phase. Within each of those chapters the tasks assigned to each task force are grouped in a separate section, except the naval coastal frontiers, which are grouped together. Pertinent special information and logistic instructions are placed with the tasks given therein or they are placed in an appropriate annex of this O-1 Plan. Where a task requires coordinated action with other task forces, reference is simply made to the annex which comprises the plan for such coordinated action.

d. Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter IV, Part V are tentative fleet operation plans which, when completed by the assignment of forces actually available at the time, and modified to meet any change in the conditions which have been visualized in this Fleet War Plan (U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five), are considered suitable, together with the annexes, for placing into effect the measures of Phase I and Phase IA of this Plan. In other words Chapter IV, Part V could be omitted as the material therein is completely covered in the text that precedes [5] them. They are included, however, for the sake of clarity and in order to have immediately available tentative fleet operation plans in the conventional form with which all concerned are familiar.

e. Annexes I, II, etc., are plans, special plans issued by the Commander-in-Chief for a particular purpose. They may be made effective separately if occasion requires. The forces affected are indicated in the annex itself. Some of the annexes may ultimately be only guides for promulgation of an operation order by despatch or letter.

f. Supporting plans of subordinate commanders, which are prescribed in the next chapter, are to be appended as lettered annexes.

[6]

CHAPTER III. SUBORDINATE PLANS

0301. Subordinate plans to support this Fleet Operating Plan will be prepared as follows:

a. The Commanders of the forces designated in the Task Organization in Chapter I, Part I of this Plan, will prepare supporting plans for each assigned task, the accomplishment of which would be facilitated by further planning.

b. These supporting plans will be, as closely as practicable, in the standard form of operation plans, and will be incorporated as annexes to this Fleet Operating Plan. Where the nature of the tasks lends itself to such procedure, the plan for their accomplishment may be in the form of a single annex. Where such is not the case, as where tasks are assigned in one or more of the Commander-in-Chief's annexes, several plans may be required.

c. Letter designations for annexes are assigned to each commander as listed below. The first annex to be prepared will be designated as "Letter-1", the second as "Letter-2", etc. It should be noted that if the nature of a task assigned at present does not require the preparation of a subordinate plan by a commander, the annex assigned him below will be vacant.

Task Force One.....	A-1, etc.
Task Force Two.....	B-1, "
Task Force Three.....	C-1, "
Aircraft Scouting Force.....	D-1, "
Submarines Scouting Force.....	E-1, "
Minecraft Battle Force.....	F-1, "
Base Force.....	G-1, "
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.....	H-1, "
Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.....	J-1, "
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.....	K-1, "

d. In the subordinate plans, forces should, in general, be listed in the task organization by organizations and approximate numbers of types rather than by name, unless it is known that specific units will be available.

e. If a commander considers it desirable to disseminate the considerations which have governed his decision and task assignments, he should append a brief and summarized estimate of the situation as an addendum to his plan. Auxiliary directives such as communication plans should also be appended as addenda to the task force commander's plan.

f. If the execution of the subordinate plans would be facilitated by still further preliminary planning, task force commanders should require their group commanders to submit plans for the accomplishment of the tasks assigned them in the task force commander's plans. These will be designated as addenda, but will not be incorporated with this Fleet Plan. They need be submitted only to the task force commander for acceptance.

g. If appropriate, each subsidiary plan will include in an addendum, the logistic requirements for carrying out the plan in so far as they can be foreseen. Such addenda may or may not be incorporated in the Fleet Plan, but, in every case, copies will be supplied to Commander Base Force.

h. The plans must be predicated upon realities and must provide for maximum possible utilization of forces presently available. Unless absolutely necessary, plans should not be based upon either conceptions or material not reasonably attainable. When material, equipment or personnel, not immediately available, is necessary for the successful execution of the measures to be undertaken, this shall be made the subject of an addendum. The commander concerned shall take immediate action to remedy the deficiencies, forwarding necessary correspondence through the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Thereafter the Commander-in-Chief shall be informed of corrections of these deficiencies as they occur.

i. Task force commanders will employ, in subdividing their forces, the decimal system of numbering subdivisions.

j. In numbering the pages of the plans which form annexes of this Fleet Plan, lower case letters to correspond to the letters assigned in subparagraph c above will be used. Thus the first page of the plan of Commander Task Force One will be "a-1".

[8]

CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION

0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day.

[9] PART I. TASK ORGANIZATION, ASSUMPTIONS, INFORMATION

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1101. The forces available to the Pacific Fleet are listed in the current Appendix II of the Basic Plan. In addition, the Commanders of the Pacific Southern, Pacific Northern, and Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the Commandants

of the Naval Stations Guam and Samoa are considered to be officers of the Pacific Fleet, and, through them, the local defense and coastal forces, are subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

1102. For planning purposes, tasks are assigned to the commanders of the current task forces in the Fleet and to certain other commanders who are to become task force commanders as indicated in paragraph 1107 below.

1103. As of July 1, 1941, the major task forces, their commanders, and the broad tasks for which they are training, are as follows:

Task Force One.—for covering operations—Commander Battle Force in command.

Task Force Two.—for reconnaissance in force and raiding operations—Commander Aircraft Battle Force in command.

Task Force Three.—for landing attack operations—Commander Scouting Force in command.

1104. The subdivision of the Fleet which is made in paragraph 1107 is designed to provide a flexible overall task organization from which may be selected the task forces to accomplish the operations which can be visualized at this time. It must be realized that, for most operations, certain units must be transferred between task forces, some will be absent in the navy yard or for other reasons, and, in some cases, two or more task forces will be merged under the command of the senior officer concerned. Also many of the tasks assigned to a task force under this plan do not require the employment of the whole task force. In such cases the task force commander will utilize such units of his force as are required to accomplish the assigned task.

[10]

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1105. It is not expected that the Task Organization as shown below will be effective throughout the campaign. Rather it will be the basis for making particular task organizations for the various operations that may be required. It will be the specific plans and orders in effect at any given time which will determine the task organizations at that time.

1106. Units assigned to a task force or to a task group in the normal organization that are subsequently assigned to another task force or task group thereafter continue as an integral part of the last organization to which assigned until released by the commander thereof. The commanders mentioned herein release such units as promptly as the situation at the time permits when the period of assignment to their commands has terminated or when further reassignment is made by competent authority.

[11] 1107. The Normal Task Organization for this Plan is as follows

1. <i>TASK FORCE ONE</i> Commander Battle Force	
Batdivs 2, 4.....	6
SARATOGA.....	1
Crudiv 3, 9.....	5
Desflot 1 less Desrons 5, 9.....	4
	2
	16
	2

(#Includes Southeast Pacific Force of 2 OCL and 4 DD.)

2. <i>TASK FORCE TWO</i> Commander Aircraft Battle Force	
Batdiv 1.....	3
Cardiv 2 less YORKTOWN.....	1
Crudiv 5.....	4
Desflot 2 less Desrons 4, 8 and Desdiv 50.....	1
	8
	2

(#Includes Atlantic Reinforcement of 4 CA.)

3. <i>TASK FORCE THREE</i> Commander Scouting Force	
Crudiv 4, 6.....	8
Cardiv 1 less SARATOGA.....	1
Desrons 4, 5.....	2
	16
Minron 3, less Mindiv 5, 6.....	5
Available Transports Base Force.....	—
2d Marine Div less Defense Batt.	—
2d Marine Air Group.	—

[12] 4. *TASK FORCE NINE (Patrol Plane Force)* Commander Aircraft Scouting Force

All units of Aircraft Scouting Force.....	107 VP
	2 AV
	2 AVP
	4 AVD
Utility Squadron from Base Force.....	10 VJR

5. *TASK FORCE SEVEN (Undersea Force)* Commander Submarines Scouting Force

All units of Submarines Scouting Force except Sound School..	30 SS
	2 OSS
	1 SM
	1 ODD
	3 AS
	2 ASR
	1 AM

6. *TASK FORCE EIGHT (Mining Force)* Commander Minecraft Battle Force

All units of Minecraft Battle Force.....	1 CM
	8 DM

7. *TASK FORCE SIX (Logistic & Control Force)* Commander Base Force

All units of Base Force except AP, APD and Minron 3 less	8 DMS
Divs 5 and 6 and 10 VJ.	4 AF
	6 AT
	1 AH
	13 AO
	2 AR
	1 ARD
	2 AK
	2 AE
	1 AKS
	10 AM
	4 AG
	Utility Wing

[13] 8. *TASK FORCE FOUR (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Local defense forces.

9. *TASK FORCE FIVE (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

Coastal and local defense forces.

10. *TASK FORCE TEN (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

Local defense forces.

[14] 1108. The Southeast Pacific Force and the Atlantic Reenforcement, composed as indicated above, will operate under the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet until specifically detached by the Chief of Naval Operations. They will not, however, be sent to such distances from Pearl Harbor as would prevent their arrival in the Canal Zone twenty-one days after their transfer is ordered.

[15] CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS

Section 1. General Assumptions

1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:

a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth, (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

Note. As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan.

b. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

c. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive elements, but will remain in a non-belligerent status unless subject to direct attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.

d. That the principal military effort of the Associated Powers will be in the Atlantic and European Areas, and that operations in other areas will be so conducted as to facilitate that effort. Therefore, transfer of units from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet is provided for in the Navy Basic Plan, and additional transfers may become necessary.

e. That the Asiatic Fleet will not be reinforced by the Pacific Fleet, but eventually, if Japan enters the war, heavy British reinforcements will be needed in the Far East.

[16] *Section 2. Special Assumption*

1221. That the Pacific Fleet is virtually mobilized and is based at Pearl Harbor, but regular navy yard overhauls are in progress which would reduce force immediately available by about one-fifth.

[17]

CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

Section 1. General Information

1311. a. The Pacific Area, which is under the command of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, is that part of the area of the Pacific Ocean:

1. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.
2. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.
3. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American Coast and Longitude 74° West.
4. Less waters in which Canada may assume strategic direction of military forces.

b. In addition, the United States will afford support to British Naval Forces in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

c. The Southeast Pacific Sub-Area, when established, will be that part of the Pacific Area south of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier and between the West Coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West.

d. The Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone extending from the northern boundary of California to the southern boundary of Mexico.

e. The Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone of the Northwestern United States north of the northern boundary of California, and, in addition, Alaska.

f. The Pacific sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone defined to be within a broken line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala boundary to a point in Latitude 5° South, Longitude 95° West and thence to the Peru-Ecuador border, and to include the sea routes near the southern and western borders of that zone.

[18] g. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu, and all land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston Island, Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.

h. The Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence west to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea, thence south to the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.

i. In the Far East Area, responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines will be assumed by the British Naval Commander in Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines.

j. The Australia and New Zealand Area comprises the Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the equator. The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, is responsible for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in this Area.

1312. The foregoing delineation of principal areas and the agreements as to cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth are contained in the Report of United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1). Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22), is now in the process of preparation. Similar agreements with the Netherlands East Indies are being made.

[19] 1313. The following principles of command will obtain:

a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the United Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsibility of their own Power.

b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.

c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their type, be employed as task forces charged with the execution of specific strategic tasks. These task forces will operate under their own commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power. Only exceptional military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks.

d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of time in grade.

e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate under United States Naval command, and will remain an integral part of United States Naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.

1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as follows:

Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. [20] The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

Section 2. Enemy Information

1321. Information of the enemy will be disseminated prior to and on the execution of this Plan, by means of intelligence reports.

1322. Information which is of special interest with respect to a specific task is included with that task in Part III or in the Annexes.

[21] Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action

1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

d. The principal defensive efforts to be:

1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.

2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.

3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.

1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

a. Capture of Guam.

b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced

bases, and by the [22] destruction of United States and allied naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.

- c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
- d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-L area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.
- e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light forces.
- f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other United States positions.

1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

- a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.
- b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of Mandates.
- c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable base in Halmahera).
- d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Navy in that area.
- e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported.
- f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and light marines in the Hawaiian Area.
- [23] g. Obsolete and weaker units on patrol of coastal areas and for defense of lines of communication.
- h. Merchant ships in neutral ports or proceeding home via detours and unusual routes.

[24]

PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN—MISSION

2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:

- a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by denying enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and defense of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;
- b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;
- c. Destroy axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels directly or indirectly with the enemy;
- d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far as longitude 155° east;
- e. Defend Samoa in category "D";
- f. Defend Guam in category "F";
- g. Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying raiding forces;
- h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by deterring hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the use of land positions in that hemisphere;
- i. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces;
- j. Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as circumstances require;
- k. Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.

[25] CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSION

2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption a1 and dividing the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:

- a. PHASE I—Initial tasks—Japan not in the war.
- b. PHASE IA—Initial tasks—Japan in the war.
- c. PHASE II, etc.—Succeeding tasks.

2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:

- a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
 - b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
 - c. Transfer the Atlantic reinforcement, if ordered.
 - d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
 - e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-day.
 - f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier on M-day.
 - g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.
 - h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
- [26] 2202. i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.
- j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
 - k. Continue training operations as practicable.
 - l. Move the maximum practicable portion of second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.
 - m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

Phase IA

2203. Phase IA tasks are as follows:

- a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.
 - b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been completed.
 - c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and tenders in the northern Pacific.
 - d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the associated powers, and of the naval coastal frontier forces, chiefly by covering operations.
 - e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.
 2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids against Japanese shipping in waters between Hansai Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
 - f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.
 - g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.
- [27] 2203. h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawaiian Area and the West Coast.
- i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.
 - j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier as necessary.
 - k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division.
 - l. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island Area.

Phase II and subsequent phases

2204. Tasks of Phase II and Subsequent Phases which can be formulated at this time are:

- a. Capture and establish a protected fleet anchorage in the Marshall Island Area.
- b. Capture or deny other positions in the Marshall Island Area as necessary for further advance to the westward.
- c. Raid other Japanese land objectives and sea communications.
- d. Capture and establish an advanced fleet base at Truk.
- e. Continue uncompleted tasks of Phase IA.

[28]

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3111. *Task Force One* will perform tasks as required by the following graphs of this section.

3112. When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the Navy Basic Plan.

3113. Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[29] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3121. *Task Force Two* will:

Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[30] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3131. *Task Force Three* will perform the tasks assigned in the following graphs of this section.

3132. Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3133. a. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.

b. Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases at the Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on the capture of Eniwetok.

c. 1. *Special Information.*

As of July 1, 1941, the Marine defenses in Hawaii and the outlying islands are as follows:

MIDWAY —34 officers
750 men
6 5"/51 caliber guns
12 3"/50 caliber AA guns
30 0.50 caliber machine guns
30 0.30 caliber machine guns
4 searchlights.

JOHNSTON—18 men
2 5"/51 caliber guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns

PALMYRA —4 officers
101 men
4 5"/51 caliber guns
4 3"/50 caliber AA guns
4 0.50 caliber machine guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns

[31] OAHU —32 officers
620 men
4 5"/51 caliber guns
8 3"/50 caliber AA guns
20 0.50 caliber machine guns
16 0.30 caliber machine guns

NOTE: The above personnel are defense battalion personnel only and are in addition to personnel employed in duty, barracks duty, etc.

WAKE —None.

2. *Task*

Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander in-Chief.

[32] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*

3141. *Task Force Nine* will perform the tasks assigned in the following graphs of this section.

3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue the rotation of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[33] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3151. *Task Force Seven* will perform tasks as required by the following graphs of this section.

3152. a. Special Information.

1. There are indications that Axis raiders have been basing in the Marshall area.

2. The imminence of the entry of Japan into the war requires a deployment suitable for this eventuality.

3. NARWHAL and NAUTILUS are fitted to carry 13,500 gallons of aviation gasoline each for fueling patrol planes.

b. Task

Maintain patrols required by the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

c. Special Logistics.

Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor and to a limited degree at Midway.

3153. Assign one submarine division to Task Force Three as required for landing attack training.

3154. On w-Day transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaskan sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.

[34] Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)

3161. Task Force Eight will:

Continue operations and training under commanders *Task Forces One and Two*.

[35] Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)

3171. Task Force Six will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs.

3172. Provide logistic service to the fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases.

3173. Perform tasks required by The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3174. Maintain in the office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the fleet, the loading of base force and NTS vessels, and the routing and protection of U. S. and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.

3175. Transfer ten VJR to Commander *Task Force Nine*.

[36] Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS

Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)

3181. Special Information.

The *Basic Plan* assigns the following tasks to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier:

a. Defend the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in Category "D". (Category "D"—May be subject to major attack). (N. B. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, does not consider Category "D" will apply during Phase I.)

b. Protect and route shipping within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

c. Support the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

d. Support the Army and Associated Forces within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

3182. By this *Fleet Plan*, *Task Force Four* is assigned the tasks below.

a. Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned. (As of the date of issue of this plan, the security plan of the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (as Commander, Base Defense) is already in effect).

b. Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized. Assist as practicable in the development of Samoa and Guam.

c. Make the facilities of outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in the vicinity; and directly and through own task group commanders cooperate with other task force and task group commanders in coordinating the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV.)

**U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE)**

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

[37] **3182. d.** Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and Canton.

*Task Force Five (Pacific Southern) and Task Force Ten (Pacific North
Naval Coastal Frontier)*

3183. Commanders *Task Forces Five and Ten* perform tasks assigned in Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[38] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3191. Until detached from the Fleet, all forces less those of Naval Frontiers will perform the following tasks:

- a. Units in the Hawaiian Area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor end of four W-day; units designated for early operations complete mobilization prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units in Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.
- b. Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.
- c. Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperate with commanders of naval coastal frontiers while within the limits of frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese forces.
- d. Continue such training activities of the fleet as the commander may direct.
- e. Reinforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.
- f. Protect the territory and communications of the associated power operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other actions as directed by the commander-in-chief.

[39]

CHAPTER II. PHASE IA

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3211. *Task Force One* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3212. Perform task assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I)

3213. Reinforce and support operations of Task Force Two as required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

[40] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3221. *Task Force Two* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3222. Conduct reconnaissance and raid in force against the Marshall Islands as required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

[41] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3231. *Task Force Three* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3232. Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3233. Reinforce Task Force Two as required by the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II).

3234. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.

3235. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133c, 2.

[42] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*

3241. *Task Force Nine* will perform tasks as required in the following paragraphs of this section.

3242. a. *Special Information.*

1. Patrol plane operations from Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, Canton are feasible, the extent of such operations being dependent upon defenses, facilities and supplies available at the time operations commence. Those defenses, facilities and supplies are being augmented. As of July 1, 1941, tenders cannot base at Wake or Canton, but Pan-American Airways' facilities may be used by special arrangement or by commandeering. A project for improvement of Wake as a base is underway. No such project for Canton has been approved.

2. No aircraft are assigned at present to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

3. Our submarines will assist in the defense of Midway and Wake, and habitually operate offensively in enemy waters.

4. Land defenses exist on outlying islands, as described in paragraph 3133c, 1. Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), is charged with the defense of these outlying islands and will make them available for patrol plane operations.

5. It is believed that enemy action in the area subject to our patrol plane search will comprise:

(a) Submarine raids and observation off Oahu and outlying islands and along our lines of communication.

[43] (b) Surface raids on our lines of communications.

(c) Surface and air raids against Wake and possibly against Midway, Johnston, Palmyra and Canton.

(d) Possibly carrier raid against Oahu.

b. *Tasks.*

1. Perform patrols required by patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

2. Subject to the specific tasks prescribed elsewhere in this plan, operate patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.

3. Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.

4. Perform tasks assigned in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

5. Coordinate operations of patrol planes with submarines operating in same general area.

6. Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid disproportionate losses.

[44] 3242. b. 7. Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ Squadron from base force) based on Oahu at all times. During the absence of major portions of the fleet from the vicinity of Oahu, such squadrons, at discretion, may be temporarily transferred to commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

c. *Special Logistics.*

Logistic support at outlying bases will be supplied by own tenders, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, Base Force, and, if necessary, by Pan-American Airways facilities.

[45] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3251. *Task Force Seven* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph.

3252. a. *Special Information.*

1. Surface units of the Fleet will initially conduct the operations required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) and the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II). Thereafter operations will be conducted for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines, with occasional sweeps toward the Marianas and the Japanese Homeland.

2. Our patrol planes will be operating from Midway, and possibly Wake and Johnston Islands.

3. Japan is developing extensively the defenses of the Mandated Islands. Land planes are known to be based at Saipan, Truk and Jaluit and have been reported at Marcus Island. Air fields are believed to exist at Wotje and Maloe-lap. Port Lloyd in the Bonins is a minor operating base and some aircraft usually base there and at Hachijo Jima. Aircraft may be present on Amami Oshima.

4. Considerable air strength is based on the Japanese Homeland but it is believed that, with many commitments elsewhere and a general lack of patrol planes, the air patrol surrounding the Homeland will not be particularly intensive.

5. The main units of the Japanese Fleet will probably be operating from the Inland Sea.

6. All important harbors will probably be mined and netted against submarines and are well fortified. A considerable number of small patrol craft must be expected.

[46] 3252. a. 7. The southwestern and western lines of communications from Japan may be considered vital needs and those toward the Mandates are very important.

8. It is expected that all Japanese Merchantmen will be armed or will be operating under naval control, and will therefore be subject to submarine attack. Specific instructions on this subject will be issued later.

9. Arrangements will be made with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic to extend the Pacific Area sufficiently for submarines to pass through the Shoto as far south as Latitude 28°-30' N.

10. Mining Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned; specific authority for such mining will be issued later.

b. *Tasks*

1. Continue patrol of two submarines each at Wake and Midway.

2. Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese home islands thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operations, giving Stations the following priority.

YOKOHAMA
BUNGO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU

3. Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces including shipping, torpedoes and mines, and, if appropriate, gunfire.

[47] 3252. b. 4. Report important enemy movements by radio if such attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.

c. *Special Logistics.*

Utilize facilities at Midway as necessary to increase endurance on patrol.

[48] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3261. *Task Force Eight* will:

Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment local defense forces during this phase.

[49] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FOR*

3271. *Task Force Six* will:

Continue tasks assigned for Phase I and perform the tasks assigned for patrol and sweeping plan (annex I) and the Marshall reconnaissance and control plan (annex II).

[50] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

3281. *Task Force Five* (Pacific Northern) and *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) will:

Continue tasks assigned for phase I and perform the tasks assigned for patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

3282. *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) will:

Continue tasks assigned for phase I.

[51] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3291. *All task forces concerned:*

a. Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3191.

b. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

[52] CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE I A

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3311. *Task Force One* will:

Cover operations of other forces as prescribed in the Eniwetok plan (annex I) and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

[52a] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3321. *Task Force Two* will:

Reinforce Task Forces One and Three as required in Eniwetok and other plans and perform such reconnaissance and raiding as is directed.

[52b] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3331. *Task Force Three* will:

a. Continue training for landing attacks.

b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex I) and other operations involving landing attacks.

c. Patrol as directed in subsequent plans.

d. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.

[52c] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*

3341. *Task Force Nine* will:

- a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3242 b, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7.
- b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

[52d] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3351. *Task Force Seven* will:

- a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3252 b, 1, 2, 3, and 4.
- b. Carry out tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

*U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)*

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE 1A

[52e] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3361. *Task Force Eight* will:

Perform such mining tasks as may be assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other operations and continue to augment local patrols as directed.

[52f] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC AND CONTROL FORCE)*

3371. *Task Force Six* will:

- a. Continue tasks prescribed in paragraphs 3172 to 3174.
- b. Prepare plans for the establishment of a fleet anchorage at Eniwetok and a fleet base at Truk after the positions have been captured.

[52g] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

3381. *Task Forces Four, Five, and Ten* will:

Continue the tasks assigned in paragraphs 3182 and 3183.

[52h] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3391. *All task forces concerned:*

Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3291.

[53] CHAPTER IV. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN

3401. The execution of this Plan may be in one or two steps depending on whether Japan does or does not become a belligerent on the first day of execution.

a. If action against European Axis Powers only is to be taken the despatch will be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE".

b. When action against JAPAN is to be taken the despatch for execution will be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE AFIRM".

3402. In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power against the United States prior to the existence of a state of war, it is the duty of the senior commander on the spot to take such action in the defense of his command and the national interests as the situation may require, and report the action taken to superior authority at once.

[54] CHAPTER V. INITIAL TRANSFER OF UNITS

3501. The table below gives, for ready reference, a summary of the transfers to be made in going from the current peace time organization to the task organization as of W-Day and as of J-Day. Those transfers for W-Day will be made upon the placing into effect of Phase I of this Plan. Those for J-Day will be made when the execution of Phase 1A is ordered. Units concerned will report by despatch to the commanders of the task forces to which they are transferring.

From	To	Unit transferred	Transfer effected	Remarks
Taskfor 1.....	Southeastern Pacific For. Taskfor 3.....	{ 2 OCL..... 1 Desdiv..... 1 CL.....	} When directed.. W-Day.....	For rotation on patrol until J-Day.
Taskfor 2.....	Taskfor 3.....	1 CA.....	W-Day.....	For rotation on patrol until J-Day.
	Atlantic Reen.....	4 CA.....	When directed..	If Atlantic Reen. is detached.
Taskfor 3.....	Taskfor 2.....	2 CA.....	When directed..	If Atlantic Reen. is detached.
	PSNCF.....	{ 12 VPB..... 1 AVD..... 1 AVP.....	} W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
Taskfor 9 (Patrol Plane Force).	PNNCF.....	{ 12 VPB..... 1 AVD..... 1 AVP.....	} W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
Taskfor 7 (Undersea Force).	PNNCF.....	{ 2 SS..... 1 ASR.....	} W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
	Taskfor 3.....	NARWHAL or NAUTILUS.	W-Day.....	Base Samoa. Released on J-Day.
[55]				
Taskfor 8 (Minfor).	Hawaiian NCF.....	{ 1 CM..... 8 DM.....	} J-Day.....	Until further orders.
Taskfor 6 (Logistic and Control For).	Taskfor 3.....	1 AO.....	W-Day.....	Base Samoa, released on J-Day.
		1 AO.....	J-Day.....	For fueling at sea ships in initial sweep. To revert when released.
	Taskfor 2.....	2 AO.....	J-Day.....	For fueling at sea ships in initial reconnaissance of MARSHALLS. To revert when released.
	Taskfor 9.....	10 VJR.....	J-Day.....	Until further orders.
All Forces.....	Hawaiian NCF.....	As directed.	When directed.	
	Taskfor 6 (Logistic and Control Force).	Any ship passing between West Coast and Hawaii.	Prior to scheduled date of departure.	For escort duty. To revert on completion.

[56]

PART IV. LOGISTICS

CHAPTER I. GENERAL

4101. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force) is charged with the logistic supply of the Fleet and, in cooperation with Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), with supplying the present outlying bases in the Mid Pacific. He will make requests for replacements as required by paragraph 4322 g of the Navy Basic Plan. He will maintain a liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) and, through him, will control the quantities and times of delivery of material and personnel requirements to the Fleet. In so far as practicable, a reserve of consumable supplies will be established and maintained at Pearl Harbor. After capture of bases in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES a reserve of supplies will be maintained at these places, as permitted by storage and transportation facilities available.

4102. The supply of units of the Second Marine Division after they have left the West Coast will be included with that of the Fleet.

4103. Special logistic instructions affecting particular tasks have been included in the task assignments in Part III and the Annexes of this Plan.

4104. For the benefit of Commander Task Force Six, Commanders of other task forces will include, in the plans which they prepare, their logistic requirements as far as they can be foreseen.

4105. The requirements of the U. S. Pacific Fleet are placed in the second highest priority classification by paragraph 4261 of the Navy Basic Plan.

[56a]

CHAPTER II. TRANSPORTATION

4201. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force), through his liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier), will coordinate the transportation of material and personnel by Fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transportation Service.

4202. The Naval Transportation Service vessels assigned to assist in the supply of the Hawaiian and Alaskan areas will be shown in a revised Chapter IX,

Appendix II, of the Navy Basic Plan. If practicable, they will not be employed for transportation farther westward than Hawaii.

4203. The employment of commercial vessels to assist in transportation from the West Coast to Hawaii is most desirable and is acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

[56b]

CHAPTER III. HOSPITALIZATION AND EVACUATION

4301. The facilities of the Fleet including those of hospital ships, advanced base hospitals and mobile medical units will, as far as practicable, provide hospitalization for sick and wounded personnel.

4302. As necessary, such personnel will, under the coordinated supervision of the task force commanders responsible for the personnel and for the transportation facilities employed, be evacuated to the nearest shore establishment having hospital space available.

4303. The ships concerned will furnish hospitalization to embarked Army forces until ineffectives can be transferred ashore.

[56c]

CHAPTER IV. PRIZE CREWS

4401. The Navy Department will furnish prize crews as follows: U. S. Pacific Fleet—8; Southeast Pacific Force—8. If those for the Pacific Fleet are available they will be placed aboard ships assigned to make the search for enemy merchant ships in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[56d]

CHAPTER V. SALVAGE

4501. All units, particularly of Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) and suitable units of Task Force Seven (Underseas Force) will render salvage service, as practicable, to naval and other vessels in the Pacific Area outside of a zone lying 500 miles from the continental United States, Alaska, and Panama. Within the above mentioned zone, salvage service will be rendered by the shore establishment.

[57]

PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER I. TIME TO BE USED

5101. GREENWICH Civil Time will be used in carrying out this Plan.

[58]

CHAPTER II. COMMUNICATIONS

5201. Communications will be in accordance with USF-70 as modified by Annex III to this Plan.

[59]

CHAPTER III. LOCATION OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

5301. The Fleet will be kept informed of the location of the Commander-in-Chief.

[60]

CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

5401. Tentative Operation Plans Nos. 1-R5 and 1A-R5 as formulated below are designed to facilitate the promulgation and execution of the tasks assigned for Phases I and IA of this U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five). It is expected that they will be modified and executed by despatch when the corresponding Phase of this O-1 Plan is placed in effect as prescribed in paragraph 3401.

[61] *Section 1. Phase I*

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Operation Plan No. 1-R5

Initial Task Organization

(See paragraph 1107 of this Plan for normal organization)

(a) *Task Force One*—Commander Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus $\frac{1}{2}$ minecraft less 1 cruiser in rotation to *Task Force Three* patrol pool.

(b) *Task Force Two*—Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus $\frac{1}{2}$ mincraft less one cruiser in rotation to *Task Force Three* patrol pool.

(c) *Task Force Three*—Commander Scouting Force.—Normal units this task force plus 1 cruiser each from *Task Forces One* and *Two* for cruiser patrol pool plus 1 SS from *Task Force Seven*, 1 AO from *Task Force Six*, and (on request) 1 patron and tender from *Task Force Seven* for South Pacific operations.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) (S. O. P. Aircofor Hawaiian Area).—Normal units this task force less 24 VP and tenders transferred to Naval Coastal Frontiers, and (if requested by *Commander Task Force Three*) 1 patron and tender to *Task Force Three*.

[62] (e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force)—Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.—Normal units this task force less 2 SS and 1 ASR to *Task Force Ten* and 1 SS to *Task Force Three*.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force).—Non-operative as such; normal units thereof being divided between *Task Forces One* and *Two*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force)—Commander Base Force.—Normal units this task force plus any units transferred from other forces for escort duty West Coast-Hawaii less 1 AO to *Task Force Three*.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus units from other fleet forces when and if the Commander-in-Chief directs transfer.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from *Task Force Nine*.

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from *Task Force Nine* plus 2 SS and 1 ASR from *Task Force Seven*.

[63] 1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and III of Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding against attack by Japan.

3. (a) *Task Force One*.—(1) When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the Navy Basic Plan.

(2) Perform the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(b) *Task Force Two*.—(1) Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(c) *Task Force Three*.—(1) Maintain the patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(2) Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.

(3) Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan for capture of Eniwetok.

[64] (4) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).—(1) Transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).—(1) Maintain patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(2) Assign one submarine division to *Task Force Three* as required for landing attack training.

(3) Transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaska sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.

(f) *Task Force Eight*. (Mining Force).—(1) Continue training under Commander *Task Force One*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).—(1) Provide logistic services to the Fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases.

[65] (2) Perform tasks required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(3) Maintain in the Office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the Fleet, the loading of Base Force and Naval Transportation Service vessels, and the routing and protection of United States and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned.

(2) Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton is authorized. Assist as practicable in the development of Samoa and Guam.

(3) Make the facilities of the outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in the vicinity and cooperate with Commanders of Mobile Forces in coordinating the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV).

(4) Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and Canton.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Perform tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[66] (j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).—

(1) Perform tasks assigned by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(x) (1) Units in the Hawaiian area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor within four days of date of execution of this Plan; units designated for early operations complete mobilization prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.

(2) Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

(3) Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating with the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers while within the limits of those frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese Forces.

(4) Continue such training activities of the Fleet as the Commander-in-Chief may direct.

(5) Reenforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.

(6) Protect the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, the operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other operations as directed by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor, on the West Coast, and as specially provided for in the Annexes.

5. (a) Communications in accordance with U. S. F. Seventy, as modified by Annex III.

(b) Use Greenwich Civil Time.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[68] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

Section 2. Phase IA

Tentative

United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Place
Date.

Operation Plan No. 1A-R5.

Initial task organization

(See Basic Fleet Plan for normal organization.)

(a) *Task Force One*. Commander Battle Force.—Normal units this task force less any cruiser absent on patrol with *Task Force Three* less 1 CV and all other large CL's to *Task Force Two* for reconnaissance of MARSHALLS.

(b) *Task Force Two*. Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus 1 CV and available CL's (approximately 4) from *Task Force One* plus 1 CV from *Task Force Three* less any cruiser absent on patrol with *Task Force Three*.

(c) *Task Force Three*. Commander Scouting Force.—Same as for Plan 1-R5 less 1 CV to *Task Force Two* less 1 SS and 1 AO from SAMC to their respective normal task forces plus 1 AO from *Task Force Six* at sea.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) Senior Officer. Present Scouting Force, HAWAIIAN AREA).—Same as for Operation Plan 1

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PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATIONS PLANS—PHASES I AND

Section 2. Phase IA

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force) Commander Submarine Force.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5
plus 1 SS returned from *Task Force Three*.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force)

Non-operative as such, normal units thereof being detached
Forces One and Two at end of Phase I and on commencement
IA being transferred to *Task Force Four*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force) Commander Base

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5,
plus 1 AO returned from *Task Force Three*
less 2 AO transferred to *Task Force Two*
less 1 AO transferred to *Task Force Three*.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) Command
tenth Naval District.

Normal units this task force
plus all units of Minecraft, Battle Force.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) Com
Twelfth Naval District.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) Com
Thirteenth Naval District.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

1. Information, Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and
Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

[70] 2. This Fleet, while protecting the sea communications and
the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area, and supporting the operat
British Navy south of the equator as far west as Longitude one hundr
degrees East, will:

(a) Conduct an initial sweep with light forces and aircraft agai
merchant ships and raiders.

(b) Raid Japanese communications to westward of NANPO SH
cruisers.

(c) Patrol Japanese homeland with submarines.

(d) Conduct a reconnaissance and raid against the MARSHALLS,
divert Japanese forces away from MALAYSIA, and to prepare for the
the MARSHALL-CAROLINE area.

3. (a) *Task Force One*.

(1) Perform task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex
Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(2) Reenforce and support operations of *Task Force Two* as requ
MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy
Rainbow Five).

(b) *Task Force Two*.

(1) Conduct Reconnaissance and Raid in force against the MARS
required in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (A
Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

[71] (c) *Task Force Three*.

(1) Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as
the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow

(2) Reenforce *Task Force Two* as required by the MARSHALL Rec
and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) Move from SAN DIEGO to HAWAII the remaining units and
of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exerc

(4) Continue preparations and training for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the MARSHALLS with particular emphasis on plan for capture of ENI-WETOK.

(5) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Subject to the specific tasks prescribed below, operate patrol planes in the HAWAIIAN Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.

[72] (2) Perform patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.

(4) Perform tasks assigned in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(5) Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid disproportionate losses.

(6) Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ squadron from Base Force) based on OAHU at all times. During the absence of major portions of the Fleet from the vicinity of OAHU, such squadrons may, at discretion, be temporarily transferred to Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).

(1) Continue patrol of two submarines each at WAKE and MIDWAY.

(2) Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese Homeland and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating conditions, giving stations the following priority:

YOKOHAMA
BUNGO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU

[73] (The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements for submarines to pass through that part of the Far Eastern Area in the NANSEI SHOTO as far south as Latitude twenty-eight degrees, thirty minutes North).

(3) Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces, including shipping, utilizing mines and torpedoes and, if appropriate, gunfire. Mining of Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. Specific authority for such mining will be issued later.

(4) Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force).

(1) Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the local defense forces during this Phase.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force).

(1) Continue general logistic support of Fleet and assistance to outlying bases.

(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five), and the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5, with regard for the probable increase in enemy activities.

[74] (i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5 with regard for the probable increase in enemy activities.

(2) Perform the tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

4. Logistic replenishment at PEARL HARBOR, on the West Coast, and as specially provided for in the Annexes.

5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Rainbow Five.

(b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief
U. S. Pacific Fleet

[I-1]

ANNEX I

United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA
Place
Date

Patrol and Sweeping Plan
No.

INITIAL TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) Task Force One.
 - (b) Task Force Two.
 - (c) Task Force Three.
 - (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
 - (e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force).
 - (f) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force).
 - (g) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).
 - (h) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).
 - (i) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).
- (Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1-R5.)

1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.

2.

Phase I

This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

- [I-2] (a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa;
- (b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.
 - (c) Covering.
 - (d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
 - (e) Routing shipping.

Phase IA

This Fleet will: (a) continue the operations of Phase I, except as modified which will be modified or discontinued as necessary in order to carry out prescribed offensive operations;

(b) attack enemy communications by making initial sweep for enemy merchant ships and raiders, and by raiding Japanese sea communications of Nanpo Shoto;

(c) reconnoiter and raid the Marshall Islands.

Subsequent Phases

This Fleet will: (a) continue operations of Phase I except as to patrols, further directives will be issued later.

3. (a) Task Force One.

(1) Cover territory, forces and shipping of the Associated Powers as directed.

[I-3] (2) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to Task Force Three for cruiser patrol pool; and be prepared to furnish, on order, other ships for a striking force, or both.

(3) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) conduct such sweep as information and circumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.

(b) *Task Force Two.*

(1) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to *Task Force Three* for cruiser patrol pool. (In case of detachment of Atlantic reinforcement this subparagraph is inapplicable).

(2) Be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or a striking force, or both.

(3) Develop contacts made by patrol planes from Oahu if vessels of *Task Force Three* are not within supporting distance of such contacts.

(4) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) conduct such sweep as information and circumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.

(c) *Task Force Three*, reinforced with one cruiser each from *Task Forces One and Two* (for cruiser patrol pool), *NARWHAL* or *NAUTILUS* from *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force), and one oiler from *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force), also further reinforced by one squadron of patrol planes and tenders from *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) (by request on Commander *Task Force Nine*) when the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilities there permit:

(1) Patrol against enemy units that may attack own and allied communication lines, operating in general as follows:

[I-4] (a) Maintain two cruisers (one, if Atlantic Reinforcement is detached) on patrol between Hawaii and the Pacific Coast in areas more than five hundred miles from land. Reserve such ships either in Hawaii or on Pacific Coast.

(b) (i) Maintain two cruisers, two destroyers, one submarine and one oiler in the South Pacific based on Samoa, normally keeping one cruiser on patrol within one thousand miles of Samoa along routes to New Zealand.

(ii) When the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilitates there permit, request from Commander *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) assignment of a patrol squadron and tenders; and advance it into that area for operations.

(iii) Coordinate activities of unit operating in the South Pacific with British naval forces as far west as longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East as the situation at the time makes expedient; and in accordance with such directives as may from time to time be issued.

(c) Maintain one cruiser, based on Midway, on patrol to the northward of the Midway-Marianas line, in the vicinity of trans-Pacific trade routes.

(2) Upon commencement of Phase IA, dispatch two heavy cruisers in company to raid Japanese communications westward of the Nanpo Shoto, and return to base when fuel situation or other circumstances require. Arrange directly with Commander *Task Force Six* for fueling such cruisers at or near Midway on outward passage and on return as may be feasible. The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, concerning the utilization of the portion of the Far Eastern Area involved.

[I-5] (3) Upon commencement of Phase IA, discontinue patrols required by paragraph 3 (c) (1) and sweep for enemy merchant ships, operating along the following general lines:

(a) Samoa based cruisers and destroyers sweep northward to latitude twenty thence to rendezvous designated by Task Force Commander for operations in conjunction with the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1). Other Samoa based units rejoin their normal commands.

(b) Cruisers on patrol between West Coast and Hawaii sweep or search for specific enemy merchantmen, as Task Force Commander may require enroute to rendezvous designated by him for operations in conjunction with Marshall Raid.

(c) Other available units conduct maximum practicable sweep in general area bounded by Hawaiian Island chain, latitude forty-six North, and longitudes one hundred sixty-seven West and one hundred eighty; such sweep to occupy about six days, and to begin on or as soon after J-day as possible.

(d) Units operating in the foregoing northerly area originate radio traffic to indicate an advance toward Japan via a northern route.

(4) (a) Upon completion of sweep directed in subparagraph (3) (c) above, rendezvous with oiler supplied by *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force) in latitude twenty-seven North, and one hundred seventy-eight West, or other rendezvous you may have designated. Fuel and proceed to join *Task Force Two* (Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan, Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) on twelve J-day at rendezvous Tare in latitude sixteen North, longitude one hundred seventy-seven East or other designated time and rendezvous.

(b) If any units will be delayed in joining *Task Force Two*, advise commander thereof as to the extent of the delay.

[I-6] (c) If conflict of tasks exists, operations against inferior enemy within striking distance take precedence over joining *Task Force Two*.

(5) If Atlantic Reinforcement is detached, assign two heavy cruisers to *Task Force Two*. (In such event the assignment of one cruiser from *Task Force Three*, hitherto mentioned will, of course, not be made).

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep plane conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to west of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the bases. The threat and the situation at the time makes practicable.

(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander *Task Force Three*, to transfer patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the Pacific.

(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces encountered during initial sweep of Phase IA.

[I-7] (8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1).

(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent consistent with assigned tasks, with other forces thereat. Be guided by principle of command relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan O-1.

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).

(1) Maintain two submarines on patrol at Wake and two at Midway to receive information and for attack on enemy units approaching those places.

(2) Be prepared, if Commander-in-Chief directs, during Phase I to make observations, by submerged submarines from outside the three-mile probable radar bases in the Japanese Mandates.

(3) At commencement of Phase IA, or earlier if so directed, establish off the Japanese homeland as prescribed in the basic Fleet Plan.

(4) Route submarines advancing to westward for patrols so as to confront. Coordinate such routing with other patrol and sweeping operations including that prescribed for cruisers in the area westward of Nanpo Sh to avoid contact of submarines with own forces.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief and task force commanders concerned as to location and routes of own submarines.

(6) Transfer NAUTILUS or NARWHAL to *Task Force Three* for operations in South Pacific during Phase I.

(f) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).

(1) Through liaison with Commanders of *Task Force Five* (Pacific Fleet) and *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Fleet) [I-8] Naval Coastal Frontier that routing of shipping is in accordance with general directives of Commander-in-Chief and is coordinated with the protection offered by Fleet and with the routing and protective measures of the British in the South Pacific.

(2) Escort important ships or convoys by using combatant vessels enroute or from the West Coast and Hawaii, which vessels are made available for such purpose. If escort is found necessary and suitable vessels will be not by modifying schedules of escorts or convoys, make suitable representation to the Commander-in-Chief as far in advance as possible.

(3) During Phase I maintain one oiler at Samoa to operate under Command of *Task Force Three*.

(4) Provide oiler to fuel at sea units of *Task Force Three* on eight degrees latitude twenty-seven North, Longitude one hundred seventy-eight West, at time and place designated by commander of that Task Force.

(5) See also oiler requirements under Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1).

(g) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Coordinate, as practicable, patrol in coastal zone with patrols by other forces.

(2) Through liaison with Commander *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Coastal Force) and Commander *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) coordinate routing and escort of shipping in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier with that in the Fleet Control Zone, when and if established, and in the general Pacific Area.

[I-9] (h) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Coordinate routing of shipping with the protection afforded by Fleet forces and by British forces in accordance with current situation, and with general directives that may be issued by the Commander-in-Chief.

(2) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.

(3) In the initial stages of Phase IA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable.

(i) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.

(2) In initial stages of Phase IA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable. It is especially desired to cover until eight J-Day UNIMAK PASS and the maximum area to the southward of Dutch Harbor that daily flights and available planes will permit.

(x) (1) This plan effective simultaneously with Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

[I-10] (2) All task forces make available to Commander *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force) for escort duty, all ships enroute between Hawaii and West Coast.

(3) Destroy enemy combatant ships encountered.

(4) Capture or destroy enemy merchant ships encountered.

(5) Investigate neutral merchant ships encountered; send them to port for adjudication if investigation warrants; or if necessary and permissible under international law, destroy them. (See "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare").

(6) Seize any opportunity to inflict disproportionate damage on the enemy, modifying or discontinuing plans in operations if necessary in order to do so.

(7) Disseminate pertinent information to other Task Force Commanders as conditions of radio silence and other circumstances permit.

(8) Aircraft attempt, without taking undue risk, to force merchant ships to the vicinity of supporting surface vessels or to United States' ports.

(9) This plan effective with Navy Plan O-1.

(10) Be prepared to transfer units of Southeast Pacific Force and Atlantic Reinforcement on short notice. So employ such units that if transferred they can reach Canal Zone within twenty-one days. If transferred, such units proceed along routes and conduct such sweeps as the Commander-in-Chief may prescribe.

(11) Continue such training as these and other prescribed operations permit.

[I-11] 4. Logistics as in Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

5. Provisions of Part V Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five apply.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[II-1]

ANNEX II

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA
Place
Date

*Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan No. ———**Initial Task Organization.*

- (a). *Task Force One.*
- (b). *Task Force Two.*
- (c). *Task Force Three.*
- (d). *Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).*
- (e). *Task Force Seven (Undersea Force).*
- (f). *Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force).*

Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1A-

1. (a) *Information.*—(1) This plan covers the initial operation of the MARSHALLS for carrying out the basic task of diverting Japan away from the MALAY BARRIER through the denial and capture in the MARSHALLS.

2. This force will:

(a) Reconnoiter the MARSHALLS, particularly ENIWETOK, prior to a raid in force and to eventual capture, in order to develop the most effective defenses and material installations therein.

(b) Raid the MARSHALLS with ships and aircraft and small landings in order to destroy enemy mobile forces, fixed defenses and facilities.

[II-2] 3. (a) *Task Force One.*—(1) Transfer available large landing ship and carrier to *Task Force Two* on J-Day.

(2) About Five J-Day, depart PEARL HARBOR with remainder of force to rendezvous with *Task Force Two* at Point Tare on Eniwetok. If delay in arriving at rendezvous is in prospect, advise Commander *Task Force Two*, of the probable time of arrival. Transmit any such message to the PEARL HARBOR area, if possible. Sweep as required by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) If the Commander-in-Chief is not present upon making the raid, the Commander *Task Force One* assume general charge of all further operations in connection with this reconnaissance and raid, and direct Commander *Task Force Two* to commence the raid at a suitable time after he has reported ready.

(4) Upon making rendezvous, assume command of battleships of *Task Force Two*.

(5) Cover operations of *Task Force Two*, as reinforced, from the northward of the MARSHALLS, furnishing such support to that for operations require, and keeping its commander informed as to the local situation. Detail escorts for any damaged ships of *Task Force Two* to be necessary to return to base.

(6) Utilize security offered by operations of patrol planes at Wake Island. [II-3] (7) After *Task Force Two* has completed raids and reconnoitered, if Commander-in-Chief is not present, Commander *Task Force One* conduct further operations of a similar nature or conduct the combined forces in PEARL HARBOR at discretion.

(b) *Task Force Two*, reinforced as provided in this plan, reconnoiter the MARSHALLS, carrying out the following approximate procedure:

(1) On One J-Day, unless otherwise directed, depart PEARL HARBOR with reinforcements provided by this Plan and proceed toward TAONGI and destroyer screen at fifteen knots, remainder of force at twenty knots along the route in accordance with Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to O-1, Rainbow Five) and furnish security as practicable to *Task Force One*. Furnish destroyer escort to oilers as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) (1).

(2) Five J-Day, fuel the advance group from oilers at Rendezvous Point other designated rendezvous.

(3) Six J-Day to Nine J-Day reconnoiter the MARSHALLS as follows:

(i) Reconnoiter by air such atolls as weather conditions, forces, time permit, giving particular attention to ENIWETOK, BIKIN, LAP, WOTJE, JALUIT, KWAJALEIN, MALOELAP and ARADAP. Reconnoiter ENIWETOK particularly with a view to an early attack for information.

[II-4] (ii) So conduct reconnaissance as to leave the enemy in doubt as to what further reconnaissance is about to be undertaken, or as to what particular places may be attacked.

(iii) Supplement air reconnaissance by reconnaissance from surface units and by landing patrols, and raid with forces immediately available if the situation and developments at the time indicate that such supplementary action is desirable and feasible.

(iv) Utilize both photographic and visual observations to determine as accurately as practicable the opposition that may be expected to raids and landing parties; and the targets suitable for air and surface bombardment. Of particular interest are:

- ships and aircraft;
- storage tanks;
- power plants and radio installations;
- docks;
- air fields;
- storehouses and other buildings;
- guns and observation posts;
- mines;
- channel and beach obstructions;
- other defense installations;
- beaches suitable for landing operations;
- extent of anchorage area;
- hydrographic, topographic, and meteorological features.

(v) Retire on own battleships or *Task Force One* for assistance should circumstances require.

(vi) Operate battleship group to furnish support as necessary.

(vii) Unless persistent bad weather or other unforeseen developments prevent, adjust operations to complete reconnaissance in four days or less after making initial flights over enemy territory.

[II-5] (viii) Upon the completion of reconnaissance, withdraw to join *Task Forces One and Three*. Transfer battleships to *Task Force One*. *Task Force Three* will merge into *Task Force Two* at this time.

(ix) Study and analyze information gained in reconnaissance; determine upon the atolls to be raided and the specific objectives for attack. Complete final plans therefor, with due regard for subparagraph (4) below, and issue to those concerned. Via destroyer, furnish the Commander, *Task Force One* and the Commander-in-Chief, if present, with information and aerial photographs obtained, and copy of raiding plan.

(x) Report by visual (or by destroyer if out of signal distance) to the Commander-in-Chief, if he is within the general area, otherwise to the Commander, *Task Force One*, the time it is desired to place the raiding plan into effect.

(4) Beginning about Thirteen J-Day, when directed, carry out the raiding plan. In preparing and carrying out the raiding plan, be guided by the following:

(i) Make such additional air reconnaissance immediately prior to attack as best meets the existing situation.

(ii) Attack the selected objectives with air and surface forces, the scheme of attack being at the discretion of the Task Force Commander and designed to provide the best economy of force. Avoid directing enemy attention in advance to the objectives of attack.

[II-6] (iii) The priority of objectives is as follows:

- combatant ships, tenders, and aircraft;
- other ships;
- fuel tanks;
- power and radio installations;
- troop concentrations;
- storehouses;
- other installations.

(iv) Except in unusual circumstances, no vessel expend more than twenty-five per cent of bombs or ammunition on *fixed* objectives.

(v) Where conditions appear favorable, land personnel to demolish installations and eliminate enemy personnel.

(vi) Do not enter lagoons with ships.

(vii) Make suitable arrangements for the protection of and withdrawal of damaged ships, requesting escorts from *Task Force One*.

(viii) If sufficient weakly held positions are developed to warrant to carry them out, otherwise discontinue raids at discretion and join *Task Force Two*.

(c) *Task Force Three*.—(1) If Atlantic Reinforcement has been transferred two heavy cruisers at PEARL HARBOR to *Task Force Two*.

(2) If carrier is available, assign it to *Task Force Two* for this operation J-Day.

[II-7] (3) While in the Northern Pacific carrying out the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) employ radio intercept as to intentions in the MARSHALLS.

(4) If available, assign combat unit of about one hundred fifty marine aircraft which will eventually join *Task Force Two*.

(5) Upon completion of the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan about Ten J-Day, join *Task Force Two* with cruisers and destroyers at or other designated rendezvous. Thereafter operate as part of *Task Force Two* until released upon completion of the raiding operation of this plan.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) coordinate operations of patrol with those of other forces as follows:

(1) Prior to Five J-Day advance maximum practicable patrol planes to WAKE, MIDWAY, and JOHNSTON, leaving not less than two squadrons at OAHU.

(2) JOHNSTON-based planes, during passage of units of other forces westward, search along the route of advance from the vicinity of J to longitude one hundred seventy-eight degrees west.

(3) MIDWAY-based planes search sectors to the southwestward of Johnston to prevent surprise attack across that sector on units operating in the MARSHALLS.

[II-8] (4) WAKE-based planes make preliminary air reconnaissance of TAONGI and BIKAR on Five J-Day, or as soon thereafter as practicable, acquaint Commander *Task Force Two* with the results. Thereafter, to the extent that available planes and supplies will permit, conduct surprise attack from the westward by enemy surface forces on own units toward the MARSHALLS.

(5) On completion of the raiding operations of *Task Force Two* resume operations as required by paragraph 3242b. of the Fleet Operating Plan.

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).—No primary tasks in connection with this plan are assigned but:

(1) Submarines which may have been in the MARSHALLS in connection with the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) to obtain enemy information obtained.

(2) While en route to patrol stations to the westward:

(i) Seize opportunities to damage important enemy units.

(ii) Avoid contacts with own forces.

(iii) Force Commander keep other forces advised of location and movements of submarines.

(f) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force). Despatch two oilers out the following:

(1) Proceed on J-Day with destroyer escort provided by Commander *Task Force Two*, to rendezvous with the advance group of *Task Force Two* at Point Tare, or as directed by Commander *Task Force Two*.

[II-9] (2) Thereafter conduct fueling and proceed as directed by Commander *Task Force Two*.

(x) (1) Seize every opportunity to damage the enemy, but avoid action at a disadvantage.

(2) Be alert to detect and destroy enemy mobile forces, particularly expeditions which may be directed at our outlying islands.

(3) Restrict the use of radio to a minimum.

(4) This plan effective simultaneously with the execution of Part 4 of U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).

4. (a) Fuel from oiler as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) above.

(b) Fuel destroyers from large ships at discretion of force and group commander.

(c) Logistic support for submarines and patrol planes as in U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).

5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan (Rainbow Five).

(b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.

(c) Rendezvous Tare: Latitude sixteen degrees North; Longitude one hundred seventy-seven degrees East.

(d) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised as to his location.

Admiral,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[III-1]

ANNEX III

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Communication Plan No. 1, Rainbow Five

USF-70 effective as modified herein. The numbered parts, sections, and paragraphs of USF-70 listed are effective in toto, or as indicated. Omitted numbered parts, sections, or paragraphs are not effective unless specifically made so by Task Force Commanders by supplementary communication plans.

1110. Effective.

1120. Effective. Unless otherwise directed this communication plan is effective coincident with the placing in effect of Navy Plan O-1 Rainbow Five.

1170 to 1178. Effective.

1179. Effective. The above procedure shall be used for Radar contact reports.

No receiver not supplied by Bureau of Ships shall be used for this or any other purpose until it has been thoroughly tested to assure that it does not transmit a carrier from its oscillating circuit.

1180. Effective.

1190. Effective.

1212. Effective.

1220. Effective.

1330. Allied communications in Pacific Area are governed by SP 02376; in the Eastern Theater by current Andus publications.

[III-2] 2120. Condition 19 effective.

2131. Effective.

2200. The radio frequency plans are as set forth in Appendix B, USF-70, except that Naval Coastal Frontier Defense Communication Plans will be governed by Article 4005, 1(a) of WPDNC-46.

No transmission shall be made on 500 kcs. frequency without the authority of the O. T. C. of a Task Force.

When the O. T. C. of a Task Force or component at sea considers that the risk is justified by the importance of the traffic concerned he may transmit traffic to the nearest shore radio station that guards the Naval Calling Frequency (355 kc) or to Radio Washington or Honolulu on the 4235 kc series. He shall not, except in extreme emergency and when he is sure that the situation justifies the risk, answer calls or receive traffic on 355 kc, except by interception.

The various circuit guards required shall be so disposed as to permit the maximum number of ships to set watches on the radio direction finder, underwater listening equipment and other intelligence equipment as directed by Task Force Commanders.

The Senior Commander of Units from different task organizations operating in the same area shall arrange for rapid means of inter-communications, preferably by available shore stations. Task Organization Commander in a port or operating area shall establish an area radio frequency for use under circumstances when visual systems will not serve. In port radio shall not be used [III-3] for inter-communication or communication with shore when a visual link or landline exists or may be established.

Guard NPM Primary Fox regardless of geographical position.

2300. Effective.

2400. Effective.

2510. CSP-1161 effective with this communication plan and shall be used in lieu of CSP-776 for Task Organization command traffic.

2520. Use effective Confidential Radio Call Sign lists and ciphers for administrative traffic.

2540. Effective.

2720. Effective.

2740. Effective.

3000. Effective.

4120. Effective.

5000. Effective.

5230. Until receipt of satisfactory radio recognition device for all following approach and recognition procedure shall govern the approach of aircraft to either units of the Fleet or Naval outlying island bases. special procedure will be prescribed for major bases and areas.

Aircraft approach from outside of gun range in simple cruising for more than one plane) on bearing 045° T. or 225° T. [III-4] or (GCT), and 135° T. or 315° T. on even days (GCT), from center of formation station at 1000 feet or under. (These bearings may be changed if no local authorities.) They shall never approach from the bearing on the the sun is low.

If station does not recognize plane as friendly it challenges by making searchlight, or by training searchlight with red filter on plane if available at shore bases use a red smoke bomb during daylight and a red rocket.

On seeing challenge plane, or leading plane if there is a formation, follows:

(a) *Daytime*.—On odd day of the month (GCT), leave formation, circle right and, when back on the approach course, dip right wing twice, on (GCT), leave formation, circle to the left and, when back on approach course, dip left wing twice. This must be made distinctive, dipping the wing 45 degrees to the prescribed side and returning to horizontal after each dip.

(b) *Nighttime*.—Turn on running lights and proceed as for daytime challenge, except circling may be omitted; or make emergency identification by pyrotechnic signal prescribed in effective CSP.

When approaching aircraft are recognized as friendly, the recognition stations shall [III-5] train on the approaching aircraft a powerful searchlight or make "Fs" or show green colored light. Those signals indicate to planes that they are recognized as friendly and will not be fired on.

In a Fleet formation the recognition stations will be, unless otherwise directed, those ships on the outer circle closest to approach bearings 045° T. or 135° T. and 315° T. (depending on the day) from Fleet center.

0131. Effective.

6200. Effective.

6400. Effective.

6500. Effective.

6810. Effective.

7000 (less 7100). Effective.

[IV-1]

ANNEX IV

Command relationships and coordination of activities at outlying bases

1. Forces operating from outlying stations or bases, under this annex, consist, broadly, of the following:

(a) Local Defense Forces, consisting of the local garrison and the local forces (which may include submarines and aircraft especially designated for defense purpose), operating under the direct control of the base or station commander and with the primary mission of defending the base or station against attack.

(b) Fleet forces consisting of submarines, airplanes and possibly surface vessels or detachments, operating under a fleet task force commander or commander of whose missions, while contributing indirectly to local defense, are dictated by broader strategical and tactical considerations in connection with other operations.

2. Command relationships, under these conditions, will be governed by the following:

(a) The base or station commander will, normally, command and coordinate the operations of local defense forces, in accordance with the directive of the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District). This base commander, a task group commander under the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, who is himself a task force commander, the Commander-in-Chief, may, on occasion, also have functions of coordination in connection with Fleet units in the vicinity.

(b) Fleet forces will, normally, be operated in accordance with directives of their respective Fleet task organization commanders. In entrance and egress, use of facilities, arrangements for berthing and services, etc., they will conform to and be guided by the local regulations.

(c) In the event of contact with enemy forces which may threaten the base, or the forces operating [IV-2] therefrom or in connection therewith, the senior officer present in the base area will assume command of all forces and activities in the vicinity as necessary to take appropriate action against the threatening enemy. As it is entirely possible that such procedure may temporarily divert Fleet forces from some broader task contemplated by their task force commanders of the Commander-in-Chief, local commanders must bear this in mind and reduce such diversion to a minimum. They must also, within the limits of the information available to them, and as permitted by the urgent local situation, so direct any action taken by Fleet units under their temporary command, as to further the broad operating plan in effect.

(d) To obviate to a maximum the difficulties which are inherent in the command and communication relationships at such bases, it will be necessary to insure that all interested commanders, including the commanders of bases concerned, are made information addressees of all appropriate plans, orders, and reports of enemy forces. Commanders of all forces within the area will ensure that the base or station commander, as well as the Senior Officer Present, is familiar with the general nature of their orders and with their general operations (unless specifically directed otherwise).

(e) In general, the question of command in such circumstances is covered by articles 801 and 1486, U. S. Navy Regulations.

(f) The shifting of vessels, squadrons, or other units within an area may result in consequent changes in seniority among those actually present.

3. (a) A Base Defense Plan and a supporting Communication Plan will be prepared under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. They must provide for the Fleet units present participating in the defense, and for adequate communications among the various fixed and mobile forces, both local and Fleet. Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier will furnish copies of such plans to appropriate fleet force commanders. [IV-2] The latter will, whenever practicable, supply copies to units of their command prior to departure for operations at the outlying base. A unit commander arriving in the area without receiving the plans in advance, however, will obtain them as soon as possible after arrival.

(b) The Base Defense Plan should be analogous to the one currently in effect for the Pearl Harbor area. The Senior Officer Present, in exercising his function of command (paragraph 2 (c) of this Annex) should normally conform to the Base plans.

(c) The Communication Plan should include provisions for:

(1) Inter-communication between units of the local defense forces, and between such forces and the local defense commander.

(2) Communication between local defense commanders and fleet task organization commanders.

(3) An area radio frequency which may be used within that area for both (1) and (2) above and for inter-communication between the fleet task organization commanders present.

EXHIBIT No. 17 (HART INQUIRY)

In reply refer to

Initials and No.

OP-30C1-AJ.

(SC) N20-12.

Serial 09380.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,

Washington, Feb. 15, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations

To: The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

1. Consideration has been given to the installation at A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among the following may be considered:

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present expect to drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 140 miles per hour. Desirable height for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is a success. This may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel barges, and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries which can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within the harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of the congestion.

3. As a matter of interest the successful attacks at Taranto were made at low launching heights at reported ranges by the individual aviators of 400 to 500 yards from the battleships, but the depths of water in which the torpedoes launched were between 14 and 15 fathoms. The attacks were made in the face of intensive and apparently erratic anti-aircraft fire. The eastern shore anchorage and moorings were protected by numerous balloon barrages, but there was no trawler borne balloon barrage to the west. The torpedoes were dropped inside of the nets, probably A/T nets.

4. It is considered that certain large bays and harbors, where a fleet of heavy ships may be anchored and exposed with a large body of water on one entire flank, should have that flank protected by a series of baffles if the water is deep enough for launching torpedoes. The main fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow, for instance, has an A/T net extending slightly to the north of a line between Flotta and Cava Island protecting the main fleet anchorage. The water where this net is laid is approximately 17 fathoms. On the other hand, in constricted harbors, in which practically all available space is taken up by the ships, and which is relatively deep probably must depend upon other defenses. It might be possible and practicable to provide in some places, where not protected by relatively shallow water, anti-torpedo baffles practically insuring a limited number of berths or large ships, such as battleships or carriers. An extreme example of this is furnished at the present time by the French fleet where double nets surround the Richelieu; she is placed similarly as to the dock, and evidently would have to open a section of the net to be hauled out of the depth of water at Dakar, however, is very shallow.

5. The present A/T nets are very expensive, extremely heavy, the anchors and moorings take up about 200 yards of space perpendicular to the net, take a long time to lay, and are designed to stand up under heavy conditions. There is apparently a great need for the development of a portable torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within the harbors and which can be readily removed. It is hoped that some such device will be developed in the near future.

6. Recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief are desired.

(s) H. R.
H. R.

Copy to:

CinC Atlantic Fleet.
CinC Asiatic Fleet.

EXHIBIT No. 18 (HART INQUIRY)

CinC File No.
S81-5/0398

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
AT SEA, HAWAIIAN AREA, March 12, 1941.

Confidential

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

Reference: (a) CNO Conf. ltr. file OP-30C1-AJ (SC) N20-12 Serial 00830 of 15 Feb. 1941.

1. In view of the contents of reference (a), the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommends that until a light efficient net, that can be laid temporarily and quickly is developed, no A/T nets be supplied this area.

H. E. KIMMEL.

EXHIBIT No. 19 (HART INQUIRY)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 13, 1941.

Op-30C1-AJ
(SC)N20-12
Serial 055730

Confidential

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commandant, First Naval District.
The Commandant, Third Naval District.
The Commandant, Fourth Naval District.
The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.
The Commandant, Sixth Naval District.
The Commandant, Seventh Naval District.
The Commandant, Eighth Naval District.
The Commandant, Ninth Naval District.
The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.
The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.
The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

Reference: (a) CNO conf. ltr. Op-30C1 Serial 010230 of Feb. 17, 1941.

1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it can not be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be attacked can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered in any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (ten fathoms or more) is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Tientsin were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms.

R. E. INGRAM

Copy to CinCpac. CinClant. CinCaf. C. O. Naval Net Depot, Tiburon. Naval Net Depot, Newport. Comdt. NavSta, Guantanamo. Comdt. 1st Naval Air Station, Samoa. Buord. Op-12.

EXHIBIT No. 20 (HART INQUIRY)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington, 10 March

From: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer.

To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

Subject: Examination of witnesses for purpose of recording and preparing testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H. December, 1941.

Reference:

(a) Examining Officer's ltr. dated 17 February 1944 addressed to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

(b) Examining Officer's ltr. dated 4 March 1944 to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

1. As you were advised by reference (a), subject examination meeting was held at a. m., Tuesday, 7 March 1944. At that and subsequent meetings to date the following witnesses have appeared and testified before the Examining Officer:

Admiral C. C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, Retired
Commander Benjamin Katz, U. S. Navy
Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, U. S. Navy
Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, U. S. Navy
Rear Admiral W. S. Delany, U. S. Navy.

2. The Examining Officer intends to continue hearings on each week hereafter, in Room 2744, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., and to call the following members of the naval forces:

Vice Admiral W. S. Pye, U. S. Navy, Retired
Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy
Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. Navy
Rear Admiral A. C. Davis, U. S. Navy.

3. You are hereby advised of time and place of the meetings, as set forth above, and of the fact that you will be accorded the rights set forth in reference (a). You will be further advised of subsequent meetings, at which you will be entitled to the rights outlined in reference (a).

/s/ Thos. C. Hart
Thos. C. Hart

A true copy. Attest:

THOMAS C. HART,

Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired,
Examining Officer.

EXHIBIT No. 21 (HART INQUIRY)

[1]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.
A2-11/FF12/
A3/(12)
Serial 01772

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., October 31, 1941.

Confidential

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER 14CL-41

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject: Task Forces—Organization and Missions.
Reference:

- (a) Pacific Fleet Conf. Letter No. 4CL-41.
- (b) Cincpac Conf. Ltr. A4-3/FF12/(13) Serial 01254 of 13 Aug. 1941 (Furnished only to Type, Force and Task Force Comdrs. and CG, Second Marine Div).

1. Reference (a) is cancelled and superseded by this letter, effective 15 November 1941.

2. To provide for all phases of type, inter-type, and Fleet training, concurrently with performance of certain required patrol and escort duties, the following Task Force organizations are prescribed:

Task Force One (Commander Battle Force)

Batdivs TWO, FOUR	6 BB.
Cardiv ONE less LEXINGTON	1 CV.
Crudiv NINE	5 OL
Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE	1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD.
OGLALA, Mindiv ONE	1 CM, 4DM.

Primary Mission: To organize, train, and continue development of doctrine and tactics for operations of, and in the vicinity of, the Main Body; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and current plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient *Covering Force* available for supporting operations of other forces; or for engagement, with or without support, in fleet action.

Task Force Two (Commander Aircraft, Battle Force)

Batdiv ONE	3 BB.
Cardiv TWO	1 CV.
Crudiv FIVE	4 CA.
Desflot TWO	1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD.
Mindiv TWO	4 DM.

Primary Mission: To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for reconnoitering and raiding, with air or surface units, enemy objectives, particularly those on land; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient *Reconnoitering and Raiding Force* for testing the strength of enemy communication lines and positions and for making forays against the enemy, and for operations in conjunction with other forces.

[2] *Task Force Three (Commander Scouting Force)*

Crudivs FOUR, SIX	8 CA.
LEXINGTON plus Marine Air Group 21	1 CV.
Desron FIVE	1 DL, 8 DD.
Minron TWO	13 DMS.
Trainron FOUR	A AP.
2nd Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment.	

Primary Mission: To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for capturing enemy land objectives, particularly fortified atolls; to keep normal arrangements and plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the force in order to provide an efficient *Amphibious Force* for attack, with the support of other forces, on outlying positions of the enemy.

Task Force Four (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District)

That part of Fourteenth Naval District Activities which involve Island Bases.

Primary Mission: To organize, train, and develop the Island Bases to insure their own defense and provide efficient services to Fleet units for advanced operations.

Task Force Seven (Commander Submarines, Scouting Force)

Subron FOUR less Subdiv FORTY-ONE-----	1 SM, 8 SS, 1 AS, 1 DD.
Subron SIX-----	12 SS, 1 AS.
*Subron EIGHT-----	6 SS, 1 AS.
*Subron TEN-----	4 SS, 1 AS.

*Upon reporting.

Primary Missions: (1) To organize, train and, concurrently with the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics to provide an efficient *Submarine Observation and Attack Force* for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces.

(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander in-Chief, United States Fleet in order to improve security of Fleet units.

Task Force Nine (Commander Patrol Wing Two)

Patwing ONE-----	36 VPB(A), 1 AV, 1 AVP.
Patwing TWO-----	42 VPB(A), 2 AV, 1 AVP.

[3] **Primary Missions:** (1) To organize, train and, concurrently with the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide an efficient long range *Air Scouting and Air Strike Force* for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces.

(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet in order to improve security of Fleet units and bases.

Task Force Fifteen (Commander Base Force)

Units assigned----- 4 CA or CL

Primary Mission: To escort trans-pacific shipping in order to protect Pacific shipping against possible attack.

3. Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO, and THREE, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to the organization, training, and operations of their respective Task Forces. In addition, they will control the time of day for Task Force and Type exercises, in the at sea exercise period, and employment schedules of their respective Task Forces. The relations of the Commanders to the Task Force Commanders, in matters relating to operations, will be the same as now exist between Type Commanders and Force Commanders.

4. Commander Task Force FOUR, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to organization, training, and development of the Island Bases.

5. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to organization, training, expansion, and operations of their respective Task Forces. They will issue orders for and control the conduct of prescribed patrols. In addition, they will control the time of day within their respective Task Forces to operations (including inter-type training) and upkeep, with due regard to sufficiency of personnel in maintaining material conditions of readiness for war service.

6. Commander Task Force FIFTEEN, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to organization and operations of his Task Force. Presently, cruisers will be assigned to this Task Force in rotation in the proportion of one each from Cruiser Divisions FOUR, FIVE, SIX, and SEVEN, insofar as overhaul schedules and other circumstances permit. The

westbound convoys will be formed on the West Coast by the Commandant Twelfth Naval District or in the Hawaiian Area by the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, depending on circumstances. Eastbound convoys will be formed in the Manila Area by the Commandant Sixteenth Naval District. Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will provide liaison between the three District Commandants and Commander Task Force FIFTEEN, furnishing information as to makeup, schedules, and routing of convoys. Commander Task Force FIFTEEN will issue the orders for and supervise the conduct of escort duties. Cruisers assigned to the Escort Force but not actually engaged in escort duty will be available to their respective Type Commanders for routine training and upkeep.

7. Force and Type Commanders will continue to exercise other functions as now assigned, and as required by U. S. Navy Regulations and basic instructions.

8. Unless already covered by appropriate publications, Task Force Doctrines and Current Tactical Orders for Task Forces shall be prepared and issued in tentative form. As soon as they have been sufficiently tested they shall be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for final approval.

9. Units of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, not specifically detailed to the Task Forces appearing herein, will remain under the Force Commanders as at present.

[4] 10. *Communications.* Effective with the organization set forth in this letter:

(a) Units in Task Organizations, while at sea or away from Pearl Harbor, shall use the effective Task Force frequency plans, except,

(1) Island Base shore radio stations guard 4265 series.

(2) Units of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE ordered to patrol in vicinity of Island Bases guard 4265 series.

(3) In Task Forces FOUR, SEVEN, and NINE, certain *Task Group* designations are assigned additional geographical area significance, as follows:

1. Midway
2. Wake
3. Johnston
4. Palmyra

in order that other components of the Fleet and Fourteenth Naval District forces may know automatically how to communicate with the forces present in those areas.

Example:

Task Group 4.1—District Activities at Midway.

7.1—Submarine Patrol at Midway.

9.1—Patrol Planes operating from Midway.

(b) Units of each task organization, when in port, will guard and use harbor circuit (2562 kcs. currently in use in Pearl Harbor) and such other circuits as may be prescribed. Senior Officer Present Afloat will also guard the harbor circuit, and establish communication, preferably by visual or landline, with the nearest shore command activity.

11. *Schedules.* Current employment schedules for Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE, and units not assigned to Task Forces, remain in effect except for units transferred to Task Forces SEVEN and NINE by this letter. Assignment to Task Force FIFTEEN will be indicated in the Task Force ONE, TWO and THREE schedules. Commanders Task Force SEVEN and NINE submit revised schedules for the period 15 November to 31 December 1941, at the earliest practicable date. For the present, required inter-type training of submarines and patrol planes with surface types will be limited to the Fleet Tactical periods listed in reference (b). Commanders Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will, if practicable, have at least two divisions of submarines and two squadrons of patrol planes available for each of these Fleet Tactical periods. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will include in their schedules joint arrangements for exercises between patrol planes and submarines in recognition signals, visual and radio communications, and coordinated tactics. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will also arrange for inter-type training in addition to that required during Fleet Tactical periods by mutual agreement with Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO, and THREE during the regular at sea operating periods of the surface Task Forces.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Distribution: (5CM-41)

List II, Case 1: A, X, EN1, EN3, NA12, ND11AC, ND11-12-13-14, NY8-10, (A1-Asiatic, A1-Atlantic).

P. C. CROSBY,

Flag Secretary.

EXHIBIT No. 22 (HART INQUIRY)

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

AND NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

S-A16-3/A7-3(3)/ND14

(0410)

Secret

From: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor.

Reference: (a) Correspondence between the Secretaries of War on this subject dated 24 January 1941 and 7 February 1941.

Inclosures:

- (A) Copies of two joint letters HHD-14ND dated 14 February 1941
- (B) Annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan
- (C) Joint Estimate by Commander Hawaiian Air Force and C Naval Base Defense Air Force.

1. In connection with reference (a) there are enclosed herewith for information copies of the principal directives issued in cooperation with Army authorities in accordance with which operation plans have been put into effect, and are in process of test and improvement, to provide joint defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Hawaiian waters against surprise raids or air attacks.

2. Inclosure (A), two joint letters HHD-14ND dated 14 February 1941 stated study by joint committees of Army and Navy officers of the joint plan for the defense which were mentioned in reference (a), and also included additional problems which were raised by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

3. Inclosure (B), Annex No. VII of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is a new joint agreement with the local Army authorities which pertains to security measures. Section II in particular relates to joint air operations.

4. Inclosure (C), Joint Estimate by Commander Hawaiian Air Force and Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, serves as the basis of joint operation orders which have been issued, placed in effect, and are in process with a view to improvement in their effectiveness.

5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

6. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not be delivered to the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

C. C. F

C. C.

Copy to:

CinCPac (less inclosures)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 20, 1941.

Op-30B2-BP
(SC) A7-2(2)/FF1
Serial 069230
Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commandants, All Naval Districts.
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

Subject: Joint Security Measures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base.

Enclosure: (A) Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information. Attention is invited to the importance of the problems presented in the subject matter.
2. Transmission by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized.

/s/ H. R. STARK.

Copy to: Op-12

EXHIBIT No. 23 (HART INQUIRY)

Op-12B-2-McC
(SC) A7-2(2)/FF1
Serial 087712
D-30798

Secret—Memorandum

JUNE 11, 1941.

From: The Director, War Plans Division.

To: The Director, Naval Districts Division.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor.

Enclosure: (A) Com14 secret letter (0410) S-A16-3/A7-3(3) ND14 of May 1, 1941, with enclosures.

1. Enclosure (A) should have been routed direct to the Director, Naval Districts Division for action.
2. It is recommended that copies of enclosure (A) be forwarded to all Commandants of Naval Districts, to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, for use in the preparation of similar plans, and in the holding of joint exercises. It will be noted that copies have been furnished the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

R. K. TURNER.

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

AND NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

S-A16-3/A7-3(3)/ND14
(0410)

1 MAY 1941.

Secret

From: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor.

Reference: (a) Correspondence between the Secretaries of War and Navy on this subject dated 24 January 1941 and 7 February 1941.

Inclosures: (A) Copies of two joint letters HHD-14ND dated 14 February 1941.

(B) Annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (JCD-42).

(C) Joint Estimate by Commander Hawaiian Air Force and Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

1. In connection with reference (a) there are enclosed herewith for your information copies of the principal directives issued in cooperation with the local

Army authorities in accordance with which operation plans have been prepared, put into effect, and are in process of test and improvement, to provide for the joint defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters against surprise raids or air attacks.

2. Inclosure (A), two joint letters HHD-14ND dated 14 February 1941, initiated study by joint committees of Army and Navy officers of the joint problems of the defense which were mentioned in reference (a), and also included study of additional problems which were raised by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

3. Inclosure (B), Annex No. VII of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, is a new joint agreement with the local Army authorities which pertains to joint security measures. Section II in particular relates to joint air operations.

4. Inclosure (C), Joint Estimate by Commander Hawaiian Air Force and Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, serves as the basis of joint air operation orders which have been issued, placed in effect, and are in process of test, with a view to improvement in their effectiveness.

5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification *other than* secret.

6. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

C. C. Bloch.
C. C. BLOCH.

Copy to:

CinCPac (less inclosures)
C-A16-1/A6/A&N(3) (0137)
Headquarters,
Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

HEADQUARTERS,
14th NAVAL DISTRICT,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
14 FEBRUARY 1941.

Subject: Measures for Communication, coordination, and liaison between the Inshore Patrol and the Harbor Defenses.

To: Officers named in par. 2 herein.

1. Reference is directed to the following:

- A. CGHD letter AG 354.2/24JAX of 11 Januar 1941.
- B. General Gardiner's report on Joint Exercises of 7 November, 1940.
- C. Chief of Naval Operations Serial 041230 of 5 November 1940.
- D. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Navy Short Title 14ND JCD-13-Army Short Title HC F-39), dated 14 April 1939.

2. In order to study and make recommendations to the Planning Representatives (Paragraph 4, Reference D) on measures for Communication, Coordination and Liaison between the Inshore Patrol and the Harbor Defenses, and to implement Reference C, the following joint Committee (Paragraph 5, Reference D) is appointed:

Army Members:

Fort DeRussy: Major I. N. Ritchie.
Fort Kamehameha: Major R. E. Bingham.

Navy Members:

14ND Operations Officer: Comdr. H. B. Knowles.
14ND C. O. Inshore Patrol: Comdr. G. B. Woolley.

Enc. (A) Com14 serial (0410) 1 May 1941.

3. The studies and recommendations of the Committee will be based upon existing conditions and steps which may be taken in the near future to improve these conditions. Senior Officer of this Committee will act as its chairman. Direct consultation by Committee members with any units under the control of the Department Commander or of the District Commandant is authorized and encouraged. The report containing the recommendations of the Committee will be submitted to the Planning Representatives (Paragraph 4, reference D) not later than 1 March 1941, with a view to the immediate establishment of a

Harbor Control Post for Joint Defense of Pearl and Honolulu Harbors, as outlined in Chief of Naval Operations serial 041230 of 5 November 1940.

WALTER C. SHONT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding, Hawaiian Department.
C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.
Commandant.

Copies to:
CinCUS
Comdg. Gen. Haw. Dept.
Comdg. Gen., ESCAB

HEADQUARTERS
14th NAVAL DISTRICT,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH
NAVAL DISTRICT, 1939

28 MARCH 1941.

ANNEX No. VII SECTION VI JOINT AGREEMENTS

JOINT SECURITY MEASURES, PROTECTION OF FLEET AND PEARL HARBOR BASE

I. General

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-39, (14 ND-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

II. Joint Air Operations

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

III. Joint Communications

5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, The Army will operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broadcasts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly and hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS are such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will in most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAAIS will be transmitted on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade.

6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation of available information and transmit them to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.

7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service (after establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods, joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer. The temporary loan of surplus communication equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint communication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken by the service receiving the borrowed equipment to obtain replacements for the borrowed articles through their own supply channels.

*IV. Joint Antiaircraft Measures**8. Arrival and Departure Procedure, Aircraft.*

During joint exercises, alert periods, and combat, and at such other times as the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy aircraft approaching Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will conform to the Arrival and Departure Procedure prescribed in Inclosure A. This procedure will not be modified except when a departure therefrom is essential due to combat (real or simulated during exercises) or due to an emergency.

9. Balloon barrages.

Reports from abroad indicate the successful development and use of balloon barrages by European belligerents both British and German. Although detailed information is not available, the possibilities of balloon barrages in the Oahu area are recognized. Further investigation and study is necessary both locally and by the War and Navy Departments in order to determine the practicability of this phase of local defense.

10. Marine Corps Antiaircraft Artillery.

When made available by the Naval Base Defense Officer, (Commandant, 14th Naval District), Marine Corps units manning antiaircraft artillery present on Oahu will be placed under the tactical control of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

11. Aircraft Warning Service.

The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior to the completion of the AWS installations, the Navy, through use of RADAR and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.

(Signed) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding, Hawaiian Department.

Approved: 2 April 1941.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch,
C. C. BOCH,

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

MARCH 31, 1941.

Comdr. Naval Base Defense Air Force, Commanding General
Commander Patrol Wing TWO, Hawaiian Air Force,
Naval Air Station, Fort Shafter, T. H.
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.

I. Summary of the Situation.

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. Survey of opposing Strengths.

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armoured and armed with 10-8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and at least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us in a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on Oahu, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft in general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

III. Possible enemy action.

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would

most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

IV. Action open to us:

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its dispatch for attack when information is available.

(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate dispatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.

2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.

3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carriers.

(d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.

2. Dispatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.
2. Attack Unit.
3. Air Combat Unit.

For scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be possible. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task commander.

Decisions:

This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against our fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

Subsidiary decisions. In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation

1. *Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO)).* The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Patrol squadrons.
- Shore-based VO-VS units.
- Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
- Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
- Army bombardment squadrons.
- Army reconnaissance squadrons.
- Navy Utility Squadrons.

2. *Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force)* The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Army pursuit squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
- Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
- One division of shore-based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft).

Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

1. *Search and Attack Group.* Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

2. *Air Combat Group.* Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request. Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan

- (a) An air attack occurs on OAHU.
 - (b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.
 - (c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.
- Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows:
Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

MATERIAL READINESS

All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for approximately one quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the of this plan.

DEGREE OF READINESS

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior officers of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A is a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for a short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any condition will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, D, and E can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

V. Decisions:

(f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the force immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of daily flying from all units to their prospective task force command reports to state:

(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber,

(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.

(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable contingencies requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in any emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in the following temporary details will be made:

(a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Hawaiian Wing TWO) an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group.

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

(Signed) F. L. Martin,
F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force

(Signed) P. N. L. Bellinger,
P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, N. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force
(Commander Patrol Wing)

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

AND NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

1/A7-2/ND14

(629)

Confidential

30 DEC. 1940.

Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Chief of Naval Operations.

Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

References:

1. Opnav dispatch 092135 of October 1940.

2. Opnav dispatch 182128 of October 1940.

3. Chief of Naval Operations' personal letter addressed to CINCUS dated 22 November 1940 (copy sent to Com 14).

4. Com 14 dispatch 150055 of October 1940.

5. Com 14 dispatch 220230 of October 1940.

In view of the inquiries contained in references (a), (b) and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the Fourteenth Naval District to meet surprise hostile attacks of an enemy with the present armament and forces at hand.

AIRCRAFT RAIDS.

Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be brought down by anti-aircraft guns and fighters. Therefore, there are two ways of repelling attack. First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Second, by driving off attacking bombers with anti-aircraft guns and fighters. The Navy component of local defense forces has no planes for distant reconnaissance with which to locate enemy carriers and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces are the Army bombers when located would be the Army bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian area fifty-nine B-18 bombers. All of these are classified as being obsolete. The model is six years old and the planes themselves are five years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers nor types are satisfactory for the purposes intended. New bombing planes are expected sometime in the future. For distant reconnaissance, requisition would be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet. Driving off bombing planes after they have been launched will require both anti-aircraft planes and anti-aircraft guns. The Army has in the Hawaiian area six pursuit planes, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of them are five years old and some of them are four years old. In numbers and models there is a serious deficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40 is produced to the extent that the 185 projected for Hawaii can be delivered. It does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941; this number does not seem adequate.

The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor base by anti-aircraft guns. There are in Hawaii twenty-six fixed 3-inch guns and forty-four 3-inch guns. There are projected twenty-four more, to be delivered in 1941. There are no 37-millimeter and only 109 .50 caliber out of the projected 300 37-millimeter and 308 .50 caliber machine guns. The Army plans to place a greater part of the 3-inch guns around Pearl Harbor and only a few near other military objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary to increase the number of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to have any semblance of anti-aircraft defense. Furthermore, I express my doubt as to the efficacy of a 3-inch gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers. The Army has no plans for the anti-aircraft defense of Lualualei or Kaneohe; furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of anti-aircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor of Honolulu in order that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited knowledge of the density of anti-aircraft barrages abroad, I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of this size and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian Islands. This number is in addition to 37-millimeter and .50 caliber machine guns. In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning service which will consist of eight Radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed and three are mobile. When completed at an indefinite time in the future, this warning net should be adequate.

3. DEFENSE AGAINST SUBMARINES.

The ideal defense against submarines would be conducted by patrol vessels and aircraft working in conjunction. The district has no aircraft for this purpose. Recently, there have arrived here three vessels of Destroyer Division EIGHTY which is assigned to the local defense forces. These vessels have listening gear and, when repaired and ready for service, will be a valuable contribution for antisubmarine and escort work. A large number of patrol vessels will be required for anti-submarine work in the vicinity of Oahu and the other islands. At present, the district has none and request would have to be made on the Fleet for such vessels and planes as could be spared for this most important work. No anti-submarine nets are planned, nor are any considered desirable. Anti-torpedo nets are projected for the entrances of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. They will probably be delivered about 1 March 1941. The net depot will be completed somewhat later.

4. DEFENSE AGAINST MINES.

The district has recently built and equipped one sweep barge and three tugs are being equipped for towing and energizing the coil. This barge can probably look out for Honolulu and Pearl Harbor until such time as it is seriously injured. The district has no vessels available for use as sweeps for anchored mines. A number of mine sweepers are being built or purchased, but their delivery dates here are uncertain. A large number of sweepers will be required in order to keep the harbors of Pearl Harbor, Honolulu and Kaneohe clear and, in addition, Hilo on Hawaii, Kahului and Lahaina on Maui, and Port Allen and Nawiliwili on Kauai. With the delivery of sweepers now being built or purchased, the general situation will be improved immeasurably.

5. DEFENSE AGAINST BOMBARDMENT.

The coast defenses of the Army are considered adequate except that Kaneohe receives very little protection from the batteries.

6. SABOTAGE.

There are two tank farms, the upper and the lower. The lower is entirely contained in the government reservation and, by the use of roving patrols, is considered reasonably secure. The upper farm is adjacent to a public highway. The farm is surrounded by an unclimbable fence and each tank with an earth berm. Its chief exposure is along the highway. To counteract this, three elevated sentry stations have been erected, each equipped with searchlights. This enables sentries to keep a continuous lookout over the entire fence line day and night; the upper farm is considered fairly secure.

7. WATER AND ELECTRIC SUPPLY.

Recently, a guard house has been erected and an arrangement has been made, the Marines alternating with the Army, for constant guard on the water supply.

A constant guard is kept on the electric supply lines through which outside power is received.

8. An elaborate system of photographic passes, search and examination is in effect. There are over 5,000 Civil Service employees who come into the yard each day. In addition, there are about 5,000 employees of civilian contractors and several thousand enlisted men. In addition to the above, there is a constant stream of trucks and vehicles of all descriptions carrying supplies, stores, et cetera. It is impossible to maintain absolute security without disruption of the work of the yard. However, surprise searches and periodic stops, et cetera, are in effect in order that the alert may be emphasized. The main gate has been strengthened to prevent rushing; there have been two drills for the purpose of giving surprise training to the yard garrison in the event of a surprise riot in the yard. In addition to the above, a survey has been made not only of the yard but of all of the outlying stations, and every effort is being made to close holes and stop gaps. While the Commandant is not satisfied, he feels that the precautions taken are reasonably effective but that they are susceptible to improvement, which will be made as occasion warrants.

9. It should be borne in mind that until comparatively recently none of us in this country had very much conception of what measures were necessary and what provisions were desirable in order to effect any measure of protection against aircraft, against submarines, against mines and against subversive elements. The officers and men of this command have been alert, zealous and vigilant in executing all measures under their control in order to properly prepare the district for any exigencies.

10. It should be assumed that the War Department is fully aware of the situation here and that they are proceeding vigorously with a view to overcoming deficiencies. It may be that they have failed to recognize the necessity for large

ers of anti-aircraft guns and pursuit planes. I suggest that the Chief of Operations make inquiry from the War Department as to what their are and on what dates they predict that they will be accomplished and if the numbers and dates are not satisfactory, these features may be discussed at length.

It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view that the War Department should in any way come to believe that there is lack of agreement between the Army authorities and Navy authorities here, or that the officials of the Fourteenth Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do something in regard to Army matters.

C. C. Bloch.
C. C. BLOCH.

File No.

/

UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Jan. 7, 1941.

Confidential

Endorsement to

14 Conf. Ltr.

3-1/A7-2/ND14

of 30 Dec. 1940.

Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

Forwarded. The Commander-in-Chief has conferred with the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

As a result of the conference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and an inspection in company with him, information was furnished to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District who prepared the basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District who prepared the basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in the opinion that the present Army Pursuit Batteries and anti-aircraft batteries are inadequate to protect the Fleet and Pearl Harbor against air attack. When established the proposed pursuit strength would be adequate. The proposed total of 68 mobile three-inch guns for this area would be considered adequate. With the almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area a materially greater number of larger and longer range anti-aircraft batteries are necessary to counter high altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.

As neither the increased anti-aircraft batteries nor the augmented pursuit Batteries will be available for an extended period the defense of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans for cooperation with the local defense forces are being made. At present the continuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or anti-aircraft batteries is not contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present conditions does not in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant interrupting entirely the training required by Fleet air units which would have to be largely curtailed if instant readiness of a fighter squadron were required.

There does not appear to be any practicable way of placing torpedo baffles in the harbor to protect the ships moored therein against torpedo attack without greatly limiting the activities within the harbor, particularly the movements of large ships and the landing and take-off of patrol squadrons.

Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the only operating base available to the Fleet in this area any passive defense measures that will further restrict the use of the base as such should be avoided. Considering this and the improbability of an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of an enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of active operations, it is not considered necessary to lay such nets.

The defense against submarines and mines are considered adequate under present peace time conditions, but early installation of underwater sound-detection system should be made. Also the delivery of the required equipment to the Fourteenth Naval District Defense Forces should be expedited, particularly ships for sweeping magnetic and anchored mines.

5. In this connection, it is urgently recommended that Local Defense units adequate for the protection of naval installations at Pearl Harbor and units based thereon, be provided the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. In order to provide freedom of action for the United States Fleet, and to avoid the necessity for detailing important Fleet units (because no others are available) to tasks requiring only part of their full capabilities, it is considered that the forces provided should be sufficient for full protection and be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the U. S. Fleet. It is considered that the provision of adequate Local Defense Forces for the Fourteenth Naval District should be given higher priority than continental Naval Districts where both the possibilities of, and objectives for, attack are much less.

J. O. Richardson
J. O. Richardson

Copy to:
Com FOURTEEN

EXHIBIT No. 24 (HART INQUIRY)

[1] PW2/A16-3/022

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION

Confidential

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A., 16 Jan 1941

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: (1) The Commander Scouting Force.

(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.

Reference: (a) OpNav Conf. serial 095323 to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet—"Protection of Fleet Air-Craft."

1. I arrived here on October 30, 1940, with the point of view that the international situation was critical, especially in the Pacific, and I was in with the need of being ready today rather than tomorrow for any event that might arise. After taking over command of Patrol Wing TWO and going over the situation, I was surprised to find that here in the Hawaiian Islands, an important naval advanced outpost, we were operating on a shoestring and the more I looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be.

2. (a) War Readiness of Patrol Plane Squadrons is dependent not only on the planes and equipment that comprise these squadrons but also on the operating needs and requirements at Air Stations and outlying bases. The Patrol Wing Commander has no direct control. Needs and requirements for War Readiness include: spare planes, spare engines, spare beach equipment, squadron equipment, spare parts, stores, material, ammunition, base operating facilities, overhaul and repair facilities, personnel to man all base facilities and shops all in sufficient adequacy to insure continuous operating readiness. These cannot be provided or planned. The isolation of this locality from the source of supply, the distance, and the time involved, make careful and comprehensive long distance planning mandatory. I am informed that in the past, the average interval between the request and receipt of material has been nine months.

(b) Reference (a) reads, in part, as follows: "In about one year practically all fleet aircraft except Patrol Wing TWO will have armor and fuel protection. As there are no plans to modernize the present patrol planes comprising Patrol Wing TWO, this [2] evidently means that there is no intention to replace the present obsolescent type of patrol planes in Patrol Wing TWO in one year and that Patrol Wing TWO will be practically the last Wing to be furnished new planes. This, together with the many existing deficiencies, indicates to me that the Navy Department as a whole does not view the situation in the Pacific with alarm or else is not taking steps in keeping with their responsibilities."

3. (a) Presumably, the offices and bureaus concerned are familiar with the situation in the Hawaiian Area over which they have particular cognizance. Certainly enough correspondence has already been written concerning the plane needs to enable bureaus and offices to take the necessary steps to meet and to anticipate such needs.

(b) If war should break in the Pacific, there is much work cut out for patrol planes and undoubtedly much will be expected of them. Cons

attention will have to be paid to anticipating their needs and action taken to provide deficiencies by all the bureaus and offices concerned if patrol planes perform according to expectations.

It is therefore urgently recommended that those concerned with War and those in the Planning and Procurement Divisions of all bureaus view the patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian Area in the light of the International situation in the Pacific; that each bureau and office check their planning and procurement lists for present requirements to insure that immediate steps be taken to furnish the personnel, facilities and equipment required and under their cognizance, to meet the present emergency and probable eventualities. The tremendous and increasing work of those in the Navy Department is fully appreciated and there is no intent to criticize or to shift responsibility. This letter is written in an effort to insure that we may not be "too late".

The following are some of the deficiencies and requirements referred to:

(a) For Patrol Wing TWO.

1. Replace present obsolescent type patrol planes with high performance modern types having latest approved armor and armament features and such numbers as the readiness of base operating facilities will permit.

2. Provide squadron spares and squadron equipment in excess so as to have available a sufficiency to provide for shift of operations to outlying bases.

3. Provide bomb handling equipment of latest design in sufficient amounts to reduce to minimum the time element involved in rearming both normal base and outlying bases.

4. Provide ordnance material to fill and maintain full squadron allowances.

5. Provide increased number of aircraft torpedoes when additional storage is available. Twenty-four aircraft torpedoes are now stored at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

6. Expedite completion and assignment of patrol plane tenders. At present, the tenders for Patrol Wing TWO consists of the U. S. S. WRIGHT and the U. S. S. SWAN. The WRIGHT now is not available due to Navy yard overhaul until March 17, 1941.

For Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

1. Increase capacity for overhaul and repair of patrol planes, engines, instruments, radio and ordnance material, and provide manufacture and storage of breathing oxygen, to anticipate [4] operating needs both now and as estimated for the future, through addition of shop space, additional shops, additional personnel, additional equipment, additional supply of spare parts and stock.

2. Increase and improve bomb storage and ammunition storage through enlargement and preparation of present storage and installation of bomb handling equipment.

3. Construction of squadron's ready ammunition storage.

4. Additional bombs in Hawaiian Area.

5. Additional ferries or other suitable means for transporting bombs from Ammunition Depot across water surrounding Ford Island to Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

6. Increase supply facilities through additional stowage, additional support personnel (officer and enlisted), additional facilities for handling supplies, assistance in obtaining and increasing the amount of spares and supplies on hand, and simplification of requisitioning spare parts and supplies.

7. Increase machine gun and rifle range facilities in Pearl Harbor Area to provide for more effective ground training for personnel of patrol squadrons based on Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

8. Provide for torpedo war head stowage at some suitable location readily accessible to the [5] Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

9. Increase barrack space to provide for increased personnel at Naval Air Station and for personnel of additional patrol squadrons as may be required.

For Naval Air Station, Kaneohe.

1. Expedite completion; providing the operating facilities necessary to permit basing and efficiently operating the number of patrol squadrons in-

tended to base thereon, including dredging the patrol plane operating area to the extent recommended, dredging ship channel, housing of the necessary personnel, supplying equipment for the various buildings, supplying necessary boats and supplying adequate station personnel. Anticipate engine and plane overhaul facilities to meet War requirements.

(d) For Keehi Lagoon.

1. Take necessary steps to expedite the development of Keehi Lagoon for a patrol plane base.

(e) For Outlying Bases; Wake, Johnston, Palmyra.

1. Expedite completion of operating facilities with particular regard to dredging ship channels; dredging landing and take-off areas; providing gasoline and oil reserves and issue facilities; bomb and ammunition supply and stowage; concrete ramps and parking area.

(f) For Midway.

1. Expedite completion and establishment of Midway as an outlying operating base with the assignment [6] of necessary personnel and with facilities and equipment to provide for the basing thereon of two patrol plane squadrons.

(g) General.

1. Stop the normal shifting and rotating between sea and shore and between other activities of personnel, officer and enlisted, in Patrol Wing TWO, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, and Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, until all personnel complements have been brought up to the requirements necessary for war-time operations.

2. Provide two sets additional beaching gear and two boats fitted with gasoline bowser tanks for use at each of the following outlying bases: Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Guam and Canton.

P. N. L. Bellinger

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Copy to:

Comairscfor.

Com. 14.

N. A. S., P. H., T. H.

Prosp. C. O., N. A. S., Kaneohe.

C. S. F. File No. A16-3/(035)

UNITED STATES FLEET SCOUTING FORCE,
U. S. S. INDIANAPOLIS, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Jan. 21, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to CPW2 conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of 1/16/41.

From: Commander Scouting Force.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Commander Scouting Force appreciates that the efforts of the Department toward the completion of adequate defense measures must necessarily be based upon the development of the entire Naval Establishment rather than concentration upon one point. He believes, however, that the importance of Pearl Harbor as the spear-head of our defenses in the Pacific, and the essential role of Patrol Wing TWO not only in the defense of Pearl Harbor but also in any operations to the westward, warrant early and full attention to the needs cited by the Commander of that Wing.

3. Commander Scouting Force has, since his arrival in this area as Commander Hawaiian Detachment, been much concerned at the lack of adequate material and facilities for proper and efficient operation of Patrol Wing TWO in war. He has effected such remedial measures as lay within his power, and has urged upon the Department such matters as the enlargement of the originally-planned installation at Kaneohe Bay and the provision of gasoline and lubricating oil reserve supplies at outlying-island bases so that these bases might be utilized temporarily without awaiting the arrival of tenders.

4. In view of the location of Pearl Harbor and the island bases, and the functions of Patrol Wing TWO in war in the Pacific, the Commander Scouting Force therefore recommends strongly that measures toward fulfilling the needs cited

Commander Patrol Wing TWO be given the highest priority in the Department's program and accomplished at the earliest practicable moment.

Adolphus Andrews,
ADOLPHUS ANDREWS,

by to:
Comairscor for Compatwing Two
ComFOURTEEN
NAS, Pearl Harbor
Prosp. CO, NAS, Kaneohe.

File No. A16-1/A4-1/VZ/(0178)

UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Jan. 31, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL.

AND ENDORSEMENT to CPW2 Conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of 1/16/41.

: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

The Chief of Naval Operations.

ct: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.

Forwarded, concurring with the basic recommendation and with the first
sement by Commander Scouting Force.

The Commander-in-Chief appreciates the spirit in which the basic letter,
g action toward effective readiness for missions that may be demanded of
Wing TWO, has been written. He also appreciates the fact that action
ready been initiated or, in some cases, is not readily practicable at this
with respect to a number of the basic recommendations; and that separate
pendence with respect to much of this material is already in circulation.
t is the Commander-in-Chief's opinion, however, that the basic letter, sum-
ing as it does the entire patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian area, pre-
a very valuable picture of the overall requirements that are urgently needed
potentialities expected of patrol planes are to be even approximately real-
Therefore, full review of the subject, accompanied by appropriate action
d expediting or initiating needed developments, is urged.

Attention is particularly invited to:

(a) The desirability of better priority in the delivery of improved patrol
lanes to Patrol Wing TWO.

(b) The great importance of increased bomb and torpedo supply, includ-
g not only bulk storage, but also ready storage at Naval Air Station Pearl
arbor, together with suitable handling and loading equipment at the Air
station, and improved transportation from bulk storage. In this connec-
on, provision at the Naval Air Station should include two "fills" for five
patrol plane squadrons and *one aircraft carrier group*.

(c) The vital necessity of expediting the readiness at outlying island de-
velopments of the basic essentials: gasoline and oil storage, bomb and am-
munition storage, parking area, ramps and dredged approaches thereto.
his latter subject has been discussed informally with representatives of
e Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and is understood to be receiv-
g full consideration. Departmental support, if and as needed, is urged.

J. O. Richardson.
J. O. RICHARDSON.

by to:
Comscofor
Comairscor for
Compatwing-2
Com-14
NAS P. H.
NAS Kaneohe

OP-23-H-KB 2/19
 CONFIDENTIAL
 (SC)A16-1/PW2
 Serial 015823

FEB. 27, 1941.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics.

Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.

Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks.

Chief of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

Subject: Patrol Wing Two—Readiness of.

Reference: (a) Compatwing Two Confid. Ltr. PW2/A16-3/022 of 16 January 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information.

2. In separate correspondence the Chief of Naval Operations has already indicated his desires on the following items of paragraph 5 of reference (a)

(a) 1. (a) 3. (b) 2. (b) 4.

(a) 2. (a) 4. (b) 3. (b) 5.

3. In regard to the remaining items and to the general situation the Chief of Naval Operations desires the addressees to be guided by the following policy:

In case of hostilities practically all the aircraft of the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets may be dependent upon the Hawaiian Area for logistics. The Area should be prepared expeditiously to handle this contingency. Needs that can be foreseen should be supplied by the Bureaus in advance of requisition.

R. E. INGERSOLL, Acting.

Copy to:

CinCpac, Comscofor,
 Comairscfor, Compatwing 2,
 Com. 14, NAS Pearl.

[1]

CONFIDENTIAL

C-A16-1/A7-3(2)/ND14(0135)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Fort Shafter, T. H.

HEADQUARTERS 14TH NAVAL DISTRICT,
 Pearl Harbor, T. H., 14 February, 1941.

SUBJECT: Army and Navy Aircraft in Hawaiian Area.

To: Officers named in par. 2, herein.

1. Reference is directed to the following:

A. Letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, on the above subject, dated 4 February 1941, (CinC serial (0195)).

B. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Navy short title, 14ND-JCD-13; Army short title, HCF-39) Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Headquarters Fourteenth Naval District, dated 14 April, 1939.

2. In order to study and make recommendations to the Planning Representatives, (Paragraph 4, Reference B), for measures relating to increasing the combat efficiency of Army and Navy aircraft stationed in Hawaiian waters and to improve the effectiveness of the defenses against hostile air attacks, the following joint committees (Paragraph 5, Reference B) are appointed:

a. *Air Operations Committee*: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraphs 5 a, c, and d, Reference A, and to prepare plans for the conduct of joint exercises, on a weekly or more frequent basis, to insure the readiness of joint defensive measures in Oahu against surprise aircraft raids.

Army Members:

Haw. Air Force:
 Lt. Col. W. S. Streett, AC
 H. S. C. A. B.:
 Major R. T. Frederick, 64th CA

Navy Members:

14ND NAS Operations Officer
 Lt. Comdr. H. F. Carlson
 Staff, Com. AirBatFor.
 Comdr. M. R. Browning
 Patrol Wing 2 C. O. Patron 22
 Lt. Comdr. G. Van Deurs

Enc. (A) Com 14 serial (0410) 1 May 1941.

[2] b. Communications Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraph 5 b, Reference A.

Members:

q. Haw. Dept.:
Lt. Col. W. H. Murphy, SC
aw. Air Force:
Lt. Col. C. I. Hoppough, SC
S. C. A. B.:
Major I. H. Ritchie, CAC

Navy Members:

PatWingTwo C. O. Patron 22:
Lt. Comdr. W. P. Cogswell
14th Communication Officer
Comdr. H. L. Thompson
Staff ComAirBatFor Communicatio
ficer:
Lt. L. J. Dow

c. Air-Antiaircraft Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraphs 5 e, f, and of Reference A, to prepare plans for the effective coordination of ship and port antiaircraft artillery gun fire against surprise aircraft raids, and to consider the desirability of using balloon barrages in the defense of the Pearl Harbor-Hickam Field Area.

Members:

aw. Air Force:
Lt. Col. Hegenberger, AC
S. C. A. B.:
Major R. T. Frederick, 64th CA
Capt. M. G. Weber, CAC

Navy Members:

14ND District Marine Officer:
Col. H. K. Pickett
BatFor Gunnery Officer, USS Missis
Lt. Comdr. W. W. Juvenal
Ass't. Air Officer, USS Yorktown
Lt. Comdr. H. F. Macomsey

d. Armament Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraph 5 g of Reference A:

Members:

q. Haw. Dept.:
Lt. Col. M. W. Marsh, Inf.
Major R. McK. Smith, OD.
aw. Air Force:
Lt. Col. A. B. Custis, OD.

Navy Members:

14ND IOC NAD Oahu:
Comdr. W. W. Meek
Staff ComAirBatFor, Gunnery:
Lt. Comdr. S. E. Burroughs, Jr.
Staff, ComPatWingTwo, Gunnery:
Lt. H. P. Cooper

[3] e. Chemical Warfare Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to measures to screen the Pearl Harbor-Hickam Field Area from air attack by the use of smoke or by other devices:

Members:

q. Haw. Dept.:
Col. J. W. Lyon, CWS
aw. Air Force:
Major M. E. Jennings, CWS
S. C. A. B.:
Major F. T. Ostenberg, 64th CA

Navy Members:

14ND CO Barracks Detachment:
Major J. M. Smith, USMC
PatWingTwo CO Patron 21:
Lt. Comdr. J. W. Harris

The studies and recommendations of the Committees will be based upon existing conditions and steps which may be taken in the near future to improve conditions. The senior officer of each committee will act as its chairman. Consultation by committee members with any units under the control of Department Commander or of the District Commandant is authorized and encouraged. Reports containing the recommendations of the committees will be submitted to the Planning Representatives (Paragraph 4 Reference B) not later than 1 March, 1941, with a view to the immediate preparation of joint defense plans for defense against air attacks.

The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, has detailed the fleet members for the committees as indicated in paragraph 2 above.

All members of all committees who are not temporarily absent from Oahu on other duty will assemble at 0930 seventeen February in Office of Assistant Staff G-3 Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter.

C. C. SHORT

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding Hawaiian Department

C. C. BLOCH

Rear Admiral, U. S. N.
Commandant Fourteenth Naval District

Copies to: C. G., H. A. F.

Fort Shafter, T. H.
C. G., H. S. C. A. B.
Fort DeRussy, T. H.
C. G., Schofield Barracks

Copies to: CinCus

ComBatFor
ComScoFor
ComAirBatFor
ComPatWingTwo

EXHIBIT No. 25 (HART INQUIRY)

CINCPAC FILE NO.
A4-3/FF12/(13)
Serial 01254

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, '
August

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander Battle Force (Commander Task Force ONE).
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force (Commander Task Force TWO)
Commander Scouting Force (Commander Task Force THREE).
Commander Base Force.
Commanding General, Second Marine Division.
Subject: Employment Schedules; U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, 1942.
Reference: (a) Cincus ltr. A4-3FF1 Serial 1773 of 16 May, 1938.
(b) U. S. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 4C1-41.
(c) Cinpac Conf. ltr. A4-3/FF1-1 Serial 0750 of 8 May, 1941
Enclosure: (A) Copy of subject schedule—Action Addresses 10 each
addressees 3 each.

(Under separate cover)

1. Enclosure (A) has been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations the general directive for preparation of the subject of this letter.

2. Second quarter employment schedules will be submitted for 5 September, printed and distributed by 15 September, 1941, as follows:

(a) Task Force Commanders inform Type Commanders and Base Force of the times in the schedule to be devoted to inter-tying their respective Task Forces, as soon as practicable.

(b) Type Commanders submit two Task Force Commanders, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommendations for indicating priorities in exercises, Commander Scouting Force marines and Patrol Squadrons to Task Forces.

(c) Task Force Commanders and Commander Base Force submit to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for approval, the employment schedule coordinating the requirements of types in the Task Forces.

3. Fleet units in Hawaiian Area are divided for training and operations into three Task Forces, Base Force, and Naval Transportation Service as follows:

TASK FORCE ONE—Commander Battle Force.

Batdivs TWO and FOUR
SARATOGA and planes
Crudiv NINE
Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE
Mindiv ONE, OGLALA
1/3 available submarines
2 Patrol Squadrons

TASK FORCE TWO—Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.

Batdiv ONE
ENTERPRISE and planes
Crudivs THREE and FIVE
Desflot TWO, Desdiv FIFTY
Mindiv TWO
1/3 available submarines
2 Patrol Squadrons

TASK FORCE THREE—Commander Scouting Force.

Crudivs FOUR and SIX
LEXINGTON and planes
Desron FIVE plus Minron TWO
Transports, Base Force (when present)
Second Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance
Submarines, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet (to include TWENTY-ONE) less 2/3 available submarines.
Aircraft, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, less 4 Patrol Squadrons

FORCE, U. S. Pacific Fleet, less transports (when present).

AL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE—Vessels operating under Opnav and

Units are assigned in accordance with reference (b). Units omitted from (b) have been included in the Task Force Organizations for training

es. Force and Type Commanders may, to suit individual ship requirements, shift from one Task Force to another, maintaining proportion of upkeep and ng time.

ne Task Force will be at sea at all times. When Task Forces enter and Pearl Harbor the same day, the departing force will clear before the entry other force commences.

reference (c) remains effective, when practicable.

chedules will provide for as many tenders and Base Force vessels as prac- to participate in Fleet Tactics during the period 21–25 November, 1941.

operating and upkeep periods are assigned as follows:

	<i>Operating</i>	<i>Upkeep</i>
FORCE ONE-----	28 Sep-9 Oct	
	10-18 Oct	19-31 Oct
	1-10 Nov	11-21 Nov
	22-28 Nov	29 Nov-12 Dec
	13-20 Dec	21-30-Dec
	31 Dec	
FORCE TWO-----	24 Sept-2 Oct	3-17 Oct
	18-26 Oct	27 Oct-9 Nov
	10-17 Nov	18-27 Nov
	28 Nov-5 Dec	6-17 Dec
	18-26 Dec	27 Dec
FORCE THREE-----	20 Sep-1 Oct	
	2-10 Oct	11-22 Oct
	23 Oct-1 Nov	2-16 Nov
	17-25 Nov	26 Nov-4 Dec
	5-13 Dec	14-25 Dec
	26-31 Dec	

Periods assigned for Fleet Tactics:—

Task Forces TWO and THREE—23–26 Oct.

Task Force ONE and THREE—22–25 Nov.

Task Force ONE and TWO—18–20 Dec.

H. E. KIMMEL.

y to: Opnav, CincLant, CincAF, Combatships, Comcrubatfor, Cominbatfor, uscofor, Comdesbatfor, Comsubscfor, Comairscfor, Cominron TWO, Com- g TWO, Compatwing ONE, Com 14.

/s/ P. C. Crosley
P. C. CROSELEY,
Flag Secretary.

EXHIBIT No. 28 (HART INQUIRY)

[1]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

fal

Cincpac File No.
A4-3/FF12/(18)
Serial 01820

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 10 November 1941.

Confidential

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander Battle Force (Commander Task Force ONE).

Commander Aircraft, Battle Force (Commander Task Force TWO).

Commander Scouting Force (Commander Task Force THREE).

Commandant Fourteenth Naval District (Commander Task Force FOUR).

Commander Base Force (Commander Task Force FIFTEEN).

Commander Submarines, Scouting Force (Commander Task Force SEVEN).

Commander Patrol Wing TWO (Commander Task Force NINE).

Commanding General, Second Marine Division.

Subject: Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Third Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942.

Reference:

(a) Cincus ltr. A4-3/FF1 Serial 1773 of 16 May, 1938.

(b) U. S. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 14CL-41 of 31 October, 1941.

(c) Cincpac Conf. ltr. A4-3/FF1-1 Serial 0750 of 8 May, 1941.

Enclosure:

(A) Copy of subject schedule—Action addresses 10 each, information addresses 5 each.

(B) Minimum number of vessels required in Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE when operating at sea.

1. Enclosure (A) is the general directive for preparation of the subject schedules.

2. The schedule is divided into operating periods assigned to Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE. Other Task Forces will operate at discretion, the Commanders arranging with the Task Force Commander at sea for operating time and with Commander Battle Force for operating areas.

3. Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR, SEVEN, NINE and Commander Base Force will submit third quarter employment schedules for approval by 1 December; print and distribute by 10 December. The following procedure is prescribed:

[2] (a) Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE inform other Task Force and Type Commanders and Commander Base Force, as soon as practicable, of the times in the schedule to be devoted to inter-type tactics in their respective Task Forces.

(b) Type Commanders submit to Task Force Commanders, information to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommendations for type training indicating priorities in exercises.

(c) Task Force Commanders and Commander Base Force prepare and submit to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for approval, the quarterly employment schedule coordinating the requirements of types in their respective Forces.

4. Naval units in the Hawaiian area are divided for training and operations between the following Forces:

TASK FORCE ONE—Commander Battle Force:

Batdivs TWO and FOUR.

SARATOGA and planes.

Crudiv. NINE.

Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE.

Mindiv ONE, OGLALA.

TASK FORCE TWO—Commander Aircraft, Battle Force:

Batdiv ONE.

ENTERPRISE and planes.

Crudiv FIVE.

Desflot TWO, Desdiv FIFTY.

Mindiv TWO.

ASK FORCE THREE—Commander Scouting Force:

Crudivs FOUR and SIX.

LEXINGTON and planes plus Marine Air Group 21.

Desron FIVE.

Minron TWO.

Transports, Base Force (when present).

Second Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment.

Aircraft, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, less Patwings ONE and TWO.

TASK FORCE FOUR—Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

That part of Fourteenth Naval District Activities which involve the Island Bases.

ASK FORCE SEVEN—Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

Submarines, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

ASK FORCE NINE—Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

Patrol Wing ONE.

Patrol Wing TWO.

ASE FORCE, U. S. Pacific Fleet, less transports when present.

Task Force FIFTEEN.

Units are assigned in accordance with reference (b). Units omitted from reference (b) have been included in the Task Force Organizations for training purposes.

Task Force and Type Commanders may, to suit individual ship requirements, transfer units from one Task Force to another, maintaining proportion of upkeep and operating time.

One surface Task Force will be at sea at all times. When a sortie and entry in succession, the sortie force will clear before the entry begins.

Reference (c) is cancelled. Enclosure (B) is effective immediately.

Schedules will provide for as many tenders and Base Force vessels as practice to participate in Fleet Tactics during the period 9-13 March, 1942.

Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE will recommend to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet the assignment of cruisers to Task Force SEVEN in accordance with paragraphs six and eleven of reference (b).

11. Operating and upkeep periods are assigned as follows:

	Operating	Upkeep
FORCE ONE -----	31 Dec-8 Jan-----	9-20 Jan
	21-29 Jan-----	30 Jan-10 Feb
	11-18 Feb-----	19 Feb-3 Mar
	4-13 Mar-----	14-24 Mar
	25 Mar-2 Apr-----	
FORCE TWO -----		27 Dec-7 Jan
	8-16 Jan-----	17-28 Jan
	29 Jan-6 Feb-----	7-17 Feb
	18-25 Feb-----	26 Feb-8 Mar
	9-18 Mar-----	19 Mar
FORCE THREE -----		1-12 Jan
	13-21 Jan-----	22 Jan-5 Feb
	6-14 Feb-----	15-24 Feb
	25 Feb-4 Mar-----	5-8 Mar
	9-13 Mar-----	14-17 Mar
	18-25 Mar-----	26 Mar-

Periods assigned for Fleet Tactics:

TASK FORCES TWO and THREE -----	13-16 Jan
TASK FORCES ONE and THREE -----	11-14 Feb
TASK FORCES ONE, TWO & THREE -----	9-13 Mar

Advanced Light Force and Advanced Submarine Force Practices.

H. E. KIMMEL

to: Opnav (50), CinCLant, CinCAF, Combatships, Comcrubattor, Cominbat-Comcruscofor, Comdesbatfor, Comairsecofor, Cominron TWO, Compatwing

P. C. Crosley,
P. C. CROSLY,
Flag Secretary.

At this point in exhibit No. 26 there appears a copy of the Fleet Deployment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, third quarter, fiscal year

1942, being Enclosure A, supra. This schedule will be produced as Item No. 2, **EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS**, Hart Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed order of the Hart Inquiry.)

Enclosure (B) to CINCPAC Serial 01820

**MINIMUM NUMBER OF UNITS REQUIRED IN TASK FORCES ONE, TWO AND THREE
OPERATING AT SEA**

1. Task Force Commanders are hereby authorized to reduce the time for individual units of their Forces in order to economize in fuel and minimize normal wear on ships.

2. The Task Force at sea will not be reduced below the following if absolutely necessary.

<i>TASK FORCE ONE</i>	<i>TASK FORCE TWO</i>	<i>TASK FORCE THREE</i>
3BB	1BB	4C
1CV	1CV	1C
3CL	2CA	4D
8DD	8DD	5DMS (not
2DM	2DM	high-speed)

3. Units of a Task Force in Pearl Harbor during part of a scheduled period, (1) will retain their Task Force Organization, (2) will maintain upkeep status nor break down any machinery which cannot be restored in the time normally required to raise steam, and (3) in the event of an emergency sortie, will sortie at once, on order from the Senior Officer Present of the Task Force in port.

4. The Senior Commander of Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE in Pearl Harbor, shall issue an emergency sortie plan for the Task Force in port.

EXHIBIT No. 27 (HART INQUIRY)

Confidential

TASK FORCE ONE EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

SECOND QUARTER 1942

A4-3/FF1(1)/(0896) UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

Task Force One

U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 15 September 1942

Confidential

From: Commander Task Force ONE.

To: Task Force ONE.

Subject: Employment Schedule, Task Force ONE, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, 1942.

Reference:

(a) Cincpac conf. ltr. A2-11/FF1-1/A3/A16/(0690) of 30 April 1942.

(b) Cincpac conf. ltr. A4-3/FF12/(13)/(01254) of 13 August, 1942.

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the appended Employment Schedule, Task Force ONE, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for the second quarter is forwarded for information and guidance.

2. The Train services required for this schedule will be furnished by the Commander Base Force.

3. Economy in fuel and mileage expenditures shall be given due consideration by all commands.

4. If unforeseen circumstances arise that make it apparent that this approved schedule within a type would be advantageous, Type C

possible for making such changes without reference to higher authority;
d, these changes do not modify Fleet or Task Force directive schedules.

W. S. PYE.

tribution:

list II, Case 1: A, B (less B4, B5).

list I, Case 2: B4, B5, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, JO, K, X1, X2, X4, X5, X6, X7,
AA1, AAA1.

Special: BD10 (1); EN3 (50); EN3-6 (2); EN4 (20); EN5 (3);
EN6 (5); EN7 (5); EN9 (6); EN9-24 (1); EN10 (3); EN11 (5);
FPO (2); ND11 (3); ND12 (3); ND13 (3); ND14 (3); ND15 (2);
NM12 (1); NM13 (1); NT1-9 (1); NT1-10 (1); NT4-4 (1); NT7-5 (1);
NY8 (3); NY9 (4); NY10 (3); BatFor Mail Clerk (2); QA (1).

Covington,

Flag Secretary.

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE ONE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship

1VOS

BATTLESHIPS—TASK FORCE ONE

WEST VIRGINIA (F)

Batdiv FOUR

WEST VIRGINIA (F)

COLORADO

MARYLAND

VO-4 (9 VOS)

TWO

MINNESSEE (F)

CALIFORNIA (FF)

PENNSYLVANIA (FF)

2 (9 VOS)

AIRCRAFT—TASK FORCE ONE

SARATOGA (F)

2VM Planes—Flag Unit

1 VSB (Group Com. Plane)

VB-3 (21 VSB)

VF-3 18 VF, 2VM)

VS-3 (21 VSB)

VT-3 (12 VTB)

Utility Unit (3 VSO, 2 VJ)

CRUISERS—TASK FORCE ONE

HONOLULU (F)

Crudiv NINE

HONOLULU (F)

PHOENIX

BOISE (RF)

HELENA

ST. LOUIS

RICHMOND

VCS-9 (22 VSO)

DESTROYERS—TASK FORCE ONE

RALEIGH (F)

2 VSO Planes

DOBBIN (Tender)

WHITNEY (Tender)

DEROYER SQUADRON ONE

HELPS—Squadron Flagship

ONE

DEWEY (F)

MACDONOUGH (RF)

WORDEN

HULL

TWO

AYLWIN (F)

FARRAGUT (RF)

DALE

MONAGHAN

DESTROYER SQUADRON THREE

361 CLARK—Squadron Flagship

DESDIV FIVE

372 CASSIN (F)

371 CONYNGHAM

369 REID

375 DOWNES (RF)

DESDIV SIX

370 CASE (F)

365 CUMMINGS (RF)

373 SHAW

374 TUCKER

MINECRAFT—TASK FORCE ONE

OGALA (F)

Mindiv ONE

PRUITT (F)

TRACY

PREBLE

SICARD

PATROL PLANES—TASK FORCE ONE

(VY-23) Patrol Squadron Twenty-Three—(12 VPB)

(VP-22) Patrol Squadron Twenty-Two—(12 VPB)

(VP-24) Patrol Squadron Twenty-Four—(12 VPB)

SUBMARINE—TASK FORCE ONE		SUBMARINE DIVISION SIXTY-ONE	
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY-TWO			
185 SNAPPER		198 TAMBOR	
186 STINGRAY		199 TAUTOG	
187 STURGEON		200 THRESHER	
191 SCULPIN (F)		206 GAR	
192 SAILFISH		207 GRAMPUS	
193 SWORDFISH		208 GRAYBACK	

(At this point in exhibit No. 27, there appear five Employment Schedules, second quarter, fiscal year 1942, for Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers, Aircraft, and Submarines, respectively, of Task Force One of the U. S. Pacific Fleet. These Schedules will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hart Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Hart Inquiry.)

EXHIBIT No. 28 (HART INQUIRY)

Confidential

TASK FORCE TWO EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

SECOND QUARTER 1942

A4-3/12-Hc/FF2-3 (0738)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

TASK FORCE TWO

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., September 12, 1941.

Confidential

From: Commander Task Force TWO.

To: Task Force TWO.

Subject: Employment Schedule, Task Force TWO, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, 1942.

Reference: (a) Cincpac Conf. Serial 01254 of August 13, 1941.

1. In accordance with reference (a), the appended Employment Schedule, Task Force TWO, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for the second quarter, 1942, is forwarded for information and guidance.

2. Type Commanders will make own arrangements for services required.

3. Economy in fuel and mileage expenditures shall be given due consideration by all commands.

W. F. HALSEY.

Distribution:

Basis:

List II, Case 1.—Fleet Force and Type Commanders, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Units of Task Force TWO less DD's, DM's, and Airons.

List I, Case 2.—DD's, DM's, and Airons of Task Force TWO.

List I, Case 1.—B2-2; B3-9; B4-01; B4-1; B4-3; B4-5; B5-1; C1-01; D2-4; D2-6; E1-1; F2; G4; H2-0; H2-1; H2-2; H4-1; H4-3; H6-0; H6-1; I4; I6; I6-2; I6-4; I8; I9; I10.

Special:

AA-1; AB-1; AAA-1; EN-1; EN-3; EN-4; EN-6; EN-11; FATU; FPO; NA-8; NA-11; NA-12; NA-37; ND-11; ND-12; ND-13; ND-14; H4-0; Comdg. Gen. Haw. Dept.; Fleet Post Office.

H. D. MOULTON,

Flag Secretary.

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE TWO, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(CV6) U. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

BATTLESHIPS—TASK FORCE TWO

CARRIER—TASK FORCE TWO

BatDiv ONE

(BB39) ARIZONA (F)
(BB36) NEVADA
(BB37) OKLAHOMA

CarDiv TWO

(CV6) ENTERPRISE (F)

CRUISERS—TASK FORCE TWO

CruDiv FIVE
(CA26) NORTHAMPTON (F)
(CA25) SALT LAKE CITY
(CA24) PENSACOLA
(CA27) CHESTER

DESTROYERS—TASK FORCE TWO

(CL8) DETROIT (F)
(AD11) ALTAIR
(AD14) DIXIE

DESTROYER SQUADRON FOUR

(DD357) SELFRIDGE (F)

EIGHT

D389) MUGFORD (F)	DesDiv SEVEN
D393) JARVIS (RF)	(DD391) HENLEY (F)
D392) PATTERSON	(DD386) BAGLEY
D390) RALPH TALBOT	(DD388) HELM
	(DD387) BLUE (RF)

DESTROYER SQUADRON SIX

(DD363) BALCH (F)

TWELVE

D384) DUNLAP (F)	DesDiv ELEVEN
D398) ELLET	(DD380) GRIDLEY (F)
D385) FANNING (RF)	(DD401) MAURY (RF)
D397) BENHAM	(DD382) CRAVEN
	(DD400) MC CALL

¹ DESTROYER DIVISION FIFTY

(DD113) RATHBURN (F)
(DD114) TALBOT
(DD115) WATERS
(DD116) DENT (RF)

MINESWEEPERS—TASK FORCE TWO PATROL SQUADRONS—TASK FORCE TWO

TWO

M15) GAMBLE (F)	(VP12) Patrol Squadron TWELVE
M18) BREESE	(VP14) Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN
M16) RAMSAY	
M17) MONTGOMERY	

SUBMARINES—TASK FORCE TWO

FORTY-TWO

S167) NARWHAL (F)	SubDiv SIXTY-TWO
S168) NAUTILUS	(SS201) TRITON (F)
S169) DOLPHIN	(SS202) TROUT
M 1) ARGONAUT (FF)	(SS203) TUNA
	² (SS209) GRAYLING
	² (SS210) GRENADIER
	² (SS211) GUDGEON

At this point in exhibit No. 28, there appear four Employment Schedules, second quarter, fiscal year 1942, for Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers and Mine Craft, and Submarines and Patrol Planes, respectively, of Task Force Two of the U. S. Pacific Fleet. These schedules are found reproduced as Items Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11 EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hart Inquiry. These illustrations are bound under the following the printed exhibits of the Hart Inquiry.)

Reduced commission. Operates with underwater sound training school. Reporting.

EXHIBIT No. 29 (HART INQUIRY)

Confidential

TASK FORCE THREE EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

1 OCTOBER-31 DECEMBER 1941

C. S. F. File No.
A4-3/FF3/ (90)
Serial 0670

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

Task Force Three

U. S. S. LOUISVILLE, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., September 11, 1941.

Confidential.

From: Commander Task Force THREE.

To: Task Force THREE.

Subject: Schedule of Employment, Task Force THREE for the period 1 October-31 December, 1941.

1. Appended is the Employment Schedule for Task Force THREE for the period 1 October-31 December, 1941.

2. This schedule has the effect of orders. Attention is invited to United States Pacific Fleet Regulations, paragraph 146.

3. Commander Base Force is requested to provide the necessary Train services required by this schedule.

4. Fuel and mileage allowances impose the necessity for planning ahead. Type Commanders and Commanding Officers will reduce expenditures and mileage to a minimum consistent with efficient operations and training.

WILSON BROWN.

Distribution:

List I (Case 2): B (less B4-5), C, I (less I6-2), X, A1 (Atlantic). A (Asiatic), JO.

List II (Case 1): A-1 (Pacific), E1-0, H (less H2-1, H4-1, H4-3), M.

List III (Case 1): G4-5, D-2, E1 1, F, G, H2-1, H4-1, H4-3, I6-2, K.

Special: EN3(50), EN4(20), EN5(3), EN6(3), EN7(5), EN9(5), EN10(5)

EN11(5), EN24(1), EN25(1), KS3(3), KS4(3), NA11(2), NA12(2)

NA26 (2), ND1-10(2), ND11-13(3), ND14(10), ND15(3), NM5-12-1

(1ea), NP1, 3, 7, 11, (3ea) NT1-9 to 11 (1ea), NY1 to 10(3), Des Base

San Diego (2), CO NITRO, SIRIUS, WM W. BURROWS. REGULUS

KAULA, HENDERSON, WHARTON, VEGA, LASSEN, (2ea), Bd I&S

Long Beach (3), Nav. War College, Newport (3), 2nd Asst. Postmaster

General, Washington (3), Postmaster, New York, CO USCG Hdqts. Los

Angeles, Director and Instructor Naval Reserves, 11th Naval District

Navy Civil Liaison Officer, Room 900 Law Bldg. 139 N. Brdy., Los Angeles

Fleet Per. Off., Fed. Bldg., San Francisco, Branch Intelligence Off., Rm

452 Fed. Bldg. Los Angeles, (1ea), Comdg. Gen. Hawaiian Dept. G3, Ft

Shafter (1), Lexington (30).

T. J. CASEY,

Flag Secretary.

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE THREE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

CRUISERS

(CA35) INDIANAPOLIS—Flagship
Ship Unit—4VSO (Attached to VCS-4)
1 VSO—Flag Unit

CRUDIV FOUR

(CA29) CHICAGO (F)
(CA28) LOUISVILLE
(CA33) PORTLAND
(CA35) INDIANAPOLIS (FF)
VCS-4 SCOUTING SQUADRON
FOUR-16 VSO

CRUDIV SIX

(CA36) MINNEAPOLIS (F)
(CA34) ASTORIA
(CA32) NEW ORLEANS
(CA38) SAN FRANCISCO
VCS-6 SCOUTING SQUADRON
SIX-16 VSO

CARRIER AND MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY ONE

LEXINGTON (Group Com. Plane) (21VSB) (21VSB) (18 VF, 2VM) (12 VTB) Unit (3VSO, 2VJ)	MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY-ONE VMSB-231 (18 VSB) VMSB-232 (18 VSB) VMF-211 (18 VF, 2VM) VMJ-252 (3VJ, 3VJR, 6VR)
---	--

DESTROYERS

DESRON FIVE

(DD356) PORTER—Flagship

V NINE 0366 DRAYTON (F) 0368 FLUSSER 0367 LAMSON (RF) 0364 MAHAN	DESDIV TEN DD376 CUSHING (F) DD378 SMITH DD379 PRESTON (RF) DD377 PERKINS
--	---

MINRON TWO

(DMS13) HOPKINS—Flagship

V FOUR 0317 PERRY (F) 0316 TREVER 0315 WASMUTH 0314 ZANE (RF)	MINDIV FIVE DMS10 SOUTHARD (F) DMS12 LONG DMS9 CHANDLER DMS11 HOVEY (RF)	MINDIV SIX DMS1 DORSEY (F) DMS4 ELLIOT DMS2 LAMBERTON (RF) DMS3 BOGGS
---	--	---

TRANSPORTS, BASE, FORCE (When Present)

SECOND MARINE DIVISION

(Less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment)

SUBMARINES

V TWENTY ONE S182 SALMON (F) S183 SEAL S184 SKIPJACK S188 SARGO (FF) S189 SAURY S190 SPARFISH D336 LITCHFIELD SR3 HOLLAND SR5 ORTOLAN	SUBDIV FORTY THREE (SS170) CACHALOT (SS171) CUTTLEFISH (SS179) PLUNGER (F) (SS180) POLLACK (SS181) POMPANO (AS14) PELIAS (AM30) SEAGULL (ASR1) WIDGEON	SUBDIV FORTY ONE (On West Coast) (SS123) S-18 (F) (SS128) S-23 (SS132) S-27 (SS133) S-28 (SS139) S-34 (SS140) S-35
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PATROL WINGS

PATROL WING ONE (VP42) Wright (Flagship Comairscos) (VP-23) HULBERT (F) (VP-21) BALLARD (VP-24) AVOCET (OLD VP-12) (AV4) (AV8) (AVD11) (AVD14)	PATRON WING TWO (Less Patrons Assigned Task Forces ONE and TWO) Patrol Squadron ELEVEN (12BPY5) Patrol Squadron TWENTY (12BPY3) Patrol Squadron TWENTY FOUR (6 PYB5) CURTISS (F) TANGIER THORNTON McFARLAND
---	--

PATROL WING FOUR

(VP41) Patrol Squadron FORTY ONE (6BPY5)
(VP42) Patrol Squadron FORTY TWO (6BPY5)
(VP43) Patrol Squadron FORTY THREE (6 BPY5)
(VP44) Patrol Squadron FORTY FOUR (6BPY5)
(AVP12) CASCO (F)
(AVD2) WILLIAMSON (F)
(AVD12) GILLIS
(AVP5) TEAL
(AVP6) PELICAN

At this point in exhibit No. 29, there appear five Employment Schedules for second quarter, fiscal Year 1942, of Cruisers, Carrier and Aircraft Groups, Destroyers, Submarines, and Patrol Wings, respectively, of Task Force Three, U. S. Pacific Fleet. These schedules will be and reproduced as Items Nos. 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hart Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Hart Inquiry.)

EXHIBIT No. 30 (HART INQUIRY)

16 MAR

From : Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy.

To : Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer.

Subject : Verification of testimony given by Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, before an examination re Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, ordered by SecNav Confidential Precept dated 12 1944.

Enclosure : (A) Transcript of testimony.

1. Transcript of my testimony before you on 15 March 1944 is returned with.

2. I hereby state under oath, the oath given me at said examination and as still being binding, that I have read said testimony and pronounce

P. N. L. BELLINGER

EXHIBIT No. 31 (HART INQUIRY)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington, D. C., 22 Mar

From : Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer.

To : Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

Subject : Examination of witnesses for purpose of recording and preserving testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 1941.

Reference :

(a) Precept for subject examination, dated 12 February 1944.

(b) Examining officer's ltr. of 17 February 1944, addressed to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

1. You are hereby notified that the examination convened by reference adjourn its meetings in Washington, D. C., for the present, on 23 March will depart from that City on or about 27 March 1944 for the purpose of the testimony of additional members of the naval forces now stationed at Pearl Harbor.

2. As the exact locations where these witnesses will be found, as well as the times and places where meetings will be held while away from Washington, cannot be now known, I shall be unable to write you as to the time of such meetings.

/s/ THOS. C. HART
THOS. C. HART

EXHIBIT No. 32 (HART INQUIRY)

[Air mail]

JUNE 4 1944

The honorable the ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.

(Attention : Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney General)

SIR: Reference is made to your letter dated May 22, 1941 in which is my opinion concerning the prosecution of the several Japanese Submarine Agents in Hawaii and also my radiogram of May 31, 1941 relative to this matter.

Immediately after receiving your letter, I contacted Mr. R. L. Shivers, Agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Agent in Charge of the Hawaiian Islands, who has been assigned to Japanese matters exclusively. Although I have been aware of this general situation for some time, no reports concerning Japanese matters have been submitted to this office. Mr. Shivers brought to my request, a copy of the investigative report of Special Agent in Charge, dated at Honolulu, March 10, 1941, in reference to ITSUO I concerning a violation of the Registration Act. From my conversation with Mr. Shivers and Mr. Tillman and from the information set out in the report, that a successful prosecution could be had against this individual Japanese Sub-Consular Agent in the Territory if the facts are substantiated the same in all of these cases. Mr. Shivers advises me that about forty

have been investigated completely and would be ready for immediate action and that the facts in the remaining two hundred or so are approximately the same and they could be brought up to date with very little notice. conference with representatives of the Army and Navy in which Captain H. Mayfield represented the Admiral of the 14th Naval District and M. W. Marsden represented the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Captain Mayfield stated that it was the opinion of the Admiral that action should be instituted immediately against these Japanese Sub-Consuls and that it should be handled in a routine manner so as to cause the least disturbance as possible. Colonel Marsden stated that it was the opinion of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department who is charged with the internal security of the Islands, that prosecution at this time would be detrimental to the general plans of the Army and would probably have a bad effect on work already done. It is also the Commanding General's opinion that the majority of the American citizens of Japanese ancestry will be loyal to the United States and that prosecution at this time of the Sub-Consular Agents only tend to aggravate the situation and probably materially effect the lives of these individuals. The Army has conveyed the opinion to the Japanese population as a whole that they will be taken care of and given full protection of the law if they are loyal to the United States. It is my opinion that these prosecutions should be instituted at the earliest possible time if they do not conflict with any policy of the State Department or other Departments of the Government. I think it has been clearly developed from investigation that these Sub-Consular Agents exercise an enormous influence on the Japanese population in the Territory and all evidence indicates that they are the sources of information for the Consul and the Agents to whom he delivers his instructions to the Japanese in the Territory. I think that if we ever hope to divorce the influence of the Consul and Tokyo from the Japanese people in the Territory of Hawaii, it should be begun immediately and that this would be one of the best steps in that direction. During the conference with the Army and Navy and other conferences that I had with individuals in Honolulu in reference to this situation, it is impossible to predict just what reaction the Japanese population as a whole in the Territory would have to such step, but it is my opinion that the good that would be accomplished would far outweigh any evil that might result. Further action will be taken on this matter until advice is received from the Department.

Respectfully,

ANGUS M. TAYLOR, Jr.,
United States Attorney,
District of Hawaii.

JB

EXHIBIT No. 33 (HART INQUIRY)

5 APRIL 1944.

Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, USN.

Vice Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Ret), examining officer.

Subject: Examination to record and preserve testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, ordered by Secretary of the Navy's General Order No. 1 dated 12 February 1944.

Reference: (A) Record of testimony given by Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, on March 28, 1944, the seventeenth day of subject examination.

Enclosure (A) is returned herewith. Recognizing that the oath given me on the seventeenth day of subject examination is still binding, I hereby state I believe the testimony given by me on the seventeenth day of said examination to be true and I hereby pronounce it correct.

JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT.

EXHIBIT No. 34 (HART INQUIRY)

5 APRIL 1944.

Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, USN.

Vice Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Ret), examining officer.

Subject: Examination to record and preserve testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, ordered by Secretary of the Navy's General Order No. 1 dated 12 February 1944.

560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTI

Inclosure: (A) Record of testimony given by Vice Admiral Richmorner, USN, on April 3 and 4, 1944, the twentieth and twenty-first day of examination.

1. Inclosure (A) is returned herewith. Recognizing that the oath on the twentieth day of subject examination is still binding, I hereby read over the testimony given by me on the twentieth and twenty-first examination and pronounce it correct.

/s/ R.
R.]

EXHIBIT No. 35 (HART INQUIRY)

U. S. S. IOWA, 6.

From: Captain John L. McCrea, U. S. Navy.
To: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Ret), examining officer.
Subject: Examination to record and preserve testimony pertinent to attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, ordered by Secretary of Navy pursuant to confidential precept dated 12 February 1944.

Inclosure: (A) Record of testimony given by Captain John L. McCrea, USN, on April 6, 1944, the twenty-third day of subject examination.

1. Inclosure (A) is returned herewith. Recognizing that the oath on the twenty-third day of subject examination is still binding, I have read over the testimony given by me on the twenty-third day of examination and pronounce it correct.

J. L.

EXHIBIT No. 36 (HART INQUIRY)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington, D. C., 24.

From: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer.
To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.
Subject: Examination of witnesses for purpose of recording and preserving testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 1941.

Reference:

- (a) Examining Officer's ltr dated 17 Feb. 44, addressed to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.
- (b) Examining Officer's ltr dated 22 March 44, addressed to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

1. Having returned to Washington, D. C., after the trip referred to in (b), the subject examination will reconvene in Room 2744, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., at 0930 on 27 April 1944.

2. Your attention is again invited to reference (a) which contains a statement of your rights in the matter should you decide to take advantage thereof.

/s/ Thos.
Thos

EXHIBIT No. 37 (HART INQUIRY)

MAKALAPA HEADQUARTERS
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 17 April 1944

From: Rear Admiral Howard F. Kingman, USN.
To: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Ret), examining officer.
Subject: Examination to record and preserve testimony pertinent to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, ordered by Secretary of Navy pursuant to confidential precept dated 12 February 1944.

Inclosure: (A) Record of testimony given by Rear Admiral Howard F. Kingman, USN, on April 17, 1944, the twenty-ninth day of subject examination.

1. Inclosure (A) is returned herewith. Recognizing that the oath on the twenty-ninth day of subject examination is still binding, I hereby read over the testimony given by me on the twenty-ninth day of examination and pronounce it correct.

I read over the testimony given by me on the twenty-ninth day of said month and pronounce it correct.

/s/ H. F. Kingman.
H. F. KINGMAN.

EXHIBIT No. 38 (HART INQUIRY)

HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER,
90 Church Street, New York, N. Y., 6 May 1944.

Vice Admiral H. F. Leary, U. S. N., Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. N. (Ret.), General Board, Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, on 7 December 1941.

(A) Transcript of testimony of Vice Admiral H. F. Leary, U. S. N., dated
May 1944.

In sending this letter, my attitude is that my oath is still binding. I hereby
state that I have verified my testimony given on 3 May 1944 and the transcript
now stands is correct.

The transmission of this letter, by registered mail, within the Domestic
Mail System of the United States is hereby authorized.

/s/ H. F. Leary.
H. F. LEARY.

EXHIBIT No. 39 (HART INQUIRY)

EXHIBIT 39 is Department of State Publication 1853, Peace and War, United
States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941. This document may be obtained in printed
form from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office,
Washington, D. C. It is not reproduced here as it is a public document.

EXHIBIT No. 40 (HART INQUIRY)

JAN. 24, 1941.

B-9-McC
A7-2 (2)/FF1
09112

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl
Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study
by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This re-
evaluation has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation
with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and
torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is
easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack
on the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval
base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the
readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character men-
tioned above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are con-
sidered to be:

- Air bombing attack.
- Air torpedo plane attack.
- Sabotage.
- Submarine attack.
- Mining.
- Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been
adequate for satisfactory. The following paragraphs are devoted principally
to discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution
of which I consider to be a primary importance.

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a strike force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

The counter measures to be considered are:

(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels; air attack can be launched.

(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;

(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;

(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;

(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet. It is possible, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are essential for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army anti-aircraft aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipment of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and radio locators which are only effective up to four miles.

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26 3" fixed anti-aircraft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 109 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft units are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of range. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by a number of new anti-aircraft guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional anti-aircraft guns, twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on Oahu. Pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombing, the augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It is of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.

The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of little value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground would prove most advantageous.

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of anti-aircraft aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an anti-aircraft net in Hawaii.

(2) That the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defense of Pearl Harbor.

(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of Army and Navy aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft operations against surprise aircraft raids.

(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft attacks against Pearl Harbor.

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance.

ty of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Department.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANK KNOX.

Honorable The SECRETARY OF WAR.

es to: CINC, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Com14

Op-22

Op-30

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, February 7, 1941.

SECRET

at: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

The Secretary of the Navy.

a. replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of sur-
attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to
s complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the ur-
of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort.
Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments,
continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses
e of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

the Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit
36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to
thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to
i within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This
ring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and
een of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new
3 pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will
embled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.
here are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns,
37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA
ne guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one
ed and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber
machine guns.

With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor
en ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements
nstallation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered.
develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot
e at an earlier date.

the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give
late consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages
e use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage bal-
are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made
ble prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand
ghty-four being manufactured—forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and
mainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds
o thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for
ing vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is
atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment
oke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the
anding General will look into this matter again.

With reference to you other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding
y of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian
ment, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities
king those measures effective.

/s/ HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

Memorandum Endorsement

NAVY DEPARTMENT, February 1

Op-30B3-AJ
(SC) A7-2(2)/FFI
D-27446

Secret

From: Director, Naval Districts Division.
To: Director, War Plans Division.
Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. (SecWar ltr, of Feb. SecNav.)

1. Returned. It is recommended that a copy of the subject letter to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and the Commandant of the 1st District.

/s/ Alex
ALEX

(Pencil Notation: Done 015712 of 11 Feb. M.)

EXHIBIT No. 41 (HART INQUIRY)

OFFICE OF SUPERVISOR, NEW YORK HAR-
17 Battery Place, New York, New York, 6 Ju

From: Rear Admiral Joel W. Bunkley, USN (Ret).
To: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Ret), examining officer.
Subject: Examination to record and preserve testimony pertinent to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, ordered by Secretary of the Navy's confidential precept dated 12 February 1944.
Inclosure: (A) Record of testimony given by Rear Admiral Joel W. USN (Ret), on 5 June 1944, the fortieth day of subject examination.
1. Inclosure (A) is returned herewith. Recognizing that the oath given on the fortieth day of subject examination is still binding, I hereby state I have read over the testimony given by me on the fortieth day of said examination and pronounce it correct.

JOEL W. B.

EXHIBIT No. 42 (HART INQUIRY)

U. S. S. VIXEN, 9 Ju

From: Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy.
To: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer.
Subject: Examination to record and preserve testimony pertinent to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, ordered by Secretary of the Navy's confidential precept dated 12 February 1944.
Inclosure: (A) Record of testimony of Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, on 5 and 6 June 1944, the fortieth and forty-first days of subject examination.
1. Inclosure (A) is returned herewith. Recognizing that the oath given on the fortieth day of subject examination is still binding, I hereby state I have read over the testimony given by me on the fortieth and forty-first days of said examination and pronounce it correct.

ROYAL E. INGERSOLL

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(The original Exhibit to which each illustration relates is indicated in parentheses following the description)

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1.	Map reflecting the Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan, showing Air Defense Sectors. (Exhibit No. 4)
2.	Fleet Employment Schedule, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942. (Exhibit No. 26)
3-7.	Employment Schedule, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, for Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers, Aircraft and Submarines of Task Force One, U. S. Pacific Fleet. (Exhibit No. 27)
8-11.	Employment Schedules, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, for Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers and Mine Craft, and Submarines and Patrol Planes of Task Force Two, U. S. Pacific Fleet. (Exhibit No. 28)
12-16.	Employment Schedules, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, for Cruisers, Carriers and Aircraft Groups, Destroyers, Submarines, and Patrol Wings of Task Force Three, U. S. Pacific Fleet. (Exhibit No. 29)

44.P31:P31 pt.27



PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 27

PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PI
HARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

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HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi-	tive from California
gan	FRANK B. KEEFE, Represent
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from	Wisconsin
North Carolina	

COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*
GERHARD A. GESELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*
JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, *General Counsel*
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, *Associate General Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

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3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
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6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

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34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

KEYED TO PAGES OF THE ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPTS, REPRESENTED IN THESE VOLUMES BY NUMERALS IN ITALICS IN ITALICS ENCLOSED IN BRACKETS, EXCEPT WITNESSES BEFORE JOINT COMMITTEE

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[2] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

MONDAY, AUGUST 7, 1944

PENTAGON BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board at 11 a. m., pursuant to notice, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Brig. Gen. Thomas North, General Staff Corps.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order. Colonel West, will you swear the reporters?

(Thereupon J. Chester Wilfong and Lloyd L. Harkins were sworn; Earl H. Pendell, affirmed.)

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, CHIEF OF STAFF,
WAR DEPARTMENT (WASHINGTON, D. C.)

General GRUNERT. Will the Recorder swear the witness, please?

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General MARSHALL. General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, War Department; Washington, D. C.

2. Colonel WEST. General, the procedure prescribed for the Board requires that all witnesses examined by it be advised [3] prior to testifying of their rights under Article of War 24. The Article of War mentioned reads in pertinent part as follows:

No witness before a military board * * * shall be compelled to incriminate himself or to answer any question to which may tend to incriminate him, or to answer any question not material to the issue when such answer might tend to degrade him.

In other words, do you fully understand that you do not have to answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate you, but that if you do, such testimony may later be used against you?

General MARSHALL. I do. I would like to say, before you get under way, I appreciate very much your coming over here, rather than my going over to your place of doing business. I would also like to say that I have not had time even to read more than about half way through the notes which they prepared for me, but I thought, in view of the fact the Secretary did not feel he could appear for quite some time, it was essential that I at least make a preliminary appearance

before the Board, to give you as much data as I could, so that you could get ahead on that basis without undue delay. If necessary, I can appear again, regarding any details that either I am misty about, or that you wish to go into, that I am not prepared to give you today.

3. General GRUNERT. We appreciate very much the opportunity to get this background. We need a starting point, and to get the War Department background is the start I think we need.

General, the order convening this Board states, in part :

[4] Pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, a Board of officers is hereby convened to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper.

Now, since the existence of the Board is based on the Public Law referred to, the Board made a study of congressional hearings thereon, and as a result deemed it part of its duties to go into the War Department background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. In consequence, the Board drew up a list of subjects on which it desires to question the Chief of Staff.

The large field to be covered by the Board in the limited time available made it advisable to assign objectives or phases of inquiry to individual members, although the entire Board will pass upon all objectives or phases. General Russell was assigned to this particular phase, so he will lead in propounding the questions, and other members will assist in developing them. That is just to get one member more familiar than the rest of the Board to go into the thing. General Russell, if you will take over, and either follow the list of subjects, or develop the thing as you see fit, you may proceed.

4. General RUSSELL. It is my thought, General Marshall, that it would probably be well to follow first the subjects that were listed in the memorandum that was sent over, and if it becomes necessary to refer elsewhere as we go along, we can do it.

The first subject on this list is described, there, in general terms as the "War Council." Apparently some confusion [5] has arisen as to the identity of that group. I am responsible for getting it into the record, and I have in mind the statements of the Secretary of State about the meetings between the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and, on occasions, with the higher military and naval authorities; so it is that group to which we refer. In order to elucidate just a little further, I might say that it was determined to discuss that subject with you, because of frequent references to the "war council" in the White Paper which the State Department has prepared and is circulating, showing the State Department's activities, through those critical years prior to 1941.

The first question under the subject of "war council" was the composition of that War Council. Do you recall who attended those meetings?

General MARSHALL. Normally, I think it was the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy. On frequent occasions, also, Admiral Stark and myself attended, and we brought with us occasionally other officials, or we took other officials with us. They occurred in Mr. Hull's office. I think, in most instances, there

was no record kept—as far as I know. I haven't a clear picture of a recorder being present; he may have been; I doubt it; certainly not on all occasions, and I do not recall on any occasion. I may be quite wrong about that. How often Admiral Stark and I went, I could not say. My dim recollection is that during this critical period, in the latter part of August, up until the outbreak of war, we probably went to most of the meetings, because I remember I was having a very hard time managing my business and attending the meetings, because they were rather lengthy; so I recall my [6] dilemma of the time involved in doing business there.

5. General RUSSELL. General Marshall, were there any limitations imposed upon you or other representatives of the War Department as to what you might disclose, that might have transpired at these council meetings?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall any limitation. It was a matter purely of our judgment.

6. General GRUNERT. That was left entirely to the Secretary of War's judgment, or your judgment, or to what either one of you saw fit to do?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of the matter, at all. I rather think that nothing was said about it, and it was just left to our good judgment. As a matter of fact, I might add that, on the security end, most of the restrictions were proposed and imposed by the military authorities, meaning officers, rather than others; so if there was any tendency to restrict and hold, it would have been on our part rather than on the other. I recall none whatsoever.

7. General RUSSELL. Is it true, or not, General Marshall, that as we moved along into 1941, and into the autumn of 1941, these meetings were more frequent than they had been theretofore?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; that is true. I would like to have about 10 minutes of a closed session.

(There was a closed session from 11:10 a. m. to 12:07 p. m., during which time the Recorder, the Assistant Recorder, and the three reporters withdrew.)

FULL SESSION RESUMED

8. General RUSSELL. General Marshall, when we were discussing [7] the relation between the War Department and the State Department as reflected in the council meetings, a moment ago, you said that those meetings were a little bit more frequent, in the latter part of 1941, than they had been theretofore.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

9. General RUSSELL. In those meetings, the subject of our relation with Japan was discussed. I assume?

General MARSHALL. With great frequency.

10. General RUSSELL. Were the possibilities of an assault on Hawaii by carrier-borne aviation considered in those meetings, or was that considered as a part of the War Department operations?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall any specific discussion of an attack on Hawaii. There were general discussions of Japanese assaults, but they related more to the Indo-China theater, where we had positive evidences of their preliminary movements.

11. General RUSSELL. Would you say, as a generalization, that the relation between the American Government and the Japanese Government became more tense as time went along, in 1941?

General MARSHALL. Decidedly so. I will add that we were very fearful of some warlike act by the Japanese, which immediately would have brought about a state of war in the Pacific, for which, at the time, we were not prepared; in addition to the fact that we had an immediate, close-up interest in the great events that were taking place in the European theater.

12. General RUSSELL. Speaking from memory, General Marshall, could you recall any occurrences in any of the council meetings in the fall of 1941 which affected to any degree the thinking [8] of the War Department toward possible trouble with Japan?

General MARSHALL. I think there were numerous indications brought to our attention by the State Department, or to the attention of the State Department by the War and Navy Departments, all of which indicated a very serious crisis developing in the Pacific in relation to Japan. I know that we, meaning Admiral Stark and myself, made it very clear, I think, to the Secretary of State, that it was of the utmost importance to utilize every resource to delay so long as possible any outbreak in the Pacific.

I recall that, I think early in September, in a discussion at one of these meetings, the question was asked of us, what was the earliest date in the near future that we would be reasonably prepared to take appropriate action; and we finally gave December 5, I believe, as that date. However, I recall particularly Admiral Stark felt that navally we would not be sufficiently prepared until, I believe, January or February—February is my recollection—and December 5 did not give sufficient time. The Army estimate of December 5 was based on the prospective sailings of transports and cargo boats to the Philippines and the movement of a total approaching 100 Flying Fortresses, being completed, in the Philippines by that time.

Actually the sailings were not made at so early a date as anticipated, due to combined difficulties of obtaining the necessary boats—that is, removing them from their then civil, commercial operations—and also the delay in receipt of matériel beyond the dates that had been given us, and, in particular, the delayed receipt of 45 Flying Fortresses, and the further delay of about two weeks, I believe, in their take-off from [9] San Francisco for Hawaii, because of unexpected head winds.

13. General RUSSELL. General Marshall, based on the information which was available to the War Department in the late fall of 1941, what if any conclusions were reached as to the probable plans of Japan for attack, as they related to the places to be attacked?

General MARSHALL. We anticipated, beyond a doubt, a Japanese movement in Indo-China and the Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay Peninsula. We anticipated also an assault on the Philippines. We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack.

14. General GRUNERT. From what we have learned, I do not think there is any use going into paragraph "B", about the Atlantic Charter.

General MARSHALL. Here is something. In further answer to your

question, I find the memorandum to the President on the subject of the Far Eastern situation, dated November 27, states this:

If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.

There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the Maritime Provinces, because of the strength of the Russian Forces. Recent Japanese troop movements all seem to have been southward.

[10] The magnitude of the effort required will militate against direct attack against Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies until the threat exercised by United States forces in Luzon is removed.

Then there are some remarks on the Burma Road or Thailand objectives, and this:

The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to the Philippines, but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process of reinforcement is being continued. Of great immediate concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before hostilities commence.

Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided as long as consistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more positive becomes the assurance of retention of these islands as a naval and air base. Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered and perhaps seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands. War with Japan certainly will interrupt our transport of supplies to Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process of aiding China.

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counter action against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United [11] States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East—

I referred to that a little while ago.

or south of 10° North—

"10° North" cuts them off from the Gulf of Siam.

Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is advantageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of communication, and an additional burden or communications. However, a Japanese advance to the west of 100° East or south of 10° North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which might lead to immediate hostilities should be taken.

It is recommended that—

prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcements, military counter action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;

in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be taken;

steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning.

[12] That is signed by Stark and signed by me.

15. General RUSSELL. Now, General Marshall, General Short went out to the Hawaiian Department early in 1941; I believe that is true.

General MARSHALL. Yes,

16. General RUSSELL. Did he come to the Department in Washington for conferences before going out?

General MARSHALL. He came to Washington. I haven't a very clear recollection of our interview here. The normal procedure would be for him to go into War Plans Division and familiarize himself with the plans relating to the theater into which he was going. I have a very indistinct recollection of that visit. However, I have a letter I wrote him just at that time.

17. General RUSSELL. The letter to which you refer is the letter of February 7, 1941?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

18. General RUSSELL. General Marshall, do you believe that that letter contains a complete statement as to the situation in Hawaii and the policies which General Short was to follow in his administration of the affairs of the Department?

General MARSHALL. No. There was a dozier or a file in the War Plans Division, of all the War Department instructions regarding the particular defense of that theater. This letter of mine gave a personal touch to my general views on the matter. I might say that since then I have rarely if ever written to any theater commander, so there could never be any confusion between my letters and the plans of the War Plans Division. As a matter of fact, I have rather given offense because I have not written. They have written to me, but I have seldom ever written to them. [13] I have made it all an official basis, coming from the Operations Section, which was the old War Plans Division. However, in this, this is not a complete defense of Hawaii, at all.

19. General RUSSELL. I think that this letter of February 7 should be incorporated into and made a part of the record.

20. General GRUNERT. What is the restricted, confidential, or other classification?

21. General RUSSELL. It is a secret letter.

General MARSHALL. Well, I do not know as it is secret, now.

22. General RUSSELL. It is marked "Secret."

23. General GRUNERT. We cannot put anything in the record that is not supposed to be treated in that manner.

General MARSHALL. Yes, I think you can put this in. All that letter of his that is here can go into the record.

24. General RUSSELL. I think then we will attach that letter.

(Letter of February 7, 1941, is as follows:)

(Stamped) Secret

WAR DEPARTMENT.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, February 7, 1941.

Lieut. General WALTER C. SHORT,
Fort Shafter,
Territory of Hawaii.

MY DEAR SHORT: I believe you take over command today, however, the reason for this letter is a conversation I had yesterday with Admiral Stark.

* * * * *

[14] Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Army matériel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns. Of course the facts are as he represents them regarding planes, and to a less serious extent regarding caliber

.50 machine guns. The 3-inch antiaircraft gun is on a better basis. What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this matériel throughout the Army, and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army.

The fullest protection for the Fleet is *the* rather than *a* major consideration for us, there can be little question about that; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. For example, as I told Stark yesterday—he had been pressing me heavily to get some modern antiaircraft guns in the Philippines for the protection of Cavite, where they have collected a number of submarines as well as the vessels of the Asiatic Fleet—at the present time we have no antiaircraft guns for the protection of Cavite, and very little for Corregidor. By unobtrusively withdrawing 3-inch guns from regiments now in the field in active training, we had obtained 20 3-inch guns for immediate shipment to the Philippines. However, before the shipment had been gotten under way the Navy requested 18 of these guns for Marine battalions to be specially equipped for the defense of islands in the Pacific. So I am left with two guns for the Philippines. This has happened time and again, and until quantity [15] production gets well under way, we are in a most difficult situation in these matters.

I have not mentioned Panama, but the naval requirements of defense there are of immense importance and we have not been able to provide all the guns that are necessary, nor to set up the Air units with modern equipment. However, in this instance, we can fly the latest equipment to Panama in one day, some of it in four hours.

You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that is humanly possible to build up the Army defenses of the Naval overseas installations, but we cannot perform a miracle. I arranged yesterday to ship 31 of the P36 planes to Hawaii by aircraft carrier from San Diego in about ten days. This will give you 50 of this type of plane, deficient in speed compared to the Japanese carrier based pursuit, and deficient in armament. But at least it gives you 50 of the same type. I also arranged with Admiral Stark to ship 50 P40-B pursuit planes about March 15th by Naval carrier from San Diego. These planes just came into production this week and should be on a quantity basis of about 8 a day by the first week in March.

The Japanese carrier based pursuit plane, which has recently appeared in China, according to our information has a speed of 322 miles an hour, a very rapid ability to climb and mounts two .20mm and two .30 cal. guns. It has leak-proof tanks and armor. Our P40-B will have a speed of 360 miles an hour with two .50 cal. machine guns and four of .30 caliber. It will lack the rapidity to climb of the Japanese plane. It will have leak-proof tanks and [16] armor.

We have an earlier model of this plane, the P40, delivered between August and October, but the Chief of the Air Corps opposes sending it to Hawaii because of some engine defect which makes it unsafe for training flights over water. Up to the present time we have not had available a modern medium bomber or a light bomber. This month the medium bomber will go into production, if not quantity production. This plane has a range without bombs of 3,000 miles, carries 2,000 pounds and has a speed of 320 miles an hour—a tremendous improvement on the old B18 which you now have. It can operate with bombs 640 miles to sea, with a safe reserve against the return trip. We plan to give you first priority on these planes. I am looking into the question of providing at least a squadron of Flying Fortress planes for Hawaii.

I am seeing what can be done to augment the .50 caliber machine gun set-up, but I have no hopes for the next few months. The Navy approached us regarding barrage balloons. We have three now under test, and 80 in process of manufacture, and 3,000 to be procured if the President will release our estimates. However, this provides nothing against the next few months. I am looking into the question of possibly obtaining some from England, but they are asking us and not giving us these days. The first test of the first forty deliveries in June will probably be made in Hawaii.

You, of course, understand the pressures on the Department for the limited matériel we have, for Alaska. [17] for Panama, and, *most confidentially*, for the possible occupation of the Azores, not to mention the new leased bases. However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first concern is to protect the Fleet.

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing

defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentration, and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yesterday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army and Navy feuds, engendered from fights over appropriations, with the usual fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of national defense. We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own nerves and irritations are concerned. Fortunately, and happily I might say, Stark and I are on the most intimate personal basis, and that relationship has enabled us to avoid many serious difficulties.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ G. C. MARSHALL.

[18] 25. General RUSSELL. General Marshall, in the letter of February 7, you stated that the mission of the Army out there was the protection of the Navy.

General MARSHALL. Yes.

26. General RUSSELL. Do you regard that as an accurate statement of the relation between Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Department?

General MARSHALL. Yes. That is the reason for the Army's being there.

27. General RUSSELL. To protect?

General MARSHALL. Hawaii's importance to us is as a naval-air base, and it is the center of Pacific Fleet activities. Our mission was to protect it, and for that reason, the eventual arrangement of command was a naval command.

28. General RUSSELL. In this letter, February 7, General, the statement was made by you to General Short that—

The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation.

Did anything that occurred between the date of this letter of February 7 and the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, cause you to change in any way that estimate of the situation in Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. Nothing occurred.

(Discussion off the record.)

[19] 29. General RUSSELL. General Marshall, between the date of February 7, 1941, and the date of December 7, 1941, do you recall any communications with General Short carried on by you either by telephone or letter or radiogram or any other method, a record of which is not in the War Department files?

General MARSHALL. No; I have no recollection of such a thing.

I have here another letter, of March 5. I do not know whether you have it in the record or not. It reads:

(Letter dated March 5, 1941, is as follows:)

MY DEAR SHORT: I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority. General Chaney has prepared a report of recent exercises held in the United States and incorporated therein his views and recommendations based on his experience in these exercises and his observation of the system and method employed by the British. A copy of this report is being sent to you.

An air defense exercise is contemplated for the West Coast in the Spring. This exercise is to include an establishment similar to that which has been se-

up in the Air Defense Command exercise in the Northeast and tested during January. It is highly desirable that representatives from Hawaii be present to observe [20] the details of this exercise. If this is found to be impracticable, we will consider having officers sent to the exercise who shortly thereafter are due for station in Hawaii.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

30. General RUSSELL. That is an important matter. Where did that letter come from?

General MARSHALL. I wrote that to General Short.

31. General RUSSELL. From what files in the War Department did you get that letter?

32. General GRUNERT. In other words, where is there a record of that letter, so far as the official files of the War Department are concerned? We have not run across it yet.

General MARSHALL. I do not know.

33. General GRUNERT. It might lead us to believe that there may be others.

General MARSHALL. My practice, when those personal letters come to me, is to send them right to the Operations Section, and they go into the files.

34. General RUSSELL. That letter could have been missed in a hurried search. I am sure if I had seen it I would have picked it up.

35. General GRUNERT. Was there an answer to that letter, General?

General MARSHALL. On the 15th of March General Short replies:

[21] (Letter dated March 15, 1941, is as follows:

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,

Chief of Staff of the Army, War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: In reply to your letter of March 5th I shall give you a brief review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department in regard to defense from air attack.

General MARSHALL. Do you have that letter?

36. General RUSSELL. No, sir.

37. General GRUNERT. Is there anything in that answer that could not be used now? In other words, is there something that might in the future jeopardize the defense?

General MARSHALL. The letter continues:

DISPERSION AND PROTECTION OF AIRCRAFT

The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack. Hickam Field is the most conspicuous target in sight and the Ford Island Navy Field is not much better. Wheeler Field is less conspicuous only because it is in the center of the Island. On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would suffer terrific loss. As I wrote you in my letter of February 19th some work has been done towards the preparation of emergency fields on outlying islands, but in no case has arrangements been completed for the dispersion of the planes in the vicinity of the field or the preparation of bunkers to protect them. I asked for [22] money and Engineer troops to do this work. The pursuit planes must necessarily be protected on the Island of Oahu on account of their limited cruising radius.

The Navy is organizing its new landing field at Barbers Point for the use of the carrier borne planes. They also are well along on the construction of an air base at Kaneohe Bay to which the 5 patrol squadrons will be moved. From their point of view this will improve the situation greatly. With the arrival of the additional 50 pursuit planes Wheeler Field will be so badly congested that it will be necessary to establish another landing field. Before my

arrival this had practically been decided upon adjacent to the new Navy landing field at Barbers Point. However, the Navy objected very strenuously to this and I think rightly so as planes coming in or going out from either field would have to fly over the other field and constitute a considerable element of danger. We have located another field about four miles northeast of Schofield Barracks. I think this is far more desirable from every point of view as we shall not be in danger of losing planes through the action of small landing parties or of having them damaged or of having the field put out of use by shelling from enemy ships. The runway will be about 5,000 feet so the bombers can use it as an emergency field should Hickam Field be out of action on account of bombing. The Observation Squadron and the squadron of light bombers is being [23] moved to Bellows Field in the next few days so as to lessen the congestion at Wheeler Field.

Plans have been made to provide gas and bombs at all emergency landing fields on outlying islands and for the stationing on Kauai, Maui, and Hawaii of the Battalions of National Guard which came from these islands for the protection of the air fields from sabotage and small landing parties. Incidentally these battalions would serve to prevent local disorders. Unless there is an emergency these troops will not be sent to the other islands until the camp buildings for one company have been provided at each air field. Part of each battalion can be quartered in existing Armories on these islands usually at some distance from the air field.

ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY

In general we have no serious shortage in 3 inch antiaircraft artillery, only 16 guns being required to complete our complement. As far as I know no provision has been made for 90-mm Antiaircraft guns. 20 out of 135 37-mm antiaircraft guns have been received. The exact date of the arrival of the others is not known. We are still short 236 of .50 caliber machine guns. Perhaps the most serious shortage is 8 long range detectors (AWS) which are supposed to arrive in June. Our present sound locators have a range of only $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles so they are practically useless. The new detectors will have a maximum range of 120 miles.

The shortage of personnel is much more serious [24] than that of equipment. Practically all of the Coast Artillery is assigned dual roles. This means that much of the Antiaircraft equipment would not be manned if it were essential to man the Harbor Defense guns at the same time. To man the authorized equipment would require 2 regiments of Coast Artillery (AA) (Mobile) (TO 4-11), 1 battalion, gun, Coast Artillery (AA) (Mobile) (less searchlight battery) (TO 4-15). 90 officers and 2,000 replacements to activate 3 gun batteries and 37-mm batteries. These were covered in my letter of February 10th.

COORDINATION OF ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE

The coordination of Antiaircraft defense presents quite a different picture at Hawaii from that existing in most places on the mainland. The island is so small that there would not be the same degree of warning that would exist on the mainland. After the installation of our new detectors we shall have some warning from the different islands and almost continuous service in the most dangerous direction for approximately 75 miles. The pursuit aviation, however, will have to be prepared to take the air in the minimum amount of time.

On account of the congestion in the areas at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, and Barbers Point, the coordination of the Army and Navy aircraft and of the Antiaircraft Artillery presents a very serious problem. We have had a committee of the Army and Navy working on this subject. The committee submitted its report March 1st and it is now being reviewed by General Martin, [25] commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, General Gardner, commanding the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, and Admiral Bellinger, commanding the Naval Air Station. We have had a number of combined air exercises in the past month and expect to have a minimum of one each week so we should find out anything that is wrong with the plan.

WEST COAST DEFENSE EXERCISE

If the situation here is such as to make it possible I would like to send both General Martin and General Gardner to the West Coast Defense Exercise

Martin is the senior with his temporary rank and probably will command our air defense if it appears that such a command is the proper solution of our problem. Gardner has had much more experience with this subject and I feel that it would be wise to send him also as he would be able to get all the details. If it is not advisable at the time to send these two officers I would like to send their Executives as I am sure a lot would be learned from the exercise.

I feel that the question of Antiaircraft Defense against air attack is the most serious problem that we have to face and I hope that funds and Engineer troops can be made available soon so that we can get definitely on the way on this subject.

Very sincerely,

/s/ WALTER C. SHORT.

[26] 38. General RUSSELL. Do you have any other letters in that file, or interchange of letters?

General MARSHALL. There is a letter from me to General Short, dated March 28. There is one from General Short to me, dated March 6, with relation to aircraft warning service.

39. General FRANK. Is this file a part of your personal files, or War Department files?

General MARSHALL. I do not have any personal file.

40. General FRANK. That file can be made available to us, can it not?

General MARSHALL. Oh, yes. I mentioned the one of March 6 without reading it. Then there is my letter to him of March 28 regarding relieving congestion by the construction of one additional field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected centers; stating that a company of aviation engineers will be sent during April, and further increases in the engineer garrison are contemplated when the necessary personnel can be made available; and my hope of arranging for the early augmentation of the antiaircraft garrison so as to provide full strength units, and also my approval of the proposal to send General Martin and General Gardner.

Then there is another letter from General Short to me, of April 14, regarding certain parcels of land.

(Excerpt from letter dated April 14, 1941, is as follows:)

Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy I am enclosing the following agreements made with them:

1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian [27] Department and Fourteenth Naval District, Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure.

2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement.

3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the joint agreement.

I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation requires.

We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force and the antiaircraft defense.

On May 5 a letter from General Marshall to General Short, referring to the letter of April 14th to which I just referred, reading as follows:

(Letter dated May 5, 1941, is as follows:)

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,

Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR SHORT: Thank you for your letter of the 14th enclosing the joint plans and the estimate concerning possible air action. It is evident that you have been on the job, and I know that the Navy is delighted to have such generous cooperation.

[28] The matter of locating strong points at various points throughout the Island looks sound to me, and authority to go ahead on the leasing of land parcels was radioed on April 22nd. War Plans and the Air Corps are still looking into the matter of the additional airdrome on Oahu, and I expect to have an answer for you in a short time.

I am hoping to leave in the next day or so on an inspection trip to the West Coast, which will include a visit to Alaska. I think they are doing a fine job up there and it will be good to get away from my desk for awhile. Last week the Appropriations Committee kept me on the stand through two successive sessions of four hours each, which involved answering a barrage of questions on all matters great and small.

It is most gratifying to hear you say that everything is going along extremely well and do not hesitate to write at any time.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

On May 29 I received a letter from him in which he reports on certain maneuvers, which I think will be probably very interesting to you gentlemen if you have not already seen it.

41. General RUSSELL. That letter is not in the file that was made available by the Adjutant General's Office.

General MARSHALL. Then there is a letter from me to General Short, dated October 10, reading as follows:

[29] (Letter dated October 10, 1941, is as follows:)

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter Hawaii.

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention and I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. For instance, the Hawaiian Air Force, among other things, is assigned the mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all air fields on Oahu against sabotage and ground attacks; and with providing a provisional battalion of 500 men for military police duty.

This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have been provided. As a matter of fact, we are now in process of testing the organization of airbase defense battalions, consisting tentatively of a rifle company and two antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific purpose of relieving the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind at locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as there are in Hawaii.

I wish you would give this your personal consideration.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

[30] Another letter from me, dated October 28, referring to a letter which I do not see here. General Short wrote me on the 14th, and it is not in here.

(Letter dated October 28, 1941, is as follows:)

Lt. Gen. WALTER C. SHORT,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR SHORT: With reference to your letter of October 14, I can understand your motives in giving ground defense training to Air Corps personnel which at present are excess for the equipment provided. However, the present rate of expansion of the Air Force is such that they are having considerable difficulty in obtaining experienced maintenance men and it is important that they be permitted to concentrate on the technical training of all potential mechanics, regardless of available equipment. Also, it is equally important that they utilize

all available time on this specialized training and the men not be left without assigned duties particularly during the maneuver period.

I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be [31] subordinated to their own specific training requirements.

It would appear that the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion program and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned. War Department Training Circular 47, which was issued July 18, 1941, can be accepted as a guide except in extreme situations.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

Here [exhibiting] is General Short's letter of October 14, 1941, replying to my letter of October 10, in which I referred to his standing operating procedure and said that it "has just come to my attention and I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units," and so forth.

(Letter dated October 14, 1941, is as follows:)

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I have your letter of October 10th with reference to the use of men of the Air Force on other than strictly air duties. At the time our tentative Standing Operating Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. Full Combat details and all overhead required only 3,885 men for the planes and organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the [32] assignment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers. Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack of Oahu could come only after destruction of our Air Forces. The fact that our planes had been destroyed would not mean that all the men had been put out of action. It is probable that several thousand men would still be left and it would not look plausible to have them sit down and do nothing while Infantrymen were detailed to protect them and their air fields. The training after the first two weeks takes up only about four hours per month of their time. It seems to me that they should continue to be trained as Riflemen in the immediate defense of air fields. As regards their use as Military Police that was not correct. The plan was to use them for guarding certain essential utilities, which did not require team training. However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon. They will be able to take over guarding of all essential utilities, highway bridges, railroad bridges, etc.

If it is not desired to train Air Corps men for their own protection and for the final defense of the air field I would like to be so advised.

Very sincerely,

/s/ WALTER C. SHORT.

42. General RUSSELL. Do those constitute the complete exchange of letters between you and General Short?

[33] General MARSHALL. So far as I know.

43. General RUSSELL. I repeat the question then, General Marshall. If there are any others than these transmitting information from you to General Short they are in the records of the War Department?

General MARSHALL. Yes. Those letters are, in effect, about what an officer in my position would say orally if he visited the command. They are not specific directives. It is what he thinks; it is what he is interested in; it is his interpretation.

44. General RUSSELL. Particularly the Board was interested in communications to General Short which bore on the relations between the Japanese and our Government in their relations in the Pacific. You have nothing in your file here relating to that?

General MARSHALL. Not other than the radios that made certain statements regarding that.

45. General RUSSELL. To refresh your memory, General Marshall, and in order that further search may be made, if necessary, the records which have been made available to the Board indicate that on July 7, 1941, a message was sent out from the Adjutant General to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in which the Japanese probabilities were discussed. It is in this language:

(Message dated July 7, 1941, is as follows:)

For your information. Deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. [34] This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive action against the Maritime Provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian Garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia. Opinion is that Jap activity in the South will be for the present confined to seizure and development of Naval, Army, and Air Bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. The neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated. They have ordered all Jap vessels in U. S. Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first of August. Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned.

The situation which developed at that time has been discussed by you previously. Our records show, General Marshall, that not again, until October, did anything go from the War Department out to General Short relating to our relations with Japan and the probabilities there.

In October, General Marshall, a memorandum originated in the Operations Department General Staff, at Washington, in which was discussed a Navy estimate of Japanese probabilities in the Pacific in which the Navy had stated that they thought war with Russia was imminent and that, since Japan held the British and us responsible for their present situation, there was a possibility of their attacking us. General Gerow prepared a memorandum which bears your initials and some other. [35] initials, disagreeing with that estimate and stating that the general recommendation was made that this be sent to the Hawaiian Department:

Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained, but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent.

From July down to October we have nothing else in our records, and we were wondering whether or not something else did exist or whether that October radiogram constitutes the next message to General Short.

General MARSHALL. So far as I know, it does. I think we have some passing back and forth between the War Plans Division and his staff out there, and I will check on that. That goes on pretty much all the time.

46. General RUSSELL. General Marshall, eliminating messages from the Navy which were shown to General Short, the next record that we have of any communication from the War Department to General Short is on the 27th of November, on which date the alert order went

out and a message from G-2 of the War Department to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department; and I was wondering if your files showed any other communications between the October message and the November 27 message.

General MARSHALL. I do not know of any. I will check up very carefully.

47. General GRUNERT. Was it SOP between you and the Navy that Navy messages of importance were shown to the Army and that Army messages of importance were shown to the Navy or did you agree that this particular message should or should not be shown?

[36] General MARSHALL. We did not say that. There were no instructions to the Commander not to show it at all. We put that in, in these critical cases, to make certain that there was no doubt about it. I know of no instructions to an Army Commander not to show this to the Navy. That was left to his own discretion. When we come to important things we put that in specifically.

I would like to explain to you here that the reason for that is that we did not want to compromise our codes; and if we sent instructions out, if the Navy sent them out and we sent them out, it presented a great hazard in the compromise of the codes.

48. General GRUNERT. But all those messages during that critical period, I believe, or most of them, did say to show it to the Navy; and in that case you did not send an additional message?

General MARSHALL. No; in order not to compromise the codes.

49. General RUSSELL. General Marshall, I will eliminate the Navy messages. A message that has been discussed considerably by the Board is the message of November 27, 1941, which bore your signature and went out to General Short.

General MARSHALL. I have it here.

50. General RUSSELL. Do you recall giving instructions for the preparation of that message or participating in its preparation?

General MARSHALL. I was away on the 27th. I left here on the afternoon of the 26th. I went down to maneuvers in North Carolina and did not return until the night of the 27th. [37] Incidentally, I think I left immediately after that, on the 28th, and went back again; and I have a rather distinct recollection of comparing the effect of this statement:

If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose intent.

I have a rather distinct recollection of considering those two statements. One, incidentally, was a governmental policy, the instructions of the President. My very dim recollection of the policy—and General Gerow or Colonel Bundy might have been more accurate in their recollection—is that I indicated the insertion of the overt act. But I am not quite clear on that. They may have gotten it from a joint board discussion, as General Gerow sat on the joint board.

I was trying to recall how that instruction came to us, but I think it was in a personal interview, but I do not recall it. I know it was the Government's policy.

51. General RUSSELL. General Gerow's testimony indicates that you did not participate in the preparation of this message of November 27, by a statement as to who did participate and your name was omitted.

[38] General MARSHALL. I think they knew I was not here. As I say, my recollection is very hazy, but I have rather a memory with reference to the matter I have just spoken of. It may have been, of course, when I looked at it when I returned the following day.

52. General RUSSELL. Similarly, General Marshall, if a message had been sent by G-2 of the War Department to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department on the same date, November 27, you being absent from Washington would not have had any personal knowledge of its contents?

General MARSHALL. I probably would not have seen it anyway.

53. General RUSSELL. To continue the history of the November 27 message, General Marshall, it requested that General Short report the action taken on it?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

54. General RUSSELL. Subsequently General Short sent a reply to that message in which he refers to the November 27 message from you over your signature by number. That message of General Short reporting action taken merely states:

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy REURAD four seven two twenty-seventh.

The original of General Short's report indicates that it was initialed by Secretary Stimson and has a stamp "Noted—Chief of Staff," and was initialed by General Gerow.

The Board has been interested to know the procedure in your office as it relates to stamping documents which do not bear your signature. Does that indicate that you did or did not see those messages?

[39] General MARSHALL. Well, I think if you look at the preceding message from the Philippines you will find that same rubber stamp on there, "Noted—Chief of Staff."

55. General RUSSELL. That is true.

General MARSHALL. And you will find it at the top of the message. You will find my initials.

56. General RUSSELL. Yes; I do see them.

General Marshall. But not on the other one. I do not know about that. I do not know what the explanation is. I initial them all; that is my practice. What happens, of course, is that there is more than one copy. One goes to the particular section that has the responsibility for working on it, which in this case was the War Plans Division, now the Operations Division, and then one comes to me. I initial it and then it goes out to the record. Where I think the Secretary of War ought to see it, and if he is not in the distribution, I check it to him. Where I think there is somebody else that should be notified, I indicate on the face of my copy who else is to be informed of this. As a matter of routine one agency is charged with the execution of the matter pertaining to the message. But in this particular case I do not know. I have no recollection at all.

57. General RUSSELL. The fact that it reached the Secretary of War's office and was by him initialed—would that or not indicate that you had sent it up to him or that it might have been sent up to him by someone else?

General MARSHALL. In this connection I invite your attention to the fact that this was filed behind a message from General MacArthur. I note that I did not initial it. [40] They evidently came in together.

58. General RUSSELL. If they were together you might or might not have seen them?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection at all. The presumption would be that I had seen it.

59. General RUSSELL. You cannot recall, General Marshall, whether or not you had at that time examined the message of the 27th to which General Short's radiogram was a reply?

General MARSHALL. No. As a matter of fact, my memory is that I discussed that message when it was being prepared, though General Gerow thinks that I saw it afterwards.

60. General GRUNERT. Who has authority to put out such a message?

General MARSHALL. The Acting Chief of Staff; in that case, whoever was acting in my absence. I do not remember who it was. Probably it was Arnold. He was the Deputy then.

61. General GRUNERT. It was by direction of somebody; otherwise they would not just out of a clear sky, after November 27, have sent a warning message. It was either by direction of somebody to send it or after some sort of a meeting or conference held that they did. Otherwise why should it have been sent on the 27th? Why not on the 26th or the 28th? Do you see what I am trying to get at?

General MARSHALL. I see exactly what you mean, but I am having difficulty in explaining it to you. I think the message was based on something that came in on the 26th, I rather imagine, but I have no clear recollection.

62. General GRUNERT. But the decision rested, as to whether [41] a message would be sent or not, with the OPD, or would it have to have the O. K. of your office?

General MARSHALL. Normally it would have to have the O. K. here. It is a question of good judgment. They send all sorts of messages all the time. I only see a small fraction of the messages sent by other people. I see the big directives. The same thing would apply to the Secretary of War. That was a very important message. I still have a very haunting memory that I was in on the discussion of the preparation of the message.

63. General GRUNERT. There was a so-called message that has not been mentioned yet, I believe, a message of November 28, signed by the Adjutant General and apparently prepared in the office of the Air Force, which dealt mainly with protection against sabotage of airplanes. Do you know anything about that message?

General MARSHALL. I know by having looked into it afterwards. What actually occurred—and General Arnold can give you a more direct statement than I can—Arnold was terribly concerned over the fact that they thought they had picked up sabotage on three or four of the big planes in this country, in the factories. They were pretty certain that certain things were the result of sabotage in the plants. But we never had any conclusive proof. So he was sending out a message, without any relation to this at all, in regard to that matter, and G-2 objected to it as a normal staff operation, that that was their bailiwick and not that of the Air Corps. The net result was that the

message was redrawn, as I recall, by G-2, and afterwards O. K.'d by the War Plans Division and sent, and it went all over the Army, overseas, and Alaska.

[42] 64. General GRUNERT. Now, your message of the 27th—that was directed to how many agencies? Panama, Hawaii, the Philippines, and West Coast?

General MARSHALL. Yes. "West Coast" includes Alaska.

65. General GRUNERT. And the G-2 was to all the G-2's?

General MARSHALL. The G-2 message had a much wider distribution.

66. General GRUNERT. It went to all the G-2 departments?

General MARSHALL. All. It went all over the place.

67. General GRUNERT. The air sabotage message, was that also of wide distribution?

General MARSHALL. Wide distribution; yes.

68. General GRUNERT. Is there any idea in your mind that the recipients of those three messages could have interpreted them or confused them to one taking the place of the other as the latest instruction?

General MARSHALL. I would say that all of these things occurring at the same time, this coincidence of reception may have had its bearing on the matter, very much as the leading planes that we finally got off from San Francisco arrived—were due to arrive—right in the middle of the confusion of the Japanese arrival, which undoubtedly did not help the expectations, the anticipations of enemy air approach. The G-2 sends a great many messages, as we all know from our own experience, and you had a coincidence there of, to a certain extent, unrelated messages going in at the same time.

69. General GRUNERT. Did you see the reports from the others—from Panama, the West Coast, and the Philippines, in reply to your message of November 27th? Apparently you did, because [43] they are initialed.

General MARSHALL. I think I initialed all of the others. The only one I did not initial, I think, was the Hawaiian one.

70. General GRUNERT. And they having reported all the measures taken, it seems odd that the Hawaiian should be the only one to misinterpret or confuse the three messages. They all got the same messages, so I would like to know if there is any light that I could get on why Hawaii particularly could interpret it one way, and the other three, the other way.

General MARSHALL. I don't know; I don't know.

71. General GRUNERT. I have put in enough, so far. Go ahead.

72. General FRANK. I would like to ask a question. Since Hawaii did not take any measures other than those against the sabotage, as indicated in the message, and since that reply had been asked for in your message of November 27th, was that Hawaiian reply satisfactory?

General MARSHALL. In the first place, as I told you, I have no very distinct recollection in the matter. The first definite reaction I have on it would be confused with the "backsight" state of mind. Colonel Bundy, who had immediate charge of this phase of the affairs in War Plans Division, spoke to me about it. His reaction to the message had been that, when he referred to his liaison to the Navy, that the whole thing opened up, because under the agreement that Short had brought

about with Admiral Kimmel, the Navy was charged with the deep reconnaissance, the Army, with the close-in affairs that pertained to Oahu direct. As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would have been involved in the deep reconnaissance would have been in detaching units to serve under the Navy. Well, the [44] main thing of course was the deep reconnaissance, to get a warning of the approach of these people. The reaction to the message also would have to be based on a knowledge of what the actual detailed defense order was. I was unaware of that. I believe that the No. 1 alert was changed in November, when the No. 1 was the top alert and later No. 1 became the preliminary alert.

73. General FRANK. This reply does not refer to a numbered alert. It simply refers to the fact that he is taking measures against sabotage, and the point I was trying to make is this: since there was a critical situation existing in the Pacific, as you stated in answer to one of General Russell's questions, and since the Generals in Panama and the Philippines had taken more conclusive measures for protection, did it not seem that the measures taken in Hawaii were somewhat sketchy?

General MARSHALL. Yes, unless you would assume, as the men who were working on the thing did assume, that when he established his liaison with the Navy, that meant that reconnaissance had started. To what extent they were familiar with the details on the sabotage alert, meaning that it took all the planes and massed them, unarmed, on the air fields, and that the anti-aircraft guns wouldn't have any ammunition by them, and things of that nature, I do not know.

74. General FRANK. There is lurking in the background, as a result of that report having been called for, and a reply made to it, an assumption that the reply was satisfactory. If it were not satisfactory, would it not have been a logical step for this office to have checked up on him?

General MARSHALL. Yes, quite so; undoubtedly.

[45] 75. General GRUNERT. It was OPD's business to advise you on that particular phase, wasn't it? You, yourself, do not, necessarily, have time to look into all those things.

76. General FRANK. No; that is true.

General MARSHALL. I have a responsibility, though, and the whole question was how you interpreted his reply.

77. General RUSSELL. General Marshall, the Board has been interested in knowing what information there was in the Office of the Chief of Staff as to the actual steps which General Short had taken for the defense of Oahu in response to this message of November 27th.

General MARSHALL. I just have no recollection of it, at the time. I might add that these messages went to all these various commanders, and they all came back, the replies came in, and they were analyzed in the War Plans Division. Business went ahead.

78. General RUSSELL. They were seen by you and referred out to the War Plans Division for the proper action?

General MARSHALL. Yes. Well, they go to them direct, and a copy comes to me.

79. General RUSSELL. A little earlier in your testimony, General Marshall, reference was made to the SOP's from the Hawaiian Department, and as I recall, your file indicated that they reached you in

October. These SOP's have in them these alerts 1, 2, and 3; 1 being the lowest type of alert. I have been told by someone in the War Plans Division that those SOP's were not received in the War Department until after the attack on December 7.

General MARSHALL. I couldn't answer that.

[46] 80. General RUSSELL. I am merely making this suggestion, now, because it may become material later, with the request that search be initiated.

General MARSHALL. Yes.

81. General RUSSELL. That is, to determine when those SOP's actually reached the War Department.

General MARSHALL. All I know is that I was told that this No. 1 alert alternated in its character from one extreme to another during November and December.

82. General GRUNERT. There was a so-called "SOP" of November 5, which may be the one which changed the alerts, if a change was made. The testimony of one Admiral Bloch also shows that he considered No. 1 of the Army to be a counterpart of No. 1 of the Navy, and therefore he didn't know this or that. How true that is, we are going to find out, but then so far as the report from Short as to the measures taken is concerned, you did not exactly know to what extent the measures taken for sabotage extended to other protective means?

General MARSHALL. No, I did not. As a matter of fact, my recollection is as to these various defense measures from all our overseas theaters, that I had not attempted to reach them all. In most cases of that kind, though, I don't recall it. In this, I have an outline made of the principal points, and I look at that. I recall reading very carefully the adjustment that Short made with the Navy, which was a brand-new departure, where they defined reconnaissance activities, the Navy taking the oversea reconnaissance mission as its responsibility, and the Army, the close-in reconnaissance, so far as air was concerned, as its responsibility. I recall it very [47] well, because the air people objected, and I supported Short. So I had a reason for recalling that quite distinctly.

83. General RUSSELL. General Marshall, on the point that you are discussing now, it is not clear, to me at least, and I do not know whether it is, to the other Members of the Board, what action was necessary, and who initiated the action to make effective the plan for the reconnaissance in the Department. I do not believe the question is clear.

Let us assume that when the message of November 27 reached General Short, he had concluded that this outer patrol and inner patrol should be made effective. We are not clear as to who should have made the initial movement to have initiated those patrols.

General MARSHALL. My own view of that would be that if the message, as I believe this message was, was repeated to the naval officer which meant it was instructions from the Navy Department, they would take action according to it, implementing the thing, as that officer's, because Short had no command over him. For several years he had known General Short, but they each had a certain mission at a certain time. Now, the point is, though, that the message went to one, to be repeated to the other, and worked out both ways, who ever started the message. In this case it was started on the War Department side.

84. General RUSSELL. Well, is it your view that both having seen the message of November 27, without more ado the Navy should have started their distant reconnaissance?

General MARSHALL. That is right. That is my view.

85. General RUSSELL. And the Army, the close-in?

General MARSHALL (reading):

[48] Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

86. General GRUNERT. That leaves it up to both parties to live up to their responsibilities?

General MARSHALL. The commanders of overseas garrisons—it is quite conceivable they might be attacked, without anything from the War Department, whatever. Of course, in all of this the point is the transition from peace to a war-time state of mind, and many alerts; as you and I recall, in the year 1907, in the Philippines. I, myself, have gone through two Japanese alerts.

87. General RUSSELL. You were rather well acquainted with the foreign policy of the United States as it related to Japanese activities, were you not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

88. General RUSSELL. Did you regard that policy as a rather definite and firm policy?

General MARSHALL. I don't believe I could comment on that. In the first place, I don't quite understand the question, and in the next place I would rather not be involved, as a military official, in expressing myself on the foreign policy of the United States.

89. General RUSSELL. I was leading up to this question—that the message of November 27, 1941, apparently can be easily broken down into two parts; one dealing with what General Short should do in the event of hostilities; the other part dealing with what General Short should do prior to hostilities. He was directed to initiate reconnaissance and take other measures [49] that he thought necessary, and then there are these restrictions or limitations or cautions. He is to carry out these necessary measures, and reconnaissance, so as not to alarm the civilian population, or disclose intent, and then as a general caution he must "limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." Members of the Board have been debating whether or not those cautions or restrictions, or however they may be properly defined, were of such nature, first, as to minimize in General Short's mind the seriousness of the situation which actually existed. I am not sure that that is a fair question; it may be a pure opinion.

General MARSHALL. I am inclined to think it is. I think that that matter ought to just stand on the record. We have got the record of what he was told, and you can draw your conclusions from that—the series of messages, and also I think you have got to have very clearly in mind as I say the transition from a peace state of mind to a war state of mind.

90. General RUSSELL. I certainly shall not care to pursue the matter further or to press you on it.

91. General GRUNERT. Just to have it in the record for our future consideration, I want to put a query, to be answered, or not as you see fit, or whether or not the question is such as to really demand an

answer. That is this: Here, the same message, or three messages, go to at least four prominent commanders, or three of them, overseas—Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines, and one, on a presumably exposed West Coast. Three of them apparently interpret those messages in one way, and the fourth one does not; so the three of them report all the measures they have taken, or show by their reports that [50] they considered this as quite a critical and dangerous situation; so they take greater measures than the fourth does. Now, is there anything in the case of that fourth, which happens to be the Hawaiian Department—are there any peculiar circumstances there that it should be interpreted in a different way for that command than it was in Panama, the Philippines, or on the West Coast?

General MARSHALL. All I can say to that is this—and my answer does not explain the contrast between the very, very urgent attitude of the naval and army commanders in Hawaii, in the spring and early summer, with relation to air and antiaircraft and radar requirements. All I can say is that Hawaii had always 130,000 Japanese in a very congested district, there, and no commander could ever forget that; and the others did not have them. That did not exist in Panama. You had Panamanians over the border, but certainly you had no feeling of fears regarding them. In the Philippines you had no Japanese population certainly of any moment. It actually developed later there was a fifth column, very well organized, out there but you had always present in your mind in Hawaii the large Japanese population, of unpredictable activities. There, I think, is quite a contrast between that one man and the other three. As I say, I don't know; I have never had explained to me, why there was apparently the cessation of fears of air attack, that seemed to be preeminent in the mind of Admiral Kimmel in February, when he wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, and that official wrote to the Secretary of War, and embarrassed us greatly, because we had almost nothing to give—we were bankrupt so far as materiel was [51] concerned—and the later urgent requests with regard to radar, for example.

92. General RUSSELL. Those are the only questions I have.

93. General FRANK. I would like to ask one question, here. Back here, in the beginning, you stated that the presence of the Army in Hawaii was for the protection of a naval and air base?

General MARSHALL. I said, a naval and air base.

94. General FRANK. I just wanted to get it straightened out in the record.

General MARSHALL. Naval and air. Originally it was naval, and then it became naval and air.

95. General FRANK. Have you any information to give or any comments to make relative to the failure of any contractors on Hawaiian projects to complete their work on time, prior to December 7?

General MARSHALL. I have no knowledge on that, but we will examine the records to see if there is any indication, here.

96. General FRANK. Have you any information as to whether or not any military personnel neglected their duties relating to Hawaiian construction contracts?

General MARSHALL. I have no knowledge of that.

97. General FRANK. Do you have any information to give to the Board on a Mr. Wilhelm Rohl?

General MARSHALL. I have not, personally; but I will have them examine into the records of the War Department to see if there is anything on the subject here.

98. General FRANK. Were you in any way familiar with the Hawaiian defense contract let by Colonel Theodore Wyman?

[52] General MARSHALL. I was not.

99. General FRANK. Now, General Marshall, a reading of the Roberts Commission testimony leads one to the conclusion that there was a general feeling in both the Army and the Navy, and in Hawaii, that there would not be an air attack. In other words, there was a state of mind of security against an air attack. Do you believe such a state of mind existed?

General MARSHALL. I was unaware of it. The previous communications we had had, notably those of the spring and up to June 1941, related very specifically to the urgency of measures protective against an air attack.

100. General FRANK. Do you believe that the presence of the Fleet in being at Pearl Harbor mainly constituted a feeling of security that contributed to this state of mind?

General MARSHALL. I had had no opinion on that, and up to this instant I do not know whether I have formed any opinion on that or not. I had never thought of that particular aspect of the matter.

101. General FRANK. At that time, December 1941, what in your opinion was the general feeling in military and naval circles relative to the effectiveness of the air attack with bombs and torpedos?

General MARSHALL. As I recall, we considered it as very effective, in view of what had occurred in the European theater.

102. General FRANK. Over a period of two years, ending December 7, 1941, on about how many occasions was the Hawaiian Department required to go on alert?

General MARSHALL. I will have to get that data for you.

103. General FRANK. This next question: Was any consideration [53] ever given in the War Department to the possibility of a feeling of apathy that might ensue as a result of "crying wolf! wolf! too often"?

General MARSHALL. Very much so.

104. General FRANK. With respect to the messages on sabotage sent to General Short from Washington, do not the provisions of his war plan and his standing operating procedure provide for full defense against sabotage?

General MARSHALL. I think it does.

105. General FRANK. Were not the provisions of these plans known in the War Department?

General MARSHALL. They must have been.

106. General FRANK. Then why was sabotage especially singled out?

General MARSHALL. By whom?

107. General FRANK. By messages that were sent to him. Between November 16 and 28 there were six messages sent to him, four of them told him to be careful not to disturb the Japanese, and three of them cautioned him about sabotage.

General MARSHALL. Two of those on sabotage that are related to air were just coincidences, and those, not to disturb the Japanese, related to air, and the extreme anxiety not to have anything happen which would provoke a break, which would enable the Japanese to say that we were taking action, to give them an excuse for action; and that was to enable Mr. Hull to stall this thing off as long as possible. All measures against sabotage are very difficult of set-up, because they indicate their purpose so plainly when you have to deploy your people around the key points and have them stay there in tents or [54] otherwise, so they always provoke a difficult situation, and one that we were fearful would give the Japanese some handle to place the accusation against us that we were taking action of a hostile character directed towards them. That is as nearly as I can recall the reason for the three messages that you refer to, I think, though I have to look at the messages to familiarize myself with what they say. I don't recall them.

108. General FRANK. In accordance with that, you feel that it was a responsibility for the War Department to caution about sabotage?

General MARSHALL. In relation to what I have just said. We were trying to be very certain that we did not take measures which the Japanese could put their fingers on and say that we were doing something that was hostile; and most of your sabotage defense has to be right out in the open, a great portion of it. Now, in that respect we were doing something. We had to talk about it, too, because that was related to the meetings with Mr. Hull, where we were trying to do anything possible that could be done to stall off a break in the Pacific.

I have got to go. I have got something that just won't wait.

109. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much, General.

110. Colonel WEST. As these proceedings are confidential, we are cautioning everyone not to mention anything.

(Thereupon, at 2 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

[55]

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[56] **PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD**

TUESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1944

**MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.**

The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

**TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JOHN L. McKEE, 87TH DIVISION, FORT
JACKSON, SOUTH CAROLINA**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General McKEE. Brigadier General John L. McKee, 87th Division, Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

2. General GRUNERT. General, in an attempt to get at the facts in looking at the War Department background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack, it is hoped that, by reason of your assignment as a member of the OPD at that time, you can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover so large a field in the time available, [57] individual Board members have been assigned objectives and phases, although the entire Board will pass upon all objectives and phases. General Russell has this particular phase assigned to him, so he will lead in propounding questions, and the other members will assist in developing it.

3. General RUSSELL. General McKee, what were your duties and assignments during the year 1941?

General McKEE. In July 1941, I was assigned to the War Department as a member of the War Department General Staff. I was assigned to War Plans Division, to the project group of War Plans Division. Specifically, I handled matters which pertained to the Hawaiian defense project.

4. General RUSSELL. Prior to your assignment to the General Staff in July of 1941, where were you and what were you doing?

General McKEE. I was P. M. S. T. at the Valley Forge Military Academy, Wayne, Pennsylvania.

5. General RUSSELL. At some time prior to your assignment to the General Staff in 1941, had you been on duty in the Hawaiian Department?

General McKEE. Yes; I was on duty in the Hawaiian Department from 1935 to 1937.

6. General RUSSELL. What was your assignment in the Hawaiian Department?

General McKEE. During the first, I should say, three months I commanded the 1st Battalion of the 19th Infantry. Then I was Assistant G-4, Hawaiian Department. My specific duties were to handle the Hawaiian defense project.

7. General RUSSELL. Were you reasonably familiar with the [58] plans for the defense of Oahu as developed by the War Department?

General McKEE. I believe I was.

8. General RUSSELL. Did that familiarity include the joint plan between the Army forces and the Navy forces in the Territory?

General McKEE. Yes, sir. I was familiar with it.

9. General RUSSELL. General McKee, your position, however, in Hawaii, and later on the General Staff, concerned itself principally or more immediately with problems of materiel and supply generally; is that true?

General McKEE. Personnel and materiel.

10. General RUSSELL. Is it true or not that in your study of those problems of personnel and materiel it was necessary for you to be familiar with the tactical situation and the strategical plans and demands?

General McKEE. Yes; that is true.

11. General RUSSELL. You were familiar with the several documents which embodied the plans that you have just testified about, were you?

General McKEE. That is correct.

12. General RUSSELL. For the benefit of the Board, and in order to clarify our thinking and our study of these documents, would you describe these documents briefly, beginning with the basic or underlying document and working toward the definite and detailed plans?

General McKEE. The plans on file in the War Department on December 7, 1941, which concerned the Hawaiian Coastal [59] Frontier, were based on the Orange Plan, which was then obsolete.

May I refer to this document to get the correct name?

13. General RUSSELL. Surely.

General McKEE. The War Plans Division prepared a strategic plan which consisted of Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5 and Concentration Plan Rainbow No. 5.

14. General GRUNERT. Who prepared that?

General McKEE. War Plans Division.

15. General GRUNERT. Of the War Department?

General McKEE. The War Department General Staff. A copy of Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5 was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, on August 21, 1941. Receipt was acknowledged on September 3, 1941. A further revision of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5 was approved by the Joint Board on November 19, and a copy of the Joint Army and

Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5 was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, on November 28, 1941. As far as I know, the latter document was not received prior to December 7. As I recall, it did not change the mission or concept of the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

16. General GRUNERT. Then the plan actually in existence, to be carried out, had been receipted for by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, September 3, 1941?

General McKEE. That is correct. But the plans on file in the War Department were not based on that plan. As I understood it, they were in the process of revision at that time. The mission and the concept were not materially changed over the Orange Plan. The Orange Plan related to a specific action.

[60] 17. General GRUNERT. What plan was the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department operating under as of December 7, 1941?

General McKEE. Under Rainbow No. 5.

18. General GRUNERT. And he had been operating under that since September 3, 1941?

General McKEE. That is correct, sir.

19. General RUSSELL. Was that the document which you referred to a little while ago as being obsolete?

General McKEE. No, sir. The document which I referred to as being obsolete was the Orange Plan. The Orange Plan related to a specific operation, whereas the Rainbow Plan related to any war in which the United States should become engaged.

20. General RUSSELL. Is a copy of the Orange Plan, obsolete, among the documents which you brought over to the hearing room with you this morning?

General McKEE. No, sir; I did not bring the Orange Plan.

21. General RUSSELL. Then it has no materiality in establishing the relationship between the War Department and the Hawaiian Department?

General McKEE. No, I think not, because the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had received Rainbow No. 5.

22. General FRANK. In September?

General McKEE. In September; and although we had not received any revision of the plan based on Rainbow No. 5—

23. General FRANK. From him?

General McKEE. From him, on December 7, because of the fact that the mission was practically the same, a little bit broader in scope, perhaps, and there was no real necessity to change his basic plan.

[61] 24. General RUSSELL. Would it be possible at this time for you to identify, for the convenience of the Board, the document on the table which you referred to as Rainbow 5?

General McKEE. This (indicating) is War Department Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5, 1941.

25. General RUSSELL. The document which you have just handed me is the entire plan, or are there other documents related to it?

General McKEE. There are other documents related to that. There is the Basic War Plan, the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, and that is Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5 (indicating).

26. General RUSSELL. Can you identify the last document which you have just described?

General McKEE. It is Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5.

27. General RUSSELL. Do you see it on the table here?

General McKEE. That is it, right here (indicating). The Basic War Plan is not here.

28. General FRANK. I thought you just identified that as the Basic War Plan.

General McKEE. No; the Operations Plan, War Department Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5. The Joint Basic War Plan is not here. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, did not have a copy of the Joint Basic War Plan; he only had a copy of the Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5, which is based on the Joint Plan.

29. General GRUNERT. Was there any reason why he should be furnished a copy of the Joint Plan?

General McKEE. No, sir.

30. General FRANK. Why not?

[62] General McKEE. Because this Operations Plan assigned him his mission. It establishes a category of defense and, as I recall, I think it sets up the missions, the troop bases.

31. General FRANK. What do you mean by "category of defense"?

General McKEE. Categories of defense were assigned to coastal frontiers. The category of defense determined the type of attack which the Joint Board visualized the particular coastal frontier might be subjected to, and formed the basis for the missions which it set up for the defense of the coastal frontier.

32. General FRANK. How many categories were there? Do you remember?

General McKEE. I do not remember, General. I know the category of defense for the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier was Category D.

33. General GRUNERT. What does that signify in regard to the other categories?

General McKEE. I do not have it specifically stated here, but Category D did not visualize a major attack against that coastal frontier. By "major attack" I mean an attack which would result in the occupation of the area by a hostile force.

34. General RUSSELL. Let me say for the benefit of the Board that this is a line of questioning which will be developed when we get on the other documents.

35. General GRUNERT. I thought it might leave a doubt in anyone's mind in reading the testimony as to what Category D was, and I wanted to develop it to see whether or not it was the highest category or the lowest, or in between, and, generally, [63] what that category did cover.

36. General RUSSELL. We can clarify it at this moment.

I hand you, General McKee, the Hawaiian defense project, and call your attention to subparagraph b under section 2 of that, in which category of defense D is described, and will ask you to tell the Board, having refreshed your memory from this.

37. General FRANK. What is a category?

General McKEE. It is a classification of defense, of the type of defense, based on what the War Department visualizes that the type of action will be.

38. General FRANK. How many were there for the Hawaiian Department?

General McKEE. There was only one. The category of defense assigned the Hawaiian Department was Category D, which assumes the possibility but not the probability of a major attack.

39. General GRUNERT. What is included in the definition of a major attack?

General McKEE. By "major attack" was meant an attempted landing on the shores of the land area of that coastal frontier.

40. General GRUNERT. Might it be described as an all-out defense?

General McKEE. Yes, sir; that is a better definition.

41. General GRUNERT. Then Category D included how far up the scale toward an all-out defense? I might add, did it include raids and air attacks and submarine attacks?

General McKEE. Yes; it did include raids, air attacks, and blocking of channels by hostile vessels.

42. General GRUNERT. Reconnaissance, patrolling, and so forth?

[64] General McKEE. Yes, by surface craft, submarine, or carrier-based aviation.

43. General GRUNERT. Is the mission of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department stated in comparatively few words and will you put that in the record?

General McKEE. Yes. You want the mission of the Army as stated in the Hawaiian defense project?

44. General GRUNERT. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, which I presume is what you call the Army?

General McKEE. Yes, sir. It is so stated here as the Army Hawaiian defense project, which is a document prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. It states:

Missions: Mission for the Army; to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces and against hostile sympathizers, and to support the Naval forces.

45. General GRUNERT. Give me the mission as far as the Navy is concerned, if you have it right there.

General McKEE (reading):

Mission for the Navy; to patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

46. General RUSSELL. Let us go back and see if we can straighten this up, General. You say that sometime in September 1941, the War Department sent General Short a plan for the defense of the Hawaiian Department. Is that right?

General McKEE. It sent in this plan in August, as I recall it, and receipt was acknowledged on September 3.

47. General RUSSELL. Would you, please, for the Board [65] identify with a note just what document or documents were sent to General Short at that time?

General McKEE. Yes, sir.

48. General RUSSELL. Will you just take a piece of paper and put it on here so that we will know what you are talking about?

General McKEE. This (indicating) is the plan that was sent to the Hawaiian Department.

49. General RUSSELL. Suppose you just make a note to that effect.

General McKEE (after writing note as requested. It was receipted for by the Hawaiian Department on September 3, 1941.

50. General RUSSELL. General, was this document which you have just identified for the record the only instruction which General Short had from the War Department for his defensive mission out there?

General McKEE. He had received instructions from time to time from the War Department, specifically from the Chief of Staff, and those instructions were not in conflict at any time with the plan.

51. General RUSSELL. Do you know anything about when other instructions were received by General Short, personally?

General McKEE. I do not know personally.

52. General RUSSELL. When you say that he had received instructions from the Chief of Staff, is that a surmise or is it based on fact?

General McKEE. It is based on my knowledge of the records.

53. General RUSSELL. What records do you refer to?

General McKEE. The War Department records

[66] 54. General RUSSELL. Will you describe them a little bit more definitely so that we may locate them?

General McKEE. Well, there was correspondence, personal correspondence, between the Chief of Staff and General Short, beginning with about the 7th of February, 1941, right straight on up and including December 7, 1941.

55. General FRANK. Were you then currently conversant with this correspondence?

General McKEE. Was I then currently conversant with it?

56. General FRANK. Yes.

General McKEE. In a general way, yes, because it usually resulted in some action being taken in the way of priorities for means.

57. General RUSSELL. Do you have something definitely in mind as illustrative of your answer to General Frank?

General McKEE. Well, I have in mind the question of radars; I have in mind the question of antiaircraft artillery; the dispersal of airplanes; provisions for bunkers; and the dispatching to the Hawaiian Department of an increase in air strength.

58. General RUSSELL. Those things all resulted from correspondence between General Marshall and General Short?

General McKEE. For the most part, yes; either that or action of the Joint Board. One thing that resulted from the action of the Joint Board was the project for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area, which occurred——

59. General RUSSELL. Rather late in 1941?

General McKEE. No; it was approved, as I recall it, by the Joint Board in April 1941. The project was set up for the [67] defense of Kaneohe Bay, which the Army had not assumed prior to that time, and the means had been set up in the Hawaiian defense project but had not reached him on December 7, 1941. The additional means, I mean.

60. General RUSSELL. In response to this operational plan which was sent out to General Short and received by him on September 3, did he prepare any documents for the defense of the Hawaiian theater or the Hawaiian frontier and return them to the War Department?

General McKEE. Not to my knowledge. It was my understanding that they were in the process of revision. But the War Department was not particularly alarmed about that, because of the fact that his current defense plan, although not based on Rainbow No. 5, was in consonance with it.

61. General FRANK. Had he had time between the receipt of this Rainbow 5 and December 7 to have prepared such a plan and have gotten it back to the War Department?

General McKEE. Well, I hardly think so.

62. General GRUNERT. In that respect, from your experience with plans and so forth, how long does it usually take for a revision to be completed, no matter whether major or apparently minor? Does it usually take up to four or six months to get it through to the War Department, on account of all the ramifications?

General McKEE. That is correct, sir. I hesitated with regard to the Hawaiian Department because actually it entailed no major revision. It was basically the same.

63. General GRUNERT. That is, in your opinion there was no [68] major revision needed, in the opinion of the War Plans Division?

General McKEE. That is correct, sir.

[69] 64. General RUSSELL. General, if no plan had been prepared by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and returned after the receipt of your plan, in September, on what plan or plans was the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department proceeding for the defense of the Hawaiian frontier on December 7, 1941?

General McKEE. As far as the War Department knew, he was proceeding on the joint plan. Let me get the correct nomenclature—Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, and plans pertinent thereto, they consisting of the Joint Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, the Naval Operations Annex, the Army Operating Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

65. General RUSSELL. Wait just a minute. I have before me the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, and I have before me the Joint Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, labeled "Operations Annex." Now, you have mentioned a third document?

General McKEE. I mentioned the Army Operating Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, and Operations Orders pertinent thereto. These are the several subordinate plans. This was of 1938, and revised in 1940: Army Operating Plan for Hawaiian Coastal Frontier; Hawaiian Department; and this was a division, the 18th Wing, and the separate Coast Artillery Brigade. This is the Hawaiian Department document.

66. General RUSSELL. Then am I correct in assuming that the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, when considered in connection with the Joint Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Naval Operations Annex, and the Army Operating Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Operations and Orders, [70] 1938, constituted the entire plan of the Commanding General for the defense of that Department?

General McKEE. That, together with the Operations and Orders, which were issued by the control of the Hawaiian division of the 18th Wing, the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Command, and the Operations and Orders, are the Hawaiian Department.

67. General RUSSELL. Then we have here before us, General, all of the material documents published by the War Department?

General McKEE. No, sir—published by the Hawaiian Department. That is, but the other is not.

68. General RUSSELL. Let me finish my question—published by the War Department and the Hawaiian Department, for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, on the 7th of December, 1941?

General McKEE. No, sir. You did not mention the Hawaiian Defense Project, revision of 1940; and then there was an SOP which I have since learned never reached War Plans Division, but somehow or other got to General Marshall, and he commented on it and sent it back to General Short in a personal letter. It was a tentative SOP.

69. General GRUNERT. By "SOP" you mean "standing operations" and operating "procedure"?

General McKEE. Yes, sir.

70. General GRUNERT. Do you recall the date on that? Was it November 5, 1941?

General McKEE. No, sir; it was earlier than that. There was another one issued, so I later learned, I believe somewhere around November, which had not been received in the War Department on December 7.

[71] 71. General FRANK. Did it have to do with the use of air troops, outlining their duties?

General McKEE. Yes, sir. The point in question was, in the first SOP missions were assigned the Air Force for the defense of air fields, and it was brought to General Marshall's attention by General Arnold, and General Marshall wrote a personal letter to General Short.

72. General GRUNERT. By "protection of air fields" you mean the ground protection by air personnel?

General McKEE. Yes, sir; that is what I mean.

73. General GRUNERT. That is all.

74. General RUSSELL. General, now, let us analyze these plans briefly. I hand you the War Department operations plans Rainbow No. 5. I think you have been over it. Whether it is in the record very clearly or not, I do not know. From that will you tell us the mission of the Army out there, as assigned to General Short?

General McKEE. Yes, sir. The mission that I read previously was not from this document. It was from the Hawaiian Defense Project of 1940.

75. General RUSSELL. Who prepared the Hawaiian Defense Project of 1940?

General McKEE. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

76. General RUSSELL. He did not assign himself a mission, did he?

General McKEE. The defense project requires that the commander preparing it set forth his mission and his concept of it, which forms a basis for his planning. It was his [72] understanding.

77. General RUSSELL. Well, let us go back to the question, General, and see if you can read out the mission which was assigned to General Short by the War Department.

General McKEE. You want the joint or the Army mission?

78. General RUSSELL. Let us have the joint, first, and then the Army.

General McKEE. I read paragraph 30:

HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER

(c) Missions.

(1) Joint—Hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base and control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

(2) Army—Hold OAHU against attack by land, sea, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers. Support naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within the tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

(3) Navy—Patrol the Coastal Zone; control and protect shipping therein; support the Army.

79. General RUSSELL. In the statement of his mission by the Hawaiian Defense Commander, General Short, was that mission set forth in identical terms in his document with the one by the War Department?

General McKEE. No, it was not, because this mission is [73] somewhat broader and superseded his publication of the Hawaiian Defense Project of 1940, and is somewhat broader in scope. The first part of it is essentially the same.

80. General RUSSELL. Now, General McKee, did the War Department have a plan which General Short had worked out to effectuate and to accomplish that mission, which provided for the distribution of his forces and the establishment of strongpoints, gun positions, and so forth?

General McKEE. Yes, sir. He had such a plan. It is incorporated in the plans which you have before you, there—the detailed plan for the disposition of his forces.

81. General RUSSELL. To repel an all-out invasion?

General McKEE. Yes, sir; to repel an all-out invasion, because in the Hawaiian Defense Project he states that while the War Department has assigned Category D, which does not visualize an all-out attack, the other bases for training and planning have adopted that as meeting any contingency.

82. General RUSSELL. Could you find that, right quickly, in the Hawaiian Defense project, for us?

General McKEE (reading):

Basis for planning

(1) Missions and Conditions.

(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon the following conditions:

The currently assigned category of defense will be Category D * * *

The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces under the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange * * *

[74] (b) Possible and probable war situations are:

(1) The sea lanes from the continental United States to Hawaii are open and, that the garrison of Hawaii will be reenforced from continental United States.

(2) That the most probable form of attack is a surprise attack consisting of raids, and bombardments by ships, ships' fire, and air forces, and action by local sympathizers.

(3) That the sea lanes from the continental United States will be closed and that there will be an attack by a major expeditionary force. From the War Department point of view, this contingency is so remote that it will make no additional allowances of either men or reserves to meet it. This is commonly referred to as the "cut-off from the Mainland situation".

(4) The latter contingency forms the basis for our training, as being all inclusive and providing maximum reality for the troops during their training.

(c) Conclusion.

To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's maximum effort. This plan is outlined in the next paragraph.

And so on.

83. General GRUNERT. May I interject a question, there?

Those instructions are to the effect that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department has been furnished certain means, and

they prescribe a category defense, which in this case happens to be Category D. Is it not possible and reasonable to suppose [75] that conditions might change, in which an all-out defense might become necessary in a hurry, before the War Department can implement the defense command for an all-out defense, and therefore an all-out defense might be required with whatever means were handy, and the information given to the defense commander in the interim would not necessarily make him wait for a change of category?

General McKEE. That is correct, sir, because the category defense says—"the possibility but not the probability." He must always be prepared for the possibility.

General McKEE. That is correct, sir, because the category defense depends a great deal upon what is furnished the commander to defend with?

General McKEE. That is correct, sir.

85. General GRUNERT. That is all I have right now.

86. General RUSSELL. Now, General McKee, after this document had gone out to the Hawaiian Department in September 1941, and the War Department received no changes in the plans of the Hawaiian Department for its defense, am I correct in assuming, or is my recollection correct, that you stated that the War Department attached no importance to General Short's not having sent in revised plans, because these original plans in the main were in line with the operations plan which arrived in September?

General McKEE. That is correct. There was hardly time for him to do it, in the first place. In the second, the War Department did not press him, because the plans which we knew to be in force were considered adequate to meet any contingency.

[76] 87. General RUSSELL. Now, again, in November, this document that I referred to as the September Rainbow No. 5, was amended and sent out to him again with some changes?

General McKEE. That is right.

88. General RUSSELL. And you never received a receipt from General Short on that, at all?

General McKEE. That is correct. I do not recall what that amendment was, but I am quite sure that it did not materially change the mission or the concept.

89. General RUSSELL. General, some time in November, late November, 1941, certain messages were sent out to General Short relative to the enemy situation, and some directions as to what he should do. Are you familiar with those messages?

General McKEE. I am familiar with the messages, but I knew nothing about them at the time they were sent.

90. General RUSSELL. Do you recall any information which reached the War Plans Division in November, from the Chief of Staff, or from G-2 which materially altered the international situation as it related to the Pacific?

General McKEE. Yes, sir. There was considerable information that reached the War Plans Division as a result of the conferences that the State Department were having at that time, and as the result of information given the War Plans Division by G-2. As a result of that information there were several messages sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, acquainting him

with the situation. In fact, messages had been sent him previous to November, informing him of the strained relations with Japan.

91. General RUSSELL. General, let us go back now to the [77] information which your division received from the Chief of Staff. Was that information in writing?

General McKEE. I cannot answer that, because I did not figure in on it. May I explain the organization? I would like to explain the organization of the War Plans Division. The War Plans Division had a project group and a strategy-and-policy group. Colonel Bundy was the Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group, and Colonel Bundy and General Gerow were the two individuals who received this information for War Plans and acted upon it.

92. General RUSSELL. Do you know what that information was?

General McKEE. The information was concerning the strained relations with Japan—the possibility of war with Japan, actually.

93. General RUSSELL. Was it general in its nature, or specific?

General McKEE. I can't answer that, because it did not come to me, and I can only be guided by what I saw later in the messages.

94. General RUSSELL. Then all you can testify about the information which reached your division from G-2 and the Chief of Staff results from the action which was taken by War Plans Division?

General McKEE. That is correct, sir.

95. General RUSSELL. So you did not see any documents containing specific information, or hear any conversations between the Chief of Staff or G-2 and your division, which conveyed any specific information?

General McKEE. I did not hear them; no, sir.

96. General RUSSELL. So, so far as you know, there was just a [78] change in the operations of your division, or in its instructions to General Short, and you believe that that was predicated on enemy information which must have been received from those sources?

General McKEE. That is correct.

97. General GRUNERT. May I suggest you change "enemy" information to "information concerning Japan," because at that time I do not think Japan was an enemy. I know that Japan was not an enemy.

The Colonel Bundy to whom you refer is now deceased, is he not?

General McKEE. That is correct, sir.

98. General GRUNERT. And General Gerow, to whom you referred, is now in Europe?

General McKEE. That is correct, sir.

99. General RUSSELL. General, let us turn to the other side of the picture, now. You say that you are familiar with the messages that were sent to General Short in late November, and you say further that there were other messages sent out there to give him the information on these strained relations with Japan; is that true?

General McKEE. That is true. There was correspondence between the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department—personal correspondence, in which he expressed his alarm at the situation. Also, a message, as I recall, that went out in July 1941, with specific reference to the Japanese situation.

100. General RUSSELL. Colonel West, will you get that out of the general's file for us, please?

[79] General McKEE. I think I have it in this thing. I prepared at the time of the Roberts Commission. July 7, 1941, a message was sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with regard to the Japanese situation.

101. General RUSSELL. What did that message say about probable Japanese intentions then?

General McKEE (reading):

For your information deduction from important information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy and is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probably aggressive action against the military provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia. Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval, Army, and air bases in Indo-China, although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. The neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated. They have ordered all Jap vessels in United States Atlantic ports to be west of the Panama Canal by first of August. Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned.

102. General RUSSELL. We know all about that message, General. We were just wondering what there was in that message which indicated to you that there was a changed situation between the Japs and the Hawaiian Department.

[80] General McKEE. Well, I would say the whole tenor of it. The whole message indicates that.

103. General GRUNERT. With reference to the messages which you refer to that went to Hawaii, do you know whether there were some naval messages that the naval authorities were directed to transmit to the Commanding General at Hawaii? Did such messages come to the War Plans Division, so that you would have such knowledge?

General McKEE. Yes, sir. There was a message of, I believe, November 24, which was sent from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commanding Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in which it says:

The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action addressed * * * inform senior Army officers their respective areas.

104. General GRUNERT. Does that also apply to the so-called "war warning" message of November 27?

General McKEE. I believe that was a "war warning" message.

105. General GRUNERT. In that message does it actually use the words "war warning"?

General McKEE. Not in this paraphrase of it, but there was a message sent, not the one I have here, but there was a message sent which began—

This is a war warning.

and the Commanding General of the Pacific Fleet was directed to inform the interested Army officers.

106. General RUSSELL. Now, General, I think we can simplify all of these messages here and all the evidence about messages by one question. You are familiar with the document which was [81] prepared by General Gerow and submitted to the Roberts Commission?

General McKEE. Yes, sir. I have a copy of it right here.

107. General RUSSELL. Does that document contain all of the material messages going from the War Department to General Short, about which you know?

General McKEE. Yes, sir.

108. General RUSSELL. Now, there was a message which went out to General Short on the 27th of November, about which you know?

General McKEE. Yes, sir.

109. General RUSSELL. And it was signed by the Chief of Staff, or the name of the Chief of Staff was signed to it?

General McKEE. I can't answer that.

110. General RUSSELL. Did you see the reply of General Short to that message?

General McKEE. Not at the time. I did not see it until about the time of the Roberts Commission.

111. General RUSSELL. From the 27th day of November until the 7th day of December, what did the War Plans Division know as to the alert which had been made effective in Oahu by General Short?

General McKEE. I cannot answer that, sir, because I personally knew nothing of it. I knew nothing of the November 27th message, nor did I know anything of the reply that was received thereto. The message was prepared by General Gerow and Colonel Bundy, and the reply was received by General Gerow, and I was not informed.

112. General FRANK. And yet you were in charge of the Hawaiian desk in the War Plans Division?

[82] General McKEE. Yes, sir. I would like to say, however, that my duties did not involve plans and policies. That was a function of Colonel Bundy's division. When that had been decided on, my particular group had to do with furnishing the material means, seeing that they got the material means.

113. General RUSSELL. General, I want to ask you a question, now, which you may or may not be able to answer, but with the hope that you had some experience which might indicate to the Board just what was done under the condition. This joint plan provided for the close-in reconnaissance to be done by the Army, and for the distant reconnaissance to be done by the Navy; that is true, is it not?

General McKEE. Yes, sir.

114. General RUSSELL. Do you know what burden if any rested upon the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to initiate steps to see that both types of reconnaissance were in force if the situation demanded such reconnaissance?

General McKEE. Well, there was a joint agreement between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commanding General of the 14th Naval District, which set forth certain measures to be taken with regard to aircraft.

115. General RUSSELL. I am just wondering whether or not this agreement between the Army and the Navy, out there, which stated that these measures for the defense of the Hawaiian frontier were to be effectuated on a cooperative basis, was the only way that they had to set things in motion.

General McKEE. That is correct. There was no unity of command.

116. General RUSSELL. And therefore anything that had to be [83] done had to be reached by mutual agreement, is that true?

General McKEE. That is correct, sir.

117. General RUSSELL. General, in one of these documents which I saw rather hurriedly there seems to be a statement that that cooperative plan shall remain in effect until something occurs, and I was not able to get it out of these documents, here, this morning. Do you remember about that?

General McKEE. May I look at the document?

118. General RUSSELL. Yes.

General McKEE (reading):

When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid, or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans.

119. General RUSSELL. The point is this, that the operation of the naval and Army forces out there in Hawaii was all to be done by agreement?

General McKEE. That is correct, sir; but the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had been given instructions by the Chief of Staff that they would get along, that the plans would be coordinated.

120. General FRANK. What effect did that have on the Naval Commander out there?

[84] General McKEE. The Naval Commander, sir, so far as I know, did not know about that letter. That was in a personal letter from the Chief of Staff to General Short, which told him the main thing was the protection of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet.

121. General FRANK. But really, of what direct effect on the Naval Commander would have been instructions by General Marshall to the Army Commander?

General McKEE. None, sir, because the Army Commander was under General Marshall.

122. General RUSSELL. One other point, I want to clear up, General. You say that you never did see the SOP's that General Short prepared out there in the fall of 1941?

General McKEE. I never did, sir, and as a matter of fact the record will show that they were never received in War Plans Division.

123. General RUSSELL. Then the War Plans Division did not know what alert 1, or alert 2, or alert 3, was?

General McKEE. So far as I know; no, sir. I certainly did not, and the record indicates that the SOP was never received in War Plans Division. How it got to the Chief of Staff I do not know. I rather assume that it got to him because there was a memorandum attached to it from General Arnold to the Chief of Staff, in which he drew attention to the use of the air-force personnel.

124. General GRUNERT. As a matter of fact, is it any of a higher commander's business to know just what means are employed to carry out the mission, unless it interferes with said mission? In other words, was the War Plans Division in the [885] habit of calling for all the subordinate measures, were they furnished as a matter of course, or did the War Plans Division consider that did not particularly affect them?

General McKEE. The War Plans Division was not particularly concerned with it. The Commanding General had been given a mission, and the means had been provided to carry out that mission.

125. General GRUNERT. In regard to the cooperation we have just been talking about, would the lack of cooperation on the part of one or the other be any justification for one or the other not carrying out his mission?

General McKEE. No, sir.

126. General RUSSELL. General McKee, in connection with these questions that General Grunert has asked you, I want to ask you a little bit about it. How did the War Plans Division consider from the standpoint of importance the Hawaiian defense command and its mission?

General McKEE. It considered it all important. It realized that the loss of the fleet base, and the Fleet, itself, would put us in the predicament that they did put us in, in the Pacific.

127. General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, wasn't that Department very high on the priority list from the standpoint of material that was shipped out?

General McKEE. Yes, sir; it was, particularly in such things as radar equipment, airplanes, antiaircraft artillery—those things that the War Department considered were essential to the most probable type of attack that would be expected to be delivered against the Hawaiian Department.

[86] 128. General RUSSELL. The importance of the Hawaiian Department was so pronounced that it resulted, as you have testified already, in a considerable amount of correspondence between the Chief of Staff, himself, and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

General McKEE. That is correct, sir.

129. General RUSSELL. The importance of the Hawaiian Department was so pronounced in the War Department that you did prepare this operations plan which goes somewhat into detail as to what is to be done out there in the defense of the Hawaiian Department, isn't that true?

General McKEE. I don't recall that that goes into detail. It assigns a mission, a category defense, and I think sets up a troop basis.

130. General RUSSELL. In all events it speaks for itself, does it not?

General McKEE. Yes, sir.

131. General FRANK. May I ask a question?

General RUSSELL. Yes.

132. General FRANK. In any event, this war plan would have been prepared, whether or not the situation with Japan was acute or not?

General McKEE. That is correct, sir.

133. General RUSSELL. You do not mean to testify that just as soon as you had prepared this plan and sent it out to General Short that you lost interest in the Hawaiian defense?

General McKEE. Certainly not, sir. That was my particular interest.

134. General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, you had agencies set up over there in the War Plans Division to follow up these [87] things, to see what was going on?

General McKEE. That is correct, sir.

135. General RUSSELL. And do you not think it was rather important for you people to know what your subordinate commander out there was doing in connection with the defense of that department?

General McKEE. I think we did know, sir.

136. General RUSSELL. Well, did you not say a moment ago that so far as you knew, in that critical period from November 27 to December 5, you did not know what disposition Short had made of his forces?

General McKEE. I would like to remind you, sir, that I personally did not know about the radiogram of November 27. I did not know that this was a critical period. I am speaking personally, now.

137. General RUSSELL. You heard General Gerow's testimony before the Roberts Commission, did you not?

General McKEE. Yes, sir.

138. General RUSSELL. You know what he testified about that?

139. General GRUNERT. May I interject a question? From your duties in War Plans Division, and with the knowledge of conditions in the Hawaiian Defense Command, do you consider that that Command was pretty well implemented for Category D defense, or were there any grave deficiencies?

General McKEE. Well, it was certainly the best equipped defense base that we had at that time. Except for airplanes, which were generally lacking, a few antiaircraft, some .50-caliber antiaircraft machine guns, and the completion of the installation of the fixed radar sets, they were well implemented, [88] extremely well.

140. General FRANK. Relatively speaking, it was better equipped than any other department, is that correct?

General McKEE. Yes, sir.

141. General FRANK. Is that correct?

General McKEE. In my opinion; yes, sir.

142. General RUSSELL. I have no further questions.

143. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

144. General FRANK. I would like to ask some questions. To get back to the manner in which a decision would be made to carry out reconnaissance, for instance, it has been brought out that for the Army and Navy to act simultaneously on the inauguration of air reconnaissance, it was necessary for that to happen through cooperation?

General McKEE. That is correct, sir.

145. General FRANK. Therefore, if the Army Commander thought that reconnaissance should be inaugurated, unless the Naval Commander reached the same conclusion and took action, it would not necessarily be inaugurated, is that correct?

General McKEE. No, sir; I see no reason why the Army Commander could not inaugurate reconnaissance on his own responsibility.

146. General FRANK. All right.

General McKEE. He had the means.

147. General FRANK. Do you know that there was an agreement that the Navy would conduct distant reconnaissance and the Army would conduct close-in reconnaissance?

General McKEE. That is correct, sir.

148. General FRANK. Then if the Army Commander determined that [89] distant reconnaissance should be conducted, and the Naval Commander did not arrive at the same conclusion, do you think it was the duty of the Army Commander to conduct it, under the circumstances?

General McKEE. Yes, sir. If the Naval Commander refused to do it and I felt that the security of Oahu depended upon it, I would certainly undertake to do it with the means at my disposal.

149. General FRANK. If he conducts distant air reconnaissance, his carrying capacity is taken up with gasoline instead of bombs, and he finds something, what is he going to do about it?

General McKEE. He could certainly have alerted his antiaircraft artillery, and the troops could have assumed their defense positions, if he had known about it ahead of time.

150. General FRANK. What becomes of the whole general plan of coordinated action then between the Army and the Navy, if the Army dissipates its effort that it is going to coordinate with the Navy in a general plan?

General McKEE. That is a very difficult question, sir. I see your point, but—

151. General FRANK. The question is not difficult. Maybe the answer is.

General McKEE. The answer is very difficult. I should say that it would depend upon how serious the Army Commander thought the threat was, and what lack of cooperation he obtained from the Navy. As far as I know there was no lack of cooperation. At least, he stated that in communications to the Chief of Staff.

152. General FRANK. Nevertheless, reconnaissance was not [90] conducted, was it?

General McKEE. I do not know, sir.

153. General GRUNERT. It does not follow that the witness has to answer every question. If he has not had the opportunity to properly judge, he may or may not answer. He may say he prefers not to answer.

General McKEE. I do not know whether a reconnaissance was made or not, sir. I am sure that the War Department thought it was being made, because it had been made at previous times when the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had been advised of a critical situation.

154. General FRANK. For the plan to work, both the Army and the Navy had to perform functions assigned?

General McKEE. That is correct, sir.

155. General FRANK. For the Army to conduct the close-in reconnaissance without the Navy's conducting distant reconnaissance would not have been particularly effective, is that correct?

General McKEE. That is correct, sir.

156. General GRUNERT. Are there any further questions?

157. General RUSSELL. Nothing.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(The Board recessed from 10:20 a. m. to 11: a. m.)

[91] **TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES, COMMANDING 1ST SERVICE COMMAND, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General MILES. Sherman Miles, Major General, Commanding 1st Service Command, Boston, Massachusetts.

2. General GRUNERT. General Miles, the Board, in an attempt to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoint prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that, because of your assignment as A. C. of S. G-2, at that time, you can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover so large a field in the limited time available, individual Board members have been assigned objectives or phases for special investigation, although the entire Board will pass upon the objectives and phases. General Russell has this particular phase. So he will lead in propounding the questions and the other members will assist in developing them. So I will turn you over to the mercies of General Russell.

3. General RUSSELL. What was your assignment in the year 1941?

General MILES. I was Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

4. General RUSSELL. Can you remember approximately the date on which you entered upon that assignment?

General MILES. May 1, 1940.

5. General RUSSELL. When were you relieved or transferred from that assignment? [92]

General MILES. The end of January 1942.

6. General RUSSELL. During that period of time you were actually the head of what we know as G-2 which embraced the Military Intelligence Division. Was that the name of it?

General MILES. That was the official name—Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff.

7. General RUSSELL. Briefly stated, General Miles, what were the functions of the G-2 section, including this Military Intelligence Division?

General MILES. The Military Intelligence Division, General, was all-inclusive. It was the whole thing, not as it is now, broken and divided between G-2 and Military Intelligence Service. It was all one division, just as the Operations and Training Division, or the Personnel Division, War Plans Division, and so forth. I was head of the entire division, which, in turn, was divided into counter-intelligence, positive intelligence, and in turn that was divided geographically to cover the world, or as much as we could cover.

8. General RUSSELL. Definitely, General Miles, as to the operations of your department related to the Japanese Government during your period of service there, what were you attempting to learn about the Japanese Government?

General MILES. We were attempting to learn everything we could about the Japanese Government, and had been doing so, in fact, a great many years. It was only one of the nations which we were attempting to cover, to gather all possible information about. Our system was a running digest.

9. General GRUNERT. May I interrupt there? If anything which [93] you put into the record is of such a nature as might be of value to other nations now, I wish you would consider that and, if so, give us that information in closed session, so that it will not be disclosed to anybody who may be able to see this record. Do you see what I am getting at?

General MILES. Yes, sir; I understand.

This summary digest was maintained on the principal countries of the world. Such a system is no secret. It has been maintained by practically every government. It was a running digest covering the military side, the political side, the economic side, and the psychological side. All the information that ever came in from any country to G-2 was collated and put into this digest and sent out to various military attaches and G-2s, all the corps areas and overseas departments who were interested in a particular country, in the form of corrected loose-leaf, so that you had a running build-up constantly. This had been going on, to my knowledge, for thirty years. In addition to that, of course, we sent out bi-weekly, as I remember, military intelligence summaries, which were short documents of facts that we had gotten in in the last two or three days from all sorts of agencies that we had. I say all sorts, because we kept in very close touch with the State Department, the Department of Commerce, the Rockefeller people in South America, and, of course, our own military attaches and observers that we had throughout the world.

That, in general, was our system of getting information and disseminating it.

10. General RUSSELL. Did the G-2 section, as such, have [94] personnel available for investigations in foreign fields in the year 1941?

General MILES. A limited personnel, General. We were building up. When I took over Military Intelligence in May of 1940 I remember there were 36 officers in the entire division. We built up rapidly to something over 400, with an equal proportion of clerical personnel. We built up very rapidly, as the war came nearer and nearer, our agencies in the field, field observers, military attachés. Our personnel was always limited. We did not have unlimited money or unlimited selection of officers, particularly officers. That was a time when the Army was building very rapidly. The natural inclination of a soldier is to go with troops and remain with troops. The general officers, of course, wanted the best men, naturally, and should have had them; and we did not have a free field for the selection of personnel, and quite rightly. We did the best we could with the personnel and the funds we had available.

11. General RUSSELL. About when did this personnel reach its maximum development of 400?

General MILES. Well, it was increasing all the time I was there. I do not know. I imagine it continued to increase after I left. I am pretty sure it did. I cannot place any date on any maximum reached.

12. General RUSSELL. Can you approximate the number of people who were available to you for service in Washington and throughout the country and in foreign fields, in October and November of 1941?

[95] General MILES. General, I would not try to answer that question from my memory. The records are certainly available to you. I could not do it.

13. General RUSSELL. General, a moment ago you referred to monthly or bi-monthly documents of some kind that were sent to the corps commanders and to the overseas departments. Did your office maintain copies of those reports?

General MILES. Oh, yes.

14. General RUSSELL. Are they in the files now?

General MILES. I imagine they are, sir. They are permanent records of the Military Intelligence Division.

15. General RUSSELL. There would be no reason to destroy them at all?

General MILES. Not that I know of.

16. General RUSSELL. I want at this point to say that I have asked for a search of the records over there and have looked at the records, but did not discover copies of such reports, although specifically I have asked for such reports. I am giving you that, because it may be necessary for us to conduct a further search to locate, if possible, these documents.

Now, to discuss for a moment the sources of information which you have divulged already and to limit it to Japanese information, what sources of information were there in Japan in the fall of 1941 on which you as G-2 could rely as to activities of the Japanese at home and in home waters?

General MILES. Within the United States?

17. General RUSSELL. No. I am now addressing myself to the situation in Japan and have asked what agencies or what sources existed in Japan upon which you could rely for information [96] about Japanese activities at home and in home waters.

General MILES. I would say that by far the most important source was our Embassy in Tokyo. We had a very excellent Ambassador who had been there a number of years with a staff that had been there a good deal longer than that. We had, of course, used the military attaché and his assistants. The information which we could get on the military side from our military attaché and his assistants was of course very limited; the Japanese being extremely close-mouthed. But the Embassy itself was constantly sending in dispatches to the State Department—Mr. Grew, particularly—on the state of mind of the Japanese people and the probability of what they were going to do next, and so forth. We also, of course, had direct access, through our very close connection with the State Department, to what was transpiring in the negotiations in the fall of 1941 here in Washington. Aside from that, I do not think there were any important sources of information in Japan. We were getting a good deal of information from what might be called the borders; in other words, China, and even the part of the Continent occupied by the Japanese. The Koreans would get out once in a while and we would get some information in that way. We exchanged information very freely with the British and to a certain extent, with the Dutch. They were a little afraid to give us information, as I remember, but we were getting some.

18. General RUSSELL. Did the British have any organization within the homeland of Japan which was watching the movement of their Army and Navy in the fall of 1941?

General MILES. I believe that they had about the same as [97] we had. As to actually watching the movements of ships and troops,

it was necessarily a system that worked sometimes and did not work at other times. You might see the ships move or the troops move, or you might not.

19. General RUSSELL. General Miles, is it true or not that from the State Department or from our Ambassador to Japan the information which we obtained related almost exclusively to the state of mind of the Japanese people toward the war and their enmity toward the United States?

General MILES. Are you putting that in the form of a question, sir?

20. General RUSSELL. Yes. Is it true or not that that was the case?

General MILES. That was the Ambassador's principal concern, naturally. I would not say, from my memory of the information that we got from our Embassy, that that by any means covered the field.

21. General RUSSELL. Do you remember a message from our Ambassador along in the fall of 1941, in which he summed up the situation and told the State Department to what extent they could rely upon him for information of troop movements, movements of the Navy, and so forth?

General MILES. I do not recall that particular message, General.

22. General RUSSELL. Maybe I can refresh your memory. May I ask you this as a preliminary? Did you attend the conferences that were held by the Secretary of State, which he refers to as the War Councils, where he had ordinarily the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and some of our high-ranking military [98] and naval people in to discuss the Japanese situation?

General MILES. No, sir. I think only the Chief of Staff attended them.

23. General RUSSELL. I refer particularly to this message which is contained in the State Department's book that they call the White Paper, which is a report from our Ambassador to Japan on the 17th day of November, I believe, 1941 (handing a book to the witness).

General MILES. What is the question, now, sir?

24. General RUSSELL. When did you first know about that message?

General MILES. I don't remember, General; I can't answer that question.

25. General FRANK. Did you know about it at all?

General MILES. I am not sure that I did. I think I did, because we had very close liaison with the State Department. I feel sure that I did; but, frankly, it is so obvious a message that the impression it gives me today is the same impression it gave me then: Yes, of course I know we can't count on it. How can we be sure that any group can tell us the movement of the Japanese fleet or army? We knew we could not.

26. General RUSSELL. In other words, the information which you have testified that you had from Japan about what was going on over there was rather general and indefinite in its nature?

27. General GRUNERT. Unless we know about that message the record will not be intelligible. Is it going to be copied into the record?

28. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Your information about the activities in Japan in the fall of 1941 was very indefinite and general? [99]

General MILES. Necessarily so.

29. General RUSSELL. The message from Ambassador Grew in Japan to the Secretary of State for purposes of the record will be identified as a paraphrase of a telegram dated November 17, 1941, and it may be copied from page 788 of this White Paper entitled "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941."

(Telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State, dated November 17, 1941, is as follows:)

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

(Telegram: Paraphrase)

TOKIO, November 17, 1941—1 p. m.
(Received November 17—2:09 p. m.)

1814. Referring to Embassy's previous telegram No. 1736 of November 3, 3 p. m., final sentence, and emphasizing the need to guard against sudden Japanese naval or military actions in such areas as are not now involved in the Chinese theater of operations. I take into account the probability of the Japanese exploiting every possible tactical advantage, such as surprise and initiative. Accordingly you are advised of not placing the major responsibility in giving prior warning upon the Embassy staff, the naval and military attaches included, since in Japan there is extremely effective control over both primary and secondary military information. We would not expect to obtain any information in advance either from personal Japanese contacts or through the press; the observation of [100] military movements is not possible by the few Americans remaining in the country, concentrated mostly in three cities (Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe); and with American and other foreign shipping absent from adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the ability to send without foreign observation their troop transports in various directions. Japanese troop concentrations were reported recently by American consuls in Manchuria and Formosa, while troop dispositions since last July's general mobilization have, according to all other indications available, been made with a view to enabling the carrying out of new operations on the shortest possible notice either in the Pacific southwest or in Siberia or in both.

We are fully aware that our present most important duty perhaps is to detect any premonitory signs of naval or military operations likely in areas mentioned above and every precaution is being taken to guard against surprise. The Embassy's field of naval or military observation is restricted almost literally to what could be seen with the naked eye, and this is negligible. Therefore, you are advised, from an abundance of caution, to discount as much as possible the likelihood of our ability to give substantial warning.

GREW.

30. General RUSSELL. General Miles, referring to the statement which is contained in Ambassador Grew's message:

and with American and other foreign shipping absent from adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the [101] ability to send without foreign observation their troop transports in various directions.

As a matter of information, do you know why at that particular time there was an absence of American and foreign shipping in Japanese waters?

General MILES. No, sir. I do not remember knowing of any particular absence of American shipping from Japanese waters at that time. Of course we had had information for a great many years which had been considered in all of our war plans in Hawaii that there was a certain part of the Pacific Ocean that we called the "Vacant Sea" in which there are practically no ships and in which large movement of ships could occur without anybody seeing them. It was that part of the ocean between the great southern routes that go from

Hawaii to the coast of Japan and China, and the northern great circle routes that go near the Aleutians.

31. General RUSSELL. The term which you used intrigues me. What was it you called it?

General MILES. I used to call it the "Vacant Sea."

32. General RUSSELL. As applied to that part of the Pacific adjacent to the mandated islands, would you say that they were in the area of the "Vacant Sea" or not?

General MILES. No, sir. The southern trade routes, as I remember, from Hawaii to Yokohama, we will say, pass considerably north of most of the mandated islands, such as the Marianas. All the seas surrounding the mandated islands were, as you know, extremely difficult for us to penetrate and get any information on for other reasons.

33. General RUSSELL. Why?

[102] General MILES. Because the Japanese would not allow us in there. You might sail through, but you would not see very much. That had existed for many years.

34. General RUSSELL. Was there any restriction on Americans landing on those islands that were mandated to the Japanese?

General MILES. Absolutely, sir.

35. General RUSSELL. Were Americans prohibited from landing in the mandated islands?

General MILES. Well, they did not say "Americans are prohibited," but Americans did not land. That was well known for years. No American warship went in there.

36. General FRANK. Do you know of any American port or any point over which the United States had jurisdiction that excluded Jap vessels or Japanese nationals?

General MILES. No, sir.

37. General RUSSELL. Do you know where there is any documentary evidence of the exclusion of Americans from the Japanese mandated islands?

General MILES. General, I would not know exactly where to put my hand on documentary evidence. It was one of the things perfectly well known to all of us in the Intelligence. I should think probably the Navy Department could aid you in that respect. I am pretty sure that the Navy Department several times tried to get ships in there.

38. General GRUNERT. As far as the so-called mandated island are concerned, they were sort of a blind spot for our Military Intelligence, were they?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

[103] 39. General RUSSELL. That is exactly what I was trying to find out.

How far are the Marshall Islands from Honolulu?

General MILES. My recollection is, about 1,600 miles. I would not swear to it.

40. General RUSSELL. General, were you acquainted with the plans for the defense of Pearl Harbor and the estimates in connection with the Japanese situation as to the probabilities of attack? Were all those things known to you at G-2?

General MILES. Rather intimately. I was G-3 of the Hawaiian Department from 1929 to 1931. I rewrote the war plan. I wrote the

general staff study and estimate of the situation, which was the "bible" at that time for some years. Then from 1934 to 1938 I was here in War Plans Division and was particularly charged with the three overseas departments, their projects and their plans. So, up to 1938, at least, and between 1929 and 1938, I was intimately acquainted with it.

41. General RUSSELL. In our brief study of the plan generally and the evidence just given by you, there was considerable emphasis placed on a probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor by carrier-borne aircraft. During the year 1941 you were, of course, familiar with the estimate and the probabilities?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

42. General RUSSELL. Did it occur to you as G-2 from what port or ports these carriers might depart on a mission of that sort?

General MILES. They might have departed on a mission from a great many ports. We did not know really what bases they had in the mandated islands, and obviously they could have departed [104] from almost any port in Japan, such as Kobe or Yokohama.

43. General RUSSELL. You stated that you did not know what bases they had in the mandated islands?

General MILES. Very little information on bases in the mandated islands.

44. General RUSSELL. As I recall, they acquired jurisdiction, such as they had over the mandated islands, as a result of the settlement at the end of the other war in 1918?

General MILES. That is correct.

45. General RUSSELL. And in 1941 they had had approximately twenty years to develop their bases in the mandated islands, their ports and so forth. Was there any information in G-2 in 1941 as to what the Japanese had actually done by way of preparing ports and bases in any of the mandated islands?

General MILES. Very little and very general information. We knew that they were developing certain places, such as Palau and Truk particularly, and we suspected Saipan. We relied very largely on information in Military and Naval Intelligence. Taken together, it could not have been called any detailed or complete information of their possible bases in the mandated islands.

46. General FRANK. Did you have anything on the Island of Jaluit?

General MILES. I do not remember what we had on Jaluit, but it was one of the islands that we used to discuss and suspect that they were developing.

47. General RUSSELL. General Miles, in the fall of 1941 did you in G-2 have sufficient data on Japanese developments in the mandated islands to predicate an intelligent opinion as to the [105] possibilities of launching convoys from there which might have included aircraft carriers?

General MILES. I would say that positively we knew enough to form an estimate that such a thing was a strong possibility, not a probability; that they had the means. That they would do it is another matter. They had the means to do it. I would say that our estimate at the time was that it was very possible, if not probable, that they did have those means.

48. General RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not the data on these developments on the mandated islands is a matter of record any place in the G-2 files?

General MILES. Oh, yes; we had files on them. We had maps and whatever we could get. The Office of Naval Intelligence had even more.

49. General RUSSELL. Did those maps show the developments, or just show where the islands were?

General MILES. So far as possible we made charts of the islands from one source or another and plotted on those charts, both Naval Intelligence and ours, where we thought they were developing, from what information we could get from traveling natives or missionaries or what have you.

50. General RUSSELL. I was asking you some questions a moment ago about the inhibition as to our going on those mandated islands. Were the inhibitions against going into the mandated islands only those of force or semi-force by the Japanese people who were there?

General MILES. That is what kept us away, General.

51. General RUSSELL. They just would not let you go in?

[106] General MILES. They just would not let us go in. They had one excuse or another. I don't remember just exactly what they were; but the net result was that mighty few people got into the mandated islands.

52. General RUSSELL. Did you attempt to send people from G-2 into the mandated islands in 1941?

General MILES. No, sir. I do not think any attempt had been made by G-2 for ten years. We knew we could not do it and get them out.

53. General RUSSELL. Were there any restrictions imposed on G-2 from higher authority about attempting to get in there and develop that situation in the mandated islands?

General MILES. Not specifically the mandated islands; no, sir.

54. General RUSSELL. But you did regard the geographic location of these mandated islands with respect to our naval base at Pearl Harbor as being rather material?

General MILES. Yes, I did, General; but, on the other hand, we knew perfectly well that Japan could attack the Hawaiian Islands without the use of the mandates. I remember very well writing one plan in which we developed the other side, based on a surprise attack launched from the mainland of Japan, with fast cruisers and carriers, carrying troops on their most rapid liners. We worked it up, just how they would take those liners off the route for one reason or another—this one to be repaired, and so forth—and suddenly launch this attack from the "Vacant Sea" and suddenly arrive in Honolulu. So the mandates were always a black shadow, but they were not [107] the only means of attacking Hawaii, and we knew it as far back as the early 1930's.

55. General RUSSELL. In those studies which were made by you, and others with which you may be familiar, did you ever consider steps which might be taken to discover in advance the mission and dispatch of these convoys to carry out that type of attack?

General MILES. We considered it, General, but, as Ambassador Grew says in that famous dispatch, "Don't rely on us from that point of view." It was much more an attack from the other side.

56. General FRANK. What do you mean by that?

General MILES. I mean, from the Hawaiian side, particularly air reconnaissance and submarine reconnaissance, to detect any force coming in before they could actually attack. I recall particularly

during all of General Drum's command out there in the middle 1930s he was very much interested and was constantly sending in papers to War Plans and they were coming to my desk, involving the possibility of a screen of large bombers which would cover the entire enormous perimeter contained in those five big islands. That was a current matter almost. Then, of course, the submarine screen was another matter that was constantly discussed. We had about twenty submarines out there in the middle 1930s.

But, to answer your question more succinctly, I do not think any Intelligence officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack force or task force in Japan before it sailed and know where it was going. That was beyond our terms of efficiency.

[108] 57. General RUSSELL. Or even the mandated islands?

General MILES. Rather less in the mandated islands.

58. General RUSSELL. You had less chance there?

General MILES. Yes.

59. General GRUNERT. Would such a force moving from one of the mandated islands indicate where it was going? Would there be a clear indication that it was bound for Hawaii or elsewhere?

General MILES. It would be no indication at all where it was going, General.

(There was informal discussion off the record.)

60. General RUSSELL. The G-2 people in their studies had to all intents and purposes eliminated investigations in Japan proper and other Japanese territory to determine probable action on the part of the Japanese Army and Navy?

General MILES. Oh, no, sir. We had not eliminated it. As Mr. Grew says, it was the principal task of the Embassy, particularly of the military and naval part of the Embassy. What I say is just what Mr. Grew says, that we never dreamed that we could rely on getting that information. It would have been almost a military intelligence miracle had we been able to spot a task force in forming and have known before it sailed where it was going.

61. General RUSSELL. Now, General, if that be true, then the conclusion had been reached, so far as discovering task forces of any sort moving to the Hawaiian Islands, that the chief if not the sole reliance would have to be placed on reconnaissance agencies based on the islands or on United States possessions contiguous thereto?

[109] General MILES. Yes, and at sea. I mean, by submarine and air power.

62. General RUSSELL. Do you recall when the last estimate of the situation was sent out to the Hawaiian Department from G-2?

63. General FRANK. Prior to December 7?

64. General RUSSELL. Yes; prior to December 7, 1941.

General MILES. General, I do not know that any estimate of the situation, if you are using that term strictly, was sent. What we sent were those corrected sheets of the digest on Japan from time to time, whenever we got the information, and copies of the bi-weekly summary. The estimate of the situation is for the information of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. G-2 is the G-2 of the General Staff. I am bringing up that point because I had to be very careful, and I think all G-2s of the General Staff have to be very careful that the information you give your Chief

is something which he must pass on from the command point of view. If that information is habitually sent out to the various overseas departments particularly, you run into the serious danger of telling the Lieutenant General commanding the Hawaiian Department, we will say, something that G-2 thinks which the Chief of Staff does not concur in, and forcing his hand or inducing him to take some action in which the Chief of Staff does not concur. In other words, you must be careful to keep out of the command channel. So you give your information, your summary, your estimate of the situation, to your Chief, and action must flow from the Chief through the command channels; and G-2 is not in the command channels.

[110] 65. General GRUNERT. Insofar as action is concerned on the information that is passed to the subordinate command, is that action then passed back through G-2, or does G-2 prepare it for the Chief of Staff insofar as it pertains to information?

General MILES. I do not know that I have your question clearly.

66. General GRUNERT. You have gotten information from various sources which influenced you to make an estimate of the situation, which you passed to the Chief of Staff. Now, there are parts of that information, if true, that certain command channels in the Philippines or Hawaii should get. Who insures that they get that information?

General MILES. As a routine matter, G-2 insures it. In other words, all information that pertained directly to the Hawaiian Department or to the Philippine Department that G-2 received, it insured that G-2 in that Department got it. That is exclusive, however, of any deductions in a very broad sense that G-2 of the War Department might draw which would induce action which, in other words, was a command proposition.

67. General GRUNERT. In other words, you give them the information, but you do not analyze it; or do you?

General MILES. Ordinarily you do not analyze it for him.

68. General FRANK. You gave information and interpretation only through command channels?

General MILES. Interpretation would certainly go only through command channels.

69. General GRUNERT. Any warning, then, should come from command channels rather than from G-2?

[111] General MILES. If it is warning that probably would result in action, yes, most definitely.

70. General RUSSELL. Your G-2 sent a message on November 27 out to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

General MILES. Yes; to all departments, as I remember.

71. General RUSSELL. Now, a few specific questions, General Miles, and I will be through:

On October 27, 1941, Brink reported to your office that there were two aircraft carriers that had been operating among the mandated islands, of which Kaga was one. Was Brink one of your operators?

General MILES. How is the name spelled?

72. General RUSSELL. B-r-i-n-k.

73. General GRUNERT. Was that not a Colonel Brink for a time in Singapore, and then he went to the Philippines?

General MILES. Yes; that was the man, I think.

74. General RUSSELL. This was sent from the Philippines?

General MILES. Yes.

75. General GRUNERT. He was one of the staff in the office of the A. C. of S., G-2, Philippine Department, and on my recommendation he was sent to Singapore to be directly under the War Department there. That is why I recall a man named Brink.

76. General RUSSELL. Do you have any recollection about that type of Japanese aircraft carrier being in the mandated islands? Do you have any independent recollection on that subject?

General MILES. I remember that the Japanese carriers were reported in the mandated islands, but I would not be able to [112] pin it down to any particular source.

77. General RUSSELL. Would it be about that time?

General MILES. It was about that time.

78. General RUSSELL. In the records some place we have discovered evidence of a photographic mission by aircraft down into the mandated islands in late November or early December of 1941. Do you have any independent recollection of that activity on our part?

General MILES. No, sir; I did not know we sent one.

79. General RUSSELL. You were in touch in a general way with the Navy at that time in obtaining information from them?

General MILES. I was intimately in touch with the Office of Naval Intelligence.

80. General RUSSELL. What did you know from the Navy about the location and disposition of the Japanese fleet in late November and early December? Do you remember?

General MILES. My recollection is that the Navy had information of carriers in the mandates, and definitely of a movement of naval vessels and transports, they thought, south through the China Sea in the direction of Indo China and Thailand.

81. General RUSSELL. What was your impression as to the knowledge which the Navy had generally during the last six months before the attack on Pearl Harbor of the location of the Jap Navy and various types of craft that were in their Navy?

General MILES. Their information was very general and incomplete.

82. General RUSSELL. General, when in your opinion did it [113] become apparent that war with Japan was inevitable?

General MILES. On the 27th of November, when we learned that we had practically given what might be considered or probably would be considered by them an ultimatum to them—from then on I considered war as very probable if not inevitable.

83. General RUSSELL. That was based almost exclusively on the negotiations between the Japanese who were in Washington negotiating with our State Department?

General MILES. Primarily on that. It was a build-up.

84. General RUSSELL. In the message of November 27, which I will not discuss with you in any great detail, there was a statement that negotiations had practically ended. I am not quoting, but it said substantially that—although there was a bare possibility that the Japanese might come back for further negotiations. Do you remember that?

General MILES. That was in General Marshall's dispatch?

85. General RUSSELL. Yes.

General MILES. I don't remember that; no.

86. General RUSSELL. Let us assume that they did come back after November 27 and continued negotiations: Would that have affected your conclusions about the inevitability of war?

General MILES. Oh, yes.

87. General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, they were back on the 1st, 2nd, and 5th of December, were they not?

General MILES. The reply was not back, sir.

88. General RUSSELL. I mean, the Japs came back and negotiated.

[114] General MILES. Oh, they continued to stay here and talk, but that all hinged, to my mind, on the reply or the position taken by the Japanese Government as a result of our paper on the 26th of November, I think it was. It was considered practically an ultimatum.

89. General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

90. General GRUNERT. I have a few questions.

General MILES. I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not quite sure of my answer there. I did not want to give the impression that I thought war was immediately inevitable. I thought that very definitely an action by Japan, a pretty radical action, would be taken almost at once; that that necessarily would be an overt and open attack on the United States. I didn't feel at all sure that war with Japan was practically inevitable any time. But there were a good many things Japan could have done, if she did break those negotiations, short of open war with the United States, and we were considering all of those matters.

91. General RUSSELL. That suggests one other question: Did you know that there had been established by reference to the degrees of latitude and longitude lines beyond which, if Japan went with armed force out in the Pacific, the British, Dutch, and Americans would regard that as an act of war?

General MILES. Yes.

92. General RUSSELL. Then you knew as G-2 that if certain things occurred, we, in association with those powers, might attack?

General MILES. Yes; certainly.

[115] 93. General FRANK. You said you were not prevented specifically by higher authority from attempting to get information regarding the Japanese mandated islands. Was there any general prohibition in this regard? Was there a general attitude of "hands off"?

General MILES. Not specifically affecting the mandated islands. It was simply a question of whether you wanted to send a man to his almost certain death or not, and whether the information you expected to get out of it would be worth that risk. But there was no general or specific prohibition against my sending a man into the mandated islands if I could get him there. But I did not think I could get him in there and get him back alive.

94. General GRUNERT. Was there or was there not a fear on the part of all concerned that doing so and being picked up after having done so would offend the Japanese?

General MILES. Oh, it most certainly would. We would have had to disavow it and swear that we never sent him, and so forth. That is an old part of the game.

95. General FRANK. On November 27 there went out a message from G-2 of the War Department, which was your organization, saying :

Advise only Commanding General and Chief of Staff that it appears that conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. Also possible that hostilities may begin.

Do you remember that message?

General MILES. Very well.

[116] 96. General FRANK. You are familiar with the war plan as it applied to Honolulu, the Standing Operating Procedure?

General MILES. Yes; in a general way.

97. General FRANK. Did not the provisions of that war plan and the Standing Operating Procedure provide for this defense against sabotage?

General MILES. Yes; it provided against all forms of attack, including sabotage.

98. General FRANK. Why, then, was sabotage especially emphasized in that message?

General MILES. I will be very glad to answer that question, General, but my answer must be somewhat long.

In the summer of 1939 the President issued a directive to all bureaus and offices of the Government to keep out of antisabotage and antiespionage work, except three that were to do it all, F. B. I., O. N. I., and M. I. D. After I took M. I. D. in May of 1940, I began to build up the counter-intelligence part of it. I drafted a written agreement with F. B. I. and O. N. I. limiting our responsibilities under the President's directive. It was then countersigned by the three Cabinet Ministers concerned. Then I drew up a counter-subversive system, and later a counter-intelligence plan, the first one we ever had. I met certain opposition among my colleagues, the other Assistant Chiefs of Staff, and I am relating it only to point out that by the summer of 1941 I had gotten myself in a position where it was definitely established that counter-subversive activity of all kinds was G-2's responsibility and solely G-2's responsibility. I shared the [117] responsibility for measures against an effort to attack by a possible enemy with Operations and with War Plans, because I was supposed to give the information on which their orders were based. But I shared with nobody the responsibility for counter-subversive measures, and therefore, when I found on the 27th of November that nothing was specifically said in General Marshall's dispatch of that date, the war warning order, I felt it necessary to warn the G-2's, not only the overseas department and later particularly in this country, but sent it to all of the corps area G-2's, because we knew the build-up in this country very well. The F. B. I., the O. N. I., and my people, were very worried about what could be done in this country, particularly in the Air Force. General Arnold was very much worried, and that broke loose the next day and occasioned the further dispatch of November 28.

So that was the reason for the emphasis. The policy had already been laid down by General Marshall's telegram. So I was simply backing up the policy of the Chief of Staff and emphasizing the form of attack for which I was most directly responsible at G-2.

99. General FRANK. In the beginning of General Russell's questions you gave an answer to the effect that as a result of your background

and experience you had felt a strong probability of an air raid or air attack on Honolulu. Is that correct?

General MILES. That was one of the methods of attack to which we were most vulnerable.

100. General FRANK. At this time, we will say, December 1, 1941, what was your attitude as to the probability of such an [118] air attack?

General MILES. If the Japs attacked openly at all, and if their attack was made on Hawaii, I think I would have said on December 1, 1941, that an air attack on the installations and the fleet, although I did not actually know the ships were there in Pearl Harbor, was one of the most probable movements that the Japs would take.

101. General FRANK. Since you went out of your way to caution them about sabotage, why did you not likewise go out of your way to caution them about the probability of an air attack?

General MILES. Because, General, all that had been covered in General Marshall's dispatch in which he specifically ordered such necessary reconnaissances—I remember the use of that word—to protect the Hawaiian Department against attack. And that was the only way—that, and of course radar—that it could have been countered.

102. General FRANK. You knew that the following day General Arnold sent a message with respect to sabotage?

General MILES. Yes, indeed.

103. General FRANK. Did the logic ever occur to you that as a result of emphasizing sabotage in a series of messages it might have the result of de-emphasizing something else?

General MILES. That had occurred to me. I very strongly objected to General Arnold's message on the basis, among other things, that I did not want to overemphasize sabotage and that I had already sent the day before a sufficient message to cover the question of sabotage.

104. General FRANK. As hindsight, of course, and considering [119] the fact that provisions for all of these defenses were covered in the war plans and other documents, would not the following message have sufficed: "War imminent. Act accordingly."?

General MILES. For me to send?

105. General FRANK. No; for the War Department to have sent. That would not have emphasized nor de-emphasized anything, would it?

General MILES. I would prefer not to pass upon the Chief of Staff's wording in his message of November 27.

106. General FRANK. There were six messages sent between November 16th and 28th. Four of them cautioned against provoking the Japs; three of them emphasized sabotage. Now, with respect to caution against provoking the Japs: while we were leaning over backward as a result of these cautions, what was the attitude of the Japanese, relatively speaking?

General MILES. Their attitude where, General? Here in Washington, in the negotiations?

107. General FRANK. All over the world. Were they as particular about preventing any suspicion on our part as we were particular about trying to prevent any provocation on their part?

General MILES. Oh, no. They had been provocative for a great many years, particularly since they began their attack on China.

108. General FRANK. Will you develop that in just a few words?

General MILES. I should say that the Japanese attack in Manchuria and later in China, which, after all, was the basis [120] of our diplomatic negotiations here in Washington in 1941, was the basic cause of it, was the beginning of a very provocative attitude on the part of the Japanese.

109. General FRANK. What I am after is this: There was little or no attempt on the Japanese side to keep from provoking us, whereas there was every effort on the part of the Americans to keep from provoking the Japanese; is that correct?

General MILES. I should say as a general statement that that is very accurate, sir.

110. General FRANK. I asked that of you because you should have information on that as the War Department G-2 at that time.

General MILES. Yes, sir; but I think it was very general information that at Shanghai and all through the Peiping episode, they had been very provocative, as we all knew; and it was the policy of our Government not to provoke war; to take a firm stand in a certain way, as you know, but not to provoke war with Japan. At least, so we read it.

111. General FRANK. Do you think that we were leaning over backwards in that attitude?

General MILES. That is a very difficult question to answer, General. I simply say that our policy was to avoid any unnecessary provocative action.

[121] 112. General FRANK. You said you objected to General Arnold's message. To whom?

General MILES. To General Arnold, in the first place, and later, to General Scanlon. It was quite a long discussion, as I remember it.

113. General FRANK. What were the circumstances under which your objection was finally overcome and the message sent?

General MILES. It had to go to the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden. General Marshall was away. General Bryden did not want to decide it, either, very much. I objected strongly and was backed up by General Gerow, and our objections were on this line: (1) this antisabotage message had gone out; (2) that a message should not go to the air forces alone, but if sent at all, should go to the Commanding Generals for their air forces and for everybody else; and (3) that the message as originally drawn was very drastic. As you know very well, at that time, the Air Force had a lot of young men in command of fields and so forth, and a very drastic order, from General Arnold, particularly, to cargo planes, and so forth, might very well have resulted in somebody's being shot.

I would also like to say, here, that General Arnold's message was primarily addressed to the continental United States; he was thinking about that. What started him was the fact about seven planes arrived at one of your western fields—I think at Salt Lake—all with the same trouble, and from different depots, and he thought there was some real sabotage going on in this country. But, to go on with the story, we finally had to take it to the Deputy Chief of Staff, late that afternoon of the 28th. I don't think it was decided until [122] about six o'clock. General Scanlon was present, presenting the Air side, and I think, General Gerow and General Gullion, Provost Marshal General; and General Bryden finally decided that it would be sent in

modified form; that is, not such drastic action to be taken against anybody who might climb over a fence; and that it would be sent to the Commanding Generals, and that the Air Corps might also if they desired send it direct under General Arnold's name to the Air Force, to the Air Commanders concerned; and that was the final decision.

114. General FRANK. Now, another question that I am asking because G-2 might have drawn a conclusion on it: What was the attitude of the public toward the possibility of war at that time? Can you answer that?

General MILES. I can only give you my impression, that they were not nearly as much worried about it as they should have been. After all, it was only a few months past since we had saved the Army by one vote in the House of Representatives. You remember, I think it was in October 1941 that that vote was taken, and we just barely saved the Army at that time.

115. General FRANK. What do you mean, "saved the Army"?

General MILES. Well, you remember there was a bill, sir, to send back all the men that had been drafted, put them back on the reserve, or something like that.

116. General RUSSELL. A bill to demobilize the National Guard.

General MILES. To demobilize the National Guard—send the draftees back. The War Department was extremely worried about it.

117. General FRANK. Aside from the people "top side" in the Army, can you give me an expression of what the attitude in the [123] Army was with respect to the possibility of war?

General MILES. Not accurately. I attended the North Carolina maneuvers, that November, preceding November, early preceding November, and I don't remember to have heard the matter discussed. The Army in those days as you well remember, we all remember, was intensely busy in building itself and training and maneuvering and so forth, and I would not say the Army as a whole were much concerned as to where war was going to break if they could get their troops ready before the break.

118. General FRANK. Do you think they felt that war was on the horizon?

General MILES. The Army?

119. General FRANK. Yes.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

120. General FRANK. All right.

General MILES. Not necessarily with Japan, but war was on the horizon.

121. General FRANK. Did you know that there was a Japanese striking force consisting of several carriers and a couple of battleships and a submarine force in the Marshall Islands, in the vicinity of Jaluit, about the 1st of December?

General MILES. I knew that such a force had been reported about there, and about that time.

122. General FRANK. Was that information given to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

General MILES. I don't know, sir. I do not remember.

123. General FRANK. Have you any way of determining that?

General MILES. The records of the Military Intelligence Department undoubtedly will disclose it.

[124] 124. General FRANK. If it were given?

General MILES. Yes, if it were given. I feel very sure that in one form or another he was informed of that report. I say "in one form or another" because one form might very well have been through Navy and Fleet.

125. General FRANK. Information on the situation surrounding the Hawaiian Islands, you stated some time back, information as to the presence of hostile activity in the waters, would mainly be obtained through submarine reconnaissance and air reconnaissance?

General MILES. That is correct—and radar.

126. General FRANK. And radar? Since the Navy is the only department that has submarines, and since also in the plan for air reconnaissance at Honolulu they were responsible for distant reconnaissance, it would appear then that it was the responsibility of the Navy to keep both the Army and the Navy in Honolulu advised and to provide protection against any kind of attack so far as reconnaissance could provide that, is that correct?

General MILES. So far as distance reconnaissance is concerned, they alone had the means of carrying it out.

127. General FRANK. That is all I have.

General GRUNERT. I want you to explain once more so I can get it clear in mind about the dissemination of information gathered by G-2, of the War Department, so I will put in various questions. You get information from the State Department, ONI, your own sources, and whatever other sources might become available to you. Now, when you get this information, who judges whether or not particular parts of that information [125] are of value and should be transmitted, for instance, to the commanding general of Hawaii?

General MILES. The first people who pass on it are the members of the section, the Geographical Section, which includes the country about which we have that information—the Japanese, we will say. Information would pass first through the Far Eastern Section, I think it was called at that time, under Colonel Bratton, of the Intelligence Subdivision of the Military Intelligence. That would then go to the Intelligence Division, itself, which collated all positive intelligence, dealt with all positive intelligence as distinguished from counter intelligence, the negative side, and would then be sent out.

If it was simply routine, the Chief in the Military Intelligence Division, G-2, would simply see it passing over his desk. If there were any question about it, it would be brought up through normal channels to the executive officer, who, if he did not feel competent to decide it, would take it up with G-2 men; and that was the method.

128. General GRUNERT. If you were disseminating it, then, to the various commands, or any particular command, would it then pass directly from G-2 to such commander, and in what form?

General MILES. The normal form would be these semiweekly summaries. I mean that would be the routine. Then, any particular information of particular importance would be telegraphed out to those agencies concerned with that particular bit of information; in the case of Japan, to (certainly) the Philippines, to Hawaii, to Panama, to the West Coast, and so forth, right to our military attache at China, to the G-2 of the foreign departments, or the corps areas.

[126] 129. General GRUNERT. But when you make an estimate of the situation, that then goes to be processed through War Plans Division, to the Chief of Staff?

General MILES. Yes.

130. General GRUNERT. Now, if there is any information to be passed out on that estimate, it then must be authorized for you to pass it out, or for them to pass it out directly to those concerned, is that right?

General MILES. Yes. It becomes more than information, then; it becomes an opinion of the War Department, a communication of the Chief of Staff.

131. General GRUNERT. All right. Now, the next question I have is one on which we will have to go back to the sabotage message. Was that sabotage message of November 27 O. K.'d by WPD, or the Chief of Staff, or whom? Or was it necessary to have that O. K.'d? Did you send it out directly to the G-2?

General MILES. It was not necessary for the Chief of Staff or his office to pass on it, since it simply carried out a policy already established by the previous messages of the same date, from General Marshall. I do remember, however, consulting, as I almost always did, War Plans, as they consulted me on messages, and I think it was General Gerow who suggested that I add to the message the G-2 was to inform the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff, only.

132. General GRUNERT. Did G-2 do its utmost to inform, by contact with the various agencies made available, so as to best advise the Chief of Staff and keep subordinate commands informed, and so that they could carry out their mission?

General MILES. I did not hear the first of your question, [127] relative to the G-2.

133. General GRUNERT. Did G-2 do its utmost, so far as you could judge, to carry out its mission, in informing the Chief of Staff of everything they had got, making estimates, and passing down information they thought was pertinent?

General MILES. The answer to that is Yes.

134. General GRUNERT. Naturally. I wanted to put it in the record.

General MILES. I might add, if I may, that we wrote so much that we got certain complaints—complaints that nobody could read all the stuff we turned out. We certainly tried to do whatever we could.

135. General GRUNERT. Did so many things go out at one time that the "low side" might have considered themselves as being informed to such a point of saturation that they did not pay much attention to the information they were getting? In other words, "crying wolf! wolf!" so that they became confused, or "fed up"?

General MILES. That could have been, sir.

136. General GRUNERT. Do you think that the G-2 message—we call it "the G-2 message," of November 27—and the sabotage message—we call that the "Arnold message," of the 28th, which was sent out under the Adjutant General's signature—did you consider whether or not they might be taken by the Command "down below" as modifying or changing the Chief of Staff's instructions of November 27?

General MILES. No, sir; I did not. The Chief of Staff's message of November 27 was a war-warning message, in my mind, all inclusive

so far as different forms of attack or dangers [128] might be considered, and my message of the same date in regard to sabotage was simply inviting the attention of the G-2, who was particularly charged with that, in each corps area and overseas department, to that particular form of danger.

137. General GRUNERT. There was no report from the recipients required?

General MILES. There was no report required.

138. General GRUNERT. That is, to your message.

General MILES. No answer to my message, of the 27th.

139. General GRUNERT. No answer? But there was a report required by the Chief of Staff's message of November 27?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

140. General GRUNERT. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department made his report to the Chief of Staff, presumably on the Chief of Staff's message of November 27. Therein, he reported just the measures taken as to sabotage. Did you see that report?

General MILES. I did not see that message—that answer, until after Pearl Harbor.

141. General GRUNERT. I do not think of anything else. Does anybody else think of anything else?

142. General FRANK. When General Grunert just asked you about the possibility of confusing those messages on sabotage, you replied from the point of view of the man at this end. Now, consider yourself for a moment as the man at the receiving end of those messages, not know who prepared them, nor anything about their source, but from the point of view of their coming from the War Department, and considering that as a single source: under those conditions, might it or might it not have been a [129] little confusing?

General MILES. It might have been, but I think the first message was signed "Marshall."

143. General FRANK. That is right.

General MILES. That would be my answer.

144. General FRANK. Now, the next question is: I asked you, in my questions a few minutes ago, as to whether or not you had sent any message to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with respect to the presence in the Marshall Islands of this Japanese force. We have, we think, all the communications that went from the War Department to the Hawaiian Department, from the 16th of November until December 7. This Japanese force was not in the vicinity of Jaluit until about the 25th. In view of the critical stage of the situation, it would seem that that information was rather vital, as there is no record of its having been communicated. Is there any explanation of that?

General MILES. I wouldn't know what the explanation was, if it wasn't communicated. If we had known at the time, as we probably did, that that information, coming from Navy, was being transmitted to the Fleet in Hawaii, to all of their naval vessels, it might very well have been that we considered that as sufficient, knowing that the two Intelligence branches, Army and Navy, were working in very close cooperation, we thought, everywhere—in Hawaii and the West Coast and in the Philippines, and so forth.

I am a little worried about that message, because I was told, this morning, by Military Intelligence, that there are numbered gaps in their files today, and they do not know where [130] those messages are. We hope you have them, but they do not know.

145. General RUSSELL. We didn't get them from G-2.

General MILES. How?

146. General RUSSELL. We haven't gotten anything from G-2.

147. General FRANK. In the Roberts Commission interrogation of Colonel Fielder, who was G-2 in the Hawaiian Department—

General MILES. Yes, G-2.

148. General FRANK. —he discloses that he was not, prior to December 7, getting this information from the Navy, in Honolulu. He was not getting it.

General MILES. He should have, of course.

149. General FRANK. That is all.

150. General GRUNERT. One final question. In your experience as Staff Officer and as a Commander in the field, outside the War Department, would a message signed by Marshall carry more weight with you than one signed by the Adjutant General, or one signed by a Staff Officer?

General MILES. Very much more weight, General, particularly when it begins with some such phrase as "This is a war-warning message."

151. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

General RUSSELL. What message did he ever send, beginning that way, General Miles?

General MILES. My impressions of the message of November 27, but I haven't it before me.

152. General GRUNERT. There was one message starting out that way, but it happened to be a Navy message. This particular message from the Chief of Staff did not start out that way, [131] according to the record.

153. General RUSSELL. Who was Creswell?

General MILES. Creswell? He was Military Attache in Japan.

154. General RUSSELL. I want to go back to my Mandated Islands for a minute, General, because you have excited me a little bit. I want to get some description of those islands. Referring to the Marshall Islands, where these carriers are supposed to have assembled, that attacked, is there anybody on those islands except Japanese?

General MILES. Some natives there, I believe—a few, there.

155. General RUSSELL. Are there towns and roads and those sorts of things there?

General MILES. The only so-called "civilized people" are the Japanese, there, and the others are natives of the Islands. They don't live in towns, very much, I imagine. My information about the Mandated Islands is very slim, now, particularly now—

156. General RUSSELL. There is no secret at all about the questions that I am asking, and what I am attempting to develop for my own satisfaction, in arriving at what happened at Pearl Harbor. They had everything on us, yet they sailed up and attacked us, and apparently today G-2 doesn't know where they came from, or how many there were, or where they went to. We have not been able so far to

get any very intelligent information on what these convoys were like, if there were more than one. Do you have any ideas about that, the size of the attacking forces?

General MILES. Prior to the attack?

157. General RUSSELL. No, since the attack. Have you gotten [132] information that led you to know how strong these convoys were that came in there, launching this attack?

General MILES. We have only general information, largely from Naval. It was supposed to be the KAGA and AKAGI, those two very large carriers of theirs, supported by probably some of their older battleships of the KONGO class—their four old battle cruisers; but I have no definite information.

158. General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

159. General GRUNERT. Thank you, very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., the Board recessed until 2 p. m.)

[132-A]

ADDENDUM TO GENERAL MILES' TESTIMONY

(The following changes were suggested by General Miles in his letter of August 18, 1944, to General Grunert:)

Page 93, line 18; delete "thirty"; insert "twenty".

Page 94, line 11; insert comma after word "selection"; delete words "of officers,"; insert "of" between words "particularly" and "officers."

Page 94, line 14; delete "of course,"; insert between words "officers" and "wanted" "in the field".

Page 94, line 15; insert period after word "them"; delete word "and" after word "them"; capitalize word "we".

Page 98, line 18; insert word "probably" between words "is" and "the".

Page 98, line 19; insert quotation mark between words "then" and "Yes".

Page 98, line 20; delete word "it"; insert in lieu thereof "the Embassy".

Page 98, line 21; insert quotation mark after "army?".

Page 102, line 15; add after words "No, sir," "except that late in '41 steps were taken to prevent certain Japanese ships from passing through the Panama Canal".

Page 103, line 13; insert word "and" between words "time" and "for".

Page 104, line 18; delete words "in Military and"; substitute therefor "from".

Page 104, line 20; delete words "any" and "their".

[132-B] Page 106, line 25; change "the route" to "their routes".

Page 106, line 26; change last word on line "this" to "an".

Page 106, line 27; insert comma after "Vacant Sea"; delete word "and".

Page 107, line 9; delete word "famous".

Page 107, line 10; delete "It was much more an" preceding word "attack", substitute therefor "We". Make balance of line read "attacked the problem from".

Page 107, line 15; preceding "to" insert "by our people in Hawaii,"; change "they" to "it".

Page 107, line 17; insert "that" between "1930s" and "he"; insert words "in it." after word "interested"; delete word "and"; insert "He" before word "was".

Page 107, line 18; insert comma after word "Plans".

Page 107, line 21; make balance of sentence read "containing the five big Hawaiian Islands."

Page 107, delete word "terms"; insert in lieu word "dreams".

Page 109, line 16. Insert period after word "careful"; delete "that"; capitalize "the" (last word on line).

Page 110, line 17. Delete word "very".

Page 110, line 19. Insert period after word "action"; make balance of line read, "The latter, in other words, is a command proposition."

Page 110, line 22; change word "him" to "them".

Page 113, line 4; delete words "to them" after word "ultimatum"; insert dashes after word "ultimatum".

[132-C] Page 113, line 5; after word "not" insert word "ultimately".

Page 113, line 26; insert word "Japanese" between "The" and "reply".

Page 114, line 2; change "that" to "it".

Page 114, line 3; change "our" to "the U. S."

Page 114, line 4; insert comma after word "was"; change "it" to "which".

Page 114, line 9; change "there" to "regarding inevitable war." Change "I did" to "I do".

Page 114, line 10; insert between words "thought" and "war" the words "on November 27th that".

Page 114, line 11; insert comma after word "that"; change "an" to "some".

Page 114, line 12; insert word "but" before "that".

Page 114, line 13; change "that" to "need not"; delete word "would".

Page 114, line 15; change "practically" to "immediately"; delete "But"; capitalize "there".

Page 114, line 16; change "did break those" to "broke her".

Page 114, line 17; insert "in Washington," between "negotiations" and "short".

Page 114, line 18; change "matters" to "possibilities".

Page 115, line 10; delete "but"; capitalize "there".

Page 115, line 13; change period to comma, and add "or get information from him while there."

Page 116, line 19; change "limiting" to "delimiting".

Page 116, line 22; after word "system" add "for the Army,"; change "counter-intelligence" to "counter-fifth-column".

Page 116, line 24; insert period after word "staff"; [132-D] delete word "and".

Page 116, line 25; change "it" to "this".

Page 117, line 1; change "effort to" to "overt".

Page 117, line 6; insert words "about sabotage" between words "said" and "in".

Page 117, line 8; insert word "of" between "only" and "the".

Page 117, line 9; make it read "departments but particularly those in this country. It was sent."

Page 117, line 13; change "in" to "to"

Page 117, line 14; insert period after "worried"; delete words "and that" and insert in lieu thereof "He".

Page 117, line 17; delete period after word "telegram" and add "of the 27th." Delete word "So".

Page 117, line 20; change "at" to "as", change period to comma, and add "and reiterating the possibility of open hostilities."

Page 118, line 4; insert words "Pearl Harbor" between "the" and "installations".

Page 118, line 5; after word "fleet", delete comma, insert parenthesis.

Page 118, line 6; after word "Harbor", delete comma, insert parenthesis.

Page 118, line 15; delete word "it", insert in lieu "such an attack".

Page 118, line 16; add new sentence, "My message also warned of possible hostilities".

Page 120, line 1; delete word "was".

[132-E] Page 121, line 11; insert period after "Gerow". Delete word "and". Capitalize "our".

Page 121, line 12; change "this" to "an".

Page 121, line 13; change "that a" to "the proposed".

Page 121, line 15; delete word "that".

Page 121, line 19; change "cargo" to "protect".

Page 122, line 3; change "Generals" to "General"; delete word "and".

Page 122, line 4; insert word "directing" between "not" and "such".

Page 122, line 5; delete "to be taken".

Page 122, line 6; delete "and" (first word).

Page 122, line 7; insert comma after "also"; insert comma after "desired".

Page 122, line 9; insert semicolon after "concerned"; delete "and".

Page 122, line 16; delete "past" between "months" and "since".

Page 122, line 25; insert word "and" between "Guard" and "send".

Page 123, line 3; delete "that November, preceding November,"; insert word "the" after "early".

Page 125, line 9; change "That" to "It".

Page 125, line 18; delete "man; and"; insert in lieu "himself." Capitalize "that".

Page 125, line 23; delete "I mean"; capitalize "that". Delete "Then"; capitalize "any".

Page 125, line 27; delete "and so forth,"; insert word [132-F] "possibly".

Page 125, line 28; delete word "right"; change "at" to "in"; delete comma; insert word "and" following word "China".

Page 125, line 29, line 29; delete "foreign departments, or the".

Page 126, line 20; make second word "date".

Page 126, line 22; insert period after "messages". Delete word "and".

Page 126, line 23; make it read: "that I add to the message that the G-2 were to inform their Commanding".

Page 126, line 24; make it read: "Generals and the Chiefs of Staff only."

Page 128, line 18; insert dashes after the word "answer"; delete comma.

Page 132, line 4; make it read: "from Naval Intelligence. The ships were supposed to be the KAGA and AKAGI, those".

[133]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. RUSSELL A. OSMUN, CHIEF, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, WAR DEPARTMENT

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General OSMUN. Russell A. Osmun, Brigadier General, Chief, Military Intelligence Service, War Department.

2. General GRUNERT. General, the Board, in an attempt to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. This includes an examination of pertinent available records. It is hoped that because of your assignment in the A. C. of S., G-2, War Department General Staff, you can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover so large a field in the limited time available, individual Board members have been assigned objectives and phases for special investigation, although the entire Board will pass upon all objectives and phases. General Russell has this particular phase, so he will lead in propounding questions, and the other members will assist in developing them.

3. General RUSSELL. General Osmun, what is your present assignment?

General OSMUN. Chief Military Intelligence Service, sir.

4. General RUSSELL. Is that a branch of the G-2 office.

General OSMUN. One of the two branches of the G-2 office.

[134] 5. General RUSSELL. As such officer, are you acquainted with the files maintained by the office to which you are assigned?

General OSMUN. Yes, sir.

6. General RUSSELL. Would there be contained in these files records or copies of messages, documents, and other memoranda which may have transpired between your Department and the Hawaiian Department in the year 1941?

General OSMUN. Yes, sir.

7. General RUSSELL. Would there be contained in the same files records or copies of similar messages or other documents which might have been transferred from your Department to the Chief of Staff or other branches of the General Staff?

General OSMUN. Normally, yes, sir.

8. General RUSSELL. General, did you at my request make a search of your files for the purpose of selecting such memoranda as are contained therein which relate to the Hawaiian Department in the year 1941?

General OSMUN. Yes, sir.

9. General RUSSELL. Did you show such documents to me as you thought were pertinent?

General OSMUN. I showed you all the documents we had found that were pertinent.

10. General RUSSELL. Have you since collecting those documents found any other documents?

General OSMUN. No, sir. May I amend that to say that we are making a continuing search, and if any other documents are found you will be notified. I don't expect to find any others.

11. General RUSSELL. This morning in the testimony of [135] General Miles—and I bring this to your attention because I did not know it when I was talking to you before—General Miles stated that there were periodic summaries prepared during the year 1941, as I now recall, one summary bi-weekly and another possibly bi-monthly, which were sent out to the Commanding Generals of the Service Corps and Departments. Did you, in your search of the records in your office, which search we have just referred to, discover copies of any such summaries?

General OSMUN. No, sir; none of those were brought to my attention, and I do not think we found any. I asked General Miles about that, and he said that in most cases the summaries were prepared for the General Staff, because at that time the G-2, as explained to me by General Miles, was an Intelligence agency for the War Department, and that in certain cases, what you might term summaries were sent out from time to time, but those were not of the same character as what we would now call an estimate of the situation.

12. General FRANK. In other words, there was information which would go to the Chief of Staff but it was not sent out to the theaters?

General OSMUN. I understand so, sir; but I want to emphasize that I was not here at the time, and this is hearsay.

13. General RUSSELL. How long have you been associated with the Division of Military Intelligence?

General OSMUN. Since the winter of 1940-41, when I was sent temporarily to London as an observer for four months. I returned in March 1941, and after a few days went back to my normal duty in the Office of the Quartermaster General. A year later I was sent out to India and have been in Military [136] Intelligence Service since.

14. General RUSSELL. Do you know something of the history of the Military Intelligence Division over there?

General OSMUN. Here in Washington?

15. General RUSSELL. The general history of this Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.

General OSMUN. Yes.

16. General RUSSELL. Do you regard as adequate the means, including personnel, which have been placed at the disposal of that Department?

General OSMUN. Absolutely not.

17. General RUSSELL. Do you regard it as a badly neglected agency of the War Department in the past?

General OSMUN. From the standpoint of military intelligence which could have been secured; yes.

18. General RUSSELL. General, how familiar are you with the general geographical situation out in the South Pacific?

General OSMUN. I know very little about it.

19. General RUSSELL. What about the mandated islands? Do you know very much about those?

General OSMUN. Very little.

20. General RUSSELL. Do you know anything about the Marshall Islands?

General OSMUN. No, sir.

21. General RUSSELL. Do you know of any reason why Americans were not permitted to go on the Marshall Islands?

General OSMUN. I believe there was a stipulation in the mandate itself which was interpreted by the Japanese as forbidding foreigners to land without very severe restrictions.

[137] 72. General RUSSELL. Have you ever seen that in the mandate document?

General OSMUN. No, sir; I have never seen the mandate.

23. General RUSSELL. Suppose there had been available to G-2 adequate personnel: Do you believe they could have developed what was taking place in the mandated islands in November and December of 1941?

General OSMUN. I think, sir, that it goes a great deal deeper than that. We had a national psychology to contend with.

24. General FRANK. Along what line?

General OSMUN. Lack of belief that we were in danger; disinclination to spend the tremendous sums of money that would be involved.

25. General FRANK. Do you think that was reflected in the small margin by which Congress just prior to that had passed the Army bill?

General OSMUN. I will have to say, General, that I am not very much of a politician, and I would rather not express an opinion on that, because my opinion would be valueless. There was a lack of really trained Army officers available, and a general lack of comprehension at that time of the need for military intelligence as we have realized was necessary. I think if we go back to that time, we will remember that very few people thought there ever would be war with Japan. Most of our people felt quite secure in our inherent strength, and I think the Japanese bogey had been discussed so often that people had stopped paying much attention to it.

26. General RUSSELL. General, I think those are all reasons [138] why we could not get adequate support; but the question was rather a different question. If you had had adequate support and adequate personnel, what was to have prevented them from going out into that area and staying in touch with what was going on?

General OSMUN. That, again, is a rather difficult question to answer quickly. If we had had adequate personnel, obviously we might have had very much better information and probably we might have had enough information to have enabled us to have avoided what happened. It is a matter of estimate. If we had been perfectly prepared we would not have been surprised.

27. General FRANK. Do you think that this emphasized effort to keep from offending the Japs when they were confronted with no such restriction imposed a handicap on our learning about their activities?

General OSMUN. I do not think that I could answer that intelligently, General, because I had nothing to do with the Military Intelligence at that time except as an observer in this country. I do not know what the handicaps were and how much they handicapped the people that tried to get the information. I should say offhand that if we were handicapped and the others were free to do as they wanted, naturally we lost a great deal of information that otherwise could have been secured.

28. General RUSSELL. If you find other documents and records along the line we have been questioning you about, will you advise us?

General OSMUN. Yes, sir. We are looking for them.

[139] 29. General FRANK. There are other agencies of the Government besides the Army and Navy that obtain information of various kinds, are there not?

General OSMUN. Yes, sir.

30. General FRANK. It would be advantageous if there were a plan for bringing all these agencies together periodically in each area, would it not?

General OSMUN. Yes, sir.

31. General FRANK. Do you consider that the bringing together of those agencies under the auspices of the Army and Navy could easily be accomplished?

General OSMUN. May I answer that off the record?

32. General FRANK. Yes.

(There was informal discussion off the record.)

General OSMUN. I think that any loyal representative of the Government acting honestly with other similar persons can get the cooperation necessary in doing a good, businesslike job if he is given half a chance and has guts enough to do what he thinks is right.

33. General FRANK. That will result in getting information that will redound to the best interests of our national defense?

General OSMUN. Yes, sir. I have never found, in the two and a half years I was over there, any difficulty in dealing with anybody who was on the square as long as he realized that I was on the square and was interested only in stopping the war a few days sooner than it otherwise would stop.

34. General FRANK. In the best interests of our United States effort?

[140] General OSMUN. Yes.

35. General FRANK. Then you believe that efforts should be made in these different areas to bring periodically together all American agencies concerned with gathering information?

General OSMUN. Yes, sir.

36. General GRUNERT. Do you think that in such a combined intelligence organization, all the agencies concerned would cooperate, or would they be inclined to withhold information because of their "hush-hush" policy and the demand of secrecy, so that they would get so that they would not trust each other?

General OSMUN. I think that is a question of personalities, and the only way I can answer it is to say that in my own recent experience overseas we had a number of individuals handling information from the very lowest to the highest degrees of security, and yet cooperating with the full understanding of each other's problems and, I believe, no loss of security.

37. General FRANK. Would the fact that it is in the interest of the national effort to be paramount and overcome any minor prejudices that might exist?

General OSMUN. At this time, undoubtedly, yes; but I think that in peace time much the same conditions would exist.

38. General FRANK. As when?

General OSMUN. As during war time, so far as the willingness to cooperate for the best interests of the Government is concerned.

39. General FRANK. Then there is no point in mentioning peace time.

You have been searching recently for all communications [141] that were sent from G-2 to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department between about the 15th of November and December 7 of 1941; is that correct?

General OSMUN. Yes, sir.

40. General FRANK. Have you found any communication which was sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department from G-2 or from the War Department that advised him that there was a Japanese force in the Marshall Islands that moved in there between the 25th and 30th of November?

General OSMUN. If so they were in the notes that I gave to General Russell—I remember specifically that there was a message to the effect that the Japanese fleet had moved south in the general mandated area.

41. General FRANK. It was in one of those radio messages sent between the 16th of November and the 7th of December?

General OSMUN. I do not remember the date, sir. I say, if it is in any at all, it is in the batch of notes I gave to General Russell.

42. General FRANK. You have given General Russell everything that you have found that was sent, have you not?

General OSMUN. Yes, sir. We have given him everything we could. I was very definite that nothing was to be withheld from our records.

43. General RUSSELL. I do not believe that in any of the memoranda you gave me there was a reference to the movement of Jap naval forces in the mandated area. I will say this: that the only messages that you gave me were those which the Board already had copies of.

[142] 44. General GRUNERT. Does it naturally follow that if there was such a force in or about the mandated islands at any particular time during that critical period, this was the force that made the attack on Hawaii?

General OSMUN. No, sir.

45. General GRUNERT. I have one concluding question, to make sure that I understand the witness's remark about information summaries. General Miles, in his testimony, referred to summaries of information and estimates. Summaries were those documents prepared periodically and sent out as a matter of information, whereas estimates were those which were prepared for the Chief of Staff and the General Staff. Do I understand correctly that you did or not find any summaries of information on the Pacific situation along in 1941 that might or might not have been sent out to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

General OSMUN. That is correct, sir. I have not found any; but when I heard General Miles speak about it this morning I directed immediate search to find out if we had them.

I would like to enter in the record a fact which you gentlemen undoubtedly are aware of, that a number of Military Intelligence records undoubtedly were given to the Roberts Commission, and you have undoubtedly seen those.

46. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[143] **TESTIMONY OF FRANCIS M. CAULFIELD, CHIEF CLERK, CENTRAL FILES, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you state to the Board, Mr. Caulfield, your name, address, and occupation.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Francis M. Caulfield, Chief Clerk, Central Files, Adjutant General's Office, War Department.

2. General GRUNERT. Mr. Caulfield, the Board is trying to get at the facts as to the Pearl Harbor attack, and is at present investigating the background, the viewpoints, and so forth, getting facts out of the War Department. That includes an examination of the pertinent available records, and we hope that from your position you will be able to tell us about the Adjutant General's records. General Russell will lead, or propound the questions with reference thereto.

3. General RUSSELL. In your official capacity did you recently participate in a search of the records of the Adjutant General's office, at my request?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes, I did, General.

4. General RUSSELL. And would you name the others in the Adjutant General's Office who helped us in that search.

Mr. CAULFIELD. There was Colonel Sepulveda, and Mrs. Lillian K. Bull, and Mr. Joseph Yarborough. I cannot tell you the exact spelling of his name. And then the clerks in the Central Files and the Restricted Files, generally, search for indices.

5. General RUSSELL. Colonel Sepulveda was unable to attend the Board hearing, because he is not permitted to climb the [144] steps?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That is correct, General.

6. General RUSSELL. You were second in charge of the search and the selection of material from the Adjutant General's records?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes, sir.

7. General RUSSELL. Your directions were to make available to me as a member of this Board all data, all documents, memorandums, and so forth, which in any way related to the Hawaiian Department, for the year 1941?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That is correct, General.

8. General RUSSELL. Were all of those documents in the Adjutant General's files, as just described, made available for me?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes; they were, General.

9. General RUSSELL. And the people whom you have just named rendered me all the help possible in going through these records and selecting those documents which I might think would be pertinent and of interest to the Board?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That is correct, General.

10. General RUSSELL. I have no other questions.

11. General GRUNERT. I have no questions.

12. General RUSSELL. Thank you.

13. General GRUNERT. All right. Thank you, very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[145] **TESTIMONY OF COLONEL CHARLES K. GAILEY, JR., EXECUTIVE OFFICER, OPERATIONS DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF, WAR DEPARTMENT**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel Gailey, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel GAILEY. Colonel Charles K. Gailey, Jr.; U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.; at present on duty in the War Department General Staff as Executive Officer of the Operations Division.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel Gailey, the Board, in attempting to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoint prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. This includes an examination of pertinent, available records. You have been called as a witness because of your familiarity with the records in so far as the office of OPD, War Department General Staff, is concerned, and General Russell will propound whatever questions there are. If there are any others, the other members of the Board will attempt to develop them.

3. General RUSSELL. Colonel Gailey, recently, as a Member of this Board, I made a request on you for all documents, memorandums, other data, and files of the OPD, as they related to operations in the Hawaiian Department for the year 1941; is that true?

Colonel GAILEY. I do not know whether it was in just exactly those words or not, sir, but I was instructed to help you out in any way we could, sir.

4. General RUSSELL. I did submit to you a list of documents which we thought were in your office and ask that you produce [146] them for us?

Colonel GAILEY. Yes, sir.

5. General RUSSELL. You produced all of the documents which I requested, which were in your office?

Colonel GAILEY. Yes, sir; I believe so. That was turned over to Mr. Bond, and I believe he got them all for you.

6. General RUSSELL. And so far as you know, those are the only documents in your office which relate to the subjects that we are investigating in this matter?

Colonel GAILEY. General, I did not check those lists of the files that you turned over, but I do believe that all the papers that pertain to this have been gotten together, I do not know whether at that time or at a later time. In what General North's outfit and you got together, and what Mr. Bond got together, I think you got it all, sir.

7. General RUSSELL. In other words, you think the efforts of these three people have cleaned out your records of everything material to Pearl Harbor for the year 1941?

Colonel GAILEY. Yes, sir; I do not think there is anything left.

8. General RUSSELL. I want to make a statement in the record. I want to say that the documents which General North obtained have been made available to us.

Colonel GAILEY. Yes, sir.

9. General RUSSELL. And the Board has had the documents that Colonel Gailey made available.

Colonel GAILEY. General, may I make another statement for the record? General Handy has issued instructions in the Operations Division that any thing this Board desires, they get, [147] and we are to give you every aid and assistance in finding what you want that we can possibly give you.

10. General GRUNERT. And General Handy is the A. C. S., O. P. D.?

Colonel GAILEY. Yes, sir.

11. General FRANK. Have you any knowledge of any papers pertaining to the subject on which we are conducting an investigation, for which we have not asked?

Colonel GAILEY. No, sir; I do not, General.

May I amend that, sir? I do not know of all the papers you have asked for, sir, but I do not know of any papers that are not covered in the three categories that I mentioned to General Russell.

12. General FRANK. And that have been made available? Thanks.

13. General GRUNERT. Are there any further questions? All right. Thanks.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

General GRUNERT. We are now going to other business.

(Thereupon, at 3:10 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

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[148] **PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD**

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1944

**MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.**

The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

(Stephen S. Maxon, shorthand reporter, was sworn by the Recorder.)

**TESTIMONY OF GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD, U. S. ARMY, WAR
DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

General ARNOLD. H. H. Arnold, General, U. S. Army; station, War Department, Washington.

2. General GRUNERT. General Arnold, the Board in an attempt to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that because of your assignment with the Air Forces [149] in Washington at that time you can throw some light on the subject.

In order to cover the large field in the limited time available, individual Board Members have been assigned objectives or phases for special investigations, although the entire Board will pass upon all objectives and phases. General Russell has this particular phase, so he will lead in propounding questions, and the other Members will assist in developing it; so I will turn you over to General Russell for the time being.

3. General RUSSELL. General Arnold, Saturday, we submitted to General White, for your attention, certain questions or subjects with the hope that they would give you an opportunity to refresh your mind and collect such data as you would want to answer those questions. It is my purpose to follow, in the main, the outline sent you on that day.

Would you please state, General Arnold, your official status during the year 1941.

General ARNOLD. I was Chief of Air Corps, until the 5th of May, 1941. I was Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, until the 19th of May 1941; Deputy Chief of Staff, to the balance of the year. I was Chief of the Army Air Forces, from the 6th of May 1941 to the balance of the year.

4. General RUSSELL. Then, during November and December 1941, you were Deputy Chief of Staff and Commander of the Air Forces?

General ARNOLD. That is correct.

5. General RUSSELL. General Arnold, were you familiar with the international situation in 1941 as it related to the Japanese Government?

General ARNOLD. That's a question of relativity. I was [150] as familiar as an officer in my position could have been. By that I mean there were certain things undoubtedly happening that I did not know about; there were certain other things happened that I did know about.

6. General RUSSELL. General Arnold, in the critical months of 1941, if we may describe those late fall months of 1941 as "the critical months," you were Deputy Chief of Staff and Commander of the Air Forces. As Deputy Chief of Staff, you were next to the Chief of Staff of the Army, were you not?

General ARNOLD. Yes, sir.

7. General GRUNERT. May I interrupt? Were you the only Deputy, or were there other Deputies?

General ARNOLD. There were two other Deputies. There were General Bryden and General Moore. There were three Deputy Chiefs of Staff at that time.

8. General RUSSELL. In the absence of General Marshall from Washington, which of the Deputies was senior and acting?

General ARNOLD. General Bryden.

9. General RUSSELL. General Arnold, I think it would be helpful if you could enlarge on or maybe elucidate your answer to the effect that you knew some things, and some things you did not know.

General ARNOLD. Well, I don't want to complicate the situation, but there were certain ultrasecret things that obviously I knew nothing about. On the other hand, there were certain ultrasecret things that were brought to my attention. I did have access to all of the conferences of the G-2 Section. I did have daily conferences with the Chief of Staff. I also had my own A-2 Section, that brought me in information [151] as to what was going on; but after it was all over, I realized there were other things that had happened that I didn't know anything about.

10. General RUSSELL. General Arnold, we have discovered in our investigation the existence of a "council of war," which apparently had its meetings over in the office of the Secretary of State. I believe General Marshall in his testimony stated that he and General Stark frequently attended those council meetings. Were you ever in on any of those council meetings?

General ARNOLD. I was never present at any of those meetings.

11. General RUSSELL. When you say that after December 7 it developed that there were things about which you did not know, were any of those things developed in these council meetings that we are discussing?

General ARNOLD. I think they probably were.

12. General RUSSELL. Generally, General Arnold, your information on the Japanese situation, in the late fall of 1941, indicated a tightening in the relationship or a continuing of the relationship; or, just what was the trend in our relations with Japan?

General ARNOLD. I think you can go back earlier. I think it became apparent as early as January 1941 that the relations were quite strained, and the various things that happened from then on through the year indicated that we knew that they were strained and we were taking necessary steps to do what we could to prepare for any eventuality that might occur, without causing an overt act against the Japanese.

For instance, it was always our endeavor to get as many [152] airplanes as we could across to the Philippines, and in order to do that we had to, as you will know, open up an air route across the Pacific, which in those days was quite a task. We did succeed in opening up an air route, with the help of the Navy, by way of Midway and Wake, down through Rabaul, into Darwin, and up into the Philippines. After the route was established, then one of our worries was whether or not if the Japs did declare war or start activities against us, we could hold those airports open.

It was some time in the summer, for instance, that I talked with Admiral Stark, and he was very much worried about what the Japs were doing down in Truk and Jaluit. We knew they were doing something down there, we did not know what; so I made arrangements then that these planes that were going to the Philippines would fly off their course to take pictures of Jaluit and Truk. It was quite a difficult task in those days, because the distances were long, we had to have gasoline, and every time we put a camera in, every time you put extra ammunition in, every time you put guns in, it meant taking off something; and yet we needed those photographs badly.

Well, it was not until December, for instance, that we finally got those pictures, and then the planes that got the pictures were the last ones to land in the Philippines before the Japs attacked the Philippines, so what the photographs showed, we never found out.

I think it was the 17th of November, General George of my outfit, then Colonel George, wrote me a memorandum and said he was worried about the vulnerability of Wake and Midway, and asked me whether we couldn't do something about it, but in [153] those days we were at peace, we couldn't take the actions that we took later, so that I was making a note of it and calling it to the attention of the War Department. There wasn't much we could do. We took it up with the Navy Department, but that was one of Navy's tasks in those days, and the Navy was putting in fields with us and for us, and as I remember it, they did send some garrisons out to Wake and Midway, maybe before and maybe after that; but we were worried—worried about losing those two islands.

Looking back on it, I am convinced now that we all assumed that the Japs would attack the Philippines. We were fairly sure that they would cut our air line, because they had to cut our air line to stop our heavy bombers from getting to the Philippines. We were pretty sure that they would attack Wake and Midway when they did attack. There was always the chance that they might attack Hawaii. Now,

against that, we had a very small air force. The planes that we had that we could use in those possessions effectively were in the hundreds and not in the thousands.

Simultaneously with that we were trying to build up an air force in the United States for any eventuality, and so the number of airplanes we could send would be numbered by the dozens; and every time you took an airplane away from the United States it meant that many less here to build up this Air Force that we knew that some time or other we would have to use.

I think that the Philippine Commander and the Hawaiian Commander were aware of the necessity for air, because they asked for airplanes. It was in August 1941 that the [154] Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department approved a request for 180 B-17's. Now, we did not have 180 B-17's to give them, because at that time the total number of B-17's in the Army was only 109. He was asking for 180, so his request naturally could not be filled.

Prior to that, as early as February, we were trying to get P-40's out to the Hawaiian Department, and the Commanding General out there wanted additional fighter airplanes, because he quite obviously saw a possible use for them; so we went to the extent of getting and sending P-40's out there on carriers, to increase the number he had available.

So I think that there was a general acceptance of the possibility of Japanese aggression, certainly against the Philippines and against Wake and Midway, and possibly, against Hawaii.

13. General RUSSELL. General Arnold, there were negotiations going on between representatives of the Japanese Government and the American Government, in 1941, about which you knew, I guess?

General ARNOLD. I knew the negotiations were going on; yes.

14. General RUSSELL. Were you kept informed as to the developments in those negotiations?

General ARNOLD. Not to any 100 percent extent. In other words, I knew that on the 27th of November negotiations had broken down, apparently broken down, and the Chief of Staff sent a message to the Philippines and to the Hawaiian Department. He sent a warning message of them.

15. General GRUNERT. Do you feel that you were given [155] sufficient information to carry on your job?

General ARNOLD. I feel I was, because I knew. With the general situation, I knew that, with the limited means at hand, somehow or other we had to do the impossible and get airplanes out to the Philippines and over to Honolulu. We didn't have the airplanes, so we did the best we could.

16. General RUSSELL. General Arnold, to go back to this subject of the negotiations, the fact that those negotiations were occurring in no way hindered or delayed your efforts to get aircraft into the Pacific area?

General ARNOLD. As a matter of fact, on the contrary, we leaned over backwards to get them over, because somehow or other I personally never trusted the Japs very much.

17. General RUSSELL. You had no faith in the good faith of the negotiations?

General ARNOLD. I had no faith at all in the negotiations.

18. General RUSSELL. You stated a moment ago, General Arnold, that you knew something was going on in Truk and Jaluit. Generally, how far were those islands from Hawaii?

General ARNOLD. My recollection is that the distance from Wake to Rabaul is about 1400 miles—General Frank knows more about this than I do—and Truk and Jaluit were about two thirds the distance, one of them on the west side of our course about twenty miles, and the other on the east side of our course about sixty miles.

19. General RUSSELL. Were those two islands in the mandated group?

General ARNOLD. Both were in the mandated group, I think.

20. General RUSSELL. Then, some time in the fall of 1941, [156] you discovered that something was happening out there?

General ARNOLD. Well, we knew that the Japs were doing something there. We knew they were building naval bases. Navy was worried about it, and we took it so seriously that I told my boys when they flew over there, or who were going to fly over there, that they would probably have a fight on their hands, and I cautioned them to have their machine guns, or load them, when they flew over those islands; so I knew we were going to have a fight on our hands.

21. General RUSSELL. Did those developments, General Arnold, that you have just discussed, in your opinion constitute a threat to Midway and Wake and Hawaii?

General ARNOLD. In my opinion it was a direct threat against my airway across the Pacific, because it cut my airline in two.

22. General RUSSELL. Were these three points, Hawaii, Midway, and Wake, all on your air route?

General ARNOLD. They were all on my airway route. My air route went from San Francisco to Hawaii, to Midway, to Wake, and then across all the mandated islands, to Rabaul, then across to Darwin and Australia, and up into the Philippines; and it was the only route we had, because the other route, we had no control over the islands. For instance, we would have liked very much at that time, as we have done since, to put a route down through Christmas or Canton, Samoa, and Fiji.

23. General GRUNERT. Let me interrupt. If the witness is giving any testimony that may be of value to the enemy in the future, anything planned, or something that they do not now [157] know, I suggest we had better have a closed session and have such things explained to us, rather than putting it in the record, which may or may not get to other eyes than ours.

General ARNOLD. I think that is an excellent idea.

24. General GRUNERT. So, if you will keep that in mind as you go along, and if there is any such information that you think ought to be particularly guarded and not put into the record, then do not give it.

General ARNOLD. I am, along that line, a little bit doubtful about this photographic business being in your open record, because somebody may pick that up at a later date as an act of war, or aggression, or something.

25. General RUSSELL. Unfortunately, if that is true, General Arnold, it is all through the record in the Roberts Commission proceedings, and in our record.

General ARNOLD. That is all right.

26. General GRUNERT. Anything that appeared in those reports may appear here.

27. General RUSSELL. That is where we got it, first.

The point, definitely, that I was attempting to establish, now, is whether or not it was a fact that the Air Corps people, your people, considered these developments in the mandated islands as a threat against Hawaii, Wake, and Midway?

General ARNOLD. Against Midway and Wake, certainly; and possibly, against Hawaii. Looking back on it now, I cannot remember that we were all so much worried about the immediate attack on Hawaii. It was always a possibility; but we all thought there certainly would be an attack against Midway and Wake.

[158] 28. General RUSSELL. Your reasoning there, I assume, General Arnold, was predicated on the fact that Midway and Wake were nearer to these Japanese developments in the Mandate than was Hawaii?

General ARNOLD. That is right.

[159] 29. General RUSSELL. General Arnold, were you at that time familiar with the plans for the operation of the Army Air Force in the Territory of Hawaii?

General ARNOLD. Yes; I was.

30. General RUSSELL. Did it include information as to the cooperation between the Army and Navy Air Forces out there?

General ARNOLD. Yes.

31. General RUSSELL. Did you consider those plans sound from the standpoint of air operation?

General ARNOLD. No. The Air Force never did consider those plans sound. We never considered any plans sound which did not give us full opportunity to use the heavy bombers and to get the most out of them; and we did not think that those plans permitted that. We figured that they were wasting the striking force on reconnaissance missions, so that when we had to use a striking force they would not be available.

32. General RUSSELL. Did you know what the reconnaissance plan was?

General ARNOLD. I read it and my people studied it.

33. General RUSSELL. It is true that the responsibility of the Army for reconnaissance ended with its inshore patrol?

General ARNOLD. The responsibility of the Army ended with the inshore patrol, but the Navy had the use of the Army heavy bombers for the long-range reconnaissance.

34. General RUSSELL. If they required them?

General ARNOLD. And they did require them, because they did use them.

35. General RUSSELL. When?

General ARNOLD. All during this period, prior to the Pearl Harbor attack and after Pearl Harbor.

[160] 36. General RUSSELL. Are you certain about that, General Arnold?

General ARNOLD. Of course I cannot swear on a stack of Bibles that I do not make mistakes, but I have a distinct recollection from seeing letters from the Commanding General over there saying they were wasting their airplanes by using them on offshore patrols.

37. General RUSSELL. Do you have any of those letters with you?

General ARNOLD. No; I have not.

38. General RUSSELL. That is a point that has not yet been brought to the knowledge of the Board, and if we can get information on it it might be of assistance.

General ARNOLD. Let me withdraw that answer. Let me look up the letters that I have and see whether I can substantiate it. Certainly it was happening after Pearl Harbor. I think I had better look that up and get the facts before I make that statement. Certainly it happened after Pearl Harbor; and my impression is that I got a letter from Martin telling about the use of the airplanes that way, but I may be mistaken. One reason why I think maybe I am mistaken is because, looking back, I think they only had about 12 B-17s in Hawaii at that time. So I guess I am mistaken.

39. General FRANK. 12 B-17s and 32 B-18s?

General ARNOLD. Yes. I guess I am mistaken. I guess they did not have enough to do it if they had wanted to.

40. General RUSSELL. It was somewhat in conflict with other data which we had on that subject, and we just wanted to check [161] it to eliminate any conflicts if possible.

General ARNOLD. You might eliminate that part of it, if you will.

41. General RUSSELL. General Arnold, if the bombers were not being used for reconnaissance missions prior to December 7, 1941, would you now testify that the plans of operation of the Air Force, including cooperation with the Navy Air Force, were sound?

General ARNOLD. I still would not say they were sound, because there was a conflict of authority, a conflict of command, out there, that in our opinion never was straightened out. The Army responsibility, for instance, as outlined in joint action, was to provide and operate the mobile land and air forces required for the defense of the coast, aircraft operating in support of Pearl Harbor defenses, and general coastal frontier defense in support of or in lieu of naval forces.

The Navy responsibility was to conduct naval operations directed toward the defeat of any enemy force in the vicinity of the coast and to support the Army in repelling attacks on coastal objectives.

In our opinion, there never was any clear-cut line there as to the duties of the Army and the Navy as far as the air was concerned, because the air overlaps both.

It is awfully hard for an officer in the Air Force to determine whether he is operating in the direct defense of the coast or whether he is operating against the defeat of enemy forces in the vicinity of the coast. One of them is the Navy's responsibility and the other is the Army's responsibility; and [162] the airplane is out 150 miles to sea and he cannot tell which he is doing.

42. General GRUNERT. If the Air Force under your direction did not think the plan was sound, what did you do about it?

General ARNOLD. We have always been objecting to those plans; we have been objecting for quite some time.

43. General GRUNERT. But you found obstacles that could not be overcome in order to get across what you air people thought was necessary?

General ARNOLD. No. I think that the Navy Department and the War Department did what they thought was best under the circumstances. I do not think it was possible to have any clear-cut chain of

command as long as everything was done by agreement instead of by direction. The Joint Board was an agreement Board; it was not a direction Board. If the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations agreed, then the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy signed the proceedings and everything was lovely; but if they disagreed, there was no possible way, without going to the President, to get a meeting of the minds. But I think this is the closest they could get under the then existing organization of the War and Navy Departments.

44. General GRUNERT. Even then you thought that certain of your equipment would be misused or not properly used?

General ARNOLD. Not properly used.

45. General GRUNERT. That has since been corrected, has it?

General ARNOLD. Yes, by having unity of command. That is what they should have had in the first place, and then you would get away from all this possibility of misunderstanding and [163] misuse of equipment.

46. General GRUNERT. Under the circumstances you think, then, that a joint air operation plan was about the best that could have been done?

General ARNOLD. Under the organization, it was the best that could be done. I think the organization was faulty to that extent, however.

47. General RUSSELL. Could you apply that defect in the organization to the scheme of reconnaissance out there where, under the plan to which you have just referred, the offshore patrol was for the Navy and the inshore patrol was for the Army?

General ARNOLD (reading):

When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, Army aircraft are made available. These aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing search operations.

That means, then, that we once again take our heavy bombers, which are a striking force, and turn them over to the Navy to be used for reconnaissance purposes, which is not a proper employment of heavy bombers.

48. General GRUNERT. But this could only be done if agreed to by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and if he did not agree, then it could not be done.

General ARNOLD. It says that:

Joint air attacks on hostile vessels will be executed under tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army's [164] bombardment strength to participate in each mission, the force to remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks if required, until completion of the mission.

The next one says:

When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, Army aircraft are made available.

I am not sure that that was ever clarified as to who determines when they are to be made available or the number to be made available.

49. General GRUNERT. Did you consider in this respect that the Navy under that plan was charged with what they call distant patrolling or reconnaissance and that the Army was not so charged?

General ARNOLD. I think that is sound; I think that is absolutely correct.

50. General FRANK. You are familiar with the message that went out on November 27, signed "Marshall"?

General ARNOLD. Yes.

51. General FRANK. In which he directed General Short to conduct such reconnaissance as he deemed necessary?

General ARNOLD. That is correct.

52. General FRANK. The only reconnaissance for which General Short was directly responsible was inshore reconnaissance, according to the agreement between himself and the Navy. Is not that correct?

General ARNOLD. Rainbow 5 says:

Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air [165] forces, and against hostile sympathizers.

No strings attached. So Rainbow 5, as I understand, was in conflict with the joint agreement.

53. General FRANK. What I am trying to do is to clarify this point that General Russell brought out.

General ARNOLD. In answer to you, General Frank, under Rainbow 5, and with the instructions received from General Marshall, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had sufficient authority to extend his reconnaissance anywhere he wanted to.

54. General FRANK. General Short was given these instructions to conduct such reconnaissance as he deemed necessary. Let us assume that when he got those instructions, realizing that the Navy was responsible for distant reconnaissance, did he show that to the Navy?

General ARNOLD. That is to be assumed; yes.

55. General FRANK. If the normal operation ensued and they followed the operation of the agreement under which the Navy was responsible for distant reconnaissance, who was responsible under this arrangement as to whether they would conduct distant reconnaissance or not.

General ARNOLD. Under the joint action it was Navy responsibility.

56. General FRANK. That is what I am trying to get at. Notwithstanding the fact, when this order went to Short, if he still adhered to the agreement and the Navy did not see fit to conduct the reconnaissance, then the reconnaissance was not conducted. Is that correct?

[166] General ARNOLD. I think that follows.

57. General GRUNERT. May I interject this question: If the War Department, that phase of the War Department which has to do with air, knowing the air plan for the defense of Hawaii, intended in any message that went out to the Commanding General of Hawaii that he should conduct any reconnaissance except that which was provided for in the joint air operations, would the War Department naturally have said in this respect that the joint air agreement did not govern? Do you see what I mean?

General ARNOLD. I see what you mean, but I think you will find that the War Department has consistently refrained from trying to tell the theaters how to run their jobs. I as an individual wrote quite frequently to General Martin. I called attention in certain cases to certain parts of the air plan out there that I did not agree with, but I always put it up to General Martin as something for him to

consider with the Navy and with the local authorities, and I never tried to tell General Martin how to run his show.

58. General GRUNERT. But here comes a directive from the War Department to the effect that there would be such reconnaissance and so forth, and they referred to air reconnaissance presumably. Naturally it would seem that the local Commander would consider that as referring to those reconnaissances as had been agreed upon.

General ARNOLD. That is right. I go right back to my former statement, that at that time we all considered an attack against Honolulu, as far as the air was concerned, a possibility. We did not think it would be as acute as an attack against Wake or Midway.

[167] 58. General RUSSELL. General Arnold, I had a thought in the memorandum which we presented to you earlier expressed as requesting the conclusions which you had reached on the 28th day of November, 1941, as to the probability of an air attack on the installations at Oahu and the Navy by carrier-borne Japanese aircraft. I am not sure but what you have covered that in substance already, but I wonder whether or not you would be good enough to enlarge on that.

General ARNOLD. The best way I know how to answer that is that when I heard that the attack had been carried out, I was out on the West Coast.

Let me go back a little bit. I went out on the West Coast to expedite the departure of B-17s for the Philippines, because I was sure in my own mind that if we could get enough of them out there we could make an attack on the Philippines unsuccessful. We figured if we could get enough B-17s the Japs could not successfully attack the Philippines. I went out to the West Coast to expedite the departure of some of them. I got to Hamilton Field—and, incidentally, they also on their way across from Wake to Rabaul were to take pictures of Truk and Jaluit. I talked to all the squadron commanders and the staff before they took off. I told them at that time that they might run into trouble. I told them that they should have their guns ready and that they might have a fight on their hands. But I did not visualize the fight in Hawaii or this side of Hawaii; I visualized it somewhere on the other side of Hawaii.

60. General RUSSELL. General Arnold, did that thought which you had about the probable place of attack out there cause you [168] to send those bombers from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor unarmed?

General ARNOLD. They were armed.

61. General RUSSELL. Did they have ammunition when they left the West Coast?

General ARNOLD. No, because at that time it was a question of gasoline or ammunition for that long 2400-mile hop. Obviously we made an error, an error in judgment. Somebody had to weigh the fact against their certainty of arriving there by providing sufficient gasoline against the probability of their using their machine guns and not getting there by carrying that extra ammunition. They had to weigh one against the other, and they decided against ammunition. So they did not take the ammunition, and they got there right in the middle of the Pearl Harbor attack.

62. General RUSSELL. I was interested in your answer a moment ago that you were pressing to get B-17s to the Philippines because you had arrived at the conclusion that if you had enough there the Japs could

not attack the Philippines. Are you talking about air attacks or any sort of attacks?

General ARNOLD. Any sort of attacks. We believed if a convoy came down off the Philippines we would have another Bismarck Sea, and we just anticipated the effectiveness of our bombers by about a year and a half.

63. General RUSSELL. The effectiveness of your bombers, or the conception of their effectiveness?

General ARNOLD. We had the same idea; we have always believed we could do it.

64. General RUSSELL. Did you not have the same bombers too?

[169] General ARNOLD. We had the same B-17's.

65. General RUSSELL. It came to pass, General Arnold, that on the 27th of November a message was sent by the Chief of Staff to these overseas departments and the West Coast Command. Were you familiar with that?

General ARNOLD. Yes.

66. General RUSSELL. Were you in on the conferences which led to the sending of that message?

General ARNOLD. Yes.

67. General RUSSELL. Do you remember whether or not you participated in framing that message?

General ARNOLD. I did not.

68. General RUSSELL. You did see that message?

General ARNOLD. I saw the message; yes.

69. General RUSSELL. Briefly, could you tell us what, in your mind, prompted the sending of that message?

General ARNOLD. I think it was the breakdown in the conference here in Washington with the Japanese.

70. General RUSSELL. In other words, there were no hostile developments, or possibly I should say that there were no new Japanese movements in that immediate period around November 27 which caused the sending of that message?

General ARNOLD. Not so far as I know.

71. General RUSSELL. And there were no developments which caused you to revise your thinking as to the probabilities of Japanese action?

General ARNOLD. Not so far as I know.

72. General RUSSELL. Then it was confined almost exclusively to the fact that these negotiations were considered as about [170] at an end?

General ARNOLD. In my opinion—and I thought it was sound, because, as I said before, I never thought the negotiations would get anywhere.

73. General RUSSELL. You do not know whether the Secretary of State had announced to the War and Navy Departments that those negotiations were about through?

General ARNOLD. I do not know that; no, sir.

74. General RUSSELL. General Arnold, on the day following the sending of the message of the 27th, a message was sent by the Adjutant General which was copied into the memorandum that we sent to you two or three days ago, and I want to repeat that message here in the record.

(Message of November 28, 1941, is as follows:)

114 WAR KR 189 WD Prty

Washn. D. C. 8:42P Nov. 28, 1941.

C G

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter T H

482 28th Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren see paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five and paren stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any [171] illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions.

You are familiar with that message, are you not?

General ARNOLD. The message relative to sabotage?

General RUSSELL. Yes. It is 482, and begins:

Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities.

General ARNOLD. Yes. I am familiar with that.

75. General RUSSELL. Was that message prepared under your supervision?

General ARNOLD. I have got to go back into history to give you the background of that.

We had been having a lot of trouble with our airplanes all over the United States. We had been having trouble with them coming out of the factories, down at Savannah, and various other stations. We had had many accidents that we could not explain, and it looked to us as if there was sabotage. Just to what extent sabotage was taking place, I did not know. So we went through a period during the fall of 1941 when we were endeavoring to stop these unexplained accidents. In certain cases the finger pointed right directly at sabotage; in certain other cases, looking back on it now, I know it was inexperienced workmen who just could not do the job properly. But at that time we were so convinced that it was sabotage that we had sent [172] sabotage messages all over the United States, to our factories, to our factory representatives, to all the training fields; and it was just an unfortunate occurrence that my sabotage message, that was brought to my attention by General Scanlon on the morning of the 28th of November, came up; and he asked me then to send this sabotage message to all stations of the Air Corps. He prepared a message and I started it through the machinery to send it out to all air stations, but as it went through, General Miles, who was then G-2, got hold of it and he said, "If you are going to send it to all the air stations you ought to send it to all Army stations throughout the world." We had quite a long discussion about it, and I withdrew from the discussion and left General Scanlon to carry on. Whether or not I actually saw the message as finally sent out, before it was sent, I do not know, but I certainly started it. I know that General Scanlon was present with General Miles when they had their discussion as to what the message should contain and the phraseology of it.

76. General GRUNERT. May I ask there if this message was directed particularly at Hawaii?

General ARNOLD. It had no connection with conditions in Hawaii. It was an over-all message sent to all Army Air Force stations.

77. General GRUNERT. From your background it might appear that the result to be attained through that message would apply more to air fields in the United States than elsewhere.

General ARNOLD. I would not have said that at the time, no, because at that time we were fearful of what might happen [173] in Hawaii, due to the Japanese who lived in Hawaii and who had had access to our air fields. We did not send it particularly to Hawaii. We sent the same thing to Panama, because we were having accidents down there too.

78. General GRUNERT. Do you know why the 28th was selected instead of the 26th or 24th or 29th? Was there anything particular to bring to mind that particular date?

General ARNOLD. General Scanlon brought it to my attention. Just why he picked the 28th I do not know. It was gradually building up before we had talked to our various Commanders in the United States about sabotage. But why General Scanlon picked the 28th I do not know.

79. General GRUNERT. Then you do not know whether there is any connection between the Chief of Staff's message of November 27 and the G-2 message on sabotage and your message?

General ARNOLD. I do not think there is any connection. As a matter of fact, I do not believe that General Scanlon knew of the Chief of Staff's message.

80. General FRANK. In other words, it was a coincidence?

[174] General ARNOLD. It is all coincidence. You have to bear in mind that for a lot of these things I am counting on my memory and I have given the story as best I remember it. In certain instances I have had a chance to refresh myself; in certain others I have not.

81. General RUSSELL. General Arnold, from your reference to sabotage a moment ago and your subsequent explanation of that situation, I gathered the impression that you were referring to sabotage as you thought it might exist largely in the plants where your planes were being manufactured.

General ARNOLD. Also in the operating bases.

82. General RUSSELL. Operating bases.

General ARNOLD. Because we knew that we were having these accidents in our operating bases, and we could not explain any of them.

83. General RUSSELL. Now, to clarify your initial statements and those made in response to questions from members of the Board, your initial conception was to provide in this message of November 28th against damage to Air Corps material?

General ARNOLD. That is right.

84. General RUSSELL. It was converted into an over-all anti-sabotage message for all Army installations in this conference between you and General Scanlon, on the one part, and G-2 on the other?

General ARNOLD. That is correct.

85. General RUSSELL. General Grunert asked you about the fact that it was sent out to all of these installations throughout the world, practically, and hence had no particular reference to the Hawaiian De-

partment, to which, as I recall, you replied [175] that it did have reference to the Hawaiian Department, because you were apprehensive about the matériel in the Hawaiian Department.

General ARNOLD. Yes.

86. General FRANK. The same as at all other stations in the world; that is correct, isn't it?

General ARNOLD. That is right; all stations in the world. I was worried about all of them.

87. General RUSSELL. General Arnold, in this radiogram of November 28th, identified as 482, the language is used, "Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security," with certain cautions which follow. Do you have any recollection as to why that particular statement was placed in that message?

General ARNOLD. I was not present when the message was finally completed, but as an indication of our belief that there might be subversive activities in our Hawaiian fields I remember quite distinctly, when the first reports came in as to what had allegedly occurred at Hickam Field, and they were reports that afterwards I think were disproved, that stated that the Japs had deliberately run their dollies into the tails of our airplanes and had performed other activities of that character, why, we were only too ready to believe them. So that was in our minds undoubtedly at that time.

88. General RUSSELL. The thing that is in the Board's mind at the moment is whether or not your limiting the activities to these protective measures affected General Short's thinking about what was to be done out there.

[176] General ARNOLD. Of course, I cannot answer that because through all this I have a continuous record of requests for airplanes against air attacks, more airplanes, more crews. "Get them over as fast as you can. Change the armament. Get these airplanes up to date against air attack." That whole thought, that thought goes through all the messages, all the letters that came back there for a period of the year starting with January 1941. So the thought that we had, the impression that it left in our mind, was that they were thinking of air attack.

89. General RUSSELL. Well, to follow the questions—

90. General GRUNERT. I would like to ask a question on that, unless you are ready to continue on it.

91. General RUSSELL. No, sir. Suppose you ask it.

92. General GRUNERT. That message 482 of November 28th which we have under discussion appeared to wind up with this statement:

This does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions. Do you know what that was intended to convey, whether or not that was intended as a caution to the effect that, although you must look after the sabotage, you must also look after other defensive measures? Do you know whether that was in your minds?

General ARNOLD. That was undoubtedly in our minds at that time.

93. General GRUNERT. I just wanted to put that in so as to complete the idea.

94. General RUSSELL. You refer to "illegal measures" and enjoin against taking illegal measures in this.

[177] General ARNOLD. They were not my words.

95. General RUSSELL. You do not know what that was?

General ARNOLD. They were G-2 words.

96. General RUSSELL. You do not know what he meant?

General ARNOLD. I do not know what he meant, because I was not present when he put those in.

97. General RUSSELL. General Arnold, it seems, then, that this message which you originally designed for the air people had grafted onto it by the G-2 Department other instructions which may or may not have resulted in some confusion in the message.

General ARNOLD. That may be. I am sorry that I was not present at the meeting where they drew up the message, so I could give what actually took place.

98. General GRUNERT. Do you think that General Scanlon would have answers to most of these questions? I believe you said that he was present.

General ARNOLD. General Bryden might be able to help out on them, or General Scanlon, because General Scanlon stood out for certain sentences to be included in the War Department message. I think that you might be able to get help from one or both of them.

99. General RUSSELL. Did you see General Short's reply to that message of the 28th, General Arnold?

General ARNOLD. I saw General Short's reply.

100. General GRUNERT. Was the reply that you saw intended as a reply to this message or to the Chief of Staff's message of the 27th in which the report was called for?

[178] General ARNOLD. I think that he made a reply to the Chief of Staff's message which was different; I think it was a shorter message.

101. General GRUNERT. Yes.

102. General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, General Arnold, General Short did reply and referred by number to this radio message 482. He did make a rather complete report on that, what he had done in response to the directions in message 482.

General ARNOLD. You see, at that time I was more interested in the air than I was in the rest of the Island because I thought that we had a big problem there, so the only thing I was interested in was getting a reply from Martin.

103. General GRUNERT. In General Short's reply to your message did he state, did he enumerate, any other measures than measures against sabotage that had been taken?

General ARNOLD. I do not remember that he did. I think it covered just sabotage; security and sabotage.

104. General RUSSELL. Those are the only questions that I have.

105. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions, General Frank?

106. General FRANK. Hawaii was on the priority list for the delivery of airplanes in '41, was it not?

General ARNOLD. It was. Second priority. Philippines first priority and Hawaii second priority.

107. General FRANK. What was the state of transition from B-18s to B-17s in Hawaii? Do you remember?

General ARNOLD. I remember they were having a school out there at the time for this transition, and that we sent over some specially skilled personnel to help them out in their [179] B-17s, but what the exact status of the transition was I do not know.

108. General FRANK. Generally do you know the state of training?

General ARNOLD. We were always of the belief that the Hawaiian Air Force was probably better trained than any of our air forces. That is the impression we had here in Washington as a result of our inspections and due to the fact that they were always carrying out some form of mission simulating what they would do in active combat.

109. General FRANK. What I was about to approach was this point, which your present answer seems to disclaim, namely, that because of the fact that they were charged with training a lot of crews to fly B-17s from California to Honolulu and then conduct a lot of transition training in Honolulu, and do certain training work in preparation for transferring squadrons to the Philippines, that perhaps they got themselves into a training state of mind rather than a war state of mind.

General ARNOLD. I wrote to General Martin, as I said, from time to time, and the establishment of a transition school in Hawaii was not done until we were assured that they would get more effective results by carrying this transition on in Hawaii than if it were done in the United States. In other words, we had no air force, as such, anywhere at that time. No matter where you had that training, it was going to disrupt something. Where could be put that training so it would interfere least with the creation of the small air force than we did have? And it looked to us as if they could carry on this transition in Hawaii and interfere less with the training [180] than anywhere else because we would have the airplanes then available, in case of an emergency, where they would be most needed.

110. General GRUNERT. May I butt in there?

General ARNOLD. And at the same time we were able to take care of the transient heavy bombers that were going through.

111. General GRUNERT. Was there anything that occurred during the attack that reflected the training, whether or not they were trained or were not trained?

General ARNOLD. It is rather difficult to answer that question, because they didn't have a chance. Those who did have a chance—

112. General GRUNERT. That is all I wanted. I just wondered. They didn't have a chance to show it one way or another?

General ARNOLD. There were three pilots that I remember who had a chance, and they went down and took airplanes and went up and gave a good account of themselves, but they were the only three that I know that had a chance.

113. General GRUNERT. Yes.

114. General FRANK. Had anything held up B-17 production that in any way had an effect on this situation?

General ARNOLD. No; we did not have the facilities to get the numbers that we wanted. If you will remember, at that time in our endeavor to get B-17s we had 90 in January, and by June the 90 was up to 109, and by November it had only gone up to 148. That was the total number of B-17s produced by the Boeing Company. We just did not have the productive capacity to get the numbers required.

[181] 115. General FRANK. In answer to a question of General Russell, I think the tenor of the reply with respect to your thoughts on an attack on Hawaii was to the effect that it was possible but not considered probable at that time.

General ARNOLD. Not as probable as some others.

116. General FRANK. No.

General ARNOLD. We always saw the probability, but not as probable as Wake, Midway, or the Philippines. The Philippines we knew were going to get attacked, in our own minds; we knew that.

117. General FRANK. I would like to develop, if I can, from any point of view that you may have, with respect to the attitude of the public toward possible war that summer and fall. Do you think general public attitude was reflected in the congressional vote on the Army, when the Army bill was passed by one vote?

General ARNOLD. I have no doubt in my mind at all but what it was reflected. I think the public was very apathetic towards all wars.

118. General FRANK. That is what I want.

Now, you had opportunities to come in contact with the Army, that is, the rank and file. Generally, what, in your opinion, was the attitude of the rank and file toward the possibility of war?

General ARNOLD. I think that the average Army officer thought it was coming. I do not think there is any question about that. It was just a question of time.

119. General GRUNERT. Was that instilled into the men? Were they war conscious, or were they apathetic to a certain extent?

[182] General ARNOLD. I do not believe that the enlisted men, certainly in the Air Force, were as war conscious as the officers, because we could not talk as openly to the enlisted men as we did to the officers. We had our officers' meetings; and, while we could not tell them everything we knew—just like it was out on the West Coast: I could not tell them everything we knew, but I told them enough so as to make them realize that the conditions were serious.

120. General GRUNERT. Do you know what that status was as far as the air force in Hawaii was concerned, officers and men? Had you any reflection of that through General Martin or otherwise?

General ARNOLD. I looked for some correspondence so as to refresh my memory on that, and I could not find it; so I am afraid that my hindsight there would indicate an impression that may not be justified.

121. General GRUNERT. But you have the impression that somewhere along the line correspondence was had on that subject?

General ARNOLD. Well, for instance—see if I can find the date in here (indicating). As early as March 31st they had a board out in Honolulu as to what might happen in case the Japanese did attack Pearl Harbor, and that was a board signed by Martin and Bellinger in which they outlined in that report pretty nearly what actually did happen. So there is no doubt in my mind that the people in Hawaii were thinking on the subject and giving it very serious thought.

[183] 122. General GRUNERT. Do you know, from any evidence available to you, whether or not the officers of the Air Force in Hawaii were kept informed of existing conditions, so as to develop a "war consciousness," as one might call it? In other words, you told us what you knew about the officers and the men. Now, how did that apply, in Hawaii? Was there anybody there to tell them, or were they told, do you know?

General ARNOLD. You see, I was over in Hawaii shortly before this, and at that time, one of the things I was doing was looking around with a view of trying to establish in my mind whether some of these

things were or were not being done; and I must say that at that time it was not as serious as it became later; but I was very well pleased with the way things were being carried on—the training and the building up of the facilities for the employment of their air arm, and the training, of course, including the instruction given to the individual enlisted men and their officers.

123. General GRUNERT. In that connection, do you think there was a cry of “wolf! wolf!” too often, so as to get them into a frame of mind that they would say, “Oh, well! just another cry of ‘wolf’!”?

General ARNOLD. I wouldn't know that. I was not close enough to them to get that impression.

124. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

125. General RUSSELL. General, you have made it very clear that in considering Japanese probabilities, it was your opinion that the attack would more probably come at Wake and Midway and the Philippines, which were nearer the Jap bases, than was Hawaii, and yet Hawaii had first priority on ships and other materiel. [184] Can you explain that?

126. General ARNOLD. In the Air Force it had second priority; the Philippines had first priority, Hawaii the second priority.

127. General RUSSELL. I misunderstood you. I thought it was the other way around.

General ARNOLD. No.

128. General GRUNERT. I understand that it was first priority in most things, but on airplanes at that particular time, it was second priority; is that right?

General ARNOLD. That is right.

129. General FRANK. I would like to ask a question, here. Were you familiar with the fact that there was a Japanese force of carriers, submarines, battleships, and cruisers at Jaluit about the 1st of December? Did you have knowledge of that?

General ARNOLD. Well, that was included in one of the things that we were going to look for, when we sent these planes over. We were going to look to see if there were any indications of any Japanese concentrations or creation of facilities in these Caroline Islands, and we figured that by sending these airplanes out and diverting them from the course far enough we could find out. As far as I was concerned at that time, it was a rumor. We didn't know. We had heard rumors of it—it was all you got—that there were such concentrations. We did not know for sure.

130. General FRANK. You did not know that the Navy knew?

General ARNOLD. No. Well, no; I didn't.

131. General FRANK. I would like to emphasize again, the facility or difficulty with which operations might be initiated [185] through the cooperative basis on which they had to be accomplished at Honolulu. Will you just give us a short statement as to your opinion of that.

General ARNOLD. In my opinion—no, the opinion of the Air Forces—that was one of the main criticisms of all the plans that they had for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Everything was cooperation, without any direct responsibility that you get with unity of command, with one Commander who is responsible for employing the facilities at hand to carry out his mission.

132. General FRANK. That is all.

General ARNOLD. I would like to make one request of the Board, if I may. I used the word "Eniwetok" when I should have said Jaluit. Those two places were Jaluit and Truk, not Eniwetok and Truk.

133. General GRUNERT. Make a note of that, please, and change it.

One last question: With respect to the subject just discussed, did that lack of what you considered proper cooperation in Hawaii reflect itself in the attack, as far as you know, from an air viewpoint?

General ARNOLD. In my opinion, the attack came so quickly and was so devastating in character that it never gave an opportunity to determine whether it was lack of unity of command or coordination, or what the trouble was.

134. General GRUNERT. But if there had been what you might term, or have termed, the proper coordination, then it might have reflected itself in the earlier stages, particularly in the reconnaissance?

[186] General ARNOLD. That is the only place where it had an opportunity to show itself, in view of the conditions under which the attack occurred.

135. General GRUNERT. Are there any further questions?

All right. Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming over here, and taking your time.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

**TESTIMONY OF COLONEL EDWARD F. FRENCH, SIGNAL CORPS,
OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE TRAFFIC OPERATION DIVISION,
CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICE; WASHINGTON, D. C.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel FRENCH. Edward F. French; Colonel, Signal Corps; officer in charge of the Traffic Operation Branch, Office of the Chief Signal Office, Washington, D. C.

2. General GRUNERT. I would also like to add to the advice given you by the Recorder relative to your rights under Article of War 24, a caution that in the event there is anything that is ultrasecret, that should not be placed in the record, before you answer the question, you may consult with the Board to see whether or not we should hear what you have to say in closed session. In other words, anything that might be of assistance to our enemy in the future.

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

3. General GRUNERT. It is not as to what has happened, unless it is of continuing nature.

This Board, in an attempt to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoints prior to [187] and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that, because of your assignment, you can throw some light on the subject. The Board has divided the work so that the individual Members thereof have a special field of inquiry, although the Board passes on everything. So, General Russell will be the one that will propound the questions to you, with the other Members of the Board asking any they see fit, on that particular line on which you are to be a witness. I turn you over to General Russell.

4. General RUSSELL. Colonel French, what were your duties on the 7th day of December, 1941?

Colonel FRENCH. I was officer in charge of the Traffic Division, and Officer in Charge of the War Department Signal Center, Washington, D. C.

5. General RUSSELL. What if any responsibilities did you have on that day in selecting the means for the transmission of messages which reached the Center from the War Department?

Colonel FRENCH. I had alerted myself on December 7, knowing that it was a rather critical period, and I came to the office early on Sunday morning, making myself available should any unforeseen circumstance arise.

6. General GRUNERT. Why did you alert yourself on that particular morning? What was in the back of your mind as to the need, that caused you to be there that Sunday instead of the Sunday before, or the Sunday after?

Colonel FRENCH. I had, General, alerted myself some time before that. I had been in my office every Sunday, every day, for quite some time. As to the exact days, I cannot now recall, but I spent many days and many nights in my office, and signal center.

[188] 7. General GRUNERT. Might you have been influenced by what had passed through your office elsewhere as to conditions?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir. The tempo was such in my office during that period that I felt that it demanded my attention.

8. General RUSSELL. Colonel French, on the morning of December 7, 1941, in your official capacity over there, you could select the means or the method by which these messages would be sent?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

9. General RUSSELL. You had that within your jurisdiction?

Colonel FRENCH. That was my authority; yes, sir.

10. General RUSSELL. That was your authority?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

11. General GRUNERT. What means were available for transmission?

Colonel FRENCH. Sir?

12. General GRUNERT. What means were available for such transmission?

Colonel FRENCH. Well, the normal means available to us were the War Department radio net. You were speaking of Honolulu, now, sir, or of all?

13. General GRUNERT. Yes, you might give a general answer, and then, also, the special one on Hawaii and Honolulu. Did you have any other means besides radios?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes; I did.

14. General GRUNERT. The Transoceanic telephone service?

Colonel FRENCH. I had commercial facilities available.

I never did use Transoceanic telephone for such [189] service, at any time, prior or since.

15. General FRANK. Isn't it available to you?

Colonel FRENCH. You might consider it available to me, General, but we had never exercised the practice of using Transoceanic.

18. General GRUNERT. Is it used from the other end?

Colonel FRENCH. Sir?

17. General GRUNERT. Is it used from the other end, to the War Department?

Colonel FRENCH. I could not say. It wasn't used to the War Department Signal Center, sir.

18. General GRUNERT. Would you have known if it had been used, for instance, between the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General of Hawaii, or vice versa?

Colonel FRENCH. I would not know of that, General.

19. General GRUNERT. You would not know that?

Colonel FRENCH. I would not know. That would be entirely up to the Chief of Staff. I had no control over the Transoceanic facility.

20. General FRANK. Had you thought of it, you could have used it, however, is that correct?

Colonel FRENCH. Not in this instance; I could not have used it, General, because the message, the traffic, that was to be routed, was classified traffic, and would not be put over a voice radio.

21. General RUSSELL. Colonel French, on this morning of December 7, 1941, you received for transmission to certain of the overseas departments a message from the Chief of Staff, is that true?

[190] Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

22. General RUSSELL. You have had occasion to testify about this message and its transmission, before?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir; before the Roberts Commission, sir.

23. General RUSSELL. And hence you are entirely familiar with the message to which I refer?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

24. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, can you recall the form in which you received that message?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

25. General RUSSELL. Will you tell us just what that was. Had it been prepared in longhand, or had it been typewritten or what?

Colonel FRENCH. Colonel Bratton personally brought that message to the code room on the morning of December 7.

26. General GRUNERT. Who is Colonel Bratton?

Colonel FRENCH. Colonel Bratton is G-2. He is on General Miles's staff as G-2 officer.

27. General RUSSELL. He is overseas.

Was it written out in longhand, or had it been typewritten?

Colonel FRENCH. I heard Colonel Bratton at the code room asking to be admitted, and my office was across the hall from there. I immediately got up from my desk and went to the code room, and Colonel Bratton was then inside the code room. He told me that he had this message that he wanted to get out in a hurry. I looked at the message with him. The receiving clerk had the message, there. Due to the difficulty in reading [191] the message, I told Colonel Bratton we should type the message up, which he agreed to, and I had that message typed in my office. That was to make sure that the code clerk would make no error. I had it typed for clarity, to make sure that there would be no error made.

28. General FRANK. How long did that take?

Colonel FRENCH. I couldn't say, General, off-hand.

29. General FRANK. About?

Colonel FRENCH. I would say a few minutes, just to type this message off.

30. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, we have gotten the form of the message, and I think we can develop the time element, step by step.

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

31. General RUSSELL. It came into your office written out in long-hand?

Colonel FRENCH. Written in longhand.

32. General RUSSELL. I believe it appears somewhere that it was in the Chief of Staff's handwriting.

Colonel FRENCH. It might have been.

33. General RUSSELL. You do not know that?

Colonel FRENCH. I don't remember definitely.

34. General RUSSELL. Have you any record to show the exact time that Colonel Bratton arrived in your office with that message?

Colonel FRENCH. No, sir; I haven't that time available to me. I put that time some place after 11:30 in the morning, when Colonel Bratton arrived there.

35. General RUSSELL. The first thing that was done to that message was having it written on the typewriter, to be clear?

[192] Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

36. General RUSSELL. And you say that just took a few minutes, because it was a relatively short message?

Colonel FRENCH. That is correct.

37. General RUSSELL. When it had been copied on the typewriter, what happened to it?

Colonel FRENCH. When it was typed on the typewriter, we had Colonel Bratton authenticate it, as I recall. Colonel Bratton read it and authenticated the message. We then gave the message to the code clerk. I left Colonel Bratton, then, and went to the Signal Center, the operating room, to check on the facilities available; that is, as to what the atmospheric conditions were. In the morning, when I came in, the normal routine was to check the operating conditions in the office. They weren't any too satisfactory when I went out there.

38. General GRUNERT. Are you going to explain that, Colonel? Do you mean the atmospheric conditions, the sending equipment or the personnel?

Colonel FRENCH. The atmospheric conditions, the electrical——

39. General FRANK. The interference?

Colonel FRENCH. The ether. Atmospheric——

40. General FRANK. Static?

Colonel FRENCH. Static interference.

41. General RUSSELL. So, now, you went to check the means available to you?

Colonel FRENCH. That's right, sir; and I checked Honolulu because that was the point where the message had to route, going to Manila and going to Honolulu proper. I found out [193] from the operator that we had been out of contact with Honolulu since about 10:20 that morning.

42. General RUSSELL. Now, let us get clear on that. You were out of contact, with your radio?

Colonel FRENCH. Correct. That is, the interference was such at that time that we were more or less standing by, changing frequencies,

to see if we could get on a frequency that would get through that static; and that, according to my log, was around 10:20, sir.

43. General FRANK. Washington time?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir; Eastern Standard Time. That condition did not clear up, according to my log, until about 2:30 p. m. that afternoon.

44. General RUSSELL. Was the effect, then, of the static condition that you are describing such as to rule out radio as a means of transmitting that message?

Colonel FRENCH. To a communication officer, yes, sir. I also observed that we were having difficulty in working San Francisco at that particular time. I hazily recall, now, it was around 11 o'clock or later that the log indicated that conditions to San Francisco were bad for transmission of messages.

45. General RUSSELL. Now, how much time was consumed, Colonel, in this investigation of radio conditions?

Colonel FRENCH. I would say, just a few minutes, General. Time passes by, when you are under pressure, and I would say maybe three to four minutes. At that time, after I had checked the Honolulu channel and checked on the San Francisco channel, I immediately made up my mind to send this message via [194] commercial means. That was the most expeditious way, in my judgment, to get that message to its destination.

46. General RUSSELL. Will you describe for us at this point what commercial means were available to you.

Colonel FRENCH. We had facilities through the Western Union and through the Postal Telegraph. The commercial facilities into Honolulu, which is what you are interested in at this moment, were the RCA, the Mackay, and the Commercial Cable Company.

47. General RUSSELL. Let us see what the RCA was.

Colonel FRENCH. I beg your pardon?

48. General RUSSELL. What was the RCA?

Colonel FRENCH. The Radio Corporation of America radio facilities from San Francisco.

49. General RUSSELL. So you had then, if I am correct on this assumption, the Western Union, the Postal, and the Radio Corporation of America?

Colonel FRENCH. Well, the Western Union worked with the RCA. That was their connecting link to Honolulu.

50. General RUSSELL. Were any other commercial facilities available to you except those three?

Colonel FRENCH. No, sir. The Postal.

51. General RUSSELL. Those three?

Colonel FRENCH. Really the fastest facility available to me was through the Postal or the Western Union.

52. General GRUNERT. Then as I understand it, you have air, wire, and telephone—air, telegraph, and telephone through the commercial lines; is that right?

Colonel FRENCH. In my office, General. We never used [195] telephone to deliver a message to any of our insular possessions.

53. General RUSSELL. Colonel, when you made this investigation, you reached a decision as to what means you would use?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir; and I had to come to a hurried decision.

54. General RUSSELL. And you decided on what?

Colonel FRENCH. I decided on sending the message via the Western Union.

55. General RUSSELL. What steps did you take next?

Colonel FRENCH. I did that. I decided on the Western Union for the reason that when we were listening for the signals from Honolulu we observed Honolulu working San Francisco, so I deducted that the fastest way would be to turn it over to the Western Union and they would get it to San Francisco by quick dispatch. They had a tube connecting their office to the RCA. I was apprized of that. I knew that, because we had handled other messages that way at times. When we would have interference and had a message of any importance that was to be transmitted immediately, we would use the commercial facility; and that had been our practice.

56. General RUSSELL. Then there were two links to it—you wired it out to San Francisco, Western Union, and there it was transmitted to Honolulu, RCA?

Colonel FRENCH. I immediately had the teletype operator in the signal center inform the Western Union that we would turn this message over to them. I then went back into the code room to check as to whether or not the message was then ready to be transmitted. I personally took the message out [196] to the Signal Center and turned it over to the operator, there.

57. General RUSSELL. When you went back into the code room, the message was or was not ready?

Colonel FRENCH. The message was ready.

58. General RUSSELL. Do you have any record to indicate the exact time that you went back and found the message ready for sending?

Colonel FRENCH. No, sir. I did not have the exact time. I wasn't checking the time that way, as to the exact time that I arrived back in the code room.

59. General RUSSELL. What was the next step, after you discovered that the message had been encoded and was ready for transmission? What did you do next?

Colonel FRENCH. As I recall, Colonel Bratton was at the code room, and he asked me how long it would take to get that message transmitted, and I told him that it would take about 30 to 45 minutes to transmit that message to its destination.

60. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, we are attempting to track you, to follow you along step by step. You had the message encoded, and then you sent it to Western Union?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

61. General RUSSELL. Did you get a receipt over at Western Union for it?

Colonel FRENCH. No, sir. When we transmit, the routine is that when the message comes into the code room, we place it in code, and then we send the coded message out to the Signal Center, and the code message is time-stamped and transmitted to the station concerned.

62. General RUSSELL. The first time that any notation on [197] this message was made as to time was when it reached the message center for delivery over to Western Union?

Colonel FRENCH. No. The original message as typed by Colonel Bratton was time-stamped in the code room.

63. General RUSSELL. Do you know what that time-stamp was?

Colonel FRENCH. I do not recall.

64. General RUSSELL. It would have been placed on the message at the time that it went from the typewriter to be coded?

Colonel FRENCH. To the code clerk; yes, sir.

65. General RUSSELL. Could you by a search of the records of the War Department determine that exact time for us, Colonel?

Colonel FRENCH. No, sir; I cannot, for the reason that that message was turned back to the originator. We are concerned with the time of transmission of that message.

66. General RUSSELL. So if there is a record showing that time stamp, it is not in your files, it is elsewhere?

Colonel FRENCH. It would be either in G-2 or in the OPD office.

67. General RUSSELL. Now, do you have any record of the exact time of the dispatch of this message by Western Union to the west coast?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

68. General RUSSELL. What time was that?

Colonel FRENCH. That message was dispatched to the west coast for Honolulu at 12:01, Eastern Standard Time.

69. General GRUNERT. What is the difference in time between Eastern Standard Time and Honolulu time?

Colonel FRENCH. Five and a half hours.

70. General GRUNERT. If it is 12:01 here, what is it in [198] Honolulu?

Colonel FRENCH. Five and a half hours, sir—that would have been 6:31.

71. General RUSSELL. I have a statement before me, Colonel, which is substantially in line with the facts that you are testifying to at the moment. There is a little conflict, which might be adjusted; and may I read this to you?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes.

72. General RUSSELL. "The message was filed at 12:18 p. m., December 7, Eastern time"—12:18, Eastern Time—"6:48 A. M., December 7, Honolulu Time." Now, you are testifying about 12:01 and 6:31.

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir. That 12:01 was the time that the message was—we count that as "filed" in the Signal Center. The time that it was finished, with the transmission of that message to the Western Union, was 12:17 o'clock.

73. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, do you have any data from which you can tell us the time of the receipt of that message at Honolulu?

Colonel FRENCH. On sending that message to Honolulu, we asked for reported-delivery on the message. The message was delivered—the message was received in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 Honolulu time.

74. General RUSSELL. It therefore took how long?

Colonel FRENCH. It took 46 minutes from the time the Western Union received that message, until they got it to Honolulu. That's creditable service.

75. General RUSSELL. Now, let us assume this, Colonel, for the purpose of a hasty calculation, that Colonel Bratton reached [199] your office at approximately 11:30 on that Sunday morning.

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

76. General RUSSELL. You said it was 11:30 or shortly thereafter?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

77. General RUSSELL. Let us say it was dispatched at 12:01, which was 31 minutes after Bratton appeared at your office.

Colonel FRENCH. That's right—if he arrived at that time. That is a question, General, as to the time Colonel Bratton arrived at my office with that message. Colonel Bratton stated at one time that it was 12:50 when he filed that message with us, and I believe that 12:50 time Colonel Bratton had in mind was our preparation.

(Brief interruption.)

78. General RUSSELL. If he came in, then, to review it, Colonel, at 11:30, and you got it away at 12:01, that was only 31 minutes?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

79. General RUSSELL. And it took 46 minutes to transmit it?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

80. General RUSSELL. So it reached Honolulu in 31 plus 46, or 77 minutes after Colonel Bratton reached your office?

Colonel FRENCH. On the assumption that Colonel Bratton arrived there, as you stated.

81. General RUSSELL. At approximately 11:30.

Colonel FRENCH. I say that it was my opinion in discussing this with Colonel Bratton that it was after 11:30, and also in discussing the matter with the officers in the Chief of Staff's office, that it was after 11:30 when he arrived there.

[200] 82. General FRANK. Generally speaking, these assumptions are about correct; is that it?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir; that is correct.

83. General FRANK. All right.

Colonel FRENCH. Colonel Bratton was there during the greater portion of the time that the message was being prepared. He was very greatly exercised in getting it through, and he was in my office and saw the diligence that was exercised by us in getting that message prosecuted.

84. General FRANK. All right.

Colonel FRENCH. No time was lost at all in getting that message prosecuted through my office.

85. General GRUNERT. Colonel, in your opinion, was that good time, excellent time, or unusually good time, to get the thing off, under the conditions?

Colonel FRENCH. That was unusually good time, General, because I was personally pushing the thing.

86. General GRUNERT. And had it been sent over your own radio net, about how much time would have been saved?

Colonel FRENCH. Well, I can give you an example. On the 27th of November there was a message filed in my office, of grave importance, to go to Honolulu, and it was received in my office at 6 p. m. It was encoded and sent to the Signal Center for transmission at 6:11. Due to the atmospheric conditions for transmission, the message had to be sent by hand. The time that it was received in Honolulu was 6:50. That was a short message.

87. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, I want to develop another phase of this. You are acquainted with the time that reasonably

[201] is required for decoding a message of this length, aren't you?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

88. General RUSSELL. About what time would the average personnel in the field, such as you might expect to find in Honolulu, require to decode this message, once it reached Honolulu?

Colonel FRENCH. Well, the actual work of decoding a message of that length would run somewhere between 10 to 15 minutes, on an average, in the system in which that was sent, the machine system.

89. General RUSSELL. Then this message should have been decoded and intelligible in 77 minutes plus 15 minutes?

90. General FRANK. Plus the time of getting it.

91. General RUSSELL. Or, plus the delivery time out in Honolulu.

Colonel FRENCH. With all things being equal, that is true. If the message would arrive there in class A order, there were no gobbles in the message, the equipment was functioning well, and everything, and all operations clicked, I would say that that would be a good performance.

92. General RUSSELL. Then a rather liberal estimate, from the time standpoint, would be that, from the moment when General Bratton appeared in your office with this message, until it would have been decoded and in the hands of the Commanding General, or the proper authority in Hawaii, would have been approximately an hour and a half?

93. General GRUNERT. I do not gather that. I gather that the hour and a half would include just the decoding of it at the other end, and not the delivery.

94. General RUSSELL. I was just adding it all up.

[202] 95. General GRUNERT. We do not know anything about the conditions of delivery. On the record, I will ask you this question: Have you any record of the time it was actually received by the Commanding General, or one of his staff? Was there a receipt demanded for this?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes.

96. General GRUNERT. Or an acknowledgment from the Commanding General?

Colonel FRENCH. We asked for a receipt of delivery. In fact, we tried all day to get an acknowledgment of receipt on that message, from Honolulu, but things were cracking so fast from 7:30 in the morning on, and I kept pressing Honolulu, asking for the receipt of that message; but there were other things apparently of graver importance at that time, so that we couldn't get a prompt acknowledgment from Honolulu.

97. General FRANK. Did you ever get one?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

98. General FRANK. What was that time?

Colonel FRENCH. The message, as I recall, was delivered to the Signal Center there in Honolulu at 11:45.

99. General GRUNERT. Do you mean to say there was from 7:33 to 11:45 before they decoded it and took it out to Shafter?

100. General RUSSELL. No.

Colonel FRENCH. He was advised that it was delivered at 11:45, Honolulu time. That delay was due to the fact that the messenger was diverted from his course during the bombing.

101. General GRUNERT. Have you finished? I have one question, here, when you get through.

102. General RUSSELL. Yes, sir. Suppose you ask your question.

[203] 103. General GRUNERT. I understood you to say that you had radio contact with Honolulu up to about 10 a. m., Washington time, on December 7.

Colonel FRENCH. 10:20, General.

104. General GRUNERT. 10:20?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

105. General GRUNERT. Had you been receiving things from Honolulu that morning?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir. We exchanged traffic through the morning up to 10:30.

106. General GRUNERT. What would 10:20 Washington time be in Honolulu time. It would be before 5 a. m.?

Colonel FRENCH. It would be before 5 a. m.; yes, sir.

107. General GRUNERT. That is all I wanted. Has anyone else a question?

108. General RUSSELL. I have no further questions.

109. General FRANK. I would like to ask a question.

What type of communication does the FBI use in Hawaii, do you know?

Colonel FRENCH. I do not know, General, what type the FBI used.

110. General FRANK. Do you ever ask the Navy to communicate messages for you?

Colonel FRENCH. Oh, yes.

111. General FRANK. Did you ask them this morning?

Colonel FRENCH. No, sir.

112. General FRANK. All right.

Another thing. Was there any indication that the difficulty in transmission might have been caused by artificial [204] means?

Colonel FRENCH. Interference?

113. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel FRENCH. No, sir. At that time of the year—

114. General FRANK. That is all I want.

Colonel FRENCH. At that time of the year we were normally out of service with Honolulu between 11 and 1 o'clock. That is a matter of official record.

General FRANK. Does the Navy have a more powerful radio than the Army, out to Honolulu?

115. Colonel FRENCH. Yes, at times they do use more power than we do; yes, indeed. But as a matter of practice, traffic going to Honolulu that we would want to expedite and I considered sending, we would not use the Navy. I considered the Navy, with relation to this message, but I know that it would have to be delivered from Pearl Harbor, up to Fort Shafter, and knowing the Navy condition is the same as ours, my judgment was, the fastest delivery for that message was by the commercial means.

116. General FRANK. All right.

Colonel FRENCH. That was considered.

117. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

118. General RUSSELL. Colonel, you stated that you had no information about the transmission of information from here to Honolulu by telephone.

Colonel FRENCH. I do not quite get the question.

119. General RUSSELL. You just did not use the telephone, at all?

Colonel FRENCH. We never use the telephone to deliver [205] messages out of the Signal Center; no, sir.

120. General RUSSELL. The only thing you had was radio, and when it was out, you had to go elsewhere?

Colonel FRENCH. To a commercial wire. Now, if they wanted to use the telephone, that was up to the individuals, themselves, the Chief of Staff, or whoever the individual concerned, who would make personal calls, or official calls.

121. General GRUNERT. You had no authority to use the telephone, no matter what the urgency of the message might be?

Colonel FRENCH. No, I wouldn't say that, General; no, sir. I have authority—I assume authority for every available means of communication that might be available to get a message to its destination; but I would not have sent that message via telephone, because it was a classified message; and if I would attempt to have phoned the code groups out, it would have taken me longer, and then possibly there would have been a misunderstanding, as you know, in transmission of messages that distance.

122. General GRUNERT. Did it occur to you that the urgency of the message might require you or suggest to you that you ought to inquire whether or not you could send it in the clear by telephone?

Colonel FRENCH. Well, not sending messages in the clear by telephone. I didn't consider at all sending that message by telephone. I assumed that the proper way to handle that message was via the wire means.

123. General GRUNERT. Suppose you get information that somebody out here in St. Louis is going to shoot somebody else, and you know you may not get that message through in time to [206] keep them from being shot, if you send it via radio, or if it is classified, and so forth. Who is the judge of whether or not to send that in the clear instead of by code, and so forth?

Colonel FRENCH. The writer of the message is responsible for the classification of the message, General.

124. General GRUNERT. And Bratton was informed that it would take about so long to get it over, and he did not say, "Get it out! Get it out over some other way!"—he was satisfied with what time was going to be consumed in transmitting it?

Colonel FRENCH. That was the means to transmit that message.

125. General RUSSELL. Colonel, let us get this part clear. If a message comes to you classified, then you have got to send it in code?

Colonel FRENCH. I must send it in code; yes, sir. That is written in the regulations.

General GRUNERT. And you cannot send it in code over the telephone?

Colonel FRENCH. I cannot send it in code over the telephone with any great dispatch. It would be faster to handle it by wire than it would by telephone.

127. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? If not, thanks very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 11:23 a. m., the Board recessed until 2 p. m.)

[207]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES D. HERRON, RETIRED

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General HERRON. Maj. Gen. Charles D. Herron, Retired.

2. Colonel WEST. And your address is Washington, D. C.

3. General GRUNERT. General, the Board, in attempting to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and also the background in Hawaii, and also to get the viewpoints of those formerly in command and having knowledge of the facts, that is, both prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped, because of your former assignment as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, that you can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover the large field in the limited time we have, individual Board members have been assigned objectives and phases for special investigation, although the entire Board will pass on all objectives and phases. General Russell has the particular phase in which the investigation is being conducted now, so I shall ask him to lead in propounding the questions, and the other members will fill in and elaborate. General Russell.

4. General RUSSELL. General Herron, when did you go on duty as the Commander of the Hawaiian Department?

General HERRON. In October 1937.

5. General RUSSELL. And you were retired when?

[208] General HERRON. In February of '41.

6. General RUSSELL. During the time that you were there, General, I assume that you had your plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Department, including the Island of Oahu?

General HERRON. That is right.

7. General RUSSELL. What did you regard as your principal mission as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

General HERRON. To make Pearl Harbor safe for the Navy.

8. General RUSSELL. Did you have a prepared plan for the defense of the Island of Oahu during your tenure as Commanding General of the Department.

General HERRON. We did.

9. General RUSSELL. Do you recall, General Herron, how that was designated—that plan—or what its title was?

General HERRON. No.

10. General RUSSELL. Did it involve the employment of the means available to the Army along with those that were available to the Navy on the Island?

General HERRON. It did.

11. General RUSSELL. General, the Hawaiian Department is associated with the 14th Naval District; is that true?

General HERRON. That is right; particularly for planning.

12. General RUSSELL. Particularly for planning. It is also true that the Pacific fleet is based at Pearl Harbor, and this fact brings the

Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in contact with the Commander of the Pacific fleet; is that true?

General HERRON. That is right.

[209] 13. General RUSSELL. Therefore there is a dual naval organization with which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department deals?

General HERRON. That is correct.

14. General RUSSELL. During the time that you were in command of the Hawaiian Department, do you recall how many Commanders of the 14th Naval District were on duty?

General HERRON. Two.

15. General RUSSELL. Could you name those, General Herron?

General HERRON. The man who was the senior man on this Navy Board.

16. General FRANK. Murfin.

General HERRON. Admiral Murfin and Admiral Bloch.

17. General RUSSELL. Now, did these two officers command the 14th Naval District?

General HERRON. They did.

18. General RUSSELL. During this same period that you were in command of the Hawaiian Department who commanded the Pacific fleet there?

General HERRON. Well, Admirals Bloch, Richardson, and Kimmel.

19. General RUSSELL. General, what was the plan in effect by which the combined forces of the Army and Navy were to be employed in this area? Or let me make the question maybe a little plainer: Was the plan of mutual cooperation or agreement for the employment of the forces in effect during the time you commanded the Hawaiian Department?

General HERRON. Yes.

[210] 20. General RUSSELL. As the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, therefore, you had no command function which you could exercise as such over the naval units in that area?

General HERRON. No.

21. General RUSSELL. Nor did the Naval Commanders have any such command over the Army?

General HERRON. No.

22. General RUSSELL. General Herron, during this period of time will you state briefly just what the relations were between you and these Commanders of the Fleet with respect to cooperation?

General HERRON. The relations could not have been better at any time. However, they were much more productive of results toward the end of my regime than in the beginning.

23. General RUSSELL. To what do you ascribe this development?

General HERRON. To the fact that in the beginning we were able to obtain for the first time an agreement on joint action which covered the entire field under Admiral Murfin with the Navy. When Admiral Bloch came in he reviewed that and said he accepted it as a whole; he did not want any changes. So that we had an understood background on which to work, and the Navy Admirals were a high type of people.

Now, then, there was difficulty in working out the air cooperation because it was entirely new and because that was the only place the Army and Navy could really cooperate, in the air. The Navy was on

the water, the Army on the land, but in the air there was a place for cooperation, joint command, and [211] so forth, and we had a good deal of trouble in arriving at some definite agreement about that.

24. General RUSSELL. Did you, before being retired, effect a working agreement for the employment of the joint air forces out there which you considered effective?

General HERRON. We effected that quite early, but by leaving some blank spaces; we did not put down in writing, for instance, who would command a joint expedition in the air, although we had something that sounded that way.

25. General RUSSELL. General, there have developed in our investigation data about the plan for reconnaissance, the inshore patrol being maintained by the Army and the distant patrol by the Navy. Was that in effect prior to the time that you left Hawaii?

General HERRON. It was. We made the agreement I think when General Frank was there. Is that right?

26. General FRANK. That is right.

General HERRON. Yes.

27. General RUSSELL. You had occasion to inaugurate a search or patrol out there in the summer of 1940, didn't you, in an alert which was in effect out there for some time during the summer and early fall of 1940?

General HERRON. Will you ask me that question again?

28. General RUSSELL. Did you, or not, have occasion to make effective this reconnaissance plan that I have just described, in the summer and early fall of 1940?

General HERRON. Whenever we had a joint maneuver, and we began to have them in the summer and fall of 1940.

29. General RUSSELL. Didn't you have an alert in 1940?

[212] General HERRON. Oh, we had alerts, yes. We had an alert in May of 1940, a total alert on the part of the Army, but the Navy was not alerted at that time.

30. General RUSSELL. Was the Navy alerted in June of 1940?

General HERRON. Not the same time the Army was.

31. General RUSSELL. General, what I am getting at—and we shall check on this alert in a little bit, because we did want to ask you some questions about it—what I am getting at is this: Was there at any time, during your period of service as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, a situation where this system of reconnaissance was made effective?

General HERRON. I hope General Frank will correct me in many of my statements about the air out there, but this division for reconnaissance purposes came about in this way: it was about that time that the Navy was getting very jealous of the Army flying over the water, and of course we had to fly over the water out there in order to go up and down the Islands.

Now, then, a reconnaissance such as we could perform with the number of planes we had, had no military importance except for this: it could scout for submarines, and the Navy were very anxious to have us watch the close-in waters for submarines. Well, now, in order to avoid coming to grips with the Navy definitely, we worded it that they would be responsible for distant reconnaissance, which of course

is logical, as they had the only planes that could go out and stay out; and in order to assure that we could fly over the water we put ourselves down for close-in reconnaissance, without defining that, but actually it amounted to trying to train our people to spot hostile submarines which came in close to shore. It had [213] no military significance otherwise.

32. General RUSSELL. General, I have extracted here from one of the A. G. files the orders, messages, and so forth, which were interchanged between you and the War Department in the summer of 1940 which bear on this subject that we are discussing now, of reconnaissance. This file indicates that on the 17th of June you were directed to immediately alert your complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking curiosity of newspapers or alien agents, and so forth. Now, there were a number of messages that went back and forth. At one time you wrote General Marshall a letter, another time he answered that letter, and finally on this subject of reconnaissance, if I remember correctly,—

General HERRON. Have you my file of personal letters to General Marshall? Is that what you refer to?

33. General RUSSELL. I have a copy of it before me now, and your present testimony is not in conflict with, but it just doesn't dovetail in with, this file.

General HERRON. Yes.

34. General RUSSELL. Here is a letter of October 15, 1940, of which I shall have the copy in a moment. I think it was your letter to General Marshall.

General HERRON. Yes.

35. General RUSSELL. In which you said,

The Navy has resumed the outer air patrol at 180 miles, but has not asked us to take any measures.

General HERRON. "Has not asked us"? Oh, yes.

[214] 36. General RUSSELL. (Reading:)

has not asked us to take any measures. Having no evidence of marked change in the situation and with an eye to the conservation of material I have not resumed the Army inner air patrol at 40 miles, nor the putting of the pursuit planes in the air at dawn.

We now have guards on utilities and highway patrols at times when they will be observed. There are constantly small maneuvers (company) on the beaches. It is my guess, however, that the international situation drifts to the left and that precautions must increase.

Now, I was struck, in reading that file, General, with the fact that as late as October 15, 1940, the Navy was maintaining a distant patrol, and you had not resumed the inner air patrol. Now, we were wondering when this was taken off, and something of its history. Do you recall it now?

General HERRON. The 40 miles was probably my personal directive to the Army only. I do not think I ever told the Navy how far out they should go; I was careful not to. Now, then, the patrol was put on on that maneuver or alert of June 15th. We put everybody on, did everything we could do, beginning on June 15, and kept them on about six weeks. At the end of that time it became apparent to me that the soldier on the beach was persuaded that

there were no Japanese out there. There weren't any planes in the sky or ships on the water or submarines underneath, and if they came the soldier wouldn't see them. He would go through the motions of being out there, and he would be on the job, but it is just not in flesh and blood to stand on. [215] tiptoe indefinitely.

Well, now, we had nothing more from the War Department. Nothing. Not another word. So on my own responsibility I withdrew the whole thing, called the alert off, and turned them to other things, in order that I might get them in a frame of mind whereby they would see something or hear something if they were put out on the beach. So that in the meantime I got what I wanted by putting out these battalions and companies in camp, to maneuver along the beach. They would be there, but I did not tell them they were on alert. Now, in a few weeks I called another alert, but I did not try to keep it six weeks again.

37. General RUSSELL. Did you call the alert on your own motion, General, without anything from the War Department?

General HERRON. From that time on, yes; after June 15th I never was ordered again by the War Department, but —

38. General RUSSELL. Now may we go back for a minute in an attempt to develop the Navy end of this alert. Your alert originated from this June 17th message, 1940, where you were directed to alert your command against a trans-Pacific raid?

General HERRON. That is right.

39. General RUSSELL. Now I am merely giving you the date which we have to connect up the Navy's tie-in with this alert: It seems that on the 20th of June you wired the War Department that you had received theirs of June 19th in which you had been directed to ease up on the alert which had been ordered on June 17th, but you said,

Full aircraft and antiaircraft precautions will be continued with easing in other lines. Local publicity on maneuvers favorable and not excited.

[216] But I am attempting now to get the Navy tie-in to this, to see what happened.

On the 21st of June you wired the Chief of Staff this message:

In interpreting your cable consideration is given to the fact that Navy here has nothing from Navy Department regarding Alert. Navy now turning over to Army inshore aerial patrol in accordance with existing local joint agreement. Will not modify Army Air and Antiair Alert before Monday except on further advice from you.

On the following day General Strong signed a message for General Marshall in which he refers to your message of the 21st and says:

In view of present uncertainty instructions for the Navy other than local Naval Forces have not been determined. Continue your Alert in accordance with modifications directed in War Department Number 434.

Now, General Herron, the thing that we were getting at is this: You went on an alert on a War Department order on the 17th of June. Five days later, on the 22nd of June, it seems that the Navy had not been ordered on an alert and that you people knew nothing about what the Navy was doing; is that true?

General HERRON. We knew they were not on an alert. They were in full conference between myself and the Navy on the spot there. Of course, it modified my opinion as to the urgency of the alert, that the Navy had not been alerted. It turned out afterwards to be a

drill, but we did not know that at the time. But imagining from the fact that the Navy was not alerted, I [217] thought it might be a drill.

40. General RUSSELL. Then, as late as 1940, when an alert out in the Hawaiian Department was ordered, the War Department ordered the Army on an alert, and that did not in any way affect the Navy: they might or might not go on an alert?

General HERRON. That is right.

41. General GRUNERT. May I interject there: Do you know whether or not the Navy queried the Navy Department as to the necessity of going on an alert because you were on one?

General HERRON. They notified the Navy Department immediately. I immediately notified the Navy within the hour, showed them my message, and they notified the Navy Department, expecting orders, and stood by for them and did not get them.

42. General RUSSELL. Then, as a generalization this is true, General Herron, that the War Department could order you to take action of some kind which might have been set forth in this joint agreement between the Army and Navy, but the Navy would not carry out its part in this given action unless and until it received an order from the Navy Department in Washington?

General HERRON. Except on a joint maneuver. On a joint maneuver they carried out their part; otherwise not.

43. General RUSSELL. Well, now let us apply that to that reconnaissance problem out there. You had the close-in reconnaissance, and the Navy the distant reconnaissance, under your agreement; that was true?

General HERRON. That is right.

44. General RUSSELL. Now, the Army ordered an alert. You went on the alert and established the inner patrol. The Navy received no orders from the Navy Department. Therefore, the [218] distant patrol did not become effective; is that true?

General HERRON. At that time they had a distant patrol on all the time, as I remember it. We had great difficulty in finding out exactly what the Navy was doing. They were not very frank about the distant patrol, and we figured because they didn't have very many planes to put out they didn't want to confess that there were only one or two or three planes out in a day, so they did not tell us very fully how many they had out. I tried to find out indirectly, but I never did press the matter, and I never knew exactly what they were doing about the distant patrol.

45. General GRUNERT. Did you have any means for any distant patrol, if you saw fit to do such patrolling to accomplish your own mission?

General HERRON. We had the old B-18, and General Frank and I were in full agreement that when a war came on we would do whatever we thought was necessary in the defense of the Island.

46. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General HERRON. The joint agreement was so drawn that we could do it and not violate its terms. We could.

47. General GRUNERT. Well, let me put it this way: Here is the Hawaiian Command. It has a mission of protection. In order to get information as to what may be against you, you should first have

the direction from it is coming and where it is, and also know what is going around your shores, by your inshore patrol. You depend on the Navy, according to your agreement, for distant reconnaissance.

Now, then, was it your conception of your responsibilities [219] to insure that such a distant reconnaissance was actually in being and, if it was not, to do your best toward doing your own distant reconnaissance?

General HERRON. In time of peace I did not need to be absolutely sure. In time of war I did need to be sure. If I was not certain, I would use my own planes, and I thought that that term "close-in and distant patrolling" was a very elastic term; and, as I say, General Frank and I were in full agreement: we would go just as far as we thought it was necessary and our planes would allow us to in war.

48. General GRUNERT. Then, on an alert in time of peace, an alert ordered by the War Department, which presumably was in anticipation of what might happen, you did not think it was necessary to use any of your own means to go out beyond your inshore patrol?

General HERRON. Well, my impression is that the 40 miles became about a hundred miles at that time, but that that is as far as we thought we ought to send the B-18s without a real reason. If one of them got down at sea there was very little means to take care of those people, and we would have a great deal of responsibility towards the parents of the men in it and towards the War Department if we sent them too far and too often.

49. General GRUNERT. All right; go ahead.

50. General RUSSELL. I wish you would read the General my last question. I think he gave me some experience without answering it.

The REPORTER (reading):

Now, the Army ordered an alert. You went on the alert and established the inner patrol. The Navy [220] received no orders from the Navy Department. Therefore, the distant patrol did not become effective; is that true?

General HERRON. My answer was that they had a distant patrol on at all times, as I remember.

51. General RUSSELL. Would that be prior to this alert?

General HERRON. Yes.

52. General RUSSELL. Of June 18th?

General HERRON. Is that right, that they had?

53. General FRANK. I do not recall when they put that on. I know they put it on.

54. General RUSSELL. Do you think it was on when you were relieved?

General HERRON. Oh, yes. All that summer of 1940 I tried to find out details, exactly how many, but without results.

55. General RUSSELL. Well, is it your impression that that distant patrol out there was maintained by the Navy constantly prior—

General HERRON. Yes, every day.

56. General RUSSELL. When did it begin?

57. General FRANK. Don't know.

General HERRON. No, we don't know when it began.

58. General RUSSELL. You didn't know much about it?

General HERRON. There when we first went out there the Navy did not trust us with very much. They told us very little, and we had to build that up.

59. General GRUNERT. You had doubts, though, about the efficiency of that patrol on 360 degree circle? Did you or did you not? [221]

General HERRON. It was physically impossible with the number of planes they had. We knew that. With the 50 planes they perhaps had and a million square miles, you cannot do it.

60. General GRUNERT. Then, it was a distant patrol, but its effectiveness was problematical.

61. General RUSSELL. Now, that being the case, General Herron, what did you mean in your letter of October 15, 1940, in which you stated that the Navy had resumed the outer patrol?

General HERRON. Presumably it had been off at some time. I do not remember more than that.

62. General RUSSELL. When General Short came out there sometime in February, I believe, of 1941, so far as you know, this distant reconnaissance was being conducted by the Navy, in whatever manner it was being conducted?

General HERRON. They assured us it was being, in very general terms.

63. General RUSSELL. Yes. Now, as a result of naval activity or of the Naval Intelligence personnel, were you furnished periodically or frequently with the information which they obtained as to Japanese activities in the Hawaiian Department or in the Hawaiian frontier?

General HERRON. Well, that also was a development. When we went out, when I first went there, the Army was not entrusted with any naval secrets. They did not give us anything. We had to work that thing through, and by the time I left them there was complete reciprocity on information the two services obtained.

64. General RUSSELL. How frequently would you get a report on what they had discovered about the Japanese?

[222] General HERRON. Daily.

65. General RUSSELL. You got that daily?

General HERRON. Yes.

66. General RUSSELL. Who was your G-2?

General HERRON. Colonel Marsden.

67. General RUSSELL. Do you know where he is now?

General HERRON. He is out there as G-4.

68. General GRUNERT. As a matter of record, he is one of the witnesses that is scheduled to be called.

69. General FRANK. May I interject this one question?

70. General RUSSELL. Yes.

General HERRON. May I add something to that?

71. General RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

General HERRON. There is a man here now in this building named Bicknell who was an Assistant G-2. Colonel Bicknell.

72. General GRUNERT. Also for the record, he is another witness who will be called.

General HERRON. All right.

73. General FRANK. I would just like to ask one question.

74. General RUSSELL. Surely.

75. General FRANK. Do you feel confident that the information on Japanese operations that you got from the Navy was the full and complete information that they had available?

General HERRON. Towards the end, yes.

76. General RUSSELL. General Herron, did you have very intimate supervision of the Department out there in your command by the War Department.

General HERRON. No.

77. General RUSSELL. Did you have any trips of inspection by [223] General Staff officers out to the Department while you were its Commander?

General HERRON. General Marshall came out.

78. General RUSSELL. Do you recall any others?

General HERRON. Colonel Russell.

79. General GRUNERT. Colonel Russell was of the WPD, was he not; War Plans Division?

General HERRON. Operations Division, yes.

80. General GRUNERT. Yes.

81. General RUSSELL. On the question of the training of your troops, did you get any directives from the War Department?

General HERRON. Yes, we got the perfunctory, once-a-year orders they sent out to the whole Army.

82. General RUSSELL. What did they emphasize; do you recall?

General HERRON. No.

83. General RUSSELL. That was all I was going to have.

84. General GRUNERT. I might put in a few questions here. If they happen to touch what you are going into later, why, let me know.

When you turned over to General Short, I presume that you turned over all instructions, plans, orders, and files that would make your knowledge available to him so that he would carry on?

General HERRON. I was very careful to do that.

85. General GRUNERT. Was there anything that you recall in your turning over to him that you spoke to him about particularly, either in cautioning, in calling attention to this or that, or what-not, that may occur to you now?

[224] General HERRON. Well, I spoke to him particularly, of course, about our Navy relations, our civilian relations, about the Japanese situation.

86. General GRUNERT. As to the Japanese situation, can you give us an idea of your size-up of the so-called Japanese situation, particularly as to their loyalty, as to their danger in the event of a war with Japan, as to their danger to your security or your carrying out your plans—along those lines?

General HERRON. Well, perhaps the best answer is to say within the last few days that Hawaiian Japanese Battalion (Italy) has been cited by General Clark for distinguished conduct in battle and has over a thousand purple hearts, one battalion, plus medals of merit and distinguished service crosses: 14 distinguished service crosses.

Now, then, our investigation upon which our war plans were based was that that would be the situation in time of war, that the Japanese would turn out to be loyal. We did not know how many, but we were satisfied that at least 5 percent were committed to the American cause, either through conviction or by force or circumstances, such as being persona non grata to the Japanese Government. Another 5 percent we said would be irreconcilable, hostile to the United States. The other 90 percent, like anybody else, would sit on the fence until they saw which way the cat was going to jump.

Now, then, the percentage of loyal ones has turned out to be much larger than we anticipated. They have been proven in battle. We have no doubt about the leading young Japanese being pro-American and being able to control all the rest. They are not now and never were any menace to our security out there, and that is what we concluded, and we drew our war plans accordingly.

[225] 87. General GRUNERT. In that respect, what was your conclusion as to sabotage, to be expected and to be guarded against?

General HERRON. We concluded there would not be any sabotage, and there was not; not one instance. General Frank got the Air Corps away from putting all their planes in the middle of the air fields, and built the first bunkers out in the bushes. Before, it was feared that they would get the airplanes. He went ahead and developed that. Had they been out in the bushes on December 7th the situation would have been quite different.

87. General GRUNERT. In that alert you mentioned I understood you to say there was an effort not to alarm the public. Did you consider that any of the alert measures that were taken under that alert alarmed the public?

General HERRON. Yes. It was the first time that troops had been turned out for an alert with the ball ammunition; and the issue of ball ammunition and of ammunition to the Coast Artillery started everyone's imagination, and many people thought the Japanese Fleet was just off the coast. Some of the officers sent their families to the hills that night.

88. General GRUNERT. Since that alert, when you have had additional alerts, practice alerts, and so forth, were they under assumed war conditions with ball ammunition?

General HERRON. Yes; from that time on.

89. General GRUNERT. Then, did those alerts after the first one alarm the public?

General HERRON. No; never again.

90. General GRUNERT. Did any of those alerts disclose what your intention was in the line of just what you were going to [226] do?

General HERRON. We were very careful not to do the same thing twice out there in any maneuver or alert, except, of course, the anti-aircraft. We had to put them in about the same place.

91. General GRUNERT. The aircraft that you had during an alert was dispersed?

General HERRON. Yes, sir; still further.

92. General GRUNERT. What various kinds of alerts did you have? Just one, or did you have a series of them in what you did in each alert?

General HERRON. We had two series of alerts, because I felt the situation was tense.

93. General GRUNERT. Did you have Alert No. 1, in which you did certain things, Alert No. 2 in which you did certain things, and Alert No. 3 in which you did certain things, or were they just alerts?

General HERRON. That was a refinement that the training men put over on General Short when he came out there. I told him I would not do any such thing. There was only one kind of alert, and that was a total alert, and then I would do it in accordance with the situation. But the training men liked refinements, as they recommended three kinds because the Navy had three kinds. But they did not get to the

real point of the thing. The Navy has three kinds, but the all-out alert is number one, always. Now they ease up into two and three; but these young men did not know that, and when Short came out they put over the three and got them reversed, so that Short went into the Number 1, which was sabotage. It did not seem to him a very important change, I don't suppose, and it turned out to [227] be vital. It was too much of a refinement.

94. General GRUNERT. I understand you to say that your primary mission was the protection of the fleet when the fleet was in?

General HERRON. Pearl Harbor and the fleet.

95. General FRANK. I would like to ask one question right there. Your plans for meeting any situation in that department were sufficiently completely so that when they were made effective no additional instructions were necessary. Is that correct?

General HERRON. That is correct.

96. General FRANK. Therefore, if a critical situation should arise, all that you needed to have been told was "Situation critical. Act accordingly"?

General HERRON. Alert. It would have been a mistake to have issued any orders. These several orders would have confused the thing if you had.

97. General FRANK. There was no necessity for a special mention of sabotage or any other item, because all of those were taken care of in your war plans?

General HERRON. That is correct.

98. General RUSSELL. General Herron, I have made some more or less detailed investigation to determine the number of alerts in the Department from the date of this ordered alert of June 17th, 1940, until December 7th, 1941. You were in command from June, 1940, to February, 1941. Do you remember any alert that you had during that period except the one that we have discussed already?

General HERRON. I cannot give you any data as to the number of the times.

[228] 99. General RUSSELL. In a general way, is it your impression that prior to the Alert of June 17th, 1940, you had had other alerts?

General HERRON. Yes.

100. General RUSSELL. Had they been directed by the War Department because of some international situation, or had they been initiated by you as a matter of training?

General HERRON. They were initiated by me as a matter of training.

101. General RUSSELL. So far as you recall, therefore, during your entire tour of duty as the commanding general of that department, there was only one War Department ordered alert?

General HERRON. I am quite sure that is the case.

102. General RUSSELL. And you think that the alert had practically disappeared in October of 1940?

General HERRON. I say, I took it off entirely in six weeks, and then put it back on again as soon as I thought the command could bear it.

103. General RUSSELL. There was some discussion between you and General Marshall, by correspondence, as to the effect of alerts on the morale of the troops. Do you recall that?

General HERRON. No.

104. General GRUNERT. I have one more question on alerts. The fact that you received a directive from the War Department to alert the command: Did that leave the impression in your mind that if anything serious happened in the future the War Department would direct you to go on the alert, or leave it to your judgment?

General HERRON. I always felt that I was entirely responsible out there and I had better protect the island.

[229] 105. General FRANK. I would like to ask you this question: In view of the fact that the Navy was not alerted during the Army alert in the summer of 1940, had there been occasion for real alarm, and had there been a Jap attack, what, in your opinion, would have been the result of the naval attitude?

General HERRON. The Navy would unquestionably have gone on the alert had there been any evidence whatsoever. I had no evidence. I had only a War Department order.

106. General FRANK. You did not know whether it was based on an impending threat, or not?

General HERRON. No. It was a fair conclusion, though, that it was not, after a day or two when the Navy got no orders.

107. General RUSSELL. I did not get that, General.

General HERRON. That when the Navy did not get any orders, like ours, it was a fair conclusion that it was a drill and not based on an international situation. I can tell you—I think it is all right to—that General Marshall told me afterward that he got worried about the international situation personally, about that time. So it was a War Department function entirely.

108. General GRUNERT. During your tour as commanding General, Hawaiian Department, did you frequently or infrequently get information from the War Department as to the international situation, particularly as to the relationship between the United States and Japan?

General HERRON. I got one such message, which was that Germany had marched into Poland in the fall of 1939. That is the only thing I ever got from the War Department.

109. General GRUNERT. Did you feel that it was necessary for [230] you to have a fairly intimate picture of things happening in the Pacific and in the Far East in order for you to accomplish your mission?

General HERRON. I felt that it would be a great help, but that I was condemned to go along in the dark as to that. I assumed the War Department had much more knowledge than I had, but I also assumed that what they had could not be very vital or they would tell me something.

110. General FRANK. What would have been your reaction had you been told that there was a Japanese striking force of six carriers, two battleships, and a large number of submarines in the Marshalls about that time?

General HERRON. I would have been very much alarmed by that message. The Navy Department sent out that there was a task force being formed in the islands; that there were two of them, one in the islands. They sent such a message in November, that there were two task forces forming up, one of which was in the mandated islands.

111. General FRANK. In November of 1941?

General HERRON. Yes, sir. I would have been very much alarmed by that.

112. General FRANK. You say the Navy did send that?

General HERRON. Yes; they sent it out to the Naval District. It is in the Roberts Report.

113. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not it got to General Short?

General HERRON. I do not know what got to General Short, except that his staff have told me that the Navy were quite meticulous about keeping us informed all that fall, and summer.

114. General GRUNERT. Up to the time you left, what was the [231] sentiment or the sense of the people in the Army in Hawaii as to a sense of security? Did they feel that they were secure with the Navy in the harbor and the Army on the job, or did they feel a sense of insecurity? Were you able to judge that?

General HERRON. The people who knew thought that we were fairly secure against any attack by surface ships, any attempt to land. We also knew, a very few people, General Frank and myself, perhaps, that an air force could come in and do damage. We hoped to be able to follow them out and destroy the carriers. But I do not think we had any idea that we could turn back an aerial attack entirely, for this reason: that the only anti-aircraft we had was that which was prepared against high-altitude bombing. We did not have the small-caliber stuff which you need to do anything about dive bombing. So we felt they could come in; that they would not come in there unless they had enough planes to overcome what planes we had.

115. General GRUNERT. Do you make a distinction between your protective measures when the fleet was in the harbor or when it was out at sea? In other words, did you feel more secure, as far as your command was concerned, when the fleet was in the harbor than when it was out? Did that ever come to your mind or did you ever base any decisions upon that?

General HERRON. We assumed in all our planning that we would depend on our own resources. Anything the Navy gave us was so much velvet.

116. General GRUNERT. They you did not feel that you had to take any particular measures when the fleet was in than when it was out? Your measures were all-inclusive, whether the fleet was in or out. Is that the idea?

General HERRON. They were the best we could do any time, [232] whether the fleet was in or out.

117. General GRUNERT. Considering the air component of your command there, ordinarily what state of readiness did you demand of it, and in that state of readiness can you recall approximately what time it would take to get into the state of alert?

General HERRON. There was a long period in which the Air Corps was undergoing a very great expansion, and the training problem was really uppermost. They had to train crews and they had to train technicians. They had to train air pilots and other flying people and their instructors, and each time they would get about ready, there would be a new expansion, and we would have to do it over again. There finally came a time—I don't remember when it was—when Gen-

eral Frank recommended to me that we go to bat; that we would have to do something like this, as I remember it: Put every man we had that could fly on a crew, regardless of his present duty. His school duty could not stop. So we organized all the flying crews we could with what personnel we had there and put them into the air and worked them. It was a make-shift, but it was the best we could do with the people we had and the planes we had.

118. General RUSSELL. General Herron, I have two or three other details. I think General Grunert and General Frank have eliminated some of the notes I had, but I have just one or two questions on this reconnaissance matter.

You did not have any radar or any air-warning service?

General HERRON. No, sir.

119. General RUSSELL. If air patrolling was expanded about a hundred miles, then the possibility of an air attack [233] developing and becoming effective in its operations was pretty large, since you did not have the means for such distant reconnaissance?

General HERRON. If we spotted them a hundred miles out there would be no time to do anything.

120. General RUSSELL. That is what I had in mind.

121. General GRUNERT. You did not have any radar or any air-warning service or interceptor command as such. Did you have Triple A. I. S. service for the antiaircraft?

General HERRON. Yes.

122. General GRUNERT. You had that?

General HERRON. Yes.

123. General GRUNERT. That would give a certain amount of warning to the antiaircraft itself?

General HERRON. Yes, sir.

124. General RUSSELL. The final subject that I have, General, is this: In the reports which this Board has seen on the attack of December 7th, 1941, it is stated almost uniformly, in all of those reports, that the nature of the attack indicated very clearly that the attacking force knew down to the minutest details where all of our matériel was, including our ships, airplanes and hangars. In other words, the Japanese Army and Navy had been completely advised about all of those things and had worked out this attack with very great detail. The question is this: Was there any way to have prevented the Japanese people from acquiring this intimate knowledge about our installations, equipment, matériel out there?

General HERRON. No way. Hawaii, or Pearl Harbor, is a gold-fish bowl. We assumed that the only thing the Japanese did not know was how we would use our troops in the event of [234] attack. Everything else we assumed that they must know.

125. General FRANK. I did not get an answer to a question that I asked a little while ago about the Army being on the alert and the Navy not being on the alert, and what would have been the situation had there been an attack. You stated that had there been war the Navy would have gone on the alert. What I was after was this: Let us assume that in 1940, when the Army was in that alert, that there was a real menace and that an attack had come similar to the one that came on December 7th with the Army on the alert and the Navy not. What do you think would have happened?

General HERRON. Well, approximately what happened on December 7th. The dive bombers would have come in. The Army could not have stopped them with its three-inch guns posted up on the hills. They necessarily would bring more planes than we had. If we had 50 combat planes they would bring 150, surely.

126. General GRUNERT. You mean that the same consequences or consequences of a like or greater or less nature, because of what you have told us about what your being on the alert meant, such as dispersion of planes and certain protective measures that may not have applied to the alert that the Hawaiian Command was on on December 7th?

General HERRON. I would like to repeat my answer. They would not have got anything like the number of our planes that they did get. They would have gotten the ships in the harbor. We would have knocked down a lot of their planes, their fighting planes, but I think their bombers could still have come in, enough of them to destroy those ships. That was what we were there for, to do defend the ships and the harbor. Whether or [235] not we saved our own planes was not important relatively.

127. General GRUNERT. That there was not enough antiaircraft in and around the harbor to have really denied the air to the Japanese bombers?

General HERRON. There was not the right kind of anti-aircraft. It was small-caliber, quick-fire. At that time the small-caliber stuff was all going to England. This was quite proper, but erroneous.

128. General GRUNERT. If there are no more questions, let me say, General, that we are after facts, and any lead that we can get which would help us in determining the sources of facts is very much welcomed by the Board. Having had years of experience in that command, can you think of anything that you might add to your testimony which might be of assistance to the Board?

General HERRON. I would like to make some comments on the Roberts Report. It is a very wonderful document and a great land-mark in this thing, and a point of departure, so that it is bound to be influential. But I would like to say a few things about some of the conclusions in that report.

129. General GRUNERT. Proceed.

General HERRON. I have here a newspaper copy of that report. One of their conclusions was that the orders given by the War Department and Navy Department made it obligatory upon the two commanders out there to confer, and they say:

These commanders failed to confer with respect to the warning orders issued on and after November 27th and to adopt and use existing plans to meet the emergency.

They say they failed to confer. Their own report says that on the 27th, the day after the orders came in, the order from [236] the War Department and the one from the Navy Department, they did get together. That was Thursday. They also got together on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday of the week the attack came. They go ahead and say that if the orders issued by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations on November 27th had been

complied with certain things would have been done, and then they say:

None of these conditions was in fact inaugurated—that is, alerts and so forth, of the right kind—

or maintained, for the reason that the responsible commanders failed to consult and cooperate as to necessary action based upon warning and to adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy commands in Washington.

That is, they say the responsible commanders failed to consult. Their own record shows that they consulted.

The report says they failed to cooperate. There is not the slightest evidence that there was any failure of cooperation between those two commanders in this whole Roberts Report; and everything that I have heard since leads me to believe that there was real cooperation between those commanders; that there was no hard feeling of any kind.

It says they failed to cooperate as to the necessary action based upon the warning. The necessary action was all written down in the joint agreement between the Army and Navy. I believe they called it a joint agreement. It says that they failed to adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy commands in Washington.

To go back to those two messages: Did they fail to obey [237] their orders? The Chief of Staff's message informed the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, that negotiations with Japan seems to have ended with little likelihood of their resumption, and went ahead and gave more information about the general situation. Also, that is the one that stated that it was very desirable that the Japs should commit the first overt act. The order which was given him was this: The message directed him, even prior to hostile action—and I think the words "hostile action" are very significant; they show that somebody assumed that the Japanese would declare war and then move out, because it does not make any sense in connection with a surprise attack to tell him to do something even prior to hostile action. It shows the frame of mind of the War Department, that the Japanese were going to declare war and then perhaps move out, but after they had declared war, apparently, he should undertake such reconnaissance and other measures which he deemed necessary. That is all the order he got—to undertake such reconnaissance and other measure as he deemed necessary. He did not disobey or fail to obey that order. So I think there is no ground for any criticism on that count.

The Navy message, which of course had a binding effect upon the Army, directed the Navy, after giving them a lot of information, to make defense deployment and preparations for carrying out war tests. That is the only order the Navy got. That bears on the accusation in here that those fellows failed to adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them.

Nothing was said in any order from either department about consulting and conferring; and they go ahead again and say that it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them—that is Kimmel and Short—not to consult and confer. It is conclu- [238] sive that they did consult and confer.

Some place else in this report they make it a point that they did not have any conference directed to the accomplishment of these orders. They had these four conferences, and apparently the agenda was in connection with the garrisoning by the Army for the relief of the Marines who were on some of those western islands. I think that was the agenda. But there is certainly no evidence that they ignored the message of the 27th.

As evidence that they did confer, it states here that General Short asked Captain McMorris, Operations man for the Navy, about the probability of an aerial attack, and McMorris said there was no probability of any such thing. So it would seem they were conferring on the probability of attack.

So that the report is not a hundred per cent. It goes ahead and discusses the state of mind of these people and says that the opinion prevailed in diplomatic, military and naval circles and the public press that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East, though it says that the existence of such a view, however prevalent, did not relieve the commanders of responsibility for the protection of our most important outposts.

That is perfectly true. I agree with that. So that, in my opinion, these fellows were guilty. But beyond this general opinion, which was revealed in these messages—there was a message from Short—all those things worked on the people's frame of mind. I think that the War and Navy Department messages led them to believe that there was not to be any attack on Hawaii.

On November 24th, the Navy Department sent Kimmel this message:

[239] A surprise movement on the Philippine Islands or Guam is possible.

It seems to me that the obvious inference from that is, and what they didn't say is, that they believed an attack on Hawaii at least to be highly improbable. That was on November 24th that they told Kimmel that. That is bound to have some effect on the ordinary man that believes that God lives in the Navy Department and the War Department and who has not been on the outside and found out that it is the Devil.

On December 6th, the day before the attack, the Navy Department sent this message to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet out there—and all this, of course, got to the Army, because the Navy showed it to them. The message said that naval commanders on outlying Pacific islands might be—and the words "might be" are in code—authorized to destroy confidential papers at that time or later under conditions of greater emergency.

That was on the day before. They were expecting a greater emergency some time later, but certainly not the next day. That had its influence, of course, on Kimmel and Short.

I quote this not because it bears on whether they were guilty or not, but on the degree of punishment of these fellows.

I would like to tell you something else off the record.

(Informal discussion off the record.)

130. General GRUNERT. Your comments regarding the Roberts Report—are they based on full knowledge of what that report contains, or how much knowledge of the Roberts Report had you when you made these conclusions as to the report?

General HERRON. They are based entirely on a study of the [240] Roberts Report. I never had any access to the record.

131. General GRUNERT. If there are no further questions, we thank you very much for coming down.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[241] **TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL PHILIP HAYES, U. S. ARMY; COMMANDING GENERAL, THIRD SERVICE COMMAND; BALTIMORE, MD.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

General HAYES. Philip Hayes; Major General, U. S. Army; Commanding General, Third Service Command; Baltimore, Md.

2. General GRUNERT. General, the Board, in attempting to get at this, is looking into the background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that because of your assignment in the Hawaiian Department, as Chief of Staff of that Department, you may be able to throw some light on the subject. In order to cover our large field in the limited time available, it has become necessary to assign members of the Board to particular fields of investigation, or special investigation, although the Board will pass on all the fields. This particular field, for the testimony we expect to get out of you, we have assigned to General Russell, and he will lead in propounding the questions, and other Members will ask such questions as they set fit. General Russell.

3. General RUSSELL. General Hayes, you were Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department in 1941?

General HAYES. Yes, sir; I was.

4. General RUSSELL. How long prior to that had you occupied that position?

General HAYES. 1940. I was Acting, the latter part of 1939, when Osmun was not so well, and then, when I got the [242] place, early January, I think, 1940.

5. General RUSSELL. You became the Chief of Staff?

General HAYES. Yes.

6. General RUSSELL. When were you relieved from that assignment?

General HAYES. When I left Hawaii, officially, which was as I remember November 5, 1941. I went on leave, though, some time in the middle of October, prior to my departure, and ceased functioning as Chief of Staff some time in the middle part of October.

7. General RUSSELL. 1941?

General HAYES. 1941.

8. General RUSSELL. By whom were you succeeded as Chief of Staff?

General HAYES. By Colonel Phillips.

9. General RUSSELL. Had Phillips been on duty on the staff of the Commanding General out there prior to the time that he became Chief of Staff?

General HAYES. He was.

10. General RUSSELL. In what capacity?

General HAYES. He was brought over there by General Short to succeed me as Chief of Staff, and so he was given a course of training in all the G positions, G-1, -2, -3, and -4, general supervisory training, and some of the other special staff positions, prior to the time he took over.

11. General RUSSELL. Then you were on duty out there in the Hawaiian Department as a staff officer, either Assistant Chief of Staff or Chief of Staff, for about how long?

General HAYES. Four years.

[243] 12. General RUSSELL. General, you had an opportunity during your period of service out there to deal with the Navy personnel which was on duty in Pearl Harbor and thereabout?

General HAYES. Yes, sir.

13. General RUSSELL. That, I believe, is the 14th Naval District, and also the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet?

General HAYES. Originally it was the 14th Naval District—I am talking over the span of years that I was there—and then the Fleet was brought in there, and there were the ships afloat and the shore installation.

14. General RUSSELL. Now, you say the Fleet was brought in there. Did that occur while you were on duty there? It had not been in there before?

General HAYES. Oh, yes.

15. General RUSSELL. Now, about what time was that?

General HAYES. I don't remember exactly, but it seems to me about 1939. In the 1939 maneuvers, the Fleet which had been based on San Diego was brought over there, and Admiral Richardson was the CINCUS; and it remained there. Although it was still based on San Diego, there was a part of the fleet which was based on Honolulu or that district. That part of the Fleet as I remember it, was under Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, but the main part of the Fleet was there most of the time from there on.

16. General RUSSELL. From 1939?

General HAYES. There still was the 14th Naval District and the Fleet; which were the ships afloat.

17. General RUSSELL. But the Naval District had been there for a long while?

[244] General HAYES. That is correct; yes.

18. General RUSSELL. And the only change in the Naval situation during the time that you were on duty in the period that you have described was this basing of a considerable part of the Pacific Fleet on Honolulu?

General HAYES. That is correct.

19. General RUSSELL. Now, you had opportunity, I assume, to work in and out with a staff of the Commanders of both the District and the Fleet?

General HAYES. I did.

20. General RUSSELL. What in general would you say about the spirit of cooperation which existed between the two services, Army and Navy, during this period that you were there?

General HAYES. Most cordial, and very marked in contrast to what it has been some other places; particularly noticeable there in its cordiality.

21. General RUSSELL. General, we have been giving consideration to the plan.

22. General FRANK. May I ask a question?

23. General RUSSELL. Yes.

24. General FRANK. Did it improve during this period?

General HAYES. During the four years, you mean?

25. General FRANK. Yes.

General HAYES. Yes; I saw a gradual improvement from the time that General Moses and General Herron came. It got to a very high peak under Herron, but it maintained that same level.

26. General RUSSELL. After General Short came out, you saw no change at all?

General HAYES. I saw no change.

[245] 27. General RUSSELL. General we have been discussing with different witnesses and have been studying the plans for the defense of Oahu and the Naval base, there, at Honolulu, those critical installations on that island, with some considerable interest. Passing over the general questions, we will go to the details and discuss them with you.

We have been interested in this question of the reconnaissance that was set up between Army and Navy, under which the Navy was to do the distant reconnaissance and the Army the close-in reconnaissance. Do you have any recollection of that plan, of its general provisions?

General HAYES. Yes, sir; I do. That plan you are referring to was a Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which was based on the theory that the outer reconnaissance should be the Navy and the defense of the land itself was the Army. To the best of my recollection the outer patrol was 300 or 350 miles around the Island, the Navy responsibility. In addition to that outer patrol there were "area forces," so to speak, Navy task forces, that covered in their movements certain directions from Oahu. There were some destroyers used also in addition to the Navy patrol planes.

The inner patrol was about fifty miles out. That was a Navy responsibility, with surface vessels with with air vessels. We re-enforced the inner patrol with some of our air.

We had also an agreement with the Navy as to the joint use of Army and Navy, of air fields on Oahu, dependent upon this situation and the mission.

The land defense was a defense of the Army. In addition to that, the Navy had an anti-aircraft defense in Pearl Harbor, [246] which was combined land-and-boat or -ship, which tied in with our anti-aircraft defense. There were several arguments as to the command of certain air ships, Navy or Army, according to the mission. That was worked out, though. And so the theory of the defense was—the outer defense, the Navy; land defense, the Army.

28. General RUSSELL. General, we have attempted to visualize situations out there which might develop and have to be controlled or regulated by this cooperative-agreement idea under which your defense and reconnaissance operated. When did these patrol systems become effective? When were they actually carried on?

General HAYES. Do you refer to the time of day?

29. General RUSSELL. No; I am referring now in period of time. Were they perpetual all the time you were out there? During the four years, was this patrolling going on?

General HAYES. No. Not all the time. They were developed largely during General Herron's period, and carried on from then. I forget the date that General Herron came out. My recollection is General Moses left about March 1, or something, the period in March 1938, and General Herron came out and became Commanding General; so from March 1938 on they were developed.

30. General RUSSELL. Do you mean that during that period of time from 1938 until you left out there, in October 1941, every day, this patrolling, the distant patrolling and the near-in patrolling, was actually being conducted?

General HAYES. I couldn't say that. I said that was in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. I do know that [247] I spoke to General Herron and General Short, for them to check as to whether the outer patrol was on.

31. General RUSSELL. Do you know whether they did make the check or not?

General HAYES. They did, numerous times. They were satisfied that it was, at the times that I asked them.

32. General RUSSELL. Do you know, of your own knowledge, whether or not during this period that you have described, that outer patrol was actually taking place?

General HAYES. Oh, I knew that it was taking place; yes; but whether it was continual or whether it was spot patrols, or whether it was periodic patrols, I didn't know.

33. General RUSSELL. In other words, you knew generally it was going on, but the details of it were unknown to you?

General HAYES. I do not remember the detail of it.

34. General RUSSELL. How many ships were out, or where they went, on those things, you did not know?

General HAYES. No. I do remember that when we looked into it at various stages, the answer they gave seemed to be satisfactory.

35. General RUSSELL. Now, let us discuss the inner patrol as conducted out there during your tour of duty, by Army people. About how continuous was that?

General HAYES. That patrol was not continuous. It was certain times of the day as I remember, largely at the dawn period, and after dawn, until seven or eight o'clock, practically every day, is my recollection of it. It is rather vague, but that is what I recollect.

36. General RUSSELL. Do you think that that was in effect [248] in the fall of 1941 when you left out there, General?

General HAYES. I think it was in effect, yes. As to whether it was daily, I can't recollect.

37. General RUSSELL. Now, General, as Chief of Staff you would have been acquainted with information which reached the Hawaiian Department from the War Department relating to our relations with the Japanese Government, wouldn't you?

General HAYES. I would have been; yes, sir.

38. General RUSSELL. You would have known it?

General HAYES. Yes.

39. General RUSSELL. Do you recall messages that reached you people out there, in 1940 and 1941, telling you about these relations between the Americans and the Japanese?

General HAYES. All these messages that centered on the Japanese came I believe after I left the Chief of Staff's office.

40. General RUSSELL. You just do not recall any while you were there?

General HAYES. I recall one or two general ones, but none of these specific ones. The last message I remember as Chief of Staff was a message which came on a Saturday afternoon, authorizing the Department Commander to spend \$6,000,000 at once for the development of the air fields along the southern route, namely, Christmas and Canton and Savaii and Fiji and those places, and stating that \$5,000,000 more would be available if he needed it. That is the last message I remember, of that import.

41. General RUSSELL. Was there any considerable supervision over activities of the Hawaiian Department by the War Department? [249]

General HAYES. I think, as I remember, there was the usual supervision which you would expect in an island that far away. It appeared to me that the Department Commander was quite free, except on the question of materiel and equipment and monies available to do certain things; and that was natural at that time, because money was not so free.

42. General RUSSELL. Did that pertain to the training of the troops in the Department, also?

General HAYES. It did.

43. General FRANK. What do you mean? Did what pertain?

44. General RUSSELL. This very general supervision as to training.

General HAYES. I guess I misunderstood your question, General. I thought that what you meant was, did that question of money affect the training.

45. General RUSSELL. No, what I had in mind was this—whether or not they attempted, by memoranda, directives, tours of inspection, and so forth, to have any intimate supervision over your training.

General HAYES. No, sir.

46. General RUSSELL. They did not?

General HAYES. No, sir.

47. General RUSSELL. Now, we have been interested in this subject of alerts. Could you tell us the number of alerts that you can recall, which were initiated and carried through in the Hawaiian Department during your tour of duty there?

General HAYES. Yes, sir. Originally, under General Moses, there was what could be called an "alert." When [250] General Herron came down, he concentrated on the alert phase, and, because an alert in time of peace may be annoying to a high commander, there was a general tendency by some of the general officers to want to have a different kind of alert, so that their men wouldn't be annoyed or harrassed. If, for example, they were going to have a certain kind of problem—well, we would leave the men in barracks, and we would not take them all out.

General Herron had one alert—battle-position alert, planes dispersed, observation facilities in position, antiaircraft in position, and

infantry and artillery in battle position. Then, when General Short came there, the question came up again, and he finally decided on three alerts—alerts 1, 2, and 3; 1 to be against sabotage, and in which everything was centered; 2, to have your observation out, your planes dispersed, antiaircraft in position, but infantry and artillery kept back at their base stations, their home stations; 3, everything in battle position, planes dispersed, observation out, antiaircraft in position, infantry and artillery in battle position.

48. General GRUNERT. Did No. 2 include dispersion of airplanes?

General HAYES. It is my recollection it did, General.

49. General RUSSELL. Now, General, may I summarize, merely for the purpose of accuracy. You testified that General Moses had one alert?

General HAYES. When I say Moses, it just occurred to me while I was talking, General Drum left in November 1937, as I remember it, and then General Moses was there from November [251] 1937 until March 1938, and most of his regime was concerned with the Army-Navy—with the Navy maneuvers, and the joint Army and Navy maneuver period which started with preparation in November, and which culminated in a maneuver some time as I remember in March.

50. General RUSSELL. And I believe, then, you said that General Herron had one alert?

General HAYES. Yes.

51. General RUSSELL. That is, probably in the summer of 1940, called by the War Department; and then General Short—

General HAYES. No; the plan called for one. His plan called for one alert.

52. General GRUNERT. You mean one kind of alert, or one actual getting on the ground, being alerted?

General HAYES. Oh, no; there were several alerts, but one kind, one type of alert.

53. General RUSSELL. Do you remember how many times General Herron had his forces out actually on the ground for alerts in his regime?

General HAYES. There were several all-out department alerts; the number, I cannot remember.

54. General RUSSELL. But there were several?

General HAYES. Several.

55. General FRANK. Frequent?

General HAYES. "Frequent" is the word; yes.

56. General RUSSELL. Now, when General Short came along, did he have any alerts in either of the categories that you have described?

General HAYES. Yes, sir.

[252] 57. General RUSSELL. Do you recall when they were?

General HAYES. I recall one. I believe in September of 1941, we were notified by the State Department, with a 6-hour advance notice, that they were going to freeze the assets of the Japanese, and he went into alert 3, with all the troops out in position. The order came out, there was no disturbance of any kind, and he left them as I remember in maneuvers then for the purpose of not showing that it was an alert for that reason but that they were just out training, and they stayed out there for several days; then he called maneuvers off.

58. General GRUNERT. Just a minute, because I have something I want to connect up. Do you recall about what date that alert 3 was called for, approximately?

[253] General HAYES. I do not remember the date, General, but—

59. General GRUNERT. What part of the month?

General HAYES. Well, if I could get the date of the Japanese —

60. General RUSSELL. I will give it to you in just a minute.

Since we have gotten on the subject of dates, I have a very definite recollection that that notice came out some time in July about freezing their assets.

General HAYES. I think so too, probably.

61. General RUSSELL. And it was an embargo in its nature.

General HAYES. That is right. Around July 26, or something like that, is in my mind.

62. General GRUNERT. If that is the case, that alert could not have lasted into October or late in the fall, could it?

General HAYES. No.

63. General GRUNERT. I do not care to pursue it any further.

64. General RUSSELL. General, I have made a search for that alert, having in mind determining when it started and when it ended and what happened after it was over, but I can find no records in the War Department, to this time, even just one message, relating to that July alert.

65. General GRUNERT. It would be in the Hawaiian records, though, would it not?

General HAYES. It should be.

May I speak off the record here for a time?

General GRUNERT. Surely.

(Informal discussion off the record.)

66. General RUSSELL. Now, as you recall, just about how long was that alert in force, General?

[254] General HAYES. It was three or four days.

67. General RUSSELL. Was it an all-out alert or a limited alert?

General HAYES. All-out alert, and battle position and maneuver positions.

68. General FRANK. Will you please state the circumstances under which the alert was decided?

General HAYES. Sometime during that day the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department received notification from the War Department that the State Department had advised the War Department that it was intended six hours later to freeze the assets of the Japanese; that this notice was given six hours ahead of time, so that the Department Commander might make any necessary arrangements to meet the situation. G-2, other departments, and the F. B. I. Chief of the F. B. I. in Oahu, were called in, were informed, informed me that it looked very safe; nothing was expected to happen, to the best of their knowledge and information. I conveyed this information to General Short. He decided to go into maneuver positions which were the battle positions, had press releases made out so that they could be given to the evening paper, to the effect that the Hawaiian Department was taking the field for a 10-day maneuver period.

69. General FRANK. This was an all-out alert?

General HAYES. All-out. Accordingly the troops were put out, and nothing happened from the incident. The troops were out in the field, to my recollection, three or four days to carry on the idea, and then were called in. During this period [255] which was part of the defense plan, troops in armored cars or government vehicles were marched through the town so that they would be able to meet any Japanese situation, as well as the other battle positions out in the areas.

70. General FRANK. I have no more questions.

71. General RUSSELL. General, there was no other placing of the troops on the ground in alert positions by General Short except this one of which you have spoken?

General HAYES. Oh, yes, there were others.

72. General RUSSELL. When was that?

General HAYES. I do not remember the dates, but they were regular maneuvers in the field.

73. General RUSSELL. Do you refer now to those big maneuvers that were held in May?

General HAYES. No, sir. I refer to other maneuvers. He usually had one large maneuver, and then during the year you had several maneuvers which covered the same idea but were not as extensive in situations. The big maneuver usually was joined in with the Navy in some way. My recollection is that troops were out in the field a great deal of the time.

74. General RUSSELL. Now, during the year 1941 did you observe in Hawaii any indications that the relations between the Japanese Nation and the American Government were becoming more strained?

General HAYES. If I had not known that they were, I am not certain that I would have noticed particularly. I did notice, though, that the new consul that they sent out there during that period was a much higher type individual when it came to handling affairs, appeared to me to be a very high type [256] diplomatic individual.

75. General GRUNERT. Did not the press indicate that the relations between the two nations were changing?

General HAYES. Oh, yes, sir; that is correct.

76. General GRUNERT. You meant official information; is that the idea?

General HAYES. I also meant—

77. General RUSSELL. I limited the question.

General HAYES. I meant on the street.

78. General RUSSELL. No. I limited that question. I had not gone into that. I asked you if there were any conditions in Hawaii itself which indicated it, and he answered it in a limited way. Now I was going into the other.

You did state in your answer, however, General, that if you had not known that relations were becoming more strained you could not have gleaned it from the appearances in Hawaii?

General HAYES. No. I was referring to the people on the street and to things like that.

79. General RUSSELL. But you did know that they were becoming more strained?

General HAYES. Yes.

80. General RUSSELL. And where did you get that information?

General HAYES. I got that from the papers and from the types of telegrams and radios that came into headquarters.

81. General RUSSELL. Well, tell us about those radios and telegrams that came into headquarters.

General HAYES. Well, the general tenor of those telegrams was that, What did we want in those supplies? Or what did we want in these supplies? Indicating that the War Department was [257] interested in building up. This question of the radar, getting the money for the radar, the priorities on the radar system: the natural things that come in a situation like that.

82. General RUSSELL. Largely on your projects for getting material?

General HAYES. That is right; and an increase in projects and an increase in money.

83. General RUSSELL. I do not believe that I have anything else, General.

84. General GRUNERT. I have quite a number of questions here. Now that I realize how long General Hayes was with General Short as Chief of Staff, it brings up quite a number of questions here, which I shall try to get through as rapidly as possible.

From the time General Short took over, were there any particular changes that he made in the defensive measures or plan concerning defensive measures that General Herron had carried on?

General HAYES. Yes.

85. General GRUNERT. Will you outline those briefly?

General HAYES. As I remember, General Short initially was very much concerned about the outer islands, the other islands. He wanted some more troops out on the other islands. He felt that the other islands were outposts which, if he occupied, would enable him to slow up a major attack on Oahu. He concentrated on the building of airfields. The basic defense plan was not changed much, as I remember. The boundaries of the divisions, the north-and-south, on some of the Hawaiian Islands, were changed, but the theory of it—

[258] 86. General FRANK. Boundaries between what?

General HAYES. Between sectors: north sector and south sector. But the theory of the defense, namely to hold the beaches lightly with a large mobile striking force, was kept by him.

87. General GRUNERT. Did he emphasize training more than General Herron did? In other words, was he primarily a training man?

General HAYES. He primarily was a training man.

88. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General HAYES. He was out a great deal of the time. I would often never see him until late in the afternoon.

89. General GRUNERT. Was there as much cooperation and coordination with the Navy, or more, after General Short took over, or what?

General HAYES. That is a difficult question to answer, for this reason: that General Herron was probably the most popular commander they had ever had out there. He was greatly admired, and they had deep affection for him. It is a personal thing. He knew the Admirals better than General Short did. Officially and in their dealings they went through the same steps.

90. General FRANK. Who? That is General Short and General Herron?

General HAYES. General Herron, yes. That was because General Short followed the policies which General Herron had established.

91. General FRANK. Yes.

[259] General HAYES. And that was once or twice a week either going one way across, and the General and Chief of Staff going over to call on the Admiral and Chief of Staff.

92. General GRUNERT. Do you recall a letter sent out by the Secretary of the Navy of January 24, 1941, regarding defensive measures in cooperation with the Navy, to make such measures effective, which the Secretary of War on February 7, 1941, sent out to the Commanding General of Hawaii? It referred particularly to taking effective measures so as to be prepared for any eventuality.

General HAYES. I do not remember a specific letter. I do remember some letters along that line.

93. General GRUNERT. At about that time?

General HAYES. About that time, yes, sir.

94. General GRUNERT. Then, you would not recall just what measures were taken in consequence of that letter?

General HAYES. No, except during the period of three years there was an intense training program. It was on the increase all along.

95. General GRUNERT. As I recall that letter, it referred also to possibility of air raids and attacks.

General HAYES. That is correct.

96. General GRUNERT. And that the measures to be taken were more in line with particularly guarding against such.

General HAYES. That is correct.

97. General GRUNERT. Now, can you give us a little short idea of what you considered conditions in Hawaii to be from early February until you left? In other words, were they disturbed? Were there rumblings among the population? Was the command [260] afraid of sabotage, of upheavals of the population itself? Were the conditions between the military and naval and the civil population friendly or not so? In other words, general conditions as to the population, especially the Japanese population on the Island of Oahu.

General HAYES. Yes, sir. First of all, as to the relationships with the Navy, it was most cordial. I never saw any incident in the higher echelon where there was not extreme cordiality.

98. General GRUNERT. Well, in that cordiality was there also efficiency in the exchange of information, and was it effective in order to allow you to do what was necessary to be done?

General HAYES. There was a sort of an agreement that when anything came in that was important, that touched on a naval phase in any way, we would call up the Navy, and General Herron or General Short and myself would go over and see the Admiral, or the Admiral and his Chief of Staff would come over to see either General Herron or Short. I do not know the number of times that would happen, but it was two or three times at least every month.

99. General GRUNERT. Did that extend down to the staff echelons as well as the higher command, the G-2s, the G-3s corresponding?

General HAYES. The G-2s and the O. N. I.s were very close together. They transferred information one to the other continually. There

was liaison in the G-3. I would send an officer over, and our G-3 would go over and see their war plans. There was cooperation. It was there when I left.

[261] 100. General GRUNERT. How about confidence?

General HAYES. Confidence in the individuals or confidence in the plan?

101. General GRUNERT. Confidence in either, as to their doing their respective job and playing a game with each other in the cooperative line.

General HAYES. I think there was confidence. You remember, during that period the joint action of the Army and Navy changed from paramount interests to cooperation, and we had a lot of conferences and discussions so that this cooperation would work, and during that period also the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was written.

102. General GRUNERT. All right; let us drop the subject of cooperation and coordination and go to the civilian personnel.

General HAYES. There was no particular evidence of there being any great strain that I saw.

103. General GRUNERT. How did you size up the Japanese element? As dangerous?

General HAYES. I sized it up this way: General Herron, based upon that action, picked out—

104. General FRANK. Based upon what?

General HAYES. Based upon General Herron's action. I am going to tell you about it.

105. General FRANK. Yes.

General HAYES. He picked out something between fifty and a hundred of the very top civilians in Hawaii. Some had been there four years, and some had been there fifty years, many of them born there, and he asked them to give him their comments [262] on the Japanese. I think out of it the whole thing came, in general, that 10 percent were definitely loyal to the Emperor, that 10 percent probably were loyal to our country, that 80 percent you could not tell about: if the going was good for us, they would be with us; if the going was good for the Japanese, they would be with the Japanese. But none of these people would tell you that they really understood the Japanese; that they had the oriental veil that no occidental has ever been able to get through. I know that I went out with Japanese official parties and they were most cordial.

106. General GRUNERT. Well, now, from all this did you or the Commanders over there figure that sabotage was going to be one of their main troubles in the future if anything happened, or didn't that overshadow other things that had to be done?

General HAYES. Sabotage, because of the uncertainty of the Japanese no one knew, was always possible and present in the thoughts.

107. General FRANK. And taken care of in the war plans?

General HAYES. That is correct.

108. General GRUNERT. And was that one of the reasons that they separated the alerts into 1, 2, and 3?

General HAYES. It may have been. That was not worked out by me.

109. General GRUNERT. That was not worked out by you?

General HAYES. No.

110. General GRUNERT. How did that come about? I understood General Herron to say that that was put across by the training people after he left.

General HAYES. After General Herron left. That is correct.

[263] 111. General GRUNERT. Because when General Herron was there he had the one kind of an alert.

General HAYES. That is my recollection.

112. General GRUNERT. That there were three types of alert?

General HAYES. General Short worked on that himself.

113. General GRUNERT. He worked on that himself?

General HAYES. With Colonel Phillips, the man who followed me.

114. General GRUNERT. All right; we shall go to another one.

General HAYES. I did not work on that.

115. General FRANK. Was that in effect before you were relieved?

General HAYES. Oh, yes.

116. General FRANK. The three types of alert?

General HAYES. Yes.

117. General FRANK. Were in effect?

General HAYES. Yes.

118. General FRANK. Before you went on leave to come back to the United States?

General HAYES. That is right.

119. General GRUNERT. Now I shall ask you a few questions on the subject of command and staff.

Was it normal for General Short, when he was in command, to consult with or have conferences with his senior commanders of the Department?

General HAYES. Yes, sir, it was.

120. General GRUNERT. Outside of actual maneuvers. And did he pass information to them as to conditions that he became aware of, and sought their advice or put propositions to them before [264] he made his decisions on the matter, or did he just rely on his staff?

General HAYES. No; I think from my recollection he conveyed the information and, when he felt it was necessary, asked them as well as his staff.

121. General FRANK. How often did he see his main commanders? General Herron saw them every week, didn't he?

General HAYES. Yes.

122. General FRANK. How often did General Short see them?

General HAYES. My recollection is that he saw them every week or two. He was very acute to this matter of training, and when you are acute on the subject of training you just have to see the commanders, and he saw them, not only the top but down below.

123. General GRUNERT. But then most of his conferences were on the subject of training?

General HAYES. No, sir; they were on the subject of air. That was quite a subject, the defense by air, and he saw the air commanders or commander quite often, the engineers on projects. He had a regular flow of staff officers.

124. General GRUNERT. Now, as to the question of staff, did you as Chief of Staff have frequent conferences with your General Staff heads?

General HAYES. Oh, I saw them every day and discussed.

125. General GRUNERT. And were they given responsibility and required to live up to it, or did they look to the high command, as the Chief of Staff or the Commanding General, to make most of their decisions, and then just follow them out, instead of making recommendations?

[265] General HAYES. I think they functioned as the General Staff officers should have functioned. You gave them the policy, and they functioned under those policies.

126. General GRUNERT. Do you care to express your opinion or judgment of the man who succeeded you? You need not answer if you do not desire to.

General HAYES. I would like to say this: I do not know as to his ability as a Chief of Staff. He was very much concerned with G-3. I think that was his trend.

127. General FRANK. Do you feel that he had worked himself in to the position of Chief of Staff by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack?

General HAYES. I do not. That is an opinion.

128. General RUSSELL. General, while we are on this subject of General Short as a trainer, do you think that he emphasized training to the point that it was a detriment to his mission, his defensive mission of protection of the fleet at Oahu?

General HAYES. No, sir. You could not read the defense plan and meet your mission without being intimately connected with the training end of it.

129. General GRUNERT. I would like to stop right here and take a recess of about a minute.

(A brief informal recess was taken.)

[266] 130. General GRUNERT. When you left the Department, about what was the state of the anti-aircraft defense system? Did you consider it in pretty good shape and efficient?

General HAYES. Yes; I did. I think it was in good shape and was a good plan. Furthermore, at that time there was not a great deal of anti-aircraft equipment in the whole Army. They needed more and they could not get it because it was not there. The plan for the defense was very well drawn out and sound. The coverage was excellent. Some of the material was not the most modern. That is my view.

131. General FRANK. What, in your opinion, ever brought about the frame of mind that resulted in a decision to install Alert No. 1?

132. General GRUNERT. May I ask if by "install No. 1" you mean the classes of alert?

General FRANK. Yes.

133. General GRUNERT. The question that General Frank has asked refers to the classes of alert, 1, 2 and 3, which was a change from what General Herron had.

General HAYES. Yes; I understand. I think the reason that he put in Class 1 Alert was that he felt that sabotage was always possible and probably present and dangerous.

134. General FRANK. Had you ever discussed the reasons with him for that kind of an alert?

General HAYES. Yes, a couple of times; and then he took it up himself and worked with Phillips, to my recollection.

135. General FRANK. On that I would like to ask you this: Since, in the situation in July of 1941, which was much less acute than this one, be installed an all-out alert, what do you think influenced him at this time to decide on the No. 1 Alert?

[267] General HAYES. "This time" being December 7?

136. General FRANK. November 27th.

General HAYES. I think, a radiogram which he probably received from some Washington source stressing sabotage.

137. General FRANK. You were gone at the time?

General HAYES. I was gone at the time.

138. General FRANK. The Navy had different classes of alert, did they not?

General HAYES. Yes; they had different alerts. What they were, in detail, I do not know.

139. General FRANK. Are you conversant with whether or not Navy No. 1 Alert was an all-out alert?

General HAYES. I am not positive. I would not like to say at this time. I did know at the time, but it has escaped my memory.

140. General FRANK. Do you know that there was an air estimate of the situation prepared and signed by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin?

General HAYES. Yes.

141. General FRANK. That was during your time?

General HAYES. Yes.

142. General FRANK. Do you remember the conclusion to which they came as to the most probable enemy action?

General HAYES. No.

143. General FRANK. Do you remember whether or not they anticipated an air raid?

General HAYES. Yes.

144. General FRANK. They did?

General HAYES. Yes.

[268] 145. General FRANK. As the most probable enemy action?

General HAYES. As the most probable. And that was also the estimate of the situation of the Department. General Herron's estimate, which was still in effect, as I remember, was that the most probable line of action was an air raid some time shortly after dawn. He did not name Sunday specifically.

146. General FRANK. Were you surprised at that air raid?

General HAYES. On December 7th?

147. General FRANK. Yes.

General HAYES. I was surprised, but I was not surprised in the form of the attack.

148. General FRANK. Would you have anticipated it?

General HAYES. If I had been there?

149. General FRANK. Yes.

General HAYES. Yes; I think that I would have done this: I would not have anticipated it, but I would have been prepared, as I was a disciple of one alert and everything out.

150. General FRANK. Had you been the Chief of Staff would you have recommended an all-out alert?

General HAYES. Definitely.

151. General FRANK. Here is another line of questions of which you may or may not have some knowledge. Do you have any knowledge concerning the failure of the contractors, the Hawaiian constructors, to complete the construction of the Hawaiian defense projects within the time prior to the 7th of December, 1941, which the contracting job orders required.

General HAYES. I do not remember the details of that at all.

152. General FRANK. Do you remember any complaints having been made that the contractors were not completing their work on [269] time?

General HAYES. Yes. There were various projects. There was the tunnel project and various projects that pressure was put on. The one on which the most pressure was put, I think, was this radar.

153. General FRANK. Who put the pressure on?

General HAYES. General Short.

154. General GRUNERT. On whom?

General HAYES. On the War Department.

155. General GRUNERT. Is that of record?

General HAYES. Oh, there must be a record of it. I know there were telegrams sent.

156. General FRANK. Or did he not put the pressure on the contractor? Why on the War Department?

General HAYES. I think he put it on the contractor. And was told that he could not get this stuff; they said that he could not get priorities on materiel and things like that. Then he went to the War Department for help.

157. General FRANK. After the contractor told him this, he then went to the War Department?

General HAYES. That is my recollection.

158. General GRUNERT. Who is directly supervising contracts?

General HAYES. At that time it was between the Colonel Lyman and Colonel Wyman. Wyman was the Division Engineer and Lyman was the Department Engineer.

159. General GRUNERT. Wyman was the Division Engineer?

General HAYES. Yes. And then it was headed up into G-4.

160. General GRUNERT. Did he put pressure through G-4 on Lyman or Wyman, the contractor, or how?

[270] General HAYES. I think he worked it through the offices; not the contractor himself.

161. General FRANK. Who was G-4 at the time?

General HAYES. Bank or Marsden—I think Marsden was G-4. He is out in Hawaii still.

162. General FRANK. Who was G-2?

General HAYES. Fielder. General Short brought Fielder down to relieve Marsden and put Marsden as G-4.

163. General FRANK. Do you have any knowledge concerning delays with reference to underground gasoline storage facilities?

General HAYES. I have a definite recollection of it. The detail of it is not sufficient to give as evidence; but a great deal of time and thought was given to that by General Short.

164. General FRANK. Prior to your departure was the aircraft warning system functioning?

General HAYES. Only on the Island of Oahu. There were no stations on Kauai, none on Molokai, none on Maui, and none on Hawaii, although all the stations had been recommended. Had been work done on them, but it was over a long period of time.

165. General FRANK. The job orders called for those installations to have been completed before you left, did they not?

General HAYES. Oh, yes; June 30, August 30, September 30, and on; various changes.

166. General FRANK. And the reason that they were not completed was because of the contractor claiming that he was not able to get credit for material; is that correct?

General HAYES. Not only that. General Short sent many a radiogram and many letters trying to get this radar equipment in, and he was told that he could not get it, as I remember, [271] because of priorities. Panama was first, the Philippines next—I don't remember that; they were probably away down on the list. But the West Coast, second, and Hawaii third. The thing was delayed from time to time for various reasons, and one of them was that the stuff was not there and they could not get all the money at the time they wanted to get it; and many letters and telegrams were sent on that matter.

167. General GRUNERT. Did that mean the complete project, or did it refer to part of the project, such as roads or concrete work or radar itself, or what? Would you be able to testify on that particular subject?

General HAYES. These places were so out of the way, on the tops of isolated mountains, that in order to live there they had to have certain things, and in order to get things there they had to have certain roads built. Take Kawaihoa and Waialea. They were very difficult places.

168. General FRANK. Do you have any knowledge as to whether or not any military personnel neglected their duties relating to the contract?

General HAYES. For the radars?

169. General FRANK. For the radars or for any of the construction.

General HAYES. No, sir.

170. General FRANK. Was there any feeling to that effect?

General HAYES. Not to my knowledge. This radar business was pressing, pressing, pressing all the time to get it in, and they just could not get it in.

171. General FRANK. Did you ever hear of a contractor by the name of Wilhelm Rohl?

[272] General HAYES. Yes.

172. General FRANK. Did anything ever come up about his status?

General HAYES. Not while I was there. Afterwards I read about him. I only saw him once.

173. General FRANK. You knew nothing about him while you were there?

General HAYES. No, sir. It came up just a month or so ago, in the paper, about Ted Wyman and Rohl together.

174. General FRANK. I have no further questions.

175. General GRUNERT. Was the Interceptor Command organized before you went on leave from the Chief of Staff's position?

General HAYES. It was organized and training was going on in an improvised way, with whatever equipment they had.

176. General RUSSELL. Where did this man Ted Wyman come from? He was an Army man, was he not?

General HAYES. He was the Division Engineer.

177. General RUSSELL. How long was he out there during your tour of duty?

General HAYES. A couple of years, I guess.

178. General RUSSELL. He came out about two years before you left?

General HAYES. As I remember it.

179. General RUSSELL. Was he charged immediately with the installation of this radar system and the supervision of its installation?

General HAYES. No.

180. General RUSSELL. What was his relation to the radar system?

General HAYES. Well, in certain things as Division Engineer he functioned under the Chief of Engineers. In cer- [273] tain things he functioned under the Department Commander. He probably arranged the contract, to get it done and, after he got the machinery, constructed the thing. I forget the details of it, but that was the idea.

181. General RUSSELL. What was the relation of the Department Commander to this project for the installation of the radar?

General HAYES. It was his responsibility. It was not the Chief of Engineers' responsibility. It is a tactical unit.

182. General RUSSELL. Who made the initial contract for the installation of the permanent radar station?

General HAYES. I do not know.

183. General FRANK. It was made by Wyman. I want to find out what right he had over the supervision of this station.

General HAYES. The tactical location and everything else was decided by him.

184. General RUSSELL. Did he have anything to do with letting the contract, as to who was to build them?

General HAYES. I do not remember anything about that.

185. General RUSSELL. Did you not know, as a matter of fact, that the contract was let in Washington to this man Rohl?

General HAYES. I read about it. I didn't know it at the time.

186. General RUSSELL. Is it not true that the supervision of the installation was by this man Wyman, the District Engineer out there?

General HAYES. Yes. There was a joint action between the Department Engineer and the Division Engineer. Certain things the Division Engineer did for the Department Commander, and certain things he did for the Chief of Engineers.

187. General RUSSELL. Who made the contract providing the period [274] in which these things would be set up?

General HAYES. That, as I recollect, came from Washington; and when the work did not meet the date Washington was contacted and it was put over to another date, a later date.

188. General RUSSELL. All of which decision was made in Washington, independent of anything that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department did or could do?

General HAYES. I am not certain about that independence, except that pressure was put on the War Department.

189. General RUSSELL. But the decisions were made in Washington?
General HAYES. That is my impression. But I think you can get all that from the engineers who worked on it.

190. General GRUNERT. If there are no further questions, we thank you for coming up, General.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 5 o'clock p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

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[276] **PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD**

FRIDAY, AUGUST 11, 1944

**MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.**

The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on August 9, 1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

**TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER CAMPBELL SHORT, UNITED
STATES ARMY, RETIRED (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, BRIG.
GEN. THOMAS H. GREEN, UNITED STATES ARMY)**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General SHORT. Walter Campbell Short, Major General, United States Army, Retired. My number is O1621. I am living in Dallas, Texas. I am not stationed any place.

2. General GRUNERT. General, the order convening this Board requires it to ascertain and report the facts relating to the [277] attack made by Japanese armed forces on the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941. You having been in command of the Hawaiian Department from the 8th of February to the 17th of December, 1941, have been ordered to appear as a witness before the Board; and the Board hopes to get at the facts from a consideration of your testimony, from that of other witnesses, and from that contained in documentary evidence.

You have already furnished the Board with a list of witnesses whom you believe have knowledge of facts pertinent to the issue. The Board hopes to be able to have all these witnesses testify.

The Board has been informed that the War Department has furnished you a copy of the records of the Roberts Commission, except certain exhibits which have been made available to you for examination. The Board made a study of those records and, as a result thereof, many of its questions are based on that study.

Have you a statement which you desire to submit to the Board?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. I would like to make an oral state and then submit a statement in writing, with supporting docum

3. General GRUNERT. If so, at the time you submit the stateme writing the Recorder will swear you to it so that that statemen be made a part of the record for the Board's consideration.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

4. General GRUNERT. Will you please go ahead with your s ment, and then I will lead in propounding questions to | try to get at some of the facts under various objectives aand phas

General SHORT. I would like to state, in the first place, that just as interested as the Board in having all the facts uncov I believe I can only gain by having the Board get a full knowl of everything leading up to the attack. I regret that I was granted the privilege of having counsel present at the interrog of all witnesses, because I think that things might have been brc out that might not be brought out without that. However, since has been refused, I would like to have a copy of my own testir before the Board, as soon as convenient after the meeting, and I v like, when the Board has completed its work, to have a complete of the record of the Board with an opportunity to go over it, so I will know what has gone before. I believe that that requ reasonable.

(Informal discussion off the record.)

5. General GRUNERT. General Short, I do not think it is w the authority of the Board to make a decision as to whether o the Board will furnish you such a copy, and the Board suggests you make application to the War Department for such a copy.

General SHORT. Shall I proceed?

6. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General SHORT. I would like to call the attention of the Boa the fact that I have had a copy of the record of the Roberts Con sion only about a day and a half. I have been able to refresl memory to a considerable extent, but it is barely possible, since i been two years and eight months, [279] that there migl some slight discrepancy in details between what I would say now what I said then. I do not think it would be anything of any ir tance, but it is possible that some detail would escape my mind.

I would like to begin by reading the message that I got from War Department on October 16. That was the first in this situ It came through the Navy and is a paraphrase of the dispatch the Chief of Naval Operations.

(Message of October 16, 1941, is as follows:)

Japanese Cabinet resignation creates a grave situation. If a new Cabi formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic. Konoye Cabinet remain it will operate under a new mandate which w include rapprochement with the United States. Either way hostilities be Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and the United are held responsible by Japan for their present situation, there is also a bility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possit you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments a not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against .

General GRUNERT. What is the date of that?

General SHORT. October 16, 1941.

I would like to point out that the message says that hostilitie tween Japan and Russia are strongly possible, [280] and

there is a possibility of that situation between the United States and Japan. There is quite a distinction.

I also point out that they did not want me to do anything that would disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan. That seemed to be a matter of considerable importance at that time.

There was nothing further of importance received on the question of Japan from then until the 27th day of November; and this is the wire that I had from the Chief of Staff. Incidentally, I want to call attention to the number of this particular radiogram. The number happens to be very important. 472 is the number. I would like to read it so that everybody will have it fresh in their minds.

(Radiogram dated November 27, 1941, is as follows:)

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictable and hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

That is a statement of a good deal of importance.

This policy should not repeat should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as [281] you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken.

That is a most important thing. They called on me for a report of measures taken.

Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 so far as they pertain to Japan stop Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

There are several things that should be noted in this. The first is that Japan must take the first overt act; that the population in Hawaii must not be alarmed. In other words, there was still a hope in the minds of the War Department that differences might be composed, and they apparently wanted to be particularly careful not to add to the flames.

Undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

I will take up in detail a little later the fact that long distance reconnaissance was definitely a function of the Navy; that the document had been signed by Admiral Bloch, Commanding the 14th Naval District, and myself, and had been approved by the Chief of Staff; so that the War Plans Division certainly should have known the definite provision in regard to reconnaissance.

We had only 12 bombers, 6 of which were out of commission, because we had stripped them to send other bombers to the Philippines, capable of long distance reconnaissance, so that all the ships that we could have sent out for a thousand miles [282] and back were 6 flying fortresses, if we had been depending on our own reconnaissance. So it was a very much safer proposition to carry out the plan as agreed upon by the Navy, wherein all the long range reconnaissance of both the Army and Navy functioned under one plan, so that there would not be any duplication of reconnaissance and there would be

an undivided responsibility. So that the Navy definitely had responsibility.

We thought when we drew up the plans on March 21, 1941—and I say, the Chief of Staff approved them, and I saw no reason for making any change and starting with my own reconnaissance, because I had received this radio I did not believe that the War Department wanted us to abrogate the agreement with the Navy and start on our own. When I got this wire, in view of the last statement about disseminating it to as few officers as possible, I immediately took it over with my Chief of Staff, who had been my G-3 up to a month before, and made the decision, after we had talked it over, to Alert No. 1. I later communicated this dispatch to G-2 and to echelon commanders. That same afternoon I talked the matter over with General Martin and General Burwell, and the contents of the message in general were sent to the two division commanders, Infantry Division and the liaison officers. I did not at that time go further down in the list in disseminating the information.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, 19

Subject: Corrections in testimony.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

Page 282, line 21,—change "Burwell to Burgin."

* * * * *

(s) Water C. Short

WALTER C. SHORT,

Major General, U. S. Army, Retired

As to what this Alert No. 1 consisted of, we had three types of it under our standing operational procedure. We had worked it out on July 14, when we brought out a tentative standing operational procedure; we worked over this very [283] carefully with all echelon so as to get a reaction on every paragraph, got their recommendations, had repeated conferences, and on the 5th of November we put out the operating procedure. Our purpose in putting it out as an operating procedure was to get rid of a great amount of secrecy so that each company commander, battalion commander, and regimental commander could know exactly what their functions were. As the document was considered highly secret, which it had been before, it was important to have everybody understand so that he could answer immediately to a separate order and know exactly and so that each unit would know exactly what its job was and could go to it without any confusion.

Our Alert No. 1 was a defense against sabotage, espionage, and subversive activities without any threat from the outside.

Alert No. 2 included all these sabotage measures in No. 1, in addition, defense against air attacks and surface and submarine attacks.

Alert No. 3 was a defense against an all-out attack, where everybody moved to their battle stations and carried out their duties as if there was a possible attempt at landing in sight.

In making up my mind as to which alert to use I was influenced by several things. In the first place, I knew from repeated conversations with the Navy that the Japanese naval vessels were supposed to be either in their home ports or proceeding to the south. They had no information indicating that any Japanese vessels were proceeding east. The nearest Japanese base to Hawaii was 2,100 miles. All of our information [284] indicated that the Japanese had no bomber that could take off from one of those land bases, bomb Hawaii, and return.

In addition to that, we had a large part of the United States Fleet at Honolulu. They constantly had used task forces, usually two, sometimes three. Those task forces had carriers with them; and the normal practice, as I understand it, was for the planes of the carrier force to scour the ocean 300 miles to each side. In other words, any carrier force had a real reconnaissance for a width of 600 miles. For the two you would have 1,200 miles of the ocean in the vicinity of those two forces well covered. If there were three you would have 1,800 miles.

In addition, the Navy had bases at Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston, and did certain reconnaissances from those islands. It cut down the flying hours very materially from what would have happened if they had tried to do it all from Honolulu.

I knew of these things, and it made me feel that the chance of an attack by air was very slight, or that it was highly improbable. I also had the expressed opinion on that day, the morning of the 27th, the day I received this wire, when I had been in conference with Admiral Kimmel in reference to reinforcing the garrisons of Wake and Midway by Army planes, a squadron at each place; but naturally, with the limited pursuit we had, if you reinforced Midway and Wake you would cut down your air defense in Honolulu. The question came up as to how serious was the need for pursuit for the immediate protection of Honolulu. Admiral Kimmel asked Captain McMorris, his operation officer, what he thought the chances of a [285] surprise attack on Honolulu were, and Captain McMorris replied, none.

I have in this supporting document an affidavit. I was accompanied at the conference by General Martin and Colonel Mollison. We were all present when this happened, and I have the affidavit of Colonel Mollison as to what was said.

Admiral Kimmel took no exception to the statement of Captain McMorris. As I remember, Admiral Bloch was there, and there seemed to be no difference of opinion at all. That was the existing opinion of Kimmel's staff, that there was practically no danger of a surprise attack by air on Honolulu.

In addition to that, it was a question of training. Alerts Nos. 2 and 3 would require so many men on duty. Alert No. 3 would take every man, practically, so it would eliminate any training. Alert No. 2 would practically put every man of the harbor defense, the anti-aircraft, and the air on duties that would prohibit training. The situation in the air with regard to training was quite serious. We had been given the mission of ferrying B-17s to the Philippines. We had already sent, I think, two groups, one of 9 and one of 12. We had also sent some crews to San Francisco for the purpose of bringing them back to the Philippine Islands. We had only 6 flying fortresses

in commission to train all of these crews. If you remember, at that time a flying fortress was relatively new and you could not just up a pilot here and there and say he could fly a flying fortress. He had to be stepped up. We had a bunch of the old obsolete bombers that were death traps if you put anybody in them to fly, but it was one step in teaching a pilot how to handle larger bombers. They were put [286] on those. They were put on the B-17s for a little time, and finally got to the B-17s. With the limited number of ships we had it took time to train these crews; not just the pilots. In addition to that we had to train the bombardiers and the gunners so that they could protect themselves from the Japs going over the mandated islands.

General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we should do nothing that would interfere with the training or the flying group. The responsibility was definitely on the Hawaiian Department. It was up to us to get the ships there and get them without loss; and we could do it if we started them out with untrained crews.

That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into Alert No. 1 rather than Alert No. 2 or No. 3.

In addition, I would like to read the wire sent to the War Department:

Re your radiogram 472—

That definitely tied it in with the wire which I had gotten from General Marshall on the 27th. This was sent on the 27th within an hour after I got the message. There should not be any question, if anyone reads this carefully, as to what radiogram it was replying to. I definitely identify it as a reply to the radiogram in which he had asked me to report the action taken. This radiogram stated:

(Reply of Lt. Gen. Short on November 27, 1941, to message No. 1 from General Marshall on November 27, 1941, is as follows:)

Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.

I am pointing out particularly the number of that message, because after I made that report to the War Department of exactly what I was doing—that was on the 27th of November—I received nothing from them until the 7th of December, after the attack, stating that they thought my action was not correct. They did not come back and say, "Your sabotage arrangements are all right, but we feel here that there is danger of additional hostile action, that you ought to alert your command for an air attack or for possible attack at landing." They came back with nothing of that kind.

I could draw only one conclusion, and it was reinforced by a number of other incidents that I will cover. I could draw only one conclusion—that as far as the War Department was concerned they approved of my action, because they had ten days after telling me to report to them and tell me that they did not approve it.

[288] General Gerow, in his testimony before the Roberts Commission, stated that it was the function of his division in the War Department, in the War Plans Division, the General Staff, to follow up on that instruction that they had given him to report action if they didn't do it, and they didn't realize that this wire of mine was an answer to their wire of the 27th, although I referred directly to

wire. It could not have been an answer to anything else. So there was a period of ten days when the War Plans Division didn't even take the trouble to tell me I hadn't answered it. They apparently didn't know whether I had answered it or not, and I had answered it as specifically as I knew how.

To show that I was not the only one that considered attack by air on Honolulu improbable, General Marshall in his testimony before the Roberts Commission stated that he was surprised by the attack on Honolulu. He was asked by the Board why he didn't use the—I will come to that a little later, but I would like to bring it out at this time—why he did not use the scrambler telephone to send his message to me on December 7th. He said, Well, the time of getting connections across the Pacific was frequently considerable, that he did not consider it absolutely secret, and that if he had been going to use the telephone he would first of all have called the Philippines, which would have taken more time, because that was the point where he considered the great threat was.

In other words, he said frankly that he was surprised at the attack on Honolulu. That, along with the various other things that happened, which I shall take up, led me to believe [289] absolutely—at the time I didn't know of that, but I did know of the other things—that the War Department did not fear an attack on Honolulu from the air.

There is one other point that I had not covered in regard to ordering that Alert No. 1, was the fact that 37 percent of our population in Honolulu, in the Hawaiian Islands, approximately 160,000, was Japanese or Japanese-American. With a population of that size it made sabotage highly probable, with those thousands of—there were about 35,000 actual aliens, and it looked reasonable that some of those aliens would be in the employ of the Japanese Government and would attempt sabotage. Character of the population made it most important that we make every possible provision for action against sabotage.

There was another reason that was very important in determining whether we should go into Alert No. 2 or No. 1. We had bunkers built that we had built without money, with our engineer battalion, at Wheeler Field, for distributing our pursuit planes so in case of attack that they would not be so likely to suffer damage. Alert No. 2 provided that the pursuit planes should be distributed to their bunkers so as to avoid damage from hostile air attack.

Now, the two methods of handling your ships as regards safety were diametrically opposed. If you wanted to protect your ships from sabotage, you wanted them grouped; and what made it even more important was, we had not gotten fencing for fencing the fields, and we had not gotten flood lights. So if you scattered some 200 ships all over the landscape, you had to have men at every ship, enough men to protect the individual ship from sabotage, and it would have taken a very large part [290] of the Air Force to carry this out.

We had asked for money, for \$240,000. I will get the date on that (referring to records). We asked for \$240,000 on May 15. \$102,000 was authorized on July 11, \$91,000 on August 12. By the time we had the money, the fencing was not available locally, and we had to order it from the States. Getting it from the States, we had to get a priority,

first on the purchase and then on the question of ship space. It took about 15 weeks to get a priority. It took additional time then to the priority on ship space. A result was that the District Engineer who was responsible for putting in the manproof fence around the fields, had not received any of this wire up to December 7. Quartermaster had the responsibility for fencing in certain gaso storage in the vicinity of Schofield and a few other things, and he gotten a small amount, but he had beaten the District Engineer to local supply and had gotten what there was, and it was just available.

Now, that made the question of the dispersion of planes and protection from sabotage all the more difficult. It looked as though up to the time we had the fencing, if we were trying to protect them from sabotage, we should group them at the various fields, distribute them by fields as much as we could, but group them where they could be held under very close observation. Colonel Burwell had been given the job by the Air Corps of making a very complete investigation and study of the question of sabotage, because it was a thing that was always possible and, particularly with the Air and the Hawaiian [291] Air Depot, was most serious; and he had come out very strongly in his recommendations that in any alert against sabotage planes should be grouped as closely as possible where there would be any possibility of sabotage.

I would like to point out that the Hawaiian Department had means in itself for obtaining information as to the movement of Japanese ships. We were dependent wholly upon the Navy getting information through the 14th Naval District or receiving that information from the War Department. We had no agents in any part of the world except right in the Hawaiian Islands. That was the only place that we had agents for obtaining information. So we were necessarily dependent upon the Navy or the War Department for information as to movement of these ships.

And, as I have said before, the responsibility for the distant reconnaissance had been assumed by the Navy, which we all thought—which apparently the War Department and Navy agreed with and approved the scheme—that they were the logical people, considering the means that they had, to have the responsibility for distant reconnaissance. This was drawn up in a very formal way and sent on to the War and Navy Departments for approval.

I will go into some detail on what was provided in this air base that was the most important place of cooperation between the services. The command in Hawaii, as you all know, was exercised by cooperation and not by unity of command up to December 7. We agreed that the distant reconnaissance would be carried out by the Navy, that in case of a threat or of an actual attack, without waiting for any orders, that I [292] would make available to the Navy the greatest possible number of bombers. I would make the decision but it was agreed and was in the written plan that was approved that that would be the maximum number that I could spare. There might be a situation where I would have to hold onto a few; that when that was done they were to be placed absolutely under the control of the Navy. They operated with Patwing 2. The Army gave them missions. They received their orders from Patwing 2, they re-

their reports to Patwing 2, and the thing happened automatically. We went into a maneuver, and it was provided that in case of an attack—we had started out with the idea that there would be a request. We found in our maneuvers—we were carrying on weekly exercises—that that was too slow, so we made it automatic: in case anything happened the Commander of the Army bombers reported immediately to Admiral Bellinger, who had Patwing 2, and was under his orders. There was a provision in this that at any time when there wasn't a maneuver, there wasn't an attack, there hadn't been an emergency agreed upon, that the Navy did not have sufficient force of long-range reconnaissance planes, that they could call upon the Army and that we would furnish strength according to what we had. That had been definitely agreed upon.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

* * * * *

Page 291, line 24, after "air" add "plan".

* * * * *

/s/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

On the other hand, if there was any air action—defensive air action—over the Islands, then their fighters that could be made available, like the marine fighters that were stationed at Ewa Field and any carrier fighters that happened to be off their carrier and ashore, were to immediately pass to the control of the Army so that there would be a unified control of the fighters under the Army for fighting immediately over [293] the Islands, and control by the Navy for distant reconnaissance. There was another provision that in case it was necessary to have fighter escorts for the bombers in attacking enemy vessels, that those fighter escorts would also pass to the control of the Navy. If they were going to make an attack on naval enemy vessels and called upon us for escorts, they passed to their command. We didn't hold any strings on them at all; we turned them over to them.

Now, these things had been maneuvered. We had at least one air exercise a week with the Navy from March on, so that it had been worked out until it functioned quite smoothly. That method had been followed from March 21st and was in effect on December 7th, and as far as I know it is still in effect. It may have been changed; I don't know.

On the 28th of November I received a message from the War Department that I would like to read: 482. I notice this is 482. Their one of the 27th was 472.

(Message, November 28, 1941, from Adjutant General to Lt. Gen. Short, is as follows:)

Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Depart-

ment (see paragraph 3 MID SC thirty dash forty five) stop. Also desired you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishment comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda protection of all activities against espionage stop. [294] This does not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop. Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoid unnecessary publicity and alarm.

They are still wanting to do nothing, apparently, to alarm Japanese public in Hawaii.

To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions.

Now, my wire in answer to 472 had been sent fairly early in the afternoon of the 27th. This was dated the 28th. There was no doubt in my mind but what they had my wire before this was sent. Apparently they didn't take the trouble to check up and see that the wire was answering theirs—my radio—from what General Gifford stated in his testimony.

Now, when I got that, I prepared, in connection with General Gifford's answer to the War Department. It just happened that we thought of these things months before and were able to answer them completely.

This was sent on the 28th:

(Message, November 28, 1941, from Lt. Gen. Short to Adjutant General, is as follows:)

Re your radiogram four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautionary being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department—

and giving the number of those paragraphs

and military establishments including personnel and [295] equipment stop As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants, telephone exchanges and highway bridges at this headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the Organic Act which provides comma in comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection and so forth stop. Further, the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand of this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed at vital installations and structures in the Territory stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded at vital installations stop In this connection comma at the instigation of headquarters the City and County of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding General Hawaii Department to close or restrict the use of and travel upon any highway within the City and County of Honolulu wherever the Commanding General deems action necessary in the interest of national [296] defense. The authority thus given has not been exercised. Relations with F B I and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters.

Now, they had stressed that we were not authorized, in view of their wire, to take any illegal measures, and I was being careful to show them that we were taking all the measures they wanted and that we were absolutely within our legal rights, because we

thought back ahead as far back as June and arranged it. For the last two years there had been a very considerable amount of the time that the Army had had guards over bridges and water works, electric light plants, and so forth, and there was a possibility that some sentry would shoot someone and he would have no defense. That had prompted me to get this legal authority from the Governor, so the Army would be fully protected. We would be within our legal rights. And our relations with the Governor and with the Mayor were such that we were able to accomplish this and to have them feel that it was the thing to do. So we were able to answer the War Department's message and state that we were wholly protected legally in doing the things that we were doing.

And you notice in that message that it is all sabotage and subversive activities and espionage; and, as I say, that message was sent after my message should have been received, and undoubtedly after my message was received. There was no doubt in my mind that they were fully cognizant of my report of action taken when they sent this message.

Now, to make it even stronger, you notice in this message [297] they said they were sending identical messages to the air stations direct, because they apparently wanted to be sure these measures were put into effect at once. In other words, sabotage was terrifically important to them.

General Martin got such a message from General Arnold, and he answered even in more detail than I have, telling them exactly what they were doing on all airfields. So they had answers from me and from General Martin showing exactly what we were doing, in great detail, and if they didn't know what we were doing it was simply because they didn't read our messages. The information was definitely there.

Now, in addition to prescribing this Alert No. 1, I prescribed that the Aircraft Warning Service would work definitely, as such, from 4 o'clock in the morning—from two hours before dawn to one hour after dawn, which was practically from 4 to 7. This service was very new. Along probably early in November we had received the mobile sets. There was no fixed station that was in operation.

I might go into a little explanation there. The original plan as drawn up provided for three fixed stations at very great altitude in all cases: one at Kaala on the Island of Oahu, about the highest point we could put it; one at Haleakala on the Island of Maui, about 10,000 feet high; and one at Kohee on the Island of Kauai, which was very new. This increased the range of the stations very greatly, but it also increased the difficulty of erection, because for the one at Kaala all material had to be drawn by cable. We could not start any construction at all until we got a cable that could be used to [298] draw the material to the top of the mountain.

As I say, none of these fixed stations was in operation. We had gotten, along in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we got them we started using them right away; and when this message of the 27th came along, I prescribed that the Aircraft Warning Service would function those hours. In addition to that, they had their normal training. They trained then from 7 to 11, and they had maintenance work, work of that kind, from 12 to 4.

Now, it turned out that we were putting a little bit too great strain on this materiel, and later in the afternoon period we had three stations working from 11 to 1, and three working from 1 to 11 so that there was a little more chance for maintenance work keeping them in shape. But that was the situation, and the Intercept Command was working with them. We were trying to coordinate the Intercept Command and the Aircraft Warning Service and using this training period as an opportunity to give them a taste at what we considered the most dangerous time of the day. Navy had a liaison officer functioning with this outfit.

I want to take up the question of conferences with the Navy. There have been at times certain allegations that the Army and Navy didn't get together, didn't talk things over. You might think some of the statements that we were almost utter strangers to each other that was far from the fact. As a matter of fact, Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch and I were on extremely friendly terms personally and as well as having very frequent conferences officially. I think that Admiral Kimmel [299] and I played golf together an average of every other Sunday morning, and very frequently the Sunday mornings we didn't play golf he dropped on my quarters; so that we really were in very close personal touch as well as officially.

On the 27th of November, the day this message came in, we had a conference for probably three hours that morning on the question of the reinforcement of the garrisons at Midway and Wake and a squadron of Army pursuit planes. That was at the conference which I told you a while ago that the Navy staff stated that they considered that there was practically no possibility of surprise attack on Hawaii. I would like to have you bear in mind that that was within three or four hours before I received this message from the War Department on the 27th, I had a very recent opinion from the Navy that they did not consider such attack probable. They had sources of information that I didn't have. With their task forces and their distant reconnaissance they had ways of obtaining information that I didn't have. There was every reason why I should accept their opinion as of value.

7. General FRANK. I did not quite understand what you said about information that the Navy had that you didn't have.

General SHORT. They had sources of information. They got continual information from the Navy Department as to location of Japanese ships. They had their task forces out constantly several hundred miles out from Honolulu, and spreading out with their aerial reconnaissance from the carrier. In other words, if there were Japanese ships roaming around the ocean there, they had a chance to pick them up, know they were there. If they didn't—couldn't find them, they at least could be [300] expected, I thought, to have information of their presence, and I was sure they would tell me if they had any such information. Now, I had no sources of information comparable to that, and it was a natural thing that I should accept the opinion of the Navy on that particular subject.

[301] It seemed to be the best informed opinion that there was in the vicinity. There did not seem to be a divided opinion. So far as I could figure, the Staff of Admiral Kimmel accepted Captain McMorris's statement as their own comments.

8. General GRUNERT. When you get to a stopping point, at the end of any particular subject, we will have a short recess.

General SHORT. Let me take just about two minutes, and I will be there, I think.

Now, that was on the 27th of November. On the 1st, he and I both received radiograms, from the Navy and War Departments, relative to the possible relief of the Marines on Wake Island and Midway, so that they could be made available for landing parties; and we were called upon for our opinion. We had a long conference on the 1st. On the 2nd, he came, I think it was, to my quarters, with an 8-page letter that he had prepared, to the Navy Department, setting forth his views on that. We were both fully of the opinion that the relief should not take place until certain work was completed on the airfields at Wake and Midway. The civilian construction and the labor condition was quite complicated, the water proposition was very difficult at both places, and we both felt that it would be an advantage if they could delay their relief until that construction work was completed.

He brought this long letter, to the Navy Department, setting forth his views, to my quarters, as I remember, and read it to me, and we went over it; and I was in full accord with his views on the subject.

On the 3rd, we had another conference at his headquarters. [302] After reading his letter, I had prepared my radiogram to the War Department, setting forth my views, which I say were practically in full accord with his on that, and we went over my radiogram and the radiogram he prepared for the Navy Department. There was one difference of opinion, there. He wanted definite unity of command on the outlying islands for the Navy, and I felt we should have the same type of command that we had on Hawaii, which was command by cooperation. I felt that as long as we had command by cooperation on Hawaii, it should extend to the subject garrisons; that if we wanted a unity of command on Hawaii, then naturally we would go to unity of command on the outlying islands. Each one of us stated his views on that subject fully to his own Department, so that there was no hard feeling about it. It was a perfectly cordial personal relation, and each one felt the other fellow should present his own views to the other Department, where there was a difference of opinion.

That went in on the 2nd. We also had orders to relieve the Navy garrison at Canton Island. They did not have much, and we had conferences that covered that to some extent, that morning, and then on the next day, Major Fleming, who was acting as my liaison with the Navy on all the matters with regard to the relief of the various garrisons on the islands, had a conference with Colonel Phyphffer, of the Marine Corps, with reference to procuring 5-inch Marine antiaircraft guns, because the Army had none, and we thought, in shoving the outposts out as far as Canton, with a small garrison, it was important to have the best antiaircraft we could have.

I covered these conferences, because it shows you very [303] definitely that our conferences were not infrequent, and that during this period of stress we were in almost daily conference, where, if at any time the Navy had had any piece of information about carriers, their presence, or that they could not be accounted for, I was sure that they would have told me.

During this period, the 27th to the 6th of December, they made no request for Army planes for long-distance reconnaissance, so I was

convinced that they either knew where the Japanese carriers were had enough information that they were not uneasy, and with the forces that I knew they had out, that they felt they could handle situation. I did not know in an official manner ordinarily when we were sending out task forces, but I usually knew informally; and I knew at that time they were preparing to send some new task force out in the next two or three days; and I had gotten permission to send one of my assistant G-3's with the task force going to Johnston Island because the Marines were going to carry out a landing exercise, and particularly wanted our G-3 Section to observe exactly how it was done; so I did know that the Navy had out one task force, and was sending out two more; and I knew the approximate places they were going, so I had a good deal of personal information on what the reconnaissance could cover.

I think we can take a break, right there.

(Brief recess.)

9. General GRUNERT. All right. The Board will proceed.

General SHORT. Shall I go ahead with my talk?

10. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

General SHORT. There were two incidents that happened prior to the attack, that convinced me fully that the War Department [304] had no feeling that there was danger of Japanese air attack on Honolulu. On December 5, a B-24 arrived from the mainland. It came in with one .30-caliber gun and two .50-caliber guns in the tail. That is all the equipment it had, and it had no ammunition; but in spite of the fact that it came in that way, we had very specific instructions from the War Department as to how it was to be equipped and it left Honolulu to fly over and photograph Truk and Jaluit.

I will read you that message in a little while. This indicates to me, the way it came in and the way it was ordered to go out, that the War Department felt that there was no danger of an air attack on Honolulu, or between Honolulu and San Francisco, that the plane was safe, could be sent without ammunition, and that it was a great hazard to carry that weight in ammunition than it was to take a chance of meeting the Japs without any ability to return their fire; but I did feel that when you hit the Mandate islands there was a real possibility of their being attacked from those land bases out there, and I gave positive instructions that they should be in shape to return attack and not take a chance of being brought down without being able to fight back.

Now, I would like to read a message:

Reference two B dash twenty four airplanes for special photo mission should be desired that the pilots be instructed to photograph Truk Island in the Carol Group Jaluit in the Marshall group stop visual reconnaissance should be desired simultaneously stop information desired as to the number and location of Japanese vessels including submarines comma airfields comma aircraft comma guns comma barracks and camps stop Pilots should be warned islands stop fortified and manned stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity Avoid Orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed stop Insure crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self-preservation stop The two pilots and co-pilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B dash twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philippines by way of route photographing Ponape while en route Moresby stop Advise pilots best

of day for photographing Truk and Jaluit stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief of Naval Operations comma and the War Department stop Insure that both B dash twenty four airplanes be fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu

In other words, they show beyond any question that they considered it important to have them armed when they leave Honolulu and that they did not consider it important to have them armed up to Honolulu.

Along that same line, for two months, when we had been flying planes, B-17's, to the Philippines, without any instructions from the War Department, I had personally seen that ships were armed, that everything was in readiness for [306] self-defense, and I had personally instructed the leader of the group out there that he was to take no chances of being shot down by the Japs; if they approached him, and acted suspiciously, that he must not wait to let them get in the first shot, he was to protect himself. That had been going on for a couple of months, beyond Honolulu.

Now, when that wire was received, the planes were examined. We found that we could by robbing B-17's get the guns to equip this B-24, and that we had the ammunition, without any trouble; but we did not have the adapters, and General Martin, commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a wire to the Chief of Air Corps, which was sent over his signature and mine, both, stating, requesting that the second B-24 bring the equipment for the first, that had been left behind, and that we were holding the first B-24 there until it was properly equipped before starting on its mission. It was there at the time of the attack, in a hangar, awaiting to be equipped, and it was destroyed. The other B-24 didn't get in.

Now, that message, at least part of it, here, is of interest :

Strongly recommend—

This was after we had told them what wasn't there in the way of equipment—

Strongly recommend that second B-24 bring necessary equipment from mainland for installation on both planes prior to departure from Hickam Field stop Plane being held here until satisfactorily armed stop Subject plane has no armorplate installation stop except for removal of passenger seats plane equipped as for ferry service North [307] Atlantic

We pointed out to them at that time the way they were sending the planes in.

The other incident which showed that up to the last minute the War Department considered that there was no danger whatever of attack between Honolulu and San Francisco was the fact that on the night of the 6th, 9:30 p. m., San Francisco time, 12:30 a. m. Eastern Standard Time, and 10:30 San Francisco time, or 1:30 a. m., on the 7th, on Eastern Standard Time, two groups of planes left Hamilton Field, six in each group, for the Philippine Islands. Those planes, when they came in, they came in during the first attack. They all arrived between 8 and 8:20. The first plane I think hit the landing mat about five minutes after eight, and the pilot was killed as they hit the landing mat. Four out of the eight planes—out of the 12—four of the 12 were destroyed. Those planes had no ammunition. The guns were all cosmolined. The guns had never been bore-sighted. If they could have shot anything, they couldn't count on hitting anything. They had skeleton crews consisting of a pilot and a co-pilot, navigator, en-

gineer, and a radioman, so if they had had their guns all complete their ammunition, they didn't have the crews to defend themselves this ceased to be a theory, it wasn't an academic question, because came in right in the midst of the first Japanese attack, and they were unable to fire a shot, unable to defend themselves. The first tried to land. Of course, they knew nothing of what was going on because there hadn't been time to get anything to them. The first tried to land at Hickam Field, and they landed pretty [308] around Oahu, anywhere they could. Some landed at Bellows Field. I think there were at least four or five that landed at outlying fields. They didn't have enough gas to go to outlying islands, but it is perfectly evident to me that if the War Department expected an attack on the 7th of December, they wouldn't have started planes out of Hamilton field in that condition. It says to me very definitely that their estimate was exactly the same as mine, that they were not expecting an air attack on Honolulu, or there wouldn't be any example in the world for anybody authorizing planes to come in that condition. They felt that the hazard of carrying the extra weight in ammunition was greater than the hazard of a possible attack by Japan. It turned out they were wrong. It meant very definitely, to me, that the War Department did not expect an attack that morning.

I would like to point out also that from November 28 up to December 7 I had not had one single word from the War Department on this situation. If there was any crisis in the situation, they had completely failed to inform me of it. If they thought there was a crisis, I felt that I would be informed, if there was any crisis in the situation at all, but there had been nothing for that period.

Now, apparently some time after those planes had left Hamilton Field in that condition, the War Department must have gotten some information that alarmed them, or that they felt that they ought to get to me as early as possible, and the Chief of Staff filed a message at 12:18 p. m., Washington time, December 7. That was 6:48 a. m. Honolulu time.

[309] General SHORT. Here is the message:

(Message of December 7, 1941, to Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H., Signed "Marshall", is as follows:)

Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard Time today—

That would be 5½ hours earlier in Honolulu—

what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their machine immediately stop. Just what significance the hour set may have, we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop. Inform Naval authorities of this communication.

As I say, that was filed at 12:18. It was sent by commercial radio via the R. C. A. I did not know at that time why it was sent commercially. However, early that morning our radio had great difficulty keeping communication through the War Department radio. Our set was a 10 k. g. set, not powerful like the Navy's or the R. C. A.'s; and the conditions that I have seen in the Roberts report since indicate that the message was sent via R. C. A. because the War Department felt that it could be gotten through on the War Department radio. It arrived in Honolulu at 7:33 a. m., December 7, Honolulu time. Just what happened right at that time, I am not sure, but the attack started.

within 22 minutes after, and it looks like what probably happened was that they did not get under way on the delivery until the attack struck, and they waited until the most serious part of the bombardment, practically all of it was over, and delivered the message to the Signal Office at 11:45 a. m. The attack had taken place at 7:55 a. m. The message was decoded and [310] delivered to the Adjutant General at 2:58 p. m., 7 hours and 3 minutes after the attack when we got this important piece of information. We had a scrambled phone that, ordinarily, you could get through in ten or fifteen minutes. It looks reasonable that they thought, even then, that if there was going to be a hostile attack, they would have tried to get it to us by more than one means of communication. General Marshall stated that the reason he did not telephone was that it took some time, that he had called the Philippines before he called Hawaii, and there was possibility of a leak which would embarrass the State Department. In other words, I think there was a feeling still at that time that secrecy was more important than the time element in getting the information to us as rapidly as possible. Whatever the reason was, we got that information seven hours after the attack. So it meant that at the time we were attacked we had no information from the War Department since November 28th. If they had used the scrambled phone and gotten it through in ten or fifteen minutes we would probably have gotten more of the import and a clearer-cut idea of the danger, from that message, and we would have had time to warm up the planes and get them in the air to meet any attack.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

* * * * *

Page 310, line 9, change "had" to "would have".

* * * * *

/s/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,

Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

* * * * *

Page 310, line 17, change "scrambled" to "scrambler".

* * * * *

/s/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,

Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

There were two things that took place that morning in addition to not getting the message to us that might have worked out to very great advantage if they had been handled differently.

A two-man submarine got into Pearl Harbor. I think it probably was about 6:45 when we first got the first indication of it, and I think it was entered as about 7:12, or something [311] that, when the report was made; but at approximately 7:15 I could have reported to me that there had been a submarine attack. That would, under the conditions, have indicated to me that there was danger. The Navy did not visualize it as anything but a submarine attack. They considered that and sabotage their greatest danger and it was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed to notify me; that he could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely wrong, but that at the time the urgent necessity of getting the information to me had not—at any rate, I did not get the information until after the attack.

The other thing was that at 7:20—there had been an agreement between the part of the control officers of the Navy and Aircraft War Service Command and not to go through the training period on Sunday morning. They normally worked from 7 o'clock on to 4 as a training proposition, but they had agreed that they would not work that morning. However, Lieutenant Tyler, the officer in charge of the interceptor station, remained at the station, and the station continued to work for practice. They picked up a considerable number of planes, 132 miles out in a direction 3 degrees east of north. The observer did not know anything about any planes being out and got quite alarmed about it. He called the operator and got in contact with Lieutenant Tyler and the Lieutenant talked to them about it and got the report and made the decision that [312] it was not of any importance. He had three reasons for that. In the first place, he thought it might be a task force, because that happened all the time. They picked it up from the station. He thought possibly it was a bombing mission from Hickam that had gone out. In the third place, what made him very positive that it was only friendly planes was the fact that he knew that a flight of B-17s was coming in from the mainland that morning. It turned out that that flight actually came in just five minutes before those Japanese planes, and the direction from which they came in was just 3 degrees off of what the Japs came in. They came from straight north and the Japs came from 3 degrees east of north. So you can see that the Lieutenant had some grounds for feeling that it was a routine friendly plane mission. He had been listening to Hawaiian music from 4 o'clock on, which practically always meant that they were bringing in a group of planes from the States, because they had a beam there and they used that for orientation, and he felt they were about due. They actually came in just five minutes later. If he had alerted the Interceptor Command there would have been time, if the pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes. There would not have been time to get them in the air. You could not have warmed them up and gotten them into the air on time, but there would have been greater—

11. General FRANK. You say the loss would have been greater.

General SHORT. The loss would have been very greatly lessened.

12. General GRUNERT. We want the record clear. You mean the loss would have been greatly lessened? You said "greater."

[313] General SHORT. I ment to say, it would have made a great difference. What you have said is much better. It would have made a great difference in the loss. It probably would not have protected the battleships; it probably would not have protected the Hawaiian depot, because they would not have had time to get the planes in the air. But, on the other hand, our aircraft would have been more instantly ready for action. It would have been a question of split-seconds instead of minutes in getting into action.

When the attack took place at 7:55 on December 7th I was in my quarters. When I heard the first bomb explode I thought that the Navy was probably carrying out some exercises that either they had not told us about or that I had forgotten about. When the second explosion took place I was out on my back porch where I could get a look at Pearl Harbor, and I saw smoke rising, and I came to the conclusion that something was seriously wrong. The Chief of Staff, who lived next door, ran in the front door and called to me and said, "It is the real thing. We have just had a message from Hickam Field". That was probably two or three minutes after 8 when he came in and notified me. By 8:10 all major echelon commanders had been told to go into Alert No. 3, and everything was under way. The first plane of the enemy, I think, was brought down at five minutes after 8. So you can get an idea of the length of time it took to get into action. The antiaircraft had skeleton crews at all of their guns. They acted as crews to protect from sabotage, but there were enough men to fire the guns. They had the small arms ammunition at the guns. At the 3-inch guns they had ammunition very immediately accessible, sir, probably 55 yards, for all but four batteries. There were four batteries in posi- [314] tion, but there was no place for storing ammunition except right out in the open; and when the alert went on, that did not look like the thing to do, so they did not have those guns working. The first 3-inch guns to get into action went into action at 8:15, and between 8:15 and 10 they were all put in readiness for action. Those last four batteries that did not have the ammunition drew it at 8:15, and the last one finished up at 10 a. m.

There is an exhibit here that shows when every battery was alerted, when it went into action; and the time that they went into action naturally varied, with whether or not they had a target. Some of them did not get targets until later in the morning, but they were ready to act and were alerted at the times given.

We had that morning the following planes: We had pursuit planes in commission, 80; pursuit planes out of commission, 69. They were in various stages of repair. Some may have been slightly out of commission, and so forth. But those that were actually available were put into the air at that time.

We had six reconnaissance planes in commission and seven out of commission. We had 39 bombers in commission and 33 out. Of those bombers the only ones available for a real mission were the six Flying Fortresses that were in commission, and the A-20's. I guess you

would consider those bombers, General Frank. We had a total A-20's in commission and one out of commission. Then there the old B-18's that were not of any very great value.

To show what took place between then and the 20th, we had our repair facilities, in spite of the very great damage done to Hawaiian Air Depot, and within two or three days we were repairing more planes than we were before, because they worked 24 hours a day.

Immediately following the bombing it looked like the machine was almost a total wreck. As a matter of fact, we salvaged between 80 and 85 per cent of the machines, so that we were able to get our repair facilities going very well. We had a new building that apparently the Japs had not identified as a repair shop, and we had got all of the new machinery probably within the week before, and we had not installed it yet. It was in the new building, not installed in the old building, which they undoubtedly had spotted, was entirely demolished, and it looked like our machinery was all shot, but we were able to move about 80 per cent within the new building, and in a period of 24 hours we were getting along very well and the result was on the 20th of December we had 61 pursuit planes actually in commission and we had 22 that could be repaired. It might take a few days on some and a day on others.

As to reconnaissance planes, we had six in commission and that could be repaired locally.

Of bombers we had 50 in commission and 13 could be repaired locally.

However, there had been 29 bombers received from the mainland. It was very unfortunate that of the B-17's, four that came in from the States were destroyed, and there were only two that were salvageable out of our six that were in commission, so that we lost six B-17's, and for some reason the A-20's escaped untouched. Apparently they were not conspicuous. So the greater part of our force was the old B-18's which we could afford better than anything else and we were able in a few days to carry on our missions very

[316] As to what took place with the infantry outfits, as they got the message for Alert No. 3 they turned out. The 25th Division turned out at 8:10 and returned the fire of the enemy planes, and at 8:30 they were moving out to their battle positions. The 24th Division was also moving out to their battle positions at 8:30. By 4 o'clock the 24th Division were all in battle positions and the 25th by 5 o'clock. They had to move pretty much all over the island. We also had a plan for the movement of troops to various positions in case of attack with a minimum of 200 yards between vehicles, because we did not want to take a chance of having a loss of vehicles and having enormous losses from air attack. So, moving in that kind of formation naturally took longer. But the enemy was not drawn fire, and we had both divisions complete by 5 o'clock in the afternoon. The harbor troops had their ammunition immediately at hand and the antiaircraft had theirs very early.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

* * * * *

Page 316, line 14, before word "fire" insert "one day's".

* * * * *

/s/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,

Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

The civilian elements that we had been training worked extremely well. We had 16 surgical teams that we had organized among the doctors on the Island. The first one of these teams reported to the hospital at 9 o'clock. They made it an hour and five minutes. We had 20 first-aid stations that were organized, with ambulances and so forth. At 12 o'clock noon they started evacuating the women and children from Hickam and Wheeler Fields and the harbor defense positions that were in immediate danger, according to the plans that had been drawn up, and they were located in school buildings at Shafter, and the ordnance depot went into two underground rooms that were being constructed at Shafter, one of which was for cold storage, which was about finished, and those people were put in there temporarily. The others went to schools, and all arrange- [317] ments were made to set up cafeterias and issue blankets; and we got them out of what looked like danger spots and sent them up to these localities for two or three days, depending on how many slit trenches were completed, and then they were allowed to return, and the slit trenches were immediately available to their quarters so they could get into them.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

* * * * *

Page 316, line 26,—after word "building" insert "period".

* * * * *

/s/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,

Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

As soon as the attack took place G-2 and the F. B. I. started rounding up enemy agents that they had listed. They had two lists, one of people that were to be arrested immediately and thrown into a concentration camp, and the other a list of those to be held under observation.

Of those who were supposed to be thrown into concentration camp that afternoon they had arrested all but four, four that they did not find, and they got them the next day. They actually rounded up and put over on Sand Island 370 Jap agents, 98 German agents, and 14 Italians.

Almost before the first attack was finished the 804th Engine which was a battalion of aviation engineers, started clearing the field at Wheeler and Hickam, and the air men started pulling their planes and getting them together as rapidly as they could, and by 7:50 all pursuit that was in condition to get into the air was put into the air. This pursuit actually brought down 10 Japanese planes. One brought down four, one brought down two, and the others were individual planes.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, 194

Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

* * * * *

Page 317, line 21,—change "7:50" to "8:50".

* * * * *

s

/s/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retiree

I have in this report an exhibit showing exactly what battleships brought down enemy planes and what the Air Corps brought down. It shows 38. G-2 thought there was a possibility of 9 duplicates. The Army brought down somewhere between 29 and 38 planes. It might have been 29; it might have been 38; [318] it might have been anything in between, because there was a number of planes brought down; and G-2 sifted the thing as carefully as possible and came to the conclusion that 29 was the minimum and 38 was the maximum of planes brought down.

The enemy planes were estimated to be somewhere between 160 and 180. In other words, we brought down somewhere between 15 and 20 per cent of the enemy planes, which I believe was a very good average in any place in the world. That percentage has not been exceeded very often, in spite of the fact that we were not installing expecting fire attack. I think that the number of planes brought down by aircraft and antiaircraft fire is something that we need to be ashamed of. If we had known they were coming we probably would have gotten a greater percentage; but we might not get more because it happens frequently that when flying over Europe they come back with less than 3 or 5 per cent loss.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, 194

Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

* * * * *

Page 318, line 10, change "fire" to "air".

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retiree

I got in touch with the Governor on the afternoon of the 7th and had a conference with him as to whether or not he should decide

martial law, and after talking it over from all angles he and I decided that we should delay martial law to give him a chance to put into effect the M-Day Bill. There were some features of the M-Day Bill—I will say that is the mobilization day bill that gave the governor the authority to create auxiliary police, home guards, auxiliary firemen and organize them, and all kinds of things. Some of those things had not been fully implemented. The Home Guards had not been called out. We felt that if we put martial law into effect immediately there was some question whether he could call them out, but delaying martial law until the next day would let him as the civil governor go ahead and implement that bill, and we [319] would have a whole lot more to work with. So that was done. He put the basis of the M-Day Bill into effect on the 7th, and on the 8th he declared martial law and asked me to take over.

[320] When that was done, the courts were closed, civilian officials were asked to continue on their jobs, and an advisory committee composed of the Governor as the head of it was organized, and a military commission was organized, and provost court was established. The sale of liquor was prohibited. Those were the important steps.

Almost before the bombing was over, the District Engineers had a gang of civilian workmen down at Hickam Field repairing the water lines and sewer pipes that were broken during the bombing. By that night I think we had water service, which was most important because we had, as you know to have been a fact, the aqua system of our gasoline floating on the water, and it was very inconvenient to try to use it without the water system open.

On the 8th, the morning of the 8th, I directed the District Engineer, who had a large organization, to take over all engineering supplies on the Island and to order all contractors to report to him to work under him, and take over all labor. We centralized the labor and materials in the District Engineer because he had a large organization. We let the Navy have from that pool what they had to have, and we also distributed material from that pool to the Department Engineer.

The Department Engineer was given the mission of field fortifications and anything that was to be done with troop labor. The District Engineer took over chiefly the construction of new airfields. We had had projects under way, or we had been trying to get money; we didn't have them under way. We had the plans complete, and he started immediately on these new airfields all over the Island. We had constructed bunkers [321] for pursuit planes. We had not constructed bunkers for the bomber planes down at Hickam because the character of the soil was such there, we had to build up. We could not dig down, and we did not have the heavy machinery necessary for doing that. He brought in these contractors, and by noon of the 8th he was in full swing at Kahuku putting in a new field, putting in bunkers at Hickam, starting expanding the field at Haleiwa, putting in a new field at Kipapa, and putting a temporary field on the golf course at Schofield.

The Department Engineer on the 8th distributed his materials and started troops on the field fortifications, and on the 9th he started making slit trenches in the parks, near school buildings, and near all

places where many people worked throughout the city, so that would be air shelters as early as possible.

Up to the present time I have talked wholly of what was done immediately before the attack, practically from November 27th. I would like to talk about the steps that I took to improve the fortifications on the Hawaiian Islands and to prepare the command defense. I think that my work should be judged throughout the period that I was in command, from the 7th day of February when I was relieved on December 16th.

I got there on the 5th, took over from General Herron, who left on the 7th, and by the 19th I had made a pretty thorough inspection survey, and on the 19th I wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff outlining the things that I thought required immediate attention. I should like to go over some of those things.

[322] First, the question of the cooperation of the Navy in making more definite plans for our cooperation, like we did on that point. That was consummated by March 21st. That was something we could take care of very readily without money.

I took up the question of dispersion of planes for their protection and putting the maintenance of the air underground. I took up the question of the anti-aircraft defense. The garrisons of the Coast Artillery were such that almost all organizations had a dual function: they had to man harbor defenses, and they had to man anti-aircraft defense. In other words, if they had an attack from the sea and the air at the same time, one of the two sets of equipment just could not be manning. and we felt that there should be enough troops there so that it would be possible to have at least one relief for both weapons.

There were certain things about the harbor defenses that appeared to be needed to be attended to. There was no protection for the gun crews at the harbor defenses, and that was gone into. The searchlights had a lot of old searchlights that were not modern, and that had to be taken up.

There had been relatively little done on roads and trails for the movement of reserves, and the Island is small enough that with suitable roads and trails we could move reserves very rapidly to any point. For instance, we completed one, changed one trail to a motor trail where it had taken two hours and twenty minutes to move our reserves over the trail on foot, and after we had completed the trail we could move our reserves and occupy the points where the reserve was stationed within twenty minutes. That shows the question of the time element that was [323] important.

There had been no bombproofs or shelters for the various command posts except for the headquarters of the Department. It was felt that under present conditions it was not reasonable, where you could find out where your command posts would be, not to give them protection. That was the command post and the communications.

Now, this letter was written to the Chief of Staff, and then as we had the estimates and the detail plans together they were sent in to the War Department. On September 10 we sent in complete plans for putting the maintenance for aircraft underground. Those came back on October 27 disapproved, stating that the amount of money involved, which was between three and four million dollars, was too great, and that they would not approve putting the maintenance underground.

I point out in this letter to them that the maintenance shop at Hickam Field stood up like a sore thumb: you could see it for ten or fifteen miles out, and that if we ever had an air attack it would be one of the first buildings to go, and which was very definitely proved to be true, and the maintenance was moved out soon after the attack. They started construction out in the gulches, ravines, and distributed the maintenance so it was not all in one place, could not be all destroyed at one time.

The field fortifications had never been properly camouflaged, and we made a careful estimate and put in for funds. The scheme was approved, but the funds had not been allotted. They were not available, apparently, and had not been allotted on December 7.

[324] We asked for \$350,000 for roads and trails, and we got some of that and had done quite a bit of work on roads and trails for moving reserves before the attack took place.

We had asked—we made a study and showed them that it was necessary to have 180 B-17's for a proper reconnaissance in case the Navy was ever pulled out, and a correspondingly large number of pursuit planes. It was perfectly apparent that we could not accommodate those planes on the airfield we had, and we put in for authority to build ten additional airfields, and those fields were located: we were putting bombers on the outlying islands, making provisions for them so in case of an alarm we could move the bombers off of Hickam, disperse them to the outlying islands where we should not have so great losses. We were figuring on putting in fields at Barking Sands on Kauai, Burns Field on Kauai, Homestead Field on Molokai, Hilo and Morse Field on the Island of Hawaii, improve Bellows Field on Oahu, improve Haleiwa Field on Oahu, build a new field on the Island of Lanai, and a field at Parker's Ranch on the Island of Oahu. We asked for a field at Kipapa on the Island of Oahu, but the War Department disapproved that and directed us to prepare plans for a field at Kahuku. Those fields were all approved, but the funds had not been allotted, but we were able to go ahead and do a lot without funds.

The District Engineer worked very closely with the W. P. A., and we put up barracks on most of the outlying islands with W. P. A. money, some civilian labor, and some soldier labor, but we got them up and got started and were pretty well under way before we got any money from the War Department. We did not do anything until the plans had been approved, but when the plan [325] was approved we went ahead as far as we could go with W. P. A. funds and had quite a good start in that way.

There was another subject: that Kaneohe Bay had been quite highly developed by the Navy. Originally there had not been enough of a channel there for any of the boats to come in, so it was not any more dangerous than the rest of the east side of the Island, and they had dredged out Kaneohe Bay so that light cruisers could come in, and destroyers, without any difficulty. In other words, they had opened our back door just absolutely wide to an enemy.

Now, when that was first started the War Department or the Commander there, I am not sure which, stated that he did not raise any objection to this development, but he could not garrison it, could not defend it. Well, when I saw what the situation was, I decided that having guards at your front door and leaving the back door wide

open didn't offer very much protection, and I told the Navy I take over the responsibility, and immediately notified the War Department of the situation, and they agreed to it, that the Army would have to take over the defense of Kaneohe Bay because the Island wide open otherwise, as it was not included in war gas at all. War garrison at that time was set at 59,000, and we asked an increase in the war garrison to 71,500 to take care of Kaneohe and certain increases in the air. We had asked for increases Engineers for aviation purposes, and general service regiment building roads and trails. We had gotten our increases allowed Engineers. We had been told that the increases for the air would be allowed until limitation on the 59,000 war garrison was [326] So we were turned down on a number of things on the that they could not go beyond the 59,000.

I considered the airfields and the aircraft, probably the aircraft warning service, the most important of all projects that we had Islands. The War Department originally had agreed to furnish materials so we could have those completed by June 30th, but things not coming along. I had almost weekly conferences with the District Engineer, who did all the aircraft warning work and all the liaison work; and Major Fleming, an engineer in my G-4 section, was liaison officer with the District Engineer and could give many of the details than I could, because he followed it. He was present in daily conference with the District Engineer and the civil office it became apparent that we were being slowed down terribly or and I sent a message that I would like to read, on the 10th of Here is a message I sent to the Adjutant General at that time:

(Message, June 10, 1941, LT. Gen. Short to Adjutant General follows:)

Division Engineer San Francisco has informed me that the priority contract W dash four one four Engineer seven eight four with Interstate Cement Corporation Elizabeth New Jersey is now A dash one dash G—

That means the priority number.

This contract is the one for furnishing all materials for cableway to Kaala aircraft warning station stop Motor and all electrical equipment sub contract General Electric stop Division Engineer states that [327] with this there is strong probability that delivery this electrical material to contract be delayed about fifteen weeks stop This Kaala station is the most important aircraft warning system and early completion of this cableway is essential

I want particularly to point out this last sentence:

I consider this aircraft warning service as the most important single in this Department stop Strongly recommended that the War Department all possible assistance to Chief of Engineers to have priority on this changed to A dash one dash B

Now, I got a wire back from the Adjutant General:

(Message, June 26, 1941, Adjutant General to Lt. Gen. Short follows:)

Re your radiogram three zero zero nine prior contract W dash four one four Engineers seven eight four Kaala aircraft warning station advanced to one C

We asked for 1-B.

Chief of Engineers will instruct Division Engineer on procedure should under this priority be unsatisfactory

Now, I wanted to point this out particularly because a committee of Congress, in investigating Colonel Wyman, stated that there had been no attempt by the Commanding General in Hawaii to speed up this contract. This is very plain what we had done, and the trouble as I had it at that time from the Chief of Engineers and from Major Fleming, who was my liaison, was the nonreceipt of material, and the priority system had [328] probably more to do with that than any one thing. This Kaala station, we couldn't do a thing toward the construction there until we got that cable because everything had to be pulled up to the top of the mountain by cable. It was so steep you couldn't get material of any weight up there any other way.

The priority proposition was very complicated. There was no one on the Island that was authorized to grant priorities. If a thing went in from the Government as a direct Government purchase, we could get the priority and get it through, but we were in the habit of buying a great deal of material locally for defense construction, and when those people ran out of supplies they could not replace them, and the only way they could get a replacement was to get us to get a priority for them. So you can see that it just slowed down all construction work if we had to wait for fifteen weeks for a priority to make the purchase, and then wait several weeks maybe for a priority to get it on the boat; and I asked them to establish an office of production management on the Island of Oahu that would handle that. They finally agreed to establish it, but it was never established during my time there. But I wanted to point that out as one of the serious difficulties in getting these air warning service stations constructed.

And the same way with all kinds of construction work. We finally got authority to build up a certain pool of lumber for the Quartermaster, no other articles but lumber. So that we were getting in additional troops, having to build barracks for new troops coming in. We were able to go ahead. The District [329] Engineer asked for a revolving fund of \$1,000,000 to enable him to have supplies on hand when he got projects approved and money allotted. This was never given him, but \$500,000 worth of material was purchased ahead of time from funds that the Chief of Engineers saw were going to be available, so the situation was remedied somewhat, but it was still very difficult at the time of the attack.

13. General GRUNERT. When you get to another place to pause, we shall have another recess.

General SHORT. All right. Right now.

14. General GRUNERT. Recess for five minutes, please.

(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.)

[330] General SHORT. The construction of the ferrying route by the southern route to Australia, was one of the important things that came up. On the fourth of October, we got a wire from the War Department, saying that they wanted the northern route closed, so they would not have to use Midway and Wake, when it was constructed, and they wanted it constructed "in weeks, and not years." That is the way it was put. That included Christmas Island, Canton Island, New Caledonia, Suva in the Fiji Islands, and Townsville, in Australia. Darwin was originally one of the places indicated, but that was then, I think, turned over to the Philippine Department. It was taken away from us.

There was no suitable places for landing grounded Army planes on these islands, so I got in touch with the Navy, made arrangements to get some large airplanes to take our engineers to these places, to make the survey, and waited, got no further instructions, sent two or three radios to the War Department. Apparently, we were all ready within a day or two, because Navy came through very nicely with everything we needed to take Air groups there to make reconnaissances, but I heard nothing from the War Department, and I wired them, and I wired them two or three times, and we finally got authority on the 11th of November to go ahead. Apparently it had been held up while the State Department threshed out with England the permission to go ahead and build on these islands, because we claimed Canton and Christmas, and they also claimed Canton and Christmas, and so as I say we were delayed from the 4th of October till the 11th of November, before we got authority to proceed.

Between the 11th of November and the 25th of December, we [331] completed the landing of crews, so we could get the B-17s through to Australia, and a flight of three planes actually made the trip on December 28. There were great difficulties involved.

We had to bring machinery in from the States, and a lot of workmen in, from the States. Honolulu had been pretty well stripped of all heavy machinery, which slowed it down, and we divided the thing, so the work at Christmas Island was done by our engineers, the work at Canton was to be done by civilians. We had to finish it with engineers, because when the attack struck we had only two small water stills down there, in the storage, a few thousands of gallons of fresh water. We had large stills on the way, on the transport, and the Navy turned that transport back. We couldn't leave civilians there without water, to be possibly captured by the Japanese, because we had about 55 soldiers as I remember with the detail, so we sent the HALEAKALA, a boat we got from the Inter-Island Shipping Company, and took them off, and left the engineer, left the Army detachment there to finish, a thing which they succeeded in doing. I do not mean to present the idea that these were fine, finished airfields. They were strips into the prevailing wind, landing strips made out of coral, and we hadn't had time to surface them, but we actually got them through. The engineers made arrangements at the Fiji Islands with the New Zealand Government to do the work there, and made arrangements on New Caledonia to have the Australian Government do the work, because they were in control, and they were very fortunate at Townsville, Australia, because they got there and found the Australians had just completed a strip 3,500 feet long, and were going to move.

[332] They got in there, Saturday afternoon, and they were starting to move the machinery away, Monday morning, and made a contract right then and there, and we got that finished up in very short order. The result was we actually were able to put that into commission and fly planes over it on December 28. I have a letter here—I won't take the trouble to read it to you—a letter from General Arnold, stating he thought we had done the job in unbelievably short time, and it turned out to be most necessary, because the other route was absolutely out. Without that route, we would have been in very serious difficulty.

I took up—and you will find supporting letters in here; you will find letters to the Adjutant General, in a very great number of cases—increases of certain types of troops. That is especially true for the Air Corps, for the Coast Artillery, so as to have at least one relief for all their weapons, and for the engineers. Also, I got authority to change the old square division to two triangular divisions, and we put that into effect. The outlying islands had never been garrisoned. I sent on my own responsibility a battalion of National Guard to the Island of Hawaii, one to Kauai, one to Molokai, and one to Maui. We later got the approval of the War Department for expanding those garrisons and putting some artillery there.

What we were trying to do was to have enough on these important islands to put down any uprising of the Japanese population, and to prevent any small force from landing without opposition. We changed. When I got there, I found that their war plan was a highly secret order. You probably remember Field Order No. 1, General Frank. It meant that the subordi- [333] ate officers couldn't possibly know what to do, because it was so secret it was kept from them, and we decided to get out a standing operating procedure and separate all the strictly secret stuff and keep it out, so that every man in the outfit would know exactly what his mission was. We thought out this standing operating procedure after we had department maneuvers in May, and both maneuvers convinced us that the old field order just was not workable on account of the secret business. We brought out the standing operating procedure in July, worked at it, revising it in November; finally, on November 5, we put it out in its final form, and we furnished ten copies to the Navy at that time, so that they would know what our general plan of defense was.

The situation was such that I felt the time had arrived for the civil community to take an active interest in the defense of the island. I was asked to talk before the Chamber of Commerce on Army Day, April 6, 1941. I decided that that was a good time to launch this, so I would have the maximum publicity, have practically all the important business men in the islands there to talk to, and get the maximum amount of publicity from the papers.

I put up the proposition to them that there were certain things that were absolutely essential from the point of view of the civil community; first, production and storage of food. Hawaii has never been self-supporting from the point of view of food. It is not that the land is not productive, but that there has been more money in growing the pineapple and sugar than in growing things to eat—vegetables. There had been some work done for some time on planning, as to what could be grown. [334] We got the plantation managers to agree to put in a certain number of things. One man would say he would try out so many acres of tomatoes; another one, so many acres of potatoes, and learn how to grow them in that climate and in that soil, and with the various bugs that attacked them. We carried on this work until we knew what we could do, and we had an estimate of the seeds required. We had an agreement from every big plantation owner in the Island that he would grow so many acres of such and such things, and we had a list of the light farm vehicles that would be needed in order to grow these things on the plantation.

That planning was done ahead of time. On the storage side, we thought that we should have a six-months supply on hand, there was relatively little storage space in Honolulu, and that we should get storage space constructed. Our estimates indicated that it would require about \$2,500,000 to increase the storage of food to a six-months supply, and about \$900,000 worth of feed for dairy cattle and poultry. We got the Governor to go after Mr. LaGuardia's Defense Committee, to try to get the funds on that. We didn't succeed, before December 7, but I think on December 17 that we got the funds that the Governor and Delegate King had been trying to get for us, so we had the thing under way, in that way.

The next thing I considered as of importance was the organization of the doctors and nurses. If they are not organized, in case of an emergency, they would probably be of very little help; and the Medical Association got squarely behind the project. They organized 16 surgical teams, 20 first-aid teams, and they had a considerable number of rehearsals and entered into [335] it very enthusiastically and it paid big dividends on December 7, because they turned out and functioned almost like trained outfits, as a result.

We felt that we needed an auxiliary police force to assist in guarding the utilities, bridges, and so forth, so that the soldiers could be relieved for real fighting, in an emergency. After we got the M Day bill through, these forces were organized, and they turned out and manned the defenses on two or three different occasions, and proved to be quite valuable. We also had additional fire organizations, volunteer fire organizations, organized with the idea that if we got a bad fire from bombing we would be able to supplement the fire organization very largely. We tried to get a lot of additional hose and some additional fire engines out of LaGuardia's Committee. We had not succeeded in getting them at the time of the attack.

We made plans. There are certain sections of Honolulu, especially adjacent to the water-front, where there is a storage of gasoline and oil and things of that kind that might start a terrific conflagration and that would certainly, if we ever go any shelling from a surface ship, it would certainly come in for its bombing, very likely too, from the air; and we drew a plan for the evacuation of all the women and children from those areas. We decided where we would locate camps to take care of them, and Colonel Lyman, the Department Engineer, drew up detail plans. After the M Day Bill was put into effect, on the 8th of December, the Governor was able to make funds available immediately, and we started the construction of those camps at once.

[336] There was a limited amount of trucks, surgical dressings, and so forth, in the Island. We had built up some reserves in the Army, we had available for the Army itself. We couldn't get from the War Department the funds that would be necessary to take care of the civil population in case that there were serious casualties that way. The Red Cross sent a representative out there. I had a good many conferences with him, and we persuaded them to establish a depot of \$200,000 worth of Red Cross supplies. They were able to do it by a subterfuge of calling it a depot for the Far East, on the theory that it would be used for any emergency anywhere in the Far East, but we got it established, and we had a very great percentage of those supplies actually in the depot when the attack took place, so that that was extremely valuable, in taking care of the wounded, at that time.

We had made plans, a complete survey, for establishing hospitals at various places, including St. Louis College, and we actually set up that hospital. We had started, the day before. We had gotten authority to lease the buildings, and we had started setting up that hospital the day before, and we had it in full operation on the day of the attack. The two men that were probably most largely responsible for all the medical preparation were Colonel King, now General King, who was the Department Surgeon, and Colonel Fronck, the Reserve officer who had been provided us by the Regular Army, who was a surgeon in Honolulu. They had great enthusiasm and very considerable knowledge, and they did marvelous things, as it turned out.

I felt that my work in preparation for the civil community [337] was really one of the important parts of my job, because we got things where they functioned on the day of the attack, that just couldn't have functioned if we hadn't made these studies. There were some things we didn't complete. We had started an inventory of all of the food supplies on the Island. We expected to get it taken at the end of December. The merchants had agreed to do this without any expense. We had the plans all made. In the end, we took that inventory from the 8th to the 10th of December. Beginning the morning of the day after the attack, we made that inventory. We were able to tell the War Department exactly what was on hand in the Island, and where we had expected to have, and hoped to have, a 60-days supply, we found there was only 37, so we got the War Department to agree to ship a certain tonnage on, of food supplies, every week, so as to take care of the population and build up a reserve.

Again the Army was all right, we had our six-months supplies, and I had got some additional cold-storage at Schofield and was building an underground storage at Shafter, which was completed within a week after the attack; so the Army, just for taking care of itself, there was no difficulty, but there was serious difficulty from the point of view of the civil population.

Now, at the expense of boring you, I would like to read to you a letter that the Governor wrote to me, unsolicited, as a result of that work. It shows the attitude that the civil community had towards me. It reads:

TERRITORY OF HAWAII,
Executive Chambers, Honolulu
[338] 23 December 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT
Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Having noted in the public press that an investigation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a statement as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on December 7, 1941.

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these Islands were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it has been only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941, that it has been brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it would play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was magnificently rewarded.

If may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations which bore fruit on December 7, 1941:

(1) The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act by a special session of Legislature called for that purpose.

[339] That is what we call the "M Day Bill."

This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of disaster. By virtue of this act, civilian defense was planned and many of its phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941.

(2) The production and conservation of food: Householders were persistently urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and storage for food reserve. This appropriation has, since December 7, 1941, been authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food crops. Agreements were also made for the growing, in normal times, of those crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives.

[340] (3) The medical facilities for the care of the injured and wounded during any disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thousand persons were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7, 1941.

(4) Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the preparation of shelters for workers in essential industries had reached a high state of perfection on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.

(5) An auxiliary police force to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. The work of this force was exceptional and excellent.

(6) Legislation authorizing a home guard was enacted at the special session of the Territorial legislature. It was well planned and so organized that [341] 1400 of such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving members of the Army for other military duty.

(7) There were many other matters too numerous to detail here which were planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public service in times of emergency.

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authorities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as a direct result of prior planning and training.

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil authorities. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demonstrated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory of Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory.

You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit.

Very sincerely yours,

(s) J. B. POINDEXTER,
Governor of Hawaii.

[342] I said that I felt that my work with the civil community was almost equally important with my work with the military as a preparation for defense; and I have here a much shorter letter that I would like to take your time to read. This letter is addressed to the President, from Honolulu.

(The letter from civilians of Honolulu to the President, dated December 22, 1941, is as follows:)

We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organizations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such a plan.

General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas to our "Territorial Legislature", to our local officials, and to our community in general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound "M-Day" Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the decision to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention of sabotage. He has shown a correct and sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians.

[343] He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts" from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing his troops and with plans, now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probable emergency.

We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned.

Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be.

This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short or any other official, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity or otherwise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in the adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation.

With very best respects and wishes, we are

Yours very truly,

The important part of this letter is the people who signed it.

The mayor of the City of Honolulu; the president of the Hawaiian Trust Company, Limited; the vice-president of Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.; the president of the Oahu Railway & Land Co.; the president of Lewers & Cook, Ltd.; Assistant Food Administrator, O. C. D.; the Governor of Hawaii; the chief justice of [344] the Supreme Court; the Director of Civilian Defense for Oahu; the President of Theo H. Davies & Co., Ltd.; Executive Vice-President, Bishop National of Hawaii and Honolulu; Executive Vice-President, Bishop Trust Co., Ltd.; Executive Vice-President, Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association; President, American Factors, Ltd.; Treasurer, American Factors, Ltd.; President, C. Brewer & Co., Ltd.; Trustee, Bernice P. Bishop Estate; Territorial Director of Civilian Defense; Manager, Merchandise Department, Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.

Those of you who know Honolulu know that that list represents pretty nearly all the important business organizations in Honolulu, and it means much more than the same number of names would mean

in any community in the United States. There is a closer organization over there. I read it as an indication of what the civil community thought of the work I had done.

That is all I have, except that I would like to present my conclusions and I would like to read them—a couple of pages—so as to give them rather exact instead of just speaking them, if that is satisfactory.

(The conclusions are as follows:)

1. The radiogram from the War Department through CINCUS Fleet of October 16th emphasized that measures taken by me during the grave situation of the Japanese negotiations should not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

The radiogram of November 27th reiterated that action should be carried out so as "not repeat not to disclose intent," not alarm civil population, and avoid unnecessary publicity.

[345] When the War Department was notified that the Hawaiian Department was alerted against sabotage it not only did not indicate that the command should be alerted against a hostile surface, sub-surface, ground or air attack, but replied emphasizing the necessity for protection against sabotage and subversive measures. This, taken in connection with the two previous radiograms mentioned, indicated to me a tacit consent to the alert against sabotage ordered by the Hawaiian Department.

I would like to interpose there that General Gerow's testimony before the Board showed that there had not been enough check made to even be aware that an answer had been received.

2. The Hawaiian Department is not provided with an agency for locating enemy ships in various parts of the world. Such information as it may acquire on this subject must be obtained from the Fourteenth Naval District or from the War Department.

The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" placed upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District the responsibility for distance reconnaissance. Annex #7 to the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" provides that when naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and army aircraft are made available, these will be under the tactical control of the naval command during search operations. That means that the army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the naval commander and carry out the search as he deems necessary in order to carry out his responsibility for distant reconnaissance.

[346] "During the period November 27th to December 6th, the Navy made no request for army planes to participate in distant reconnaissance. To me this meant that they had definite information of the location of enemy carriers or that the number unaccounted for was such that naval planes could make the necessary reconnaissance without assistance from the army. During this period I was in frequent conferences with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and at no time was anything said to indicate that they feared the possibility of an attack by the Japanese by air. In fact, the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff officer that there was no probability of such an attack. With a large part of the United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of information, I was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept any carrier attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such information from task forces or by reconnaissance as to make them aware of the presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and of the possibility of an air attack.

3. Action of the War Department on December 5th, and as late as 1:30 A. M., Eastern standard time, December 7th, in dispatching planes from the mainland to Honolulu without ammunition indicated that the War Department did not believe in the probability of an early Japanese attack upon Honolulu.

I might add there that General Marshall's testimony stated frankly that the attack was a surprise to him, and he felt that the greatest threat was in the Philippine Islands.

[347] I felt that I had a right to expect the War Department to furnish me by the most rapid means possible information should a real crisis arise in

Japanese relations. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the desire for secrecy would be considered more important than the element of time. Had the message in regard to the Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code machines been given me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time for encoding and decoding, etc., I, in all probability, would have had approximately two hours in which to make detailed preparations to meet an immediate attack.

4. I feel that my work in the Hawaiian Department should be judged by my activities throughout the complete period from the assumption of command on February 7th until my relief upon December 16th. I believe that any careful examination of my work during that period will prove that I have worked very seriously at the job and have accomplished measures of very considerable importance. I do not see how I could better have carried out what appeared to be the desires of the War Department unless I was supposed to know more than the War Department about the danger of Japanese attack and more than the Navy Department about the location of the Japanese carriers. To have taken more steps in preparation against a Japanese attack than I did would certainly have alarmed the civil population and caused publicity contrary to War Department instructions. I do not believe that I should be found guilty even of an error in judgment because I did not have the vision to foresee that the War Department would not notify me of a crisis in the least possible time [348] and that the Navy with its large fleet in Hawaiian waters would not be able to carry out its mission of intercepting Japanese carriers, or at least detecting their presence in Hawaiian waters and informing me of the fact.

That concludes my statement, General.

15. General GRUNERT. Do I understand that in addition to that verbal statement you have a written statement?

General SHORT. I want to submit this (exhibiting). It has everything that I have covered in it except my statement with reference to the statement of General Marshall and of General Gerow, and it has supporting documents, the letters to the War Department requesting funds, requesting increases of certain troops, and authority to build air fields, and so forth, and the action of the War Department; and it is indexed, so that I think the Board without any difficulty can find anything it wants.

16. General GRUNERT. We will take a recess at this time until 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12:18 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m.)

[349]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

17. General GRUNERT. The Board will please come to order.

I understand that there is a list of names submitted by General Short of witnesses who possibly have knowledge of the facts. I understood from his adviser, General Green, that they had no particular reason to call these witnesses except that they thought they knew of the facts; but if there are any particular facts that General Short would like to have the Board look after and bring out by calling these witnesses, or when these witnesses appear before the Board, then I suggest that after each one of those names they list the points that they would like to have the Board inquire into. The Board will probably do so anyway, but in that way we shall be sure to cover the ground with respect to which General Short thinks they have knowledge of facts.

General SHORT. I think in all cases but probably one that the job that they are indicated as holding would indicate pretty clearly what you indicated. Now, Fleming, I think I just showed, was Assistant G-4, but he was my liaison man with the District Engineer for all the

work that he did for us for the ferrying group, and to a considerable extent after General Hayes left the Department he was my liaison man there.

18. General GRUNERT. I think that the Board gathered that through your statement this morning and would naturally cover those points.

General SHORT. Yes.

19. General GRUNERT. But if you wish to give us a list of those points on which you suggest that the Board inquire into as far as that witness is concerned, I shall be glad to have [350] you give a report of that.

General SHORT. Yes. The others I think would just logically, from the jobs they had, inquire into the things that would be pertinent.

20. General GRUNERT. All right.

21. Colonel WEST. Do you swear that the contents of that file that you are about to introduce into evidence are true, to your best knowledge and belief, so help you God?

General SHORT. Yes.

22. General GRUNERT. That written statement will be made a part of the record.

23. General FRANK. Should it not be referred to as the exhibit so and so marked in such and such a manner?

24. Colonel WEST. I was simply trying to get away from making it an exhibit so that we would not have to make extra copies of it for every part of the record. I think if we can just incorporate it by reference in the record and say it was received and made a part of the file of the Board it would be preferable, sir.

General GREEN. How many copies are you going to have of the record?

25. Colonel WEST. Five.

General GREEN. We can furnish them five copies of them when we get them.

General SHORT. I can furnish that many.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

* * * * *
Page 350, line 25,—after word "can" insert "not".
* * * * *

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,

Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

26. Colonel WEST. Or we can make that an exhibit originally. I suggest, then, we mark this Exhibit 1.

General GREEN. You mark it and give it back. I have to use it.

[351] 27. Colonel WEST. This is the first official exhibit, then, Exhibit No. 1.

(Bound file of documents presented by General Short and sworn to by him was marked Exhibit 1 and received in evidence.)

28. General GRUNERT. All right; we shall proceed.

General Short's verbal statement has furnished answers to many of the questions the Board desired to propound. However, I shall proceed to open up the various topics on my agenda and review the questions I have on each such topic, changing some in the light of the knowledge gleaned, and adding others. Should I ask any that have been answered in the statement, the witness or members of the Board will please indicate that they have been so answered, so that we shall not waste time in repetition. When I have finished with each topic, after my own questions I will give each Board member an opportunity to question the witness on that topic before passing to the next.

General Short, will you please state the period during which you commanded the Hawaiian Department, and whom you succeeded in command?

General SHORT. I commanded the Hawaiian Department from February 7, 1941, to December 16, 1941. I succeeded Lieutenant General Charles D. Herron.

29. General GRUNERT. Will you also please state whether you know how you came to be selected for that command?

General SHORT. I was commanding the 1st Corps down at Columbia, South Carolina, and received a personal letter from the Chief of Staff stating that—I guess that was along about the middle of December—stating that he thought of detailing me [352] to command the Hawaiian Department. It happened that my wife's father had been quite ill not so very long before, and she was rather anxious not to go outside of the country; so I wrote and said to the Chief of Staff if it were purely a routine assignment I would rather not have it, but if it were in the nature of anything unusual on account of world conditions, that naturally I would be glad to go, and he came back and said I would be sent.

30. General GRUNERT. Any questions on that particular phase?

(No response.)

Will you briefly state what instructions, if any, you received concerning the Hawaiian Department prior to assumption of command, particularly as to your mission and responsibilities, if that has not already been covered in your statement?

General SHORT. It has not. I came down to Washington just before leaving the East, I think about the, oh, first week in January, and I saw the Chief of Staff for a few minutes, but he did not go into particulars of my mission at all.

31. General GRUNERT. Any questions?

32. General RUSSELL. Yes, I have some, General.

At that time, General Short, did you have a conference with the War Plans Division, as it was known at that time?

General SHORT. I spent two days around the War Department, and I had a considerable number of conferences, trying to find out what they had in the way of equipment, whether their equipment was modern, and, where it was not, when that we were going to get it. Things of that kind. But I remember I had a conference with General Spaatz about the air equipment over there. I had a conference with somebody who had been in Hawaii fairly [353] recently, about the developing of air fields on the outlying islands. I had a conference with someone about the type of artillery that they had in

Hawaii. I think they still, as I remember, had some British 75s at that time.

I had a number of conferences of that kind trying to find out how the command was equipped and what the prospect was of getting more modern equipment. I do not remember the names of a lot of people. I think I talked with General Gerow, who was in the War Plans. I know I talked with General Spaatz, and it has been four years: I don't remember the other people I did talk with. It has been three years and probably eight months.

There is one thing I remember that I particularly talked with General Spaatz about, because he had just come back from England. I talked at considerable length with him about the question of dispersion and protection of airplanes, because we had not had an awful lot at that time in this country about it, and he was probably the best informed man we had.

33. General RUSSELL. Did you know the mission of the Hawaiian Department at that time, General Short?

General SHORT. I think I did. I undoubtedly went over that with War Plans Division.

34. General GRUNERT. Will you briefly state what pertinent instructions, information, and so forth you received from your predecessor, particularly as to your missions and responsibilities?

General SHORT. He had a very considerable list of things that he thought it would be well—where he kept notes himself—would be well for me to talk to him about, and we spent pretty much the whole of an afternoon going over those points.

[354] 35. General GRUNERT. Were there any particular points that now occur to you that stand out in that turnover?

General SHORT. Well, I think probably the deficiencies in personnel and equipment, that he perhaps laid more emphasis on that than anything else, and there was a problem that I think had been making him think quite a bit, that at that time they were calling in the drafts, and the first draft ran about 66 or 67 percent Japanese, and I believe that the second draft had just come in at that time and that it was higher. I am quite sure that we called the third draft in later, which finally got up to 89 percent, but I think that that was one of the things that kind of worried General Herron a little bit about the assignment of those people and the employment of the National Guard, because the National Guard over there was just a cross section of the population: we had everything in the world.

36. General FRANK. What was that?

General SHORT. The National Guard, which was called out in the Federal service. It was strictly a cross section of the population: Hawaiians, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, and he was a little doubtful just to what extent we should put those people in various responsible positions.

37. General GRUNERT. General Short, do you recall a letter of February 7, '41, from the Chief of Staff in which he generally brings to your mind certain conditions about the Hawaiian Defense Command?

General SHORT. May I take a look at the letter, because it was not received on that date, and I do not recall it exactly by date.

[355] 38. General GRUNERT. It starts right there. It is rather a lengthy one (indicating).

General SHORT. Oh, yes. Yes, I recall that very well.

39. General GRUNERT. Was there anything in that letter that was new to you, that had not been referred to in your turnover by General Herron?

General SHORT. No. The one thing that that letter emphasized to me, I think more than anything else, was the necessity for the closest cooperation with the Navy. I think that that part of the letter impressed me more than anything else.

40. General GRUNERT. Do you recall this particular expression in that letter: "The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine constitute the real perils of the situation"?

General SHORT. I remember that letter and remember it generally. I do not remember just exactly the expression. I remember that those things were emphasized.

41. General GRUNERT. About that time or from that time on through the rest of the summer and into the fall, you have pretty well outlined what steps you took toward improving the Hawaiian Department defenses, but were you at all deeply concerned as to or respecting the probability of an attack by an enemy air raid? If so, what did you do during the succeeding months to minimize the effect of such a raid if it occurred?

General SHORT. Because of the information I had from the Navy and the Navy strength that was there, I was not exercised [356] at any one time as to the possibility of an immediate attack. I realized that there was a possibility of a considerable part of that navy being moved out at some time and that the danger would become very acute. With that in mind, I made a special effort to bring the antiair equipment up to date and to get enough coast artillery personnel that we would not have to have dual assignments, and to get the aircraft warning service functioning. As I read to you this morning, I wired the War Department that I considered the aircraft warning the most important project in the whole Department.

42. General RUSSELL. General, I do not want to crash in on your plan there, but General Short has just given an answer here that attracts attention to something that I do not recall having been in the record before.

General, you stated that you, visualizing a time when the Navy or a substantial part of it might be away from Pearl Harbor,—

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

43. General RUSSELL. —that you emphasized then the perfection of your antiaircraft defense. What part was the Navy playing in the antiaircraft defense that might be dissipated by the Navy's going away?

General SHORT. They had no landing fields closer than 2100 miles. They could not, with land planes, attack Honolulu at that time. They didn't have planes. I figured as long as the Navy was there in such force that they could not bring the carriers into position from which they could attack the Island without the Navy either knowing where they were or getting enough information to know that they were somewhere in the [357] vicinity; and with the Navy away, why, I realized that they could run carriers in, without any question, and make an attack.

44. General RUSSELL. Well, I have read since lunch here an extract from this Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, in two paragraphs of which are outlined Army and Navy missions, and one of the Navy missions was attacking enemy naval forces. The thing that you are testifying about now is that you thought if the Navy was in there in carriers they would prevent carriers from approaching within—

General SHORT. Striking distance.

45. General RUSSELL. Striking distance?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

46. General RUSSELL. I just wanted to clarify that.

47. General FRANK. I would like to determine, upon what did you base that assumption? Did you believe that the presence of the fleet in being at Pearl Harbor constituted a security?

General SHORT. It did, because they constantly had task forces out, and they had carriers with those task forces, and they spread their planes out from the task forces, and it seemed to me that there was every reasonable chance that they would discover enemy carriers or get enough information to know that they were dangerous.

48. General FRANK. To get into your relations with the Navy: Did you feel that you always—

49. General RUSSELL. Do you not have that somewhere?

50. General GRUNERT. That comes in a later topic, but you may develop these now if you do not go too deeply into it. Since you have already asked it, go ahead.

51. General FRANK. Well, he has just given an answer that [358] opens up this.

52. General GRUNERT. Everything will open up everything else. Go ahead.

53. General FRANK. It opens up this question.

Will you please read the last thing I said, Mr. Reporter?

(The pending unfinished question of General Frank, as above recorded, was read by the reporter.)

54. General FRANK. Did you feel that you always had full information on what the Navy was doing?

General SHORT. I would like to put it this way: I felt that Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, either one, would have definitely given me anything that they thought had any bearing on my job; that if they were sure that it was an absolutely inside naval proposition that did not concern me in any way, they might not have given it to me. I do not know whether that is in answer to your question, but—

55. General FRANK. The question as to whether or not you got the information was placed upon a trust that you had that they would have given it to you?

General SHORT. Absolutely.

56. General FRANK. If they in their judgment thought—

General SHORT. Thought.

57. General FRANK. —that you were interested?

General SHORT. Thought it was of any value to me or that I was interested.

58. General FRANK. Do you feel that you were secure in that?

General SHORT. I do not know what other basis you could work on. I had no right to demand that they give me all information they had.

[359] 59. General FRANK. Did you know each time a task force went out?

General SHORT. Not officially. I think I most always did personally because I talked with Admiral Kimmel particularly. I saw more of him than I did of Admiral Bloch, and whenever I saw him, which was usually at least once a week, he told me what they were doing.

60. General FRANK. A task force could have gone out and back in a period of a week, however, without your ever knowing anything about it?

General SHORT. Oh, yes, and they were sending—they had a task force out all the time, and it was a routine training with them. Of course, if we were putting on an air problem with them or if there was something like a marine landing, as I spoke of this morning, down at Johnston Island, they were telling me particularly about that because they would figure I would want to send someone.

61. General FRANK. You did not constantly know where task forces were?

General SHORT. No, except as we happened to talk about it in a personal kind of a way.

62. General FRANK. And by the same token you did not know how much of the perimeter of Honolulu was being covered, nor when any part of it was being covered?

General SHORT. Now, what do you mean by "perimeter"?

63. General FRANK. The 360 degrees around Oahu.

General SHORT. No, I did not. I did not know exactly what the reconnaissance was. I did know in general terms that it was largely to the west. I think that they did most of their [360] task work to the west, from the north around to the west, to the south; that if you would go from a little bit east of Midway Island and draw your circle towards the west through Palmyra, Johnston, Canton, Christmas, that you would cover the area that they felt was most dangerous and that they operated in the most.

[361] 64. General FRANK. Were you advised that there was a Japanese task force in the Marshalls, between the 25th and 30th of November?

General SHORT. No, sir. In fact, as I remember the thing, I was led to believe that there was a task force of Japanese out somewhere to the south of Japan, but not in those Islands. My feeling was that it was more directed toward the Philippines.

65. General FRANK. You had no knowledge?

General SHORT. At least, I don't remember that I had any. That is my recollection, that my information was that the Japanese ships were either in their home ports or had been sent to the south.

66. General FRANK. Would you not have been concerned if you had gotten the information that there was a Japanese force—

General SHORT. In the mandated islands? Yes, yes.

67. General FRANK. There was a piece of information that Navy had that they did not give you?

General SHORT. Yes, that may have happened. Did they have definite information to that effect, or was it rumor?

68. General FRANK. It was information that is reported in the Roberts report, of which they were sufficiently confident to notify the Navy Department in Washington.

General SHORT. In a report from Kimmel, you mean, or from the Asiatic Fleet?

69. General FRANK. From Kimmel to Washington.

General SHORT. To Washington? Well, I don't remember it, if he gave it, and I think I would have remembered it, because I do remember that we talked about the location of the fleet during that period, and as I remember it, it was rumored that [362] the Japanese ships were partly in their home ports, and that what were not there, they thought were proceeding to the south.

70. General FRANK. The basis of your feeling of security then was the belief that the Navy was effectively at its job?

General SHORT. I would rather say, a confidence, than a belief—a confidence that they were working at their job and doing it effectively.

71. General GRUNERT. The next item I would like to ask some questions on is that of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which the Board understands was the basic plan for the defense of Hawaii. Did not that plan charge the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department with providing antiaircraft defense of Oahu, with particular attention to Pearl Harbor naval base and naval forces present?

General SHORT. I would say, with particular attention to the Pearl Harbor naval base. I don't remember that it mentioned the naval ships present. I don't know; it may; but I don't remember that it does.

72. General GRUNERT. But that brings into question this: Did the Commanding General keep himself informed as to naval forces present? If not, why not? Part of that has been covered. Did you consider that your job in defending Pearl Harbor as a naval base was greater when the Fleet was present in the harbor, or when the major part was not in the harbor?

General SHORT. I would have considered that the task forces out lessened my job very greatly, because it made the danger of attack much less. That is, if they bottled everything up in the harbor, that my job would be very much more difficult, because I wouldn't count on the knowledge they would [363] have, and their ability to stop carriers coming in.

73. General FRANK. I would just like to clarify my own mind on what your inference, there, is. Do you mean by your answer that as a result of the task forces being out, you felt a certain security, in that they would have covered the area around, and therefore would have provided you with negative information that the enemy was not in the vicinity?

General SHORT. That was correct. I considered the task forces they had out at that time would cover 1,200 to 1,800 miles of ocean pretty thoroughly.

74. General FRANK. That was all part of your confidence in the effectiveness of the Navy?

General SHORT. Yes. The more task forces they had out, the less they had to do with long-distance air reconnaissance.

75. General GRUNERT. Then you did not consider that you had to check up on the number of vessels in or out, or going in or out?

General SHORT. I would say frankly that I imagine that as a Senior Admiral, Kimmel would have resented it if I had tried to have him report every time a ship went in or out, and as I say, our relations were such that he gave me without any hesitancy any piece of information that he thought was of interest.

76. General GRUNERT. Of course, your control post must have known?

General SHORT. They did, in Hawaii; they knew before the attack. We had one officer, a "noncom," a lieutenant colonel—I have forgotten his name—Dingman, or something of that kind—and a sergeant, who were there, to work chiefly to learn how to [364] work with the Navy on that, to see what the problem was, and whenever we had any kind of maneuver, then we increased that to three, so as to have a 24-hour shift, and during the day hours, that he would be on there, he would know what came out; but he wasn't there. One man couldn't be there 24 hours in the day, and we had only one, except during the periods of maneuvers.

77. General GRUNERT. I don't know what it was then, but now, in all these important harbors, there is an Army officer on duty 24 hours of the day, whose business it is to act in emergencies, in getting immediate connection with the commanding officer of the harbor defenses, and be particularly on the alert. All the harbor defense is particularly concerned whenever there is a convoy or a large number of ships in the harbor. Now, did that not appear necessary in 1941?

General SHORT. During the period that this officer was at the control post, he kept up that work with the harbor defense, to tell them whether they were ships that should be fired on or should not be fired on. Of course, after the December 7 attack, we had 24 hours a day of a Coast Artillery officer right there so that he would receive the maximum information, through the Navy, as to whether that was a friendly ship or not.

78. General GRUNERT. But up to that time it was not considered necessary?

General SHORT. The man, the one officer and one man were there to keep up this touch, and the training, and to keep the Coast Artillery in touch, so that there wouldn't be anything new when we did put on three in an emergency.

79. General GRUNERT. Well, you produced that Joint Plan.

80. General FRANK. There was a Japanese submarine that was [365] attacked on information from the Navy, right there in the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor, on the morning of December 7?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

81. General FRANK. When were you advised of that?

General SHORT. I didn't know of it till after the attack. I don't think I knew it till the 8th.

82. General FRANK. Until the 8th?

General SHORT. Yes. Of course, after the attack, why, it wasn't of any particular importance. I think it was the 8th when Admiral Kimmel himself told me about that.

83. General FRANK. Knowledge of that would have been important?

General SHORT. Knowledge of that would have been very important, because if I had had it, about 7:15, I could have dispersed my planes. I couldn't have got them into the air, there wasn't time enough, long enough to get them into the air, but I could have dispersed them and lessened the losses.

They did not connect it with the general raid, they thought it was separate.

84. General GRUNERT. In protecting the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, which later referred to the protection of the naval and air base, it would appear that the idea of protecting that base is to protect what is inside of that. Now, I just ran across this paragraph, 17-a of this Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which reads as follows:

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, shall provide for—
 a The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the [366] PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area.

General SHORT. That is the ammunition. I would like to expand.

85. General GRUNERT. That seems to emphasize the naval forces "present thereat."

General SHORT. I would like to expand on that a little. We hadn't gotten to the degree of coordination of antiaircraft fire where we took over the antiaircraft fire, or of the ships in the harbor. Now, that might come any time. With the Marines at Ewa, it came under air command. There were naval guns, and, through naval guns, the ships themselves, their antiaircraft facilities did not function under the antiaircraft commander.

86. General GRUNERT. That was not tied in with your antiaircraft defense?

General SHORT. No; we hadn't gotten that far in the coordination, and I think it would take some time to perfect it to the point where it would be possible.

87. General FRANK. I would like to ask a question. Really, what is the difference in your employment and deployment, whether the Fleet is in or out?

General SHORT. There would be none, as far as our own guns were concerned, but if you bring in a lot of ships there with a great deal of antiaircraft on them, then if you were going to be a coordinated whole, it might affect your dispositions quite a little bit; but as I say, our coordination hadn't gotten to the point where that we were planning a control of [367] antiaircraft fire of the guns that were actually—of the ships that were actually anchored in the harbor.

88. General FRANK. So far as your mobile antiaircraft artillery was concerned, it would go—

General SHORT. We made no changes. We were deployed so as to protect that basin, and the fact that there would be some additional antiaircraft fire from ships in there did not cause us to change any—

89. General FRANK. When the Fleet was in?

General SHORT. —because we thought that the battle danger was greater with them in there, and it was also more dangerous to the enemy, and that there was also the possibility of doing more damage when they were in there, so it was better to have a greater volume of fire right there.

I do not know whether that answers your question, or not.

90. General FRANK. And the employment of your aircraft was the same, or different?

General SHORT. It was the same.

91. General FRANK. In both cases?

General SHORT. Yes, except that we would just add that much more antiaircraft from the ships that were actually there. They were, however, not controlled by us.

92. General GRUNERT. Under this Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, wasn't the Army charged with providing antiaircraft intelligence warning services, and the protection of landing fields and naval installations?

General SHORT. That is correct.

93. General GRUNERT. Also with the establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the Oahu defensive coastal area, in [368] co-operation with the Naval inshore patrol and the antiaircraft warning service for the Hawaiian Islands?

General SHORT. The only possible value of the inshore patrol, which extended not beyond 20 miles, was for picking up submarines. Any information on air that you got from a patrol at not more than 20 miles out would be worth so little that you might as well not have it.

94. General GRUNERT. But you were charged with—

General SHORT. We were charged with that, and as I say, it was of value chiefly as to submarines, and I might add, there, also, that while 20 miles was the limit on the thing, that most of the time our patrols were limited to 10 miles on account of having single-engine planes, and the Air felt that in peacetime they shouldn't take unnecessary risks in flying over the water.

95. General GRUNERT. We will come back again to this question of reconnaissance and inshore patrol, a little later. Are there any other questions? If not, I will go to the next subject.

It appears that on the 24th of January, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy wrote a letter to the Secretary of War, and he in his reply stated in effect that all the materiel for the antiaircraft or the air warning service would be there in Hawaii not later than June, 1941. This is the Secretary of War's reply of February 7, which, in paragraph 6, states:

I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making these measures effective.

[369] Do you recall that?

General SHORT. I recall that, very well, and we kept after it, trying to get—if you remember, this morning I read you a wire I sent, in June—I think, June 10—in which I told him that all this materiel was held up, and that, largely on account of the priority proposition, and trying to get the priority changed to 1-B. They advanced it to 1-C, but they never did advance it to 1-B.

96. General GRUNERT. That letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War states in part as follows:

The dangers envisaged, in their order of importance and probability, are considered to be (1) air bombing attack, (2) air-torpedo-plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire. Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily.

What definite action was taken, as to taking effective measures? What dispositions were made, or plans revised, exercises held, or cooperation with the Navy, to look after those particular points which the Secretary of War had sent out and ordered or directed that action be taken? What was done following that?

General SHORT. In the first place, we kept hammering on that to get the weapons that had been allotted. For instance, we had 140 or 145 37-mm. guns we were supposed to get, but we never did get but

20, before December 7. We were supposed to get some more 90-mm. guns: we never got them. Now, that is on the question of equipment sought. We were also trying to get personnel, so we would not have to have dual assignments. [370] Every Coast Artillery outfit practically had to use the same man to man the harbor defenses and antiaircraft. If you had an attack of both kinds at the same time, you couldn't possibly specify both means.

Now, on the question of using what we had—we had a minimum. From March 21, on, we had a minimum of one exercise a week between the Air of the Army and the Air of the Navy, and worked very hard at the question of coordination; and I think we learned a lot.

97. General GRUNERT. What measures would you say bore directly on these points made, particularly in preparation to combat an air attack?

General SHORT. First of all trying to get the equipment and personnel.

98. General GRUNERT. Equipment for what?

General SHORT. For the antiaircraft.

99. General GRUNERT. Antiaircraft? What else?

General SHORT. Equipment and personnel, they were. It was the aircraft and antiaircraft chiefly. We tried to get more pursuit planes. We tried to get more long-range bomber planes, so that we could give them assistance in the distant reconnaissance, and then we worked with them, as I say, at least once a week, learning how to work together.

100. General GRUNERT. Then the air warning service loomed largely?

General SHORT. I believe the General and I considered it the most important single project we had.

101. General GRUNERT. Then the interceptor command, which included the air warning service and the handling of the anti-aircraft? [371]

General SHORT. I might say that that question of interceptor command was a brand-new thing in the States. I think it was early fall before they went to that command in the States, and they had a school, and we sent two air people, General Davidson and another air officer, Colonel Powell, of the Signal Corps, and one of his officers, back, so as to try to institute the very latest thing out in interceptor command, because the idea was completely new. They ordered, first, two officers over there, and we wired and asked if we couldn't increase it to four so we would get the benefit of several points of view.

102. General GRUNERT. All right, we will develop that subject a little more, later. We will come first to the Joint Air Operations Agreement, of March 21, which is one I understand was in effect on December 7. Under that agreement was the Army charged with the tactical command of the defense of air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu?

General SHORT. They were.

103. General GRUNERT. Was that agreement well understood by both the Army and the Navy?

General SHORT. Fully understood. It was maneuvered quite constantly.

104. General GRUNERT. I want to refer to one of the things brought out by your statement this morning—control of Army and Navy

planes over the sea and over the land. As I understood it, when they functioned over the sea, the Navy controlled, and when they functioned over the land, the land defense generally controlled?

[372] General SHORT. I wouldn't say exactly that if they functioned over water in the immediate vicinity of Oahu, then the Army controlled; it was a question of whether you were sending out to some distance to attack an enemy fleet; then it was definitely Navy. If the enemy's planes were coming in attacking Honolulu, our pursuit might chase them 20 or 25 miles out there, but they would still be under Army command.

105. General GRUNERT. What I am interested in is if you turned them over to the Navy for attack outside, and then the force keeps coming in, during that transition period, are they then turned back to the Army for the main defense?

General SHORT. Well, if you visualize it, there would probably be a period there when it would be pretty hard to say who was controlling. As I see the thing, what you have suggested would only take place if the enemy licked the air forces sent out, and chased them back in; and when the enemy followed them in there, naturally, everything that the Army had would strike the enemy, and if there was anything left of the pursuit planes that were being chased by the enemy, I suppose sooner or later, in a reasonably short time, they would get under control of the Army; but there would be a period there where you probably would hardly know who was controlling a particular squadron, if they were being chased.

106. General GRUNERT. That would seem to indicate to me that the joint command would probably have solved the question better than command by cooperation?

General SHORT. You mean unity of command?

107. General GRUNERT. Unity of command.

General SHORT. Undoubtedly.

[373] 108. General GRUNERT. Was there anything in that joint agreement, the Joint Air Operations Agreement, that provided who would track planes from the time they attacked and left the land defense and went back to their carriers? Whose job was that?

General SHORT. That was the Navy's job. Now, I don't know whether the joint plan specifically words that, but it was thoroughly understood that it was the Navy's job; and, right during the attack, General Martin called up and talked with Admiral Bellinger twice, and asked for a specific mission for tracking, which way he wanted him to go; and when he didn't get it, he at 11:27 sent planes out on his own mission, because he had not been assigned a mission, and he had something they could use.

109. General GRUNERT. In that Joint Air Agreement, what was the agreement about the reconnaissance?

General SHORT. The Navy were definitely responsible for distant reconnaissance.

110. General GRUNERT. What did you understand "distant reconnaissance" to mean?

General SHORT. Anything beyond the 20-mile zone.

111. General GRUNERT. And what means did the Navy have for such distant reconnaissance, if the Navy should have happened to be out?

General SHORT. There was a certain number of planes, squadrons that were assigned, that were not supposed to go out with the Fleet. Of course, that probably would be changed, as the Fleet had different missions, but we had talked over that a good deal, and they were trying, I think, to arrive at enough planes that they could always leave a certain number of [374] squadrons under the command of the 14th Naval District.

112. General GRUNERT. If you were not satisfied with the Navy distant reconnaissance, did you feel that it was your responsibility to do any such distant reconnaissance if it threatened your defense?

General SHORT. I had only six planes that I could have used for distant reconnaissance solely.

113. General GRUNERT. If you had had ample planes, would you have considered it your responsibility?

General SHORT. If I had had ample planes and felt that the Navy were not doing the job, undoubtedly I would have talked it over with them, and if they had refused to do the job under those conditions, I would have asked the War Department to abrogate the agreement, and go ahead and do it. We had made a very comprehensive study, because we visualized the Navy's being away to such an extent that we would have to take over the reconnaissance, and you probably have seen that study where we arrived at the conclusion we needed 180 Flying Fortresses, and it was a rather well done, rather scientific study, I thought, and the air people put a lot of thought on it.

114. General GRUNERT. Did your so-called "close-in" reconnaissance mean to you the inshore patrol?

General SHORT. That is what it would amount to; yes. We had a reconnaissance outfit at Bellows Field, and we put in a certain number of hours every day, training on reconnaissance; and they primarily did that.

115. General GRUNERT. What value was the inshore patrol to the Army as a defensive measure?

General SHORT. None, except for submarines that might [375] come to the surface and shell some installation.

116. General GRUNERT. Did you know whether or not the Navy conducted its distant reconnaissance regularly, or spasmodically, or what?

General SHORT. I knew that they had these task forces out all the time, with carriers, and that as part of the task force exercise, they always sent the planes approximately 300 miles each way. I knew that they did a certain amount of patrolling from Midway and Wake and Johnston Island, and I didn't know specifically—I don't know that it was the same thing every day. I don't know what the variation was. I knew that they were doing that kind of work constantly.

117. General GRUNERT. Then you did not know whether the 360 degrees of the compass were covered that way?

General SHORT. I knew it couldn't be covered.

118. General GRUNERT. Could not be?

General SHORT. Could not be. Nobody had the navy force to cover it; it was impossible.

119. General GRUNERT. Then did you in the absence of information of any danger consider it necessary to assure yourself the Navy was giving the 360-degree coverage?

General SHORT. They couldn't. I was confident that they didn't have enough to do it. That was one reason we put in the study on the question of how many B-17's it would take to do the job, and that careful study made it perfectly plain that the combined Army and Navy didn't have anything like enough.

120. General GRUNERT. Then from your understanding, the Navy did not have enough to do its full job of distant reconnaissance, and you did not have enough to do anything on your own?

[376] General SHORT. That is correct. I had enough to assist them some, if they asked for it.

[377] 121. General GRUNERT. Outside of your knowing whether a task force was out or not, did the Navy keep you informed as to what distant reconnaissance they were making?

General SHORT. Not specifically. I knew they were making reconnaissance from Midway and Wake and Johnston, but I did not know exactly just when it was and what it consisted of. I knew they were making some all the time with their task forces.

122. General FRANK. In the message of November 27, that War Department message signed "Marshall", you were directed to conduct such reconnaissance as you deemed necessary?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

123. General FRANK. Did you show that message to the naval commander?

General SHORT. I am quite sure I did; yes.

124. General FRANK. Since, from the point of view of protection against air attack, close-in reconnaissance was ineffective without distant reconnaissance—

General SHORT (interposing). Ineffective in any case, I would say. It would be in just a few minutes from the time you discovered it.

125. General FRANK. (continuing). —did not this order for you to conduct reconnaissance convey some sort of an obligation to the naval commander?

General SHORT. I will tell you what it conveyed to me, and that is that when that message was written whoever wrote it did not take into consideration or overlooked our definite agreement that the Navy was responsible for long-distance reconnaissance. It did not take that into consideration and did not take into consideration the fact that we had only six planes [378] that could do long-distance reconnaissance. So, no matter what I had tried to do would be apparently ineffectual. The only thing we could do was to count on the Navy, because they had practically everything there was to do it with.

126. General FRANK. At this time the order had gone out; the fat was in the fire. Was there no reaction on the part of the naval commander to consider that he had some sort of an obligation to conduct some distant reconnaissance?

General SHORT. He got a message, I think, about the same time, that I am sure made him tighten up a little more, and he had three task forces out where he ordinarily had two; and I believe that they considered their task force was the best possible reconnaissance, because of the way that they fanned out with practically a 600-mile front for the task force.

127. General FRANK. Here was this agreement for cooperative action. On whose shoulders was the responsibility to determine whether or not distant air reconnaissance should be carried out?

General SHORT. I would say it would be definitely on the Navy.

128. General FRANK. Here was a situation in which an order went out from one of the two major national defense departments of the government, which ordered reconnaissance on the part of one which was the responsibility of the other, and that spirit of cooperation just did not take, did it?

General SHORT. No; I do not believe that is a correct way of putting it. I believe, frankly, that the man who wrote the wire just did not realize when he wrote it that the Navy were the responsible parties. He wrote it without any consideration of that or without any consideration of what we had to do the job with. The order could not be carried out. You could not [379] carry on any distant reconnaissance worthy of the name with six planes.

129. General FRANK. But the Navy had some P. B. Y. boats?

General SHORT. It had lots of them. But I do not believe it was the intention of the War Department that we abrogate that agreement with the Navy; and as long as the agreement was not abrogated, then the responsibility for doing it was definitely on them.

130. General GRUNERT. Did not that message charge you with informing the Admiral of the Fleet of that message?

General SHORT. I furnished him a copy of the message.

131. General GRUNERT. At that time, did you make inquiries as to what reconnaissance was going to be made?

General SHORT. As I say, I talked things over with him that day and for several days, as to what task groups they were sending out for reconnaissance between those islands, but I did not pin him down and say, "Are you going to send a plane every hour? What is it going to search? How many degrees? How are you going to do your mission?" I did not ask him that.

132. General GRUNERT. For comparative purposes, in the Philippines we also had an agreement with the Navy for distant reconnaissance, and the two operations men got together and charted the entire section around Luzon, 360 degrees. They figured just how these long-range Navy planes would cover certain arcs, and what the Army planes would cover. It was practically identical with the Hawaiian situation. But you had no such arrangement, as far as Hawaii was concerned, for covering the entire perimeter in arcs?

General SHORT. Did you have an arrangement there whereby the Army planes were definitely under the command of the Navy [380] and the Navy assumed full responsibility?

133. General GRUNERT. We did not.

General SHORT. That seems to me to be the difference. They assumed a definite responsibility, and we passed the command of our reconnaissance planes whenever they called for it. We went definitely under their command, so that the planning of the sectors and what each squadron would search, and everything of that kind, was distinctly a naval job, and they had such a preponderance of power for the reconnaissance that it would not have looked very well for us to try to prescribe the reconnaissance when we had only a handful of planes.

134. General GRUNERT. In your message of November 27, you say, "Liaison with the Navy." Just what did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by that particular message?

General SHORT. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing.

135. General GRUNERT. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance?

General SHORT. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or not, it would have affected it, because they had signed a definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff.

136. General FRANK. Some time back in the testimony you stated that General Martin was in contact with Admiral Bellinger of the Naval Operations Office.

General SHORT. No; he was Commander of Patwing 2.

137. General FRANK. I meant, naval air operations. You were asking if they had any information on the location of these [381] carriers?

General SHORT. Yes.

138. General FRANK. And the Roberts report indicates that at 10:30 a. m. they did have information on the location of those carriers, that they had a bearing of some 357 degrees, or the reciprocal thereof, which is 178?

General SHORT. I think 178 was where they thought they were. But, as a matter of fact, Martin sent his planes to search, as I remember, from 165 to 190 or 195, something like that.

139. General FRANK. With the Navy having search planes and the Army having at least two—

General SHORT (interposing). We had more than that. We had six that took off on November 27th.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

* * * * *

Page 381, line 14, change "Nov. 27" to "Dec. 7".

* * * * *

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

140. General FRANK. The perimeter of the 360 degrees was certainly reduced two points. That information was available; was that given by the Navy to the Army?

General SHORT. Before Martin sent the planes out, as I understand it, he had talked with Bellinger twice, but Bellinger apparently did not have enough information to give him a definite mission. He got some information from the Interceptor Command as to the direction that those planes had taken when they left. They may have changed their direction ten miles out. I think that caused him to take the

direction he did. I know one thing: There had been a report that there was a Japanese carrier some 40 or 50 miles off Barbers Point, and he sent out to investigate that at the same time. It was southwest of Barbers Point. It turned out not to be of any value. Later, after that mission was finished, there was apparently some little confusion. General Martin, I think, had the im- [382] pression that they did not operate under the Navy until along about 2 o'clock. I do not know when it was, because the thing did not come up until it was too late for me to dig clear down into the files and verify which statement was correct.

141. General RUSSELL. We have talked about prior-to-attack reconnaissance and a lot about pursuit after attack. General Grunert was discussing with you the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, where apparently the relations between the Army and Navy touching all these questions of reconnaissance and defense were set up and worked out? Is that correct?

General SHORT. That is correct.

142. General RUSSELL. There is a statement in the official report of the Roberts Commission which is not entirely clear to me, in paragraph 5 of that report, and I will read the sentence.

(Excerpt from Roberts Commission report:)

This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan—

I assume they are referring to this document (indicating)—

was intended to become operative upon order of the War and Navy Departments or as agreed upon by the local commanders in the case of an emergency, a threat of hostile action, or the occurrence of war.

The plan itself says that this agreement shall take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renunciation in whole or in part.

My question is this: Was the Coastal Frontier Defense Plan effective from the date that you and Admiral Bloch signed it? Was it effective from then on, or did something have to happen thereafter to make it effective?

General SHORT. As a matter of fact, we put it into effect for training purposes right away, and forwarded it to Washington [383] for approval, and it was approved. I think that the distinction was that in normal peace times, when there was no danger whatever, these things would not all be done, but we might agree any time during that period that we would go into a state of maneuver, and then they would all be done. If an emergency turned up they went into effect automatically.

143. General GRUNERT. Who determined the emergency?

General SHORT. Just like December 7—there was no argument that the emergency was there—

144. General RUSSELL. I want to follow this thought, because I feel it was material in determining what was going on out there. Let us deal with prior hostile actions. There had been no attack. We had been discussing this question of reconnaissance, and you knew about naval reconnaissance at that time. Was it your impression, or not, General Short, that reconnaissance was constant from the day you reached Hawaii on February 7, 1941, until the attack on December 7, 1941?

General SHORT. I think that there was a very considerable amount of reconnaissance from February 7th, because they had been to a certain extent in a state of excitement out there for about two years. The Navy particularly had had an awful lot of warnings, and they were conducting their task force so as to give them training and reconnaissance all the time, and then when November 27 came along, Kimmel, as I understand it, tightened up his reconnaissance a very great deal.

145. General RUSSELL. We would like to get some facts, because we have not gotten any, so far, in this connection on this reconnaissance by the Navy. Did your predecessor, who was General Herron, out there, discuss with you what reconnaissance was being carried on by the Navy when you arrived there?

[384] General SHORT. I do not remember that he did.

146. General RUSSELL. Did he or not tell you that he had been making efforts for almost a year to determine what they were doing and had never found out?

General SHORT. He did not.

147. General RUSSELL. From the time you went in there on February 7 down to December 7 you made no investigation to determine definitely who was out, as a matter of routine, did you?

General SHORT. I did not ask for any formal reports. As I say, I knew almost constantly what the Navy did have out.

148. General RUSSELL. You did?

General SHORT. I knew almost constantly what they had out, because I saw Admiral Kimmel frequently. In fact, our relations were such that he always talked over what he did have out.

149. General RUSSELL. What did he tell you with respect to your last conference with him, when reconnaissance was discussed, before December 7th, as to what he had out?

General SHORT. He told me what task force he was sending out. We looked on task forces as the best means of reconnaissance.

150. General RUSSELL. So far as you know, then, prior to December 7, 1941, the only reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy was with the task forces that were out?

General SHORT. No. I knew they were sending planes out from Midway and Wake and Johnston all the time. I didn't know exactly what hours they were sending them out, but I knew they were making reconnaissance.

151. General RUSSELL. Is this an accurate statement, then, that you did not know whether or not any distant reconnaissance [385] was being conducted from Oahu?

General SHORT. I would say that I knew that there was very little if any, because it was not an economical way to conduct it, with task force out on the island bases. When you consider the number of planes they had I do not think they were sending them a thousand miles and back.

152. General RUSSELL. Your definite impression was that the only distant reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy under this agreement was that reconnaissance which was being conducted by task forces when they went out?

General SHORT. And from Midway, Johnston and Wake, and to a lesser extent, probably, from Panama.

153. General RUSSELL. But none was going out from Oahu?

General SHORT. No; I don't think so, because it would have been a big waste of planes.

154. General GRUNERT. How much of the 360 degrees did those reconnaissance planes cover?

General SHORT. My opinion would be a little over 180.

155. General GRUNERT. And the task forces covered what?

General SHORT. I meant the task forces and the islands together. I could not say. Possibly Admiral Kimmel can tell you definitely. I do not think there was much reconnaissance east of Midway or Christmas. I may be wrong, but it was my impression that that was true.

156. General FRANK. What about north of the Hawaiian group?

General SHORT. From Midway they went straight north. I do not think they went much east.

157. General RUSSELL. In this November 27th conference did you know what task forces were out that day?

General SHORT. Yes.

[386] 158. General RUSSELL. Definitely?

General SHORT. Yes; I knew what were out, and I got permission to send an officer with one force that was going out.

159. General RUSSELL. Did you consider the task forces that were out or that were about to be sent out were adequate for the purpose?

General SHORT. It was almost all the Navy had except battleships. It was all the cruisers and most of the destroyers and all the carriers. So, whether it was adequate or not, it was all.

160. General RUSSELL. Let me come back to this sentence that I read to you first, because I don't think there is information on this particular subject in the record, about when this was to become effective; that is, when this Coastal Frontier Defense was to become effective.

General SHORT. When we signed the agreement it was tentatively effective. Of course, it had to be approved by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, and we started carrying it out right away.

161. General GRUNERT. The operation become effective according to the terms of it. When approved, it made the plan effective. But the provisions of operating the long-distance reconnaissance provided therein did not become effective except during an emergency?

General SHORT. That is correct.

162. General GRUNERT. Who declared the emergency prior to when hostilities opened? When did it become effective?

General SHORT. As I say, it is my opinion, and I think you can verify the details by Admiral Kimmel, that probably for [387] almost two years—

163. General GRUNERT (interposing). It had been in effect?

General SHORT. As far as reconnaissance went, it has been in effect, because for a year before I got out there the Navy had been very keenly alive to the situation. I think that reconnaissance was about as effective as they thought they could make it for almost the whole of two years.

164. General RUSSELL. I want to ask you one or two questions. You talked about when this plan became effective and that they were constantly conducting reconnaissance out there. Is it true or not that you were ordered into an alert prior to the alert of November 27, or did you go into an all-out alert prior to that?

General SHORT. We had it along in May as a matter of training.

165. General RUSSELL. But that was not an order from higher authority?

General SHORT. No. We had never received an order from higher authority with reference to it, but there was no confusion of any kind as a result of having it. We had, I think, about 12 days of it at that time.

166. General GRUNERT. This joint air operations agreement was an agreement under the Joint Defense Plan?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

167. General GRUNERT. It appears that there is an addendum No. I to the Joint Air Operations Agreement which is a joint estimate of the air action necessary, dated the 31st of March, 1941, and signed by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger. Were you informed of its provisions, particularly as to the estimated possible enemy action and the probability of a surprise [388] dawn air attack?

General SHORT. I undoubtedly went over all the details of that with General Martin before he and Admiral Bellinger read the agreement.

168. General GRUNERT. In paragraph III of that addendum it says:

(Paragraph III of Addendum No. 1 to the Joint Air Operations Agreement is as follows:)

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

Paragraph IV says, in part:

(Excerpt from paragraph IV of Addendum No. 1 to the Joint Air Operations Agreement is as follows:)

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise.

Again, it comes back to reconnaissance. You consider that they did make such reconnaissance as the means allowed?

General SHORT. As far as possible I think they were employing all of their force.

169. General GRUNERT. You were fully aware, then, of the possible surprise air attack?

General SHORT. Oh, yes.

170. General GRUNERT. As to paragraph (4) of Section IV of that addendum, it reads in part as follows:

(Excerpt from paragraph (4) of section IV of addendum No. 1 is as follows:)

None of the above actions can be initiated by our [389] forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops, time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises.

Did not the repeated warnings from the War Department and Navy Department indicate to you a like probability of the imminence of an attack under which you should have complied with paragraph (4) of Section IV of the addendum?

General SHORT. We had gone ahead and maneuvered, and we had it to where it was automatic in case anything happened. The man in charge of bombers reported. There was no order necessary. He just reported.

171. General GRUNERT. Then, what I gather from you is that all the plans were laid had the judgment been that such an attack was imminent?

General SHORT. Definitely.

172. General GRUNERT. As to Addendum II of that same Joint Air Agreement which describes the various states of readiness of planes, why, under the circumstances, with reference to Material Readiness E, which meant that aircraft would conduct routine operations for the purposes of this plan, were not the time and the hours prescribed?

General SHORT. Because we believed that the possibility of an air attack was remote, and apparently the Chief of Staff definitely believed the same thing in his testimony before the [390] Roberts Commission, and we felt that we required all possible time for training in the Air Corps, because we had to prepare these teams for ferrying to the Philippines. Just as soon as we got a trained unit we lost it by transferring it to the Philippines.

General GRUNERT. Have the members of the Board any other questions on that phase?

173. General FRANK. We return again to the point that you placed your abiding confidence in the belief that the Navy would give you warning of an attack?

General SHORT. Definitely.

174. General FRANK. And as it worked out it would seem that your complete confidence in the Navy was optimistic?

General SHORT. That is true.

175. General GRUNERT. How did you size up conditions generally on the Island of Oahu from the time you took command until early in November when these things started to develop? By that I mean, the nature of the population, conditions as to internal trouble, conditions as to probable sabotage. Give us a picture of that which developed in your mind during that time.

General SHORT. It looked to me like with 37 per cent of the population Japanese or American-Japanese, 160,000, sabotage at least would be a very serious thing; that in case of war with Japan, if we were not alert to the extreme, we might have very serious things happen in our air and harbor defenses, particularly, and that if it got out of hand there was even a possibility of an uprising. I did not look on that as sure, but if we let it get out of hand there was a possibility. We devoted a great deal of energy to that; and I believe that had been true for years out there.

[391] 176. General GRUNERT. Did you inherit this feeling, or did it develop in your own mind as a result of your experience?

General SHORT. I am sure that my predecessor had the same feeling, and I take it that officers who had been there even earlier had the same feeling.

177. General GRUNERT. Did subsequent events show your fears were groundless?

General SHORT. It is hard to say, because we kept such a close line on it that it never had a chance to develop. What would have developed

if we had been careless about that side of the question, nobody knows.

178. General GRUNERT. Can you give us the line-up on that, as to what we might call personalities, in so far as you see fit? In the civil government was there any friction, any disagreement, any strong or weak characters that carried others with them one way or the other, or were there any such problems as that?

General SHORT. We had no friction at all. Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch and I were on extremely friendly terms. I believe Bellinger and Martin worked very closely together. They were the two that probably would have more to do with carrying out the agreement than anybody else. I do not think there was anything like that at all.

179. General GRUNERT. What about the governor and the F. B. I.?

General SHORT. Just as an example, we thought we would be in a much better local status if we had the governor write us a letter requesting us to take over the guarding of all the roads, bridges, and so forth. He did so without any hesitation at all, and it put us in a better local status. As to the mayor, when we put the proposition up to him that there were a number of [392] roads along the seacoast which, if an emergency arose, we would have to close, he had an ordinance passed so that we had authority to close them whenever we deemed it was necessary for defense. As to the F. B. I., we were on very friendly terms. There was no friction anywhere between my headquarters and the Navy or the civilian officials.

180. General GRUNERT. So far as I can judge from your testimony, there were no particular obstacles placed in the way of defense by any particular persons or officials?

General SHORT. On the contrary, they helped out a great deal. We worked with the Territorial Road Commission, so that if we did not have the money and we needed a military road, they would frequently kick through with the money and do the work for us. That shows how we operated.

[393] 181. General GRUNERT. Now, during your regime there, were there any particular changes in missions or responsibilities from the time you took over up until you were relieved?

General SHORT. The biggest change was getting that coordination between the Army and Navy air, getting the responsibility for reconnaissance, and pinning the thing right down.

182. General GRUNERT. That is what I am going into now, the question of cooperation, coordination between the Army and Navy and civil agencies.

Will you describe the method of coordination that was employed in the Joint Coastal Defense Plan, what mutual cooperation existed between the Army and Navy prior to and on December 7th? You have touched on that in a number of places. Is there anything you can amplify on that?

General SHORT. Only, as I said, by people like Martin and Bellinger, who had to work together in case of emergency, working together, and we had these exercises a minimum of one a week, air exercises, where we had to work together, but having our coast—our harbor defense people have a man in the control post and work every day directly with the naval people there to know what boats were coming in, and to have them indicate whether they were targets, and every-

thing of that kind, and with the higher command I did most of that myself. When I first got there my Chief of Staff at that time, Phil Hayes, was on most excellent terms with the Navy, and I never went for a conference without taking him along, because that he had been doing an awful lot of liaison work, that he was there until about the first of November; and after that I largely took [394] Major Fleming and the engineers with me, and I sometimes took General Martin and his Chief of Staff if there was an air proposition.

183. General GRUNERT. Would it be feasible for you to give the Board, for inclusion in the record, a list of the conferences you had with Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, as to dates and general subjects, as far as you can remember, between November 25th and December 7th?

General SHORT. On November 27th I had a conference with them with reference to the question of reinforcing the garrisons of Wake and Midway with a squadron each of Army pursuit planes. On December 1st I had a conference with them with reference to the relief—we had wires from Washington with reference to the relief of the marine garrisons by the Army.

On December 2nd Admiral Bloch was not with us. Admiral Kimmel came to my quarters with a long letter he had prepared covering the whole subject, and I went over it carefully with him; and then on December the 3rd we met again, and I had my radiograms ready for the War Department, and he had his. That was the last formal conference, I believe, that we had; that was December 3rd; but we had our subordinates: Fleming and Colonel Phyphffer had a conference on the 4th.

Now, I don't think on the 5th or 6th that we had any direct conference. My G-2 was in touch with O. N. I., I know, on those dates, but I think he was probably the only member of the staff.

184. General GRUNERT. That conference, the conference seemed to be more on the subject of what was to take place farther east. Now, as to both messages, one that the Navy received on the [395] 27th and one you received on the 27th, were they a subject of a conference?

General SHORT. Not of a formal conference. We exchanged messages, undoubtedly talked the thing over, but we didn't get together for a particular—each one knew what the—each one knew what—

185. General GRUNERT. Well, then, you refer to these conferences as formal conferences?

General SHORT. Those other conferences were where we had some particular subject we had to make a report to Washington on; we each one knew what the other fellow was doing in regard to those messages.

186. General GRUNERT. You had made a report on the November 27th message, to Washington.

General SHORT. Of just what I was doing, and I did that before I saw Admiral Kimmel, because I did that within thirty minutes after the message came in.

187. General GRUNERT. Did you discuss with the Navy whether they considered your Army Alert No. 1 was sufficient?

General SHORT. I didn't ask them whether they considered it. I told them that is what we were on.

188. General GRUNERT. Did they know what the Army Alert No. 1 was?

General SHORT. They had ten copies that were furnished to them on November 5th.

189. General GRUNERT. Well, you and I know that when you get a big document, unless the subordinates dig out those things and say, "These are the important things," why, the high command has not the time to carefully peruse the document.

[396] General SHORT. I think the operations officer of the 14th Naval District did dig into it and knew what it meant.

190. General GRUNERT. The operations officer of the 14th Naval District?

General SHORT. 14th Naval District. I think so. I think that he knew what it meant.

191. General GRUNERT. Yes. Then we get into the subject of alerts a little later on, but in connection with this cooperation: Do you know of any misunderstanding as to the Navy No. 1 Alert and your No. 1 Alert, as not considering them the same?

General SHORT. Well, I think the Navy, as far as alerts for sabotage went, that they hadn't been off of it in two years, hardly. They had a terrifically tight antisabotage guard in the Navy Yard. They went so far that they would not employ any man of Japanese blood. He might have been an American citizen for two generations, but they would not let him in the Navy Yard. They went to greater extremes than we did.

192. General GRUNERT. It appears here from some evidence in the Roberts Commission report that Colonel Phillips, your Chief of Staff—he was Senior Army Member of the Local Joint Planning Committee since November 6th?

General SHORT. That is right.

193. General GRUNERT. He says that committee never met after communication of November 27. Had they been meeting periodically?

General SHORT. No. They met when there was something we thought a change—

194. General GRUNERT. Necessary?

[397] General SHORT. A change necessary. The last, the most important thing out there where there had been a great many meetings, was when we made that agreement in regard to the joint defense of air. Now, I do not know how many meetings they had at that time. They had any number of meetings. But it was the kind of a board that only met when there was something to take up in the nature of a change.

195. General GRUNERT. Nature of a change of existing plan, instructions?

General SHORT. That is right.

196. General GRUNERT. They did not meet when there was anything that might be in the offing?

General SHORT. No, sir.

197. General GRUNERT. Then you took care of that yourself, and you were accompanied—

General SHORT. I very largely did the liaison work with the Navy myself.

198. General GRUNERT. Did your aide accompany you?

General SHORT. The aide would usually accompany me. He frequently wasn't in the conference, as I say, and as long as Hayes was my Chief of Staff, because of his experience of over two years with the Navy I took him with me always.

199. General GRUNERT. That was about up to October?

General SHORT. The first of November, and there was about a month after he left, and I usually had after that Martin, maybe Molison of the Air, and Fleming of the Engineers, who was may Assistant G-4, following a great many things the Navy were interested in.

[398] 200. General GRUNERT. Now, Admiral Kimmel, in the Roberts report, is reported to have claimed that the Navy was not informed that this Sergeant Lockhart picked up the approaching planes, and that this prevented the Navy from trailing them.

General SHORT. You mean?

201. General GRUNERT. What was the understanding as to how he should be informed, and so forth?

General SHORT. Well, as a matter of fact, the Army wasn't in on that. I think that is the case he is talking about where they picked them up at 7:20 that morning and notified Lieutenant Tyler, who was the control officer, and he thought it meant nothing but the planes coming in from San Francisco, and he didn't alert anybody. So the Navy were not alone in that.

202. General GRUNERT. Admiral Kimmel also claims here in his testimony that the furnished the Army information as to ships in and out of the harbor and that this had been done for months.

General SHORT. Well, as a matter of fact, I say, not 24 hours of the day, but we had this Lieutenant Colonel there, and he reported; he made a report to G-3, so during the period of the day that he was there we had the report constantly, and in any maneuver period we had it for 24 hours of the day, but I do not believe that we got it except when we had a liaison officer there. It wasn't a liaison officer exactly; we didn't call him "liaison." He was on duty with the harbor control post, and during the hours that he was on duty we had a complete report. I do not think we had the complete report the other hours. I might be mistaken, but I don't believe so.

203. General FRANK. Would it have done you any good to have known how many ships were in there?

[399] General SHORT. No. It was only worth something in this way, General: that it was a thing that in time of war you would have—they would have to carefully observe every ship going in and out, and the harbor defense would have to know whether that was a ship that should be fired upon, and that was his job, was to sit right there with the Navy, and when a ship was spotted they indicated to him whether it was a friendly ship which should not be fired on or a ship that should be fired on, you see; and if the harbor defense were having drills or exercises, he transmitted that immediately, and they went through simulated fire on any—

204. General FRANK. But so far as any change in plans was concerned—

General SHORT. There was no change.

205. General FRANK. It made no difference?

General SHORT. It was no change in plan. It was just simply a case that when there was an emergency you put three men in there and you had 24 hours a day in place of 8 hours a day.

206. General GRUNERT. Now, I am just trying to form a picture of the cooperation and the information which passed back and forth between the two commands, to see how that cooperation worked. Here are several questions I have along that line:

In this testimony before the Roberts Commission Admiral Kimmel claimed that he was never informed of the measures taken by the Army after the messages of November 27.

General SHORT. He was never probably given any formal notice. As I say, he and I talked together. I am sure he knew exactly what we were doing because we talked together there [400] hours that week.

207. General GRUNERT. And Admiral Bloch states he did not know that radars were not working all the time, nor anything about inshore aerial patrol.

General SHORT. Well, he may not have known, but they had a naval officer working with the Interceptor Command daily, and it was that naval officer's job to transmit the information, whenever it was working, to the Navy. So I am sure that somebody in the Navy knew.

208. General GRUNERT. Here is one: that Admiral Bloch, although he talked to General Short many times after November 27th, was not informed that the Army was only alerted to prevent sabotage. He learned differently only after the attack, that Army Alert No. 1 was the lowest and did not correspond with the Navy Alert No. 1, which was the highest.

General SHORT. He had ten copies. It was his operation officer that got ten copies of our Standing Operating Procedure on November 5th. If any of his staff officers took the trouble to read them, he should have known exactly what Alert No. 1 was, or if he had asked me. It never occurred to me that they didn't understand our Alert No. 1, because we had furnished the copies with that specifically in view.

209. General GRUNERT. Here is one that may touch on cooperation with civil authorities. It is stated here that Mr. Angus Taylor, United States District Attorney, wanted to prosecute some Jap agents for failure to register under the Alien Registration Act, but General Short was opposed to this without giving them a notice so to do, claiming it would react unfavorably to his plan of trying to make friends and create [401] good relations amongst them.

Now, was that a question of cooperation or a question of judgment on one part or one side?

General SHORT. That was purely a question of judgment. The question came up. That law had been passed, as I remember, in '39, and nobody in Honolulu, in the Hawaiian Islands, paid any attention to it. The law required the registration of alien agents, and after it had been going along for two years and nobody paying any attention to it at all, probably not—well, Shivers, an F. B. I. man, said he doubted if more than 10 percent of the agents knew they were ever supposed to register. He agreed with me, took the point of view that the fairest thing to do—that we weren't wanting to create a lot of ill feeling, and if it ever came to a war we would have this Japanese population to handle; that we didn't want to create disloyalty. We wanted to create as much loyalty as we could, and I had no objection to their arresting every one of them, but I said they ought to give them a period of ten days, or whatever

they wanted to, to register before, and announce it definitely, so all that were not registered at the end of that period would be arrested for not complying with the law.

The Navy and Taylor wanted to just go out and arrest them right now. Shivers and I thought it was not a desirable thing to do, and I radioed my opinion fully to the War Department, and the War Department agreed a hundred percent with my stand on the question. I wasn't making any objection to his arresting them, but as a matter of fair play and not to create a lot of disloyalty among the Japanese-Americans who might be loyal, we didn't want to make it appear that we were just trying to soak [402] people who might not know it.

210. General GRUNERT. In your testimony before the Roberts Commission I have two points on cooperation.

211. General FRANK. May I? I would like to ask a question on this thing.

212. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

213. General FRANK. Those Japs under consideration for arrest were nothing more or less than Japanese spies; isn't that correct?

General SHORT. Some of them probably were. The chances are that most of them were not. I think it would be more nearly meeting the situation to say that they were largely propaganda agents. They had, they called them, consular agents scattered all over.

214. General FRANK. They called them what?

General SHORT. Consular agents.

215. General FRANK. Oh, yes.

General SHORT. And the reason I say they were not to any large extent spies because the Japanese paper there published a complete list of them, so it was no trouble to get the list of them. What they tried to do was to more or less control and influence the Japanese population, and undoubtedly some of them were spies, and some of them were perfectly innocent people that were just carrying out propaganda.

216. General FRANK. To control the Japs?

General SHORT. Controlled by the Japanese consul.

217. General FRANK. They were trying to control them in what direction?

General SHORT. Well, to keep them pro-Japanese, to bring [403] them up as Japanese rather than just plain Americans, I think. That would be my estimate of the situation.

218. General FRANK. That was an un-American activity, then, was it not?

General SHORT. It was an un-American activity; there is no question about it. I had no objection to the arrest, but the way the thing had been conducted. I talked with Shivers. We had a complete list of them. He said probably not more than 10 percent knew they were violating the law.

219. General FRANK. And they had continued to undermine the American Government for quite a period of time; isn't that right?

General SHORT. Probably had.

220. General FRANK. And we had condoned it?

General SHORT. We had paid no attention to the law; we had done nothing to enforce the law.

221. General RUSSELL. I would like to ask a question or two on that.

What evidence did you have against any specific consular agent that he was undermining the American Government?

General SHORT. The F. B. I. kept a file on every one of those people, and the O. N. I. That was their job, and the way the things were delineated it was their job rather than the Army's in peace time.

222. General RUSSELL. Did they, either of those agencies, indicate to you the name of one or more of these agents who had been in that specific job?

General SHORT. Oh, I know they had two lists: a list they called an A list that they thought were dangerous enough that [404] in case of a war they should be confined at once, and we confined all of those.

223. General RUSSELL. General Short, maybe I can't ask my questions correctly, but I am certainly not getting much of a specific answer. The thing I am attempting to show now is whether or not you were given evidence against specific people upon whom or against whom you could have brought prosecutions for un-American activities.

General SHORT. Let me put it this way: that any one individual that I wanted to know about, the F. B. I. and my G-2, if he had been implicated in anything, would have a record of him and would give it to me.

224. General RUSSELL. And that record would indicate specific un-American acts?

General SHORT. Whether—if he had been in un-American acts, yes.

225. General RUSSELL. And there were some who had been engaged in it, and you could have proved it?

General SHORT. In all probability.

226. General RUSSELL. Yes. Now, then, General Short, if you had a list of these people published in a paper, what was to be accomplished by registration?

General SHORT. Well, it was a Federal law. There might have been a lot of agents that were not published in that list, don't you see. It was possible.

227. General RUSSELL. Yes.

General SHORT. And there was a law making it an offense to be a foreign agent and not register, and it had been enforced I think in the States; it had never been enforced out there.

[405] 228. General GRUNERT. What authority did you have to enforce it? Wasn't that an F. B. I. matter?

General SHORT. That was F. B. I.

229. General GRUNERT. That was a Federal matter?

General SHORT. That was Department of Justice. Yes, it was just a question—the question came up I think probably—I don't know whether the Navy or the District Attorney brought it up, and I didn't think—I was afraid that the way they were going to do it that it would create a lot of disloyalty among the Japanese-American population and make it more difficult for us to handle the population. I had no objection to the arrest if they would make it perfectly plain to these people that they were supposed to register and if they didn't register by a certain date that they would arrest them all.

230. General GRUNERT. I have two more questions on this subject. We shall exhaust this subject and then we shall take a recess. If you have any more I think this subject of cooperation—

231. General RUSSELL. I have two more.

232. General GRUNERT. Well, I will finish up these two, and then we shall finish your question and then take a recess.

In your testimony before the Roberts Commission there appears this expression: "The Navy was more secrecy minded."

General SHORT. I think that is strictly true.

233. General GRUNERT. Did that prevent them from giving you information that you should have had?

General SHORT. Well, I do not think it would have prevented them from giving me information that they thought I should have. It might prevent them from giving me information [406] that they thought was strictly of interest to the Navy and that they shouldn't give to anybody. Now, I think that they give much less to their staff than we do to ours. I think that is strictly true, that they have always held things more secret: the same thing would be more secret to them than to us.

234. General GRUNERT. But you still had confidence that they would pass to you what they thought you ought to have?

General SHORT. If they thought it was anything of genuine interest to me, I do not think there is any question but what they would give it to me.

235. General GRUNERT. The other one is this, to this effect: You stated that because of the restricted area of Pearl Harbor, whenever the fleet was in and naturally was huddled, that adequate protection from the air was almost impossible—complete protection, we will put it. Was this ever discussed with Admiral Kimmel or Bloch with a view to avoiding such huddling or making such a big target?

General SHORT. No, it was not. Now, I discussed it at some length with Admiral Standley on the Roberts Commission.

236. General GRUNERT. All right; go ahead with your question (addressing General Russell).

General SHORT. As a matter of fact, I think I remember Admiral Kimmel stating that any time that he thought there was any probability of an air attack he wanted to get everything out of the harbor. I think I remember his making that statement. You know the size of the harbor there, and I am quite sure that I remember his making that statement, that if at any time he was convinced there was danger of an air attack, that [407] he would want to move everything in the way of major ships out.

237. General GRUNERT. All right.

238. General RUSSELL. General Short, you stated that you had very little time to read this Roberts report?

General SHORT. That is right.

239. General RUSSELL. Have you read the testimony of your G-2, who I believe was named Fielder?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

240. General RUSSELL. Did you read that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

241. General RUSSELL. Do you remember the statement in Colonel Fielder's testimony that prior to December 7th they never received

any reports giving you information on Japanese activities at all, where the fleet was, and things of that sort?

General SHORT. I haven't got the question now. That he never received—?

242. General RUSSELL. Did you see where Colonel Fielder stated that they did not get this enemy information or Japanese information reports at all before December 7, 1941?

General SHORT. Oh, you mean ship movements? Wasn't that what—was that what you meant?

General RUSSELL. Well, I recall it.

General SHORT. I think that his statement was that we could not get from the Navy reports of movements of Japanese ships prior to December 7th, before December 7th, which I think is correct.

244. General RUSSELL. As I recall, Colonel Fielder's testimony was to the effect that this bureau in the Navy which corresponds to our G-2 never gave them anything before December 7th.

[408] General SHORT. I am inclined to believe that if you will look that up carefully that it was just in reference to Japanese ships.

245. General RUSSELL. Well, I will look it up during the recess.

General SHORT. Because they worked very closely as far as any individuals went.

246. General RUSSELL. Well, I am not talking about any residents. I am talking about the activity of the Japanese armed forces either—

General SHORT. Well, I think as far as the Japanese Fleet goes, that he made that statement, that that is correct.

247. General RUSSELL. And you never saw any reports as to the whereabouts of the Japanese ships?

General SHORT. All I got was by personal conversation with Admiral Kimmel and—

248. General RUSSELL. And they did not send over reports?

General SHORT. No, we did not get reports.

249. General RUSSELL. All right.

General SHORT. But I got a great deal from personal conversation.

250. General RUSSELL. One other question on operations, the operations end: Your alerts were ordered by the War Department?

General SHORT. No, sir, not necessarily.

251. General RUSSELL. Could have been?

General SHORT. They could have been ordered.

252. General RUSSELL. Or you might have originated them?

General SHORT. Yes. The War Department never did order any particular type of alert during my time.

[409] 253. General RUSSELL. But you had no jurisdiction at all over ordering the Navy to go on alert?

General SHORT. Oh, no, none whatever.

254. General RUSSELL. So you could be on your highest form of alert, and the Navy could be on no alert at all?

General SHORT. Just—yes.

255. General RUSSELL. That is all.

256. General FRANK. I would like to ask a couple of questions.

In cooperation with the Navy was there a preponderance of getting along necessary on the part of the Army, or did you feel that the Navy was meeting you fully half way?

General SHORT. I felt that they played the game pretty well. Really, I felt they played the game better than I had ever seen the Navy play the game.

257. General FRANK. You have stated heretofore that you felt a certain degree of security because of your confidence about the effectiveness of naval protection. Do you now feel that you were overconfident about naval effectiveness?

General SHORT. Apparently they did not have enough to give complete protection, and they were giving protection in the sectors they thought most dangerous.

258. General FRANK. Do you now feel that you perhaps had misplaced confidence in them?

General SHORT. I had too much confidence.

259. General FRANK. Another thing: Do you now feel that the Navy withheld from you certain information that they had available that would have been invaluable to you?

General SHORT. I don't believe that they purposely withheld anything from me that they thought really concerned me.

[410] 260. General FRANK. Don't you think that that information about the naval task force with carriers and submarines and battleships down in Jaluit would have vitally affected you?

General SHORT. Yes, possibly.

261. General GRUNERT. Did the Navy understand your mission and your responsibility sufficient to be able to be a good judge of what should be passed to you or what shouldn't be passed to you?

General SHORT. Oh, I think they did, definitely.

262. General GRUNERT. We shall take a ten-minute recess. We shall begin again directly after 4:15.

(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.)

[411] 263. General GRUNERT. I have a question, here, on the so-called Plan for Air Defense of Oahu, submitted to the War Department on the 20th of August, 1941, by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Forces, General Martin, through the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. Did you know anything about that particular so-called "plan" of August 20?

General SHORT. Was that the plan for the searching of the 360-degree sector?

264. General GRUNERT. Right.

General SHORT. Oh, yes. I went over that in very great—

265. General GRUNERT. Did you concur in that plan?

General SHORT. I thought it was an excellent study.

266. General GRUNERT. Now, we go into these various messages. Do you admit having received from the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet a paraphrased dispatch on the 16th of October?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; that was the first message I read to you, today.

267. General GRUNERT. That is the one which informed all concerned of "the existing grave situation," and which directed the Navy "to take due precautions" which would not "constitute provocative action against Japan." If so, what was your reaction thereto, and what precautions did you require of the Army, in view thereof?

General SHORT. We had had all the utilities guarded, all the bridges, and since we put out our guards on that account, in July, when

they closed the banks, and when we got that I just simply cautioned people that were responsible for that guarding to be unusually careful. We didn't go into any additional alert. It wasn't a formal alert, but we had all of [412] the utilities guarded, and we kept them guarded, since July.

268. General GRUNERT. Then this "grave situation," what did you interpret that to be? A grave situation?

General SHORT. You mean, in that?

269. General GRUNERT. In that particular message.

General SHORT. Well, if you read that message as a whole and not any one line of it you will see that they felt sure that Japan was going to attack Russia, but they thought it was only a possibility they might attack the United States and Great Britain. There was a strong possibility that they would attack Russia. It looked as if they thought something was going to happen, but they were not at all so sure we were going to be involved in the thing.

270. General GRUNERT. That was your interpretation?

General SHORT. That was my interpretation, considering the message as a whole; and that they didn't want to do anything to arouse Japan and make our situation worse with them.

271. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions?

272. General RUSSELL. Yes; I want to follow up on that, on this one message; that is all.

General Short, the files in the Adjutant General's office indicate that the War Department did not agree with that Navy summary, and General Gerow recommended to the Chief of Staff that they send you another message in lieu of that one. The message recommended to be sent to you, by the War Department, was:

Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no (repeat No) abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent (end).

[413] That is according to this Adjutant General's file. That order or that statement was sent to you under "No. 266", radiogram No. 266. Do you recall that?

General SHORT. What was the date of that?

273. General RUSSELL. October 18.

General SHORT. 18th?

274. General RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

General SHORT. That was two days after this Navy business?

275. General RUSSELL. The War Department made a study. The War Plans Division made a study of this Navy message, and they disagreed with the situation?

General SHORT. I do not remember that. Apparently this naval message must have made more of an impression on me than that, that I got, because I had this definitely in mind and dug it out; and if I got it—I suppose, if they sent it, I got that message—but, as I say, the Navy message was stronger and it had made more of an impression.

276. General RUSSELL. This is the message, and it is supposed to have been sent to you under "266," October 20.

General SHORT. October 20? It may have been, but you notice it let up. It let up on things, and I naturally would not remember that as I would one that tightened up.

277. General RUSSELL. Are the records of these messages which came to you out there from the War Department now in the Hawaiian Department?

General SHORT. That is where they would be.

278. General RUSSELL. Would they be available?

General SHORT. They would be available.

279. General RUSSELL. Therefore, if you received this message [414] 266, on October 20, saying that there was no change in Japanese foreign policy, it would be out there?

General SHORT. It would be of record, out there; yes, sir; but I frankly do not happen to remember that.

280. General RUSSELL. You do not remember?

General SHORT. It may be because it was easing off.

281. General GRUNERT. The next message I wish to refer to is the message from the Navy to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, November 24, 1941, in which it is stated as an opinion that—

A surprise, aggressive movement in any direction is possible.
and in which it was directed not to—
precipitate Jap action

Was this information transmitted to you?

General SHORT. I do not think I ever got that message.

282. General RUSSELL. If you never got it, you cannot give us a reaction thereto?

General SHORT. No; I don't remember ever having seen that message. Now, it is an outside possibility.

283. General GRUNERT. You omitted mention of that message in your statement, so presumably—

General SHORT. Now, I might have seen it, and we might not have had an official copy given to us, and I might have forgotten about it. Kimmel might have shown it to me and just handed it to me to look at, and taken it back, and I might not have remembered it; I don't know, but I don't think I have ever seen it.

284. General RUSSELL. So far as you know, then, you didn't [415] take any action on it?

General SHORT. No.

285. General RUSSELL. So far as the Army is concerned?

General SHORT. No.

286. General FRANK. Had it been made of record in your headquarters, would you have known about it?

General SHORT. Oh, if it had come to my headquarters, I am sure I would have seen it. I might not have remembered it, but I know I would have seen it if it came there, because those messages were brought to me immediately.

287. General GRUNERT. What was the procedure when the Navy over there received a message, and they transmitted information to you? Did they give you a paraphrased copy of it? Did they inform you by word of mouth, or is there a record of such messages as were transmitted to you in the headquarters of the Hawaiian Department?

General SHORT. Normally they would send me, by an officer, a paraphrased copy, and if I were in my office it would be delivered to me personally; if not, it would be delivered to the Chief of Staff. Now, if it was something that Kimmel thought he ought to discuss with me immediately before he sent a message back to the Navy Department, he would probably call me up and ask me if I wouldn't come over to his headquarters, and then he would read it to me, and we would discuss it.

288. General GRUNERT. We go on to the next message, the Navy message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, of November 27.

General SHORT. I feel sure that I have seen that message, although we could not find a copy of it in our headquarters, [416] when we looked for it, for the Roberts Commission's report. That was during the period when I was down there at Kimmel's headquarters every day for three or four days, and in all probability he either read it to me, or I read it right there, because it is familiar to me; but we couldn't find a copy.

289. General FRANK. That is the one which says "This is a war warning."

General SHORT. "This is a war warning," yes.

290. General FRANK. And it anticipates attacks on Guam, the Philippine Islands, Thai, Kra Isthmus, and Borneo?

General SHORT. Yes.

291. General GRUNERT. The testimony before the Roberts Commission includes the testimony of Admiral Kimmel, in which he says he definitely remembers sending the "war warning" message to General Short. He says it seems that he handed it to him and discussed it with him in his own office.

General SHORT. I think, in Kimmel's office, rather than mine. I think there is no question but that I saw the telegram, that I saw the radiogram, but we did not find an official copy of it in our headquarters. There is no doubt in my mind but what I saw it.

192. General GRUNERT. What action did you take with regard to that message, as to the Army preparation?

General SHORT. On the same day, I had had this message from the Chief of Staff, and I took action on the Chief of Staff's message rather than on that message.

293. General GRUNERT. You did not consider the words "a war warning" as being of such nature as to require you to take more measures than you did?

[417] General SHORT. The Navy used that expression every once in a while in their messages.

294. General GRUNERT. Meaning what, thereby?

General SHORT. (Answer withdrawn by the witness.)

295. General GRUNERT. I will ask you that question. Do you mean it is in the line of "crying wolf! wolf!"?

General SHORT. To a certain extent; yes. That may not have been a fair answer.

296. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions about that message?

297. General FRANK. No.

298. General GRUNERT. We go to the next message, on which I have a number of questions, so I had better read them, one at a time, and you can answer them, one at a time.

It is the Chief of Staff's message of November 27 to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, in which, in part, the following information was furnished and directive given:

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

And then, again—

If hostilities cannot (repeat Cannot) be avoided U. S. desires Japan commit first overt act. This policy should not (repeat Not) be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

And then again—

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out [418] so as not (repeat Not) to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.

If any of these questions were answered in your statement or in previous questions, here, we will just say "covered."

What reconnaissances were made, and what other measures were taken? I think that has been answered.

General SHORT. That has been answered very fully.

299. General GRUNERT. What measures did the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department consider desirable, but that could not be taken without alarming the civil population or disclosing intent? In other words, did you consider that you wanted to take other measures, but you did not take them, because of the restrictions in that?

General SHORT. No, sir; I will say frankly that I did not believe, in view of all the information I had, that there would be an air attack there, so I didn't—I didn't want to go into alert No. 2.

300. General GRUNERT. If a defense against attack could not be undertaken before the commission by Japan of the first overt act, what preparatory measures could have been undertaken? Were such measures taken?

General SHORT. Of course, we could have done one or two things that could have been, the way it worked out, highly desirable. We could have gone into alert No. 2, that being an instant readiness for an air attack and a surface and a subsurface attack, or we could have gone into alert No. 3, under the guise of a maneuver, and moved everybody to battle positions. Either one would have been very desirable.

301. General GRUNERT. You were particularly informed—

This policy should not * * * be construed as restricting [419] you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

In your judgment, what action was necessary to insure your defense?

General SHORT. My judgment at the time was that while the hostilities might take place, the hostilities, in our case, would be in all probability sabotage, or possible uprisings; and I believe from the testimony of the Chief of Staff that he was thoroughly in accord with that opinion, himself.

302. General GRUNERT. My next few questions appear to have been answered, but I will put them in the record.

What report on the measures taken was submitted to the War Department? That has been answered.

General SHORT. Yes, but I think I would like to repeat that.

303. General GRUNERT. All right.

General SHORT. I refer, by number, Department radiogram, and identify very definitely their "radiogram No. So-and-So"—I think it was 472, received, alerted for sabotage, liaison with the Navy. In

other words, there should have been no possible misunderstanding to what message that referred, because it identified the War Department number.

304. General GRUNERT. Did the War Department have any comment to make on your report?

General SHORT. They never at any time admitted that they knew what I was doing, or that I was doing too much, or too little.

305. General GRUNERT. If not, did this lead you to believe that measures taken sufficed under existing conditions, [420] and that inasmuch as the War Department was cognizant of the situation, this relieved you of not taking additional defensive measures?

General SHORT. It lead me to believe that the War Department was 100% in accord with my belief, that they approved definitely of what I was doing.

306. General GRUNERT. Did you specifically query the War Department on this aspect?

General SHORT. No, I had reported on what I was doing, and I had no further comment for them, except on more sabotage. They came back, and I thought it was coming up after they had considered my message—it was the next day—going into detail on sabotage, stating that—

Be sure not to do anything illegal, etc.

And I went back and told them exactly what I was doing, and the legal authority I had for it.

307. General GRUNERT. Did you figure that the War Department had opportunity to get your report and then send the other message that you received? Was not this report submitted on the 28th, and did you not get the other message on the 28th?

General SHORT. No; my report was submitted on the 27th, and I would say that their message came in, as I remember, at 1:16 p.m., on the 27th. I think that we answered that message within 30 minutes.

308. General GRUNERT. But you do not know whether it is a fact or not that it was received?

General SHORT. I do not know whether it was actually delivered to them, but I frankly, from reading Gerow's testimony, I think that the trouble came that nobody ever took the trouble [421] to follow up and see that I had made the report of action that they indicated, and that they didn't check up and see the number of the radiogram that my report referred to. He states frankly that it was the duty of his division, and it wasn't done.

309. General GRUNERT. I will ask if it is your testimony, that I recall, now, you never took into consideration whether or not to take any additional measures, and if you had taken such measures it might be against the desires of the War Department?

General SHORT. I think if I had done anything to alarm the Japanese population in Hawaii, it would have been decidedly against the desires of the War Department.

310. General GRUNERT. It never occurred to you, though, to ask the War Department whether or not you should take additional measures?

General SHORT. I had reported. They gave me a directive to report the action taken. I reported exactly the action I had taken, and I figured if they did not approve, that they would come right back and say so, or if they wanted me to do more; and they did come back, but it was just more sabotage, so I thought that they approved of what I was doing, but wanted to be 100% sure of the details.

311. General GRUNERT. Before I go into the next one, have you any questions, any of you?

312. General RUSSELL. I think, at the end of your examination I will possibly want to ask General Short some questions about this War Department relation, but I do not think it is relevant to ask it at this point.

[422] 313. General GRUNERT. I have one separate subject, here—influences of and conclusions from what I call the warning message, under which we can carry most everything in that line that comes up, that we have not covered before.

314. General RUSSELL. I think so, too.

315. General GRUNERT. We go to the next one, the message from the Adjutant General, of November 28, 1941. This question of mine appears to have been answered. "Did you consider this message of the 28th as a reply to your report of the 27th?"

General SHORT. I very definitely did—my report of the 27th.

316. General GRUNERT. The 27th?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; I very definitely did.

317. General GRUNERT. We go to the next, the report of November 28, by the Commanding General. I still have November 28 as your report.

General SHORT. Well, there are two reports. I reported the action taken, on the 27th. They replied on the 28th, with all this business about sabotage, and I wrote another report, then, on the 28th, stating the legal authority that I was given, from the Governor, to do all these things, and from the Mayor of Honolulu.

318. General GRUNERT. And that was your report of the 28th to the message of the 28th.

General SHORT. That is correct; and my report of the 27th was to the message of the 27th. In other words, both messages were answered practically as soon as received.

319. General GRUNERT. And that just elaborated on your sabotage, on the measures taken?

[423] General SHORT. And assuring them that I was not taking any illegal action, because they had been apparently worried about my doing things that would get the Army in bad with the civil authorities.

320. General GRUNERT. Now, there appear to be three messages here.

321. General RUSSELL. General, before you go away from that message of the 28th, I have something with me.

General SHORT. I think you have the "work sheets."

322. General RUSSELL. No, I have had this message checked, and I assumed that you would not remember it, but I am merely calling attention to it, so we will check it in Hawaii. There is a message which came out on the 28th, 484. Now, the message that General Grunert has just been asking you about is 482.

General SHORT. 482—that is right.

323. General RUSSELL. This goes to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and it is signed "Arnold," and stamped officially.

General SHORT. That is the one signed by Arnold. That is the one that went, practically identical to my message, that went to all the air stations.

324. General RUSSELL. You see this one, 482, went to all the air stations. 484 did not go to the air stations. I just wondered if you have any point in getting 482.

General SHORT. Here is 482. It is the one that came to me, and it says at the end of it—

To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations, but this does not (repeat Not) affect your responsibility under existing [424] instructions.

Now, that is 482, according to my number. And this is the one that went—you see it is addressed "attention Commanding Air Forces." It went to Martin, it went to the air station, and he replied to him three or four days later in great detail.

325. General GRUNERT. I think the witness is right. That was the Philippine message.

326. General RUSSELL. I do not think we ought to be partial to any of these messages. I think we ought to get them all in.

General SHORT. I have tried to keep straight on all of them.

327. General GRUNERT. We will go to the next one. It is a message of December 3, a Naval dispatch of December 3, 1941, from the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, to the effect that—

Information discloses evidence instructions were sent to various Japanese diplomatic and consular posts to destroy certain codes and ciphers and to burn certain documents.

Was this information transmitted to you?

General SHORT. I never saw that message.

328. General GRUNERT. There were some Navy messages in December?

General SHORT. I say I never saw it. I think it was quoted in the Roberts Commission's report when it came out, but up to that time I had never seen it.

[425] 320. General GRUNERT. There were also two messages, one dated December 4 and the other December 6, from the same source to the same person, regarding the destruction of their own confidential documents. Was that information transmitted to you?

General SHORT. It was not. I got no copy of it.

330. General GRUNERT. You had none of the information that was disclosed in those three messages?

General SHORT. No, sir.

331. General GRUNERT. Now, we get to the message of the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated December 7, 1941.

General SHORT. I can locate it for you, I am sure. It is on page 20.

332. General GRUNERT. It is the message from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, December 7, 1941. I think you have given us full information as to that message, as to the time of its receipt and everything.

Is there anything further that you wish to add about that; or are there any questions that the Board has about that particular message? (No response.) There appear to be none.

I will ask you a question about that. In your testimony before the Roberts Commission you referred to a time-consuming code which might have been avoided, that is, the time-consuming part, by the use of the telephone. Had you or had the War Department been in the past, during your service over there, using that phone for highly-secret matters?

General SHORT. We used it for highly-important matters.

333. General GRUNERT. Do you consider, with reference to the message of December 7th, 1941, that the situation at the time [426] might have been aggravated had there been a leak in transmission had they used the phone?

General SHORT. I think the time element was the most important element in that situation.

334. General GRUNERT. Is this in retrospect?

General SHORT. I was going to say that if I had been sitting there in the position of the Chief of Staff I might have done just what he did. Apparently even at that late date they still thought that secrecy was more important than the time element, and they did not visualize any attack on Honolulu at that time.

335. General GRUNERT. We want to develop, if there is anything else to be brought out, the conclusions drawn from this series of messages.

General SHORT. I read those conclusions to you, if you remember, because I wanted to be very exact; and think that is as good a statement of the conclusions as I could make.

336. General GRUNERT. I will ask you some questions to see whether or not they have been covered and in order to get into the record why these messages served to emphasize danger from sabotage and why not the necessity of taking a state of war readiness, and why was not the subject of taking a state of war readiness considered. I think you have well covered the question of sabotage; but did it ever occur to you that the warnings in this information necessitated taking a state of war readiness as compared with a state of internal security readiness?

General SHORT. There were two things involved. One was the information that I had from the Navy as to what they knew about naval ships; and, as I say, my confidence that they could prevent the carriers from getting through. The other was the [427] insistence on the part of the War Department that the public must not be alarmed and that the intent must not be disclosed and that there must not be any provocative measures against Japan. I think if they had been convinced that something was absolutely imminent, the only thing they would be worried about would be my getting one hundred per cent ready. They would not have cared whether I alarmed the public or what I did so long as I got ready in the least possible time to meet the situation. If they had been expecting an air attack they would have said, "Alert for an air attack at once." I do not think they would have taken any chances.

337. General GRUNERT. To what extent did the Navy's conclusion that Japanese carriers were still at home ports influence you to consider that Alert No. 1 was adequate?

General SHORT. From all we knew of their land planes, they could not make an attack from land bases; and if the carriers were so accounted for that they were not of danger to us, it looked as if we were safe from air attack.

338. General GRUNERT. What influenced you to believe that the chances of a raid out there, with the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor or thereabouts, were practical nil?

General SHORT. The Operations Officer had stated specifically in answer to a question of Admiral Kimmel that he considered that there was no chance of a surprise attack.

339. General GRUNERT. In view of the lack of definite knowledge as to the intentions of Japan, why were not measures taken to cover any eventuality?

General SHORT. If you had taken measures to meet any eventuality, you would have disregarded other parts of the message. They said, "Do not alarm the public. Do not disclose [428] intent. Do nothing provocative to Japan."

340. General GRUNERT. Do you consider that taking defensive measures of any kind necessarily would disclose intent?

General SHORT. Under the strained relations, if we were moving live ammunition to all the guns—remember, in DeRussy everything was right under the eye of the public. Your guns were just in the middle of the city, and there is no question but that it would have given rise to a lot of speculation.

341. General GRUNERT. How would they know you had live ammunition?

General SHORT. We had anti-aircraft guns there as close as from that window (indicating). If you put the ammunition out people walking along the sidewalk could read it on the boxes.

342. General GRUNERT. They knew that the army was kept over there to defend the island. Are they supposed to be impotent and not to be trusted to take ammunition out? I cannot understand the psychology.

General SHORT. Taking live ammunition out, I think, in a period of strained relations like that, is a very different thing from moving it in maneuvers or on target practice that everybody has been accustomed to.

343. General GRUNERT. You were over there with the intent of defending the island.

General SHORT. The papers were writing up the situation and they were writing scare headlines, and in combination it would have been just exactly what they told us not to do. They said not to alarm the public. If the War Department felt as you do about it I do not think they should have sent out any such instructions.

344. General GRUNERT. What ground had you to assume that the [429] War Department messages regarding subversive activities and antisabotage and your reports thereon constituted adequate preparatory measures?

General SHORT. Because, having received my report as to exactly what I was doing, they had let ten days go by without ever telling me I was doing too much or too little.

345. General GRUNERT. Did you consider, having made this report and no reply having been received, that it absolved you against taking other measures?

General SHORT. I did. I thought they agreed with me a hundred percent. And there were other things that influenced me. I pointed out before certain planes coming in from the mainland without ammunition and with all guns cosmolined. I can see a definite argument that they did not consider any great danger in the situation.

346. General GRUNERT. To what extent, if any, did you develop a sense of security due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military and naval circles and in the public press, that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East? Was this justified from a military viewpoint?

General SHORT. I supposed that perhaps we had all been influenced over a period of years by the fact that our war plans had always been against an attack on the Philippine Islands. The war plans had not been built against an attack on Hawaii. I was very familiar with those plans. I had been in the far eastern section of G-2 for three years and had commanded one of those maneuver forces.

347. General GRUNERT. To what extent, if any, did the fact that they were planning to send Army troops to relieve marines in the mandates influence you as to your decision not to take any [430] greater defensive measures than you did?

General SHORT. That in itself would have had no effect. That would have indicated to me that they foresaw the possibility of using Marines for landing forces, and they wanted to get all the Marines where they would be available. It did not mean necessarily anything immediate; and, as a matter of fact, it was not exactly an order; it was a call for a recommendation, and Kimmel and I both recommended that it be put off until certain construction had been completed.

348. General GRUNERT. I think you have covered most of the rest of my questions. I may have one more. Did you not give thought, or did you give thought, to the policy of the Axis Powers to usually attack on Sundays and also to the fact that Japan usually attacks on declaration of war but not waiting until its opponent is advised of that declaration?

General SHORT. I fully expected Japan to attack, but I expected her to attack the Philippines on account of the presence of the fleet. I thought she would attack where she would not be confronted with so large forces.

349. General FRANK. Of the 6 messages that were sent to you, three from the Navy and three from the Army, between November 16th and 28th, you seem to have been conversant with five of them. Four of them cautioned to be careful and not do anything that would provoke Japan. Three of them cautioned against sabotage. Was there any cumulative effect of this sabotage caution?

General SHORT. Undoubtedly it caused me to feel that the War Department agreed with my own judgment that the greatest danger was internal danger from the Japanese population.

350. General FRANK. Did not the provisions of your war plans [431] and your standing operating procedure provide fully for defense against all situations?

General SHORT. It did. The three alerts made the thing very definitely provided for.

351. General FRANK. Were not the provisions of your war plan and standing operation procedure known in the War Department?

General SHORT. Oh, yes.

352. General GRUNERT. You say, "Oh, yes." But what do you know about it?

General SHORT. They were reported on November 5. I do not know that anybody had read them.

353. General GRUNERT. We have had testimony to the effect that the War Plans Division representatives did not know the S. O. P.

General SHORT. That is quite possible; but they were forwarded to the War Department—just the same as the War Plans Division did not know that I made a report which they called for.

354. General RUSSELL. Is there record of those S. O. P.'s having been forwarded to the War Department?

General SHORT. I think so. There would undoubtedly be a letter of transmittal.

355. General GRUNERT. Then are you of the opinion that they knew what was in your S. O. P. of the 5th of November and knew your classes of alerts?

General SHORT. When I sent the message I knew there was a possibility that the man who got the message would not know what Alert No. 1 was, so I said "Alert for sabotage." I did not use "Alert No. 1," because I thought the man who got the message might not have read the procedure and would have to look it up and spend some time; so I said "Alert for sabotage."

[432] 356. General FRANK. Suppose that instead of all the provisions that were placed in these messages you had received one saying "War imminent. Act accordingly."

General SHORT. I, in all probability, would have gone to Alert No. 3.

357. General FRANK. Why would you have gone to Alert No. 3 in the event of naval advice to the contrary?

General SHORT. That would have indicated at least that the War Department were 100 percent convinced that something had happened.

358. General GRUNERT. Then "War imminent" to the Navy did not mean the same that "War imminent" would have meant to you?

General SHORT. Absolutely not, because I knew that expression had been used frequently in naval messages.

359. General FRANK. Now, with respect to the cautions against provoking the Japs, that was a national policy, was it not?

General SHORT. Apparently, yes, without exception.

360. General FRANK. While we were refraining from provoking the Japs in general, what were they doing?

General SHORT. I would not know enough of all of their diplomatic circumstances to tell you, sir. They were apparently getting ready to make some preparations to attack, if that is what you mean.

361. General FRANK. Do you not think that that was generally known?

General SHORT. You mean by our diplomats?

362. General FRANK. Yes.

General SHORT. I do not know. After an event has happened many people profess to have known things that they did not know before.

[433] 363. General FRANK. Were you not familiar with Mr. Grew's reports?

General SHORT. I have read his statement in the State Department White Paper. But the Grew report I think was ten months before.

364. General FRANK. That indicated the attitude of the Japs, did it not?

General SHORT. Yes; but if it has been ten months or a year, they might come to the conclusion that Grew had been wrong.

365. General FRANK. Further, you were familiar, were you not, with the activities of the Japanese agents attached to the consulate?

General SHORT. We felt sure that they were carrying on propaganda to have people keep their dual citizenship in place of renouncing it, and things of that kind.

366. General GRUNERT. Was there anything by way of indication in Honolulu or about Honolulu to the effect that they were arrogant, that they despised this nation because of what looked to be a weak-kneed policy of conciliation?

General SHORT. No; I would not say they were. At the time they closed all the Japanese bank accounts—I guess that was in July—there was a lot of uneasiness among the Japanese population, a very great deal of uneasiness, but I do not remember at any time any arrogant attitude on the part of the population.

367. General FRANK. You do not seem to have a feeling that we were very restricted in our efforts or that we were impeded at all in taking full-out measures for national defense in our attitude of keeping from provoking the Japs?

[434] General SHORT. I think we were to a certain extent. As I explained a while ago, if we had taken any action; for instance, suppose at that time we had seized all these consular agents. That would have been exactly what the War Department did not want us to do. When we got that message on November 27th about hostilities, if we had recommended to the District Attorney that he arrest all those consular agents, I think we would have been doing exactly what the War Department directed us not to do.

368. General GRUNERT. If you had not received any message from the War Department, what would have been your action? What would you have done or not done?

General SHORT. We had been not quite on Alert No. 1 from July on, from the time the banks were closed. We were extremely watchful. I think in all probability we would have been on Alert No. 1 with a careful recheck of all our guards and strengthening where necessary.

369. General GRUNERT. But still you would not have gone beyond Alert No. 1?

General SHORT. No; I do not think we would, because, as I saw the thing, I did not visualize an air attack at that time.

370. General FRANK. Had you been on sort of an alert ever since July?

General SHORT. At least half an alert. We had never taken the guards off of the highway bridges and utilities. Our guards along the waterfront were not nearly as strong as they were after November 27. We put out a lot of additional guards and checked on everything; and we had gotten all of the gasoline people, all of the public utility people, as early as July, to build man-proof fences and put flood lights around the properties [435] so that we could guard them.

371. General FRANK. Do you think that this continuous alert had been carried to such an extent that the command had become apathetic?

General SHORT. I do not, because when the attack occurred everything clicked. There was not any confusion of any kind. There was no delay, and the troops went into action as fast as anybody could expect them to.

372. General FRANK. Do you recall ever seeing the order that called for the alert of the previous year, 1940?

General SHORT. You mean Field Order No. 1?

373. General FRANK. No; the order that came from the War Department.

General SHORT. I think I knew about one that General Marshall sent out, and I did not tell them whether it was the real thing, or not. It stayed out for some time. I don't remember the wording of the alert, but I knew about it; and they were kept on that alert, as I remember, for some time, not knowing whether it was drill or whether it was the real thing.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Page 435, line 15,—omit "I".						
*	*	*	*	*	*	*
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

/s/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

374. General FRANK. Did these caution messages have any effect on the full-out measures that you had taken?

General SHORT. They made us extremely cautious about everything possible pertaining to sabotage. We tightened up and it would have been very difficult for them to have gotten away with anything.

375. General GRUNERT. What, short of a War Department order to do so, would have caused you to take Alert No. 2 or No. 3?

General SHORT. If they had radioed me that they considered there was danger of an air attack we would have been in Alert No. 2 in three minutes. If they had wired me that they considered [436] there was danger not only of an air attack but a possible attempt at landing, we would have been alerted just as fast, because we were so organized that all we had to do was to put Alert No. 2 in effect or Alert No. 3 in effect and there would be no delay and no confusion.

376. General GRUNERT. If you had never received what we called a G-2 sabotage alert and the so-called Arnold sabotage alert, would you still have gone under Alert No. 1?

General SHORT. I went on Alert No. 1 when I received the message from the Chief of Staff, because I thought it was the thing to do. If I had received nothing else and gotten no reply after making my report, I might have wondered more about it. But in view of the things that came afterward, and the planes that came in without ammunition, without preparation for defense, I was a hundred per cent convinced.

377. General FRANK. I would like to develop this thought for just a minute. This is in consideration generally of military operations. In estimating the situation with which a military commander is confronted, our teachings in the military establishment generally have been along the lines of taking all information that is available, evaluating it and using it as a guide. Is that correct?

General SHORT. Yes.

378. General FRANK. That is in accordance with our Leavenworth teaching, our war college teaching and our actual practice in the organization. Now, in coming to a decision on military disposition and general practice in the Army, Army teachings, as perhaps Army tradition, indicate that a commander should prepare for enemy action of what character?

[437] General SHORT. The worst.

379. General FRANK. The worst. Now, can you tell me why that was not done in this instance?

General SHORT. Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air Corps particularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn't meet the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I reported action taken and there was no comment that my action was too little or too much I was a hundred per cent convinced that they agreed with it. They had a lot more information than I had.

380. General RUSSELL. General Short, before asking you some questions about the relations between the Hawaiian Department and the War Department, I want to come back to one thing that was brought up a little earlier in the afternoon, because it is going to be a very material issue here apparently, and that is the extent of the naval reconnaissance on the 27th of November and the days thereafter. I do not want to repeat the questions—

General SHORT. No.

381. General RUSSELL. —or to elicit the answers that have already taken place here this afternoon; but the statement which you made as to task forces which were acting at the same time as reconnaissance parties on which these planes were sent is in conflict with all of the other facts or statements that I know of about that situation.

[438] General SHORT. In other words, you do not believe the task forces were out.

382. General RUSSELL. I have no personal belief about it.

General SHORT. No, but I mean your information doesn't indicate—?

383. General RUSSELL. My information is that there were a couple of task forces that had gone out to the east to leave some people on some islands. That is, as they were returning from this mission, the planes had been sent out.

384. General FRANK. To the east or west?

385. General RUSSELL. On that way. (indicating); I don't know which way that was.

General SHORT. I think I am correct in stating that there was one task force coming back in and that there were two going out, one going

towards Midway and one going to Johnston Island, that landed—I know in that case it landed just five minutes before the attack. It got the report of the attack in five minutes after they landed. I had a staff officer with that one, so I know in regard to that.

386. General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, General Short, it may come to pass that you will be back here tomorrow; and I think you will find, or you will find in this Roberts report a statement as to naval activity on December 7th, and I am merely suggesting that if you desire it might be well to check that and check that evidence which you have given this afternoon.

General SHORT. And I think it would be well to check specifically, if you have Admiral Kimmel, as to what task forces were out. I am quite convinced that there was one coming in and two going out.

[439] 387. General RUSSELL. Your evidence was this afternoon that the Navy had out on reconnaissance all of its available——

General SHORT. I think they had every carrier.

388. General RUSSELL. Every one.

General SHORT. I think there were only about two cruisers that were in the harbor and just a small number of destroyers. Their battle-ships were all in.

389. General RUSSELL. Very well.

General SHORT. I think that is correct.

390. General RUSSELL. You get the sense of the remarks that I am making?

General SHORT. Yes.

391. General RUSSELL. My effort is to eliminate from this record every factual issue that it is possible to eliminate.

General SHORT. I have no worry of definitely saying that that was the case, but Admiral Kimmel could give you positive information on the subject. I think I am definitely correct, and I know that the one that went south to Johnston Island landed just five minutes before the attack, because I say I had a staff officer on it.

392. General RUSSELL. Yes. Now, before we leave this subject of reconnaissance to determine what else could have been done that day, you had these people on from 4 until 7, on the radar?

General SHORT. That is right.

393. General RUSSELL. There are statements in the record and facts as to how effective those radar training or mobile sets were, how far they would reach, and how accurately they operated. Now, how far could your radar detect the presence of aircraft?

General SHORT. That morning they actually detected it at [440] 132 miles, apparently.

394. General RUSSELL. Well, might it not be that they had taken off from a carrier which was 132 miles away?

General SHORT. They might have.

395. General RUSSELL. Do you know, General Short, whether or not they would have detected aircraft any farther away than 130 miles?

General SHORT. In all probability not with our mobile stations. Now, we hoped, with those fixed stations that we were building up as high as 10,000 feet, eventually to get to 200 miles with those stations, 10,000 feet up. We didn't figure that we could count on more

than 75 or a hundred miles under average conditions with the mobile stations. There are times when you get them farther.

396. General RUSSELL. Therefore, the reconnaissance agency available to you that morning was limited in the detection of aircraft in the air to 130 miles or so?

General SHORT. That was as far as we could expect it, yes.

397. General RUSSELL. The only other reconnaissance measure which you could have taken would have been in connection with the distant reconnaissance?

General SHORT. Distant reconnaissance.

398. General FRANK. Something that you have to realize about the operation of radar is that radar will not operate over the curvature of the earth.

General SHORT. That is the reason for going up 10,000 feet.

399. General FRANK. Also, the higher the aircraft is flying the further away it will pick it up, and also the higher the [441] radar is above the sea level the further away it will pick it up.

400. General RUSSELL. I understand all those factors, but the thing that I was attempting to develop was the strength of the radar instrument which you were operating.

General SHORT. I think that 132 miles is about as far as we could ever hope to get anything with those mobile sets.

401. General RUSSELL. What I had in mind was whether or not they were to the radar world what the walkie-talkie was to our radio in the Army.

General SHORT. To a certain extent. They would not get the distance that the fixed stations would get.

402. General GRUNERT. What is the line of the rest of your questions?

403. General RUSSELL. In the rest of my questions, I believe, except some miscellaneous, I am going to talk about or ask General Short some questions on what he knew about the general hostile situation.

404. General GRUNERT. I think we have gone about as far as we can today, and we shall start tomorrow morning on the rest of this agenda, in which we shall cover interceptor command, aircraft warning service, A. A. defense, in-shore patrol, command, and staff and so forth, and there will be an opportunity to get those questions in.

(Thereupon, at 5:25 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

[442]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[443] **PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD**

SATURDAY, AUGUST 12, 1944

**MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.**

The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

(M. R. O'Connor and V. C. Brown, transcribing reporters, were sworn by the Recorder.)

**TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER CAMPBELL SHORT, UNITED
STATES ARMY, RETIRED—Resumed. (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS
COUNSEL, BRIG. GEN. THOMAS H. GREEN, UNITED STATES ARMY)**

405. General GRUNERT. You may proceed.

406. Colonel WEST. The witness is reminded that he is still under oath. It will not be necessary to repeat the oath.

407. General GRUNERT. We will take up the combination of Interceptor Commands and Air Warning Service.

408. General RUSSELL. I have some questions that I did not [444] finish yesterday.

409. General GRUNERT. Do you want to take them up on subjects that we went into yesterday?

410. General RUSSELL. Yes.

411. General GRUNERT. All right. We will wait until General Russell finishes his questions, and take up the topics which I mentioned.

412. General RUSSELL. General Short, when we left off yesterday we were discussing the reconnaissance which was being conducted by the Navy on the 6th and 7th of December. There seemed to be some confusion as to just what was being done. I have had an opportunity to check the Navy testimony on that. I thought it would be well to have our record clear on it if it could be made clear.

Captain DeLany of the Navy testified before the Roberts Commission. Did you know Captain DeLany?

General SHORT. Yes.

413. General RUSSELL. He stated that certain of the Pacific Fleet was in Pearl Harbor, describing it as Task Force 1, giving the number of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers; also the ships of the base force

with the Oregon as the flagship, and repair ships. Those were the ships at Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 7th?

General SHORT. Yes.

414. General RUSSELL. He said that out was Task Force 8, the Enterprise with the addition of heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers; that they were approximately 200 miles west of Oahu.

415. General FRANK. When?

[445] 416. General RUSSELL. They were returning from an expedition to Wake Island where they had landed a squadron of Marines. That was on the night of December 6, 1941. It was from that point that the Enterprise sent 18 or 19 planes out on a definite reconnaissance mission. That is one of the forces. The second task force that was out was No. 12 in which was the Lexington. Is that a carrier?

General SHORT. That is a carrier.

417. General RUSSELL. They were approximately 425 miles southeast of Midway?

General SHORT. Yes.

418. General RUSSELL. And their principal mission was landing a squadron of Marine bombers on that island.

General SHORT. Did he not indicate that the men went out on this task force with planes?

419. General RUSSELL. He makes no reference to any reconnaissance launched from the Lexington.

General SHORT. He might not, because, as I understand it, it was habitual.

420. General RUSSELL. We will attempt to develop that; but I am attempting now to get the record straight.

Now, in addition to these 18 or 19 planes that had been sent out by Task Force 8 from the Enterprise, there were either three or four patrol planes carrying out the morning search required by the security order in the operated areas to the southward of Oahu?

General SHORT. Yes.

421. General RUSSELL. Evidently they had their base at Pearl Harbor.

General SHORT. Did he say anything about any planes that went to Johnston Island and landed on Johnston Island five minutes before the Japs struck Pearl Harbor? The mission was commanded, as I remember, by Admiral Brown.

422. General RUSSELL. Where is Johnston Island?

General SHORT. About 900 to 1100 miles southwest of Oahu. I think it is about 900 miles.

423. General RUSSELL. We will check on that later.

General SHORT. I am so positive about it because I had a staff officer with them.

424. General RUSSELL. Yesterday, General Short, you were asked a hypothetical question by General Frank which, in substance, was about this: Had you received a message on December 7 saying "War is imminent. Do the necessary," what would you have done? To that question you replied, "I would have gone into Alert 3."

General SHORT. I think I probably would if I had received such a message. Of course I did not receive it. It is purely hypothetical. It would be very difficult to say positively what I would or would not have done.

425. General RUSSELL. In all the evidence which was adduced on yesterday the definite trend, if not the definite conclusion, could be reached that, based on the information which you had, you had no confusion in your thinking about the adequacy of going into an alert for sabotage?

General SHORT. That is correct.

426. General RUSSELL. There was nothing left in your mind about that that was uncertain or indefinite.

General SHORT. That is correct.

[447] 427. General RUSSELL. In your early testimony, however, you referred to the fact that when you received this very important message of November 27 you did reach the conclusion that the War Department thought that there was still some possibility of avoiding war with Japan?

General SHORT. I thought so from the caution about not taking any provocative measures against Japan and not alarming the public. To take the message of the 16th of October and the 27th of November together, they indicated to me that they were still hopeful of avoiding hostilities.

428. General RUSSELL. Do you recall that in the message of November 27 and at the beginning of that message, there is language to the effect that there existed the barest possibility that the Japs might come back and offer to continue negotiations?

General SHORT. Yes.

429. General RUSSELL. What effect on your thinking would the return of the Japanese and the resumption of negotiations have had?

General SHORT. That there was a possibility of arriving at something short of war.

430. General RUSSELL. Did you have from the War Department, after the message of November 27, 1941, any further information as to the resumption of negotiations with the Japanese?

General SHORT. I had nothing. All I had from the War Department was the message of November 28 which went into detail about sabotage.

431. General RUSSELL. From the press or any other source did you know that between November 27 and December 7 there were [448] other negotiations between the Japanese representatives in Washington and our Government?

General SHORT. I am sure I knew whatever was in the papers. I habitually read them.

432. General RUSSELL. If, then, as a matter of fact, the Japanese returned on the 1st, 2nd, or 5th of December, the chances are you knew about it?

General SHORT. I undoubtedly knew about it.

433. General RUSSELL. Then the possibility that they might come back for other negotiations had become an actuality?

General SHORT. Yes.

434. General RUSSELL. General Short, what if any information did you have from the War Department from the message in July 1941 to the message of October 16, 1941?

General SHORT. I do not remember anything outstanding. I have not dug into it, gotten out the messages and gone over them; but there was a break there where messages struck me as a very out-

standing piece of information in July, and the next serious one was October 16. Do not misunderstand me; there may have been others that I do not recall.

435. General RUSSELL. During this period of time you did have some correspondence with General Marshall, did you not?

General SHORT. I possibly did, on the question of obtaining things for the Department. Just what correspondence I had directly with him at that time I do not recall.

436. General RUSSELL. Did you have any messages from G-2 or other agencies of the War Department detailing or describing to you what was going on in our international relations with Japan?

[449] General SHORT. I do not think so.

437. General RUSSELL. Were you told at some time in September 1941 that General Marshall and others who were in conference with the Secretary of State had decided that war with Japan was inevitable?

General SHORT. I do not think I ever knew of that conference.

438. General RUSSELL. Did you know that the policy of the United States Government from some time in August or September of 1941 until the date of the attack was largely one of a delaying action, playing for time, with the realization that war with Japan was inevitable?

General SHORT. I think I knew at the time in an indefinite way. Later on I undoubtedly got that information when I read the State Department paper that came out a year or so afterwards.

439. General RUSSELL. Did you know, General Short, as Commander of the Hawaiian Department, that we were negotiating with the British and Dutch about coordinated military action in the Pacific area?

General SHORT. I knew nothing that was not in the papers.

440. General RUSSELL. Did you know that an agreement had been reached with all nations, the effect of which was that if the Japanese moved forces into Thailand west of 100 degrees east or south of 10 degrees north we would regard that as an act of war?

General SHORT. I did not.

441. General RUSSELL. Nobody ever conveyed that information to you at all?

General SHORT. If it was not in the papers I did not know that; and I am sure I do not remember its being in the papers.

[450] 442. General RUSSELL. You would hardly think that that information would be in the public press?

General SHORT. I would not expect it to be.

443. General RUSSELL. General Short, suppose you had known this policy of the American Government and suppose that it was taken in association or in conference with those other powers, do you think you would have been in a better position to have estimated the situation on the 27th of November when it was brought to your attention that negotiations had practically ended?

General SHORT. I think it would have made me more conscious that war was practically unavoidable.

444. General RUSSELL. And in reply to General Frank's question yesterday you stated that you would have gone into Alert No. 3 if you had known that war was unavoidable?

General SHORT. I do not think that is a good way of putting it. If I knew it was immediately imminent. Because it might be unavoid-

able and go along for a year, and you would not want to go into No. 3 and stay there. But if I had known it was immediately imminent, then I should think I would have gone into Alert No. 3.

445. General RUSSELL. If you had known all these things and then it had been brought to your attention that these negotiations had about ended, would or not that have indicated to your mind the possible imminence of war?

General SHORT. It would have looked to me definite that the war was almost upon us.

446. General RUSSELL. General Short did you know that on the [451] 26th of November the State Department handed to the Japanese representatives a memorandum which G-2 of the War Department at least considered as an ultimatum to the Japanese Government?

General SHORT. I knew nothing of anything of the kind until a year or so afterwards, whenever that State Department paper came out.

447. General RUSSELL. Did you know on the 27th of November, when you received that message, that the Secretary of State had in a meeting on the 25th of November told the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and probably the Chief of Staff of the Army, and Admiral Stark, that the State Department had gone as far as it could in its negotiations with the Japanese and that the security of the nation was then in the hands of the armed forces?

General SHORT. I did not.

448. General RUSSELL. Did you know that in January of 1941 Ambassador Grew made a report to the State Department or to the Secretary of State in which he stated that there were rumors in Japan that in event of trouble with America the Japs would attack Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. At that time I was not in command; but I have known of that later, I think probably a year or so later. I do not think I knew anything about it at that time.

449. General RUSSELL. Did you have any information in the period from November 27 to December 7, 1941, as to the disposition of the Japanese Fleet?

General SHORT. I am sure that I talked with Admiral Kimmel and, from the information, I thought that the Fleet was either in home ports or that a very considerable number [452] of Japanese ships had been sent south. As I remember, that was the gist of the thing. I know my impression was that they were moving more towards either the Malay Peninsula or the Philippines.

450. General RUSSELL. What was your impression as to what the Fleet knew about the location of the Japanese Fleet and its various types of surface ships during the six months immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. Admiral Bloch was in command of the District and kept a map locating as many as possible of the Japanese elements. I do not believe they felt that it was very complete or that it was accurate enough. I do not believe we were able to have agents in Japan accomplish much of anything. The means of obtaining information are not known to me.

451. General RUSSELL. What type of ship would have been of more interest to you as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department? I refer now to Japanese craft.

General SHORT. Carriers. Submarines would be second, probably.

452. General RUSSELL. If you had known that during the last six months prior to December 7, 1941, the location of the carriers of the Japanese Fleet were unknown to our Navy for 112 out of 180 days, what effect would that have had?

General SHORT. It would undoubtedly have made me feel that the reports were far from complete.

May I ask, General Russell, whether you mean 112 days in a stretch, or two-thirds of the days just taking the calendar days, that they did not know where the ships were?

[453] 453. General RUSSELL. Not 112 days on a stretch, but at intervals.

General SHORT. That might have a very different meaning. A ship might go from one harbor to another and there might be several days that they would not know anything about it except that it had left the previous harbor.

454. General RUSSELL. The information seems to be that they were lost 12 periods and those 12 periods apparently aggregated 112 days.

Now, I have some miscellaneous questions and I shall be through.

It is your belief, as I remember, that information about the Japanese was conveyed to you in talks, informal talks, between you and the Navy Commanders?

General SHORT. Yes; almost wholly.

455. General RUSSELL. Is it your opinion or not that unity of command would have been more effective than the cooperative agreement under which you and the Navy were working?

General SHORT. I think it would.

456. General RUSSELL. With the lack of enemy information, General Short, and the possibility of confusion created by the messages which you received from Washington, and maybe looking back in retrospect, do you not think that the situation demanded vigorous action on your part?

General SHORT. Very definitely not, from the information I had.

457. General RUSSELL. General Short, on the morning of December 7th the only screening or reconnaissance work that was being done was by the Navy?

[454] General SHORT. That is correct.

458. General RUSSELL. You were there with the mission of protecting the Navy.

General SHORT. I might add one thing. From 4 to 7 we had our Aircraft Warning Service, which was practically the only thing the Army had for reconnaissance.

459. General RUSSELL. A moment ago we were discussing what you would have done in event that you thought war was inevitable and imminent; and I have some recollection of a statement made by you on yesterday relating to a discussion with the Navy Commanders as to what they would have done with respect to dispersing the ships and moving them out of the harbor in the event of war.

General SHORT. I do not know whether it took place right at that time, but at some time I talked with Admiral Kimmel about the question of procedure in case of an air attack, and I very definitely had the idea that if he expected any immediate air attack he would clear

the harbor. Just when that conversation took place—we had so many—I would not know.

460. General RUSSELL. Yesterday in your testimony, General Short, you made some comparison of the aircraft available to you for the protection of Pearl Harbor and the Island of Oahu, with the number of aircraft that came in from the Japanese carriers. I have some notes about it, but they are not very complete. Did you form any conclusion as to the relative strength of the aircraft available to you and that of the Japs that made the attack?

General SHORT. We thought that they had somewhere between 160 and 180 planes. I believe the Navy figured possibly a [455] larger number than that. We had 105 pursuit planes that were modern enough to fight. We had 6 flying fortresses that were capable of being used on a mission. We had 10 A-20's, 9 of which were in commission, that were good for a relatively short mission. We had quite a bunch, probably 50 of the B-18s. It would have been suicide to send men in them. They were not even fast enough to run away if he had an idea of doing nothing but going out and looking around and returning as soon as he had his information. I believe that is a correct statement, General Frank. They were so obsolescent that they were almost useless.

461. General FRANK. It depends upon the point of view of the seriousness of the situation and how much you felt you wanted to pay for the information for which they went.

General SHORT. I did not mean I would not use anything in the world, no matter how obsolete; but they were not modern ships in any sense.

462. General FRANK. No.

463. General RUSSELL. You referred to the number of aircraft that were available there because of the presence of the Navy; I mean, Navy aircraft.

General SHORT. I might say that the ships that I gave you were not all. I think we had a total of 80 pursuit planes that were in commission. That includes some older types.

464. General RUSSELL. I believe all those details are in your statement. I was just attempting to get your considered opinion as to the relative strength of the contesting air forces.

General SHORT. I do not believe we could have mustered as much strength in modern planes if we had everything we could have [456] put in the air. We would have been quite inferior to the Japanese.

465. General RUSSELL. Do you include the Navy ships also?

General SHORT. That is another proposition. The Navy had a considerably greater number of reconnaissance planes than we had. My recollection is that it was something like 95 for reconnaissance.

466. General RUSSELL. Whatever the relative strengths of the contesting forces may have been on the morning of December 7, 1941, had you been in Alert No. 3 the damage which was done to us out there may have been greatly lessened?

General SHORT. Yes. I do not believe that we could have kept those low-flying planes from getting in, because the antiaircraft was almost helpless against them. They came in extremely close

to the water. The estimates were anywhere from 10 feet to 200 feet above the water. I believe that antiaircraft men will tell you that that would be the most difficult target to handle; the angle changes so rapidly.

467. General RUSSELL. Were those the ships that did the worst damage?

General SHORT. The torpedo planes, as I understand it, did the real damage. I think the real damage to the ships was practically all done in the first five or ten minutes of the action.

468 General GRUNERT. Will you please differentiate between ships of the air and ships of the Navy so that the record will show which is which?

General SHORT. I will say planes from now on.

469. General RUSSELL. I believe you stated on yesterday that [457] there was no surprise that the Japs would attack without a declaration of war?

General SHORT. That is correct.

470. General RUSSELL. Had there been any changes on the Island proper, under your command out there during the year 1941, which indicated the imminence of war?

General SHORT. I do not believe that there were any outward signs in the Japanese population. The only time that anything was definitely indicated was when they closed their accounts in the banks. There was a great deal of restlessness on that account. It practically stopped the business of the Japanese merchants. There was quite an upset at that time. I think it was more noticeable then than at any other time.

471. General RUSSELL. Would it have been possible to have guarded your aircraft against sabotage even though it had been dispersed?

General SHORT. Yes; but it would have taken a very great number of men and it would have interfered very seriously with training. If we had had the fencing and the floodlights the number required would not have been so great.

472. General RUSSELL. Were there not frequent arrivals of aircraft from the United States, in Oahu?

General SHORT. Not frequent arrivals. It was considered somewhat a perilous flight. We got in certain groups of flying fortresses and B-24's, the only time I remember flights coming all the way. When our pursuit planes were brought in they were brought in on carriers and took off in some instances and came in maybe the last 200 miles.

473. General RUSSELL. General Short, were there any considerable number of visitations or inspection trips made by War [458] Department personnel out in your area in 1941?

General SHORT. There were several people that came out there.

474. General RUSSELL. What was their purpose?

General SHORT. I took it that their purpose was to get a look at the status of things on the Island. As I remember, General Evans of the Air Corps came out and looked over things; and the Division Engineer from San Francisco came out and spent several days and inspected the Office of the District Engineer, because the District Engineer functioned directly under him.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

* * * * *

Page 458, line 7, change "General Evans" to General Emmons".

* * * * *

/s/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

475. General GRUNERT. Who was that?

General SHORT. Hannum. He came out and stayed several days and had two or three conferences with me at the end of his inspection. He came to tell me what he had found, and so forth.

476. General RUSSELL. Did they bring you any details of the negotiations between the Japs and our Government?

General SHORT. No.

477. General RUSSELL. On yesterday you discussed the necessity for arming and equipping these ships to fight, which were on the way to the Philippines, stopping off at Oahu. Where would they next stop to pick up gas?

General SHORT. They were flying then to Midway to Wake and from Wake to Port Moresby.

478. General RUSSELL. Could they get gas at Midway?

General SHORT. Yes; they could get gas at Midway and at Wake and at Port Moresby; and then they landed up around Darwin.

479. General RUSSELL. How far was it to Midway, the first stop for gas?

[459] General SHORT. I believe Midway is 1,100 miles. It is about 900 or 1,000 miles from there on to Wake, as I remember. The longest jump was from Wake to Port Moresby.

480. General RUSSELL. There has been some discussion about what would have happened if you had had another hour and a half or two hours on the December 7 message. I want to ask you two or three questions now about the condition of readiness. At some place in the record we have seen that it would require four hours for you to have gotten your aircraft into the air ready to fight.

General SHORT. No. There is a type of alert where it would require it, but in a case of emergency, the very fact that the pursuit planes were actually in the air by 8:50 shows that they did not require four hours. It would take a little longer for the bombers, but they are not defensive planes. If they were going to load up with bombs it would take a little longer, but it would not take that much time. As a matter of fact, they were actually in the air at 11:27.

481. General RUSSELL. The bombers?

General SHORT. Yes.

482. General GRUNERT. What was the idea of the 4-hour period?

General SHORT. On account of personnel. If you had a 4-minute, you had to have the personnel right at the planes. If you had a 30-minute, you had to have the men at the airfield. If you had 4 hours the crew members could be in their barracks.

483. General GRUNERT. Under your Alert No. 1 where were the men?
General SHORT. In our Alert No. 1 the men that were required for guarding purposes were all definitely at their [460] planes. The crews were not tied down.

484. General GRUNERT. Someone must have figured 4 hours. Why did they not make it 3 or 2?

General SHORT. They had a 2 and they had a 4.

485. General GRUNERT. Individual planes could do some fighting, but organized fighting in the air would take how long?

General SHORT. It actually took 55 minutes.

486. General GRUNERT. Were they organized to fight in the air, or was it individual fighting?

General SHORT. It was largely individual. They took off in two or three, when they got to the field. Most of the officers were spending their nights in their own quarters at Schofield Barracks several miles away.

487. General GRUNERT. My understanding was that the 4-hour was for perfectly organized fighting in the air?

General SHORT. By making it 4 hours it gave the possibility to the men going ahead with recreation and athletics without being worried about getting that alert. That could go right ahead with their normal functions. They might have been out on a problem where it would take them an hour to get back in.

[461] 488. General GRUNERT. Well, that was Alert No. 1, was it?

General SHORT. Alert No. 1; they went right ahead with their training

489. General GRUNERT. All right.

General SHORT. Completed it.

490. General RUSSELL. General Short, a great deal has been said about the population of Oahu there, the Hawaiian Islands generally. How many Americans were there there?

General SHORT. I think there were normally about 20,000, but of course there were at that time, with the armed services there, approximately close to probably fifty-seven, fifty-eight thousand Army personnel there, and I would say more than that of the Navy, that is, in and out with the Navy.

491. General RUSSELL. People who resided there and who were not in the armed forces, there were about how many?

General SHORT. Probably about 20,000, but there were a lot of defense workers. I expect the American population had been increased to 40,000 in that last year, but the normal population of Americans was rather small.

492. General RUSSELL. General Short, on the 24th of January a letter originated in the office of the Secretary of the Navy that General Grunert examined you on yesterday.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

493. General RUSSELL. The substance of the letter was that the Navy was very apprehensive about an air attack on the ships there at Hawaii.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

494. General RUSSELL. Now, in late November, early December, when you had the conference at which it was stated that the [462]

possibility of an attack of that sort at Oahu was nil—Do you recall that?

General SHORT. Yes.

495. General RUSSELL. Can you account for the change in the attitude of the Navy personnel between this date of January and late November toward an air attack?

General SHORT. One was an attack and the other was a surprise attack. The question there was whether a surprise attack.

496. General RUSSELL. The question where?

General SHORT. The question November 27 was the question whether surprise attack was possible.

497. General RUSSELL. Well, you do not think that the letter of January 24th related to a surprise attack?

General SHORT. It might have related to either one, but I mean the apprehension of the Navy about getting our antiaircraft and our pursuit defense built up was not just for surprise attack but for any kind of an attack. The Japanese might have attacked them in superior force. You see, their Navy had been reduced by sending certain elements to the Atlantic Fleet, and they might have been subject to an attack any time, and if it were reduced too much they might have been worried about being attacked by superior force, in which case the air business would have been serious. They were, I think, interested not just from the point of view of surprise attack but of always having proper antiaircraft defense.

498. General RUSSELL. You think that the general interest inspired the letter of January 24?

General SHORT. I think so.

[463] 499. General GRUNERT. Before you leave that subject: Was there a sentiment in the Army and Navy in Hawaii from about January 1, '41, to July, we will say, in which they seemed to fear action by Japan against Pearl Harbor, and then from July on they seemed to have more of a sense of security and did not appear to be so alarmed about the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor? Did you have any knowledge of any such sentiment?

General SHORT. I don't think so. They were pushing us all the time on the question of antiaircraft defense and air—and pursuit defense.

500. General FRANK. Who was pushing you?

General SHORT. The Navy. They were always talking to me about the desirability of getting everything that we had coming to us in the way of antiaircraft guns and getting better guns. They thought our 3-inch equipment was not satisfactory, and we were supposed to get some new 90-millimeter guns which we never got. They felt that our old 3-inch equipment was decidedly inferior to their antiaircraft guns, and they were anxious to have us build up our antiaircraft to the latest type, with sufficient numbers.

501. General GRUNERT. In February 1941 Admiral Kimmel is alleged to have been astounded at the existing weaknesses of the Pearl Harbor defenses.

General SHORT. That inspection was made before I got there. I know about it.

502. General GRUNERT. And he is supposed to have pointed out the inadequacy of antiaircraft guns, the obsolescence of land-based

aircraft, the lack of aircraft detectors. Now, was that cured so that the sentiment was different after about the middle [464] of the year, or what?

General SHORT. Well, we were definitely—we had hoped to have the antiaircraft warning service, the material delivered by June 30th. That was the original plan. The Navy probably felt better because funds had been allotted for that purpose, and there was a definite—we were definitely trying to get it installed.

503. General GRUNERT. But as far as you know there was no real change in sentiment throughout the year?

General SHORT. I think the change was that they thought that we were putting more emphasis on it than had been put on it previously, that they had a little more feeling of confidence that we were going in a period of a few months to be better prepared.

504. General RUSSELL. I have one more miscellaneous question: General Short, this subject of the creation of this Board, of the proper procedure by the War Department, was on debate in the Congress. A Representative of one of the States made the argument or took the position that on the 6th day of December at about noon an intelligence officer from your staff brought to your quarters a deciphered message which had been intercepted. As I recall, it was a telephone conversation between some Jap at Oahu and some Japanese official on the homeland. The Congressman charged that you were engaged in some sort of social activity and cursed this officer out and ran him out of the quarters. I do not know that you will come back before this Board, and I am bringing that representation to your attention now for any remark that you would like to make about that.

General SHORT. Colonel Bicknell brought that message to [465] me at about 7 o'clock, I would say sometime around between 6:30 and 7 o'clock, on the evening of the 6th. Colonel Fielder—I don't know whether he came with Bicknell or whether I sent for him, but we went—the three of us went over it together, and we were frankly unable to get anything definite out of it. I have read it again since I have been here, and in the light of all events that have taken place it would be very difficult for me to interpret it today and say, This means so and so.

505. General GRUNERT. Do you mean the message was so garbled that you couldn't understand it?

General SHORT. No. It was such general talk that it could mean anything, and that the only way that you could possibly know what it could mean would be if you knew that the individuals had agreed ahead of time. There were certain words in that; in the light of everything that has happened, there is a possibility that certain flowers meant certain types of ships, and that we don't know, but at the time neither Bicknell nor Fielder had a suggestion as to the possible meaning of it. If they had had a month to work on it and had gotten something further, maybe they could. But nobody was able to say, Well, that means so and so.

506. General GRUNERT. As I recall this Congressman's statement, he stated something to the effect that you cursed this officer who brought the message, and practically threw him out.

General SHORT. Bicknell is in town. I think you could verify that very simply by having him.

507. General GRUNERT. We shall go into that, but while you are here and the subject was brought up—

[466] General SHORT. He came, and, as I say, Fielder either came with him or I sent for Fielder, and the three of us read it, and Bicknell had had more time looking over the message than anybody else, and we first asked him if he had any interpretation he could make, and he didn't have, and Fielder didn't have, and I frankly couldn't interpret it.

508. General FRANK. Is there or is there not any basis of fact in the report?

General SHORT. There is absolutely no basis of fact, except that the report was made to me.

509. General GRUNERT. Such a report?

General SHORT. And it was discussed with Bicknell, who was the contact officer, and with Fielder, who was my G-2, and we all admitted we couldn't interpret it. Now, as I say, they might have come back if nothing had happened: the next week or ten days they probably would have come back with some kind of a possible interpretation, might not have come back with one that they felt was positive, but Bicknell was suspicious because he knew something of the man who did the talking, and he was suspicious on that point. He said that it just didn't look right to him, that he couldn't make an interpretation of it.

510. General RUSSELL. That is all the questions I have.

511. General GRUNERT. I have one more question before we go to the next two topics.

General SHORT. I might add there that there wasn't any social function going on at my house, or anything, at the time that he came there. Just the three of us were in on the thing.

512. General GRUNERT. As to your possible knowledge of the imminence of war with Japan, had you been reading the Honolulu [467] Advertiser?

General SHORT. I read the Honolulu papers carefully.

513. General GRUNERT. I quote extracts here on which I would like to question you:

(Extracts from Honolulu newspapers were read as follows:)

Headline, page 1, Sunday, 30th of November, '41: Japanese nation ready, may strike over week end.

General SHORT. That is November 30th?

514. General GRUNERT. 30th of November, 1941:

Japanese May Strike Over Week End

Kurusu bluntly warned nation ready for battle

Then, another headline, page 1, Monday, 1st of December:

Hull, Kurusu in crucial meeting today

Some unofficial quarters asserted that Japanese Premier General Tojo's speech on Saturday indicated that Japan may possibly have decided upon war.

Did such articles like that give you pause for thought as to the possible imminence of war?

General SHORT. Undoubtedly, but I didn't look on those things as authentic, as coming from the State Department.

515. General GRUNERT. Now, a Mr. Raymond Coll, C-o-1-1, Hawaiian newspaper editor, is quoted by a Washington newspaper

shortly after submission of the Roberts report January 24, '42, in substance that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had made clear by their utterances before December 7, '41, the probability and the imminence of a Japanese attack at an early date. Is that true?

General SHORT. I wouldn't say that, at an early date. [468] We had both made repeated talks as to the necessity for the civil community preparing for war. My first talk was on Army Day on April 6. I had pounded at them to get them to provide production, storage of food, to organize their doctors, and to organize an auxiliary police force, auxiliary firemen. It wasn't preparation for war tomorrow, but it was getting the community organized so that if anything did happen there wouldn't be confusion, that there would be efficiency. That had been going on—I started April 6.

516. General GRUNERT. And when was your most recent talk before December 7 in that way?

General SHORT. I do not think that I had made a public talk for some time. I could not say what date, but the one talk where that I got the whole thing before the community and got their interest and got a very considerable action was on April 6, and we had kept on pushing the thing from April the 6th on.

517. General GRUNERT. Your G-2, Colonel Fielder, also made some talks?

General SHORT. Colonel Fielder in the last month or six weeks made a considerable number of talks, made talks in different islands.

518. General GRUNERT. All right. We shall go ahead with the two topics.

519. General FRANK. I have some questions.

520. General GRUNERT. Have you some questions before you want to open up the other two topics?

521. General FRANK. I have some questions about this that we have been talking about.

[469] 522. General GRUNERT. Go ahead. Finish that, and then we shall take up the other.

523. General FRANK. Did you say that you saw the message from the Navy of November 27th?

General SHORT. I am sure I did, although we could not find the official copy in the files.

524. General FRANK. In that message was the statement generally along the line, "An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number, equipment, and organization of Japanese task forces"?

General SHORT. Yes, sir, I remember that.

525. General FRANK. What was your reaction?

General SHORT. My reaction naturally from that was that if there was an attack going to take place it would more likely fall on the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, or that neighborhood over there than at Honolulu; that our hostilities in all probability would be in the nature of sabotage or uprisings, but in any event that—

526. General FRANK. In other words, that led you away from the thought of an attack on Honolulu?

General SHORT. Very definitely.

527. General FRANK. Did you consider the Aircraft Warning Service a form of reconnaissance?

General SHORT. The best, the only form the Army had of real reconnaissance.

528. General FRANK. Well, then, since that War Department message of November 27th directed reconnaissance, why didn't [470] you make the Aircraft Warning Service reconnaissance more extensive?

General SHORT. It was very, very new. We had very few trained men. We made it definite for what we considered the most dangerous period, and they carried on—that was from 4 to 7, and they carried on training from 7 to 11 and from 1 to 4. The last period was largely maintenance. We were working the men a good—a very large number of hours, because it was practically one relief for the thing.

529. General FRANK. However, after the December 7th attack they went on a 24-hour basis?

General SHORT. You can work men 24 hours when you are at war. You can't in peace times continue to work 24 hours indefinitely.

530. General FRANK. On the other hand, a year before that, in the alert that ran from June through to August, they were—

General SHORT. They didn't have any Aircraft Warning Service.

531. General FRANK. I know, but they were on a full-out 24-hour basis at that time so far as working 24 hours was concerned.

General SHORT. On maneuvers you expect to. We did that in May. We had the whole command out, and they worked without regard to hours, but you can't do it indefinitely.

532. General FRANK. Did you confer with your staff relative to the probability of an air attack?

General SHORT. When I got that message my Chief of Staff and I talked over carefully what alert we should go into. He had just finished a month before being G-3, and we talked over [471] what alert we thought was essential, and I had the G-2 in and talked with him, and I think he agreed fully with me that that was our danger. I did not talk it over with the other members of the staff aside from G-2 and G-3. I talked it over, not asking whether they thought there would be an air attack, but I talked to the echelon commanders, particularly I think General Martin of the Air and General Burgin of the Coast Artillery. I think I personally gave them the messages and talked about what we wanted done. And I talked with General Murray. He had control of most of the sabotage in the Honolulu area, and I imagine that I had at least four or five conferences with him in the next week, because we were having a very complete check made by him personally of the guarding of the waterfront and everything of that kind, and we ran into some things that we thought had not been as completely done as they should be, and we made a very considerable number of changes.

533. General FRANK. All right. Now, you have given considerable testimony about how you arrived at your conclusion of the adequateness of Alert No. 1, and in general may we say that you came to this conclusion as a result of your faith in the effectiveness of naval operations and the influence of naval opinion and to a certain extent of the line of thought as a result of what was contained in messages between the 16th of November and the 27th?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. And that was later confirmed by, may I add, actions of the War Department in not replying to my message

and stating they wanted more, and in sending planes in without any ammunition.

534. General FRANK. All right. Did you feel that the wording [472] of messages coming in there to you indicated an effort toward a supervisory control?

General SHORT. I thought that it indicated very definitely two things: that they wanted me to be extremely careful and not have an incident with the Japanese population that would arouse Japan, and the other thing was not to violate territorial laws in my eagerness to carry out defensive measures.

535. General FRANK. The question has arisen in the minds of the Board as to why, when that air estimate anticipated just exactly what happened, steps were not taken to meet it. I assume that the answer—

General SHORT. You mean the estimate of the year—you mean the year before?

536. General FRANK. No. The Martin-Bellinger estimate.

General SHORT. Oh.

537. General FRANK. Of 1941.

General SHORT. Yes.

538. General FRANK. I assume the answer is the answer that you gave to the question asked just two or three questions back.

General SHORT. Yes.

539. General FRANK. How long previous to November '41 was daily reconnaissance performed by the Army?

General SHORT. We had a reconnaissance squadron stationed at Bellows Field that had a regular training program providing for so many hours of reconnaissance daily. They were the ones that performed it. It was a daily training proposition really. They performed this reconnaissance as part of the training of their squadron daily.

540. General FRANK. Was this going on in November '41?

[473] General SHORT. Yes, sir, this was going on. I think you may somewhere have maybe the program of Bellows Field which would show you just exactly what they were carrying on just in their daily training.

541. General FRANK. But this was not being carried on on the morning of—

General SHORT. Not then on that morning, because it was Sunday morning.

542. General FRANK. Yes. That was a form of reconnaissance?

General SHORT. It was very definitely reconnaissance.

543. General FRANK. That you were carrying on?

General SHORT. But it was of no particular value where air was concerned, not like the Aircraft Warning Service. It actually would have been of real value only against submarines, as I see it.

544. General FRANK. All right.

545. General GRUNERT. That was the only reconnaissance mission that those training planes had, was it not?

General SHORT. Yes, the close-in reconnaissance: go out 20 miles.

546. General GRUNERT. Were they armed, and did they have ammunition?

General SHORT. They did not.

547. General FRANK. Did you have an official arrangement for systematic furnishing of information to your headquarters from the Navy?

General SHORT. The G-2 and O. N. I. were in constant touch, and they had a teletype circuit that they and the F. B. I. were on. [447] That worked both ways, so they could instantly exchange information. We were not getting routine daily reports of the O. N. I.

548. General FRANK. What I am trying to arrive at is this: You, through your testimony, have stated that in your personal contacts with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch you were advised at intervals with respect to when task forces went out, but I am trying to make it appear in the record that there was no official arrangement for that kind of information to come into your headquarters.

General SHORT. No, there were no written reports being transmitted every day to us as to exactly what was being done, until after the attack. That went into effect right away on December 7.

549. General FRANK. Not only that, but you may or may not have known when task forces went out; is that correct?

General SHORT. Yes, I think I probably always knew what they did have out: I mean, in general terms; I may not have known the exact number of ships, but I always knew in general terms what was out.

550. General FRANK. Did you always know where they were?

General SHORT. In general locations, probably whether they were going towards Canton, whether they were going towards Wake, whether they were going towards Midway.

551. General FRANK. How often did they go into the area north and east of Oahu?

General SHORT. They constantly had them out.

552. General FRANK. In the north and east?

[475] General SHORT. Largely north. North and west, you mean?

553. General FRANK. No. I mean north and east.

General SHORT. Oh, you mean to the east of Midway?

554. General FRANK. No. I mean straight north and northeast of Oahu.

General SHORT. I don't think that they—I think they went straight north quite a bit. I don't think they went east to any considerable extent, that they considered that the area to the west was more dangerous and that the great part of their work was done there.

555. General GRUNERT. Their task forces, the directions that they went, got to be sort of routine, so that Japanese agents could have been aware that they seldom went to the north and east?

General SHORT. I don't—I never knew the exact courses that the task forces traveled on. I knew where they wound up, but when they were going to Wake Island I didn't know whether they shot out this way for a few hundred miles and then this way (indicating). I never did know their courses.

556. General FRANK. The manner in which this information came into Army hands, namely, that it was given in more or less of a personal manner to you, did not make it readily available to your staff for planning purposes, did it?

General SHORT. No, except that if I had gotten anything of prime importance I naturally would have called in G-2.

557. General GRUNERT. Then there were no periodic meetings—
General SHORT. No periodic.

558. General GRUNERT. —between the Army and Navy representatives to interchange information or say, "There is nothing doing [476] today," or what?

General SHORT. There was practically—there was daily contact between O. N. I. and G-2, and, as I say, with the teletype they could exchange messages just any minute.

559. General FRANK. I know, but the O. N. I. never gave to your G-2 any information about these task forces?

General SHORT. No, they did not, not until after December 7.

560. General FRANK. Now let us get back to the method of dispersion and protection. Had the bombers at Hickam Field been dispersed, either with or without bunkers, and had the crews at critical hours or in emergency manned the machine guns in the airplanes, that would have furnished a defense against attack from the air as well as against an attack by saboteurs on the ground, would it not?

General SHORT. To a very limited extent. You probably know better than I to what range that you would expect them to be effective. My understanding is that they don't count on the .30 caliber in a fight much beyond a hundred yards, or the .50 caliber something like two hundred yards. Is that correct?

561. General FRANK. Well, that is correct, but at the height at which the Jap planes were attacking the fields that morning those machine guns certainly would have been effective?

General SHORT. They probably would have had some effect.

562. General FRANK. And just that method that we were recounting was used the year before?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. Now, I'll tell you, our main—with the heavy bombers our idea was to disperse to the outlying islands. That was what we were working towards. We couldn't [477] disperse at Hickam Field; the character of the ground was such that you couldn't roll the heavy bombers off of the apron and count on getting them out. When we finally got where we could disperse them, we had to build bunkers above the ground, because you couldn't dig down on account of the water, and you had to build runways that were macadam to a certain extent, and the ground was of such a nature that you couldn't just run them out promiscuously over the ground.

563. General FRANK. You are talking about the B-17s?

General SHORT. Yes.

564. General FRANK. But you had only 12 of those?

General SHORT. That is correct.

565. General FRANK. Out on that morning?

General SHORT. That is correct.

566. General FRANK. Now let us pursue this defense against sabotage a little further. Hickam Field was not very extensive?

General SHORT. No, not very great.

567. General FRANK. It was bounded by the water on the south and by the channel and the Navy on the west. There was a plan the year previous to place barbed wire along the exposed boundary to the north and east of the field, clear the space in front of the barbed wire, and enfilade it with machine guns.

General SHORT. We had put in in May for money for wire for fencing the fields and enfilading the fields. We finally got the money in

September, and on account of the priority proposition, because the material was not available locally, we had not gotten the material at the time of the attack.

568. General FRANK. For the fence.

General SHORT. Yes.

[478] 569 General GRUNERT. Had you got any other material?

General SHORT. What?

570. General GRUNERT. Did you have barbed wire?

General SHORT. The amount of barbed wire in Honolulu at that time was, I would say, extremely limited. The supplies had been used up there, and the merchants couldn't get anything without priorities, so anything in the construction line was extremely difficult to get.

571. General GRUNERT. If they defended that way in 1940, was that just a plan?

General SHORT. That was '41. That was just a plan, if you are talking about that. They didn't have that.

572. General FRANK. Yes. A certain amount of barbed wire was put in place, and the Engineers, in that warehouse at Kamehameha, had a certain supply of barbed wire?

General SHORT. We had a certain supply of barbed wire, but that wasn't what they were trying to fence with, that barbed wire. We had rolls of that we were using for field fortification work. We had dumps established on that, but that was not what the air people wanted for fencing the fields. They wanted a—

573. General FRANK. Well, it was not a question of using it for fencing, but it was a question of using it as protection against people coming in for sabotage.

General SHORT. I see.

574. General FRANK. Then, there was an officer by the name of Lord, of the Corps of Engineers, who designed an armored machine gun box, and we actually installed one and put machine guns in it, at the angle at the northeast side of Hickam so that it [479] enfiladed the area in front of the barbed wire.

General SHORT. We had regular ground defense organized. We had infantry organizations detailed to assist in that ground defense. We had a battalion of 500 airmen trained by infantry officers for that ground defense.

575. General GRUNERT. Then, the reason you bunched the airplanes on Hickam is that there was not room to spread them, or what?

General SHORT. Two reasons. The first reason was that the question of sabotage was, we figured, very much safer, and, as I told you in my testimony, Colonel Burwell had made a very detailed investigation for the Air Corps and very strongly recommended that they be grouped.

576. General GRUNERT. Well, could they have been dispersed despite Burwell's report?

General SHORT. The heavy ones could not. The flying fortresses could not have been moved off on account of the nature of the ground.

577. General GRUNERT. What proportion were they of the rest of the planes?

General SHORT. They were the valuable portion, you might say.

578. General GRUNERT. How many? What percentage?

General SHORT. I think there were 12 of those and I think about 54 of the old B-18s, but they were worth decidedly more than all of the B-18s. And there were some A-20s. There were 10 A-20s, and the A-20s weren't touched in the attack.

579. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, the B-17s could have been placed on the runways other than the north-and-south runway. [480] because that was done before, and if necessary they could have taken off in a light cross wind, because that north-and-south runway was used about 80 percent of the time.

General SHORT. Yes. Of course, the more you scattered them the more difficult was your protection.

580. General GRUNERT. Were these planes on all the fields, as I say, bunched on your order, or on the judgment of the commanding officer of the field?

General SHORT. They were definitely—it was provided in Alert No. 1. We had given serious consideration to that. As I say, we had had this very elaborate study made, and Alert No. 1—we had decided very definitely that it was advantageous to disperse them by fields as much as possible, but to group them on any particular field.

581. General FRANK. How was it anticipated that a sabotage would be accomplished?

General SHORT. In any possible way.

582. General FRANK. Well, what?

General SHORT. We figured that there were enough alien Japanese on the Island.

583. General FRANK. Hand grenades or hand bombs?

General SHORT. I wouldn't—you can just visualize anything you want to, anything from having a man in the Hawaiian Depot that was working on motors put emery in the motors, or anything. There were all types of possible sabotage.

584. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, if you bunch them all together and somebody heaves a hand grenade or a bomb in there, he destroys not one but several.

General SHORT. Yes, but if you have them grouped it [481] doesn't take very many men to be sure that nobody can get close enough to heave in. That was the idea.

585. General FRANK. Then, furthermore, if a fire is started and they are all bunched together, it is almost impossible to get in there through the heat and get those that are not yet affected away, and while they are all bunched together you can't man the machine guns on the interior ones and have them as positive machine gun defense against the people advancing across the airdrome.

General SHORT. We were not counting on—we were counting on the machine guns mounted on the ground for that defense. That is a strange thing: at Kaneohe Bay all of their planes that were dispersed were destroyed without exception, and the ones that were grouped on the landing aprons were very largely saved. They were damaged to some extent, but very largely saved, and the others were all destroyed.

586. General FRANK. Were the machine guns in the airplanes manned?

General SHORT. I don't know. I don't image they were, but I don't know.

587. General FRANK. Another thing: there were a certain number of Air Corps men that were excess at the time because you didn't have enough available equipment.

General SHORT. That is correct.

588. General GRUNERT. These planes at Kaneohe Bay, what planes were they? Navy?

General SHORT. Navy planes.

589. General GRUNERT. It would appear that the Japanese came over to cripple the Navy more than the Army. Would it have been [482] possible that they selected those targets which would cripple the Navy and keep the Navy from going to the Far East? In other words, did it appear possible their objectives were Navy objectives more than Army objectives?

General SHORT. No. The ones I was pointing out that were not destroyed there were also naval planes that were up on the landing field and on the apron, and their losses among them were not so very great, but my understanding is that in the group that were dispersed every single plane was lost.

[483] 590. General FRANK. It would have been possible, because there were excess men in the Air Force, to have dispersed them, and to have had the men protect the perimeter of the flying field and thus have been protected by dispersion from both air attack and sabotage?

General SHORT. Yes. . .

591. General FRANK. But that comes to a question of judgment?

General SHORT. And also a question that, you see those men were not just sitting there doing nothing, they were all being trained for some job, and if you stayed on this Alert No. 1 for a month and kept those men all around the perimeter of the airfield, you couldn't do anything else with them.

592. General FRANK. Were your personnel being trained to ferry planes to the Philippines?

General SHORT. They were. We were definitely responsible for the ferrying of the planes to the Philippines.

593. General FRANK. How much did that interfere with your training for your own war effort?

General SHORT. It meant that as far as the B-17's were concerned we had to have all of our B-17's constantly on work training those crews, and, to make it worse, to keep those planes, we didn't have spare parts for B-17's, and to keep them going to the Philippines, we had to rob six of our planes of parts to keep the others going, and our orders were such that we felt that our first mission there was to shove the planes to the Philippines, so we took the parts from six of our planes, to keep the others going.

594. General FRANK. We had testimony that we read in the Roberts Report that Admiral Bloch, and I am not so sure about [484] Admiral Kimmel, but Admiral Bloch is distinctly of the impression that the aircraft warning service was in continual operation. What led him to that conclusion?

General SHORT. I don't know.

595. General FRANK. Had you reported?

General SHORT. No, I had not. They should have known what was going on. They had a Naval liaison officer in our G-3 section who knew exactly what was being done, and he should have kept

them, the right man, informed of details. Lieutenant Burr, of the Navy, was on duty as liaison officer with the G-3 for the express purpose of keeping Navy informed.

596. General FRANK. Here are two letters, one of which is of the 19th of June, that you sent to Admiral Bloch:

It is anticipated that the Army Aircraft Warning Service will be placed in operation in the near future. Due to interest expressed by the Navy radio operators in the Army equipment, I will cause arrangements to be effected to afford such naval personnel as you may desire to inspect the Army.

That is one. Is that correct?

General SHORT. Now, I must say that we went further than that. They had a man, a Commander Taylor, who was supposed to be quite an expert.

597. General FRANK. Yes.

General SHORT. And he assisted us in getting the thing under way; so there were at least two naval officers who should have known exactly what was going on.

598. General FRANK. You remember writing this letter?

General SHORT. I remember the letter; yes.

[485] 599. General FRANK. And here is a letter.

General SHORT. Now, may I say, there, that originally the War Department had stated that we would get delivery of the Aircraft Warning Service materiel by June 30. We didn't get it, but that was their original hope.

600. General FRANK. Then, on the 5th of August there is another letter, in which you stated:

The Army's Aircraft Warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department are rapidly approaching completion.

General SHORT. We hoped, we kept hoping all the time they would get that materiel in, and they approved the priority, and they didn't give it as good a priority as we asked for, but they improved it, and said that if that did not produce it, the Chief of Engineers would act.

601. General FRANK. This quotation from a letter of August 5 is from a letter that you wrote to Admiral Kimmel?

General SHORT. Yes.

602. General FRANK. Do you think that these two letters, and especially this last one, led the Navy to a conclusion as to the operating effectiveness of the AWS?

General SHORT. It was done to try to keep them informed of the situation, and what we expected. You will notice, in neither one of the letters did I tell them that we had it, but we were hopeful, when I wrote those letters, and they were so interested that I was trying to keep them informed.

603. General FRANK. You stated that you didn't expect an air attack; is that correct?

General SHORT. That is correct.

604. General FRANK. Now, with respect to that do you want to [486] make any differentiation between an air attack as a part of a general attack, and an air raid, a hit-and-run proposition?

General SHORT. I didn't expect either one, frankly, with the information I had.

605. General FRANK. All right.

606. General RUSSELL. Two or three things, very briefly, General. There was some discussion about this reconnaissance which was being conducted by Army personnel as part of the training, from one of those airfields.

General SHORT. Yes.

607. General RUSSELL. General Short, when you went out to the Department and took command, were those reconnaissances being made as part of training the men?

General SHORT. I think in all probability they were, although Bellows Field, at the time I took command, was relatively little developed. We had developed Bellows Field and were using it much more, but I think they had the same small squadron of reconnaissance planes, and were working on the training of it, probably from Wheeler Field.

608. General RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not it is true that in the year 1940 the Department was ordered under an alert from the War Department, and that in the fall of 1940 the War Department directed General Herron, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, to discontinue these reconnaissances, except as part of this training?

General SHORT. I do not know, sir.

609. General RUSSELL. You would not know, then, whether that was set up under War Department order by Herron and carried on under you, or not?

[487] General SHORT. I do not.

610. General RUSSELL. General, a great deal has been said about this November 27 message, and the failure of those men who were on the radar that morning, when they detected the presence of the incoming aircraft, to report it. Did the provision in the November 27 order, that you would disseminate this highly secret information to the minimum number of officers, in your opinion prevent you from passing it down, so that the officer in the control office that morning, or the central information office, could have had it?

General SHORT. I wouldn't have expected him to have it. He was just one of a number of young officers that were being trained in there. He had only been in there a few days.

611. General RUSSELL. It is quite obvious that if he and the man on the radar had had the information that an attack might come, they would not have been so complacent.

General SHORT. Possibly not, but I think his complacency was based on his knowledge of our own planes that were coming in.

612. General RUSSELL. A great deal has been said about the installation of the permanent radar stations out there. Who made the contact for the installations of those?

General SHORT. The district engineer.

613. General FRANK. Colonel Wyman?

General SHORT. Colonel Wyman.

614. General RUSSELL. Upon whom was it necessary for you to rely in order to hasten the installation of those radar stations?

General SHORT. As far as the work went, it was necessary to call upon the contracts of Colonel Wyman. On the other hand, we had to get back to getting materiel. I do not think [488] he was responsible for the materiel. I do not believe that his contracts had anything to do with obtaining the electrical materiel and things of that kind.

615. General RUSSELL. Upon whom was the responsibility for obtaining that electrical materiel?

General SHORT. I think that the Signal Corps, in the United States, had ordered those. I think I am correct. I may be wrong about it, but that is my feeling, that the Signal Corps in all probability bought those.

616. General RUSSELL. Was that an agency over which you had control?

General SHORT. No control, whatever. All I could do was to cable the War Department, radio the War Department and ask them to try to speed things up. Yesterday, you remember, I read you a wire to the War Department, June 10.

617. General RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

General SHORT. And I asked for a change of priorities so as to get the things. I do not know definitely who purchased that materiel, but it was Signal Corps materiel, so I assume that they did.

(Brief recess.)

618. General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

General SHORT, I have a number of questions here on the Interceptor Command, and on an activity of that Command, the Air Warning Service. I will ask those on the Interceptor Command as such, first.

On the 5th of November, 1941, I understand you put out an SOP, and in that SOP it referred to an Interceptor Command. Was that an Interceptor Command actually organized and in [489] being on December 7?

General SHORT. It was actually functioning, but I would say that it wasn't definitely put in. It was actually functioning, but the Aircraft Warning Service had not definitely been put under the command, as a command of the Interceptor Command. It was in the process of formation.

619. General GRUNERT. My understanding of an interceptor command is that it has the Air Warning Service as one of its primary functions, and it also has the fighter aircraft, and it has control of the antiaircraft.

General SHORT. That's correct.

620. General GRUNERT. Is that the conception of that?

General SHORT. May I explain that at that time the idea was quite new, and we had sent General Davidson and Colonel Powell and two subordinate officers to the school in the States, and they got back, I believe, about the 4th or 5th of December, and we were waiting on their return, to be sure we were fully—we had put this, what we thought was correct, in the Standing Operating Procedure, and we were waiting on their return to put it in effect, when they would know exactly what the War Department was doing in the mainland.

621. General GRUNERT. When did they return?

General SHORT. I think it was about the 4th or 5th of December. They had been back only a day or two.

622. General GRUNERT. And General Davidson was in command of the Interceptor Command?

General SHORT. He was the one who was to—he was in command of the pursuit, and in all this exercise we had been carrying on; it was functioning under him, but the actual [490] command of these units had not been turned over to him, on December 7.

623. General GRUNERT. Then there was no Interceptor Command, as such, with a commander?

General SHORT. You might say that, formally, but it was all working just as if it existed. We were trying to get to the point where we thought we could issue the order.

624. General GRUNERT. Well, the order was issued?

General SHORT. But not made—that part of that Standing Operating Procedure was more or less suspended till we got General Davidson and Colonel Powell's opinion.

625. General GRUNERT. Then the component parts of the Interceptor Command were in existence and functioning, but not the Interceptor Command, as a whole?

General SHORT. They were functioning together, you might say, cooperating and coordinating, but had not been placed definitely under Davidson's command.

626. General GRUNERT. And tests and practices were conducted of component parts, but not as a whole?

General SHORT. Yes, they were conducted as a whole, but the question of being absolutely under his command, the order had not been issued.

627. General GRUNERT. Then, was there Navy representation, there? Did you participate in tests and practices?

General SHORT. I am of the opinion that they were there. Whether they were there constantly, I don't know, but the provision was for them, and we had had this Naval Commander Taylor working with them, and I believe it was about the 24th of November that we had asked the Navy, through him; had him [491] request the Navy to have officers there to work with us, as early as possible.

628. General GRUNERT. There was an actual information center organized, was there?

General SHORT. Oh, yes; there was an actual information center organized, and it was working daily. It was working just the same as it would have worked if the definite order was issued.

629. General GRUNERT. Who had charge of that?

General SHORT. Well, you had your aircraft warning service, there; you had your control officer, who was actually in charge of the functioning of it.

630. General GRUNERT. Who was he?

General SHORT. We was General Davidson's recommendation—I mean, General Davidson's representative.

631. General GRUNERT. Who had charge of the center?

General SHORT. When it was functioning, the control officer had charge.

632. General GRUNERT. Who was the control officer?

General SHORT. I was just trying to think of the Major's name. It was an Air Corps Major that was representing General Davidson.

633. General GRUNERT. Was his name Bergquist?

General SHORT. I think so, I think so; and General Davidson, himself, was there a great deal of the time.

634. General GRUNERT. Then it seems to me that it was understood that Davidson, some time in the future, was to have this, and during the present, had an interest in being there. Did he?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; very definitely, he knew he was [492] going to get it, and that it was just dependent on when he said he was ready.

635. General GRUNERT. Where did the Signal Officer, Colonel Powell, come in?

General SHORT. Powell? Well, I should say he was responsible for the technical functioning of all the stations, and the transmission of the information to the control room.

636. General GRUNERT. But he was not in control of the information center?

General SHORT. No. I would say that Bergquist was more in charge of the whole thing than Colonel Powell.

637. General GRUNERT. What was Bergquist's relationship to General Davidson?

General SHORT. He was General Davidson's man. He was his representative.

638. General GRUNERT. Then, as far as you know, there were some naval officers interested in the thing, but whether they had actually been detailed, there—

General SHORT. We had made the request, and Commander Taylor was working all the time with the outfit. Now, whether they had actually sent these people that we had asked to have sent, I don't know. I was through the place two or three times, and it may be that if Taylor was there, that I thought of him as the Naval representative.

639. General GRUNERT. Was the Navy kept informed of its status all through this organizing state, so that they knew what to depend upon, and what its status was?

General SHORT. We had two officers. We had one officer, Lieutenant Burr, who was the liaison man with the G-3, whose [493] duty was solely to keep Navy informed of what we were doing. Then, we had the other man, who was Taylor, that he was there to help us, because he was an expert on the thing. It wasn't primarily his duty to keep the Navy informed. It was Burr's duty to keep the Navy informed. I think, however, that Taylor probably did keep them informed, to a considerable extent.

640. General GRUNERT. Then, whether the Navy was informed as to its status, was a question of whether Commander Taylor or Lieutenant Burr—

General SHORT. Burr, particularly. Whether Burr did the job he was detailed for—

641. General GRUNERT. He was detailed under what?

General SHORT. G-3. He was supposed to know everything, and he sat in on everything that G-3 had.

642. General GRUNERT. So far as you know, there was no Navy man actually detailed as part of the information center?

General SHORT. I frankly do not know definitely. I know the request was made, and I was of the opinion that it was being carried out; but I can't say, definitely.

643. General GRUNERT. Part of the testimony before the Roberts Commission stated:

General Short testified that there were naval officers at the information center, but Admiral Kimmel stated that no naval officer had ever been detailed to the Air Warning Service Center, to keep the Navy advised.

General SHORT. Well, as I say, I couldn't say definitely. I know the request had been made, that it was contemplated, and I thought it had been carried out.

644. General GRUNERT. Now, referring to the testimony before [494] the Roberts Commission:

General Short admitted that at the time of the attack the Interceptor Command had not a definite organization and that he didn't know for sure whether the Navy knew this.

I think you have covered that.

General SHORT. That is correct. They should have known from Burr. Whether they did, I don't know.

645. General GRUNERT. Then, there is a statement here in that record which states:

The Air Force merely cooperated on its own hook.

meaning that they cooperated, when they saw fit, or if they saw fit?

General SHORT. No, they always had a control officer there.

646. General GRUNERT. Then, I have a note here to the effect the Interceptor Command was actually activated December 17.

General SHORT. I think that is probably correct, that that was the date when that official order was put out.

647. General GRUNERT. Now, as to the Air Warning Service, will you tell us what that consisted of, and what it was intended to consist of, and what was actually in being in the latter part of November and early in December.

General SHORT. It was intended to consist of the pursuit command, which was two groups, I think, of seven squadrons.

648. General GRUNERT. I am talking about the Air Warning Service.

General SHORT. Oh, I thought you meant the Interceptor Command.

[495] 649. General GRUNERT. The Air Warning Service.

General SHORT. The Air Warning Service, we actually had mobile stations. We had no fixed station that was able to function.

650. General GRUNERT. How many fixed stations were there to be, and how many mobile stations were there to be?

General SHORT. In the original plan, there were to be three fixed stations. Then that was switched, and Burr changed that, at a later date, and increased the number to six.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Correction in testimony.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

* * * * *

Page 495, lines 8 and 9 omit "and Burr changed that".

* * * * *

/s/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

651. General GRUNERT. When was that?

General SHORT. Oh, I don't know. I think that may have been some time along—well, maybe as late as September, and we were to have six

mobile stations, and I am inclined to believe—I am not sure whether the parts for all of those mobile stations had arrived, or whether we were able to operate only three. I am not definite on the number that we were actually able to operate.

[496] 652. General GRUNERT. Then there were supposed to be six permanent and six mobile?

General SHORT. Six mobile and six permanent; that is right.

653. General GRUNERT. Now we shall take the permanent. How many permanent were there actually operating or in condition to operate?

General SHORT. None.

654. General GRUNERT. None. Of the mobile stations how many were operating or able to operate?

General SHORT. I am inclined to think that the parts had arrived for all of them. I don't know. I visited in that period of ten days, I think, three of the stations. I can't say definitely whether all six were operating or not.

655. General GRUNERT. What seemed to delay first the mobile stations? What delayed their installation?

General SHORT. The question of electrical equipment.

656. General GRUNERT. Electrical equipment?

General SHORT. Obtaining the electrical equipment. We had been promised it by June 30.

657. General GRUNERT. They needed no particular construction?

General SHORT. No.

658. General GRUNERT. Except access to the station?

General SHORT. That was it. The construction that they required could be done without any great amount of material, because—

659. General GRUNERT. When the Secretary of War told the Secretary of the Navy in February of '41 that all material for the air warning system would be over there by June, what [497] did he mean?

General SHORT. I think that he expected—

660. General GRUNERT. For all stations?

General SHORT. I think that he expected it for all stations.

661. General GRUNERT. But you said that there were to be three permanent.

General SHORT. Yes. Well, I mean at the time he made the statement he would have expected to have the material there for three fixed, and as it existed.

662. General GRUNERT. For the project as it existed?

General SHORT. As it existed, and then it was changed.

663. General GRUNERT. Then he expected to have the material over there for six mobile and three permanent?

General SHORT. Finally, but when he wrote the letter I would say three fixed and six mobile.

664. General GRUNERT. All right. Now, why didn't he get the material there? What were the conditions in June when the Navy had a right to expect that the Army had its stuff over there?

General SHORT. As I read you a wire yesterday of June 10 I sent to the Adjutant General stating that the electrical equipment and the cables for the construction had not been obtained, and apparently a priority was holding it up.

665. General GRUNERT. Well, now, as to the permanent stations, what was short there? Why didn't—

General SHORT. Well, the first thing that was short on Kaala, which was possibly the most important permanent station, was the cable.

666. General GRUNERT. The cable.

[498] General SHORT. We couldn't even start.

667 General GRUNERT. You told us that.

General SHORT. We couldn't even start construction because the only way to get the material up on top of the mountain was by cable.

668. General GRUNERT. Was all other material present except the cable?

General SHORT. Oh, no, no. As a matter of fact, on December 7th you didn't have material for the fixed stations. I think maybe that it was largely there except motors.

669. General GRUNERT. Then, the shortage of equipment applied to both of them?

General SHORT. I do not remember the details of just what parts of the equipment, but I know that the equipment for the fixed stations had not been completed at that time.

670. General GRUNERT. Now, in what way were the fixed stations different from the mobile?

General SHORT. They were much more powerful stations.

671. General GRUNERT. More powerful. How were they run, by generated electricity or by gas, gas machine, or what?

General SHORT. I think that we had contracts for the public utility companies to run wires so we could use current generated in that way, and then we had motors so in case that went out we could have an alternative.

672. General GRUNERT. Yes. But it was not until June that you started to get after the War Department?

General SHORT. That is right.

673. General GRUNERT. What happened between February and June?

[499] General SHORT. They agreed—we had been told they would arrive by June 30th. We weren't really expecting them until right at the end of June, and we didn't find out until early in June that they were not going to get there, and when we did I sent the wire.

674. General GRUNERT. When did they actually get all the equipment, if ever, before you left?

General SHORT. They did not. I think we got practically all of the equipment for the mobile stations along maybe the last week in October or the first week in November, because we set them up as soon as we got them.

675. General GRUNERT. Then, all the mobile stations should have been working on December 7?

General SHORT. I am under the impression that we had the mobile equipment. Now, there may be one or two that had not been completely set up.

676. General GRUNERT. But how about the equipment for the permanent ones?

General SHORT. I am sure that it had not all arrived.

677. General GRUNERT. So you couldn't operate anything on account of the lack of equipment?

General SHORT. Lack of equipment as far as permanent ones.

678. General GRUNERT. And you didn't have all the stuff to put on the inaccessible places, so it was not so much the question of roads and cables to get the whole thing working, if you didn't have all that equipment?

General SHORT. No, only that we were particularly anxious to get the construction work all done so when the equipment arrived there would be no additional delay.

[500] 679. General GRUNERT. Then, there was a combination, as I see it: the lack of equipment and the lack of materials to construct cables to get the equipment—to put them in these permanent stations.

General SHORT. That is correct.

680. General GRUNERT. After June 10th when again did you go after the War Department or anybody else?

General SHORT. I kept in constant touch with the exact status of the construction of the fixed stations by—I had a liaison officer, Major Fleming in the Engineers, who was in almost daily touch with the District Engineers and reported to me on the status of construction.

681. General GRUNERT. You used Fleming as your liaison with the District Engineer?

General SHORT. With the District Engineer. He was an engineer and was one of the Assistant G-4, and he was almost in daily touch with the District Engineer in regard to construction of airfields, aircraft warning service, and certain construction for storage of ammunition up in the vicinity of Scofield.

682. General GRUNERT. Was the District Engineer under you?

General SHORT. He was not.

683. General GRUNERT. Was he not placed under you along toward the fall sometime?

General SHORT. He was not. He came under me with everything else on December 7th, or December 8th; when the martial law was declared, why, naturally he came under me.

684. General GRUNERT. And to whom did he look for instructions, and how far could you push him?

[501] General SHORT. I'll tell you how they worked. Traditionally, you know, all field fortifications have been carried out by the Engineers, all airfield construction. He was made responsible for that by the War Department, and for the construction of these aircraft warning stations, and I might say also for the construction of bombproofs. If we had a project like bombproofing a headquarters or providing for gasoline storage, ammunition storage, I talked over with responsible people what they thought we ought to have. If it were a question of providing—now, the heavy seacoast guns over there, none of them had any protection for personnel. In that case I would talk it over with the Chief of the Coast Artillery, General Burgin, have Fleming in on it, have him draw up roughly what we were after. Then the District Engineer would put his engineers and his draftsmen on the thing and draw up detailed plans, and then we would have a conference with the District Engineer, with Fleming and Burgin, say, and go over the detail plans. If they appeared to be fully what we wanted, the approval was given to the plan.

685. General GRUNERT. You approved the plan?

General SHORT. Approved the plan, and then he got the money from the Chief of Engineers in Washington.

686. General GRUNERT. Who decided on when such and such a thing had to be in?

General SHORT. We made the decision as to when we wanted it in. Of course, you couldn't make a decision that it had to be in because you didn't know how long it was going to take to get the money and you didn't know how long it was going to take to get the material.

[502] 687. General GRUNERT. Well, at certain times all these contracts were let and had a completion date at least estimated.

General SHORT. I think most all—

688. General GRUNERT. Who estimated that?

General SHORT. Most all the contracts, that would have been done by the dates of the needing. Most all of the contracts of the District Engineer I think had been let before my arrival. He was working on those same contracts. Now, some—

689. General GRUNERT. You were interested in getting these defense contracts completed as of the date of completion?

General SHORT. That is right, and I had—

690. General GRUNERT. Who extended the date from time to time? Did you?

General SHORT. Often it was force of circumstances, that it was impossible to get the material, that there wasn't any question of anybody extending it; it just was an impossibility. I had a conference—

691. General GRUNERT. From whom did you get reports that it was impossible to get the material?

General SHORT. I had a conference on an average of every week or ten days with the District Engineer.

692. General GRUNERT. From the District Engineer you got the information?

General SHORT. From the District Engineer and with Major Fleming present. He kept me—I probably saw Fleming almost every day and talked over some of these things with him, and, as I say, the District Engineer came in and made a report of progress probably every week or ten days and went into his [503] difficulties, whatever they were.

693. General GRUNERT. If they were not satisfied with that progress, what was your recourse?

General SHORT. To wire the War Department.

694. General GRUNERT. And you did that once in June?

General SHORT. I did that.

695. General GRUNERT. On the air warning stuff?

General SHORT. I did.

696. General GRUNERT. Did you make any other complaints to the War Department as to lack of material?

General SHORT. I did. The other complaint, the other things—well, for instance, the airfields were not going as fast as I wanted them, but it was a question of allotment of funds. I was trying constantly to get the allotment of funds. We couldn't do anything until we got it. We had the approval of the project, but we didn't have the funds, actual funds, in most cases.

697. General GRUNERT. Were you responsible for getting the things, or was the District Engineer?

General SHORT. I was responsible for getting projects approved and the amount approved, and the funds then were transmitted to the District Engineer.

698. General GRUNERT. But as far as the air warning service is concerned, it wasn't a question of funds?

General SHORT. No, it was not.

699. General GRUNERT. It was a question of getting the air warning service completed as quickly as possible?

General SHORT. That is correct.

700. General GRUNERT. And you found that the material was not [504] going in as you desired or thought it should, so you complained to the War Department?

General SHORT. The report that the District Engineer had from the Division Engineer in San Francisco, he was advised by the Division Engineer that there was going to be a very considerable delay on account of priorities. He felt apparently that if we could get the War Department to step up our priority, that we would get it very much faster, and that is what prompted that.

701. General GRUNERT. And that contractor was dependent upon the Army getting priorities for him?

General SHORT. Very definitely. That is the only way. That is the only way you could get any priority.

702. General GRUNERT. And as far as you know there was no fault or delay on the part of the contractor?

General SHORT. I don't know of any delay on his part.

703. General GRUNERT. Well, now, after June 10th when you made your complaint, did you then think that everything was O. K., that they would do it when they could, or didn't you needle them again?

General SHORT. As I say, I had a conference and got a report of progress probably on an average of every week or ten days, a personal conference, and if there was anything we felt could be pushed faster we tried to have it done.

704. General GRUNERT. Did you feel it was necessary to go after the War Department again?

General SHORT. We did—not on those particular things. Often we could get something speeded up by a conference with the District Engineers.

[505] 705. General GRUNERT. Were you satisfied with the progress made?

General SHORT. I wasn't satisfied. I wasn't satisfied very frequently with the progress made.

706. General GRUNERT. Well, here is from June to December, a matter of nearly six months, and still the thing is not completed.

General SHORT. It took about fifteen weeks to get a priority through.

707. General GRUNERT. Well, you were put on a higher priority then?

General SHORT. Yes, but we never did get on—now; the Navy were on an A-1. We never—and I tried to get this put on a 1-B, and they put it on a 1-C.

708. General GRUNERT. You were very much concerned about this air warning service?

General SHORT. I was very much concerned.

709. General GRUNERT. That was really your No. 1 priority construction?

General SHORT. That was. It was the thing I looked on as probably the most essential thing.

710. General GRUNERT. Was it important enough to bring it to the personal attention of the Chief of Staff?

General SHORT. I had written a letter about the whole thing to Chief of Staff sometime earlier, on that. I did bring the question of priority to the attention of the Deputy Chief of Staff, of the whole priority, and I got some help from General Moore, who was the Deputy Chief of Staff. I did not get what I asked for, but I got some decided help as a result of my direct [506] communication with him, not on this, but I got authority for creating a lumber pile so we could have some lumber on hand to build barracks, and we got a certain amount of hardware material that the District Engineer was going to need; that they built up the thing ahead of time. But I would say the Deputy Chief of Staff had more to do with helping us on that than anybody else.

[507] 711. General GRUNERT. Now, I think you referred to this in your testimony before: General Short wrote Admiral Kimmel June 19th that air warning service would be in operation in the near future. Against on August 5, '41, that the air warning service was rapidly nearing completion.

When did it actually get in operation? That has been answered.

General SHORT. That is about the first week in November.

712. General GRUNERT. Why the delay? In other words, now here you write the Navy on the 19th, "near future"; on August 5th, "and rapidly nearing completion". Then from August 5th to December 7th, September, October, November, four months, the thing isn't completed yet. And did you again notify the Navy that you were in error or mistaken about the near completion?

General SHORT. They, I am sure, they were. We at least had one of their officers who was helping set up the whole thing and knew the exact status of the thing. Now, I don't think I wrote another letter to them on that. I undoubtedly talked to them about it, because that project was very dear to their hearts. They were terribly interested in it.

713. General GRUNERT. Captain DeLany knew the air warning service was very unsatisfactory. I say we found that out from Captain DeLany. And then again it says, "General Short said his S. O. P. on November 5, '41, was issued as an accomplished procedure." Evidently the——

General SHORT. It was with regard to everything except the Interceptor Command.

714. General GRUNERT. Everything but that point.

Again referring to the Roberts Commission: General Short states that it would have made no difference in his plan if he [508] had been furnished with all the materials needed; also that if his radars had all been completed he would still have been operating them the same way he was doing December 7th, '41. I just have a question here of why. You mean by that that you would have been operating just during those same morning hours?

General SHORT. In all probability my estimate of the situation was such that I didn't think it required a 24-hour operation of them.

715. General GRUNERT. Do you suppose it was general knowledge that you were operating just between those hours: general knowledge to the public, or that the Japanese agents could have gotten that information?

General SHORT. Japanese agents; it would have been possible for them to get that information.

716. General GRUNERT. Would you suppose that would have influenced them to attack after they presumed that the radar, the air warning service, had quit for the day?

General SHORT. I have no way of knowing.

717. General GRUNERT. I have a note here that the air warning service, the mobile unit training, had been in training since November 1st. Do you consider that the mobile units actually installed were capable of operating on December 7th to a reasonable degree of efficiency?

General SHORT. I think that the men were not experts, but I think they were getting trained to the point where they could do pretty well.

718. General GRUNERT. And then it was just a question of their operating on that particular day and that particular time?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

719. General GRUNERT. I have exhausted my questions on this [509] interceptor and air warning, on which you undoubtedly have a number of questions. I yield to you next.

720. General FRANK. I would like to bring out in a little greater detail some facts about the equipment furnished and that needed. With respect to equipment furnished, is it a fact that, so far as the radar themselves were concerned, you had three heavy radar sets complete and six mobile sets complete?

General SHORT. I am of the opinion that we did not have the motors. Now, Colonel Powell would be very much safer on that answer than I would be.

721. General FRANK. You mean the motor generators?

General SHORT. Yes.

722. General FRANK. Well, if they were hooked up with commercial current, then you didn't need them?

General SHORT. You wouldn't have had to have them. You do need them so that if anything went wrong with the current.

723. General FRANK. For reserve?

General SHORT. Yes. But, as I say, that is a feeling I have, but I wouldn't be safe.

724. General FRANK. Well, what I am getting at is this: from the point of view of the Secretary of War when he made the statement that this material would be furnished in June or about.

General SHORT. It definitely was not. The material I am sure didn't get there until about November 1st. He thought it would. I was told by the War Department, as I remember, that by June 30th, we would have everything.

725. General FRANK. I have a signed letter here from the Signal Corps which, in answer to some questions that we asked, states as follows: "All components of one SCR 271 set were turned [510] over by the Signal Corps to the Quartermaster for shipment on the 26th of May."

General SHORT. All components?

726. General FRANK. Of one.

General SHORT. Of one set?

727. General FRANK. Yes.

General SHORT. Well, now, that is a—

728. General FRANK. Now, just a minute. "All components of two SCR 271 were turned over for shipment on the 26th of June, one month later."

General SHORT. Yes.

729. General FRANK. So there were three sets?

General SHORT. Yes. Now, you have got to figure they have got to get priority to ship them.

730. General FRANK. Now; five SCR 270, which are the mobile sets, were delivered to the Quartermaster for shipment on the 22nd of July.

General SHORT. Yes.

731. General FRANK. It is not so material about the mobile sets because along in November you had the mobile sets and they were functioning.

General SHORT. Yes, they were functioning, and I think—

732. General FRANK. All I wanted to bring out is this: that it was not a question as to whether or not you had the radar equipment on hand. It was a question of having the installation in which you were going to put it in shape so that you could erect the radar on that installation.

[511] General SHORT. In at least one case the question of a collar was involved.

733. General GRUNERT. Do I understand, then, that all the permanent radar equipment to be installed in permanent stations was in Hawaii and available, except some parts that were still missing?

General SHORT. I think some of the parts were missing. I would not know definitely. The only safe way would be to call Colonel Powell or someone directly responsible. But this letter that they had shipped the equipment would not necessarily mean that it all arrived. If one part failed to arrive it would have prevented the use of the system.

734. General FRANK. The shortage of equipment to build roads; to build emplacements in these sites after you got to them over the roads, was really what was holding up the installation and operation of the permanent stations. Is that correct?

General SHORT. I believe that the roads and the buildings, except at Kaala were pretty well completed. That is just memory. I have no statement as to just the degree. We got reports of the degree of completion; but I believe that on the Island of Maui the Haleakala Station was actually on. I believe that the road construction had been done.

735. General GRUNERT. Where would such reports be available for the record?

General SHORT. I think that the District Engineer and the Department Signal Officer would both know definitely the status.

736. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, are you really conversant with those details?

General SHORT. No. I knew generally, but as to exactly what had been received I would not know.

[512] 737. General GRUNERT. We will develop that later. We want to find out how much you know, so that if there are some of these questions that you cannot answer you can say so. We have other ways of getting the information.

General SHORT. I would not know except in a general way.

738. General FRANK. May we have a copy of the June 10th message?

General SHORT. It is in this book, 1-E.

739. General FRANK. May we also have copies of the letters in which you asked for priorities?

General SHORT. Yes.

740. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, while the A. W. S. system was not completed, with full advantage of the power available and the distance obtainable by the permanent station, nevertheless the A. W. S. system was operative with mobile sets up to a distance of about 130 miles. Is not that correct?

General SHORT. That is correct. You could not count on 130 miles, but under favorable conditions you would get it.

741. General FRANK. I bring that out to clarify something that General Grunert spoke about.

Have you any information to give or comments to make relative to the failure of any contractors on the Hawaiian construction to complete their work?

General SHORT. I do not believe that the District Engineer ever reported to me that the contractor had fallen down on his job. I think most of the reports he made to me was as to the inability to get materials so that he could push the contractor.

742. General FRANK. Have you any information as to whether or not any military personnel neglected duties relating to the Hawaiian construction contract?

[513] General SHORT. I have none.

743. General FRANK. Do you have any information to give to the Board on a Mr. Wilhelm Rohl, a German contractor who operated in Hawaii?

General SHORT. I have never even heard his name until a few months ago.

744. General FRANK. Were you in any way familiar with the Hawaiian defense contract that was let by Colonel Theodore Wyman to The Hawaiian Constructors?

General SHORT. It was let before my arrival in the Islands. I knew that generally The Hawaiian Constructors were doing the work there, but I was not at all familiar with the details. I might state that when Colonel Hannum came out from San Francisco he went over the work that Colonel Wyman was doing, and after he had made an inspection of the office and the work he came to my office and made a report to me of what he had found, and seemed to be thoroughly satisfied with the conditions that he had found.

745. General FRANK. Are you familiar as to whether there were any parts missing on the radar, or were they parts of generator sets?

General SHORT. I could not say definitely. I had the feeling that generator sets were missing, but I might be wrong. I am sure that they were not complete.

746. General FRANK. Yesterday in your testimony you gave some information relative to the state of training of bombardment. That

was only part of the force that was there available. What was the state of training with respect to your fighter aviation units?

General SHORT. We had a bunch of new aviators sent over [514] that had just completed their primary training. I think it was 200 hours. None of them had flown the P-40, a much faster ship than the training ship. As I remember, the air people stepped them up gradually by putting them on the P-36. I think they may have flown the A-20's before they went to the P-40's; but it was a gradual proposition of getting the pilots where they were safe to fly the plane, and then they were given gunnery, probably, after they had reached that stage.

747. General FRANK. Did you anticipate 24-hour use of the aircraft warning service just as soon as your permanent stations were installed?

General SHORT. Any time that the situation demanded.

748. General FRANK. If the equipment could stand it was there any point in not operating it if a critical situation existed?

General SHORT. If a critical situation existed, unquestionably; but as a peace-time proposition if there was any critical situation I do not know whether you would operate it 24 hours a day, or not. We had not had the experience.

749. General GRUNERT. Did you not, in answer to my question, state that it would not have made any difference whether all equipment was there and all stations in, that you would have done the same?

General SHORT. With the estimate I had of the situation, that is correct.

750. General FRANK. Who determined the hours of operation of the A. W. S. sets, from 5 to 7?

General SHORT. In the morning or the afternoon?

751. General FRANK. In the morning.

General SHORT. 4 to 7?

752. General FRANK. Yes.

[515] General SHORT. I made the determination, because all of our studies indicated that they were the most dangerous hours, that if carrier planes were going to attack they would come in so that when they returned to their carriers—they would not want to return before daylight, because they would not dare to turn on lights for landing on their carriers. They would run in as close as they could so as to get there near dawn, do their bombing and go back and make a landing on their carriers. If you will take that study about the 180 B-17's, that is gone into very fully as to the different distances.

753. General GRUNERT. Then there must have been in your mind some idea that there might be some little danger of it actually happening in those hours, or was it just for practice in order that they might get used to those hours?

General SHORT. If there was going to be any danger, definitely that would be the dangerous time; and also I wanted them to get accustomed to working, so that in critical periods they would be thoroughly familiar with the conditions during that time.

754. General FRANK. This No. 1 Alert at this time anticipated that pilots would be available to fly their aircraft within what length of time?

General SHORT. Four hours, I think. That was not a question of being able to put a plane in the air in four hours, but it was a question of making the personnel available.

755. General FRANK. In other words, you depended on four hours?

General SHORT. No. That would be the maximum time. As a matter of fact, the conditions were such there that 50 per cent of the personnel, I would say, or more, were always there, unless they were out on a problem or maneuvers.

[516] 756. General FRANK. Generally an optimistic estimate of the range at which the radar was effective was about 130 miles?

General SHORT. That is really better than we estimate. I think we estimated 75 to 100 miles. It is just like anything else. There were times when they were perfect.

757. General FRANK. That would enable an approaching force to get in there well within a half hour?

General SHORT. Yes.

758. General FRANK. Considering that pilots were not to be alerted except on a four-hour basis and with most everybody else having a day off on Sunday, why was the A. W. S. operated at all on Sunday?

General SHORT. Largely because it was new and they needed training in it more than any other element of the command.

759. General FRANK. When we speak of the A. W. S. we really mean construction of the information center and the establishment of communications between the radar station and that center?

General SHORT. And the operation of the radar station; yes.

760. General GRUNERT. Also communication between the center and the command?

General SHORT. Any communications; yes.

761. General FRANK. All communications.

General SHORT. Yes.

762. General FRANK. Why was it put under the Signal Corps?

General SHORT. All that technical work had to be done by the Signal Corps.

763. General FRANK. Why was not the control of its installation placed under the Air Force who were going to operate it?

[517] General SHORT. At that time we did not think that the technical training of the Air Corps had progressed to a point where we could count on performance. We thought it was a little better if the Signal Corps man felt that he had control up to the time he said his operators were in shape to turn over, and things would go along a little faster. It might have been wrong.

764. General FRANK. It strikes me that right within the Army itself you had a situation between the Air Force and the Signal Corps where this A. W. S. was operating on a cooperative basis rather than on a positive command basis.

General SHORT. Because it had not reached a state of training where we thought it could work to the best advantage.

765. General FRANK. But if the vast proportion of the people concerned with its operation were Air Force people—

General SHORT (interposing). Not the technical operation. The operation of the communications and the radar system is definitely for the Signal Corps.

766. General FRANK. But the moment it became operative it came under the control of the Air Force?

General SHORT. Yes.

767. General FRANK. Why not put it under control of the Air Force in the first place?

General SHORT. Because the Signal Corps thought they could train them faster to where they were better technical men than if it were put under the Air Force.

768. General FRANK. Generally in the United States these installations were put under the supervision of the Air Force Interceptor Commander.

General SHORT. The actual installation?

[518] 769. General FRANK. Yes.

General SHORT. We fully intended, as you notice from our standing operating procedure, to have them operated by the Air Corps, but the building up of the stations and all of the technical work we looked upon as a Signal Corps matter.

770. General GRUNERT. When they operated during maneuvers and tests with the Navy, I understood from my reading that the information center and such warning service as was in existence actually operated with the Navy during some of those maneuvers and tests. Who operated the system then?

General SHORT. We did not have a system formally set up until—well, it was pretty close to November 27th.

771. General GRUNERT. Somebody operated it during maneuvers?

General SHORT. The Signal Corps undoubtedly operated it.

772. General GRUNERT. Colonel Powell?

General SHORT. Yes. We had not built the control station at that time.

773. General GRUNERT. This youngster, Lieutenant Tyler, who apparently in the information center or the control center, whatever you may have called it—I understood from your testimony that you considered him as in charge there at the time; is that right?

General SHORT. I did. He was the control officer who was there.

774. General GRUNERT. Under whose direction was he then functioning?

General SHORT. Under General Davidson's, the actual command for all operating purposes. It was operating the same as it would have been if General Davidson had been actually placed in command.

[519] 775. General GRUNERT. Then it was by and with his consent that he was doing what he was doing, and not by order?

General SHORT. General Davidson; yes; and he understood that it would be by order as soon as it got to the point where he and Colonel Powell thought it would be proper.

776. General GRUNERT. The next two subjects, Antiaircraft Defense, and Inshore Aerial Patrol, I think we have covered, unless either one of you has any particular question that has not been covered on those two subjects. If not, I will go to the next subject, Command and Staff. I have some general questions here that I would like to propound.

Were conferences held by you or your Chief of Staff with the principal subordinate commanders wherein they were kept informed of the situation and, in turn, informed you of the measures taken by them to meet such situations?

General SHORT. We had a conference normally on Saturday morning.

777. General GRUNERT. Normally once a week?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

778. General GRUNERT. Were subordinate commanders informed of the imminent approach of probable hostilities set forth in the messages received late in November and early in December?

General SHORT. G-2 and G-3 and the Chief of Staff were. Whether all of the subordinate members of the staff were, I am not sure.

779. General GRUNERT. Were discussions had as to measures to be adopted in preparation for such an eventuality?

General SHORT. My discussions on that were confined to G-2, G-3, and the Chief of Staff and the Echelon Command.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

* * * * *
Page 519, line 29, change "command" to "commanders".
* * * * *

/s/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

780. General FRANK. Who were the echelon commanders?

[520] General SHORT. An Air Corps officer, General Martin, General Burgin, and the two division commanders.

781. General GRUNERT. In the weekly conferences, when the question of a plan or order came up, such as your S. O. P. of November 5, was that generally discussed?

General SHORT. Whoever was responsible for the development of that would conduct a discussion and would outline what was being done, the state of it, and ask for questions. It would depend on what the type of project was, what staff officer would have it.

782. General GRUNERT. With whom did you discuss or from whom did you seek advice as to whether or not you should put your command in Alert 1, 2 or 3? Mind you, I do not mean after you would make a decision, but to get information.

General SHORT. The Chief of Staff and the G-2, and General Martin. I think I talked more at length with him, because he had that ferrying business, and he and I talked at considerable length on that.

783. General GRUNERT. When you received the message of November 27th from the Chief of Staff, how long was it before you decided upon what alert to adopt?

General SHORT. I decided in a very few minutes, because if I wanted to go further, all I had to do was to say "Go into Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3."

784. General GRUNERT. Then this long conversation with General Martin was a build-up before that?

General SHORT. No. I talked to him. I had him over within probably an hour after I had made the decision and talked it over with him that same afternoon; and I think I talked with General Burgin that same afternoon. I talked with General [521]

Murray on several occasions, because he had the most serious part of that sabotage work.

General GRUNERT. That was after the decision was made?

General SHORT. Yes.

876. General GRUNERT. Did you then consider that they had the right to argue whether or not that was the best for their command? Or did you change your decision, or was it an accomplished fact?

General SHORT. As a matter of fact, I believe General Burgin felt that we might go successively into 2 and 3 and go into a maneuver like we had in May.

787. General GRUNERT. You and I will know that it is not a good thing to have a round robin to get a bunch of opinions, or the opinion of a group, on which to make a decision, except to seek advice. But after a decision is made, then everybody carries it out without question, and a great many of them feel probably that they have no more say after the decision is made.

General SHORT. I do not believe that my higher echelon commanders or my staff felt that way about it. If they had any suggestions which they thought were important I am sure they would have made them.

788. General GRUNERT. You feel, then, that your subordinate commanders and your staff felt free to come to you if they thought that you may have been mistaken in what you did from the information you had?

General SHORT. I am sure they would.

789. General GRUNERT. Were those commanders and staff officers informed about the other information you had received from the Navy concerning what we might call the critical period, or were they only informed of the November 27th information?

[522] General SHORT. I am quite sure that they were all informed of the July business and were all informed of the October 16 and November 27th information. Between that I do not remember anything of sufficient importance from the Navy to give to them in detail. I may have talked casually about it.

790. General GRUNERT. The notes on the testimony before the Roberts Commission indicates that General Wilson, commanding the 24th Division, was never called in conference or consulted regarding the warning message of November 27th.

General SHORT. Did he say he got it from the Division Officer?

791. General GRUNERT. He said he was never consulted.

General SHORT. He had the north sector where the anti-sabotage work was not nearly as serious. While I had repeated conferences with Murray, I may not have had any with Wilson.

792. General GRUNERT. Wilson thought the Navy had an inshore and offshore patrol. Why was he not instructed and informed?

General SHORT. His job was quite different from that of the other divisions. While I had repeated conferences with Murray, and I had Murray personally inspect every post and he came back to me with recommendations and made a lot of changes—

793. General GRUNERT (interposing). That was in connection with your Alert 1?

General SHORT. Yes.

794. General GRUNERT. But in connection with the possibility of his giving advice as to any other alert, he, Wilson, did not have any information?

General SHORT. I did not have any conference with him as to whether he wanted to advise me as to something different.

795. General GRUNERT. Colonel Fielder says he discussed the [523] possibility of an attack with the Commanding General in a purely academic way. I do not quite understand how there is anything academic about discussing the possibility of an attack.

General SHORT. I do not. We discussed the possibility, probably because he was G-2 and was supposed to have some information.

796. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not your Chief of Staff and your G-2 agreed that you had pulled the right alert?

General SHORT. I am sure they both fully agreed.

797. General GRUNERT. General Murray, when he got Alert No. 1, was not informed as to the seriousness of the existing situation, no intimation, nothing, although he talked to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, several times between November 27 and December 7. Why was he not informed?

General SHORT. I am sure he had all the information that I did. I may not have given him the idea that we were going out in the midst of an attack the next day. That may be what he means. But he probably had as much conversation with General Murray about what we were doing as anybody in the command, because he made a tremendous amount of changes.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

* * * * *

Page 523, line 19, —change "but he" to "but I".

* * * * *

/s/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

798. General GRUNERT. I think he refers not to Alert No. 1, but to the general situation and the knowledge you had.

General SHORT. I am sure he knew the contents of the message. But I did not go down and talk over with him what his opinion was as to whether the message meant they were going to attack or whether he would expect at attack.

799. General GRUNERT. General Burgin did not know the Interceptor Command under General Davidson was not working. He thought it was, because it had been for drill.

[524] General SHORT. That is what I say. It was actually operating, but had not been officially organized.

800. General GRUNERT. You had a conference once a week. What did you confer on if it were not what the condition of things was

and what should or should not be done, and so forth? I do not know whether this is the truth, but that it what is in the record, and we will question about it.

General SHORT. Undoubtedly that is correct. Burgin was not in on the weekly conferences. I did confer with the staff.

801. General GRUNERT. Then the weekly conference was a staff conference and not a conference with subordinate commanders?

General SHORT. No. We had a conference with subordinate commanders on irregular occasions, whenever there was something we thought we should take up with them.

802. General GRUNERT. When you wanted to talk to your commanders about anything you had a special conference and not a periodical one?

General SHORT. That is correct. I had them very often, one at a time, because they were problems that might be different.

[525] General GRUNERT. "Lt. Col. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, informed the staff at a meeting on December 6 that the Japs were burning papers on December 5. Says it meant that war was imminent, to him." De he so inform his Chief of Staff or his Commanding General? If so, what conclusions were reached with regard to it?

General SHORT. I am sure he didn't inform me. I don't know whether he informed the G-2 of it. On the other hand, we burnt similar messages every day, so I don't think Colonel Fielder would have thought so much of it.

804. General GRUNERT. But this seems to intimate that a member of your staff, or assistant to a head of your staff, thought that war was imminent.

General SHORT. Well, he was decidedly less experienced than Fielder. He was a Reserve Officer, and he might have taken that burning of messages as a good deal more serious, and may have been overlooking the fact that we burn similar messages constantly.

805. General GRUNERT. That may have been an afterthought with him, for all I know.

General SHORT. Yes.

806. General GRUNERT. But that was in the record.

General SHORT. It may have been.

807. General GRUNERT. And General Martin did not seem to know that the Interceptor Command was not activated until December 17.

General SHORT. Well, the fact was it was actually operating, and there was such a technical difference, there that apparently Bergin and Martin, neither one realized it hadn't gone out as an order. It was actually operating daily.

[526] 808. General GRUNERT. General Rudolph, the Commanding General of the Bombers, stated that had he had any intimation of preceding trouble his planes would not have been bunched or concentrated but would have been ready for the air. Then, in parenthesis, "especially on a Sunday morning." Was he not informed by the Commanding General, or the Commanding General of the Air Forces, of the warnings of the immediate past?

General SHORT. I went over the thing very fully with General Martin, talked over with him at as great length as anybody. I would imagine that he talked with his subordinate commanders.

809. General GRUNERT. There is in the record somewhere, I believe, that General Martin sent two telegrams, to General Davidson, absolutely telling him to bunch his airplanes.

810. General FRANK. One, from Martin, and one from the Department?

811. General GRUNERT. I meant that Martin sent one, and he received another one, presumably from the Department, to that effect.

General SHORT. The Standing Operating Procedure definitely provided for distributing by airfield, but grouping them all on the individual airfield.

812. General GRUNERT. I wondered why, in view of the Standing Operating Procedure, these telegrams on this particular thing were necessary?

General SHORT. I do not know they were sent.

813. General GRUNERT. Was there some argument about whether to do it or not?

General SHORT. General Davidson might have asked the [527] question; I don't know. Now, I will tell you one thing that might have caused it. We were having an exercise, maybe a month or so before that, and I got up to Wheeler Field along about 11 o'clock at night and found that their planes had not been distributed in the bunker, and that gasoline had not been put in the bunkers, and that ammunition had not been put in the bunkers, and the situation was such that it should have been, in this maneuver; and that might have caused somebody to ask the question. I did not know that that had taken place.

814. General GRUNERT. That is all I have on that particular subject. Do any questions occur to any one of you two, on what I call the "command" subject?

I have one question, or a small series of questions, here, on alerts. The points that you seemed to dwell upon in your testimony before the Roberts Commission as the reasons for alert 1, and not 2 and 3, are briefly summarized as follows: Strong possibility of sabotage, no definite information to indicate an attack by air. Under alert 2, some bombers would have had to go to other Island. No fence for the airfields available. The difficulty of constructing the bunkers on Hickam Field. The interference with training, particularly aircraft ferrying training. Under alert 2, the aircraft would have been placed where it could not continue its proper training.

If any of these are incorrect, will you so inform me.

Are those the ones?

General SHORT. That is correct.

815. General GRUNERT. Have any of the other Members any questions to ask on the subject of alerts?

The next subject I have is "defensive and protective [528] measures." A great many of these questions have been answered, but I would like to go over those that I have, to make sure that I haven't missed any points that I particularly wanted to have brought out.

In the Roberts Report it referred to a deficiency of matériel. What particular deficiency was there that interfered with the taking of appropriate defense measures, with the means available? Did the deficiency of any matériel prevent you from taking whatever measures were possible with what you had?

General SHORT. No, but it would not have been as effective as it would have been if we had all of the matériel.

816. General GRUNERT. Generally, how would increasing the defense measures curtail the training or virtually suspend same?

General SHORT. If Alert No. 3 had been ordered, practically every man in the Department would have gone to his field positions, and all training would have stopped.

817. General GRUNERT. Did Alert No. 2—

General SHORT. Alert No. 2 would have practically stopped the training of the Air Corps and the Antiaircraft Corps. It would not have interfered seriously with the training of the infantry divisions.

818. General GRUNERT. Did you have any provisions in Alert No. 2, where only a certain part of each squadron was to be alerted, and the rest would come in?

General SHORT. When we went to the No. 2, we put all of the Air, all of the antiaircraft, definitely on the alert, and all of the harbor defense.

819. General GRUNERT. While on the subject of alerts, when you took over, I understand there was just one class of alert [529] that covered everything to be done; and some time after you took over, you established 1, 2, and 3. What was the purpose in establishing three classes of alert and not continuing what had been done in the past?

General SHORT. What had been done in the past was done by what they call Field Order No. 1, which was highly secret, so nobody knew what his job was, and when anything went into effect there had to be all kinds of long-winded orders issued, causing delay and confusion, and what we were trying to do was to eliminate all the secret stuff from the standing operating procedure and get it so that we could actually use any alert against any situation without confusion, and as promptly as possible. That was the basic reason for it.

820. General GRUNERT. Of course, then, it is a question of judgment as to what alert to adopt, the decision to be made at that time. Had you had only one alert. Would you then have alerted yourself?

General SHORT. If you had nothing but alert 3, you probably would have gone to alert 3, but if it be provided that every time there was any kind of an alarm, that you went into your field positions, you would probably have turned out the whole command.

821. General GRUNERT. There appear to have been some actions taken and orders issued since December 7; for instance, at Wheeler Field, by the Commanding Officer, pertaining to chemical air attack, on December 9; air-raid instructions, on December 7; distribution of Claxon horns for air-raid-warning systems; after attack, practiced air-raid for Honolulu, December 9, and the exchange of old gas masks for new, December 9.

[530] Are these indications that no such, or inadequate, instructions regarding these measures were issued prior to December 7?

General SHORT. It simply means that we learned that certain parts of our plan we thought necessary to improve or change. Now, we, on the Claxons, were trying sirens, or Claxons, to make them for the City of Honolulu, that could be heard; and we had been expecting to get them. We hadn't got them. When this thing came on, we issued the best thing we had to them.

822. General GRUNERT. Somewhere in the report it shows that some Army officer's wife stated that she did not know what was to be done in case of an air raid, and that she had never been told what to do; whether to go out—she did not say this, but the intimation was—whether to go out and jump into a slit trench, or whether to go to a certain place for shelter.

Were those matters covered prior to December 7?

General SHORT. We had a plan for evacuation of all the women and children from the affected area. We did not have trenches constructed, as we did, later. Beginning on the 8th of December, we actually dug the trenches on the lawns of the officers' quarters. We did not have them at that time. We had the plan for the evacuation, and the evacuation started according to plan at 12 o'clock, noon, and they were moved to school buildings, or cafeterias were set up, cots and blankets issued, and that all existed by a plan and was carried out by the civil community.

823. General GRUNERT. Were there any black-out regulations in effect?

[531] General SHORT. We had had two or three black-out alerts with the civil community.

824. General GRUNERT. In the testimony of General Burgin, it was reported that he stated to the effect that he believed General Short counted on the Navy for warning from sea approach—that is, Navy scouting—and that Short expressed himself forcibly that no enemy ships could get close enough to land a plane. Why this belief?

General SHORT. I believed that the Navy would be able—

825. General GRUNERT. Your confidence in the Navy?

General SHORT. In my confidence in the Navy.

826. General GRUNERT. Then there is an expression attributed to you, which you are quoted as having said—

Frankly, I was more serious about training rather than expecting anything to happen at that time.

Why this, in view of the messages received?

General SHORT. What I meant by that was, on an air attack, in view of the information that the Navy had given me that the Japanese fleet were proceeding to the south, and all, I foresaw a possible attack on the Philippine Islands, but did not think we would have anything besides sabotage and possible uprisings.

827. General GRUNERT. "General Short issued orders for a practice air-raid on December 10; instructions for protective measures in Honolulu, December 9; and an SOP on defense against a gas attack, and a bulletin of information for the conduct of families in an air-raid, Dec. 7." Were no such instructions issued prior to the attack?

General SHORT. We had had practice alerts with the civil [532] community. I couldn't have issued orders to the civil community until we were under martial law.

828. General FRANK. May I ask a question, now?

829. General GRUNERT. All right. Go ahead. I have three more, here, when I get around to it.

830. General FRANK. They had instructions, issued in the studies by the Office of Civilian Defense?

General SHORT. I say we had alerts in the civil community, and the Governor put out instructions, and it was all done at our inspection. It wasn't a question of our issuing them orders.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

* * * * *
Page 532, line 10,—change "inspection" to "suggestion".
* * * * *

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

831. General GRUNERT. Under Alert No. 2, "ammunition would have been at the guns. However, this would have alarmed the public, contrary to War Department instructions." I am quoting this from a statement which you made, somewhere in the Roberts Commission report. I will read that again:

Under Alert No. 2, ammunition would have been at the guns. However, this would have alarmed the public, contrary to War Department instructions.

Why should this have alarmed the public?

General SHORT. Because it was something we never did. Now, the small-arms ammunition was for protection against sabotage, because all of the guards and everybody of that kind was armed with small-arms ammunition; but we never moved out loaded ammunition to those guns that were set up right in the City.

832. General GRUNERT. Did it ever occur to you that it might have been a good thing to have done that with a daily routine, about once a week, and so forth?

[533] General SHORT. Not in view of the messages I was getting from the War Department not to alarm the public.

833. General GRUNERT. Did you consider the War Department instructions mandatory on this subject, even if it jeopardized your defense?

General SHORT. No, not if it definitely jeopardized my defense, and if I had thought there was going to be an air attack, everything would have been out there.

834. General GRUNERT. "If so, why didn't you ask the War Department to O. K. your going on Alert No. 2?"

General SHORT. I didn't believe so, and they knew I was on Alert No. 1, and didn't tell me I was wrong. They had known, for ten days.

835. General FRANK. Might it not have been a good idea from the very start to have gone into the field periodically with real ammunition, as a maneuver measure, and that would have eliminated drawing attention to it?

General SHORT. I think that everyone who has ever done any maneuvering realizes that one of the things you always do on maneuvers is to inspect very carefully and make the officer sign a certificate that there is no live ammunition there, because you don't want to kill the people in maneuvers. I have never been in a maneuver in my life that I didn't require certificates from battalion commanders that there was no live ammunition there.

836. General RUSSELL. General Short, suppose that every week you had taken all your people and give them live ammunition and run

them out to these gun positions: what effect would that have had in developing a "wolf! wolf!" spirit, that has [534] been discussed here quite frequently?

General SHORT. Well, I am sure that they would have thought it was very unnecessary.

837. General RUSSELL. That is all.

838. General GRUNERT. One question, here. Somewhere in my notes, here. I have something to the effect that your Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips, stated that he was not informed as to what took place at your conferences with the Admiral. Did you keep him informed, or did you discuss with him what happened?

General SHORT. Anything of any importance, I am sure I discussed with him. We were on a very friendly personal basis, and I am sure that if I picked up any piece of information that I thought was of any importance—and I know that I talked to him about certain task forces, because when it came to sending an officer along, why, he would be the one that would get out the order.

839. General FRANK. May I ask a question?

Might he have come to that conclusion through the absence of information that even you didn't have?

General SHORT. He might have. I don't believe that he intended to indicate that I withheld information from him.

840. General GRUNERT. Vice Admiral Pye, U. S. Navy, stated before the Roberts Commission that after he took command, after December 17, he called in General Emmons, and they really got together on inshore and distant patrolling.

General SHORT. He had unity of command.

841. General GRUNERT. The officer states that "now" this is done. Does that mean that there was no real getting together prior to that?

[535] General SHORT. No, but it means that beginning December 17 there was unity of command. He could call up General Emmons and order him to do things, and that the situation was completely changed with reference to the command.

842. General GRUNERT. He states "they really got together," meaning, "They have now really got together for cooperation."

General SHORT. You had passed from cooperation to unity of command.

843. General GRUNERT. Then does that lead you to believe that you two couldn't get together, without the unity of command?

General SHORT. We could get together. I am satisfied unity of command would always be more successful than cooperation.

844. General GRUNERT. What struck me was that "they really got together," meaning that in a sense they didn't get together, before.

General SHORT. The point of view with the fellow that's in command, when he is in command of the whole thing, would always be, I think, that he could control things better.

845. General GRUNERT. I have this question: What evacuation provisions under alert 2 were there? Were there any evacuation provisions under that alert?

General SHORT. We had elaborate evacuation plans, to be carried out by the committees in town. They would not be carried out till the notice was given for them to be carried out. They were not just developed as part of any one plan.

846. General GRUNERT. Then in your verbal statement to the Board at the beginning of the hearings, here, I gathered that [536] there was a spurt in construction after December 7, compared to delays prior thereto. How did that come about?

General SHORT. They gave me a "blank check."

847. General GRUNERT. A "blank check"? But your materials, your priorities, and your shipments, and everything?

General SHORT. Yes, but we also took over all the material on the Island, no matter who had it. If we needed it, we took it.

848. General GRUNERT. Then there was material on the Island that could possibly have been used before, had you been able to get it?

General SHORT. There may have been in the hands of plantations certain material which we could have used. There may have been, in the hands of certain contractors; and beginning the 8th of December the district engineer was ordered to take over all construction material and take over all contractors with their machinery, for war. In other words, the situation was so changed that we could take anything that was in the Island, no matter whether the man wanted to give it up or not.

849. General GRUNERT. Now, the question is whether to continue. I do not think I have many more questions, here, but I will check them over. This is on the state of readiness of aircraft, which probably has been covered, but I want to check it. The questions under that topic have all been covered. I go to the next one, incidents during the attack.

Was the attack of December 7 a complete surprise to you?

General SHORT. It was.

850. General GRUNERT. Were you informed of the sinking of one submarine at about 6:45 a. m., December 7, in the prohibited [537] area off Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. I was not. I didn't know about it, until the following day.

851. General GRUNERT. At what time on December 7 did you realize an attack was on?

General SHORT. Practically, when the first bomb dropped, about 7:55. I was not sure till two or three minutes later, when the second one was dropped, and I ran out and looked; and at 8:03 my Chief of Staff came in a minute or two afterwards, ran into my house and said he had messages from Hickam and Wheeler, practically the same thing.

852. General GRUNERT. What Naval support was rendered the Army in its mission of securing Pearl Harbor against hostile attack, on December 7? What did they do to help?

General SHORT. All of their ships that were in there, as I understand it, did antiaircraft fire, and the Marines had certain antiaircraft installations at Ewa Field, and went into action.

853. General GRUNERT. This was all part of the plan for defense under your tactical control?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. Of course, now, the guns on the ships were not under my tactical control.

854. General GRUNERT. They had not been worked into the scheme of protection?

General SHORT. No, no; we had not gone that far with the cooperation. All of the naval and marine guns ashore operated under our anti-aircraft, but the guns on the ship did not.

855. General GRUNERT. What firing they did aboard those ships during the attack was on their own?

[538] General SHORT. It was on their own.

856. General GRUNERT. And did they appear to be surprised, also?

General SHORT. I think they were as much surprised. They had, I believe, skeleton crews on their guns, and I believe that possibly two guns on each battleship had full crews—two .50-caliber guns. That is just memory. It may be inaccurate.

857. General GRUNERT. Under the special items I have two questions. Did anything provide for the restriction of military personnel under your various classes of alerts?

General SHORT. We had certain battalions, of which every man was held right in camp, and there was motor transportation there to move those battalions; and, of course, the personnel that was on guard over these various installations were definitely restricted.

858. General GRUNERT. Let me put it in the line of social gathering.

General SHORT. There were no restrictions at all except for the people who were on duty.

859. General GRUNERT. There were no restrictions on social gatherings, under Alert No. 1?

General SHORT. No, sir.

860. General GRUNERT. How about 2, and 3?

General SHORT. We had not, definitely, but with Alert No. 3, every officer would have been on duty, and there could not have been any social gathering. On Alert No. 2, it would have been possible for officers of the infantry division to have attended a social function.

861. General GRUNERT. I have no further questions. Has either [539] of you any questions on any subject?

862. General RUSSELL. I just have two or three brief ones. Is General Short's report on this action of December 7 in that file, there, as a part of it?

General SHORT. It is. The first 50 pages of this report is a statement, first, of events leading up—

[540] 863. General RUSSELL. I am rather familiar with it.

General SHORT. —and then of the events that took place, and then later on the things, the steps I had taken to improve the defenses and to improve the possibility of correct action by the civil community.

864. General RUSSELL. Now, did the Navy have a Pearl Harbor only two carriers, the Lexington and the Enterprise?

General SHORT. They had not a single carrier in Pearl Harbor that morning.

865. General RUSSELL. I mean if they had all been in, were only two carriers based at Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. I believe that you are right, but I wouldn't be a hundred per cent positive. But I know there was no carrier in there.

866. General RUSSELL. That is all.

General SHORT. There may have been one. There may have been one other. The LEXINGTON and the ENTERPRISE. Was there a carrier called the P-a-t-r-o-n by any chance?

867. General RUSSELL. I didn't see a record of it anywhere.

General SHORT. I know the LEXINGTON and the ENTERPRISE were there, and I am not sure whether there was anything else or not. Of course, you understand the cruisers carried a certain number of planes, so that if a task force was out there was a certain number of planes available for reconnaissance even if they did not have a carrier.

868. General GRUNERT. General, do you wish to make any additional statement in view of what has transpired during your hearing?

General SHORT. I do not believe that I do, sir.

869. General GRUNERT. Do you wish to appear again before the [541] Board for a rehearing or for such questions as the Board might have as it develops testimony?

General SHORT. If the Board feels that it has developed things that require my testimony, I do.

870. General GRUNERT. Would it be more convenient to you to come to San Francisco in the last week in September, or Washington the first week in October?

General SHORT. I am about half way. It wouldn't matter very much.

871. General GRUNERT. Then if the Recorder gets in touch with you upon our return to San Francisco from Hawaii, we can determine where to give you an additional hearing.

General SHORT. Yes. Whatever place the Board would desire me. I can be there because the difference in time would be very little.

872. General GRUNERT. All right. The Board thanks you for coming up and giving us your testimony.

General SHORT. I thank the Board for very courteous treatment.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 12:35 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

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[543] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

MONDAY, AUGUST 14, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Saturday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JOHN J. KINGMAN, U. S. ARMY
(RETIRED)

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General Kingman, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

General KINGMAN. Brigadier General John J. Kingman, U. S. Army, retired; Washington, D. C.

2. General GRUNERT. General, the Board, in attempting to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background, to get what information may be gleaned here in the War Department as to matters which related to the Hawaiian Department. It is hoped that because of your assignment at the time of the attack [544] on Hawaii and prior thereto, you can give us some facts that will help us in what we are concerned with and doing.

In order to cover the large field in the short time we have available, I have had to parcel out special investigations to individual Members of the Board, although the entire Board will pass on all the subjects; so General Frank has drawn this special line of investigation, and I will ask General Frank to lead in propounding the questions. Then, if General Russell or I have anything to ask in addition thereto, we will do so. General Frank.

3. General FRANK. On what duty were you, in 1941?

General KINGMAN. I was Assistant to the Chief of Engineers.

4. General FRANK. In that capacity, what were your responsibilities?

General KINGMAN. I had under my supervision six sections of the office of the Chief of Engineers. They were the Military Personnel

section, the Railway section, the Intelligence section; what had been called the "Construction" section, later for a short time called the "Fortification" section, and the Operations and Training section. The other, I cannot think of at the moment.

5. General FRANK. Did you have anything to do with the processing of contracts?

General KINGMAN. No. I used to sign the papers sometimes, when General Schley, the Chief of Engineers, was absent.

6. General FRANK. In your capacity as Assistant Chief to the Chief of Engineers, and in your capacity in accordance with the duties that were assigned to you, would you have had any information relative to the failure of any contractors on [545] Hawaiian projects to complete their work on time?

General KINGMAN. None, whatever; no, sir.

7. General FRANK. Did you have any such information?

General KINGMAN. I did not.

8. General FRANK. The several sections that you have referred to were in that part of the office over which you had supervision?

General KINGMAN. Yes; that is right.

General FRANK. Did a German by the name of Hans Wilhelm Rohl ever come to your attention?

General KINGMAN. I never met him, that I know of; but I knew that there was a man named Rohl, I didn't know the rest of his name, who was a member of a firm of contractors in southern California, that had the contract for the Los Angeles breakwater.

9. General FRANK. On August 28, 1941, you signed a letter requesting action on Rohl's citizenship papers, of which this is reported as a copy; is that correct?

General KINGMAN. I think that is correct; yes, sir.

10. General FRANK. Why was this request made by you?

General KINGMAN. It was signed by me as a routine matter. I have looked the matter up in the last two days. I have here a photostatic copy of the file-copy of that letter, with the initials of the officials who prepared the letter for signature.

11. General FRANK. Who were they?

General KINGMAN. I find that the letter was drafted by an employee named Benjamin L. Stilphen, who was then in the Contracts and Claims Branch, Office of Chief of Engineers. Later, he was commissioned in November, and I learned Saturday [546] that he has been either retired or discharged for physical disability, and is now somewhere in New York City. This letter was initialed in the ordinary routine, and, as you see here, I find those initials "F. T. J." By looking in the telephone book of the War Department, I was able to locate that man as now Major Frederick T. Johnson. I talked with him, and he gave me the information about the letter having been drafted by this man Stilphen.

The final initialing was by Colonel Earl E. Gesler, who was the head of the Finance Section, Office, Chief of Engineers. I have no personal knowledge as to why the letter was initiated.

12. General FRANK. Whose initials are those, directly under the signature?

General KINGMAN. Colonel Gesler's. He is now division engineer of the Middle Atlantic Division, in Baltimore.

13. Colonel WEST. May I ask at this stage that, if that photostatic letter has been received in evidence, we have the reporter mark it "Exhibit 2," for purposes of identification.

14. Major CLAUSEN. It has been. It is Exhibit 2.
(The letter of August 28, 1941, is as follows:)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, August 28, 1941.

LEMUEL B. SCHOFIELD,
*Special Assistant, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization,
Office of the Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. SCHOFIELD: [547] The Hawaiian Constructors, a joint venture consisting of the W. E. Callahan Construction Co., Los Angeles, Calif.; Rohl-Connelly Co., San Francisco and Los Angeles, Calif.; Gunther & Shirley Co., Los Angeles, Calif., and Ralph E. Woolley, contractor of Honolulu, T. H., are working on very important defense construction at Honolulu, T. H., pursuant to Engineer Corps Contract No. 2-414-eng-602.

Mr. H. W. Rohl, 8519 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif., one of the principal stockholders of the Rohl-Connelly Co., applied to the United States district court at Los Angeles, Calif., on January 15, 1941, for his final citizenship papers which have not, as yet, been issued. Mr. Rohl is possessed of outstanding ability, excellent judgment, and resourcefulness for the management of difficult construction work. Some of the outstanding work performed by Mr. Rohl was the construction of the Los Angeles-Long Beach detached breakwater, the construction of the Headgate Dam at Parker, Ariz., for the Indian Service, and miscellaneous dams, tunnels, and other heavy construction in the State of California. To date, Mr. Rohl's valuable services have not been available for Government defense projects because of his alien status.

The services of Mr. Rohl are of vital importance to the expeditious completion of the aforementioned defense construction project because of his peculiar qualifications and scarcity of qualified supervisory personnel. It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question. It is therefore requested that the granting of Mr. Rohl's final citizenship papers be [548] expedited.

Your consideration and cooperation will be very much appreciated.

Very respectfully,

JOHN J. KINGMAN,
*Brigadier General,
Acting Chief of Engineers.*

15. General FRANK. Do you know why this request was made to hurry his citizenship papers?

General KINGMAN. Well, I know that it had something to do with the work going on in the Hawaiian Islands. That is stated in the letter.

16. General FRANK. Did you know Rohl?

General KINGMAN. I don't think I ever met him. When I was Division Engineer in San Francisco, his company had the contract on the Los Angeles breakwater, and I inspected the work on two or three occasions, but so far as I can recall I never met Rohl. I might possibly have met him, without recalling it.

17. General FRANK. What was the general reputation of that firm?

General KINGMAN. They were supposed to be very good contractors. They did a good job on that breakwater. That is the only contract that they had, that I ever had anything to do with.

18. General FRANK. With so many firms in the United States whose members were reputable, "1000%" citizens, why were you pressing the case of Rohl, a German citizen?

General KINGMAN. I didn't know he was a German citizen.

19. General FRANK. You signed this letter?

[549] General KINGMAN. Nothing says that he is a German citizen in that.

20. General FRANK. In order to get citizenship, he certainly had to be something besides an American?

General KINGMAN. Well, he might have been anything, belonged to any nationality, other than the United States.

21. General FRANK. As long as you were signing the letter, did not your curiosity lead you to question the nationality from which he was changing?

General KINGMAN. There was nothing in that letter that aroused any misgivings in my mind as to the propriety of signing it. I didn't question it, at all.

22. General FRANK. You, therefore, did not know that he was a German citizen?

General KINGMAN. I certainly did not.

23. General FRANK. At this time, the war in Europe was on, was it not?

General KINGMAN. Oh, yes! We were not in it.

24. General FRANK. However, our sympathies certainly were not neutral, were they?

General KINGMAN. Evidently not!

25. General FRANK. And yet, here was a man whose citizenship papers you were trying to expedite, and it never occurred to you as to what his original nationality was?

General KINGMAN. No; it did not.

26. General FRANK. Did you know Colonel Theodore Wyman?

General KINGMAN. Oh, yes; I knew him.

27. General FRANK. Did you know anything about his personal association with Rohl?

[550] General KINGMAN. No, no; nothing.

28. General FRANK. You knew nothing as to whether a friendship existed there, or what those personal relationships were?

General KINGMAN. No; I knew nothing about that.

29. General FRANK. It seems a little difficult for me, in view of the upset in world relations at that time, to reconcile how these steps could have been taken to get a man by the name of Rohl citizenship, without being interested to the extent of wanting to know what his original nationality was. Does it not seem peculiar to you that, on the verge of war with Germany, the office of the Corps of Engineers was trying to clear a German citizen for naturalization, so as to give him war contracts?

General KINGMAN. Of course, we knew nothing about his nationality; at least, I knew nothing about it.

30. General FRANK. Certainly somebody in the Corps of Engineers had to know something about his nationality, or he would not have been asking for citizen papers.

General KINGMAN. I don't know what other people may have known about it. I doubt if they knew that he was a German.

31. General FRANK. When a man makes application for citizenship, he certainly has to state his original allegiance?

General KINGMAN. Well, I presume he must have stated that to the court. I dare say the FBI and the Department of Justice knew about it, but the Corps of Engineers, I don't think had been fur-

nished any information that would arouse any misgivings whatever in regard to the man's nationality.

32. General FRANK. In any event, you were not familiar with it?

[551] General KINGMAN. I knew nothing whatever about it. I was merely acting for the Chief of Engineers in signing a great many papers; and I signed this one, in the absence of the Chief of Engineers.

33. General FRANK. Are you familiar with the negotiations for a contract dated the 20th of December 1940 with the Hawaiian Constructors for defense projects in Hawaii?

General KINGMAN. No, sir.

34. General FRANK. Do you know anything concerning the failure of those contractors to complete the construction of the defense projects?

General KINGMAN. No, sir. I thought they had probably done pretty well, from what I heard.

35. General FRANK. Do you have any knowledge concerning whether any military personnel neglected their duties relating to that contract?

General KINGMAN. No; I have no knowledge. A day or two ago, I received a letter that might be of interest to this Board. I do not know whether it is proper for me to submit it, or not.

36. General FRANK. That is all right.

General KINGMAN. It is from a man that worked for me on Corregidor some thirty-odd years ago, when we were building the fortifications of Corregidor.

37. General FRANK. To what does the letter refer?

General KINGMAN. It refers to Colonel Wyman. I do not know whether it is proper to submit it, or not.

38. General FRANK. During that period of Wyman's life does this come in?

[552] General KINGMAN. December 7, 1941.

39. General FRANK. What was your assignment on the 20th of December 1940? Were you Assistant Chief of Engineers?

General KINGMAN. Yes, sir.

40. General FRANK. And you had the same responsibilities on the 20th of December as you enumerated at the beginning of this interrogation?

General KINGMAN. That is correct. That did not include anything to do with making the construction contracts. The Supply Section came under me, too.

41. General FRANK. Did you know during any of this period that Hans Wilhelm Rohl had been under investigation by a Government agency for suspicious activities?

General KINGMAN. I did not.

42. General FRANK. What if any measures should have been taken by the personnel of the Corps of Engineers for the protection of the Government against contracting with a person having such a record?

General KINGMAN. If they had any reason to question his loyalty, they should have reported him to the FBI for investigation, I should think.

43. General FRANK. Who, in the office of the Corps of Engineers, was responsible for looking into a man's reputation, who was handling Government contracts through the engineers? Who was responsible for it, in the office of the Corps of Engineers?

General KINGMAN. I don't believe I can answer that question.

44. General FRANK. You signed this letter that you presented [553] to the Board?

General KINGMAN. Yes, sir.

45. General FRANK. You stated you were not familiar with the details. Somebody in that office certainly had to be familiar with the details and responsible for the facts in the letter. Who was that?

General KINGMAN. That would have been Colonel Gesler, with relation to contracts. He was the one who finally initialed this letter.

46. General FRANK. In what part of the office did he serve?

General KINGMAN. He was head of the Finance Section.

47. General FRANK. Did not the Intelligence Section or the Personnel Section come into this, at some place?

General KINGMAN. No; none whatever. They wouldn't have known anything about it.

48. General FRANK. Do you mean to say, if there was a question relative to the suspicious activities of an individual with whom the Corps of Engineers was doing business, the espionage or counter-espionage agency would not have been concerned with it?

General KINGMAN. That would have been G-2, not the engineers.

49. General FRANK. The engineers were the people who had the direct contact with this man?

General KINGMAN. That is correct.

50. General FRANK. Wouldn't they have reported it?

General KINGMAN. I don't think they had anything to report—as far as I know.

51. General FRANK. You are familiar with the Espionage Act [554] of the 28th of March 1940, are you?

General KINGMAN. Yes, sir. I have had no contact with it, at all; no duties in connection with it.

52. General FRANK. Give us a short résumé of that, will you, Major Clausen?

53. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. This act forbids the employment of aliens upon a government contract, or making aliens aware of the details of a government contract dealing with national defense. It is a penal offence to so do.

General KINGMAN. I had nothing to do with making these contracts.

54. General FRANK. Did you ever receive any notice of any reports concerning activities in Hawaii of Colonel Wyman that were derogatory to Colonel Wyman?

General KINGMAN. I never did; no. I wouldn't have received them, any way.

55. General FRANK. Who would have received them?

General KINGMAN. I think General Robins would have received them.

56. Major CLAUSEN. May I interrupt to say that the Espionage Act to which my attention was invited was set forth by the War Department in Circular 121, in 1940, and then distributed to war installations of the War Department.

57. General FRANK. In your capacity as assistant to the Chief of Engineers, did you have anything to do with the assignment of personnel?

General KINGMAN. Yes, sir.

58. General FRANK. Would you know when an officer was relieved for inefficiency?

[555] General KINGMAN. Oh, yes!

59. General FRANK. Was Colonel Wyman relieved for inefficiency, from Hawaii?

General KINGMAN. Well, that was after I retired, I believe, that he was relieved from Hawaii.

60. General FRANK. Were you familiar with the Canol project?

General KINGMAN. In a general way, in the way everyone of us is.

61. General FRANK. With respect to this letter that you have about Colonel Wyman, what is the tenor of it?

General KINGMAN. It is a personal letter to me from a man I knew years ago, and in it he mentions what happened on the 7th of December 1941. I don't know whether this Board would like to look at it informally or not.

62. General RUSSELL. Was this man Sisson, about whom you are talking, and from whom you received that letter, a great big, tall fellow?

General KINGMAN. Yes.

63. General RUSSELL. Do you know anything of his history in the States?

General KINGMAN. I know that after he worked for the Engineer Department in the Philippines, at the time I knew him, from 1907 to 1910, he went into private practice, I think, for about twenty years, as an engineer. Then, as I recall it, about 1930 or 1931 he came back to the Engineer Department and worked in the Ohio Valley Division; I think, most of the time in the Huntington District.

64. General RUSSELL. I am only interested in the period, General, when he was not with the Government, but was out as [556] a private engineer. Do you know where he was located during that period?

General KINGMAN. I remember he wrote me that he was in Canada a part of the time.

65. General RUSSELL. Do you know whether he went into the southern part of the United States?

General KINGMAN. No; I do not.

66. General RUSSELL. His name is George A. Sisson?

General KINGMAN. Sisson.

67. General RUSSELL. That is all.

[557] 68. General FRANK. Will you read that part of the letter which is pertinent?

General KINGMAN. The letter is dated Honolulu, T. H., 17 July 1944, contains the following:

Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., U. S. A., was District Engineer here during the most strenuous period and really got things done. He was a real hustler. Unfortunately, it looks as though someone in Washington has been trying to make a goat of him. The statement that recently appeared in the papers that he was drunk on the morning of December 7, 1941, was absolutely false. I was Area Engineer of the 2nd Field Area with my office at Hickam Field, which, as you no doubt know, adjoins Pearl Harbor. The Jap planes attacked Hickam at the same time others hit Pearl Harbor. We had a crew working that morning and as soon as the attack started an assistant of mine rushed to the phone and tried to call Lieutenant Colonel B. L. Robinson at his residence to inform him of the attack, however that line was busy. He then called Colonel Wyman at his residence. Colonel Wyman answered the phone and was in good condition.

I have talked to employees who were in the district office when he arrived shortly afterwards and they stated that he was entirely sober. Colonel Wyman, being the go-getter that he is, naturally has stepped on various toes at times, but he was the man who really got work accomplished. As a matter of fact, he impressed me as being the coolest, most capable [558] officer here at the time of the "blitz." Wyman, like others, has some faults, but neglecting his duty was not one of them.

He had made a rather unfortunate choice of the contractors who secured the fixed-fee contract. I understand that on the Coast the firms that went in and formed the Hawaiian Constructors were reliable firms. The trouble was that they sent their scrub team over here. However, in spite of that they accomplished a lot of work.

69. General FRANK. Of course, it must be realized that that is not sworn testimony; it is simply an expression of opinion. Nor is it known how familiar the writer was with the situation where Wyman was on that morning, because his only contact with Wyman was by telephone; that is correct, isn't it?

General KINGMAN. That is correct, yes.

70. General FRANK. Yes. So that first paragraph is more or less in the category of hearsay?

General KINGMAN. I should say entirely.

71. General FRANK. All right.

72. General GRUNERT. Who was Chief Engineer at the time you were Assistant Chief?

General KINGMAN. Major General Julian L. Schley.

73. General GRUNERT. When you testified as to the number of activities in the Engineer office of which you had charge, you said the construction section. Did that construction section have anything to do with the letting of contracts?

General KINGMAN. When the contracts were let by the [559] necessary engineer they were then forwarded through the Division Engineer to the Office of Chief of Engineers if it was a large enough contract to require the approval of the Chief of Engineers, and were handled by the finance section. That is where this letter with reference to Rohl was prepared.

74. General GRUNERT. Did you have anything to do with the checking of the progress under the contracts where they led to construction?

General KINGMAN. My construction section did on fortification work.

75. General GRUNERT. Would construction under the Air Warning Service come under fortification work?

General KINGMAN. It did for a time under this construction section.

76. General GRUNERT. Did you know how things were progressing in Hawaii? The contracts referred to the defense projects in Hawaii, including the one of the Air Warning Service.

General KINGMAN. No, I did not.

77. General GRUNERT. You did not know anything about those?

General KINGMAN. No.

78. General GRUNERT. And it was not part of your duties to check that up to see whether the contract was progressing, to see whether it should be done away with? Or, in other words, you did not know anything about that contract?

General KINGMAN. No.

79. General GRUNERT. Now, what were the regulations as to the checking of contractors? Here, as I understand, the District Engi-

neer awarded a contract to a contractor or to a number of contractors. Whose business is it to check as to the [560] reliability of said contractors? Is it the District Engineer's? Is it the finance section? Or is it nobody's business?

General KINGMAN. Well, it would be primarily the District Engineer, and finally the checking would be done in this finance section handling contracts in the office of the Chief of Engineers.

80. General GRUNERT. Then, it was up to the finance section of the Chief of Engineers office to check on the District Engineer?

General KINGMAN. That organization has been—I am speaking of the organization as it was at that time.

81. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General KINGMAN. It has been so modified since my retirement that I cannot tell you about the way it is today.

82. General GRUNERT. Well, what I am trying to get at is this: Who was responsible that the German citizen was awarded a defense contract?

General KINGMAN. Well, I think someone else could answer that question a great deal better than I can, because I had no supervision over this contract.

83. General GRUNERT. That is what I am trying to get at. Who, in your opinion, could answer that line of questions?

General KINGMAN. I think General Reybold or General Robins could answer that much better than I could.

84. General GRUNERT. Now, you signed the letter urging the expediting of citizenship to this man Rohl. You say you signed as a matter of form or routine. Had you signed similar letters to get citizenship for other people or hurry them up, or was this the only case that you remember?

[561] General KINGMAN. I think that is the only case I ever handled—I ever signed as Acting Chief of Engineers.

85. General GRUNERT. Then, you did not think, inasmuch as no other cases that you knew of had gone through, that you should look at it and make inquiries about it? Did it strike you as anything unusual?

General KINGMAN. None whatever. As I have stated before, there was nothing in the circumstances which aroused any misgiving on my part.

86. General GRUNERT. Then, it was the custom in the Chief Engineer's office to sign most everything proposed by some other section or that responsible head; is that the general idea of it? I will not say signed everything, but you put your signature to a letter proposed by, initialed by, so and so; that means you trust him that that is all right?

General KINGMAN. Yes, sir.

87. General GRUNERT. You did not think you had to go into it any further, even though it may have referred to something that might have caused suspicion otherwise?

General KINGMAN. So far as I knew at that time, this was a very unimportant matter.

88. General GRUNERT. You say you think the Board can get the best evidence as to the letting of contracts, and so forth, from the officer who was then finance officer of the Chief of Engineers office?

General KINGMAN. Yes, sir.

89. General FRANK. What was his name?

General KINGMAN. Colonel Earl E. Gesler.

90. General GRUNERT. How is Wyman considered as an officer [562] among his fellow officers?

General KINGMAN. Well, he is considered one of the most efficient officers on construction that we have in the Corps of Engineers.

91. General GRUNERT. What is he, dynamic?

General KINGMAN. Very dynamic.

92. General GRUNERT. Or what is known as a go-getter?

General KINGMAN. Absolutely.

93. General GRUNERT. Has he been in trouble before because of that go-getting attitude? Do you know?

General KINGMAN. Well, he sometimes would ride a little roughshod over people, and they did not like it.

94. General GRUNERT. Generally, what were the reports on him prior to your retirement, that you know of officially, as having charge of that part of the office?

General KINGMAN. He was rated as a superior officer.

95. General GRUNERT. One other question I have: While you knew Rohl in California and I believe had awarded a contract to his firm, was there any inclination on his part to try to entertain you?

General KINGMAN. So far as I know, I never personally met Mr. Rohl.

96. General GRUNERT. As far as you know there was no attempt on his part to get in your good graces by social entertainment?

General KINGMAN. None whatever.

97. General GRUNERT. I have no further questions.

98. General RUSSELL. Did you have any?

99. General FRANK. No.

100. General RUSSELL. I have some, from these notes that I have [563] here:

General, you stated that when this letter, the mimeographed copy of which has been furnished the Board, was submitted to you for signature there was nothing in it that indicated to you something out of the ordinary?

General KINGMAN. That is correct.

101. General RUSSELL. In that letter there is a sentence that, "To this date Mr. Rohl's valuable services have not been available for Government defense projects because of his alien status." That sentence was in there, and that did not indicate to you that his status was about to be changed so that he could get information on our defense projects?

General KINGMAN. I don't know whether I get the import of that question exactly.

102. General RUSSELL. This letter was for the purpose of changing his status from that of a foreigner to that of an American.

General KINGMAN. Yes.

103. General RUSSELL. And the purpose of it was to enable him to do defense project work.

General KINGMAN. Yes.

104. General RUSSELL. Did that not indicate to your mind immediately, General, that some investigation of that sort of thing should be made by the Corps of Engineers before they placed their stamp of approval on this proposed changed status?

General KINGMAN. No, it did not. This man had been doing work for the Corps of Engineers for several years.

105. General RUSSELL. Well, now, this job that he had done out on the West Coast under your supervision, at Los Angeles, I [564] believe—did that come in the category of a defense project?

General KINGMAN. No; it was building a breakwater there.

106. General RUSSELL. So far as you knew, therefore, this was the first time that a foreigner with the name of Rohl was going to participate in a defense project?

General KINGMAN. That is correct, yes.

107. General RUSSELL. Now, you say that you did not know what nationality Rohl was. Did that name indicate anything to you?

General KINGMAN. Not a thing, no.

108. General RUSSELL. At that time, General, was it difficult to get competent contracting firms to do the work that the Engineers wanted done for the Government?

General KINGMAN. I had nothing to do with that, but I think it probably was pretty difficult to get them at the outlying places where we were doing work, remote portions of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

109. General RUSSELL. Then, in these areas that you last described you did have difficulties in getting contracting firms to go there to do the work?

General KINGMAN. Well, as I say, I had nothing to do with this.

110. General RUSSELL. You just do not know?

General KINGMAN. I do not know.

111. General RUSSELL. Now, in reply to some question that was asked by General Frank you stated that you thought the contractors had "done pretty well," if I recall your language, out at Hawaii. I wanted to ask you now, was it generally considered in the Office of the Chief of Engineers that satisfactory progress was being made by the firms who were [565] doing the work out at Hawaii in the year 1941?

General KINGMAN. I do not know the answer to that.

112. General RUSSELL. Well, what did you mean a moment ago when you said you thought the contractors had done pretty well at Hawaii?

General KINGMAN. Well, that was just the impression that I had gotten, from no direct connection with the work.

113. General FRANK. Casual conversation?

General KINGMAN. Just casual conversation without any knowledge of the details.

114. General RUSSELL. But you are not in position now to testify whether or not they had done pretty well out there?

General KINGMAN. No.

115. General RUSSELL. When was this breakwater work done at Los Angeles?

General KINGMAN. Well, it was started, as I recall it, about September 1936.

116. General RUSSELL. And finished when?

General KINGMAN. It might have been in '38 or '39; I am not sure.

117. General RUSSELL. General, do you know whether or not the request made in this letter of August 28, '41, for speeding up action on Rohl's naturalization application originated in the Office of the Chief of Engineers or out on the West Coast?

General KINGMAN. I found nothing in the file to indicate where it originated, but I think probably that General Robins or Colonel Gesler could give evidence on that point.

118. General RUSSELL. You were fairly well acquainted with the Office of the Chief of Engineers in Washington here at that time, [566] were you not?

General KINGMAN. Yes.

119. General RUSSELL. Would there have been any reason for anyone in this office here to have known of the filing of Rohl's application for naturalization or the progress which had been made on it unless such person or persons in the Office of the Chief of Engineers had been told by someone who was on the scene where the naturalization application was pending?

General KINGMAN. I would say no.

120. General RUSSELL. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that the interest of the Engineer Corps was first developed elsewhere than in the Office of the Engineers here?

General KINGMAN. I would say that probably this was initiated by the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman.

121. General RUSSELL. Were you more or less familiar, General, with the agencies available to the Engineer Corps for expediting work on contracts such as that which was being done at Hawaii? Do you know the machinery that was used by the Engineers to hurry along work on the contracts?

General KINGMAN. Well, there was no machinery that I know of other than the offices of the District Engineer and the Division Engineer concerned.

122. General RUSSELL. Who were where the work was being done?

General KINGMAN. Yes.

[567] 123. General RUSSELL. These contracts were being executed in Oahu. What authority did the Commander of the Hawaiian Department have over that work?

General KINGMAN. I do not know.

124. General RUSSELL. Were you not Assistant to the Chief of Engineers at that time?

General KINGMAN. Yes. I may have known at that time. If I did, I have forgotten now.

125. General RUSSELL. That is all I have to ask.

126. General FRANK. Were you acquainted with any employees or officials of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization?

General KINGMAN. No, sir.

127. General FRANK. This letter, then was brought to you to sign purely in your capacity as Assistant to the Chief of Engineers?

General KINGMAN. As Acting Chief of Engineers.

128. General FRANK. Will you differentiate briefly between defense projects and other projects?

General KINGMAN. Defense projects would be those that related to the national defense.

129. General FRANK. The Rohl firm had a contract with the Corps of Engineers prior to the time that they were considered for defense projects. What I am trying to bring out is, what kind of projects were they working on before they were considered for defense projects?

General KINGMAN. The only contract that I know of that they had was this one on the breakwater at Los Angeles.

130. General FRANK. What kind of a project do you call that?

General KINGMAN. A river and harbor project.

[568] 131. General FRANK. As distinguished from a defense project?

General KINGMAN. Absolutely.

132. General FRANK. That is what I am after. I have nothing further.

133. General GRUNERT. There appears to be nothing further, General. Thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. EUGENE REYBOLD, CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY (ACCOMPANIED BY DOUGLAS I. McKAY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, AND MAJOR LUE LOZIER, J. A. G., ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF CHIEF OF ENGINEERS)

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Cononel WEST. Will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General REYBOLD. Eugene Reybold—R-e-y-b-o-l-d; Major General, Chief of Engineers; stationed in Washington, D. C.

2. Colonel WEST. For the purposes of the record will you also please state the names and connections of the gentlemen who are accompanying you?

General REYBOLD. Mr. Douglas I. McKay, Special Assistant to the Chief of Engineers, and Major Lue Lozier, J. A. G., assigned to the Office of Chief of Engineers.

3. General GRUNERT. General, the Board is attempting to get at the facts about the attack on Hawaii, and we are now looking into the War Department background, together with all the information we can get that refers to conditions in Hawaii prior [569] to and during the attack. So we have called you in the hope that we will get some information that will lead us to facts or that you will give us facts on which to make a report and judge what to recommend. In order to cover the large field in the limited time we have available, individual Board members have been assigned objectives or phases for special investigation, although the Board itself will pass on all phases. General Frank has been assigned this particular phase, and I am going to ask him to lead in propounding the questions, and the other Board members will fill in and develop the subject.

4. General FRANK. What was your assignment during the years 1940 and 1941?

General REYBOLD. Up until August 1940, I was the Division Engineer.

5. General FRANK. Where?

General REYBOLD. At Little Rock, in the United States Engineers Department, and on about August 1st I was assigned as Acting G-4 of the War Department.

6. General FRANK. That is, in 1940?

General REYBOLD. That is 1940. On October 1, 1941, I was appointed Chief of Engineers. So I served as G-4 of the War Department from the period of about August 1—I think it was August 4, to be specific—until September 30, 1941.

7. General FRANK. We are interested in the progress of certain construction projects in Hawaii as identified by job order which cover the construction of certain aircraft warning service installations in Hawaii. We are desirous of getting information on the progress or lack of progress of that construction. Are you familiar with those details?

[570] General REYBOLD. I am not familiar with those details, although I have made some examination of the records existing in the Office of the Chief of Engineers.

8. General FRANK. Was there some delay in the construction of the aircraft warning service projects?

General REYBOLD. Apparently the initial job orders issued in connection with three fixed stations were issued in June of 1941. To be specific, permit me to refer to Job Order 23.1 under date of June 18, 1941.

9. General FRANK. All right.

General REYBOLD. That job order provides for A. W. S. camp, utilities, and fence, Kokee Road, and was to have commenced on June 23, 1941, with an estimated date of completion set as September 23, 1941.

10. General FRANK. The completion date was September 23?

General REYBOLD. Yes.

11. General FRANK. What happened to it? That is what I am interested in.

General REYBOLD. I have a record here which I cannot reconcile, identified as Job Order 23.1 Revised, dated December 17, 1941, entitled A. W. S. base camp and field station. It is not in exact agreement with the project title of 23.1 referred to a moment ago. It is dated December 17, 1941. But subsequent information was obtained through a telegram received from the District Engineer in Honolulu on June 26, 1944, fixing the date of completion as 31 December, 1941, indicating further in this telegram that the time of completion was changed to that date under date of November 30, 1941.

[571] 12. General FRANK. What was the cause of these delays?

General REYBOLD. All that I can do at the moment is to generalize on those delays and to quote from the same telegram referred to a moment ago as having been received from the District Engineer at Honolulu.

13. General FRANK. In 1944?

General REYBOLD. Yes. I quote now from that telegram in response to inquiry of my office:

(Excerpt from telegram of June 26, 1944, is as follows:)

Chronological sequence causing delay in construction cannot be given. Stop. Causes of delay can be attributed to the following: numerous changes in plan by issuing agency, difficulty in procuring special items of Signal Corps buildings and structures from the Mainland, critical situation in shipping facilities, radar equipment required for the operation of stations was to be furnished by Signal Corps and was late in arriving at its destination in the Islands, inclement weather conditions in the vicinity of stations during construction period delayed work to some extent stop

14. General GRUNERT. Like all generalizations, they do not state anything in particular as to any one of the delays mentioned there?

General REYBOLD. That is correct.

15. General FRANK. Do you have any first-hand information with respect to the causes for those delays, or has all this information been obtained by you from some members of your [572] organization?

General REYBOLD. That is correct. All the information I have is obtained from the records and from these few telegrams that have been dispatched to our present District Engineer in Honolulu.

16. General FRANK. Therefore, this information that we are obtaining is repeated information taken from original records that are elsewhere?

General REYBOLD. That is correct.

17. General FRANK. Where are these original records?

General REYBOLD. In the Office of the District Engineer in Honolulu; and perhaps some of the original copies are on file in our own office.

18. General FRANK. Are there people on duty now in Honolulu who are conversant with those original records?

General REYBOLD. I would judge that the present District Engineer, with the assistance of some of his division employees who have been on duty there since the period under discussion, would be able to furnish valuable information.

19. General FRANK. I am interested not only in this Job Order 23.1; I am interested in Job Order No. 23 which has to do with the construction of a road, with addendum 1, 2, and 3, and Job Order 23-1. I am interested in Job Order 41, which has to do with the construction of a road on Haleakala, and addendum 1, 2, and 3. I am interested in Job Order No. 2.1 which covers an access road from Kolekole Pass to the proposed site of the cableway at Kaala; Job Order No. 2 covers the construction of the cableway itself; Job Order 2.2 which covers the construction [573] of the A. S. W. camp and installation on the top of Kaala; also Job Order 46, which later was suspended, covering the road, buildings, and so forth, on the top of Mauna Loa. Then, in addition, I am interested in Job Order 20.1 covering the construction, including the fabrication and installation, of 12 50,000-gallon gasoline storage tanks; Job Order 20.120 covering 6 50,000-gallon gasoline tanks; Job Order No. 20.130 covering 12 50,000-gallon tanks; Job Order 25: construct, fabricate and install 9 50,000-gallon gasoline storage tanks, the first addendum thereto; and Job Order 21.1 covering 9 50,000-gallon storage tanks, and certain others.

The point arises that all the information that we would get from you is information that you have collected from original sources, when those original sources would be available to us. Is that correct?

General REYBOLD. That is correct.

20. General FRANK. Therefore I question the advisability of pursuing the details of this matter further with the Chief of Engineers, when we are going into the original records in Honolulu.

21. General GRUNERT. I agree with you.

22. General RUSSELL. I have just one question on that point.

General, I listened to your description of what happened to this initial job order 23.1. I may be mistaken, but I gathered the im-

pression that some of the information which you gave us as to delays was gathered from original memoranda or data in the Office of the Chief of Engineers here in Washington?

General REYBOLD. No, sir. That information came to us in the form of a telegram which was in response to a telegram [574] that we had sent to our District Engineer at Honolulu under date of 19 June, 1944; and I will be glad to submit this as part of the record, and the response, which speaks for itself; both our telegram and the reply.

23. General RUSSELL. That is the second record to which you referred, the 1944 telegram, and the reply thereto, about which there was no confusion. But earlier, and in the beginning, you read to us some other papers which you had in your hand, giving us the history of the postponements of 23.1 which involved work on the A. W. S. station, and I was wondering if all that data was collected from the Hawaiian office or if some of it was gotten out of the Engineer's office here.

General REYBOLD. What I have said up to this time has been taken from the job order records of No. 23.1 and the telegram received from our District Engineer.

24. General RUSSELL. All those records on 23.1 came from Hawaii?

General REYBOLD. Yes.

[575] 25. General FRANK. Do you have a monthly progress report that you require be sent into your office from your district engineers?

General REYBOLD. At that time we had a report generally known throughout the service as a "monthly report of operations," and those reports are on file in our office.

26. General FRANK. Would they cover these job-orders in which we are interested?

General REYBOLD. Only in a general way.

27. General FRANK. We will give you references to these job-orders and ask, if you please, that you forward us copies of the progress reports on these jobs, through to the completion of the project.

General REYBOLD. We will be very glad to give you whatever records we have in that respect. I should like to add that in our search of these records, the report of operations for the month of November, in connection with the storage tanks referred to, is missing from our files.

28. General FRANK. Are you familiar with the negotiations for a contract, W-414-eng-602, dated the 20th of December, 1940, with the Hawaiian Constructors, for defense projects in Hawaii?

General REYBOLD. Only as I have examined to some limited extent the contract on file in the office of the Chief of Engineers.

29. General FRANK. That was before you were directly associated with the Corps of Engineers?

General REYBOLD. Yes, sir. I was not appointed until October 1, 1941.

[576] 30. General FRANK. Are you at all conversant with the case of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General REYBOLD. Only as I have read in the papers and heard over the radio, and in connection with the report of the Military Affairs Committee of the House, and what we might term the "squadroom talk." I never met the gentleman, to my knowledge.

31. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not he is at the moment a government contractor?

General REYBOLD. I do not.

32. General GRUNERT. Could he be, without your knowledge?

General REYBOLD. He might be.

33. General FRANK. After all the investigation that has gone on with respect to his firm, wouldn't it have been normal for you to have had an investigation in your own establishment, to have uncovered that?

General REYBOLD. It might well have been.

34. General FRANK. Whose responsibility is that?

General REYBOLD. That's perhaps the responsibility of the Chief of Engineers, but we have pretty close watch on those things through the office of the Provost Marshal General, and through G-2, and through the Service Command headquarters, in this country; and of course any individual leaving these shores for a foreign nation is very carefully investigated prior to his departure.

35. General FRANK. However, foreign agents have methods of communicating their information without they themselves leaving the country; that is correct?

General REYBOLD. Oh, yes

[577] 36. General FRANK. Have you any personal or official knowledge of the reliability of one Rohl?

General REYBOLD. I know nothing about the individual, personally. Going back to contracts, if they be a fixed-fee contract, we have a Contract Advisory Committee sitting in our office, which looks into the ability to perform, and the financial responsibility of every contractor, before we award a contract; and that is equally true of course of a lump-sum contract; we examine very carefully into those features.

37. General FRANK. What did you call that agency?

General REYBOLD. "Contract Advisory Committee," it is called.

38. General FRANK. Did that exist at the time this contract was let?

General REYBOLD. That existed, and I have been told—I can't vouch for this—that this particular contract, at the time of its award, was referred to that Contract Advisory Committee for its approval prior to the award.

39. General FRANK. Do you know who comprised that committee at that time?

General REYBOLD. I could readily get that: Mr. Blossom, Mr. Harvey, Mr. Dresser, Mr. Talow, now a Colonel in the Army, and Mr. A. L. Sherman.

40. General FRANK. You are conversant with the Espionage Act that requires contractors receiving defense-project contracts to be citizens of the United States?

General REYBOLD. I am not familiar with it, but I judge that that's so, all right.

41. General FRANK. Well, that is a law.

[578] General REYBOLD. Yes.

42. General FRANK. I am just developing this as a background for the next question. Whose responsibility would it be to check as to whether or not a contractor was a citizen of the United States?

General REYBOLD. That would be the responsibility of everyone in connection with the award of a contract. By that I mean if a contract be under consideration for award in a district, the district engineer,

and, in turn, if it came forward, the division engineer; and if again it required the approval of the Chief of Engineers, it would be the responsibility of the Office of the Chief of Engineers.

43. General GRUNERT. Is that all set forth in regulations and instructions, or is it just understood?

General REYBOLD. I think that is generally understood.

44. General FRANK. So far as you know, then, there is nothing specific in the regulations about that?

General REYBOLD. Nothing specific, but here is a copy of a letter which may be of interest to the Board, under date of December 12, 1941. The subject is "Counter Subversive System." It is addressed to "The Commanding Generals, All Corps Areas; and The Chief of Engineers." With your permission, I will read it. It is brief.

45. General FRANK. Proceed.

General REYBOLD (reading):

1. Reference is made to the Counter Subversive System which was inaugurated by the Construction Division of the Quartermaster Corps at the time that the Construction Division was under the jurisdiction of the Quartermaster General.

[579] 2. In view of the fact that the Construction Division has recently been placed under the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers, it is directed that the Counter Subversive System referred to in paragraph 1 above be maintained by the Corps of Engineers, and that it continue to function under the control of Corps Area Commanders in accordance with the provisions of Counter Subversive Instructions.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. S. ADAMS
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

46. General FRANK. Are you conversant with the fact that the firm of Rohl-Connolly Co. had a contract for building a breakwater in Los Angeles?

General REYBOLD. Only by hearsay.

47. General FRANK. In a situation like that, and in accordance with this system, as outlined in that letter you just read, will you explain how that counterespionage system would work in determining any questionable activities of Mr. Rohl?

General REYBOLD. Our people in our district maintain very close contact of course with the Service Command Headquarters, their subversive people, the G-2 people. They, at the Corps Areas or Service Command headquarters, know what is going on in the line of Federal work throughout their respective commands, I judge, under the terms of this letter, and we in turn have an Intelligence Section in our own office which maintains very close contact with the activities of our office, and, in turn, with the G-2, and with the Provost Marshal General.

[580] 48. General FRANK. Is there a clean-cut line of operation, or is it of nebulous positiveness as to the manner in which it works?

General REYBOLD. There is nothing positive on the books, to my knowledge, as to a requirement as to looking into the loyalty of a contractor, prior to Pearl Harbor.

49. General FRANK. What if any orders of the Corps of Engineers required that the loyalty and background of proposed contractors be investigated before a contract was awarded?

General REYBOLD. We say, none as to loyalty. As to background, it was the duty of the Corps of Engineers to be informed about and be

satisfied with the experience, ability to perform, and financial responsibility of its contractors.

At the time, preceding the award of this contract there was no occasion for the Chief of Engineers to suspect or doubt the loyalty of any member of the contracting group. Had there been, the matter would have been reported to G-2 for appropriate attention. As of 20 December 1940, and before, G-2 was the sole agency within the War Department charged with the duty of reporting on and conducting investigations into matters pertaining to loyalty.

50. General RUSSELL. General, was that the 20th of December, 1940, or 1941?

General REYBOLD. That was 1940. That was the time of the letting of the basic contract, General.

51. General FRANK. In the case of Rohl, are you conversant with the personal relationship of Colonel Theodore Wyman and Rohl?

General REYBOLD. Nothing more than what I have heard, and [581] read in testimony.

52. General FRANK. You have gathered from that testimony that Rohl and Wyman were intimate or casual friends?

General REYBOLD. I would say that they were pretty close friends.

53. General FRANK. In a situation like that, where the friendship was so close between the man letting the contract and the man receiving it, a situation could exist where there could be some question about the loyalty of the man receiving the contract, and the system which was implemented for determining that being distributed among the Corps of Engineers, the Corps Area Commander, the FBI, the G-2 of the War Department, that system might be so diversified as to prevent its ever being picked up; is that correct?

General REYBOLD. It might be.

54. General FRANK. Therefore, might it not be logical to draw the conclusion that the system for determining this was rather loose?

General REYBOLD. I would say Yes.

55. General FRANK. I think we will go back and take the questions that we sent over to you, ask you those questions, and proceed with the development in accordance with the answers that have been prepared in your office. Just give me a general answer to these questions, and then I can pursue that later, in view of our understanding.

General REYBOLD. All right.

56. General FRANK. As of the 7th of December, what was the state of completion of the work on each item contemplated by Contract No. W-414-eng-602?

[582] General REYBOLD. Our records are not clear, and I would suggest that that information be obtained in detail from the district office in Honolulu.

57. General FRANK. That office has the original records?

General REYBOLD. It has the original records.

58. General FRANK. The next question: When was the work on each item commenced?

General REYBOLD. The same answer as (a).

59. General FRANK. What were the number and locations of the permanent aircraft warning stations included within the work of the contract?

General REYBOLD. The original contract, dated 20 December, 1940, and approved by the Under Secretary of War, 3 January 1941, did not specify the number nor the site locations. It provided:

Warning service stations at locations to be determined, specified in Article I, 1. Article I, 1B:

Aircraft warning service stations on the Islands of Oahu, Hawaii; Maui and Kauai, involving certain installations, including buildings, roads, trails, cableways, haulage ways and other structures appurtenant to aircraft warning service, as directed by the Contracting Officer.

As of the date of the contract, the War Department had authorized the construction of the following:

(a) Three fixed stations, as follows:

Mt. Kaala on Oahu

Haleakala on Maui

Kokee on Kauai

[583] (b) Seven mobile stations.

(c) One information center at Fort Shafter.

There is a lot more to this. I do not know whether you want to hear all this stuff, or not. We have got an awful lot of stuff in here. It is a sort of summation of that contract.

60. General GRUNERT. Let us put it in the record. Go ahead. We may need it, later on.

61. General FRANK. Go ahead.

General REYBOLD. On the 21 April 1941, the District Engineer submitted revised detail cost estimates on the original program, increasing the estimated costs from \$505,000 to \$890,804. On 24 May 1941 this office requested allotment of additional funds for this work of \$385,804. On 8 July 1941 the District Engineer submitted additional data regarding costs requested by the Chief Signal Officer 10 June 1941.

[584] The War Department of 8 July 1941 authorized general changes in the program, including the addition of three more fixed stations (at Pahoa on Hawaii, Opana on Oahu, and Manawahua on Oahu) and the reduction of the number of mobile stations from seven to six (eliminating the Mauna Loa station and changing the location of some of the other mobile stations), and requesting estimates of cost and report on locations.

The requested estimates of cost and report were forwarded by the District Engineer 18 September 1941, and were forwarded by this office 3 October 1941 to the Adjutant General through the Chief Signal Officer. The Secretary of War approved the revised Hawaiian aircraft warning service program on 4 December 1941, before which date no construction could have been started on the additional work covered by the revised program, nor job orders thereon issued to the contractor.

Accordingly, "the number and location of the permanent aircraft warning stations included within the work of the contract" on 7 December 1941 were the three fixed stations and the information center described in subparagraph (4) above, approved by the Secretary of War 4 December 1941.

62. General GRUNERT. May I develop that a little more? I did not quite understand from the reading of that. It seems the original contracts were awarded. Then they kept changing or asking for

more money, and this went on from early in '41 until December '41. What was actually completed in the contract, or are all these pertaining to the same contract that were not completed or only partially completed? I do not get a clear picture of what was done except that they kept asking for something else.

[585] In other words, is there any clear-cut thing there to show, This was a contract to so and so; they did so and so on it by such and such a time?

We shall have to take each one of these contracts, it seems to me, and follow it up as to what was done with it. If it was revised, who asked that it be revised? Who approved the revision? How much did it cost? Was there money available? Were the materials available? and all that. Otherwise I do not get a clear picture of it at all. It seems building the Air Warning Service was just not done during that year, and we want to find out why.

63. General FRANK. Well, I can explain that.

64. General GRUNERT. Can you?

65. General FRANK. To this extent. There was a master contract made, and that did not cover the specific projects. As a project came up, then that particular project was covered by a job order which became a part of the master contract, and those projects as covered by these specific job orders were the things to which I referred when I first started questioning the Chief of Engineers.

66. General GRUNERT. That is just what I want to get in the record, so it will be intelligible to the laymen who will have to study the thing.

67. General FRANK. And we have here a complete record of the commencement date, the estimated date of completion, and the various revised dates, and the addendum to the original job orders in each instance.

68. General GRUNERT. All right, fine. Now, what can we get from the present witness that will help us toward a better [586] understanding of that when we get to the source of the record?

69. General FRANK. That I think will be brought out as we ask these questions.

70. General GRUNERT. All right; go ahead, then.

General REYBOLD. Without putting this on the record unless you want it there, General, that is a little confusing. I know this thing is confusing to me too. But what had been done up to this date when I quit reading there was to develop facts; that although there were numerous plans in the mill over there being considered, quite a program: Navy, Army, and everything else, what you are trying to get at here was as of December the 7th what might have been completed in the nature of these air warning stations. Now, that is what you want to do, and I developed down to the fact that there were three of them firmly on the books, even though you will find later that that developed into six fixed stations, six movable stations, and one communications center.

71. General GRUNERT. You see what I want: when the record is completed I want to be able to read it and study the record. Now, what have we got? What facts have we? When we put in a report, we cannot bear out all this unless we have something in the record to show for it, and this talk off the record will not help us a bit when it comes to thinking back on it.

General REYBOLD. Yes.

72. General GRUNERT. What I want to do is to get this in the record so we can study the record and come to conclusions and piece it out by additional testimony where necessary.

General REYBOLD. Well, the last paragraph I wrote there finally concludes those three stations.

[587] 73. General FRANK. All right. That is in answer to what question, now?

General REYBOLD. That was c. That was 2 c.

74. General FRANK. All right. Now, what were the number and location of the underground gasoline storage tanks included within the work of the contract?

General REYBOLD. We cannot answer that from the records on file in the Office of the Chief of Engineers.

75. General GRUNERT. Can you suggest where we can find information on that subject?

General REYBOLD. That information can be obtained from the District Engineer in Honolulu, who has the original records.

76. General FRANK. Which if any of these facilities were completed as of the 7th of December, '41?

General REYBOLD. None, except at least one mobile station with the smaller type tower affixed to a truck, was in operation in a temporary location in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. As to the status of completion of the three fixed stations and the information center on 30 November 1941, see Inclosures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

Now, that is these things [indicating].

77. General FRANK. What do those inclosures show?

General REYBOLD. They show the status of completion as of November 30, 1941, of the three fixed air warning stations that had been approved for construction, and the information center.

78. General FRANK. In answer to the original question, "which if any of these facilities were completed as of the 7th of December, 1941?" what is your answer?

General REYBOLD. None insofar as the fixed stations are concerned. [588]

79. General FRANK. What was the status of completion of the information center?

General REYBOLD. 72 percent on November 30, 1941.

80. General FRANK. Do you have information there on the percentage of completion of the fixed stations? They were three in number, were they not?

General REYBOLD. Mt. Kaala: the project as a whole was 50 percent completed, the access road was 97 percent completed, and the cableway 20 percent completed.

Haleakala: project as a whole, 96.4 percent; access road, 100 percent; power building, 60 percent; barracks and communications building, 99.9 percent complete; detector building and tower, 95 percent complete.

Kokee: project as a whole was 50 percent completed; access road, 86 percent; power building, 57 percent; barracks and communications building, 70 percent; detector building and tower, 84 percent.

81. General FRANK. In answer to the following question, "What was the time fixed by the contract and the job orders for completion of

each of these facilities?" that information is more readily available from the original records in Honolulu?

General REYBOLD. Yes.

82. General FRANK. In the delays in completing the facilities what were the causes?

General REYBOLD. I could give you no further information on that question than that read from a telegram received from the District Engineer.

83. General FRANK. In Honolulu?

[589] General REYBOLD. In Honolulu.

84. General FRANK. Therefore, that information should be available to us in Honolulu?

General REYBOLD. Correct.

85. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not protests as to the delays were made to the contractors?

General REYBOLD. I do not.

86. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not your office was advised with respect to the delays?

General REYBOLD. I do not.

87. General FRANK. Have you any information as to any of the delays for which the contractors were responsible?

General REYBOLD. I have no such information.

88. General FRANK. Do you have any information as to any delays for which the Government was responsible?

General REYBOLD. In general terms, it is known that the following constitute certain sources of delay: (a) Numerous changes in plans by the using agency.

89. General FRANK. What do you mean by "the using agency"?

General REYBOLD. Signal Corps if they were going to operate these installations.

90. General FRANK. Or the Aircraft Warning Service?

General REYBOLD. Or the Aircraft Warning Service, wherever that belongs.

91. General FRANK. All right.

General REYBOLD. (b) Difficulty in procuring special items of Signal Corps buildings and structures from mainland.

92. General FRANK. What do you mean by "special items"?

General REYBOLD. Well, special items of Air Corps [590] installations and everything, you might say, in connection with building materials, with perhaps the exception of rock. Crushed rock did not have to be shipped over from the United States.

93. General FRANK. Well, I am trying to be a little more specific there as to exactly the things to which you refer. Will you state that again, please?

General REYBOLD. Difficulty in procuring special items of Signal Corps buildings and structures from the United States. Those steel towers were fabricated in the United States.

94. General FRANK. Do you really know whether or not the non-receipt of those in Honolulu held up construction? Do you really know that?

General REYBOLD. Specifically I do not.

95. General FRANK. All right. Proceed with the answer.

General REYBOLD. I know in general terms also, there was a critical situation in shipping facilities, but nothing specific. I am told that

radar equipment required for the operation of the aircraft warning service stations was to be furnished by the Signal Corps and was late in arriving at the destination in the Islands.

96. General FRANK. May I ask a question right there: The foundations on which to install this permanent equipment could have been put in prior to the arrival of this equipment?

General REYBOLD. If the location had been definitely fixed.

97. General FRANK. If the location had been fixed and if the plans had been furnished you?

General REYBOLD. That is correct.

98. General FRANK. Therefore, the nonarrival of the radar [591] equipment itself need not have held up preparatory construction?

General REYBOLD. No, not preparatory construction, if the plans and the location were at hand.

99. General FRANK. Go ahead.

General REYBOLD. Labor shortage and special difficulty in securing competent, experienced supervisory personnel.

Earlier competition for labor, and supply priorities, between the different agencies of the Government engaged in the defense program.

And to some limited extent, which I think you could write off, inclement weather, because they will have that under any contract, but is merely reported from over there. Inclement weather is the last thing.

100. General FRANK. This answer that you have given is all the information you have as to the causes of the delay in the installation of this equipment?

General REYBOLD. That is all that we have.

101. General FRANK. What equipment was furnished for the installation and the facilities for the underground gasoline storage tanks?

General REYBOLD. We have no answer to that question yet, but are continuing our search of the files.

102. General FRANK. Where is information more readily available on that?

General REYBOLD. In the office of the District Engineer at Honolulu.

103. General FRANK. Do you know when this equipment was delivered in the Hawaiian Islands?

General REYBOLD. I do not.

[592] 104. General FRANK. Do you know from whom this equipment was received?

General REYBOLD. I do not.

105. General FRANK. What was the chain of command, so far as the District Engineer in Hawaii was concerned, from the commencement of the work under the contract and down to the 7th of December?

General REYBOLD. The District Engineer reported to the Division Engineer, and he, the Division Engineer, in turn reported to the Chief of Engineers.

106. General FRANK. The District Engineer in this instance was Colonel Wyman in Honolulu?

General REYBOLD. That is correct. General Hannum at San Francisco was the Division Engineer.

107. General FRANK. What if any responsibility had the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in this instance?

General REYBOLD. Would you state that again?

108. General FRANK. What if any responsibility did the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department have with respect to this construction?

General REYBOLD. He had nothing to do with the actual operations, except of course the District Engineer had the closest contact with him; but I would judge that in the planning for these installations which we are discussing here he would have a very great responsibility in determining the number and locations of the installations.

109. General FRANK. What I am after is: To what extent would it have been possible for him to have taken steps to have expedited [593] work on any project in a contract?

General REYBOLD. He might well have gone first to our District Engineer; and if he did not obtain the results I am sure that a communication either with the Division Engineer or with the Chief of Engineers would have brought forth results.

110. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not that was done?

General REYBOLD. I do not.

111. General FRANK. Will it be possible for you to furnish the names and locations of military personnel and supervisory civilian employees of the Corps of Engineers who were on duty in Hawaii during this period?

General REYBOLD. I have here the record of military personnel on duty at the time under consideration, but have not a list of the civilian personnel.

112. General FRANK. It is the supervisory civilian personnel we want. I would rather change that to supervisory civilian personnel.

General REYBOLD. I would suggest that the supervisory personnel be obtained from the office of the District Engineer in Honolulu. Now, would you prefer that we wire and get that for you? We probably could.

113. General GRUNERT. It is up to you.

114. General FRANK. Yes, we would like to have that list available prior to going there, so that we shall know where they are. It may be necessary to contact some of them in the United States.

115. General GRUNERT. We shall take a recess for five minutes.

(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.)

[594] 116. General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

117. General FRANK. I should like to have this list of names included in the record, but I should like to have after each name the position that he held.

118. General REYBOLD. We shall be glad to furnish that information.

(List of names furnished by General REYBOLD is as follows:)

(Original transcript does not contain above-mentioned list.)

[596] 119. General FRANK. Who was the contracting officer with respect to the mentioned contract during this period?

General REYBOLD. Colonel Theodore Wyman.

120. General FRANK. What were the duties of the District Engineer and the contracting officer with respect to this mentioned contract?

General REYBOLD. Could I go back and add to that other question? You asked who was the contracting officer. I think we should clear up one point in there that you may want to follow up.

121. General FRANK. Yes?

General REYBOLD. I said, Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., signed the original contract and Supplements Nos. 2 to 10, both inclusive, and Change Orders Nos. 1 to 6, both inclusive, as contracting officer. These covered the period from 20 December 1940 to 29 November 1941. Colonel (now Brigadier General, Retired) Warren T. Hannum, then Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, signed Supplement No. 1 as contracting officer. Supplements and Change Orders numbered higher than 10 and 6, respectively, bear dates "after Pearl Harbor."

And then in answer to the question, "What were the duties of the District Engineer and the contracting officer with respect to the mentioned contract?" the answer: To administer and exercise general supervision over the performance of the contract.

122. General FRANK. What if any orders of the Corps of Engineers prohibited the acceptance by the District Engineer and the contracting officer of favors or gifts from contractors?

[597] General REYBOLD. Reference is made to Army Regulations 600-10, 6 December 1939, which was in effect during this period. Also to the following provisions of Orders and Regulations, Corps of Engineers, dated 15 January 1939:

Par. 17 (c). Officers of the Corps of Engineers shall not engage in any work outside the duties officially assigned to them that may interfere with the performance of their official duties or conflict with the duties assigned to the Corps of Engineers and they shall not, without the prior assent of the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of War, accept compensation for services from any State, municipality, corporation, or person that has any interest that touches on the duties of the Corps of Engineers."

Par. 17 (d). Receipt by officers of pay from State or private interests for services rendered in connection with the supervision of expenditure of funds contributed toward river and harbor improvements is not authorized.

Par. 1039.8 (c). The practice of receiving presents from persons not in the Military Establishment or in the employ of the Government in recognition of services rendered, through not expressly forbidden, is opposed to the spirit of the statute and for that reason is not approved by the department.

123. General FRANK. Will you state generally from your memory the provisions of Army Regulation 600-10?

General REYBOLD. That general paragraph forbids the [598] acceptance of gifts.

124. General FRANK. You may get it and read the language into the record later.

Would you consider frequent companionship with, frequent entertainment by, and association with a contractor by a District Engineer as being in compliance with these general provisions?

General REYBOLD. Personally I have always tried to avoid that sort of thing, and I think you have got to know your contractors. There are contractors who couldn't buy me a sandwich, and there are other contractors who, out of mere courtesy, could buy me a sandwich so to speak. In this particular instance it is apparent to me that there was too much familiarity between the contracting officer and the contractor, only as I observed from what I have heard and what I have read, and from no first-hand information that I have ever observed.

125. General FRANK. What if any orders of the Corps of Engineers required that the loyalty and background of proposed contractors be investigated before a contract was awarded?

General REYBOLD. None as to loyalty. At the time preceding the awarding of this contract there was no occasion for the Chief of

Engineers to suspect or doubt the loyalty of any member of the contracting group. Had there been, the matter would have been reported to G-2 for appropriate attention. As of 20 December 1940, and before, G-2 was the sole agency within the War Department charged with the duty of reporting on and conducting investigations into matters pertaining to loyalty.

128. General FRANK. Has that procedure been changed in any way [599] since December 7th?

General REYBOLD. Loyalty investigations now rest with the Office of the Provost Marshal General.

127. General FRANK. Do you consider the present system is sufficiently watertight?

General REYBOLD. I believe it is now, perhaps more as a result of the investigation concerning this man Rohl than ever before.

128. General FRANK. This still depends upon each of the various agents concerned doing his part as he sees it in making the necessary reports?

General REYBOLD. That is correct.

129. General FRANK. It does not specifically require an investigation into loyalty; it is a question of a man's individual interpretation of his duties?

General REYBOLD. I would say you are correct insofar as contracts within continental United States are concerned, but on the other hand I do believe that contractors going into our outlying possessions, and particularly to foreign countries, would be very, very carefully surveyed.

130. General FRANK. Do you feel that there is still room for improvement of the system of checking on these people?

General REYBOLD. It could be strengthened.

131. General FRANK. Who was responsible for investigating the loyalty and background of the contractors in this mentioned contract?

General REYBOLD. I would say initially the contracting officer.

[600] 132. General FRANK. Who was?

General REYBOLD. Who was Colonel Theodore Wyman.

133. General FRANK. What reports with respect to the loyalty and background of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, of the Rohl-Connolly Company were received by the contracting officer, the District Engineer, the Division Engineer, and the Chief of Engineers before this contract was awarded?

General REYBOLD. None as to loyalty so far as the Chief of Engineers was concerned.

134. General FRANK. What attempts were made to get such reports?

General REYBOLD. None by the Office of the Chief of Engineers.

135. General FRANK. What if any complaints or derogatory remarks as to performance by the contractors were received by the contracting officer, the District Engineer, the Division Engineer, or the Chief of Engineers before the 7th of December, '41?

General REYBOLD. None insofar as the Chief of Engineers is concerned.

136. General FRANK. If there were complaints, none of them got as high as the Office of the Chief of Engineers?

General REYBOLD. To the best of my knowledge, that answer is correct.

137. General FRANK. In your testimony covering any orders prohibiting the acceptance by the District Engineer of favors or gifts you referred to Army Regulation 600-10. Can you give me the provisions of that Army Regulation?

General REYBOLD (reading):

It is impossible to [601] enumerate all of the various outside activities and interests to which these regulations refer. The following examples may be regarded as typical:

138. General FRANK. Are you reading from the Army Regulation?

General REYBOLD. Yes, and the one to which I referred a few moments ago.

139. General FRANK. Yes.

General REYBOLD. That is all in quotation except, "and the one to which I referred a minute ago." I mention (a):

Acceptance by an officer of a substantial loan or gift or any emolument from a person or firm with whom it is the officer's duty as an agent of the Government to carry on negotiations.

[602] 140. General FRANK. Have you any knowledge concerning whether any military personnel neglected duties relating to this contract?

General REYBOLD. None to my knowledge.

141. General FRANK. Have you any knowledge as to whether there was any neglect of duty by not properly investigating the loyalty of Hans Wilhelm Rohl prior to the award of the contract?

General REYBOLD. I would say there was none.

142. General FRANK. Have you any information as to whether or not there was neglect of duty by not supervising properly the performance of the contractor's work?

General REYBOLD. None, to my knowledge.

143. General FRANK. You have already stated that so far as you know there was no informing of higher authority of delays and deficiencies.

General REYBOLD. I have here a telegram received from the Hawaiian Department, addressed to the Adjutant General, under date of June 11, 1941.

(Telegram dated June 11, 1941, from Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, is as follows.)

I have been informed by the Division Engineer, San Francisco, that A-1-G is the priority covering contract W-414 Engineer 784 with Interstate Equipment Corporation, Elizabeth, New Jersey, materials for cableway to Kaala aircraft warning station covered by this contract. General Electric has sub-contract for motor and all electrical equipment. According to Division Engineer a delay of about fifteen weeks in the delivery of this electrical material to contractor [603] is strongly probable under its priority. As this Kaala station is most important in our aircraft warning system it is essential that this cableway be completed early. In this Department this aircraft service is considered to be the most important single project. War Department assistance to District Engineer to have priority of this contract changed to A-1-B is strongly recommended.

To which this office replied, under date of June 17, 1941, to the Adjutant General, under the heading of Second Indorsement:

(Telegram dated June 17, 1941, from Chief of Engineers to the Adjutant General, is as follows:)

1. By telephonic conversation with the Priorities Committee, Army and Navy Munitions Board, a rating of A-1-C was authorized.

2. The contractor should contact his suppliers to determine if satisfactory delivery can be made with this rating. If not, he should contact other sources for early delivery.

3. In the event further assistance is requested instructions in circular letter Finance No. 144 should be followed.

144. General FRANK. Do you know the outcome of that?

General REYBOLD. I do not, without further search of the records.

145. General FRANK. In any event, it was not sufficiently advanced to enable the cableway to be constructed and the aircraft warning system to be erected on Mt. Kaala prior to December 7. That is correct, is it not?

General REYBOLD. To my knowledge, that is correct.

[604] General GRUNERT. May I interject a question there? I presume, with reference to raising the priority, it was raised when you put it in 1-C. What does that mean in actual weeks' saving between one priority and the other, normally?

General REYBOLD. I would never be able to answer that.

147. General GRUNERT. Why was it put in 1-C if it did not make any difference?

General REYBOLD. It would perhaps enable the manufacturer to secure components at an earlier date than he would otherwise have secured under the former priority.

148. General FRANK. To your knowledge, what information was given Colonel Wyman to complete these defense projects as speedily as possible?

General REYBOLD. None from my office, to my knowledge. The presume, with reference to raising the priority, it was raised when ment Commander.

149. General FRANK. What were the functions of the position which you occupied on the 20th of December, 1940, with respect to this contract referred to above?

General REYBOLD. I was G-4 of the War Department.

150. General FRANK. Did you have any responsibility in that capacity for this contract?

General REYBOLD. Unquestionably there was something concerning that matter that passed through G-4. What it was I do not remember at the moment.

151. General FRANK. It was a matter of policy rather than one of operation?

General REYBOLD. Yes, indeed.

[605] 152. General FRANK. Have you any memory of anything passing through G-4 with respect to this contract at that time?

General REYBOLD. I have a faint recollection of some difficulty in fixing upon the location of some of the aircraft warning station sites.

153. General FRANK. Was that some difficulty that you were having with the Department of the Interior?

General REYBOLD. Yes. That was mixed up in the affair. I think the Secretary of the Interior was very insistent upon having locations of roads and the character of the buildings that were to be installed

on his reservation placed before him for approval, or his representatives.

154. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not that held up the work?

General REYBOLD. I do not.

155. General FRANK. Can you find out?

General REYBOLD. I think you would have to obtain that from the District Engineer's office in Honolulu, because evidence would have to be weighed as to whether fixing upon the location or the receipt of the last piece of material and equipment to be installed would be a governing factor.

156. General GRUNERT. There is a question that I want to ask there: Could a contract have been let without the location having been fixed? In other words, if there was any delay would it have been before the contract was let, or would that keep the contract from being let until there was a determination?

General REYBOLD. Not in this kind of a contract, General. This is a so-called fixed-fee contract, and its terms are very flexible. I might refer, perhaps, to what General Frank stated [606] in one of his opening remarks, that the contract is very general in nature, and the work was specified by job orders; and until one of those job orders was issued there could be nothing specific concerning any individual item.

157. General FRANK. You read a radiogram from the Hawaiian Department asking for a change in priority. Do you have any other examples or instances in which there was complaint made or help asked for from Hawaii to assist in completing those projects in Hawaii?

General REYBOLD. I have nothing insofar as our search of the records has revealed to the moment. We are continuing our search, and anything brought to light will be furnished to the Board.

158. General FRANK. Will you give us negative as well as positive information on that?

General REYBOLD. Yes.

159. General FRANK. So that if you do not find anything we will be so advised?

General REYBOLD. Yes; I will be glad to do so.

160. General FRANK. What means did the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman, have to prod or drive the contractor or to bring pressure to bear so that the work would be completed within the time specified?

General REYBOLD. He had full authority.

161. General FRANK. What could he have done if the contractor were not working as fast as he thought he should?

General REYBOLD. He could have urged him verbally, urged him in writing, and advised him that the contract would be canceled unless he took steps to expedite it.

[607] 162. General FRANK. This question has been answered piecemeal. I will ask it again. What if any measures should have been taken by personnel of the Corps of Engineers for the protection of the Government against contracting with a person having a record like that of Hans Wilhelm Rohl? What measures should have been taken?

General REYBOLD. It is a difficult question to answer. If the character of the individual had in some manner been brought to the attention of the Corps of Engineers, unquestionably the investigation would have gone deeper; but under the circumstances there was no reason to believe at that time, as far as I know, that the individual was a dangerous character. I am told, although I have not looked up the records, that he had done work for us on a breakwater somewhere on the Pacific Coast and that his services were satisfactory.

163. General FRANK. He had been under investigation by the F. B. I., had he not?

General REYBOLD. Not to our knowledge.

164. General FRANK. That, in turn, indicates looseness in the general system, does it not?

General REYBOLD. Perhaps so; yes.

165. General FRANK. What if any rules or regulations did Colonel Wyman violate in event that he, having been informed that Rohl was an alien, discussed with him details of a secret defense project contract?

General REYBOLD. What did he violate?

166. General FRANK. Yes.

General REYBOLD. I would say, the rules of good judgment and common sense.

[608] 167. General FRANK. Is there any written regulation or specific document that covers that?

General REYBOLD. AR 380-5, to safeguard military information, certainly covers it.

168. General GRUNERT. When was that published?

General REYBOLD. June 10, 1939.

169. General FRANK. Did you ever receive notice or have knowledge of any reports concerning the activities of Colonel Wyman in Hawaii that were derogatory to Colonel Wyman?

General REYBOLD. No; I never had any such report.

170. General FRANK. Were you Chief of Engineers when he was relieved from Hawaii?

General REYBOLD. Yes.

171. General FRANK. Did you ever receive notice or have knowledge of a report dated the 14th of February, 1942, by an Army officer to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to the effect that Colonel Wyman should be relieved as District Engineer for inefficiency?

General REYBOLD. I do not recall any such thing. There may be something like that in the record.

172. General FRANK. When Colonel Wyman was relieved as District Engineer what were the circumstances?

General REYBOLD. I believe that that was done after we had decentralized completely all engineer work to the Department Commander; and that was done by an order or circular letter of the Adjutant General of the Army under date of February 28, 1942.

173. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not the question of Wyman's efficiency entered into the matter?

General REYBOLD. No. I do know this, that the Department Engineer, who was Colonel Lyman at that time, either wrote [609] a personal letter to me or to somebody in my office indicating that he

could get along without Wyman over there, or perhaps better without him. I am just stating from memory.

174. General FRANK. Do you have a copy of that letter?

General REYBOLD. I do not know. I will have to look it up.

175. General FRANK. Please look it up and let us have a copy of it if it is available.

General REYBOLD. Yes, sir.

176. General GRUNERT. Colonel Lyman is deceased, is he not?

General REYBOLD. That is correct, sir.

177. General FRANK. Are you conversant with any Inspector General's report on Colonel Wyman's operations as District Engineer in Hawaii?

General REYBOLD. Some time after Wyman was brought back to this country and was then in charge of the Canol project, and as a result of some reports received from that project, together with some reports that had been received through a Congressman—I think it was Representative Thomason of Texas—in which a contractor by the name of McKee was registering some violent complaints about Wyman and his activities in Hawaii, I asked for an Inspector General to look into the matter, and a Colonel Hunt investigated the activities in Alaska on the Canol project, and I think he extended his investigation to Hawaii, but to what extent I do not remember. There is a report from the Inspector General on file that perhaps is available.

178. General FRANK. For the purposes of the record I will state [610] that we have accessible Colonel Hunt's report on that investigation, and we are calling Colonel Hunt as a witness before the Board.

Do you have any memory of what the conclusions were of that investigation?

General REYBOLD. To the effect that Colonel Wyman should not be placed in charge. I do not know whether it said "of public works," or "civil works," or "large public works;" but the conclusion was that he should not be placed in charge of large work in connection with our works program, or words to that effect. I would rather get the record on that.

179. General FRANK. Has he been so placed since that time?

General REYBOLD. Since the receipt of that report?

180. General FRANK. Yes.

General REYBOLD. No; he has not. He has been in command of a general service regiment.

181. General FRANK. With respect to the assignment of Colonel Wyman on the Canol project, what if anything do you know concerning a contract or contracts awarded to Rohl's firm on this project?

General REYBOLD. I do not think that Rohl has ever been on that project, although, in connection with an extension of the Alaskan highway from Hanes, I believe it is called, down near Skagway to a point somewhere north and west of Whitehorse, a contract was let with Foley Brothers, and then I believe that certain equipment which belongs to the Rohl-Connolly organization, was either brought on the job or an attempt made to negotiate for that equipment. There was some connection in the contract between Foley Brothers and this particular strip of road to [611] which I refer.

182. General FRANK. Was this during your regime as Chief of Engineers?

General REYBOLD. Yes.

183. General FRANK. Were you conversant at that time with the Wyman-Rohl contact and intimacy?

General REYBOLD. I would have to look up that contract. I do not know whether Rohl's name appears in it or not, but I have my doubts whether it appears. I think it was something that was brought to my attention after that.

184. General FRANK. Has there ever been in your mind any suspicion about the association between Rohl and Wyman?

General REYBOLD. Not a bit, not in my mind.

185. General FRANK. Does there now exist any suspicion?

General REYBOLD. Not in my mind. He is the most indiscreet man that I ever knew. I would put it that way. I do not know Wyman, but—

186. General FRANK. Who was indiscreet?

General REYBOLD. Wyman, in his business transactions. I do not know the man very well, but he is known to me as a "go-getter." In what he does on the side he evidently is very, very indiscreet.

187. General FRANK. When was Colonel Wyman relieved from his assignment to the Canol project?

General REYBOLD. It was prior to Hunt's investigation.

188. General FRANK. Will you provide that particular information with the particulars surrounding his relief in detail?

General REYBOLD. Yes.

189. General FRANK. You have a Colonel Horowitz?

[612] General REYBOLD. Yes.

190. General FRANK. Colonel Horowitz made an investigation of that situation, did he not?

General REYBOLD. He made an investigation of the progress of construction in what we called our Northwest Division, and his report was very derogatory concerning Wyman in his treatment of personnel and other matters.

191. General GRUNERT. Is that report available?

General REYBOLD. I think it is.

192. General GRUNERT. Do you have a copy of it?

193. Major CLAUSEN. We have a copy, sir.

194. General FRANK. What if anything did you have to do with Colonel Wyman's first assignment?

General REYBOLD. I had all to do with it. I relieved him from service in the Northwest Service Command and sent him to a general service regiment.

195. General FRANK. Do you know what has been the nature of his services in that regiment?

General REYBOLD. No; I do not. It was trained at Camp Claibourne, Louisiana, and later went to England, and I do not know just exactly the service of either himself or his regiment from that date.

196. General FRANK. Do you have anything in addition to the answers to the questions I have asked you that you want to state to the Board with respect to this situation?

General REYBOLD. I have nothing further to state to the Board.

197. General GRUNERT. General Russell, have you any questions?

[613] 198. General RUSSELL. Reference has been made to the elasticity of this basic contract under which the work was to be done at Honolulu. I have gotten the impression, General, that

you entered into a contract in which you paid the contractor for whatever he did plus some profit.

General REYBOLD. Plus a fixed fee; yes.

199. General RUSSELL. You could do anything out there that you wanted to do under this basic contract?

General REYBOLD. That is correct.

200. General GRUNERT. As I understand it, then, this basic contract was awarded in December of 1940, and under that basic contract there were a number of subcontracts which resulted in job orders, so-called. A job order specifies the actual date of completion?

General REYBOLD. Yes.

201. General GRUNERT. Why the constant revision and constant changes of the estimated date of completion? Was there anything anywhere along the line that pinned down the contractor to finish the work in a specified time?

General REYBOLD. Only by the issuance of the job order. You will find instances in which the job order was revised.

202. General GRUNERT. Who had the authority to revise it?

General REYBOLD. That is all in the hands of the contracting officer and the District Engineer, who, in this case, were one and the same.

203. General GRUNERT. Then if you have contracts which are not on a fixed-fee basis, and are flexible, the contractor must live up to it more than in the case of the other kind?

General REYBOLD. Yes, sir. If you have what we term a [614] firm contract or a lump-sum contract, the time for completion is definitely specified. But frequently in cases of those contracts there are delays that cannot be charged to the contractor, and then the contracting officer, after hearing the evidence, may supplement the contract and extend the time of completion.

204. General GRUNERT. Then it is within the judgment of the District Engineer or the one who awarded the contract?

General REYBOLD. Yes.

205. General GRUNERT. It can go on ad infinitum, as far as he is concerned, if he believes that it is justified?

General REYBOLD. He could, but in some cases he may have to refer the contract to his higher echelon, the Division Engineer, or over to the Chief of Engineers for approval of these extensions.

206. General GRUNERT. What I am getting at is the picture, as you see it, just as well as the Board is trying to look at it. Almost a year had gone by from the time they started the Air Warning Service over there, and to complete these stations a lot of construction had to take place, a lot of material had to be furnished. Then came along, in June, definite contracts, and they were delayed and delayed or revised until the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Board must find the facts in the case and must render a report on who is responsible for these delays. Were they acts of God? Were they created by man, or what? So far as you know, the Chief of Engineers Office had no control over those delays?

General REYBOLD. No, except that a report may have [615] reached our office to give help.

207. General GRUNERT. The only report you received to give help was that one of June 11; and you gave such help as you could under the circumstances?

General REYBOLD. Yes. There may be others in our records, but I cannot tell you until our search is more complete.

208. General GRUNERT. I wish that search would be as complete as possible, because I think a great deal depends on whether or not those who were on the ground and howled to be given help could have done something themselves.

209. General FRANK. The establishment of priorities might have had some very potent effects on this construction. Is that correct?

General REYBOLD. Yes. But if I may say this to the Board, upon the conclusion of the Board's detailed investigation in the field you may be able to pick up some leads that would be beneficial to us in running down what we did do over here in response to certain requests that perhaps we will not find in our records.

210. General GRUNERT. General Short in his testimony referred to a message he sent to the Adjutant General complaining about this fifteen weeks' delay before he could get any cable over there; and so the action taken here to help in that particular instance ought to be pretty well traced if we can possibly do it.

What is this system of priorities? Will you explain to the Board the system of priorities and who makes them and who can change them so that you could get something done more quickly and get things done in the time in which they ought to be done?

[616] General REYBOLD. Yes. In the old days that was more or less wholly within the hands of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. Then when the War Production Board came into being, I think that is the ultimate authority now on these higher priorities. But I firmly believe in those days that the Army and Navy Munitions Board set the priorities. At least they did a mighty good job on the screening process to see whether they should be pushed up in priority.

211. General GRUNERT. Priority on materials, priority on shipping, priority on raw materials, or what?

General REYBOLD. Mostly on manufactured goods.

212. General GRUNERT. If it were a question of cable, what would that mean?

General REYBOLD. That would mean that perhaps the Navy was in for a vast quantity of cable, that the Maritime Commission might be in for a vast quantity of cable, and the Signal Corps might be in for a vast quantity of cable.

213. General GRUNERT. At that time, if that were the case, and he asked for priorities, say, on getting cable, whose business was it to represent to the Army and Navy Munitions Board the urgency of sending that cable to the District Engineer over there so he could satisfy the Commanding General?

General REYBOLD. In the first place, the Commanding General over there would make his request, and it was up to us to transmit that right over to the War Department, which we did promptly, and get it before the Army and Navy Munitions Board; and probably some of our people over there appeared in person to try to get it.

[617] 214. General GRUNERT. Presumably it was done because you changed the priority?

General REYBOLD. Yes.

215. General GRUNERT. Was there any follow-up on this?

General REYBOLD. I cannot say at the moment.

216. General GRUNERT. You do not know whether he complained again or whether your office on its own hook followed up to see whether or not what you had arranged had actually been acceded to?

General REYBOLD. I am certain of a follow-up in our office, because that is one thing that we do pay particular attention to.

217. General GRUNERT. Suppose this priority is granted: Who determines whether or not there is shipping space to get the cable to him? Where does that come in?

General REYBOLD. Through the Transportation Corps.

218. General GRUNERT. They had their priority question?

General REYBOLD. In that particular case I think General Hannum, our Division Engineer out there, did a mighty good job. He was right behind all those shipments, and I might say also in representing Wyman in this country in procurement of materials needed for that vast job over there.

219. General GRUNERT. If you as an engineer had been in Wyman's shoes over there and had a job to do—I as Commanding General and you as District Engineer. Suppose I should say, "Here, Reybold, I have got to get those stations in. My whole plan depends on it. I have got to get them in in a hurry. You have the contracts." What could you do or what would you have done to put those things through?

[618] General REYBOLD. I certainly would have prepared a telegram for the signature of the Commanding General to the War Department with all the power I could put behind it.

220. General GRUNERT. And if you did not get action you would do it again?

General REYBOLD. Yes.

221. General GRUNERT. Until you were told to stop?

General REYBOLD. That is right.

222. General RUSSELL. Suppose you had a different sort of engineer out there, a go-getter type, who thinks that the Commanding General doesn't know what it is all about, anyway, and he doesn't follow up. What could the Commanding General do about it?

General REYBOLD. What I would do would be to report him over here to the Chief of Staff and have him kicked out of there.

223. General RUSSELL. Would you go over to the War Department?

General REYBOLD. Yes. Any Department Commander who sent anything to me and said, "You have a District Engineer who is not playing the game with me,"—he would be out of there on the next boat, as far as I am concerned.

224. General RUSSELL. You have made rather a careful search and you have not found one line from Wyman about any other delays out there?

General REYBOLD. We have not found anything here so far. Hannum was doing everything in the world for Lyman at that time. I do not know about telephone calls.

225. General GRUNERT. Right on that line: You referred to Wyman as a go-getter. Go-getters usually take the sort of [619] action that you say you think you would take. Why, then, all these delays?

Can you put your finger on why there was a delay at least from June to December? Have you tried to analyze that in your own mind as to what caused these delays, priorities, materials, conniving, or what?

General REYBOLD. I think a combination of factors, General. I am only giving my opinion, because I have tried to wade into this the same as you gentlemen have. But I think one of the great delays was indecision as to location, indecision as to how many of these air warning stations should be adopted in their program.

226. General GRUNERT. Who makes that decision?

General REYBOLD. I should think all the planning was done by the Commanding General and his Department Engineer. He had a Department Engineer. They did the planning; also G-4.

227. General GRUNERT. The Commanding General would have to approve those plans and any changes in them before they were ever adopted as a job order?

General REYBOLD. All that planning would come up to a certain point, and when concluded it would be turned over to the District Engineer, who was Wyman. If all I hear about Wyman is true—and I know very little about Wyman personally; I had never served with him; but all through the whole Corps of Engineers, if you wanted somebody to go get somebody to do something, they would have selected Wyman. He is a go-getter. How much his ears were knocked back by the high command over there I do not know; but I do not think there is anybody that can knock his ears back if he has materials in there to do a job.

[620] 228. General GRUNERT. Then he was really selected for this job because of that reputation? Is that the reason he was selected for successive large construction jobs that involved go-getters to get things done?

[621] General REYBOLD. He was, in connection with the Fort Peck dam. Now, whether he was sent to Hawaii for that purpose, I am inclined to think that he was due for foreign service and was sent to Hawaii under the old "foreign service plan."

229. General RUSSELL. Is there any evidence in your records indicating that this delay could in any way be attributed to slow operations on the part of the contractor?

General REYBOLD. No, sir.

230. General RUSSELL. There is no evidence, therefore, that indicates that he "drug his feet" at all?

General REYBOLD. No, sir.

231. General RUSSELL. In the event he was operating rather slowly, do you think the fact that Wyman may have been under some sort of obligation to the contractor because of extensive entertainment might have prevented Wyman from "pinning back the ears" of that contractor?

General REYBOLD. Oh, I would doubt that! I think Wyman is the type of man that would really "kick anybody down" to accomplish his mission of construction work.

232. General RUSSELL. Notwithstanding the fact that he may have been on a liquor party with a man whose "ears" he was going to "pin back," for three or four days prior to that?

General REYBOLD. Absolutely.

233. General RUSSELL. It would have no effect on him, at all?

General REYBOLD. No, sir; I do not think it would have a bit of effect on him.

234. General RUSSELL. And yet you have never served with Wyman General REYBOLD. I have never served with him.

235. General RUSSELL. And all of your opinion of Wyman has been [622] formed on these reports about his disposition as a "getter"?

General REYBOLD. That is correct; by very reliable officers in the Corps of Engineers.

236. General RUSSELL. Let us go back to the time you made your basic contract in December 1940. Were you furnished at that time with any plan by the tactical command out there as to what they wanted done with respect to an air warning service? I do not care to go into the details of the plan. I am attempting to find out if the tactical people gave you a plan in 1940.

General REYBOLD. Only from hearsay. Have you had Colonel Fleming before the Board?

237. General RUSSELL. Not yet.

General REYBOLD. Have you listed him?

238. General FRANK. Yes.

General REYBOLD. I would judge that he would give you a very good explanation.

239. General RUSSELL. Was or not this establishment of an air warning service out there an integral part of the job that these people were employed to do?

General REYBOLD. Yes, indeed! This is incorporated right in the contract, isn't it?

240. General RUSSELL. Can you tell us how much of these funds that were being allotted for your Hawaiian Department contract were going to be expended on this air-warning-service installation?

General REYBOLD. I couldn't tell you, unless they came in [623] with a separate project, for approval.

241. General RUSSELL. The point I make is this, General—that the engineers in the Chief of Engineers' office did not make the contract and agree to pay that man an approximate sum of money for an air warning service, unless you knew something about the nature of the service, did you?

General REYBOLD. That's correct. The original contract on that must be based on some sort of estimate; otherwise you couldn't determine his fixed fee.

242. General RUSSELL. And that estimate was based on a plan for the establishment of an air-warning service?

General REYBOLD. Unquestionably, as one of the items.

243. General RUSSELL. Do you know how much of a change occurred in that plan between that date and June?

General REYBOLD. No, sir.

244. General RUSSELL. And yet you testify that in your opinion the change in the plan by the tactical command was the prime factor in working delay out there?

General REYBOLD. No, I didn't testify definitely.

245. General RUSSELL. I will ask two or three more questions along this line. General, you do not know now how many changes occurred on the part of the tactical commander between December 1940 and June 1941, as to the establishment of this air-warning service?

General REYBOLD. No.

246. General RUSSELL. That would be a matter of record entirely?

General REYBOLD. I would think so, yes.

247. General RUSSELL. And the facts would have to be obtained elsewhere?

[624] General REYBOLD. That's true.

248. General RUSSELL. But when you let your initial contract in December 1940, it was based on a definite plan for the establishment of an air-warning service out in Hawaii?

General REYBOLD. That is correct.

249. General RUSSELL. And therefore the tactical people, who had been in there before, had worked out a plan for that system, and it was in existence in December 1940?

General REYBOLD. Must have been; yes,

250. General RUSSELL. And there is, in the Engineer's office, in Honolulu, a record of all of these changes that had been proposed by the tactical commander between 1940 and the date of the completion of the air-warning service?

General REYBOLD. Must be.

251. General RUSSELL. And we can get that out there?

General REYBOLD. That's correct, sir.

252. General RUSSELL. And so far as you know, that is the only place?

General REYBOLD. That is correct.

253. General RUSSELL. You referred to the mobile stations, a moment ago, and it is your opinion that the engineers had something to do with the construction of those stations?

General REYBOLD. I think we would have built the shelters and roads into the stations, of course.

254. General RUSSELL. Whatever the causes may have been, General, not one of these fixed or permanent stations in connection with the air-warning service had been completed on December 7, 1941?

General REYBOLD. That's correct, although the report [625] that we had from the field indicated that one of those stations was fairly well completed on November 30.

255. General GRUNERT. If not complete, could they have been operated, do you know?

General REYBOLD. I don't know.

256. General RUSSELL. I was going to ask this question in connection with that same thought: If they had not been completed, the engineer people or the contracting people were there, engaged in completing it?

General REYBOLD. I can't answer that question.

257. General RUSSELL. Isn't it true that the tactical commander would have been prevented from moving in and taking over those installations and beginning their operation, until the work had been completed and had been approved and accepted by the engineers?

General REYBOLD. That isn't true in all instances, General, because we have now in our program, and even during the big program in this country, what we term "beneficial occupancy," when the using agencies did move in prior to positive, absolute, 100% completion.

258. General RUSSELL. You do not know whether this system of "beneficial occupancy" was in effect as respects those permanent radar stations in Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941?

General REYBOLD. I do not.

259. General RUSSELL. Is there anywhere that we could determine whether or not negotiations for that "beneficial occupancy" had been initiated, and the result thereof?

General REYBOLD. Only on the ground, in Hawaii.

260. General RUSSELL. I think we have discussed quite freely [626] with you the opinion which you have of Wyman, and the sources from which you got your information on which to base that opinion. Now, General, you testified rather vigorously a while ago as to his efficiency out there in Hawaii. Was that opinion of Wyman changed in any way by virtue of Hunt's report?

General REYBOLD. I really couldn't say. I glanced over that report, General, but I would have to go back and read it. I really don't know. I suppose that assisted him in the formulation of his judgment that never again should this man be placed on a big job of construction and responsibility where he is dealing with contractors.

261. General RUSSELL. You were charged then with the responsibility of arriving at a conclusion about whether or not you would take him off that sort of work, were you not?

General REYBOLD. When I got Hunt's report?

262. General RUSSELL. Yes.

General REYBOLD. I had him off before that, I think.

263. General RUSSELL. What had happened, General, that made you change your opinion of Wyman as an outstanding "go getter," especially fitted for the big stuff out in Hawaii, taking him off and sending him to a service regiment? What were your mental processes?

General REYBOLD. My mental processes were, even though he is a "go-getter," he just makes too damned much trouble for me to be bothered with that kind of people, I can find other people who don't make all that kind of mess, who will go and do a job. Now, that's the whole thing, in a nutshell.

264. General RUSSELL. Let us sum it up: He could do his job, but he carried a mess along with it?

[627] General REYBOLD. That's right.

265. General RUSSELL. And you wanted somebody who would do the job and leave the mess at home?

General REYBOLD. That's right.

266. General RUSSELL. So you put him in the service regiment? Now, what would be your definition of the "mess" that he made?

General REYBOLD. Oh, complaints—complaints from his subordinates—and of course these things that have come up in connection with this contract—that's enough for me. I said the man is indiscreet, and I would say that he is exceedingly indiscreet in his dealings with contractors who are doing work for the Government, if it all be true—"if it all be true."

267. General RUSSELL. You believed in the reality of those charges or the truthfulness of those charges to the extent that you decided to relieve him from that sort of work, didn't you?

General REYBOLD. Yes, sir.

268. General FRANK. I would like to ask a question, there. You are his direct superior?

General REYBOLD. That's right.

269. General FRANK. In the face of all this indiscretion, have you ever had it investigated, as his superior, with a view to determining whether or not he should be disciplined?

General REYBOLD. That's the reason I sent Hunt up there, or asked the Inspector General to send an inspector up there.

270. General FRANK. If that be the case, then why were not Hunt's conclusions pursued more vigorously and more intimately?

General REYBOLD. There was nothing in Hunt's recommendation, to my knowledge, that this man should be brought to trial, or anything.

[628] 271. General RUSSELL. I have no more questions.

272. General GRUNERT. I have a few questions to clear up, here. Are delays such as appear to have occurred in these contracts in Hawaii normal under a fixed-fee contract? In other words, do a lot of these contracts hang over, change, and one thing and another, so that when you figure on something's being done in about three months it usually takes about six or nine?

General REYBOLD. No, sir; that's not common.

273. General GRUNERT. That is not common?

General REYBOLD. No, sir.

274. General GRUNERT. The causes that you stated that might have caused delay, here, are those causes common to contracts, as a rule—priorities, and inclement weather, and those that you enumerated? Are those particular to that Hawaiian bunch of contracts?

General REYBOLD. They may apply, of course, anywhere, but I think that that group of generalities mentioned by me on more than one occasion this morning might well bear further investigation to get down to some of the details. Any contractor on a job, or we in preparing our plans and specifications and our estimates, and the time of completion, of course, take into consideration weather conditions. If you start a job, in other words, in a northern territory in November, you know that you are going to get into difficulties of weather, but if you start to build in northern New York in May, you have the season ahead of you and you know your weather pretty well.

275. General GRUNERT. Usually in making an estimate of the situation, which is true about your estimate of the date of completion of the contract, do not the experienced engineers [629] take that into consideration? They make estimates, and then they have to reestimate, and sometimes do it a third time? Is that normal in a series of contracts, or is that quite abnormal?

General REYBOLD. It is abnormal, and every contract, in the conduct of its prosecution, would have to be considered on its own merits, and even every one of these job-orders that you have under consideration here will have to be considered on its own merits.

276. General GRUNERT. When it gets to the place where a district engineer doesn't think his contractors are coming across, can he not abrogate that contract, can he not give it to somebody else, and get the job done?

General REYBOLD. Yes, sir; yes, sir.

277. General GRUNERT. And none of that was done in this case, apparently?

General REYBOLD. I don't know whether it was or not. I doubt it.

278. General GRUNERT. I do not know of any. We have not gone

into it thoroughly yet, but I do not know of any case where they say, "You haven't done this job; we give it to somebody else"; but that is done, not infrequently, is it?

General REYBOLD. Oh, it is very seldom that we have to come to that; once in a while.

279. General GRUNERT. What conditions require or demand that, or you do take it out of their hands and do it yourself, or get somebody else to contract?

General REYBOLD. A breach of contract, or a man who doesn't progress, doesn't show that he has made any [630] effort to progress, he hasn't brought any additional equipment on, as required or as requested by us, and we have played along with him and tried to be square—then we notify him that he is done, or that if he isn't going to come across within 30 days we are going to take his contract away from him.

280. General GRUNERT. Then it is usually a question of good will and intent, to a great extent?

General REYBOLD. Yes, sir.

281. General GRUNERT. I think Wyman was decorated with some sort of decoration. Was that done through your office? If so, for what reason?

General REYBOLD. That was done on the recommendation of General Hannum, and I think it was for his work in relation to the construction of those "stepping-stone" airfields, if I remember correctly. We have a record on that.

282. General GRUNERT. You mean that would be beyond Hawaii?

General REYBOLD. Yes, sir.

283. General GRUNERT. On the way out to the Far East?

General REYBOLD. Yes, sir.

284. General GRUNERT. He was given what—the Legion of Honor, or the Legion of Merit?

General REYBOLD. He was given a Distinguished Service Medal. I will check on that. Maybe you would like to have the citation, General, and the recommendation upon which it was based, for your record.

285. General FRANK. Yes.

286. General GRUNERT. Together with the time it was actually recommended.

287. General FRANK. Yes—and the time it was awarded.

[631] 288. General GRUNERT. One more question. I think it will probably be of value in checking. This Advisory Committee that investigates contracts and one thing and another—is there a chairman of that Advisory Committee, and do you recall who was Chairman?

General REYBOLD. We can find that out.

289. General FRANK. I want the name of the one single individual who is best qualified to give us information on what went on in the Contract Advisory Committee in the fall of 1940. Can you give us that name, now?

General REYBOLD. Will you let me find out? I know what you want.

290. General FRANK. You will advise us with respect to that name?

General REYBOLD. I will.

291. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

292. General FRANK. You called this contract a "cost-plus-fixed-fee" contract?

General REYBOLD. That is right.

293. General FRANK. And in this type of contract there usually is no penalty clause?

General REYBOLD. No, there is no penalty clause.

294. General FRANK. In a fixed contract, there is a penalty clause, as a rule, in which event, if the contract is not finished on time, through the fault of the contractor, he pays a penalty?

General REYBOLD. That is correct.

295. General FRANK. That is one of the disadvantages of this type of contract, is it not?

General REYBOLD. It is; but I doubt whether you could ever [632] have gotten anybody to go over there on a lump-sum basis, with so many unknowns attached to a contract, and get it under way. There was no other way in God's world of prosecuting a contract such as this, except under this cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis.

296. General FRANK. Who presented the case of the War Department to the Priorities Board in order to get a high priority for materiel for the War Department?

General REYBOLD. We will have to furnish that information later, General.

297. General FRANK. What I am after is this: How was its strategical urgency represented to the Priorities Board?

General REYBOLD. I couldn't answer that, unless these individual—I cannot answer that question.

298. General FRANK. This thought enters into this situation: it is, that here was a highly important strategical project that was not finished in time, so that the permanent aircraft warning service was effective on December 7. It is possibly conceivable that direct responsibility can be traced back to the failure to give sufficiently high priority to the materiel going into that project, is it not?

General REYBOLD. It is possible.

299. General FRANK. Therefore, the details following through to the conclusion of that priority's being established is something in which we are interested, do you see?

General REYBOLD. Yes, indeed; and I would suggest that the records of our Division Office at San Francisco, and Colonel Hannum, be consulted very freely in those matters, particularly in connection with shipping facilities to Hawaii at that time.

300. General FRANK. Another thing on which I would like to [633] ask you to make a record is to give us as complete a list as possible from your point of view of possible reasons of delays that contributed to the delay in finishing this work at Hawaii.

General REYBOLD. You want that for the record, or just possible delays that we might think of, over in our office?

301. General FRANK. I would like to have you, within the next day or two, send us a written statement of those, will you please?

General REYBOLD. I would be glad to do so, and that will relate also to our Division Office?

302. General FRANK. Yes.

General REYBOLD. In San Francisco?

303. General FRANK. Yes.

What do you know about disciplinary action of Wyman as the result of the Dawson Creek explosion? Are you familiar with that?

General REYBOLD. I am familiar with it to the extent that there was an explosion. It might be well to have General Worsham of our present office over here, who was in command.

304. General GRUNERT. He was your District Engineer in charge?

General REYBOLD. He was the District Engineer, at that time.

305. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not there was any disciplinary action taken against Wyman?

General REYBOLD. Not to my knowledge.

306. General FRANK. That is what I am interested in.

General REYBOLD. There is a report. Somebody certainly made a report on that thing, whether it was our fire-fighting people or whether it was the Provost Marshal General, or the FBI, or what went up there. It was on Canadian territory.

[634] 307. General FRANK. You would have a report of disciplinary action under the 104th Article of War, would you not?

General REYBOLD. Oh, yes.

308. General FRANK. By and large—and I have brought this out before, in testimony—the general system of information with respect to personnel, activities, G-2 information, and so forth, as it relates to contracts, is not so clean-cut, would you say?

General REYBOLD. It is not.

309. General FRANK. I have nothing further.

310. General GRUNERT. General Russell?

311. General RUSSELL. No.

312. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much, General. We took quite a bit of your time.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

General GRUNERT. The Board will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m.)

[635]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board at 2 o'clock p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL JULIAN L. SCHLEY, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The witness was sworn by the recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General SCHLEY. Julian L. Schley, Major General, United States Army, Retired; called back to active service. My address is 3881 Department of Commerce Building, Washington, D. C.

2. General GRUNERT. General, the Board is after facts and, in view of the position held by you leading up to and during the Pearl Harbor attack, we hope that you have some facts that will help us to get down to the bottom of the real picture and throw some light

on the subject. It is a large field that we have to cover, and we have a limited time in which to cover it. So we have parceled out the special investigation fields to members of the Board. The entire Board will pass on everything for each field, but one member is particularly looking after certain lines. So General Frank will propound the questions at this time and General Russell and I will interject when we think something needs elaboration.

3. General FRANK. On what duty were you in December, 1940?

General SCHLEY. I was Chief of Engineers, United States Army.

4. General FRANK. When did your tour in that job start and end?

General SCHLEY. It started about September of 1937 and [636] ended, so far as my official duties were concerned, on September 8, 1941, when I entered on a leave of absence.

5. General FRANK. What were your responsibilities with respect to contracts which were entered into by the personnel of the Corps of Engineers?

General SCHLEY. In a normal case, in normal times, I was the last authority which signed contracts when they came to me for signature. Some of them did and some did not. In the case, however, of those which pertained to cost-plus-a-fee which the office had entered into in considerable quantities in the latter part of 1940, because of the amount of work then in progress, I signed the papers, but they had to be reviewed and signed again as final authority by the Under Secretary of War. The difference between the ordinary contract and these cost-plus-a-fee contracts I will be glad to explain if you are interested.

6. General GRUNERT. Yes; I would like to hear your explanation.

General SCHLEY. The usual method of our entering into contracts for ordinary work is to advertise for bids, which is common in all government work, and to award the bid to the lowest responsible bidder. That is the usual government system and it is well adapted to our government. It gives all contractors opportunity and prevents partiality as well as giving opportunity. For two reasons that is not applicable under some conditions. Those two reasons generally are that if the specifications and drawings are not complete and, therefore, what you are advertising for bids on is not definite, then a cost-plus-a-fee contract will allow you to start work right away, and the designing merely goes along with the work. The second reason for resorting to that is the failure of contractors to meet [637] competition. Both of those were true in the emergency period of our building, because there were hardly enough contractors so that the competition was not real competition. Also, we were starting construction at the earliest possible time. So, for both those reasons the United States turned to cost-plus-a-fee contracts, and that was the system which was rather closely held in hand by the Under Secretary of War who gave directions as to how it would be proceeded with.

7. General GRUNERT. Then the latter class, the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee, would appear to get the quickest action and it would be more flexible; is that right?

General SCHLEY. Yes. A cost-plus-a-fee contract is almost like a government representative doing the work himself. He uses the contractor's personnel and his labor and his plant as he sees fit to use it,

In the firm bid contract form in open competition there are two particular things the contractor bids on. After he reads and fully understands the specifications and the terms of the proposed contract he bids on the cost he is willing to be paid for doing the work; second, the time at which it will be done. That time is often stated in the contract. He therefore binds himself to do those two things; finish at the date set and to be paid this fixed amount of money. In order to do that he must know very definitely the work to be done.

8. General GRUNERT. Would the straight contract as distinguished from the cost-plus-a-fee not encourage more responsible bidders, more reliable firms, to carry it out than the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee?

General SCHLEY. No. I think that that is not true. In fact, I would not say the opposite is true, but there is a [638] tendency in that direction. The private owner of property seldom advertises broadly for bids, because he only wants to consider contractors of reputation whom he knows or about whom he can get information. He might ask selected ones to bid against each other. Irresponsible men often bid, and the government has to determine which man is responsible. So you do not necessarily get a better man by competition. You often get a man who has not the plant, who has not the knowledge or the financial responsibility. You have got to guard against awarding it to him, to the low man who has those characteristics. When you have a cost-plus-a-fee bid you must have some very good system of preventing the contract being given at the end to a poor contractor.

9. General GRUNERT. Under which system do you get more knowledge of the contractor; or are they about equal in that respect?

General SCHLEY. I do not know that I would say there is much difference there. You do not offer it to the man who is a poor contractor.

10. General FRANK. On the other hand, in a fixed-fee contract you generally have a penalty clause?

General SCHLEY. For time.

11. General FRANK. In the cost-plus contract you have no penalty clause?

General SCHLEY. That is correct.

12. General FRANK. Therefore you have something very definite to which to hold the man in the fixed-fee contract?

General SCHLEY. Yes. And if you have all your specifications and drawings made so that what you are advertising to be done is very definite, and you have real competition among the [639] bidders, that is the normal way and the best way, all things considered.

13. General FRANK. Are you familiar with the negotiations for the basic contract which is designated by W-414-Eng-602 dated 20 December, 1940, which was the basic contract for the construction of defense projects in the Hawaiian Islands with the Hawaiian Constructors for defense projects in Hawaii?

General SCHLEY. I am familiar with only what the records show in the office of the Chief of Engineers, because I do not remember the contract specifically, personally. I had occasion to examine the records when the Military Affairs Committee was looking into the matter about four months ago, so that I am now fairly familiar with the contract and what the record shows as to the steps leading up to it.

14. General FRANK. Could you give us your background on that?

General SCHLEY. I have some notes on the subject which came from the records in the office of the Chief of Engineers which I will refer to.

15. General FRANK. You were Chief of Engineers at the time, were you not?

General SCHLEY. That is correct.

16. General FRANK. And this contract came to you for approval?

General SCHLEY. It came to me for approval or, you might say, for recommendation to the Under Secretary of War for his approval.

17. General FRANK. After you signed it, it then went on up to the Under Secretary of War who, in turn, approved it?

General SCHLEY. That is correct.

18. General FRANK. Will you proceed, then, with your discussion of the contract?

[640] General SCHLEY. I might preface this by saying that in my department the selection of the contracting firm originally was done in the field by the District Engineer, and we attempted to keep that practice, and all during the time I was in the office we felt that our men in the field, who had certain districts to work in and who had been in there for some time, knew the contractors in that area. Therefore, the recommendation initially came in from the District Engineer recommending that a certain contractor be given a certain award, a certain contract. However, we had to get permission first to use the cost-plus-a-fee system. The records show that application for approval of a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of construction contract was submitted on the 14th of December, 1940, by Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., who was at that time District Engineer of the Hawaiian District, and it was forwarded by first endorsement the same day from the Division Engineer, Colonel J. G. Matheson, Engineer, United States Army.

If you do not know the organization, I will be glad to explain the districts and divisions.

There were 40-odd districts into which the country was divided, and again grouped into about 11 engineer divisions.

19. General FRANK. Where was Wyman?

General SCHLEY. In Honolulu.

20. General FRANK. Where was Matheson?

General SCHLEY. In San Francisco.

21. General FRANK. How did that contract get Wyman's and Matheson's signature on the same day?

General SCHLEY. Evidently they were together on that date in conference, or otherwise; I do not know. My record here does not show whether that was in San Francisco or not that the two [641] were together.

That organization was one of our permanent organizations, because the Corps of Engineers has public works to do, which are civil engineering construction, as well as some military construction. At this stage we were in process of taking over additional construction. We had had only sea-coast fortifications, and at this time we had been given fairly recently construction at Air Corps stations in addition, and we were in process of taking that over from the Quartermaster.

22. General FRANK. You were given the construction of other than Air Corps stations, were you not?

General SCHLEY. Not until about eight months later, I think. On December 18 a letter to the Assistant Secretary of War was written by Lieutenant Colonel Earl E. Gesler, Corps of Engineers, Finance Section, in the office of the Chief of Engineers, requesting authority for use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract. This was approved by the Under Secretary of War by first endorsement December 20, 1940, stating that the Secretary of War had determined that it was necessary to enter into a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract for construction and gave authority to enter into negotiations, the contractor selected and the contractor's fee being subject to approval by the Under Secretary of War.

General FRANK. May we have a copy of that submitted to us for our record?

General SCHLEY. Those are in the office of the Chief of Engineers which I have no connection with.

I might explain at that point that there were two features which the Under Secretary of War watched particularly in the case of these contracts. The first, for very evident reasons, [642] was the contracting firms which we selected; and one of the things, of course, which he watched was to see that we used impartiality and used what he called local contractors. For instance, for work in Baltimore, if possible the contract would be awarded to a Maryland contractor.

Second, it was to see that the fixed fee was not excessive. He did not want the fees to climb to unreasonable figures.

On December 26, 1940, Colonel Gesler sent a memorandum to me, General Schley, Chief of Engineers, and copy of contract dated December 20 between the United States and The Hawaiian Constructors.

On December 28 Colonel Gesler sent a memorandum to Commissioner Knudson requesting clearance for the award of contract M-414-902. This was approved by Commissioner Knudson on December 30, 1940.

On December 28 Colonel Gesler sent a letter to the Under Secretary of War transmitting the contract and giving certain information concerning it. This was approved by Mr. Patterson, Under Secretary, under date of January 3, 1941, subject to my signing the contract.

24. General FRANK. That is the history of the contract?

General SCHLEY. Yes.

25. General RUSSELL. General, you said that the Under Secretary of War insisted on a local contractor, where possible, being given the contract. Was that the sole limitation imposed upon the Division Engineer in proposing the contractor or group of contractors for a specified job?

General SCHLEY. No; I would say that the contractor had to be otherwise acceptable.

26. General RUSSELL. Let us assume that the contractor, whose [643] name was submitted to the War Department, was otherwise acceptable and was also a local contractor. Then the discretion of the Division Engineer in making the selection was rather broad?

General SCHLEY. Of course, his selection was only a recommendation. He did the original selecting and that was subject thereafter to review by all the agencies which reviewed it. In this case it was Mr. Knudson's office and, later, our office and, later, the Under Secretary of War's office.

27. General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, General, for that recommendation to have been disapproved it would have been necessary for one or more of the reviewing authorities to have established some factual basis for disapproving the recommendation?

General SCHLEY. Yes. Yet, I can tell you what the practice was, perhaps at that time, certainly later. When Mr. Knudson's office was taken by another office it was called the Construction Advisory Board. It was located in the Quartermaster General's office. It must have been established at a later time, because Knudson originally had the authority, and later it was this board. At the time this board was functioning I happen to remember they built up what you might call a panel of acceptable contractors in reputation, through good work they had done or through recommendations of responsible people.

28. General RUSSELL. Let me approach my question, then, from the other side. What effect, if any, did the recommendation of a contractor by the Division Engineer have?

General SCHLEY. First the district and then reviewed by the Division Engineer.

29. General RUSSELL. I am talking about the Division Engineer.

General SCHLEY. I would say that outside of a place like [644] the Hawaiian Islands, where probably the number of contractors is limited, I assume that in a State his judgment would be pretty sound. At least, I would so consider it in my office. Presumably he knew and was dealing with men he knew the reputation of. There, of course, conditions are different because it is a smaller place and there are fewer contractors to select from.

30. General RUSSELL. Then would it be an accurate generalization to say that the recommendation of the District Engineer was presumptively sound and must be overcome by the introduction of some factual situation?

General SCHLEY. I would not say there is a presumption in that case, because if our office knew nothing at all about the man we would write back and say, "Tell us more about it."

31. General RUSSELL. Did your office place upon the District Engineer the burden of showing that the man or the firm that he had recommended was capable of carrying out the contract?

General SCHLEY. I would say that the recommendation initially would cause him to assume that obligation initially.

32. General GRUNERT. How many District Engineers have you ever turned down on a recommended contractor?

General SCHLEY. That is something I cannot say.

33. General GRUNERT. From your memory were there many or were there any?

General SCHLEY. We have had very few such up to this period of time. Yes; I can say we have.

34. General FRANK. You have what?

General SCHLEY. We have turned down men recommended by District Engineers.

35. General GRUNERT. Has the Under Secretary of War turned [645] you down on any of your recommendations?

General SCHLEY. I would say that he had, definitely, and also this Advisory Board.

36. General GRUNERT. On what ground?

General SCHLEY. Often it was because he felt that there was a contractor in the State, when we had selected one outside the State, feeling that there was no available one in the State.

Another case was where the Advisory Board set up by the Quartermaster General's office would come back itself if they did not have the contractor on the list.

37. General GRUNERT. Suppose a contractor was recommended and they had no information on him; they did not have him on their approved list: Who would do what in the line of finding out whether he was any good and whether or not he should be given any contract?

General SCHLEY. This Advisory Board—naturally I remember more cases because it was in effect longer—called on our office and said, "This contractor is not on our list"; and the obligation was on us to show that it was a proper award to make.

38. General RUSSELL. Generally, if a contractor was well located geographically, and on the list, the District Engineer approved him or you would approve him?

General SCHLEY. Yes; and sometimes we found if he was on the Board's list before we approved. Sometimes I will say that a name would come in that we did not know ourselves in our office; we had no record of it. We would go over to the Board and say, "Is this contractor on your list?" They would say, "Yes, he is on our list." And we would recommend him if he was recommended by the district and the division and the board said he was a good man.

[646] 39. General FRANK. Do you know anything about the availability of contractors for work in Hawaii at the time this contract was let?

General SCHLEY. The contractors resident there?

40. General FRANK. Yes.

General SCHLEY. I do not.

41. General FRANK. Contractors resident there or contractors from the United States who had offices and organizations there?

General SCHLEY. No, sir; I do not.

42. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not there were sufficient contractors on the spot in Honolulu to handle this situation?

General SCHLEY. No, I do not.

43. General FRANK. Do you know how the particular list of contractors who comprised The Hawaiian Constructors was determined?

General SCHLEY. No; I do not.

44. General FRANK. This was done while you were Chief of Engineers?

General SCHLEY. That is correct.

45. General FRANK. On whom did you depend to determine these details?

General SCHLEY. The District Engineer in the field, in the first instance; the Division Engineer, who was his next superior, in the second instance.

46. General FRANK. Who was that?

General SCHLEY. In this case, J. G. Matheson, of San Francisco.

47. General FRANK. And Wyman was the District Engineer in Honolulu?

General SCHLEY. Yes. Third, I looked directly to the man [647] in charge of the branch in my office which handled this work.

His name was Brigadier General Thomas M. Robins. He, in turn, was held responsible for all of our construction work along this particular line; that is, the awarding part of it and the drafting of the contracts. Lieutenant Colonel Earl E. Gesler, whose name I have given you before—

48. General FRANK. He was the finance man?

General SCHLEY. The finance man and contract man in the office. He, in turn, had Major James B. Newman, Jr., since he had other forms of contract than this, in charge for him in that part of his office. He was succeeded on June 4, 1941, by another man whose name I can give you if you want it.

49. General FRANK. Therefore the chain of events went from Newman to Gesler to Robins to you?

General SCHLEY. And Robins had this man working on it.

50. General FRANK. And then down on the other side to Matheson to Wyman?

General SCHLEY. I do not understand that step.

51. General FRANK. To the division to the district?

General SCHLEY. For the command function?

52. General FRANK. Yes.

General SCHLEY. The command function was from me or Robins, who was my assistant, to Matheson to Wyman; that is correct.

53. General FRANK. Were you at that time aware that there was a contractor being considered by the name of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General SCHLEY. No; I was not.

54. General FRANK. Did you ever hear of the firm of Rohl & Connolly?

General SCHLEY. No, sir.

I might add, if it is of interest to you, that I know the [648] other two firms, Gunther-Shirley Company and Callahan Company.

55. General FRANK. Were you familiar with the name of McKee?

General SCHLEY. McKee? I do not know that name.

56. General FRANK. Robert McKee Company?

General SCHLEY. No.

57. General FRANK. Since you were not aware of the existence of one Hans Wilhelm Rohl it naturally follows that you did not know that he was a German agent. Was it the responsibility of the contracting officer, Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., who was also the District Engineer, to check as to whether or not a contractor was a citizen of the United States?

General SCHLEY. I do not know that there was anything in the written instructions so requiring, but I would assume that he would make recommendations for a contractor considering his qualifications in all regards. I would assume that he would not limit his consideration of the qualifications of the contractor in any regard.

58. General FRANK. What was the status of the world at that time with respect to the conduct of war?

General SCHLEY. Well, the stage of the war was such that France had fallen; and I do not remember just exactly beyond that point what the stage was. But that fixes it fairly well.

59. General FRANK. Britain, France, and Germany were at war?

General SCHLEY. Yes.

60. General FRANK. Would you say that the United States at that time had very definite sympathies?

General SCHLEY. By that you mean, public opinion as judged through the press?

61. General FRANK. Yes.

General SCHLEY. Yes; I think there is no question that we had. [649]

62. General FRANK. Where were those sympathies?

General SCHLEY. Those sympathies were with the Allied forces.

63. General FRANK. With the war raging in Europe and with American sympathies being with the Allies, do you think it a smart move to consider a German agent a qualified contracting agent to handle American defense projects?

General SCHLEY. I might say that all defense projects have that difficulty, which relate not only to the contractor but to the overseers, the superintendents, the foremen and the workmen. One of the very serious problems in our work in this country often was to have those confidential things such as plans, known to as few people as possible, and only to those that you could trust, if possible. So that it applies not only to the contractor; it applies to the foremen as well and almost to the workmen, because I assume that the best position for a man to get into is in one of these workmen's jobs if he is seeking information.

In order to deal with that we have in many cases—I might say, in most cases—done the work by the form which we call hired labor, ourselves hiring the labor, instead of letting it out to contractors. So I would say that that question is everpresent in dealing with fortifications. It not only goes to the contractor but to the foremen, the superintendent and the workmen.

84. General FRANK. Did the Corps of Engineers at that time have any policy with respect to this question?

General SCHLEY. I would say that the policy has always been to have those things known to as few people as possible, [650] and to have responsible people connected with them in defense work.

65. General FRANK. Was there any policy with respect to an alien being taken into confidence on a construction project?

General SCHLEY. I do not remember in any written instructions anything which bears on the contractor himself or any of the employees, but I would say that it is generally understood that caution is to be exercised in keeping this secret information as confidential as possible.

66. General FRANK. What was the date of the contract, again?

General SCHLEY. December 20 was the date of the signing by the Secretary of War.

67. General FRANK. Are you conversant with the espionage act of March 28, 1940?

General SCHLEY. I do not know whether I know it by that name. Undoubtedly I do know it.

68. General FRANK. Which forbade the hiring or the awarding to an alien of contracts?

General SCHLEY. Yes.

69. General FRANK. Was it the responsibility of the contract officer, Colonel Wyman, to check as to whether or not Rohl was a citizen?

General SCHLEY. As to whether the law would require him to so report I do not know, but I would say that his natural requirement, outside of what the law may be, would be to look into things of that kind which might have an adverse effect on information being gotten abroad.

70. General FRANK. There is a law, and there should be some method in any organization in carrying it out, a responsibility at the start, at a point of contact some place. If it did not [651] start with the award it should start at the determination of the responsibility for checking citizenship.

General SCHLEY. I would say that the responsibility for enforcement of the law in our work starts in the field and starts with us; it starts with both ends. It is everywhere.

71. General FRANK. Here is a specific instance. Where does the responsibility start to determine the citizenship of one Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General SCHLEY. In this case the question of responsibility would start with the man in the field, because he made the initial recommendation.

72. General FRANK. And that was one Colonel Wyman?

General SCHLEY. He made the recommendation from the field.

73. General FRANK. Do you have any information concerning the failure of The Hawaiian Constructors to complete construction of the defense projects within the times and in the manner prescribed prior to the 7th of December, 1941, as required by the job orders?

General SCHLEY. No; I have not. I attempted to make such a comparison, because the Military Affairs Committee of the House asked questions along that line. At that time only limited material was available. Some had been gotten from the Hawaiian Islands, but not all; some was found in the office of the Chief of Engineers here, bearing on the subject.

74. General FRANK. Where would that information be available?

General SCHLEY. I understand that all those job orders—and, by the way, I have now seen them all, but I have not seen all the progress reports—I understand that all those job orders were sent from the Hawaiian Islands to the Chief of Engineers' office in Washington, and I have seen them all, but I was unable [652] to tie them in to progress reports, because I could not get all the progress reports. I was able to see enough of it to get an idea of how the thing went, how it proceeded.

75. General FRANK. The original information would be available in the office of the District Engineer, would it not?

General SCHLEY. Yes. It ought to be of record now in the office of the Chief of Engineers, and I do not doubt that a group of men assigned to that investigation could unearth it. But here is one thing that I suggest you bear in mind, and that is that the contract being a cost-plus-a-fee contract, not only was the work to be done indefinite to commence with, but changes were made as the work progressed, many, many, many changes.

76. General FRANK. The job orders will cover that, will they not?

General SCHLEY. Yes. Additions to the work were naturally given priorities, either before or after something else. So I would say that whether a particular thing was pressed to completion, comparing its

priority with other work which was to be done, would depend on three things, as I have thought the thing through. The first is the importance placed on it by the contracting officer, Wyman, in connection with the whole job to be done; second, since it is defense work it is in a strategically important place. The third would be the availability of the material or plans to do the job.

77. General FRANK. And, fourth, priorities on the equipment and transportation?

General SCHLEY. Yes. But I was thinking only of the factual things. The thing must have relative importance in the mind of the man who is performing the work; that is, the District Engineer. So all those things probably have a bearing.

[653] And you must remember that whereas the original contract said 6 months the contractor specifically reserved protection against the local stand that the work was to be done in 6 months. I explained that to the Committee over and over again. You will find that the times of completion were advanced, and sometimes additional work was thrown in. Instead of one road there would be two roads. Instead of 1,700 feet of track it would be 3,600 feet of track. Therefore it is important to get the man who knows those things to see what influence they had, and also the people who knew what materials were available.

[654] 78. General FRANK. What I am getting at is, the logical place in which to look for those where there is a greater number of people conversant with the details is in the office of the District Engineer in Honolulu now?

General SCHLEY. I am not sure but what those records have been now sent here. I would search here first, and insofar as the personnel are concerned I think you will have to consult those who were in the Engineers at the time.

79. General FRANK. Which includes?

General SCHLEY. Colonel Wyman and his assistants.

80. General FRANK. What is your knowledge in this connection especially concerning delays in constructing facilities for the air raid warning system and the underground gasoline storage tanks?

General SCHLEY. I have no knowledge of that.

81. General FRANK. What knowledge do you have concerning whether any military personnel neglected duties relating to the contract?

General SCHLEY. I have none.

82. General FRANK. You would not know whether they failed by not investigating properly, prior to the award of the contract, the loyalty of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General SCHLEY. No, I do not.

83. General FRANK. By not supervising properly the performance of the contractors' work?

General SCHLEY. I do not.

84. General FRANK. By not informing higher authority of delays and deficiencies?

[655] General SCHLEY. I do not.

85. General FRANK. Did any complaints come in that came to your notice?

General SCHLEY. None during the time I occupied the position, which was up until September 8th.

86. General FRANK. To your knowledge, what information was given Colonel Wyman to complete these defense projects as speedily as possible?

General SCHLEY. That I have no knowledge of.

87. General FRANK. On December 20, 1940, you were the Chief of Engineers?

General SCHLEY. That is correct.

88. General FRANK. You have stated your responsibilities with respect to this contract previously in the testimony; did you not?

General SCHLEY. The testimony here?

89. General FRANK. Yes.

General SCHLEY. I think so.

90. General FRANK. Well, if not, will you state the function of your position with respect to the contract?

General SCHLEY. I would say that I assumed responsibility when I signed it, and I would say that I had the responsibility of its execution, all of course as the head of a large organization which was carrying on the expenditure of vast sums of money, and presumably there would be brought to my attention the things which I needed to know which didn't normally come to my attention, and I made an effort to inspect a great deal of the work going on. I did not get to the Hawaiian Islands to inspect that work.

[656] 91. General FRANK. Did you receive any communications from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, or from Colonel Wyman requesting that you assist in speeding up materials for the work or assist in obtaining higher priority on materials for the work?

General SCHLEY. No, but that does not mean that the Office of Chief of Engineers did not. Their records will have to be examined to determine that.

92. General FRANK. What was the responsibility of the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman, to prod the contractors so that the work would proceed more rapidly?

General SCHLEY. I would say that it was very great, much greater in the case of a cost-plus-fee contract than in the normal firm-price contract, because time is not stated as a part of the contract, and therefore it is up to him to drive the parts which need to be driven.

93. General FRANK. Did you know on 20 December 1940 or at any time that Hans Wilhelm Rohl was then or had been under investigation by government agency for suspicious activities?

General SCHLEY. No, I did not even know the name before this matter came up.

94. General FRANK. What if any measures should have been taken by the personnel of the Corps of Engineers for the protection of the Government against contracting with a person having such a record?

General SCHLEY. I do not know what that record is, and for that reason it is difficult for me to answer the hypothetical question, but I would say that we should know, [657] and so should the reviewing board know—who was particularly charged with that work of reviewing the contractors—they should all know that they were acceptable in all senses.

95. General FRANK. This is a procedure that is not specified but which you leave to the good judgment of the District Engineer; is that correct?

General SCHLEY. No, I am not sure that it is not specified. I do not recall specific instructions to the effect. I do not recall them at this time, and they may or may not have been in existence. If there were not, however, I would say that at this time there was an obligation to watch those things.

96. General FRANK. If it were not picked up by the District Engineer, was there any general understanding that things like that should have been watched for and picked up by the Division Engineer?

General SCHLEY. Not specifically. I would say that the entire review should have been made by everyone through whose hands these things passed and who recommended that the award be made. There were no different instructions to the District Engineer than to the Division Engineer. Instructions of that kind would be general.

97. General FRANK. The placing of definite responsibility was rather loose, then?

General SCHLEY. I would not say so, no. I say any such instructions are general rather than specific as to individuals. Now, in the Office of the Chief of Engineers I would say yes, there was a definite place for those things to be looked for.

98. General FRANK. Where was that?

General SCHLEY. I would say it is in this organization here [658] (referring to papers).

99. General FRANK. Was that in Newman's office under Robins?

General SCHLEY. Yes, I would say that it is.

100. General FRANK. Or is it under Gesler?

General SCHLEY. Well, they all have exactly the same function, one reporting to the other: Newman initially, Gesler next, and Robins third and myself fourth.

101. General FRANK. But you did not have any instructions how to pointedly look for this sort of thing?

General SCHLEY. Well, that may have been. I cannot recall it. I do not recall it at this time.

102. General FRANK. Do you not think that you would remember it, in view of this Rohl case, had a situation like that existed?

General SCHLEY. You see, the Rohl case has been recounted to me only four months ago, so this is a brand-new thought. I had no idea of a Rohl case in those days when we were issuing instructions, so the two would not associate themselves naturally in my mind.

103. General FRANK. Did you have any instructions in the Corps of Engineers with respect to discussing with an enemy alien details of a defense project?

General SCHLEY. Well, I would say that such a thing would be entirely unnecessary. There may have been such instructions, but general instructions would cover any such matter as that.

104. General FRANK. Army Regulations would cover that?

General SCHLEY. Yes, and the fact that all those plans and all those specifications are marked at least "Restricted"; and, as I have told you a moment ago, it goes down much further [659] than the contractor himself. The foreman is a very dangerous man because he is one of many who are on the job.

105. General GRUNERT. How can a contractor intelligently bid on or prepare to execute a contract unless he knows about that contract?

General SCHLEY. Oh, he knows about the contract.

106. General GRUNERT. Well, do you not have to give him a certain amount of restricted information in order for him to intelligently bid or prepare himself?

General SCHLEY. I do not know what this man knew, but I would say—when I say “this man” I mean these men, because there were at least six members of the contracting firms. Those men need not have known, in order to accept this contract, anything more than was in the contract itself, I would say, because it is not a firm bid. They are not going to be paid that sum of money which you see in that contract, a million and-odd dollars. They are going to be paid on a scale of reimbursement to themselves plus a fee. The Government pays all costs, and in addition to that the contractor gets a fee. So this estimate in here is nothing but something to give the contractor an idea of the magnitude of the work and the amount of money he is going to get, because it is within a percent of that is the way you arrive at your fixed fee, a rough percent. So I would say that reading that contract alone, now a wise contractor wants usually to see the site. By that I mean he wants to see what the unloading facilities are at the place where his stuff is coming in; he wants to see what the local conditions with respect to labor are, whether labor is plentiful [660] or whether it is expensive. But that is in the firm bid. Many take much bigger chances on making a bid on cost plus a fee because all costs are paid by the Government, the materials bought or furnished by the Government, the labor rolls, pay rolls.

107. General FRANK. Here in this contract is a fixed fee of \$52,220.

General SCHLEY. I would say that is the only thing in the contract that is fixed.

108. General FRANK. What is the theory of putting that amount of fixed fee in the contract?

General SCHLEY. Because that is what the contractor is going to get over and above his costs, and all he is going to get, and he will take the contract or refuse it very largely on what that sum is. That is the profit that is in it for him.

109. General GRUNERT. No matter what might be developed later on under the contract?

General SCHLEY. Oh, no. Additional work added by a supplemental agreement usually adds to the fixed fee, because that is more than he expected to undertake.

110. General GRUNERT. Well, this contract originally started about a million and went up about thirty million, didn't it?

General SCHLEY. I think even bigger than that. At the time I left it had grown to about forty million, I think.

111. General GRUNERT. It seemed rather strange that they would all get together here in Washington to lobby through a contract in which they were obviously going to divide \$52,000, didn't it? You need not answer that; it is just a remark.

112. General FRANK. Did you ever receive notice or knowledge [661] of any reports concerning the activities of Colonel Wyman in Hawaii which was derogatory to Colonel Wyman?

General SCHLEY. No, I did not, that I recall.

113. General FRANK. Did you ever receive notice or knowledge of a report dated the 14th of February, '42? That was after you left?

General SCHLEY. February '42 I had left the service over a year and a half.

114. General FRANK. Oh, yes. When you left the service Colonel Wyman was still on duty in Honolulu?

General SCHLEY. So far as I recall, he was.

General FRANK. Have you anything further that is pertinent to the case that you would like to state to the Board?

General SCHLEY. You might want to know the work which was taken over by the Corps of Engineers in order to see where this came in the procedure. On November 20, 1940, the Air Corps station work was assigned to the Corps of Engineers. At that time it was in progress under the Quartermaster General's Office. Instructions were issued that the work would be taken over job by job in order not to cause any interruption of the progress, so that it took quite a while before the entire work was turned over. This contract, therefore, came within that period, and we were setting up—at that time we were preparing for this vast amount of work which was on the way, and it was immediately placed under the same part of General Robins' office in which our civil works had been.

115. General FRANK. That is, this Hawaiian defense project was placed there?

General SCHLEY. No. I am speaking of the Air Corps [662] station work, which was new work for us to be doing. All construction work of the Army was turned over to us December 16, 1941, according to the record, which was after I left the service. Those dates you might want to have in mind.

You might also wish to have in mind, if you go into it further, there was another branch of our office which was interested in this contract, and that is the part which had always existed and which handled seacoast fortification work. It was called the fortification section and came not under the civil construction division, of which General Robins was the head, but came under the military division of which Brigadier General John J. Kingman was the head; and therefore you will find progress reports on this contract here in those two parts of the office. You will find something in the fortification section, the progress reports, on the seacoast fortification part of the work, and that on the airfields and other things you will find under the civil division part of the office.

I can give you some idea of how the work was added. Jobs were added over and above apparently what the contract called for originally; and a job on Wheeler Field to construct reinforced concrete, bombproof ammunition and storage structures, for instance, dated February 24, 1941 (that is one of the early job orders) called for three bombproof ammunition storage magazines, each of 30,000 cubic feet capacity. What was called Addendum No. 2, of May 26, 1941, added two more. There is a job order which presumably was based on one of the general provisions in the contract which started out to be a smaller figure. Addenda Nos. 3 and 4 provided for additional work in [663] this same job order. Addendum No. 5, of July 1, 1941, called for four more bombproof ammunition storage magazines, each 30,000 cubic feet, over and above what I have just mentioned. Ad-

dendum No. 6, of August 14, '41, called for two more of 5,000 and three of 10,000. Addendum No. 7 called for four of 5,000 cubic feet each.

116. General FRANK. All those additions, however, do not preclude the necessity of requiring a termination date on the completion of construction of the first three?

General SCHLEY. I would say that, as I have found in the job orders, they all read—they all have their own estimate of time. And that is another thing I think you would be interested in knowing. Each job order had an estimated time for completion, and this additional work was added to each job order.

117. General FRANK. Each addendum.

General SCHLEY. Unquestionably their time was extended, and perhaps those were placed ahead of something which had already been started, some other job order which was considered less important. So I think it is going to be quite an undertaking to see how those estimated times of completion were changed as the work went on, because so much work was added as the job proceeded, and the contract itself provides for additions, specifically so states.

118. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions, General Russell?

119. General RUSSELL. Just one.

General, I believe that the operations in the Chief of Engineers Office have been described to us fairly definitely, but I wanted to ask this question: There was no plan or no [664] individual or individuals in the Office of the Chief of Engineers discharging the function of checking the individuals, the members of firms, the stockholders and officers of corporations who might be seeking Government contracts, to determine their nationality, status of citizenship, or past criminal record?

General SCHLEY. No. And I hope you won't take my failure to recollect specific instructions in existence at the time to be the final answer of the Office of Chief of Engineers on the subject. I hope that you will ask the Office to provide you with information which would be more definite than my recollection of it is.

120. General RUSSELL. It comes to pass, therefore, that if an investigation touching these questions of citizenship, prior individual records as to criminality, and so forth, were to be made at the instigation of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, it would be because in some way information might reach your office indicating that those subjects should be investigated?

General SCHLEY. Well, you are carrying on now, I think, if I may say so, the same thought you originally expressed, and I am in hopes that you will have the record searched to see what the instructions were at that time on the subject.

121. General RUSSELL. I have no further questions.

122. General GRUNERT. Who selected Wyman for the post as District Engineer in Hawaii? Do you know?

General SCHLEY. No, I do not, but we had a personnel section which operated under General Kingman, that is, the office of personnel section; and, this being work which was under General Robins, I do not doubt that both of them knew. [665] I knew that he was going to go there from Los Angeles where he had been before.

123. General GRUNERT. Did you know Wyman?

General SCHLEY. Very well.

124. General GRUNERT. What did you think of him?

General SCHLEY. I first met Wyman in the last war, which was when he came into the service, and I met him then as an Officer of an engineer combat battalion that was with the Second Division, Engineers of the Second Division, and he was a very excellent man. If I remember correctly he is a graduate of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and he has a very fine technical knowledge of engineering. He has a reputation of being a very hard driver, that is, of piling pressure on to do things on a large scale and do them fast.

In Los Angeles he had a very, very big job before he left there, that he was on the very, very big flood-control project which was to try to protect the town of Los Angeles and the valuable property which has been built there in a very unwise location, against those torrential floods, which the Federal Government undertook to participate in. That was a very big job and one which a great many private interests were involved in, because it stepped on many toes; it took property under Government authority to seize property for such construction work. It ran into bridges, change of bridges, railroad bridges or private railroads as well as the county bridges. So it was a very difficult, very ticklish job.

I might say that he steam-rolled a great deal of it, and we had to sort of deal with the local people in more diplomatic ways than he often did, but I think they appreciated his work [666] very much because they asked for his retention there although he had been there more than our usual tour. We usually did not keep a man more than four years at one of those public works jobs because we wanted him to get broader training and we wanted him not to get his roots too deep in the local soil. He must perfect his federal apprenticeship so we usually change him every four years. My recollection is that he was there five because of the importance of that work. I have confidence in him, in his integrity and in his driving ability.

125. General GRUNERT. It would seem to me that this step-by-step processing of a contract, for instance from Newman to Gesler to you to the Under Secretary—is it possible that each one of you depended upon the one step below doing all the necessary work regarding the contract and then did not consider that these various higher echelons had any responsibility regarding that contract, and therefore passing the buck down to the lowest man, who seems to be Newman here, as far as the Chief of Engineers Office is concerned?

General SCHLEY. I do not think so. I think it is very much like a military command, and I think it probably has evolved from the fact that there are military men connected with it. I would say that Gesler did look to Newman because Newman was the original one in that scale, and I would say similarly Robins and I looked to Gesler. But that is true of all organizations.

126. General GRUNERT. But there was no particular one that said, "It is your duty to go and contact the F. B. I. to see if they have anything against this man," was there?

General SCHLEY. I would say that Newman is the man who [667] had to satisfy himself concerning the contractor, first. Perhaps Gesler would accept his recommendation unless there was something on the face of it. But you must remember that we had those other reviews which were set up particularly for the purpose.

127. General GRUNERT. What is the advisory board that I hear about? What do they do?

General SCHLEY. The advisory board was set up by Mr. Patterson, Under Secretary, and it was set up in the Quartermaster General's Office, but all of us looked on it as Mr. Patterson's board.

128. General GRUNERT. Well, they were supposed to look into things to satisfy Mr. Patterson?

General SCHLEY. Its purpose was, I would say, primarily to pass on the contractor, since it was not usually a government firm.

129. General GRUNERT. Did they have a preferred list of contractors or an eligible list, or what?

General SCHLEY. They had a list of those whom they had already looked into sufficiently to put them on their panel.

130. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether Rohl was on this list?

General SCHLEY. No, I have no knowledge. In fact, this did not go to that board for review, because that board apparently was not acting on our cases at the time. It went to Knudsen. I explained that a little bit earlier.

131. General GRUNERT. But it seems to me I read in the Congressional report on this thing, or that Committee of [668] Congress that made a report of it in September, to the effect that there were three or four of them, including Colonel Wyman, who came to Washington to put this contract through. Now, what is the necessity of anybody coming to Washington with your scheme of contract? Is that usually done with some contracts or all of them, or what?

General SCHLEY. The field man comes rather frequently for conference on almost anything.

132. General GRUNERT. Does he bring the prospective contractors with him to sell themselves, or why did they have to come to Washington?

General SCHLEY. I do not know the circumstances of the trip that you speak of, but I would say it is not infrequent for the District Engineer to come in. He would come in for conferences often.

133. General GRUNERT. I can imagine that. Then, you know nothing about that particular, what you might call a lobby group or an explanatory group, or what, that came here?

General SCHLEY. No, I do not know.

134. General GRUNERT. Do you know of anybody who would know about that particular? Would Robins know anything about that? Would Gesler know anything about that?

General SCHLEY. I would say that Robins would be very apt to know. Newman certainly would know, and Gesler might.

135. General GRUNERT. Any other questions?

136. General FRANK. Did you have any discussion concerning this contract with a man by the name of Grafe?

General SCHLEY. Not before it was awarded. I know Grafe personally. I have heard him speak of his government contracts [669] in general, I don't doubt, since that time, and he may have mentioned it, but I had no conversation with him that I can recall about this contract before its award.

137. General FRANK. Do you know Mr. Connolly, who is an associate of Rohl's?

General SCHLEY. I have tried to place him, and I can call up the Office of Chief of Engineers to have them refresh my memory on some Connollys that I do know, to see if this was one of them. His name does not suggest anyone offhand.

138. General FRANK. Did you discuss this contract with Grafe?

General SCHLEY. No; I do not remember any mention of it at all by anyone to me before it was executed.

139. General FRANK. Or Martin?

General SCHLEY. I do not know Martin.

140. Major CLAUSEN. This Connolly is Tom Connolly of San Francisco.

General SCHLEY. I know Grafe. I used to know a Shirley. As a matter of fact, Shirley and I used to know, who is now dead, the contractor whom Grafe was with.

141. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much, General. We appreciate your coming in and helping us out here. What we are after is information and facts, and I think that you have been of considerable help to us.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

142. General GRUNERT. The Board will take a recess of 5 minutes and then proceed with the next witness.

(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.)

[670] **TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. ROGER B. CALTON, ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, grade, organization, and station?

General COLTON. Major General Roger B. Colton, Army of the United States, Chief of the Engineering and Technical Service, Signal Corps, Army Service Forces, Washington, D. C.

2. General GRUNERT. General, this Board is making an attempt to get at the facts, as far as we can, in and around the War Department as to matters prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. We hope that in the position you occupy you can help us out in telling us about matters pertaining to the Signal Corps. In the large field we cover in the limited time, we have divided special investigation amongst the three of us, although the entire Board will pass on all matters. The special investigation on which you are to be a witness is under General Frank, who will lead in propounding the questions, and the other members will ask such additional questions as they see fit. General Frank.

3. General FRANK. Will you repeat, please, your present assignment?

General COLTON. I am Chief of the Engineering and Technical Service, Signal Corps, in the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Army Service Forces, War Department, Washington, D. C. That means that I am in charge of research and development for the Signal Corps at the present time.

4. General FRANK. What is your responsibility with respect
[671] to radar equipment?

General COLTON. What is it now?

5. General FRANK. Yes.

General COLTON. I am in charge of the Signal Corps research and development of radar equipment.

6. General FRANK. Who was responsible for research and development of radar equipment in the fall of 1940?

General COLTON. I was directly responsible for research and development of ground radar equipment. At the time I was director of the Signal Corps Laboratory at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. The officer in charge in Washington in the fall of 1940 was, as I recall it, Colonel Hugh Mitchell. The officer in charge at Wright Field for airborne, if my recollection serves me correctly, was Colonel Gardner, now General Gardner.

You said 1940, did you not?

7. General FRANK. Yes; fall of 1940.

General COLTON. Yes.

8. General FRANK. Are you conversant with the plan for the location of permanent radar in the Hawaiian Islands?

General COLTON. Only through having read the Board reports and War Department actions. The Board report I refer to is the report of the Board of Officers that recommended the locations, and that was a local Board in Hawaii.

9. General FRANK. Can you tell us what were the number and location of the permanent aircraft warning stations contemplated for the Hawaiian Islands to complete a phase of Contract No. W-414-Eng-602?

General COLTON. The number and location of permanent [672] aircraft warning stations originally contemplated for the Hawaiian Islands were three 271 and 271-A fixed stations and five SCR-270 mobile stations. The three fixed stations 271 and 271-A were planned to be located at Kaala, Kokee, and Haleakala. Three of the five mobile stations were planned to be located at Nuana Pali, Manawahua, and Mauna Loa. The other two mobile stations were designated as roving stations. There is no record of the Corps of Engineers' contract W-414-Engineering-602 in the files of the Chief Signal Officer, and I have no familiarity with it.

10. General FRANK. What equipment was to be furnished by the Signal Corps?

General COLTON. The equipment to be furnished by the Signal Corps was three fixed stations 271 delivered complete with shelter, except for the concrete foundation of the shelter, and also five mobile radar stations 270 to be delivered complete and ready for operation.

11. General FRANK. What priority was placed upon this equipment?

General COLTON. The War Department, under date of March 10, 1941, set the priority for the delivery of radio sets 270, 271, and 271-A as indicated in inclosure 1 to the document that I furnished the Board, and I have a copy here.

12. General FRANK. Please state that as a part of your answer.

General COLTON. Please state the priority?

13. General FRANK. Yes, giving the dates on which each of those three sets was to be made available for delivery to [673] Honolulu.

General COLTON. For Hawaii two 271's were originally scheduled to be shipped from the United States during March.

14. General FRANK. Of what year? March of 1941?

General COLTON. March 1941. And one 271-A was also scheduled to be shipped during March.

15. General FRANK. Of 1941?

General COLTON. Of 1941. That priority was set up by the War Department under date of the 10th of March.

[674] 16. General FRANK. We have then two 271 sets for Hawaii for March, and one 271-A, in March?

General COLTON. That was the schedule. That was a shipment schedule, General.

17. General FRANK. Is that a shipment schedule, or is that the date on which it was turned over to the Quartermaster?

General COLTON. That is the date on which it was to be turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment.

18. General FRANK. Whether or not it was shipped in that month is something we will have to determine from the Quartermaster. That provides for the three sets?

General COLTON. Yes. That was the War Department schedule, General. They were not actually shipped, then.

19. General FRANK. That was the War Department priority?

General COLTON. Yes.

20. General FRANK. Two 271's, in March, and one 271-A, in March?

General COLTON. Yes. And I might point out that Panama was scheduled to get two sets. We are just pointing out the priority. I might put it this way: They were the third and fourth and fifth sets—the third, fourth, and fifth sets off the production line.

21. General FRANK. All right. Now, let us come down to the 270 sets, which are the mobile sets they were scheduled to get. Look at April and May.

General COLTON. April and May, yes. They were scheduled to have one turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment, in April, and four to be turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment in May.

[675] 22. General FRANK. That made a total of five mobile and three permanent or stationary sets?

General COLTON. Yes, sir.

23. General FRANK. How did such priority compare with similar equipment furnished at about the same time to installations in the Philippines and Panama?

General COLTON. Under the priority furnished by the War Department under date of March 10, as I have already stated, Hawaii was scheduled to get the third, fourth, and fifth sets; Panama was scheduled to get the first and second sets.

24. General FRANK. All right. Thank you.

General COLTON. That is as regards the fixed stations.

As regards the mobile stations, the relative priorities were, two to the 1st Air Warning Company; one to the Signal Corps Laboratories; one to the 1st Air Warning Company; four to the 1st Air Warning Company; one to Hawaii; two to Fort Monmouth; and then four to Hawaii, completing the priority on that schedule as it stood as of that time.

25. General FRANK. When was the Hawaiian radar equipment actually delivered to the Quartermaster for shipment?

General COLTON. The Hawaiian radar equipment was delivered as follows, to the Quartermaster, for shipment: All components of one 271-A were turned over by the Signal Corps to the Quartermaster Corps for shipment by 26 May 1941. All components of two SCR-271s were turned over to the Quartermaster Corps for shipment by 26 June 1941. Foundation plans were furnished in advance of the above dates.

The five mobile stations, SCR-270, were delivered to the Quartermaster Corps for shipment on 22 July 1941, together [676] with one additional mobile station, which had in the meantime been authorized by the War Department for the Hawaiian Department. I would like to say in this connection it should be noted that three additional fixed stations for Hawaii were authorized by the War Department 28 May 1941, for inclusion by the Chief Signal Officer, in a supplemental estimate for fiscal year 1942.

26. General FRANK. Since they were not authorized until the 28th of May 1941, to be put in the 1942 fiscal year supplemental estimates, when might it be expected that those three additional would become available?

General COLTON. Normally it would be nine months to a year. The reason I mentioned that was that I believe they were placed on the priority schedule, and my recollection is that owing to having some money left over, we placed the order in advance.

27. General FRANK. They, however, would not be ready until 1943?

General COLTON. I would think that would be the case—1942.

28. General FRANK. All right, 1942.

General COLTON. To be ready in 1942.

29. General FRANK. Now, when these were delivered, you say they included "all components." Does that mean that that included the towers?

General COLTON. Yes, sir; that included the towers.

30. General FRANK. Did it include the generator sets?

General COLTON. It included generator sets.

31. General FRANK. What about extra tubes?

[677] General COLTON. It included the extra tubes. Of course, they were not contemplated. It was not contemplated that tubes were to be furnished for the entire life, but spare tubes were furnished.

32. General FRANK. For about how long?

General COLTON. I don't recall the exact basis, but on a basis that we would be able to keep them in operation continuously, should the need come.

33. General FRANK. After they once went into operation?

General COLTON. Yes.

34. General FRANK. Was the equipment ready for installation when delivered?

General COLTON. The equipment was ready for installation when delivered. May I go back a moment, General? You asked me only about the fixed stations, previously? You haven't asked me as to the readiness of the mobile station.

35. General FRANK. Will you state as to the readiness?

General COLTON. The previous testimony related to the fixed stations. The mobile stations were delivered complete and ready for operation.

36. General FRANK. In other words, they could be taken off the boat, deployed, and operated?

General COLTON. Yes, sir.

37. General FRANK. Did they have their generator sets with them?

General COLTON. Yes, sir. The dates that I give, here, are the dates shown by our records for the shipment of the last component.

38. General FRANK. If there were delays in furnishing the [678] equipment, what were the causes?

General COLTON. The delay in delivery of equipment was caused principally by lack of sufficiently high priorities, by which I mean the manufacturing or production facilities. Up until later than the 11th of July 1941, aircraft detection equipment had a preference rating no higher than A-1-B, whereas at that time there existed higher preference ratings, AA, and A-1-A.

39. General FRANK. Were protests as to delays made to the manufacturer? Was higher authority informed of the delays?

General COLTON. Protests as to delay were made to the manufacturer, and representations were made to higher authority to obtain higher preference rating. Higher authority was informed of the delay.

40. General GRUNERT. In that, I understand that you mean the delay in turning them over to the Quartermaster, but these are the final dates you gave us, on which they turned them over to the Quartermaster. It included the delay?

General COLTON. The dates I gave you are the dates of actually turning them over to the Quartermaster for shipment. The delays I refer to are the delays in manufacture.

41. General GRUNERT. Prior to those dates?

General COLTON. Prior to those dates; yes, sir.

42. General FRANK. Was any equipment originally intended for the Hawaiian Islands diverted elsewhere? If so, by whose authority?

General COLTON. Equipment originally intended for the Hawaiian Department was diverted elsewhere by order of the Secretary of War from time to time. The most significant change [679] is that furnished in a document which I have presented to the Board and which is marked "Enclosure 2," dated the 28th of May, 1941. That is a new priority list.

43. General FRANK. Do you have it, there?

General COLTON. I think I have it right here, General. Yes, I have that with me, a copy of it.

44. General FRANK. Will you read it? Read the letter.

General COLTON. An "Immediate-action letter", 28th of May, 1941; subject, "Aircraft warning service for the United States Overseas Departments and Bases":

To the Chief Signal Officer:

The enclosed copy of a Priorities and Delivery Schedule SCR-270-A and 271 radio sets, approved May 21, 1941, is forwarded to you for your information and necessary action. You will note that a considerable amount of modification of existing contracts in order to provide the proper type of set may be required. You will note that there are now authorized for production and installation in the United States and overseas a total of 218 long-range detectors, instead of the number authorized in the schedule dated April 5, 1941, and approved April 11, 1941.

It is desired that you take the necessary action to include in supplemental estimate, fiscal year 1942, sufficient funds to finance the enlarged program, subject to a limitation of \$20,000,000, in addition to such funds as are now available to you.

It is further desired that every effort be made to expedite delivery of the sets listed in the attached schedule, as an urgent need exists for this equipment [680] the various defense and base commands and mobile units concerned.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(s) D. R. VAN SICKLER,
Adjutant General.

1 Enclosure, Priority and Delivery Schedule for SCR 270 and 271 Radio Sets.

Do you wish me to read the priorities?

45. General FRANK. Will you state the manner in which this changed the priorities?

General COLTON. On the 271, I find no change in the first three.

46. General FRANK. In other words, the new priority list made no change in the first three sets going to Hawaii; they still go to Hawaii, in March 1941?

General COLTON. That is correct.

47. General FRANK. They were the fixed stations?

General COLTON. They were the fixed station.

Now, the priority for the mobile stations is now given as two to the 1st Air Warning Company.

48. General FRANK. Let us stick to Honolulu. State it this way: In the previous priority, one mobile set went to Honolulu, in April, and four, in May?

General COLTON. That is correct, sir.

49. General FRANK. The new priority puts six mobile sets in June?

General COLTON. Six mobile sets are set up for June.

50. General FRANK. And two additional fixed sets, in June 1941, and an additional fixed set, in July 1941?

[681] General COLTON. That is correct, sir.

51. General FRANK. That makes a total of six fixed sets and six mobile sets destined for Honolulu?

General COLTON. That is correct.

52. General FRANK. And you have already testified that three fixed sets were turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment, one in May and two in June of 1941, and five mobile sets were turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment the 22nd of July 1941; is that correct? Six. That is right?

General COLTON. Yes, sir; except that one additional mobile station was also turned over on the 22nd of July, making the total of six.

53. General FRANK. That would make the correction of six mobile stations that were turned over in July?

General COLTON. Yes. In preparing to give my testimony here, I do not believe I looked into that addition of three, because I understood the question to be about the original plan, and it did not appear to me to be material to the issue, because the fixed stations, even the first three, did not seem to have been—

54. General FRANK. We have not pursued it so far as the second three were concerned, because we did not have the first three installed.

55. General RUSSELL. Was it clear a while ago that these three fixed sets were not going out there, the last three fixed sets, until 1942?

General COLTON. No, no. You see, that depends; if they are set up in the budget, to be purchased out of funds to be obtained by budgetary methods, and you do not make any diversions, [682] then you wouldn't get them until 1942; but the War Department made a diversion there, you see, which would make them come off the line, accord-

ing to the best information, at the date at which the War Department published this document. They would come off the line at the time that the War Department stated, and would be diverted the

56. General FRANK. This new priority list that we just got through reading furnished all the sets in 1941:

57. General GRUNERT. Therefore, naturally, I want to know, were they prepared for shipment, or not, before Pearl Harbor?

General COLTON. I didn't look into the files to determine that question, General.

58. General FRANK. Proceed with the remainder of the answer to the question that I asked you, which was: Was any equipment originally intended for the Hawaiian Islands diverted elsewhere; if so, whose authority?

General COLTON. As I have stated, that most significant change in the priority list was the one furnished by the War Department, dated 28 May 1941, which we have just referred to. This record is from the office of the Chief Signal Officer, which indicates that that priority list remained in force until after the Pearl Harbor attack on the 7 of December 1941.

During this period, some diversions were made, upon the authority of the War Department, from the priority list. However, the only significant diversion as regards the Hawaiian situation was the diversion of seven mobile radio sets, SCR 270, to the 1st Aircraft Warning Company, to replace early production models that had been in the hands of that organization for a period of nearly one year.

[683] 59. General GRUNERT. May I ask where the 1st Aircraft Warning Company was? They were not in Hawaii, were they?

General COLTON. No.

60. General FRANK. If you will just wait a minute, we will tell you that.

61. General GRUNERT. That has been referred to several times, and I still do not know where it is.

62. General FRANK. We will tell you, here, in just a second.

63. General GRUNERT. All right.

General COLTON. The records of the office of the Chief Signal Officer in this connection are merely as follows. The first paragraph, I quote from memory, from the file in the office of the Chief Signal Officer:

The 1st Aircraft Warning Company has been made a part of the Gray for The War Department has directed that the 1st Aircraft Warning Company be prepared to furnish long-range warning service and be prepared to embark at an overseas point by June 10, 1941.

Accordingly, seven radio sets, SCR 270-B, were issued to the 1st Aircraft Warning Company, early in June 1941, to replace the early production SCR-270-A radio sets then in the hands of that organization; and since these early-production sets were not deemed to be suitable for shipment to Hawaii, there was a resulting delay of approximately one month in the shipment of the mobile SCR-270 sets to the Hawaiian Department; and no record has been found in the files of the Chief Signal Officer to indicate the person in the War Department who conveyed to the Chief Signal Officer the above authority for diversion.

Does that answer your question, General?

[684] 64. General GRUNERT. Yes, it answers mine, but I am still assured that there were six mobile sets turned over to the Quartermaster, the 22nd of July. They were not diverted, were they?

General COLTON. No; they would just have gotten there a month earlier, if it had not been for this diversion.

65. General GRUNERT. That is all.

66. General RUSSELL. I think we are going all around the patch. What I am trying to find out is, when did we send some stuff to Hawaii?

67. General FRANK. He cannot tell us that. All he can tell us is that it was turned over to the Quartermaster, and I have got to get it from another agency as to when it was shipped.

68. General GRUNERT. All right, but is or not the Signal Corps responsible for delivery to the Hawaiian destination?

General COLTON. No, sir.

69. General RUSSELL. Is it the evidence now that this part that you gave them—six, on July 22—you immediately took them back and gave them to the 1st Company?

General COLTON. No, no.

70. General GRUNERT. That is what I want to get straightened out.

General COLTON. I was asked, first, when were they delivered to the Quartermaster for shipment? and I gave that date, which I believe was July 22—wasn't it?

71. General FRANK. Yes.

General COLTON. Then I was asked about a question of diversion, and how it affected this situation. I state, in effect, that some sets were diverted to another organization, [685] and if they had not been so diverted, Hawaii would have gotten their six sets in June instead of in July.

72. General GRUNERT. That is, they may have been turned over to the Quartermaster in June?

General COLTON. I say they would have been turned over. That should have been corrected. Hawaii wouldn't have gotten them, but they would have been turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment to Hawaii in June instead of July.

73. General RUSSELL. All this evidence now, about diversions does not affect the finality of the testimony that the Signal Corps turned over to the Quartermaster on the 22nd of July six 270 mobile sets for Hawaii?

General COLTON. That is right.

74. General RUSSELL. And it never did take them back?

General COLTON. That is right.

75. General RUSSELL. All right.

76. Major CLAUSEN. Plus the fixed stations.

77. General RUSSELL. There has been no diversion evidence about them.

78. General FRANK. When was the filter information center constructed?

General COLTON. No information could be found in the files of the Chief Signal Officer to show the date the filter information center was constructed.

79. General FRANK. For the information of the record, that was accomplished by the district engineer in Honolulu, under the supervi-

sion of the Department's Signal Officer, and we will get information on that when we get to Honolulu.

80. General GRUNERT. May I ask you at this time what [686] particular installation, matériel, and so forth, was furnished for the station, and when was that turned over? Was that part of the shipment?

81. General FRANK. That is my next question.

82. General GRUNERT. Go ahead. I thought you had finished this.

83. General FRANK. No.

When was the equipment for the information center furnished?

[687] General COLTON. There was no standardized filter for the information center arranged for equipment. Such equipment was furnished on requisition against project funds.

I want to change the emphasis of that statement. I say, such equipment was furnished on requisition against project funds. I mean to say that that was the plan set up for it, that it was intended to be requisitioned by the local authorities against project funds.

In this connection, however, I would like to make reference to a document that I have here which indicates that information centers were in operation prior to the 14th of November, 1941.

84. General FRANK. Therefore they were equipped with the necessary equipment and in operation in November of 1941?

General COLTON. Yes, sir; and I may say that I have at one time or another seen pictures of the installation, but I have no information as to exact dates.

85. General FRANK. In the absence of the installation of the permanent stations, were there portable stations to your knowledge?

General COLTON. General, may I complete my answer to that information question?

86. General FRANK. Yes; go ahead.

General COLTON. The document that I refer to is a memorandum to me from Lieutenant Colonel Powell who was Department Signal Officer of the Hawaiian Department. Colonel Powell had flown into Washington and came to my office. I asked him to write the memorandum on the 14th of November, 1941, it being a matter of interest to the Signal Corps as regards the performance of equipment.

[688] (Memorandum from Colonel Powell to General Colton dated November 14, 1941, is as follows:)

NOVEMBER 14, 1941.

Memorandum for: Colonel Colton, Chief, Materiel Branch.

In recent exercises held in the Hawaiian Department, the operation of the radio set SCR-270 was found to be very satisfactory. This exercise was started approximately 4:30 in the morning and with three radio sets in operation. We noted when the planes took off from the airplane carrier in the oscillation scope. We determined this distance to be approximately 80 miles, due to the fact that the planes would circle around waiting the assemblage of the remainder from the carrier.

As soon as the planes were assembled, they proceeded towards Hawaii. This was very easily determined and within six minutes, the pursuit craft were notified and they took off and intercepted the incoming bombers at approximately 30 miles from Pearl Harbor.

It was a very interesting exercise. All the general officers present were highly pleased with the proceedings of the radio direction finding sets and the personnel associated with the information centers.

We have had very little trouble with the operations of these sets. When the fixed stations are installed in the higher mountains surrounding Hawaii, we expect to have as good an air warning system available for use as is now oper-

ing for the British on their tight little island, as their situation is approximately the same as ours is on Hawaii.

C. A. POWELL,
Lt. Col., Signal Corps,
Department Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department.

[689] This document, which was dictated to my stenographer and signed by Colonel Powell, indicates that the information centers were in operation on November 14. As I say, I have seen pictures of them.

87. General GRUNERT. Was there more than one?

General COLTON. I have only seen the picture of one center. He speaks of information centers. It is possible that that might be a little stretching. I think there was probably really one main information center.

88. General FRANK. What is the range of a set of this type at Honolulu?

General COLTON. The range, as you know, General, varies with circumstances; but considering the tactical dispositions used by aircraft at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, I think it would be rated normally at something better than 100 miles, and with the different tactics that are employed the range would be somewhat less, probably, for the sea-shore sites. I would say that properly in place, though, corresponding sets today are still rated at 100 miles. That is a nominal rating. It depends somewhat on circumstances.

89. General FRANK. Judging purely from the point of view of the power and assuming that the aircraft has sufficient altitude to pick it up at the full extremity of the power range?

General COLTON. Under those conditions it developed a range of 120 miles, and it met those military characteristics on every official test.

90. General FRANK. What is the range of the 271?

General COLTON. There is no difference in the range of the two sets if they are installed at the same height above sea-level; that is, there is no difference between the 271 and [690] the 270 in range if the antenna is the same height above sea level or the ground plane.

91. General FRANK. Explain briefly, will you, the effect of having your towers at a higher elevation on the ground and the effect of airplanes coming in at different altitudes?

General COLTON. The height of the antenna of a radar set above the ground gives two different effects: One is that the higher the antenna is above the ground for the ground plane, or if the plane in which you are interested is relatively close to the sea, one effect is that the height above the plane increases what is called the line of sight distance. That is, the distance which you can see.

92. General FRANK. What kind of sight are you talking about? Radio sight?

General COLTON. No; visual sight. Therefore, since radio waves follow somewhat the line of sight, you get an increased range somewhat.

There is another intricate reflection effect that keeps the radar set down closer to visual line of sight the higher you put it up; so, as a matter of fact, the effect of increasing the height of the antenna is to increase the range of detection of the target airplane.

Does that answer your question?

93. General FRANK. Yes.

General COLTON. It will also increase at a given range in height of the radar set and will enable you to detect airplanes closer to the surface of the water. The higher the antenna above the surface of the water the closer to the water at a given range can you detect the presence of an airplane.

94. General FRANK. Will radar detect beyond a tangent with [691] the surface of the earth? Does the curvature of the earth have anything to do with it?

General COLTON. Yes. The curvature of the earth has a great deal to do with it. Radar sets of the types that we refer to here, the earlier radar sets, 270 and 271—I think they were the only radar sets in those days in existence anywhere in the world—would not detect below the tangent. They would not go around the curvature of the earth.

95. General GRUNERT. The net result is that the reason they used the permanent one was so that they could put up a higher antenna. Is that the main reason?

General COLTON. The stated reason given to me when we were developing the set was that they could have better housing and servicing arrangements. The height of the antenna would not come in to any extent on the 271's that were scheduled for Hawaii, though some advantage could have been obtained from the height of the antenna on the 271-A, because on the 271-A the antenna was, as I recall it, 100 feet high, and there would have been some advantage there.

96. General GRUNERT. The general effect was that you could get the same thing out of the 270 mobile as you could out of the permanent, approximately?

General COLTON. Yes. I would rather have the 270 mobile in Hawaii.

97. General FRANK. I would like to ask another question.

General COLTON. Might I just go back and answer General Grunert's question? If you have a low, flat shoreline, if you have 271-A with a hundred-foot tower, three times the height of the 270, it is advantageous. If you are on an island and if you can crawl up the side of the mountain the 270 is just as [692] good, because the difference of a few feet in a thousand feet is immaterial.

Does that answer your question?

98. General GRUNERT. It covers it.

99. General FRANK. Let us assume that your set is in place and one airplane is coming in a thousand feet off the water and another airplane is coming in 10,000 feet off the water. Is there any difference in the distances at which each can be detected?

General COLTON. Yes. The one coming in at 10,000 feet off the water would be detected perhaps two or three times as far if in ordinary locations. In fact, I believe almost any location, because the one that is 1,000 feet off the water drops below the tangent of the earth's surface sooner than the one that is 10,000 feet off, and when it drops below the tangent it positively cannot be detected by the 270 except under the most abnormal climatic conditions.

100. General FRANK. You stated that the range of the 270 was something like from 100 to 120 miles?

General COLTON. Under the conditions you gave me, an airplane flying at 10,000 feet; yes.

101. General FRANK. You just got through stating that the difference in the range at which these two airplanes, one at a thousand feet and one at 10,000 feet, could be detected, was that the one at 10,000 feet could be detected at about three times further.

General COLTON. I said, with the ordinary location.

102. General FRANK. Does that increase the range any?

General COLTON. Will which increase it?

103. General FRANK. The altitude of the airplane?

[693] General COLTON. The altitude of the airplane only increases the range by bringing it well above the line of vision.

104. General FRANK. The 130 miles is still the maximum range?

General COLTON. I said 120 was the military characteristic range, and I considered that. May I say that you get very freak results occasionally, but the 120 is a good average maximum range, and it stood up under that.

105. General GRUNERT. That does not mean that you can get three times 120 miles with planes at 10,000 feet?

General COLTON. No. At 10,000 feet you would get 120 miles; but if the plane was at 50 feet you would have to have a very, very high antenna site to get him at all.

May I say that it is rather immaterial whether the plane is at 10,000 feet or whether your detecting spot is at 10,000 feet. If one is low and the other is high it reverses the situation. You get similar range effects.

106. General FRANK. In the absence of the permanent system, were there portable stations? If so, in what quantities? When were they set up, and where?

General COLTON. In so far as the Signal Corps is concerned, the permanent system was operated in Hawaii sufficiently in advance of the attack on Pearl Harbor to have been placed in efficient operation by that date. The portable stations originally contemplated were also on hand, and it may be concluded that those portable systems provided an adequate aircraft warning service, in view of the fact that adequate warning of the impending attack was furnished by this equipment on the 7th of December, 1941.

In this connection I have a copy of a letter from the Signal Officer, dated December 31, 1941, which I will now read.

[694] (Letter dated December 31, 1941, from Lieutenant Colonel C. A. Powell to the Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C., is as follows:)

31 DECEMBER, 1941.

Subject: Aircraft Warning Service.

To: Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C.

1. Inasmuch as five out of six radio sets SCR 270 were operating from 4:00 to 7:00 A. M. on December 7, 1941, and one station, namely the Opana station, remained in operation thereafter until 7:39 A. M., it is believed that the following two inclosures may be of some interest:

2. Inclosure No. 1 is a composite based on the written records of ranges and azimuths kept at the following stations: KOKO HEAD, KAAAWA, OPANA, KAWAIILOA, and FORT SHAFTER. Attention is invited to the close agreement of data secured on aircraft north of OAHU between 6:48 and 6:54 A. M.

3. Inclosure No. 2 is the graphical record made on the OPANA station plotting board. This record discloses the period covered in Inclosure No. 1 and subsequent hours of December 7, 1941. Attention is invited to the plot begin-

ning at 7:02 A. M. near the top of the chart and ending at 7:39 A. M. as it developed that this was the hostile *flight* which attacked PEARL HARBOR 8:10 A. M.

/s/C. A. POWELL,
Lt. Col., Signal Corps,
Signal Officer.

(Letter dated December 31, 1941, from Lieutenant Colonel C. A. Powell to the Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C., was marked Exhibit 3 and received in evidence.)

[695] Two charts are enclosed, of which I have photostat copies here. I may say that the originals, as I recall it, were black on white photostats and I had these photostat copies made (indicating). I have not been able to locate the originals, but I know these to be correct copies.

107. General FRANK. We will incorporate them into the record.

General COLTON. I might have add that you have asked me what the locations of the stations were. The question can be answered by looking at these charts on which the locations are given.

(Chart of detector station records was marked Exhibit 3-A and received in evidence.)

(Chart showing plots of airplane flights was marked Exhibit 3-B and received in evidence.)

108. General FRANK. Have you any record to indicate the location at which the 270 stations had been set up and were operating on the morning of December 7, 1941?

General COLTON. I have a record that shows five detector stations were located at Kaawa, Opana, Kawailoa, Shafter and Koko Head. Those were the stations that were in operation on the 7th of December, 1941.

109. General FRANK. What permanent and what temporary radar stations were in position or available for installation on the 20th of November, 1941?

General COLTON. Three primary and six mobile radar stations were in position or available for installation by the 20th of November 1941, and five mobile stations were actually in operation from 0400 to 0700 on the 7th of December, 1941, of which one station, namely the Opana station, remained in operation thereafter until 0743.

[696] 110. General RUSSELL. General, you testified a little while ago that this radar equipment, so far as you knew, was the only such equipment in the world at that time?

General COLTON. No, I said that at that time there was essentially no equipment of higher frequency. I probably expressed it, that it would detect airplanes at a lower altitude. In other words, all radar stations as of that date were the same frequency, approximately. Since that time we have gone into lots of radar equipment which is much better and of much higher frequency and picks up airplanes at a lower altitude. But I thought that the Board was concerned with conditions as they existed at that time.

111. General RUSSELL. This equipment that was sent out to Hawaii and the Panama Canal, and wherever else it was sent, was the first equipment of that type that had reached those destinations, so far as you know? Let us confine it to Hawaii.

General COLTON. As to Hawaii; yes.

112. General RUSSELL. It was necessary, therefore, to train the personnel out there to operate this equipment, was it not?

General COLTON. Yes; I would say it was.

113. General RUSSELL. It was a new thing?

General COLTON. It was new to them.

114. General RUSSELL. That is all.

115. General GRUNERT. There appearing to be no further questions, we thank you very much for helping us out.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[697] **TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS M. ROBINS, UNITED STATES ARMY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF ENGINEERS (ACCOMPANIED BY DOUGLAS I. MCKAY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS.)**

(The witness was sworn by the recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you state to the Board your name, grade, organization, and station?

General ROBINS. Thomas M. Robins, Major General, United States Army; Deputy Chief of Engineers.

2. General GRUNERT. General, this Board is after facts. It is required to go into facts of which you may have knowledge because of your position in the Chief of Engineer's office. We hope that you can throw some light on the subject.

General Frank will lead in the questioning, because we have divided the field into various parts so as to cover the ground as quickly as possible. The other members of the Board will ask some questions to help get an understanding of what is brought out. So, General Frank will lead in propounding the questions.

3. General FRANK. What position did you hold in the fall of 1940?

General ROBINS. I was Assistant Chief of Engineers in charge of civil works. We also had at that time taken over in my Construction Division of Civil Works, airport construction or a large part of it.

4. General FRANK. By civil works, you mean construction other than defense projects?

General ROBINS. That is correct. We had at that time two divisions, so to speak, in the office of the Chief of Engineers, a military division and a civil division.

[698] 5. General FRANK. And you had charge of the civil division?

General ROBINS. I had charge of the civil division; but we had also taken over quite a large part of the Air Corps program, as you may recall, from the Quartermaster, and were carrying that on under my direction. That did not apply until about October, 1941, on the work in Hawaii.

6. General FRANK. Are you familiar with the negotiations for contract 414-Eng-602, dated the 20th of December, 1940?

General ROBINS. Not the negotiations.

7. General FRANK. Are you familiar with the contract with The Hawaiian Constructors, for defense projects in Hawaii?

General ROBINS. Yes.

8. General FRANK. Will you state generally to the Board the manner in which you are familiar with it?

General ROBINS. It was brought to my attention as a matter of course in the office of the Chief of Engineers because the Contracts and Claims Section was operating under my direction, and it came up in this way, that the Chief Engineer at Honolulu, Colonel Wyman, came to Washington and recommended that the contract for this work in question be made with Callahan and Rohl and Connolly; and I was familiar to this extent, that those contractors were cleared through the O. P. M. and that the Contract Advisory Board was consulted and I knew that the contract at that time was in the amount of something over a million dollars. That is about the extent of what I had to do with it at that time.

9. General FRANK. Who is O. P. M.?

General ROBINS. The Office of Production Management, which succeeded the O. E. M. At that time all contractors had to be cleared with them.

[699] 10. General FRANK. Do you remember the date of this contract?

General ROBINS. My recollection is it was December 20, 1940.

[700] 11. General FRANK. That is correct. Do you know that Rohl and Connolly constituted a firm, one of those contractors?

General ROBINS. Yes.

12. General FRANK. Did you know Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General ROBINS. I did not know him personally. I knew of his firm. I have known of his firm for quite a few years.

13. General FRANK. Did you know that he was a German alien?

General ROBINS. No.

14. General FRANK. What machinery have you in the Engineer Corps for determining the reliability and loyalty of contractors?

General ROBINS. Well, we always investigate the experience and the ability and the financial responsibility of contractors as a matter of course, as a matter of orders and regulations.

15. General FRANK. What about the loyalty?

General ROBINS. Loyalty is a matter which we have never been charged specifically with investigating.

16. General FRANK. Then, you can pick up any contractor who has produced good results from the construction point of view and give him a contract, if he has done good work, irrespective of his loyalty?

General ROBINS. We cannot do that under the law at the present time.

17. General FRANK. What would have stopped you at that time?

General ROBINS. Well, at that time, as I understand the law at that time, you could not communicate any classified information to an alien.

18. General FRANK. Do you remember when the Espionage Act was passed?

General ROBINS. I do not know just which act you are referring to, General.

[701] 19. General FRANK. War Department Circular 121, the Espionage Act was the 28th of March, 1940. This was prior to the letting of this contract.

General ROBINS. Yes, that date is prior to the letting of the contract.

20. General FRANK. And the provisions of the Espionage Act prohibit the letting of a defense work contract to an alien.

General ROBINS. I am not familiar with that.

21. General FRANK. You are not now familiar with it?

General ROBINS. I do not know it as an Espionage Act. My understanding was that the first War Powers Act, which revived the old Trading With The Enemy Act, which was passed shortly after Pearl Harbor, forbids the awarding of a contract to an enemy alien.

I stated that, as I understood the law at the time that this contract was let, an alien could not be given any information in connection with a contract that was considered classified, but as I recollect that law it said nothing about the awarding of contracts. As far as that is concerned, none of us knew that Rohl was an enemy or an alien at that time. He was not an enemy alien. He was an alien, but we did not know it.

22. General FRANK. What do you mean by "none of us knew"?

General ROBINS. Anyone that I know of that had anything to do with negotiating that contract in the office of the Chief of Engineers.

23. General FRANK. Well, some people knew it, because we have documentary evidence to the effect that it was known that he was an alien.

General ROBINS. Oh, that was true. The first I knew of it I think was along in June or July when he applied for citizen-ship. [702]

24. General FRANK. It was necessary for him to be a citizen for his company to be awarded a defense contract; is that correct?

General ROBINS. No. I do not understand it that way. He could not take any active part in the contract or he could not be given any classified information, and he did not take any active part in the contract until he was made a citizen.

25. General FRANK. If he had been given any information on the details of the defense contracts in Honolulu prior to his having been naturalized, that would have been in violation of the Army regulations which prohibit disclosing of secret information?

General ROBINS. I understand it would be in violation of the law to give him any.

26. General FRANK. So any information that he got prior to his becoming a citizen, the man who gave it to him was culpable; is that correct, if he got it?

General ROBINS. Well I can answer that this way: that anyone knowing that any Army officer or anybody having anything to do with it that knew that he was an alien, that gave him that information, was certainly culpable, law or no law.

27. General FRANK. All right. Do you know whether or not Rohl took any active part in the contract?

General ROBINS. It is my understanding that he took no active part in the contract whatever until after he was made a citizen, which was some time in September, 1941. He most certainly took no part in the negotiations of the contract, because I was familiar with that.

28. General FRANK. Did a representative of his company take—

General ROBINS. No. The man that carried out the negotiations and who had the power of attorney to do so was Mr. Paul Grafe, who was the vice-president of the Callahan Construction Company. [703]

29. General FRANK. Do you remember ever meeting Mr. Connolly, who was a member of the firm of Rohl-Connolly?

General ROBINS. Yes, sir, I remember Mr. Connolly.

30. General FRANK. Did you have negotiations with them prior to the time that Rohl became a citizen?

General ROBINS. You mean in connection with this contract?

31. General FRANK. Yes.

General ROBINS. I did not conduct the negotiations for this contract, but to the best of my knowledge and understanding the negotiations were carried out entirely with Mr. Grafe. Now, Mr. Connolly was in town at that time, but Mr. Grafe represented The Hawaiian Constructors in negotiating that contract.

32. General FRANK. Did you talk with Mr. Grafe?

General ROBINS. About this contract?

33. General FRANK. Yes.

General ROBINS. Yes, he came in to see me and talked about it in a very general way.

34. General FRANK. Did you talk to a Mr. Martin about some negotiations?

General ROBINS. Not about the negotiations. The first time that I remember seeing Mr. Martin is when he came in at the time that Rohl was trying to get his citizenship, and I think about the time that a letter was written from the office of the Chief of Engineers signed by General Kingman, Acting Chief of Engineers, requesting that the citizenship proceedings be expedited.

[704] 35. General FRANK. What was your responsibility with respect to contracts in the office of the Chief of Engineers at this time?

General ROBINS. Well, I was responsible for all the construction contracts particularly for work which was under me and generally for the conduct of the Contracts and Claims Division of the office. This particular contract, the work at that time was under the military side of the office and not under me.

36. General FRANK. You stated, or I get it by inference, that notwithstanding the fact that Rohl as an alien should not be given secret information, nevertheless it was all right to give it to his firm; is that correct?

General ROBINS. The way I stated that, I think, General, was that anyone that knew he was an alien—as far as I know, no detailed information was given to Mr. Rohl until after he was naturalized and went over to Hawaii. At the time the contract was negotiated I most certainly did not know that he was not a citizen of the United States, and I do not think anyone in the Chief's office that had anything to do with the negotiations knew that. Rohl and Connolly were well-known and reputable contractors out there on the West Coast, with a reputation for doing work as quickly and as cheaply as any other contractors on the coast.

37. General FRANK. Well, somewhere in the scheme of organization of an astute outfit it strikes me that there should be some sort of machinery for determining the background of people with whom the government is making contracts. Was there such a system in the Engineer Corps setup at that time?

General ROBINS. There was as far as everything in connection with a contractor was concerned except the question

[705]

of loyalty; there was no machinery, never has been any; it never has been considered the duty of the Chief of the Branch of Technical Service, as they call it now, to conduct a G-2 investigation.

38. General FRANK. Well, is there any machinery now for determining that before the Chief of Engineers lets a contract?

General ROBINS. Yes; as I understand it, now there is. We are required to report to the G-2 before we disclose any classified information in regard to the letting of a contract and, after a contract is let, to report that the contract has been let to such-and-such a firm, giving the names of the people involved.

39. General FRANK. Was there any arrangement in 1940 to refer the contractors' names to G-2 to find out any background on them?

General ROBINS. Not to my knowledge.

40. General FRANK. In other words, the question of loyalty never occurred; it was simply a question of efficiency?

General ROBINS. Yes, that generally. Of course, before the war the question of loyalty went along severally, without saying, in connection with the responsibility of the man.

41. General FRANK. When were you aware that Hans Wilhelm Rohl was an alien?

General ROBINS. As I remember, it was some time in June, 1941, when the District Engineer wrote in and requested that the office of the Chief of Engineers request the proper authorities to expedite his becoming a citizen so that he could go to Honolulu and help to manage the work there.

42. General FRANK. At that time was there any check-up made [706] with the F. B. I. or any other agency to find out if he had a background?

General ROBINS. As I recollect it, it was the understanding of the Acting Chief of Engineers that the F. B. I. knew all about this application for citizenship and had cleared it.

43. General FRANK. That was an understanding. Was there any actual determination of fact on it?

General ROBINS. I could not answer that question, General, because I did not handle the details of that. My recollection is that that was stated in a letter. What it was based on, I do not know.

44. General FRANK. This letter which is quoted in the Interim Report of the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, seventy-eighth Congress, second session, pursuant to House Resolution 30, as the copy of General Kingman's letter, next to the last paragraph says:

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question.

Do you know of any positive efforts that were made to determine that?

General ROBINS. No, I do not know what that statement was based on because I did not draft the letter and I did not pursue that any further. I assume that if a man was going up for citizenship he would not be granted citizenship unless his loyalty was investigated and found all right. In other words, it would seem to me that if he was granted citizenship there would not be any question about his loyalty.

45. General FRANK. Well, this is before the court now. That is what this letter was, to go up before the Special Assistant to the Bureau of

Immigration and Naturalization, and here is a [707] statement of the Acting Chief of Engineers: "It is the understanding that Mr. Rohl's loyalty is beyond question." I am trying to find out, from where did they determine that understanding.

General ROBINS. Well, I cannot answer that question, because I do not know.

46. General FRANK. Furthermore, this letter is under date of August 28, 1941, and the contract in question is under date of the 20th of December, 1940, and this letter states that this group of contractors "are working on very important defense construction." Therefore the contract was let to this group of contractors that constituted The Hawaiian Constructors and included Rohl's firm while he still was a German alien.

General ROBINS. That is correct. He took no active part in the contract. He was not an officer of the Rohl and Connolly Company.

47. General FRANK. Rohl was not an officer of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

General ROBINS. No. Connolly was president of the company.

48. General FRANK. What check did you make that he took no part in the operation of the organization?

General ROBINS. Well, I know that Mr. Paul Grafe went to Hawaii and managed the—took charge of the contract operations there, and that Rohl did not go to Hawaii until he was naturalized.

49. General FRANK. Do you know of any communication or do you know of any actual effort expended from any place in the Corps of Engineers to find out anything about Rohl's background?

General ROBINS. About everything connected with his ability to execute that contract. I know of no investigation [708] that was made to find out whether he was a citizen of the United States or not, or whether he was loyal or anything of that kind.

50. General FRANK. Who was the man in charge of your Finance and Contract Section at that time?

General ROBINS. I think Colonel Earl Gesler.

51. General FRANK. That is right; Colonel Gesler. I take it from the information that we have had up until now that Colonel Gesler was the man responsible for writing that letter asking that Rohl's citizenship papers be expedited. He should be able to shed some light on this?

General ROBINS. I think he could, yes, sir.

52. General FRANK. Was it the responsibility of the contracting officer, Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., who was also the District Engineer in Hawaii, to check as to whether Rohl was a citizen?

General ROBINS. It was, under the law, if he was going to give Mr. Rohl any information whatever in regard to the classified parts of the contract.

53. General FRANK. Do you know anything concerning the failure of The Hawaiian Constructors to complete construction of the defense projects within the times indicated prior to the 7th of December, '41, prior to the time indicated on the job orders?

General ROBINS. I have no information on that except the reports that came in as to the status of completion.

54. General FRANK. Do you have any information as to whether or not those reports indicated delays?

General ROBINS. Those reports showed incomplete status on many items of the contract.

55. General FRANK. Do you remember anything about the aircraft [709] warning system?

General ROBINS. My recollection is that there were three of those permanent stations under construction, none of which was entirely complete. One of them was about 80 or 90 percent complete, and the others a less percentage complete.

56. General FRANK. Do you remember what was holding them up?

General ROBINS. I have no direct information as to what held them up. I know what was claimed in a general way. One thing was the delay in determining the locations, delay in approval of plans.

57. General FRANK. Approval of what plans?

General ROBINS. That is, plans for the layout and the foundations, and so forth. Also it was common knowledge that there was great difficulty in getting men, equipment, and materials. That condition prevailed in the Hawaiian Islands throughout the whole time of the contract.

58. General FRANK. What is there about the plans of a permanent radar set that would require change? The towers are already fabricated and fit a fixed-dimensional foundation, and the other stuff is all fixed. What could change about it?

General ROBINS. Well, I think there was quite an argument, you might say, General, about whether the stations were to be fixed or movable and just what was to be done. Of course, the foundation, the construction work on one of those stations is very simple, once you have got the foundation layout for the tower and also for the power plant building or anything else.

59. General FRANK. Well, they determined ahead of time that there were three of them that were to be permanent. Therefore there was no question about the fixed nature of those plans, was there?

[710] General ROBINS. Well, I would hate to answer directly on that. If I might suggest, that the Board would find the best and most accurate information on the details as to the delays right there in the Honolulu office.

60. General FRANK. You just got through saying that one of the delays was incident to the change in plans, and I wondered when you stated that if you knew what any of those changes in plans were.

General ROBINS. No, sir, I do not, because, as I say, that work was handled up until a very short time before Pearl Harbor in the planning stage by the construction section of the Chief of Engineers' office, which was not under me.

61. General FRANK. I see. In any event, you think that more accurate and detailed information would be available in the district office in Honolulu?

[711] General ROBINS. Yes, sir. I think that is the only way you would get at the real facts as to what they had at the time the work orders were issued, and so forth.

62. General FRANK. A copy of the job orders has been sent in from the district office to the Office of the Corps of Engineers, Honolulu? Was that the original set, or is there still a copy of the job orders and the contract in Honolulu?

General ROBINS. I am sure the original is in Honolulu.

63. General FRANK. What knowledge do you have concerning whether any military personnel neglected duties relating to the contract? Have you any?

General ROBINS. No, sir.

64. General FRANK. Have you any information as to whether or not there was any appeal to higher authority relative to delays and deficiencies?

General ROBINS. No, I know of none.

65. General FRANK. By the District Engineer?

General ROBINS. There were many requests for expediting materials and equipment and things of that kind that went on continuously. Whether you would call that an appeal or not, I do not know.

66. General FRANK. Can you put your finger on any of those?

General ROBINS. No, I cannot. I imagine I can go to the files and pull out a lot of them, because it was a fight to get anything done at that time. There was a great deal of work going on in Hawaii. The Navy was doing a lot of work over there, and there was one continual fight to recruit people and to get equipment and get materials and get shipping space.

67. General FRANK. Can you get in your records and give us a list of those appeals that were made, those requests? [712] We would like to have them to indicate the effort that was made to eliminate delays as they existed in this contract.

[713] General ROBINS. I would be very glad to have the files examined.

68. General FRANK. But you state that there were a large number of such messages. I would like to get copies of them. Will you have that looked up, and furnish a set of those to the Board?

General ROBINS. Yes, sir; I will.

69. General FRANK. Will you make a note of it, so we won't miss it?

General ROBINS. Yes, sir.

70. General FRANK. To your knowledge, what information was given Wyman relative to completing these defense projects as speedily as possible?

General ROBINS. No, I have no direct knowledge on that.

71. General FRANK. What were the functions of the position you occupied on the 20th of December 1940, with respect to the contract to which we are referring?

General ROBINS. The only responsibility I had was as to the qualifications of the contractor, seeing that they were cleared by proper authorities, and the fee that was charged.

72. General FRANK. And the "clearing by the proper authorities" took into consideration, so far as you considered at that time, only his ability and general reputation for doing good work; it did not bring up the question of loyalty?

General ROBINS. No, sir. Of course, we didn't know at that time, and don't know yet, what the OPM clearance covered, but we were required to report everyone and get a clearance from them before we could go ahead. It might well be that some investigations other than those of just pure ability, [714] experience, and so forth, were carried out, there, but we certainly did not consider it the duty of the Office of the Chief of Engineers to investigate the citizenship and loyalty of the contractor.

73. General FRANK. If every other office connected with it had the same attitude, then nobody looked it up.

General ROBINS. As it stands, now, we are not supposed to make the investigation, General. That is for G-2 and the FBI.

74. General FRANK. Somebody has to make it, though?

General ROBINS. Well, I imagine that the G-2 at that time was supposed to be keeping track of those kinds of things.

75. General FRANK. Do you have any memory of any request from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, or from Colonel Wyman, requesting that you assist in speeding up materials for the work, or assist in obtaining a higher priority on materials for the work?

General ROBINS. I know that there was a lot of that done. I can't quote here any specific instances.

76. General FRANK. Are you sure that there was a lot of it done?

General ROBINS. Yes, I am.

77. General FRANK. All right. You are going to furnish us with such copies of that as you can find.

Did you know on the 20th of December that Rohl was then or had been under investigation by a government agency for suspicious activities?

General ROBINS. No, sir.

78. General FRANK. What if any measures should have been [715] taken by personnel of the Corps of Engineers for the protection of the Government against contracting with a person having such a record?

General ROBINS. As far as awarding the contract was concerned, legally I don't think there was any obligation on the office of the Chief of Engineers to investigate. As far as furnishing anyone in the firm with any classified information, then I presume the contracting officer was bound to investigate.

79. General FRANK. I think I asked you this, before: Right now, who is responsible for looking into the loyalty and integrity of your contractors?

General ROBINS. The G-2.

80. General FRANK. Do you have a fixed manner in which they are requested to do that?

General ROBINS. Yes, sir; we are supposed to, before any information is disclosed, secret information, in any way preliminary to making a contract, we are to clear with G-2 on the people that are going to be taken into confidence.

81. General FRANK. There is a positive system for accomplishing that?

General ROBINS. Yes; but that was put into effect in 1943.

82. General FRANK. What if any rules or regulations of the Corps of Engineers did Colonel Wyman violate in the event he, having been informed that Rohl was a German alien, discussed with him details of the secret contract?

General ROBINS. As far as I know, it has been some time since I checked over all the orders and regulations of the Chief of Engineers. I don't think there is anything in the orders and regulations on that subject.

[716] 83. General FRANK. In other words, it is all in Army regulations?

General ROBINS. Well, if it is in Army regulations, then it is in O&R of the Chief of Engineers, because that specifically calls attention to all pertinent provisions of the Army regulations.

84. General FRANK. Did you ever receive notice or knowledge of any reports concerning the activities of Colonel Wyman in Hawaii which were derogatory to him?

General ROBINS. I never received any official reports; no.

85. General FRANK. Did you ever receive any reports with respect to his intimate association with Rohl?

General ROBINS. Not any official reports; no, sir.

86. General FRANK. Did you ever receive any reports?

General ROBINS. Letters were written to the Chief of Engineers after the investigation made out in California by a committee of the legislature of California, in which many allegations were made against Wyman in the connection you mention.

87. General FRANK. What date was that?

General ROBINS. It was in 1943, I think. It was during 1943.

88. General FRANK. Did you ever receive notice or have knowledge of a report dated the 14th of February 1942, by an Army officer to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, to the effect that Colonel Wyman should be relieved as district engineer for gross inefficiency?

General ROBINS. No, sir.

[717] 89. General FRANK. Are you familiar with the details surrounding Colonel Wyman's relief as district engineer in Hawaii?

General ROBINS. I am not. I know that there was some correspondence between the Department Engineer and the Office of the Chief of Engineers to the effect that Colonel Wyman could be released, and that he was released, but I was not directly connected with the personnel of the branch office of the Chief of Engineers.

90. General FRANK. Do you know whether copies of that correspondence are available?

General ROBINS. I do not know. I imagine that they are.

91. General FRANK. Will you make an investigation of that and furnish the Board with those copies, please.

Did you have anything to do with the assignment of Colonel Wyman to the Canol project?

General ROBINS. Yes, sir. He was assigned there on my recommendation.

92. General FRANK. Let us have the background of that.

General ROBINS. The Canol project was dumped into my lap one morning and had to be done in six months, and I went over all the available engineer officers that could be assigned to duty at that project, and I thought Wyman was the best man available to go up there and push it through.

93. General FRANK. Why was he relieved from Honolulu?

General ROBINS. I couldn't answer that question specifically. My understanding was that the Department Engineer, General Lyman, wanted to have him relieved, but it was not my understanding that he was relieved for inefficiency.

[718] 94. General FRANK. There has been reported in the congressional investigation a background of association between Rohl and Wyman. Over a period of years, in Los Angeles, a determined

effort was made by Wyman to have Rohl's citizenship hastened; a determined effort by Wyman to have Rohl-Connolly established in Honolulu. There has been testimony with respect to the close personal relations of Rohl and Wyman even in Honolulu; and do you mean to say that this went on over a period of several years, and no information on it ever infiltrated into the Engineer headquarters in Washington?

General ROBINS. It certainly did not get to me. And I knew nothing about Rohl—I knew that Rohl-Connolly had contracts with the Engineer Department in Los Angeles and vicinity, but I knew nothing of Wyman's social relations or personal relations with Rohl, whatever; it was none of my business.

95. General FRANK. Do you know anything relative to Wyman's activities in awarding contracts to Rohl's firm in the Canol project?

General ROBINS. Yes, sir; I do. That was in connection with what we called the Hanes cut-off road. Foley Brothers was the firm selected for that contract, and Wyman wanted Rohl-Connolly in it only to get the floating equipment that Rohl and Connolly owned, and which was coming off the job down in Los Angeles, the Los Angeles breakwater. Wyman told me that, himself.

96. General FRANK. There never seemed to be any question in your mind over the fact that, where Wyman went, there went Rohl and Connolly, also.

General ROBINS. No, I never—the only place he ever [719] went was from Los Angeles to Hawaii, up to that time.

97. General FRANK. And from Hawaii to Alaska?

General ROBINS. Yes; but this was only a very small part of the work up in the Pacific Northwest, and I asked Wyman why he wanted Rohl and Connolly, and he gave me that as a reason, and it was understood that Mr. Rohl—by that time, this investigation had started on Mr. Rohl, and it was understood by all concerned that Mr. Rohl would not go on the work or have anything to do with the management, that Foley Brothers would handle the contract, all Rohl had was an interest in it on account of his equipment. Mr. Rohl never had anything to do with the management of that contract in any way, shape, or form.

98. General FRANK. You seem to exclude Rohl from this Alaskan venture. However, he walked in so far as reward was concerned, in the fees for the use of his equipment, certainly?

General ROBINS. Certainly. He was a stockholder in Rohl-Connolly Co., and he got his share of the rentals, because it was his equipment.

99. General FRANK. That is "the fly in the ointment," so to speak, isn't it?

General ROBINS. Oh, I wouldn't think so. We were desperate for the equipment. We had to have it. That was the only place we could get it. There certainly was nothing dishonest, or no question of any classified information, or anything of that kind.

100. General FRANK. Did you receive notice and knowledge of any reports concerning the activities of Colonel Wyman on the Canol project that were derogatory to him?

[720] General ROBINS. Well, the first report that I saw was the so-called "Horowitz Report." I would say that was derogatory to him. That was a report made by Colonel Horowitz to Colonel Strong.

Colonel Horowitz was on duty under Colonel Strong, who was in charge of the construction division, and Colonel Horowitz' duties were to go around and inspect all the projects.

101. General FRANK. Do you know anything about the Dawson Creek explosion?

General ROBINS. Yes, I know they had an explosion and killed a lot of people.

102. General FRANK. Was there any action taken with respect to it?

General ROBINS. There was a very thorough investigation made of that.

103. General FRANK. Nobody responsible?

General ROBINS. The responsibility was fixed on—to a certain extent, the contractor was mainly responsible.

104. General FRANK. That is, Foley?

General ROBINS. No, no. No, that was—I have forgotten. There was a contractor that had the contract with the telephone line, Miller Brothers, I think. Foley had nothing in the world to do with it; neither did Mr. Rohl.

105. General FRANK. What was Wyman's relation to this?

General ROBINS. Wyman was division engineer, at the time, and in charge of all the work up there.

106. General FRANK. Did he have any responsibility with respect to this Dawson Creek explosion?

General ROBINS. He had general responsibility, as division engineer. My recollection is that the responsibility, as far as the Government was concerned, was narrowed down to Wyman's executive officer. Wyman was absent at the time. He was out on the job somewhere, and Colonel Woodbury and—I am not certain; I think, the district engineer, and some of the inspectors. Colonel Woodbury was reprimanded as a result of the investigation.

107. General FRANK. Why was Colonel Wyman relieved from his assignment to the Canol project? Can you state the circumstances surrounding that?

General ROBINS. From my point of view, because he didn't seem to be able to administer the job in the way it should be administered.

108. General FRANK. Was it for inefficiency?

General ROBINS. In many ways, he was very efficient. In getting work done, and shoving the work and everything, he was very efficient. He was not efficient in keeping a smooth-running organization and keeping all the administrative matters under control and coordinated.

109. General FRANK. How did his administration of the Canol project compare with his administration in Honolulu?

General ROBINS. I am not intimately acquainted with his administration in Honolulu, except I know that he got a tremendous amount of work done over there. He did the same thing on the Canol project.

110. General FRANK. Did you have anything to do with Colonel Wyman's present assignment?

General ROBINS. No.

111. General FRANK. You did recommend him for the Canol [722] assignment?

General ROBINS. I did.

112. General FRANK. Have you anything further, with respect to this case, that you would like to state to the Board?

General ROBINS. No, sir. I don't think so. I have simply covered about everything I could testify on.

113. General FRANK. I would like to ask you one question about something we were talking about, some time back. Did you talk with Mr. Connolly relative to the negotiations for this contract?

General ROBINS. No, sir; I did not. The only man I talked to was Grafe.

114. General FRANK. Are your initials on this Exhibit 2?

General ROBINS. No; I don't see them.

115. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions, General Russell?

116. General RUSSELL. General, when this contract was negotiated and entered into on the 20th of December 1940, I believe you state that Wyman came in to Washington, then?

General ROBINS. Yes; he came in. That was customary. When he had negotiated a fixed-fee contract, the district engineer came in ordinarily and sat right down and participated in the negotiations, because he was the man that had to administer the contract.

17. General RUSSELL. Was there a group of people who came in with Wyman, representing these contractors?

General ROBINS. So far as I know, Mr. Grafe, I know, represented him. He had the power of attorney, and he signed the contract. Whether he had any lawyers or not, I don't know, because, as I said before, I didn't participate personally in [723] the negotiations.

118. General RUSSELL. As you recollect, it was only Wyman and Grafe who were in here when that contract was signed?

General ROBINS. I know that they were both here; yes.

119. General RUSSELL. You do not remember anybody else?

General ROBINS. Mr. Connolly might have been in town. I think Mr. Connolly was in town, at the time.

120. General RUSSELL. But only Grafe and Wyman made—

General ROBINS. Grafe and Wyman, so far as I know, were the only ones.

121. General RUSSELL. Who was Martin?

General ROBINS. Martin is a lawyer and an attorney who has represented Rohl-Connolly.

122. General RUSSELL. As I understood your testimony this man Martin came to the Chief of Engineer's office, and it was through his activity that this letter which is known as Exhibit 2 now, and is the letter in which the Engineer's office here in Washington asked that action on Rohl's application for citizenship be expedited, was written? Now, is it true that Martin is the man who came in and had that letter written and executed?

General ROBINS. Mr. Martin came in, in that matter. As I recollect it, Colonel Wyman wrote a letter, an official letter to the Chief of Engineers, asking that such a letter as this be written, and that this Mr. Martin came to Washington along with that, and came to the office, because he knew that letter was coming in, and that Mr. Martin presented all the detailed information, a great deal of which later came out in the court.

[724] 123. General RUSSELL. Do we have a copy of the Wyman letter to the Chief of Engineers, asking for the expediting of the application of Rohl to become a citizen?

General ROBINS. I think we can get that out of the files.

124. General RUSSELL. Have you any work-sheet down there on which are contained any data that Martin gave you about Rohl?

General ROBINS. I have not.

[725] 125. General RUSSELL. Is there a file down there on this expediting of Rohl's application?

General ROBINS. I have never seen the file. A copy of the letter of course is in the file.

126. General RUSSELL. Would you have your records searched to determine that?

General ROBINS. I will be glad to do that.

127. General RUSSELL. There were a number of contractors who organized themselves into a group for the completion of this work on Oahu; is that right?

General ROBINS. Yes; there were several firms.

128. General RUSSELL. One of them was this Rohl-Connolly Company; is that right?

General ROBINS. That is right.

129. General RUSSELL. So far as you know, Rohl was not an officer of the Rohl-Connolly Company, was he?

General ROBINS. No. Connolly was president of the Rohl-Connolly Company.

130. General RUSSELL. His only relation to that company, so far as you know, was that of a stockholder?

General ROBINS. My understanding is that before it entered into this contract—all this I found out afterward—Rohl gave up any position in the company as an officer and Connolly took over as president.

131. General RUSSELL. Rohl-Connolly was a corporation?

General ROBINS. Yes.

132. General RUSSELL. Did this man Rohl have any interest in any of the other companies or associated companies in doing war work?

General ROBINS. So far as I know, he had none.

[726] 133. General RUSSELL. So far as you know, the only relation that Rohl had to those organizations was as a stockholder in the Rohl-Connolly Company?

General ROBINS. Up to the time he was naturalized.

134. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not Rohl had any official position in the Rohl-Connolly Company prior to getting this contract of December 20? Does it appear to you that he just stepped out from that knowing that he should not be officiating as an officer of that company when they were engaged in a defense project?

General ROBINS. Yes. He was an officer of the company before that.

135. General GRUNERT. It appears that he just stepped down well knowing that he should not stay in there on that sort of work until he became a citizen?

General ROBINS. Oh, yes; I do not think there is any question about that.

136. General GRUNERT. Who selected Wyman to go out to Hawaii?

General ROBINS. I think Colonel Wyman went to Hawaii with troops and was stationed at Schofield Barracks. I have no personal knowledge of the circumstances but I know that the District Engineer was sent home and Wyman was right there and he was detailed on that job.

137. General GRUNERT. From what you know of his work in Hawaii—I believe you said something about the good work he had done out there, so you selected him to go to the Canol Project—what is there of record to show the good work he had done out there?

General ROBINS. I think he had done a tremendous amount of work very quickly in connection with the chain of airfields which were put in just before Pearl Harbor; and he certainly did [727] a tremendous amount of work after Pearl Harbor.

138. General GRUNERT. Before 1941 the air warning service was not completed and a number of defense projects were not completed anywhere near to the estimated completion date. Was that considered good work?

General ROBINS. I think he did lots of other work over there, General. You will find a considerable quantity. The aircraft warning service, from a construction standpoint, amounted to very little except getting into the locations.

139. General GRUNERT. What was the basis of his getting the Distinguished Service medal?

General ROBINS. My understanding is that the citation mentioned particularly his work on the Island Airfields.

140. General GRUNERT. Who recommended him?

General ROBINS. I think that Colonel Hannum did; also the Division Engineer recommended him.

141. General GRUNERT. Then, so far as you remember the citation, it was mainly about the work after December 7; did he work on the chain of airports or what?

General ROBINS. My recollection is that the work on the chain of airfields was what you might call the outstanding feature of the citation. I do not think it excluded any work he might have done.

142. General GRUNERT. We are quite a bit concerned about the efforts made by all those concerned, particularly from the Hawaiian end, about getting these defense projects, particularly the air warning service projects, stepped up; so I wish you would exert the greatest effort in seeing what the records of the Engineer's Office can give us as to any complaints, requests for help to get those projects through, and so forth, and getting [728] higher priority in procuring materials and getting prompt shipments, and things of that sort. I think it would help the Board a great deal if you could give us the history of that as shown by the records.

General ROBINS. Very well, sir. We will get everything we can. I am sure the Board can get a great deal of that in Honolulu in the District Office. Their files are not quite as voluminous as ours. We will get everything we can.

143. General FRANK. You stated that Wyman did outstanding work in Honolulu by completing certain projects other than those we have mentioned. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department has stated that the project that was on first priority in the Hawaiian

Islands was the aircraft warning service project. If Wyman was so good at getting results, it would seem that he ought to have gotten results on the project of first priority. Would you not think so?

General ROBINS. Yes; I would think so. I do not know the reasons for his lack of progress on these A. W. S. stations.

144. General GRUNERT. There appearing to be no further questions, the Board thanks you for giving us your time and helping us out.

General ROBINS. I was very glad to do so.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 5:44 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

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[730] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

TUESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDINGS,
Washington, D. C.

The Board at 9:35 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

(Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., was sworn as Executive Officer to the Board.)

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

**TESTIMONY OF COLONEL ROBERT B. RICHARDS, GENERAL STAFF
CORPS, FINANCE OFFICER, A. C. OF S., G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel RICHARDS. Robert B. Richards, Colonel, General Staff Corps, Finance Officer, A. C. of S., G-2, War Department.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is after facts, and a [731] representative of your particular section of the War Department General Staff we think should have some facts that we want; and General Russell will lead in propounding the questions on the subject on which we expect to get facts from you.

3. General RUSSELL. Colonel, what was your assignment on July 1, 1940?

Colonel RICHARDS. I was Finance Officer, G-2.

4. General RUSSELL. Have you been on that assignment continuously since that date?

Colonel RICHARDS. July 1, 1940? I have. I was assigned to that duty about the 23rd of November, 1939.

5. General RUSSELL. Have you been on that assignment continuously since November 23, 1939?

Colonel RICHARDS. I have.

6. General RUSSELL. Colonel, the subject which we want to develop by your testimony is the funds made available to the Assistant Chief

of Staff, G-2, for the employment of special operators for investigations and the proportions of those funds which were made available to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department for the employment of special operators. I will ask you whether or not these funds to which I have just referred result from Congressional appropriations that are a matter of public record.

Colonel RICHARDS. They are the result of Congressional appropriations which are a matter of public record.

7. General RUSSELL. Hence there is nothing which you might give us in your testimony about appropriations of these funds which would not be a matter of public record?

Colonel RICHARDS. No, sir; there is not.

[732] 8. General RUSSELL. First, we will direct our attention to the appropriation for the period July 1, 1940, to June 30, 1941. Will you please state to the Board the amount appropriated for hiring of special personnel by A. C. of S., G-2, for that period?

Colonel RICHARDS. The appropriation, titled Miscellaneous Expenses, Military Intelligence Activities, Army, in the appropriation act of the fiscal year 1941 carries language which makes it available for all purposes of military intelligence, which includes other objects than the actual hire of, for example, investigation personnel. However, the military appropriation act, which was signed on the 13th of June, 1940, was for \$125,000. Subsequent to that the second deficiency appropriation act, signed on the 27th of June, 1940, carried an addition to this military intelligence appropriation of \$135,000. Then the third supplementary appropriation act, signed on the 8th of October, 1940, carried a further addition to the same portion of the 1941 appropriation act of \$100,000; making a total of \$360,000, which was available for miscellaneous expenses requisite for and incident to the military intelligence activities of the Army and maintenance of military attaches at the United States Embassies and Legations abroad, including the purchase of law books, maps, professional books of reference, and subscriptions to newspapers and periodicals, for the hire of interpreters, special agents, and guides, and for such other purposes as the Secretary of War may deem proper.

The balance of that appropriation act is not particularly germane, and is outlined in the published act.

9. General RUSSELL. Upon what authority might those funds be [733] expended, Colonel.

Colonel RICHARDS. By an allotment to the A. C. of S., G-2, of the funds and the suballotment by him to other agencies of the Army.

10. General RUSSELL. Was it necessary to account for those funds?

Colonel RICHARDS. Yes, sir, except that these funds may be expended upon confidential voucher which has the approval of the Secretary of War and the details of such expenditures are not disclosed upon the face of the voucher nor the attached documents which, with ordinary vouchers, go to the General Accounting Office.

11. General RUSSELL. Were allotments made from that fund to the Hawaiian Department for the fiscal year 1941?

Colonel RICHARDS. Yes, sir.

12. General RUSSELL. Can you tell us briefly the total amount that was allotted and any directions that were given as to its expenditure?

Colonel RICHARDS. On the 25th of July, 1940—and, parenthetically,

I might explain that although that appropriation was available from the 1st of July, the actual allotments sometimes are not made until after the 1st of July to us, and we do not make them to, for instance, the Hawaiian Department, until after the 1st of July, but often advise other agencies to whom we are allotting that the allotment is being made and they have the authority to expend it prior to the actual receipt of this document, which is War Department Form 23. So, on the 25th of July, we allotted to the A. C. of S., G-2, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., the sum of \$6,060 from the [734] appropriation miscellaneous expenses, military intelligence activities, Army, fiscal year 1941. The limitation placed upon this sum of \$6,060 is carried in the language of the allotting document, Form 23, which reads as follows:

(Excerpt from Form 23 is as follows:)

For the maintenance of intelligence work, including the hire of civilian personnel, not to exceed \$3,060 for the year. \$6,060.

I might explain, however, that the limitation of \$3,060 for the year was placed upon the amount which could be expended for the hire of clerical personnel out of the total of \$6,060; thus leaving for other purposes than the hire of civilian personnel, \$3,000.

13. General FRANK. The \$6,060 was for the period from the 1st of July, 1940, to the 30th of June, 1941?

Colonel RICHARDS. That is correct, sir.

14. General FRANK. Was this \$6,060 to cover the normal routine expenses of clerical personnel permanently assigned to the G-2 office?

Colonel RICHARDS. No, sir. The clerical personnel permanently assigned to the G-2 office were drawn from the station complement assigned to the Hawaiian Department, and additional clerks were authorized to be paid for from this appropriation who were engaged at least 50 percent of their time on counter-intelligence work.

15. General FRANK. Why do you call them clerks?

Colonel RICHARDS. They were civilian clerks, sir. They were not enlisted investigators.

[735] 16. General FRANK. I know; but why call them clerks at all? They really were investigators, were they not?

Colonel RICHARDS. No, sir. I might explain that investigations which were being carried on required a great amount of clerical personnel to type the necessary reports, and, for example, later we estimated that it took one clerk for each three investigators. Reports were sent to O. N. I., F. B. I., and other agencies.

17. General FRANK. Were some of these investigators civilian investigators?

Colonel RICHARDS. That I do not know, sir. The clerks were civilian clerks and were not investigators.

18. General FRANK. If they had had some civilian investigators and \$3,000 was to be paid for clerks, it certainly does not leave very much money to be spent for investigative purposes in Hawaii, does it?

Colonel RICHARDS. No, sir. I might explain, however, that additions were made, if I may continue with the further allotments which were made.

On November 15 an increase was made to the previous allotment of \$1,500, "Increase to cover intelligence activities as per recent radio from this office."

19. General GRUNERT. Do I understand, then, that \$1,500 was for use in addition to the \$3,000 for other purposes than additional clerks?

Colonel RICHARDS. Yes, sir; because in this allotment of \$1,500 no mention was made of any increased authority so far as clerks were concerned. Therefore the original limitation placed upon the Hawaiian Department in the first allotment [736] would hold, namely, that they were not to spend more than \$3,060 during the fiscal year.

20. General RUSSELL. To hurry along, Colonel, because I have gone over the figures, it came to pass that you sent those people \$7,500 out there for the fiscal year 1941, and toward the end of that fiscal year they turned back to you \$424.79?

Colonel RICHARDS. \$424.79 was returned from the Hawaiian Department.

21. General RUSSELL. So that the Hawaiian Department in the fiscal year 1941 had \$7,500 of these funds and used slightly more than \$7,000 of them?

Colonel RICHARDS. That is correct, sir.

22. General RUSSELL. And a limitation on clerk hire of \$3,000 was placed on the expenditure of the funds?

Colonel RICHARDS. \$3,060; yes, sir.

23. General RUSSELL. Let us talk about the last six months of 1941.

General GRUNERT. Is that the fiscal year or the calendar year?

24. General RUSSELL. The calendar year, up to the 7th of December when the attack was made on Pearl Harbor. The record which you have shown me, Colonel, indicates that an initial appropriation to A. C. of S., G-2, for the fiscal year 1942 was \$640,000. Is that true?

Colonel RICHARDS. That is correct.

25. General RUSSELL. And the appropriation act itself was signed on the 30th of June, 1941?

Colonel RICHARDS. Yes, sir.

[737] 26. General RUSSELL. And that, by a supplementary appropriation act which was signed on the 17th of December, 1941, was increased to \$239,000?

Colonel RICHARDS. Increased by \$239,000.

27. General RUSSELL. Then for that period, July 1st to December 1st, 1941, there was available for this fund \$640,000?

Colonel RICHARDS. That should be stated from July 1st to and including December 17. The supplementary appropriation act was not signed until the 17th of December.

28. General RUSSELL. Of that money, how much was made available to the Hawaiian Department prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Colonel RICHARDS. On the 16th of July, 1941, we allotted to the Hawaiian Department \$8,320 for the first and second quarters. The allotment in the previous year was made for the total year, but this was \$8,320 for the first and second quarters.

29. General RUSSELL. So they had \$8,640 made available to them for the first six months?

Colonel RICHARDS. \$8,320.

30. General RUSSELL. Can you tell us right quickly how much of that could be expended on clerk hire?

[738] Colonel RICHARDS. \$2,430 during the half year. The limitation placed upon them for clerk hire was for the full year, of not to exceed \$4,860, therefore dividing that by two to arrive at the figure of \$2,430.

31. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, a question or two about the general purposes for which this money was appropriated. I will ask you whether or not it was to be for the hire of special operators to secure information in different parts of the world that the War Department might be interested in.

Colonel RICHARDS. Aside from the limitations which were placed upon the expenditure of these funds by the appropriation act, I cannot answer that question, sir. It is a G-2 policy matter. However, it has come under my observation that these funds were spent, have been spent, for the hire of agents, reimbursement to individuals giving or selling information.

32. General RUSSELL. There is reference in the appropriation act to expenditures in connection with our foreign embassies. Was it for the upkeep of the normal costs of those embassies that this money was expended?

Colonel RICHARDS. No, sir. The portion which was expended out of this appropriation by our military attaches at foreign embassies and legations was for, in the main, military attache maintenance allowance which was used for official entertainment and for compensation for the necessary front which the military attache had to maintain. Also, the military attache was usually authorized not to exceed a small amount for the purchase of information.

33. General RUSSELL. I think that is all I have.

[739] 34. General GRUNERT. I do not see just what we have gotten, and I would like to develop the thing a little further, and take Hawaii, for instance. For 1940 and 1941 up to December 7, what total amount of money was available to the Commanding General over there through his G-2 to get information that he could not get otherwise? As I understand it here, approximately \$4,500 plus \$6,390; approximately \$10,000; is that right?

Colonel RICHARDS. If I may make a calculation here, \$10,310.

35. General GRUNERT. Now, what was that command over there? Did that just take in the Hawaiian Islands themselves, or any outlying islands outside of the Hawaiian group itself?

Colonel RICHARDS. That I do not know, sir.

36. General GRUNERT. You do not know. Now, of these comparatively large amounts for military intelligence activities of the Army of \$360,000 and \$640,000, was some of that turned back to the Treasury at the end of the year, or was it all expended? I do not care about the particular amounts, but was a percentage of it turned back? If so, the approximate percentage?

Colonel RICHARDS. That figure I cannot tell you, sir. It is on record with the Purchase Office of the War Department.

37. General GRUNERT. According to your memory was it 5 percent, 10 percent, or what?

Colonel RICHARDS. I think, sir, that comparatively little of the fiscal year 1941 appropriation was turned back. You understand that these funds are allotted to a great many agencies. Each one of those agencies wishes to have sufficient funds to [740] take care of all of their obligations. Thereby, at the end of the fiscal year these turn-backs of many small amounts foot up to a considerable amount.

38. General GRUNERT. Did the A. C. of S., G-2, and the War Department General Staff attempt to get more funds than were given to them? Do you know?

Colonel RICHARDS. I do not believe that in the fiscal year 1941 the A. C. of S., G-2, made any request for more than the \$360,000 which was appropriated for his purposes. However, in the fiscal year '42 we had in progress prior to Pearl Harbor the appropriation act of \$239,000, and also at approximately that same time an appropriation act of \$1,343,000 which was not signed until April 28, 1942.

39. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether these additional amounts were requested for a particular purpose or to supplement these various allotments that are usually given out?

Colonel RICHARDS. For many particular purposes. The appropriation act is defended in detail for such and such items.

40. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether any of those pertained to an attempt to get more information about the situation in the Far East, particularly in the mandated islands?

Colonel RICHARDS. I have no such information; no, sir.

41. General RUSSELL. Colonel, you have testified that in the fiscal year 1941 \$360,000 was made available to G-2 under the appropriation act which you have already described. Do you know how much of that money was used by G-2 to hire special operators to procure information, or for the purchase of [741] information?

Colonel RICHARDS. No, sir.

42. General RUSSELL. Is there any way that you can determine that amount?

Colonel RICHARDS. No, sir. The records are in the offices to which the funds were allotted.

43. General RUSSELL. None of that money, then, was expended for the employment of special operators or to purchase information by the G-2 section directly?

Colonel RICHARDS. That I cannot be sure of, sir.

44. General RUSSELL. Would you follow up this line of investigation we have indicated and advise us at your convenience as to what you discover?

Colonel RICHARDS. That, sir, you want for specifically the Hawaiian Department, or the Army as a whole?

45. General RUSSELL. Both if we can get it.

Colonel RICHARDS. The activities of G-2 included all the corps areas, the departments, and our overseas offices.

46. General RUSSELL. Could you get both for us: Hawaiian Department and the summation of the expenditures as a whole for those two purposes?

Colonel RICHARDS. I will attempt to.

47. General GRUNERT. Would the same thing apply to the \$640,000, fiscal year 1942, or half of that fiscal year?

48. General RUSSELL. Yes, it would. I am just wondering if we were getting into trouble and if there is a lot of confusion in our records. I do not know. Would you make the same search with respect to the \$640,000 for the period July 1st— [742] December 17, 1941?

49. General GRUNERT. 7th; not the 17th.

50. General RUSSELL. They got some money on the 17th.

51. General GRUNERT. All right.

52. General RUSSELL. They used up the \$640,000 by December 16th.

Colonel RICHARDS. Yes, sir.

53. General GRUNERT. I would like to develop just one more point. I believe you said you did not know just to what extent the Hawaiian Department extended in the use of this so-called G-2 money, whether it extended outside of the actual Hawaiian group or not.

Colonel RICHARDS. No, sir, I do not know the limitations that were then placed upon the activities of the Hawaiian Department.

54. General GRUNERT. Was there any allotment of funds to any agency that would or could cover the mandated islands?

Colonel RICHARDS. That I do not know, sir. I have no recollection.

55. General GRUNERT. Do you know if any activities were carried on directly by G-2 that covered matters that did not pertain to any particular department or corps area in which these funds were allotted?

Colonel RICHARDS. I have no such knowledge, sir, no.

56. General FRANK. May I ask a question now: Do you have any information as to how these United States appropriations compare with funds appropriated for similar purposes by England, Russia, Germany?

Colonel RICHARDS. No, sir.

[743] General FRANK. Japan?

Colonel RICHARDS. No, sir.

58. General FRANK. Have you any way of looking that up?

Colonel RICHARDS. I think that some of our records might show, but I can assure you that the information that we had from Japan and Germany would not show any breakdown for military intelligence.

59. General FRANK. Well, the G-2 Department was out there for the purpose of getting information. Suppose you look and find out if they got any information along the line of the question that I just asked; will you, please?

Colonel RICHARDS. Yes, sir.

60. General FRANK. All right.

Colonel RICHARDS. You would like England, Russia, Japan, and Germany?

61. General FRANK. Yes. Just make a comparison to see what they were spending to get information on world situations.

Now, we will say that the Hawaiian Department was given \$16,000 for a year, and that out of that they were authorized to spend about \$5,000 for the year for extra clerks.

Colonel RICHARDS. Correct.

62. General FRANK. That left \$11,000 for agents for investigative work?

Colonel RICHARDS. Yes, sir.

63. General FRANK. About what do they pay those agents?

Colonel RICHARDS. I do not know, sir.

64. General FRANK. Well, were they hired—do they pay \$2,000, \$3,000, or what?

[744] Colonel RICHARDS. I do not know, sir.

65. General FRANK. Well, we shall assume that they pay them \$2,500, and that would give them \$11,000, we will say five agents.

Colonel RICHARDS. On that basis, yes, sir.

66. General FRANK. Roughly speaking. We have, I think, from the Roberts Commission a report to the effect that there were attached to the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu something like 80 Japanese

agents gathering information on us in the Hawaiian Islands. It varied from time to time, as I understand, but the figure 80 seems to hang in my mind. Now, on the relative basis it would seem that a lot greater effort was being taken by Japan in going out after and getting information than was evidenced, as least by the money spent, by the United States.

Colonel RICHARDS. May I explain, sir, that the enlisted investigators, Corps of Intelligence Police, were paid from pay of the Army, and only such civilian investigators as might be hired were paid from these allotted funds, in addition to which certain extraordinary expenses of the enlisted investigators might be paid. Therefore, the measure—

67. General FRANK. Might be paid from where?

Colonel RICHARDS. From these same funds.

68. General FRANK. Other than these?

Colonel RICHARDS. No, sir. From these funds.

69. General FRANK. Yes?

Colonel RICHARDS. In other words if they had, as you suggest, five civilian agents, or say four civilian agents, they [746] may have had a great many enlisted agents who were paid from pay of the Army, and only their extraordinary expenses in connection with their investigations would be paid from these funds.

70. General FRANK. Do you know how many enlisted agents they had in Honolulu?

Colonel RICHARDS. I do not; no, sir. It is a matter of record, however, I believe.

71. General FRANK. That is all.

72. General RUSSELL. That is all I have.

73. General GRUNERT. All right, Colonel. Thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL JOHN A. HUNT, I. G. D.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel HUNT. John A. Hunt, Colonel, I. G. D. Serial number?

2. Colonel WEST. No, sir; we do not particularly need that. War Department?

Colonel HUNT. That is right.

3. Colonel WEST. You are on duty in the Inspector General's Office?

Colonel HUNT. Inspector General's Office.

4. Colonel WEST. War Department, Washington, D. C.

5. General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is after facts both [746] as to the War Department background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack, and anything that may have a bearing thereon. We have asked you to come up here to tell us about some records and to give us such other information as you may have that will lead us to the facts if we do not develop the facts from you. General Frank will lead in propounding these questions, and the Board will fill out where they see fit.

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir.

6. General FRANK. Colonel Hunt, were you chaged with making an investigation of Colonel Wyman?

Colonel HUNT. I was, yes, sir.

7. General FRANK. At what time did you start on this? How long did it take?

Colonel HUNT. It started about the middle of April, as I recall it, 1943, and took about two months, I believe, to complete it. I did not check on the period, but I understand that the Board has a copy of my report, and the period is indicated there.

8. General FRANK. Is this a copy of your report (indicating)? Will you identify it?

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir; that is my report.

9. General FRANK. That is your report?

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir.

10. General FRANK. And the supporting papers comprise sworn testimony that you took in the case?

Colonel HUNT. That is right, and documentary exhibits.

11. General FRANK. Will you state to the Board the conclusion, [747] the recommendations at which you arrived?

Colonel HUNT. Only the recommendations?

12. General FRANK. Yes.

(Recommendations of Colonel Hunt in re-investigating of Colonel Wyman are as follows:)

Colonel HUNT. I recommended:

a. That in the future, Colonel Wyman be not entrusted with the direction of expensive public works involving the administration of contracts.

b. That the recovery from the Hawaiian Contracting Company of \$9,100 paid them for obsolete, worn-out and useless equipment be promptly initiated.

c. That in the renegotiation of Contract W-414-Eng-602, full consideration be given the fact that a substantial part of the \$123,411 paid the Hawaiian Constructors on the one percent per month equipment recapture provision was a profit over and above the fixed fee stipulated.

13. General FRANK. Will you state to the Board the instructions that you received with respect to making this investigation?

Colonel HUNT. I suppose you would like to have that checked with the record?

14. General FRANK. That is right. What was the purpose of the investigation?

(Excerpt from report of Colonel Hunt in re investigation of Colonel Wyman is as follows:)

Colonel HUNT (reading):

That part of the investigation conducted in [748] Hawaii had to do with the administration of construction work in the Hawaiian Department by Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., CE, and was based originally upon the complaint of Mr. Robert E. McKee, a contractor of El Paso, Texas and Los Angeles, California, transmitted by letter dated 1 March 1943, to the Honorable R. E. Thomason, Member of the House of Representatives from Texas. This complaint inclosed newspaper clippings which strongly implied that Colonel Wyman had accepted lavish entertainment from Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl, a contractor of Los Angeles, California, who lately headed the Hawaiian Constructors, a group of contractors acting as co-adventurers under a contract covering construction works in Hawaii and in the South Pacific Area of considerable magnitude. It was implied that the award of that contract and the virtual elimination of Mr. McKee and other independent contractors) from participation in War Department construction in the Hawaiian Islands, excepting as subcontractors arose from the friendly relations existing between Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman, rather than from

consideration of the Government's best interests. Mr. McKee's letter also stated that according to rumor, Colonel Wyman was inebriated most of the time.

That in substance is the origin of my investigation of Colonel Wyman.

15. General FRANK. All right. Now will you read to the Board your conclusions as a result of your investigation?

[749] Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir. And in so doing I believe it would probably be pertinent to indicate that in the course of the investigation certain additional allegations arose, conclusions respecting which are a part of the detailed conclusions included in my report.

16. General FRANK. All right.

(Conclusions of Colonel Hunt in re investigation of Colonel Wyman are as follows:)

a. During the years 1936-1939, Colonel Wyman, as District Engineer, Los Angeles, maintained a close personal friendship, as distinguished from a business friendship, with Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl, which was inappropriate on the part of a United States Army officer administering costly works on which the said Mr. Rohl was engaged as contractor. This relationship extended so far beyond the need for ordinary cordial business relation as to give rise to such presumptions of impropriety as formed, in part, the basis of this investigation. In maintaining that relationship, Colonel Wyman was not sufficiently mindful of that unquestionable reputation for integrity and impartiality which it was the duty of a man in his position to cultivate at all times.

b. The flattery of Colonel Wyman personally and professionally, which was bestowed upon him by his wealthy associate, Mr. Rohl, evoked in Colonel Wyman so complete a confidence in the former as to lead him to an unwise acceptance of Mr. Rohl's judgment and [750] advice during their subsequent association in Hawaii. He thereby relinquished to some extent that independence of judgment required of an officer in charge of the Government's interests, as indicated in his too ready acceptance of Mr. Rohl's recommendations relating to equipment purchases and appraisals.

c. It is not established that the relationship in question had a direct bearing upon the exclusion, excepting as subcontractors, of Mr. Robert E. McKee or other independent contractors from participation in construction work in Hawaii, after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The available evidence is to the effect that an honest decision had been reached that singleness of management was imperative and that the conduct of business through a single control agency, such as the Hawaiian Constructors, met that requirement, where other arrangements would not.

d. Charges that Colonel Wyman was drunk a large part of the time in Hawaii are not supported by the facts. The evidence indicates that the close personal friendship between Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl continued after Mr. Rohl arrived in Hawaii, and there, as in California, gave rise to undesirable comment, but that while they occupied adjoining rooms in the Pleasanton Hotel occasionally there were appropriate reasons in justification thereof.

e. Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government's best interest when in purchasing Rohl-Connolly equipment [751] at a cost of \$166,423.17 against the appraised value of \$131,411.03, he failed to fully justify for the record, the payment of the larger of the two amounts. There is no definite proof that any dishonesty was involved, nor that the Government was charged more for the equipment than its true worth.

f. Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government's best interests in the purchase of equipment from the Hawilan Contracting Company at a cost of \$156,000, in that he based that payment upon a prejudiced appraisal, and failed to take such action as would insure that the equipment purchased was actually required, was in good condition and useable and was worth the amount paid. As a result of this failure, the United States paid \$9,100 for equipment which was not required, was obsolete and was not useable.

g. The inefficiencies charged to the management of construction matters in Hawaii actually existed, but it is impossible to determine the extent to which such conditions were due to acts or omissions by Colonel Wyman, if at all. The various types of inefficiency were inherent in the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of

contract and in surrounding conditions over which the District Engineer had no control. It is not at all clear that they progressed further under Colonel Wyman than they would have under any other management.

h. The payment of the one percent per month of rental, over the net value of equipment, upon its recapture, was not a violation of the contract, despite [752] the fact that it represented some profit to the contractor in excess of the stipulated fee.

i. The chartering of the yacht *Vega*, so far as Colonel Wyman was concerned, was honestly initiated. There is no ground for the charge that the vessel was unsuited for the use for which it was chartered.

j. Colonel Wyman's attitude toward many subordinate officers and toward many of the civilian key employees of various contractors—

I would like to say that the remaining conclusions relate to Colonel Wyman's work in Alaska, and ask if the Board wants that.

17. General GRUNERT. I think we had better hear all the conclusions so that we can judge whether there is anything that refers to those points that we are looking into.

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir.

Resuming the reading of my conclusions where I left off:

in the Northwest Engineer Division, was characterized by an undesirable aloofness and by such a manner of disdain, superiority, lack of consideration and at times of humiliating treatment as to alienate that wholesome respect which it is the duty of any officer to encourage and foster, to the detriment of morale and performance.

k. Colonel Wyman gave inadequate attention to important administrative functions relating to the work of the Northwest Engineer Division, specifically the proper organization of his own forces, the delegation [753] to them of specific responsibilities and commensurate authority in connection therewith, and the proper correlation of Engineer and Contractor forces. This failure contributed largely to the growth of a chaotic and confused condition in the administration and operation of contracts. The presence on his staff of two officers specially skilled in organization and administration was not an acceptable explanation of this inattention on his part to one of his most important duties.

l. Living quarters for the personnel of the Northwest Division office were unconscionably extravagant, considering the temporary use contemplated. This waste was a direct result of Colonel Wyman's inattention to the administrative phases of his duties.

m. The charge that Colonel Wyman procured the employment of his wife at a substantial salary for unimportant duties is untrue.

n. The faults herein assessed against Colonel Wyman cannot be charged to lack of devotion to duty nor to lack of ability in the performance of duty, in both of which respects he acted commendably. These faults must be charged to personal characteristics contributing to a poorly balanced appreciation of the human aspects of large endeavor and the necessity of recognizing and attending to the larger details of administration. Possessing these characteristics, Colonel Wyman is considered to be poorly adapted to the supervision of large construction projects.

[754] 18. General FRANK. Will you state, if you can, as the result of your investigation, what was the nature of the advice that Wyman got from Rohl.

Colonel HUNT. I can recall having in mind, in the writing of that report, or in the making of that investigation, no specific advice. I do know that Colonel Wyman claimed that Mr. Rohl was a man of vast experience in heavy contracting work, particularly excavation. I believe I recall that Colonel Wyman indicated that he relied somewhat on Mr. Rohl's advice with respect to "mining operations," meaning by that excavation in rock; and also with respect to where heavy construction equipment might be located, obtainable for that work.

19. General FRANK. Did this advice redound to the advantage of Rohl?

Colonel HUNT. I am sure that I could find no case in which it did, unless it had to do with the chartering of Mr. Rohl's or his wife's yacht VEGA, but inasmuch as that yacht was chartered to the Government for a consideration of \$1.00 a year, together with the understanding that the Government would stand the cost of any modifications to the boat, and the cost of replacing it in its original condition when they got through using it, I think that there was no personal consideration redounding to the benefit of Mr. Rohl.

20. General FRANK. Did these provisions with respect to putting the boat back in shape result in any appreciable amount of money being paid to Rohl for that purpose?

Colonel HUNT. As I recall it, the matter, at the time I was making the investigation, was in the hands of the division engineer at San Francisco. I talked with General Hannum and [755] his assistants, and my recollection is that the entire cost of the chartering of the boat and of its maintenance during the period of its charter was \$37,000.

21. General FRANK. Do you consider that a reasonable amount?

Colonel HUNT. There were items of that cost that I didn't consider reasonable.

22. General FRANK. Do you remember what they were?

Colonel HUNT. I recall that one of them was a matter of white uniforms for the crew.

23. General FRANK. What period of time did this \$37,000 cover?

Colonel HUNT. The vessel was chartered early in October 1941, as I recall it, and was in Hawaii until some time early in March 1942, at which time it was ordered returned to the mainland and the charter terminated.

24. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not it was used?

Colonel HUNT. I do not think that it ever performed any of the functions for which it was chartered.

25. General FRANK. Then it turned out to be an extravagance?

Colonel HUNT. "Hind-sight" extravagance; yes, sir; although I believe, in all fairness, the fact might be considered that this vessel could have performed the function of sailing to the islands east and south of Hawaii where they proposed to study the possibility of building additional air bases, and that it could do that without oil; also also I think it is fair to consider the fact that any vessel at that time was a pretty hard thing to get hold of. The Navy had gobbled up a great many of them. I believe that if the thing had been done as originally conceived, as I see that conception, it would not have been a disadvantageous arrangement for the [756] Government.

26. General GRUNERT. Was there anything during your investigation which disclosed that Wyman used this vessel for other purposes than originally intended, and was there anything in the evidence to show that he used it for his own personal use and not official?

Colonel HUNT. There was not. I believe that the testimony taken by me does not include anything on that subject. My idea in that matter was that it would be a waste of time, since I had made informal inquiries of a vast number of people, a great number of people, about that boat, and nowhere could I get even the slightest hint that it had been used for any purpose whatsoever after getting to Hawaii.

27. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether, in accepting boats at a nominal rate such as a dollar a year, it is usual to include in that agreement that the boat be put back in the same shape as that in which it was accepted?

Colonel HUNT. That is true; yes, sir. That is customary.

28. General FRANK. Will you briefly give us the history of the purchase of Rohl's equipment, and the difference of opinion with respect to the price that the Government was to pay for it, including Parker's appraisal of it, and the amount that eventually was paid.

Colonel HUNT. I believe you are asking me something, there, General, that I can very easily get confused and tangled up about, unless I refer to the record.

29. General FRANK. You know the information that I am after?

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir.

30. General FRANK. You may refer to your supporting papers.

[757] Colonel HUNT. Some time just prior to the 9th of December, 1941, the need for more construction equipment became evident as increased operations to the south of Hawaii became necessary. Colonel Wyman knew that the Rohl-Connolly Company owned certain equipment which was then idle at the Caddoa project, in Colorado. He made arrangements with the Rohl-Connolly people whereby this equipment would be shipped to Los Angeles, there overhauled, and then transshipped to Canton Island, Christmas Island, and other points in the Pacific.

Apparently a great deal of that arrangement was verbal, and no written instructions covering such an agreement were found. Efforts to trace the movements of the equipment failed, although it was determined that some reached Canton Island, some was en route to Christmas Island on the 7th of December, when the ship which was carrying it was diverted by Navy orders. Some of it reached Honolulu.

By a letter dated the 11th of March 1942, which was signed by Mr. Rohl on behalf of the Hawaiian Constructors, he requested the district engineer to purchase certain listed equipment from the Rohl-Connolly Company. The records of the district engineer's office were in a state of rather terrible confusion, and the exact items of equipment included in the original verbal agreement could not be identified. However, there was a list of specific items referred to by Mr. Rohl in his letter of the 11th of March, and they had been appraised by Mr. M. G. Parker, a civilian employee of the district engineer. He reported, on his findings, a value of \$131,411.03. That was done by letter dated the 11th of March 1942.

On the 12th of March, Mr. Parker was ordered to report [758] to Colonel Wyman's operations officer, who was Colonel B. L. Robinson. According to Mr. Parker's testimony, Colonel Robinson referred to a table, at which were sitting Mr. Rohl, Mr. Ralph E. Woolly, and Mr. H. P. Benson. The latter two had been taken in as co-adventurers along with the Rohl-Connolly Company and others of the Hawaiian Constructors. A discussion was held in which apparently Mr. Rohl attempted to convince Mr. Parker that his appraisal was wrong, that it was too low. Mr. Parker, however, refused to recede from his stand and continued to claim that the fair value of the equipment was only \$131,411.03, as he originally stated.

In talking to Mr. Woolly and Mr. Benson, separately, they both testified that they had no part in that discussion. Colonel Wyman

expressed complete ignorance of the fact that they had had such a discussion. However, on the 13th of March, which I believe was two days before he left the Islands, Colonel Wyman directed the Hawaiian Constructors to purchase the equipment at the exact price named by Mr. Rohl. Colonel Wyman's subordinates went through with that purchase and paid the price asked by Mr. Rohl.

31. General FRANK. Just a minute. Who purchased the equipment?

Colonel HUNT. Colonel Wyman's subordinates.

32. General FRANK. Did the Hawaiian Constructors purchase the equipment?

Colonel HUNT. They purchased it on behalf of the Government; yes, sir.

33. General FRANK. The Hawaiian Constructors purchased this equipment for the Government?

[759] Colonel HUNT. That is right.

34. General RUSSELL. What was that price, again?

Colonel HUNT. \$166,423.17. General Frank, I would like to say, here, that the statement last made is correct to the best of my memory. I believe that at the time this purchase was made, the purchase order was actually issued in the name of the Hawaiian Constructors; but under the contract, which required them to purchase all necessary material and equipment, they were also required to maintain records of the possession of the equipment, and later to turn them over to the Government. I know that the engineers disbursed the money for that purchase, but whether that was a disbursement in reimbursement of the contracting company or a direct reimbursement of Rohl-Connolly, I could not be positive now. It may be that the purchase orders are in here as exhibits. If that is the case, I think they would illustrate that. I think it is immaterial, because it was bought either by the Constructors or by the district engineer's own forces.

35. General FRANK. It was being paid for, however, by Government money?

Colonel HUNT. By Government money; that is right.

36. General FRANK. And the payment of the advanced price was directed by Wyman?

Colonel HUNT. That is right.

37. General FRANK. And he had authority to do so?

Colonel HUNT. That is true; yes, sir.

38. General FRANK. Are there any other questions on that?

General GRUNERT. Not on that; no.

39. General FRANK. In your conclusions and in speaking of the [760] association of Rohl and Wyman, you stated that there was some criticism of their living in adjoining rooms at the Pleasanton Hotel in Honolulu, but that there was justification for it. What was that justification?

Colonel HUNT. This all occurred after the 7th of December, I believe, at which time Mr. Rohl was the general manager of that contracting organization, or occupied the top position, although that may not have been his exact title. Colonel Wyman, as district engineer, was the top Government man in connection with that contract; in other words, their being together was a necessary part of the contractual relation whereby the two top men of the respective

contracting parties had to deal daily and almost momentarily, on large changes to the original contract, as they came up. I do not believe that my report indicated that there was any truth to the expression used in the allegation, that Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman "lived" in adjoining rooms.

It developed during the testimony that was taken there that Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl probably on a limited number of occasions after working all night and all day did not depart to their respective homes, wherever they may have been. I believe that Colonel Wyman's was in the Pleasanton Hotel. Mr. Rohl's was elsewhere. He lived with a Mr. Winne; but, having spent all of the day and most of the night at actual work—and I was thoroughly satisfied that that was the case—Mr. Rohl merely and probably bunked in a room adjoining the one in which Colonel Wyman bunked, for a brief period of sleep, until work started the following day.

40. General FRANK. Another statement in your conclusion—
[761] conclusion "G" as I remember it—is that there were inefficiencies over which the district engineer had no control.

Colonel HUNT. That is right.

41. General FRANK. Why?

Colonel HUNT. Well, if the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had directed that steps be taken immediately to build a runway or a landing strip at a point where there then was none, the lack of ability to go out and rent the best type of equipment for it, to take the time to secure competitive bids, to take the time to have it sent over from the mainland on some slow ship because the freight rate was low, and the inability to shop around and select and eliminate until you had only the most efficient of the available workers—all of that would represent waste which was unavoidable either on the part of Colonel Wyman or any other man; and it was inefficiencies of that nature, which were totally unavoidable, to which I had reference in this conclusion.

42. General FRANK. This investigation of yours was primarily as a result of a letter that was written by McKee?

Colonel HUNT. That is true.

43. General FRANK. Are you conversant with the general reputation of the McKee firm?

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir; I am. I have known them for years.

44. General FRANK. Do you know and are you conversant with the reliability and the efficiency of the work performed by the McKee firm?

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir; I believe I am, about as well as anybody.

45. General FRANK. What was that reputation?

[762] Colonel HUNT. He had a reputation, and with me it was more than a reputation because I had administered contracts which he had performed, but he had the reputation of being a thoroughly honest and highly efficient contractor, who performed his work for the Government at prices low enough to win the dislike of competing contractors; in time, rapid enough to be a source of great satisfaction to the Army—that is, that part of the Army that was interested—and with an attitude toward his work such that should any failure develop even long after the period of its guarantee had expired, he would come back and rectify it without cost to the Government.

I believe in all respects the War Department agencies in contact with Mr. McKee in any way agreed that he was a very fine, very up-standing, honest, efficient contractor.

46. General FRANK. Highly reputable?

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir.

47. General FRANK. Previous witnesses before this Board have indicated that there was a scarcity of reputable contractors, in Hawaii. Mr. McKee had an organization in Hawaii about the time these Hawaiian Constructors were organized, did he not?

Colonel HUNT. He did; yes, sir.

48. General FRANK. Were there any other contractors in Honolulu who were there, available, who held good reputations, who were not included in the Hawaiian Constructors organization?

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir; there were.

49. General FRANK. Who were they?

Colonel HUNT. E. E. Black, an individual as distinguished from a company or a partnership, was a very substantial contractor, and he could have undertaken projects such as were later [763] done over there, after December 7, running into several millions of dollars, I feel quite certain.

50. General FRANK. Were there any others?

Colonel HUNT. There were a number of others who were considerably smaller. One I believe was W. S. Ching, a Chinese contractor; but I do know that he had some good construction equipment. He had a very good organization, although not a large one, and he was well adapted to take on, oh, any project such as the development of Bellows Field. I feel very sure that if they could have taken that man in and told him, "We want you to build this—can you do it?" he would have said "Yes," and he would have done so with complete satisfaction to the Army.

51. General FRANK. How did it happen that these people were not given an opportunity to participate?

Colonel HUNT. Colonel Wyman claims that they were given such an opportunity. I could not find any evidence of that either in the files of the district engineer's office, which would not indicate very much, because the files were so terribly disrupted, nor from questioning people who should have been in a position to know, like Colonel Wyman's chief clerk, Mr. Chew; but I did talk to the various contractors, and when I asked them if they had been approached by Colonel Wyman with a view to their taking over some part of the work that was then in view, as I recall it, every one of them indicated that they had never been approached by Colonel Wyman with such a view.

[764] 52. General FRANK. Yet he went out of his way to go over and bring the Rohl-Connolly firm into Honolulu when, prior to his interest in them, they had never built anything in Honolulu. Is that correct?

Colonel HUNT. Part of that is correct. Just how much Colonel Wyman went out of his way I do not know. As near as I can determine from the record—I am sure this part of it is quite correct—General Hannum, the Division Engineer in San Francisco, was convinced of the fact that some large cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contractor was the sort of an outfit that ought to do that job. The contract was

signed right here in the Chief of Engineers Office in Washington; and I do know that other contractors had been called upon by General Hannum to come in and bid, and they indicated that they were interested. Just how far afield Colonel Wyman and General Hannum went to talk to other possible bidders and contractors I do not know.

There was very little record kept; there was no record whatever kept of the minutes of negotiations by which the contract finally was entered into, either here in Washington, San Francisco or elsewhere. All that could be done was to rely on memory; and as near as I could make out it was probably Wyman's recommendation, with approval—although I could not prove that. I believe that it was more than just the elimination of other contractors as unfit that resulted in Rohl-Connolly going over there and heading up that organization.

53. General FRANK. In your investigation did you run across any difficulties between the McKee Company and Wyman?

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir; I did.

54. General FRANK. What were they?

[765] Colonel HUNT. I believe there was none until after the attack, on December 7; but at that time a number of contracts that Mr. McKee and his outfit had under way were terminated or, rather, suspended, in their then incomplete state of completion.

55. General FRANK. By Wyman?

Colonel HUNT. By order of the Department Commander as given to Wyman and by him given to the McKee forces. Thereafter Wyman, wanting to get into the one big contractors' organization all of the available talent, asked Mr. McKee's representatives to come in as part of the Hawaiian Constructors on a sort of subcontract basis, and there was a great deal of discussion over that. There was even a little difference of opinion between several of the top men of Mr. McKee's organization then in Hawaii. At any rate, Mr. McKee resented the idea of himself, a successful independent contractor, being handed anything so humiliating to him, as he would see it, as a subordinate position in another man's outfit. He declined to do it, although he offered to do anything that the Government over there might see fit to ask him to do otherwise, and without any regard to cost or profit.

56. General FRANK. Did the proposition anticipate his coming in on a lower level than Rohl and Connolly and the rest of them?

Colonel HUNT. If he had come in as a subcontractor he would have been on a lower level. But if he had come in as an associate contractor, as a co-adventurer, he would have had a say in the organization's business in proportion to the amount of capital he put in.

57. General FRANK. But he was not given opportunity to come [766] in as a co-adventurer; is that right?

Colonel HUNT. That, according to Mr. McKee's statement, is correct.

58. General FRANK. For purposes of the record and to indicate your own background as a basis for expressing an opinion, I would like to have you state for the record how you came to be familiar with contracting facilities in Honolulu. What had been your experience in Honolulu prior to this time?

Colonel HUNT. I see the object of the question. Before 1917 I had earned my living in the construction industry in various capacities, from pushing a wheelbarrow up to superintendent of construction. In 1917, after enlistment, I was placed in a construction organization of the Construction Division of the Army and I remained in that as constructing quartermaster or utilities officer at various posts and then until July 1940, when I was assigned to the Inspector General's Office, and in the course of such duties I was constructing quartermaster at Hickam Field, Hawaii, from early in 1938 to June 1940.

59. General FRANK. In that capacity you became familiar with contractors and methods of construction in general in the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel HUNT. That is true; yes.

60. General FRANK. All right.

61. General RUSSELL. Colonel, I have noticed with some interest your testimony about the association between Rohl and Wyman out there, especially that part of your testimony which described their bunking near each other when they were rather [767] weary after a lot of hard work. I rather got the idea that Rohl was a high-pressure man and worked very hard on the Islands.

Colonel HUNT. That part of my testimony related only to a question having to do with their occupying adjoining rooms in the Pleasanton Hotel for a brief period. Aside from that brief period I was not asked. A great deal was said about Mr. Rohl's work or lack of attention to work.

62. General RUSSELL. Definitely, what was that?

Colonel HUNT. Mr. Rohl, while living at the Moana Hotel, during the earlier part of his presence in Hawaii—

63. General RUSSELL. Prior to December 7, 1941?

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir—according to witnesses that I interrogated over there, was, on various occasions, filthy drunk and for rather extended periods of time.

64. General FRANK. Who was this?

Colonel HUNT. Hans Wilhelm Rohl. And as to Mr. Rohl's activity in supervising the work, I believe that the testimony that I took over there convinced me that until the attack on Pearl Harbor he did not contribute much; that he was pretty drunk a large part of the time.

65. General RUSSELL. Do you remember about when he went out there, Colonel?

Colonel HUNT. He did not go out there until after he received his citizenship papers, and that was September 15, 1941, I believe. I believe that immediately thereafter he went over there.

66. General RUSSELL. In the application for citizenship and in the endorsement which the Chief of Engineers gave to him in [768] connection with that application, as I recall the reason for the interest of the Engineers in having him made an American citizen, it was to make it possible for him to go out there to the Islands and exert his executive capacity in connection with hastening the work out there.

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir; I believe that is true.

67. General RUSSELL. Your conclusions, based on the evidence which you took, indicate that the reasons for his going out there were not any too good; is that so?

68. General FRANK. Were not fulfilled, you mean?

Colonel HUNT. Of course I cannot answer for the actual intention that was in Colonel Wyman's mind. Colonel Wyman testified that he got him out there because of his executive ability, because the work was not going any too well, and he was positive that when Rohl got over there he would get things going. I believe that in that opinion Colonel Wyman and the next top man of the Rohl-Connolly Company, Mr. Paul Grafe—or, rather, he was of the Callahan Construction Company, but Paul Grafe believed that that was all "eye wash"; that he was not being delayed; he was doing all he could and all anybody else could.

69. General RUSSELL. Are the names of the witnesses from whom you obtained the evidence as to Rohl's conduct prior to December 7 in this record which you have on the table?

Colonel HUNT. Yes. There is a list of witnesses there appended as a part of this report, and all witnesses that were interviewed upon the record. I talked to a great many other people informally concerning these matters, and if they [769] obviously could contribute nothing to the record, I did not take their sworn testimony.

70. General RUSSELL. Passing from Rohl's executive ability, you gave an answer earlier in your testimony to the effect that there were delays in the Hawaiian construction which were necessarily incident to any undertaking or construction project under the form of contract prevailing in Hawaii at that time. Will you develop that for us?

Colonel HUNT. I believe that the General put a narrower view on what I had to say than I meant to convey. It was not due to the fact that it was a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee type of contract that these delays and inefficiencies occurred. Had they had a fixed-price contract I believe the same thing would have resulted, the same inefficiencies and delays, because the contractor, knowing the consequences of the demand for speed, would have had to protect himself in his bid by adding unknown costs so that he would not go broke giving the Government something for which he would not get enough money to pay the costs.

71. General RUSSELL. I did place that sort of construction on your answer. Let us take for a moment the type of contract under which those partners were operating out there. Is it your opinion, based on the investigation which you made, that delays in the work did occur?

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir; some delays did occur, undoubtedly.

72. General RUSSELL. Can you assign any reasons for those delays?

[770] Colonel HUNT. Well, one of the reasons that I have already touched upon was the fact that when they ordered equipment over there it was on the high seas, some of it, on the day of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Some of it was ordered back to the mainland by the Navy. Now, whatever work it was planned to do, that particular equipment must have been delayed by the delay in the delivery of the equipment that was going to be used in the work.

73. General RUSSELL. I think my question probably was unfortunate, in view of the issue here, and was probably too broad, and I will ask the question in another way.

Do you believe that any of the delays which existed or that you discovered out there were the result of the inattention or drunkenness of this man Rohl?

Colonel HUNT. I have no cause to believe that that was the case after my investigation. No, sir; I do not.

74. General RUSSELL. Did you have any evidence that there were any positive acts on the part of this man Rohl which had for their purpose delaying the construction work in Hawaii?

Colonel HUNT. No, sir. On the contrary, I believe the testimony that I have bearing on that at all, either directly or indirectly, was to the effect that whenever Mr. Rohl was active he was very active, and that he tolerated no argument on anybody's part, and he tolerated no excuses. That was the general reputation of the man, as I got it, relating to the times when he was sober and attending to business.

75. General RUSSELL. Let us pass to the period following December 7.

[771] 76. General GRUNERT. May I put in a question there?

77. General RUSSELL. Certainly.

78. General GRUNERT. When Rohl was incapacitated or partially so, on account of his personal habits, do you know whether or not the work slackened or stopped because of such incapacity?

Colonel HUNT. No, sir. I do not know that.

78. General GRUNERT. There is an intimation that when Rohl was on the job and sober, he was a go-getter, and was a driver, and so forth. Does that mean that when he was not so on the job the work was delayed and waited for him to again get in such capacity, or what?

Colonel HUNT. I did not mean to give any impression of that nature. I do not believe that to be the case. I found no evidence that such was the case. I found plenty of evidence to the effect that whether Rohl was there or not in an advisory capacity primarily, it was Wyman's purpose to drive everybody, even to the point of driving them crazy. He was a driver; there is no doubt about that. I doubt very much if there is anything in the record or any testimony anywhere to the effect that Mr. Rohl's condition of sobriety or lack of it at any time over there had any delaying effect on any part of the work. That is my opinion of it.

80. General GRUNERT. So, as far as it came to your attention during your investigation, you did not run across any delays that you attributed to Rohl's intention to cause such delay so as to handicap the work in its ultimate completion or as to the date of completion?

[772] Colonel HUNT. No, sir; I did not.

81. General GRUNERT. Had other contractors been on the job, in your opinion, from what you have learned, would they have had the same labor troubles, the same troubles in getting priorities on materials, the same troubles about getting priorities on shipments, and so forth, or do you have any reason to believe that others could have gotten materials more quickly and have done the job more quickly?

Colonel HUNT. I doubt very much if any other contractor over there would have had any better luck with priorities or shipments than the contracting company that had the work in charge.

82. General GRUNERT. If any local contractors had been given contracts, did they have any equipment or material locally that could have been used on the contract that were denied to the Hawaiian Constructors who did the job?

Colonel HUNT. I do not believe they had any equipment that would have been denied to the Hawaiian Constructors.

83. General GRUNERT. How about material that the Hawaiian Constructors had to get from the States? Did local contractors have any such material on hand?

Colonel HUNT. No, sir; I am sure they did not, because the materials that had to come from the States would not be material that they would carry in stock.

84. General GRUNERT. A great deal of the material did have to come from the States, in your opinion?

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir, and would have in any event, regardless of who the contractor may have been. The Hawaiian Constructors came into existence over there early in the year 1941 at a time when the amount of work contemplated to be done was only a matter of a million or a little over a million dollars. It was known at that time by the Corps of Engineers that additional work was coming up, but to what extent additional work was coming up I doubt if anybody knew, since the bulk of it came up after the attack. But I have no doubt—to finish the answer to the original question—that had Colonel Wyman so desired he could have made far greater use of the local contractors, their personnel and organizations, or their equipment, than was done.

85. General GRUNERT. And if he had done so, have you reached the conclusion or have you considered whether or not that would have sped the completion date?

Colonel HUNT. General, that question is so broad* that I do not think any man on earth could ever answer it. It involves a philosophy of management, the difference between cost-plus work and bid-price work. My own way of attempting a job of that nature would have been very, very different from Colonel Wyman's. At the time I was there—and I left in 1940—I knew that the volume of work then on hand was creating a labor problem. Before that labor problem ever arose I was very keenly aware of it, because we were about to do work which, when I estimated it and estimated the labor required, I saw that there was more work than there was labor to do it. The Navy was doing a lot of work, and I did not want to be left there in a difficult position and, for that reason, extended myself to the limit that I could go within the law and regulations to get all of the local contractors corralled and working [774] on our work so that we would have available their equipment, their technical supervision, and their labor. I believe that that could have been extended; and I know that in the middle of 1941 there had been a great decline in the total volume of Army work under way. Seen in that light, if I had had the work to do that had then been given to the District Engineer to do, I would have bent every effort to get these good lump-sum contractors at work on lump-sum work, so that there would not have been involved at that time, unless over my dead body, any cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. As to what score I would have made by using my method as compared with the score that Wyman made using his method, I am not the proper referee.

General GRUNERT. During your investigation did you happen to find out much, if anything, about the contract that covered construction connected with the Air Warning Service? Do you know whether that was considered on a high priority, or did you find out much, if anything, about that particular phase of the contract?

Colonel HUNT. I found out initially nothing about that particular phase. It was entirely apart from instructions under which I was working, and in the course of that investigation no hint of anything in connection with that work ever reached my ears. Therefore I had no allegation to justify my investigation of that angle. I was interested in it, of course, and talked outside of office hours with friends of mine over there, as a matter of curiosity, and I seem to recall some comment by somebody to the effect that there was a great deal of difficulty in getting over there men who were [775] sufficiently familiar with the work to do it properly, and also some difficulty in getting over the equipment that was involved in the work. That was wholly unofficial. Technical equipment to be used in the warning service system.

87. General GRUNERT. Were the personnel you referred to, by "technical equipment," to operate such a system or to set it up?

Colonel HUNT. No, I believe not. As I recall it, it was persons who were familiar with the assembly of various parts of a warning unit, how it was to be put together in a proper way and function properly.

88. General FRANK. This was largely hearsay evidence, however, on your part, wasn't it?

Colonel HUNT. That is true. However, I believe that it was Colonel H. B. Nurse from whom I got that information. I would not even be positive of that, because it was not in the scope of my investigation and was purely personal interest.

89. General GRUNERT. That finishes my line. You may continue with yours.

90. General RUSSELL. Just one other question, Colonel. I want to go back to this period following December 7 where apparently Wyman and Rohl worked long hours and very hard. Was that the impression that you had conveyed or attempted to convey earlier in your testimony?

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir, as a part of an answer to some other question probably; but to put it directly, I will say that I was very definitely convinced by a great deal of testimony, by people who knew, that Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman, his operations officer Colonel Robinson, Colonel Howard Nurse, and other top men in that construction organization did work what would amount [776] to two full ordinary days every day for rather prolonged periods. I was particularly interested in the last five days that Wyman was there. It had been alleged before the Tenney Committee (as a matter of fact, it was a matter of sworn testimony before the Tenney Committee) that Wyman lay dead drunk in the Pleasanton Hotel for the last five days he was there. Well, one of the allegations I was investigating had to do with the statement that Wyman was inebriated most or at least a large part of the time over there. I was very careful to find out what happened, and I was absolutely convinced, and I think anybody who wishes to look at the record thoroughly will be convinced, that Rohl and particularly Wyman worked indefatigably during those five days. I could find nobody to indicate that he had been drunk at any time during those five days. I saw the physical evidence of the work that he did, the letters that he wrote, the directives that he had started long before but had not completed and which he then completed, which must have taken his very careful and concentrated attention for long, long hours. Really I am amazed at the amount of work that that man

did during those five days, and if he was drunk he was certainly an amazing man.

91. General RUSSELL. Now, in order to get the record straight, Colonel, you referred to doing two days' work almost every day, by Rohl and Wyman. I will ask you whether or not that description refers to the period after December 7, 1941.

Colonel HUNT. It does; yes, sir. I know that he kept two shifts of office personnel.

92. General RUSSELL. It does not refer to the period prior to [771] December 7, 1941?

Colonel HUNT. As I stated it, it does not.

93. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Colonel HUNT. That may have been done before December 7; I do not know. I doubt it, but I did not mean to indicate it had been done.

94. General RUSSELL. All right; that is all.

95. General GRUNERT. Any further questions?

96. General FRANK. Did you investigate Wyman's conduct with respect to the use of liquor while you were over there?

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir; I did.

97. General FRANK. What were your general conclusions on that?

Colonel HUNT. My general conclusion was that he was a two-fisted drinker and that he drank on every appropriate occasion for drinking, and some that were not appropriate, but that he did not get drunk, I mean to the point of being visibly drunk to an observer.

98. General FRANK. Did it interfere with his work?

Colonel HUNT. I feel quite certain that it did not.

99. General FRANK. At any time?

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir. I was unable to unearth a single instance in which that man interrupted or delayed or slowed down his work as a consequence of drinking.

100. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether the drinking that he did do incapacitated him from using good judgment in doing that work?

Colonel HUNT. Well, sir, I think the man used some execrable judgment, but whether that was due to any liquor he [778] drank or the mental constitution of the man, I do not know. I considered that he considered himself a Napoleon of construction and industry, and was intolerant of other people's views; his alone were good. Now, whether that was a matter of an exalted ego that had always been there, or of an exalted ego inspired by liquor, I do not know. I rather think that it was constitutional with the man, and I doubt if his drinking had much to do with it.

101. General FRANK. That is all.

102. General GRUNERT. There appear no further questions. Thank you very much for the giving of your time and helping us out. (The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF CASE B. RAFTER, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you state to the Board your name, address, and occupation, please?

Mr. RAFTER. Case B. Rafter, 2434 Thirty-ninth Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C. I am a project manager at the Veterans' Administration, Construction Service.

2. General GRUNERT. Mr. Rafter, the Board wants facts, and I believe you have some facts about records that we would like to get.

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

3. General GRUNERT. Are you going to ask the questions, General Frank?

[779] 4. General FRANK. Major Clausen will ask them.

5. General GRUNERT. The Assistant Recorder will ask you some questions about some records which I wish you would tell us about.

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

6. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Rafter, your superior is Colonel Tripp?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

7. Major CLAUSEN. And your services were made available to the Board for the purpose of analyzing the job orders and the contract with which we are concerned?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

8. Major CLAUSEN. And in pursuance of that you have selected from the various job orders those that pertain to the air raid warning system?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

9. Major CLAUSEN. The underground gasoline storage tanks and certain other installations in the Hawaiian Islands; is that correct?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

10. Major CLAUSEN. You have prepared for us and the Board summaries of these various job orders which I hold here in my hand; is that correct?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Now, so that the Board may know, what has been your schooling in doing work of this kind?

Mr. RAFTER. I have been in construction work since graduation from Lehigh University in 1913, and for the past 13 years I have been with the Veterans Administration, Construction Service. Prior to that I was in private practice [780] as a consulting engineer on construction work.

12. Major CLAUSEN. Now, Mr. Rafter, without taking each one of these up separately, I am going to ask you whether the summary that is attached to the respective job orders correctly sets forth the information that has been received from the job orders.

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir. That is a summary of the information given in the job orders, and it sets forth the items which General Frank asked to have listed as shown on the front of each summary.

13. Major CLAUSEN. Would you just take one (this is the Mt. Kaala having to do with the air raid warning system) and indicate to the Board just what you have done with regard to that particular Mt. Kaala project, and I do not think we shall have to go through the rest.

Mr. RAFTER. This job order where the job orders were numbered—

14. General FRANK. What job order is this?

Mr. RAFTER. Oh, I see: the United States Engineer Office of Honolulu issued job orders under Contract No. W-414-Eng-602, and this particular contract covered construction of aircraft warning system;

and job order No. 1 was a proceed order to construct 9,000 feet of access road from Kolekole Pass Road to the proposed site of the cableway at Mt. Kaala, and then under direction I put down the estimated cost.

15. General FRANK. Which you got from the job order?

Mr. RAFTER. Which I got from the job order, our addenda thereto, the commencement date, the estimated date of completion, and the name of the supervisor or, in case he was not named, [781] his title, as the Area Engineer of the 3rd Field Area in this case was J. J. Kestly.

16. Major CLAUSEN. These various job orders to which you refer are the job orders that were handed you by General Frank and myself?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

17. Major CLAUSEN. These job orders (indicating)?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

18. Major CLAUSEN. And in turn, for the information of the Board, we have a whole file drawer full of them, but these are the ones that we selected as bearing upon the matters in which the Board is interested.

Mr. RAFTER. May I amplify my answer, in that I went through the files too, to see if there were any other job orders pertaining to these subjects which have not been given me. I found none.

19. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Rafter, I hand you the summary concerning Mt. Kaala and ask you, did you prepare that summary from the job orders that are attached to that summary?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

20. Major CLAUSEN. And it is all correct, is it?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

21. Major CLAUSEN. That refers to Job Orders 2.1, 2.0, and 2.2; is that correct?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

22. Major CLAUSEN. All right. We will suggest that this will be the exhibit next in order, which would be No. 4.

Colonel WEST. The reporter will please mark the document Exhibit No. 4.

[782] (Summary of job orders in re Mt. Kaala was marked Exhibit No. 4 and received in evidence.)

23. Major CLAUSEN. Now, Mr. Rafter, I show you the summary referring to the Kokee air raid warning system which refers to Job Orders 23.0, 23.1, and ask you, did you prepare that summary from those job orders?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

24. Major CLAUSEN. And the summary is correct, is it, from the information?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

25. Major CLAUSEN. All right. We offer this as exhibit next in order.

26. Colonel WEST. These are all related. We may make this 4-A.

27. Major CLAUSEN. All right, sir.

(Summary of job orders in re Kokee was marked Exhibit No. 4-A and received in evidence.)

28. Major CLAUSEN. Now, Mr. Rafter, I show you the summary referring to the Haleakala air raid warning system which covers

Job Order 41.0, and ask you whether the summary is correct and refers to that job order.

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir, it does.

29. Major CLAUSEN. I ask that this be marked 4-B.

(Summary of job order in re Haleakala was marked Exhibit No. 4-B and received in evidence.)

30. Major CLAUSEN. Now I show you the summary referring to the Mauna Loa air raid warning system, referring to Job Order 46.0, and ask you if you prepared that summary from that job order.

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

[783] 31. Major CLAUSEN. Correct, is it?

Mr. RAFTER. That is correct.

32. Major CLAUSEN. I ask that this be marked 4-C.

(Summary of job order in re Mauna Loa was marked Exhibit No. 4-C and received in evidence.)

33. Major CLAUSEN. I show you the summary referring to the Bellows Field underground gasoline storage tanks and Job Orders 20.1, 20.120, 20.130. In addition to that you have affixed Job Orders 20.140 and 20.150. Did you prepare that summary?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

34. Major CLAUSEN. Referring to those job orders?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

35. Major CLAUSEN. And the information on there is correct?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

36. Major CLAUSEN. I ask that this be marked as the next exhibit.

(Summary of job orders in re Bellows Field, etc., was marked Exhibit No. 4-D and received in evidence.)

37. Major CLAUSEN. This (indicating) is the summary referring to the underground gasoline storage tanks for Barking Sands, Job Order 21.1. Did you prepare that summary from that job order?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

38. Major CLAUSEN. And is it correct?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

39. Major CLAUSEN. I ask that that be marked as the exhibit next in order.

[784] (Summary of job order in re Barking Sands was marked Exhibit No. 4-E and received in evidence.)

40. Major CLAUSEN. This is the summary referring to Morse Field underground gasoline storage tanks, Job Order 25.0 [indicating]. Did you prepare that summary?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

41. Major CLAUSEN. Referring to that job order, and is it correct?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

42. Major CLAUSEN. I ask that that be marked the exhibit next in order.

(Summary of job order in re Morse Field was marked Exhibit No. 4-F and received in evidence.)

43. Major CLAUSEN. I show you this summary referring to Wheeler Field bombproof ammunition storage structures, Job Order 5.0, and ask you whether you prepared that summary from that job order.

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

44. Major CLAUSEN. That is correct, is it?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

45. Major CLAUSEN. I ask that this be marked the next exhibit.
(Summary of job order in re Wheeler Field was marked Exhibit No. 4-G and received in evidence.)

46. Major CLAUSEN. Hickam Field is this next summary that I show you, referring to magazines, Job Orders 7.0, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, and ask whether you prepared that summary.

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

47. Major CLAUSEN. Referring to those job orders?

[785] Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

48. Major CLAUSEN. You got that information from them, and is it correct?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

49. Major CLAUSEN. I ask that this be marked the next exhibit.
(Summary of job orders in re Hickam Field was marked Exhibit No. 4-H and received in evidence.)

50. Major CLAUSEN. This (indicating) is the Punchbowl fire control station, summary Job Order 14.0: I ask you whether you prepared that summary.

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

51. Major CLAUSEN. From that job order, is that correct?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

52. Major CLAUSEN. And the information on there is correct?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

53. Major CLAUSEN. I ask that be marked the next exhibit.
(Summary of job order in re Punchbowl was marked Exhibit No. 4-I and received in evidence.)

54. Major CLAUSEN. This is Diamond Head fire control station Job Order 15.0 (indicating). Did you prepare that summary?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

55. Major CLAUSEN. Based on that job order?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

56. Major CLAUSEN. And it is correct, is it?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

57. Major CLAUSEN. I ask that be marked as the next exhibit.
(Summary of job order in re Diamond Head was marked Exhibit No. 4-J and received in evidence.)

[786] 58. Major CLAUSEN. And this is Kawaihoa Camp, power house, Job Order 13.0. Did you prepare that summary?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

59. Major CLAUSEN. Referring to that job order?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

60. Major CLAUSEN. And is that information correct?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

61. Major CLAUSEN. From the job order?

Mr. RAFTER. From the job order.

62. Major CLAUSEN. I ask that be marked as the next exhibit.
(Summary of job order in re Kawaihoa Camp was marked Exhibit No. 4-K and received in evidence.)

63. Major CLAUSEN. This (indicating) is the Fort Shafter radio transmitter station, Job Order 17.0. Did you prepare that summary on that job order?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

64. Major CLAUSEN. And the information is correct as taken from the job order?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

65. Major CLAUSEN. I ask that be marked as the next exhibit.

(Summary of job order in re Fort Shafter was marked Exhibit No. 4-L and received in evidence.)

66. Major CLAUSEN. Hickam Field: armament, fire control, supply and repair building, Job Order 29.0. Did you prepare that summary from that job order?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

67. Major CLAUSEN. And it is correct, is it, as taken from the job order?

[787] Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

68. Major CLAUSEN. I ask that be marked as the next exhibit.

(Summary of job order in re Hickam Field was marked Exhibit No. 4-M and received in evidence.)

69. Major CLAUSEN. This is Fort Kamehameha, Job Order 24.0. Did you prepare this summary?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

70. Major CLAUSEN. And it is correct as taken from the same?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir.

71. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

(Summary of job order in re Fort Kamehameha was marked Exhibit No. 4-N and received in evidence.)

72. Major CLAUSEN. Now, with regard to completion dates, Mr. Rafter, did you prepare, for the House Committee on Military Affairs, a study which is set forth on pages 39 and 40, giving various estimated dates of completion, by dates and percentages, which I hand you?

Mr. RAFTER. Yes, sir, I prepared the original.

73. Major CLAUSEN. And from where did you get the information to prepare the data which are set forth in that document?

Mr. RAFTER. That information was supplied to the Committee; it was at the office of the Committee on Military Affairs, supplied by the Army Engineer Office.

Pardon me. Shall I go into detail, just what the sources were?

74. Major CLAUSEN. I would like you to do that.

Mr. RAFTER. The percentage dates, the estimated dates set forth in these sheets, that I was asked to go through the [788] records and find the percentage which was complete at the date set forth, and also the percentage completion reported of December 1st. The reason for selecting December 1st, the reports were made monthly and they were made up in order to establish the amount of fee due the contractor, so that that would be paid him, and it was paid on the percentage of completion of the work; and I went through the file in the same manner in which I went through to arrive at these summaries and got these figures off and tabulated them, and this schedule was made up from that information.

[789] 75. General FRANK. The job-orders from which you made these reports that have just been submitted in evidence were from the official files of the Corps of Engineers, is that correct?

Mr. RAFTER. They were so stated, in the letter of transmission, sir.

76. General FRANK. So they constitute authentic records of the job-orders, which really were the contract for doing the work in Hawaii?

Mr. RAFTER. May I explain and amplify the answer? The contracts set forth certain work to be done in a certain time, after order to proceed was given. The job-order constitutes the order to proceed and describes the work to be done under that order.

77. Major CLAUSEN. I think it might be advisable to offer in evidence this summary, contained on pages 39 and 40 of this House Military Affairs Committee Report. Unless there is objection, I will ask that it be marked as Exhibit 5, that being just the summary.

(The Summary referred to was marked as Exhibit 5, and received in evidence.)

78. General GRUNERT. Are there any further questions?

General FRANK. No.

79. General GRUNERT. There being no further questions, thank you very much for coming over here to help us.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 12:25 o'clock p. m., the Board recessed until 2 o'clock p. m.)

[790]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board, at 2 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JAMES A. MOLLISON, MOBILE AIR SERVICE COMMAND, MOBILE, ALA.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

General MOLLISON. Brigadier General James A. Mollison, Mobile Air Service Command; Mobile, Ala.

2. General GRUNERT. General, the Board is attempting to get at the facts and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. We hope from your testimony to get some leads, or to throw some light on this subject. With that in view, I have a few questions to ask you, and then I think General Frank has a few that relate to some special subjects which he is investigating.

Will you tell me what your position was in Hawaii in 1941?

General MOLLISON. I was Chief of Staff of the 7th Air Force.

3. General GRUNERT. And who was in command of that Air Force?

General MOLLISON. General Frederick L. Martin.

4. General GRUNERT. In the Roberts Commission report there is one statement to the effect that General Short says he talked with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch for two or three hours on November 27, and that General Martin and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Mollison, were there.

General MOLLISON. That is true, sir.

5. General GRUNERT. Can you from your memory tell us about [791] what happened during that 2- or 3-hour conference? What was talked about? What did they confer on?

General MOLLISON. The purpose of the conference was to show the Navy the radiogram that General Short had received from the War Department, and to discuss with them their plans, and to inform them of the plans of the Army.

6. General GRUNERT. Do you recall just what Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch told General Short, General Martin, and yourself, as to their plan?

General MOLLISON. I don't believe I can give a verbatim report on that. It generally dealt with the provisions of the radios, which consisted of advising that war was imminent, that we should be particularly watchful for acts of sabotage, that nothing should be done to excite the civil population; under no circumstances were we to commit the first overt act. Considerable of this conversation had a bearing on Army planes that were supposed to be sent to Wake, P-40s, and from the general tenor of thing it appears that the Army had offered the use of these P-40s at Wake.

We had at the time discussions as to how they could be landed, from carriers, and so forth, put them off of carriers some 200 miles at sea. The one point was brought up—in fact, I brought it up—that sending our P-40s to Wake was contrary to our mission, which was the defense of Oahu. I recall distinctly one piece of conversation between Admiral Kimmel and, at that time, Captain McWilliams, who was Plans Officer.

7. General FRANK. Was it not McMorris?

General MOLLISON. No, McMorris is a different man. This is either Williams or McWilliams, who was the Chief of Plans [792] for Admiral Kimmel; and in sort of glossing over that reason for keeping P-40s, Admiral Kimmel asked this chap, "What do you think the chances of a surprise attack on Oahu would be?" and this chap stood up and said, "None, Admiral—none!"

8. General GRUNERT. The evidence that we have had before us so far indicates that that was Captain McMorris, who gave that information to the conferees at that time.

General MOLLISON. I may be wrong on that, General, but it seems to me that it was either Williams or McWilliams.

9. General GRUNERT. I think it might be well if I read you this message of November 27, in order to refresh your mind, and then ask some questions concerning those things about the message that might have been discussed. The message, under date of November 27, reads as follows:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot (repeat Not) be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not comma (repeat not comma) be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat Not comma to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five [793] so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

(signed) MARSHALL.

Did they discuss under that what action both the Navy and the Army were going to take?

General MOLLISON. I know that Rainbow 5 was discussed at the time. That is 2½ years ago, and it is a little bit difficult for me to remember the exact statements that were made.

10. General GRUNERT. Did General Short explain to Admiral Kimmel what his decision was, and what action the Army was going to take?

General MOLLISON. I don't believe he did, at that time, General. My recollection of that is that we went back to Department Headquarters, and there, General Short made the decision that we were going on alert No. 2, as provided by SOP, Hawaiian Department.

11. General GRUNERT. Alert No. 2, or No. 1?

General MOLLISON. Alert No. 2.

12. General GRUNERT. I think probably your memory does not serve you correctly, because they went on alert No. 1. What was the alert that they went on? What did that encompass?

General MOLLISON. That was the antisabotage alert.

13. General GRUNERT. That happens to be alert No. 1.

Was the question of the reconnaissance to be undertaken discussed?

General MOLLISON. I don't recall that it was, General.

14. General GRUNERT. Aside from that opinion or judgment expressed by the staff officer of the Navy, to Admiral Kimmel, [794] that the possibility or probability of a surprise attack was practically nil, was there any discussion about a possible air attack?

General MOLLISON. There was none, that I recall. No, I don't recall any discussion about any surprise air attack. We had been training for that, for some period of time, but I don't recall that that was discussed.

15. General GRUNERT. You stated that after the conference, General Short went back to his headquarters and there made the decision to go on the alert against sabotage?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

16. General GRUNERT. Was there any other discussion as to whether or not to go on any other alert—for instance, No. 2, that envisaged air attack, or No. 3, that envisaged an all-out attack?

General MOLLISON. No, sir. No, sir; I don't recall any discussion of that kind.

17. General GRUNERT. On behalf of General Martin or yourself, was there any question in your mind as to whether or not other measures than going on a sabotage alert should be taken?

General MOLLISON. No, sir. I recall stating to General Martin on our way back to Hickam Field that under the circumstances it appeared to me that General Short had made a very good decision.

18. General GRUNERT. Were you aware of any other messages that had been received prior to that, through the Naval sources, as to what might be considered a warning of things that might come?

[795] General MOLLISON. Only this general talk. In fact, there were several messages in connection with increasing the defenses of Wake and Midway.

19. General GRUNERT. Did you have any knowledge of a message on the same date, November 27, received by the Navy, which said, "This is a war warning"?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir. The Navy read that to us.

20. General GRUNERT. Was that discussed on that same day?

General MOLLISON. That was.

21. General GRUNERT. What was their conclusion as to the "war warning" message? that it was not a war warning for Hawaii?

General MOLLISON. I think that they considered it a war warning,

but for some unknown reason—that is, I can't say “for some unknown reason,” but it is unknown to me—something came out, that there was an attack expected against Malaya, on December 2.

22. General GRUNERT. But it did not occur to any of you, at that conference—or did it?—that that war warning message, in connection with the Chief of Staff's message, constituted a warning to you people in Hawaii to be prepared for anything, not only sabotage but for anything else?

General MOLLISON. It could not be construed as anything else but a war-warning message, there is no question about that.

23. General GRUNERT. What did “war warning” mean to you?

General MOLLISON. That means that a state of war practically exists, or, if it does not exist, it was imminent. However, the information that our A-2 was getting daily from this Naval [796] Intelligence Commander Layton, indicated that they were pretty well convinced that they had the location of every Japanese ship. In fact, if that statement was made once to me it was made a half a dozen times.

24. General FRANK. Did the Navy give you those locations?

General MOLLISON. No.

25. General FRANK. Or did they just tell you that they had it?

General MOLLISON. They said they knew where they were located.

26. General GRUNERT. Then in your own mind, did you have every confidence in the Navy to the effect that if anything was coming near Hawaii, you would be duly informed?

General MOLLISON. Yes, indeed! They were also charged with off-shore patrol, which was supposed to give us warning in plenty of time, in the event that anything was moving in.

27. General GRUNERT. As far as the Air Force Command was concerned, under alert No. 1, the sabotage alert, how much time under that alert would it take you then to go to another alert and be ready to take the air to fight?

General MOLLISON. That could be done inside of an hour, to get the planes in dispersed position. They would not all be. We wouldn't be armed with our bombs in that length of time, but we could get them all to the dispersed position. I should say it would take two to three hours to arm the planes and have them on their way.

28. General GRUNERT. Then as far as you were concerned, you thought that the alert for sabotage was sufficient?

General MOLLISON. I thought it was a good decision, General, because we were very short of experienced troops in [797] our air force. We had under this SOP certain positions that we had to guard—down-town, and so forth—which had been modified somewhat; but if we had to take up positions, guard the bridges and the electric plants and the waterworks, and so forth, it would have left us in pretty bad shape; and if you could move all of your stuff in, it appeared to me that it was a much better plan than dispersing your airplanes all over the different airdromes; and I think it was a good plan, with the instructions that we had.

29. General GRUNERT. Now, either one of you go ahead, if anything occurs to you. I did not know how far this subject might lead.

Had you not gone on alert No. 1, what would have been your condition to meet an attack?

General MOLLISON. I do not think it would have been a bit better, with the exception of the fact that they disabled a good many planes

on the ground that perhaps might have been unhurt or undamaged if we had had them in dispersed position.

30. General GRUNERT. But ordinarily, without going on alert No. 2, would your planes have been more dispersed than when you went on alert No. 1?

General MOLLISON. No, no.

31. General GRUNERT. Would they have been less concentrated than they were under alert No. 1?

General MOLLISON. No; that was just the place. They had them on the ramps tied down in their normal positions.

32. General GRUNERT. What did the SOP require of you in the line of taking care of your own, if not instructed to go on alert No. 1? In other words, there was Field Manual 100-5, I [798] believe, that made each separate Commander responsible for his own safety, including danger from the air?

General MOLLISON. Well, that is very true. We would have had these planes in dispersed position, which would have required—oh, I would say it would take about, perhaps five times the number of guards to properly safeguard them from sabotage. They would have been safer from air attack.

33. General GRUNERT. Hasn't each plane a ground crew?

General MOLLISON. That is true.

34. General GRUNERT. Ordinarily, is it the responsibility of the ground crew to take care of that plane, under all circumstances?

General MOLLISON. That's true, General. They are supposed to maintain them and furnish incidental protection to them, but that would mean that you would have to keep these people on the go 24 hours a day, which is hardly practicable; so you would have to have in addition to the combat crews and the maintenance crews, additional guards.

35. General GRUNERT. Were not the fields themselves normally fairly well protected against sabotage?

General MOLLISON. No, they were not. There were no perimeter fences. We had a little strip of barbed wire, which we got through a fluke, around the perimeter, or the vulnerable perimeter of Hickam Field. Wheeler Field was wide open, as well as Bellows. They didn't have man-proof fences or even barbed wire around either of the other two fields.

36. General GRUNERT. General Russell?

37. General RUSSELL. General, in the interest of clarity in the record, I wanted to ask some questions, here, about the [799] time required to get your fighter planes in the air and to engage the enemy. On this day, December 7, 1941, were the weapons in your fighter planes?

General MOLLISON. Yes, indeed!

38. General RUSSELL. Was there any ammunition in your fighter planes?

General MOLLISON. In some of them; not in all of them.

39. General RUSSELL. What is your estimate of the time that would have been required to have gotten the ammunition into all of the planes, or do you have that data?

General MOLLISON. I haven't that data. I can say this, that within eleven minutes after the members got to some of the planes, they were in the air.

40. General RUSSELL. We have had testimony to the effect that if the personnel was at the plane, then the plane could have been gotten into the air in four minutes.

General MOLLISON. That's true; I think you can "scramble" your planes in four minutes.

41. General RUSSELL. We have also had testimony to the effect that if you had the personnel at the airfield, but not in the planes, it would have required thirty minutes to have gotten the planes in the air.

General MOLLISON. That is about right.

42. General RUSSELL. Then, we have had testimony to the effect that if the troops were away from the field, offices, and headquarters, and the troops, in the quarters, or with routine training in progress, or with recreation in progress, to have gotten that personnel to the field and into the planes would have required four hours, and to have gotten the [800] planes into the air?

General MOLLISON. Well, that is normal procedure for us. We feel that, either on the 30-minute alert, the 1-hour alert, or the 4-hour alert.

43. General RUSSELL. Then is it true, General, that in estimating the time element to get your planes in the air and in contact with hostile aircraft or other targets, there would have been two factors, out there—the time to get your personnel to the plane, and, second, the time to get the ammunition into the plane?

General MOLLISON. Well, I don't think that that would normally hold, General. You have certain planes that are on the alert. That means, ready to go, right now. Other planes are on 2-hours notice; others, on 4-hour notice. Those that are supposed to go, right now, are supposed to be ready, with everything.

44. General GRUNERT. Is that normal, to have some ready all the time?

General MOLLISON. Oh, yes, yes; indeed!

45. General GRUNERT. Were they set aside, or were they grouped with the rest of them?

General MOLLISON. Generally, they do that by squadrons, General. The squadron is on the alert. That's the "alert squadron" or the "alert squadrons." Certain ones of them are given a little more relaxation, to be ready after two hours, and others, four hours.

46. General GRUNERT. Did these alerted planes in each squadron get in the air and put up a fight?

General MOLLISON. No, sir! The only place that we got [801] in the air came from a field that the Japs didn't know we had—Haleiwa. There were several that tried to take off from Bellows, but they were shot down on the take-off. These planes were over the fields before anybody knew that they were coming. The first that I knew of it was when the bombs were dropping.

47. General RUSSELL. General, I have been attempting to recreate, or to create, in my mind, the picture of Oahu, had General Short elected, on the 27th day of November, to have gone to alert 2; which, as I understand alert 2, provided for the men to be at the planes, with the ammunition in the planes, ready to go, to repel a surprise air attack.

48. General FRANK. I think that is alert 3.

49. General RUSSELL. As I understood, it was 2. I may be confused on it, as I understood, alert 2 provided against an air attack; but let us assume we had gone to 3, in order that you could have been in position to have met the surprise attack that did come in, there. This message came on the morning of November 27, that General Grunert discussed with you. The attack was made on the morning of December 7, which was nine or ten days later. Now, to have remained on the major alert, from the Air Force standpoint, with the men at the planes, for a period of ten days, what sort of tax on your personnel would that have been?

General MOLLISON. Oh, it is difficult, it is really difficult, to keep your people constantly on the alert for that period of time; and frankly, we didn't have the people over there at that time, in either pilots or in maintenance crews, to keep them on the alert all that time.

[802] 50. General GRUNERT. What was done after December 7th? Were they not then on alert all the time?

General MOLLISON. They were, indeed; but we had to break the period and put a lesser number of planes available for the alert for the first three days, until Wednesday I should say, because nobody got any sleep and they were all completely worn out by Wednesday and Thursday, and we had to revamp and revise the whole scheme.

51. General RUSSELL. Did I understand you to say that in revamping the scheme you reduced the number of planes that were on the major alert?

General MOLLISON. Yes.

52. General RUSSELL. And thereby gave some of the personnel time off?

General MOLLISON. A chance to rest.

53. General GRUNERT. Then, Alert No. 2 did not visualize what you had to do after December 7. In other words, it did not visualize that the alert might last for a considerable length of time, and therefore you had to get up a scheme that you could carry into effect effectively.

General MOLLISON. That is right.

54. General GRUNERT. Alert No. 2 is primarily against an air raid, whereas No. 3 combines with No. 2 in getting the infantry out. That is the primary difference, it is not?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

[803] 55. General GRUNERT. And Alert No. 2 did visualize an air attack?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

56. General FRANK. Did General Martin have any conversation with Short relative to the type of alert on that morning that you went back to General Short's office and to the Navy?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

57. General FRANK. What were General Martin's comments to General Short on that?

General MOLLISON. The decision was made by General Short. The first we knew of it we were out in General Hayes' office, and they came out and said we would go on this alert.

58. General FRANK. Was this before General Martin had any conversation with him about the alert whatever?

General MOLLISON. He had had no conversation other than this general conversation over at the Navy Yard.

59. General FRANK. Was General Martin in full agreement with this No. 1 Alert?

General MOLLISON. Yes; I think he was.

60. General FRANK. That carried with it some sort of a conviction that there was not going to be an air attack?

General MOLLISON. That is right, too.

61. General FRANK. Was that the general feeling?

General MOLLISON. That was the general feeling.

62. General FRANK. How far down?

General MOLLISON. I should say, through all the echelons. Nobody in Hawaii felt that there would be a surprise attack on Hawaii.

63. General FRANK. What led you into that frame of mind?

General MOLLISON. I think, the confidence and optimism of [804] the Navy more than anything else.

64. General FRANK. That had to be supplemented by your belief in the effectiveness of the Navy for you to have had a similar feeling?

General MOLLISON. That is very true.

65. General FRANK. Did you have confidence in the effectiveness of the Navy?

General MOLLISON. I had this confidence, General, that if they knew the location of every ship of the Japanese Fleet we would certainly have sufficient warning before there would be a surprise attack.

66. General FRANK. Had they assured you that they did know the position of all the ships of the Japanese Fleet?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

67. General FRANK. That is all that you had—just the general information that they had the information?

General MOLLISON. That is correct.

68. General FRANK. You did not yourself know where these Jap ships were, did you?

General MOLLISON. We had asked many questions of the Naval Intelligence which they were very chary about supplying to us, stating that this was information that they knew about and that were not in a position to pass out any details. That occurred not only as to the location of the Japanese Fleet, but on many other items.

69. General FRANK. Who in particular gave you the assurance that you were so well covered by the Navy?

General MOLLISON. Colonel Rayley was our A-2 at that time. He was working directly with Commander Layton, who was the Naval Intelligence Officer.

70. General FRANK. Layton, of the Navy, was the man who gave you the assurance that they knew what they were doing?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

71. General FRANK. Did you by any chance know that between the 25th and the 30th of November there was a Japanese task force down in the Marshall Islands?

General MOLLISON. No, sir; I did not.

72. General FRANK. Commander Layton did not tell you about that?

General MOLLISON. No, sir. I am sure he did not tell Rayley or anybody else, because that is the first time I have ever heard that mentioned.

73. General FRANK. What would have been your feeling had you known that there was a Japanese task force at Jaluit?

General MOLLISON. I would have had an entirely different idea of the whole picture. That is within striking distance of Hawaii. I think we would have tightened up our belts considerably.

74. General FRANK. You knew that the Navy was sending out task forces from time to time?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

75. General FRANK. Did you know when they went out?

General MOLLISON. No, sir.

76. General FRANK. Did you by any chance know where they went?

General MOLLISON. No, sir.

77. General FRANK. You mentioned some time back something about there being air troops on guard at installations down town.

General MOLLISON. We had certain obligations to fulfill as far as policing and guarding was concerned, in the first [306] Police District of Honolulu.

78. General FRANK. At the same time you stated that you were short of trained troops to accomplish the air work that was necessary at your air station?

General MOLLISON. That is right.

79. General FRANK. How did it happen that you could spare troops for ground guard duty downtown?

General MOLLISON. We could not, General.

80. General FRANK. Who made that decision?

General MOLLISON. That was General Short's decision.

81. General FRANK. How many troops were involved?

General MOLLISON. Total Air Force troops?

82. General FRANK. Yes.

General MOLLISON. Approximately 7,500.

83. General FRANK. 7,500 were turned over for ground duty?

General MOLLISON. No, sir; 3 battalions of 500 men each.

84. General FRANK. 1,500?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

85. General GRUNERT. Was this normal procedure or under Alert 1?

General MOLLISON. That was under Alert 1.

86. General FRANK. Let us get to this massing of planes on the apron. At Hickam Field you had about 36 P-18's and about 12 B-17's?

General MOLLISON. Six B-17's in commission; six out of commission.

87. General FRANK. There were 12 dispersed?

General MOLLISON. You might say 10, General, because there were two that were pretty well cannibalized. I do not think you could have moved them.

88. General FRANK. There was room at Hickam Field to have [307] dispersed that number of planes?

General MOLLISON. Plenty of room.

89. General FRANK. You had barbed wire along the north stretch and down to John Roger Airport?

General MOLLISON. That is correct.

90. General FRANK. You had machine guns enfilading the area in front of the barbed wire?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

91. General FRANK. Had you dispersed your planes and put the crews sleeping in the planes, with machine-gun ammunition at the guns, so that in case of attack the guns in the planes could have been manned, the ground and air crews could have taken care of those planes by having the men sleep in the vicinity of the planes, could they not?

General MOLLISON. I do not believe, General, that that would have been considered an adequate defense. I would not consider it so.

92. General FRANK. If the planes had been dispersed the machine guns in the planes could have been used for the ground defense as well as air defense in case of attack?

General MOLLISON. That is true.

93. General FRANK. And the barbed wire entanglement with the machine-gun defense covering the front of it would have deterred saboteurs from coming onto the field, would it not?

General MOLLISON. It would deter them, yes; but it would not stop them.

94. General FRANK. Had you had Hickam Field's proportion of the ground personnel that was downtown guarding streets to have protected Hickam Field, it would have been possible, even from your point of view, to have dispersed the planes and still had [808] protection?

General MOLLISON. I think I have given a misconception of the things. On this particular alert our troops were not pulled out. On the next alert that would have been given they were supposed to be pulled out.

95. General FRANK. What do you mean by "pulled out"?

General MOLLISON. Pulled out away from the Air Force to take over this policing of the First Police District.

96. General FRANK. You had these troops then?

General MOLLISON. We had them. That is one reason why I thought it was a good alert. We were left with all our people.

97. General FRANK. Then you had people that could have been made available to have protected your perimeter?

General MOLLISON. That is true.

98. General FRANK. You did not have to worry about the Navy side?

General MOLLISON. No, sir.

99. General FRANK. And you did not have to worry about the Pearl Harbor entrance side?

General MOLLISON. No, sir.

100. General FRANK. You did not have to worry about the Kamehameha side?

General MOLLISON. That is a pretty wide open field.

101. General FRANK. Kamehameha could have taken care of it, though?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

102. General FRANK. So that left you only the narrow strip at the east end and the north side which had barbed wire?

General MOLLISON. All this area that comes right up through this slough [indicating on map]. All of this was wide [809] open. And as to this point below Kamehameha, there is not a thing down there to keep people from infiltrating across there. (Indicating)

The wire only went down perhaps half a mile beyond the limits of our field.

103. General FRANK. You still would have preferred to have had your planes destroyed there than to have had them dispersed and taken care of this way, then, I take it?

General MOLLISON. I think that every man weighs those things in the balance. If he felt that there was an air attack coming, certainly the planes would have been dispersed. If he feels that with 40 per cent of the population of the place in which he is living are potential enemies, he will take steps to guard his property against sabotage. And that was our reasoning—to be particularly watchful for sabotage; and we felt that if war was declared or started by either side, the first things that would be done would be acts of sabotage by the nationals that were living in Oahu.

104. General FRANK. Did the contents of these messages have any influence upon your estimate of the immediate presence of hostile activities? Do you remember reading the messages?

General MOLLISON. Yes.

105. General FRANK. Do you remember the contents of them?

General MOLLISON. I remember them generally. I knew them quite well at that time; but I do not believe that anyone felt either in the Army or Navy that in the event war was declared the first push would be across the Pacific. We were pretty well sold on an attack against Malaya.

106. General FRANK. The Navy, you felt, had implicit confidence in themselves to be able to give warning of an impending attack?

[810] General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

107. General FRANK. And that confidence was relayed rather completely to members of the Army?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

108. General FRANK. Are you conversant with the estimate of the situation that was prepared and signed by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir; I am generally familiar with it, but it would be hard for me to quote it at the present time.

109. General FRANK. You remember the estimate of the situation described and anticipated just exactly what happened in this attack?

General MOLLISON. We had been working on that for months, General.

110. General FRANK. If you anticipated and described it in your estimate of the situation, why was it that you did not give it sole consideration when you were notified that it was a war warning?

General MOLLISON. Well, here is a part that I can speak only for myself on, because I do not know that General Martin felt the same as I did. We had this offshore patrol, P. T. Y.'s going out every morning just at the crack of dawn, supposedly taking care of all of the offshore patrol. Their warning in the event that anything was coming in could have reached us in sufficient time so that we could have moved our airplanes around in any way we saw fit.

111. General FRANK. You were conversant with the fact, however, that they did not have enough P. B. Y.'s to cover Oahu by 360 degrees?

[811] General MOLLISON. That is very true, sir; but they were not attempting it by 360 degrees.

112. General FRANK. Then why did you feel such security?

General MOLLISON. That was supplemented, of course, by carriers that were out on patrol. However, we did not know where they were patrolling or what areas they were covering.

113. General FRANK. Then, just on the assurance of the Navy you were blindly confident that they were "delivering the goods"?

General MOLLISON. That is about what it amounts to. We were all so sold on the idea that the Navy had this picture, and that with the fleet in Pearl Harbor they would not dare to attack.

114. General FRANK. Do you believe that the presence of the fleet in being at Pearl Harbor, with the traditional strategic defense that that offered, contributed in any way to the complacency that existed?

General MOLLISON. I do not doubt at all but what it contributed to an erroneous feeling of safety on the part of the Army.

115. General FRANK. Was there a reconnaissance squadron at Bellows Field?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

116. General FRANK. How often did it conduct reconnaissance?

General MOLLISON. I should say, daily, General.

117. General FRANK. Was that for reconnaissance purposes or training purposes, or both?

General MOLLISON. Both.

118. General FRANK. Did it operate on Sundays?

General MOLLISON. Not to my knowledge. I am sure it did [812] not. It may have on this Sunday, but I doubt very much if it did.

119. General FRANK. What did you have by way of reconnaissance in addition to this reconnaissance squadron at Bellows Field?

General MOLLISON. The only thing that we had in the way of reconnaissance was occasional missions of B-18's within the inshore patrol area.

120. General FRANK. Would you have considered an advisory military mission to have sent B-18's to be used on patrol where they would have contacted Japanese Zeros?

General MOLLISON. No, sir. That is suicide. Is just no defense against any reasonable fighter plane.

121. General FRANK. In a B-18?

General MOLLISON. That is right. Of course, they were not used for that, General. They were used only for the inshore patrol, which is within 20 miles of Oahu.

122. General GRUNERT. What were they reconnoitering for?

General MOLLISON. Submarines.

123. General GRUNERT. Were they armed?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir; but their armament is so small they had practically nothing.

124. General FRANK. That is, practically nothing in the light of present day armament of modern bombers?

General MOLLISON. That is true.

125. General GRUNERT. You are speaking of both B-18's and reconnaissance planes?

General MOLLISON. That is true.

126. General FRANK. What was the reconnaissance plane.

General MOLLISON. C-47.

127. General FRANK. That is a single engine airplane?

[813] General MOLLISON. Yes.

128. General FRANK. Even prior to the message of November 27 reconnaissance was conducted by the Hawaiian Department?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

129. General FRANK. And that continued?

General MOLLISON. Swede Munson came over to see us about this and I complained bitterly about using B-18's on this reconnaissance. In the first place, it is a very bad airplane for that purpose. You should be able to see directly down, and with your B-18 it is pretty hard to pick up anything in the water. You are looking at an angle.

130. General FRANK. A man in the nose could see straight down?

General MOLLISON. Yes; but he is the only one. By the time he looks for about an hour his eyes begin getting pretty fuzzy, if he is really looking hard. I thought perhaps there were other types of planes that might be made available that could be used to better purpose on this inshore patrol.

131. General FRANK. With respect to the aircraft warning service, are you conversant with that?

General MOLLISON. Yes, generally speaking.

132. General FRANK. Who was the main authority on the location of the permanent sites?

General MOLLISON. The main authority on that was Colonel Powell.

133. General FRANK. The plan for the defense of the island with 271's, or permanent installations, called for three, one on Kaala, on Haleakala and one on Kokee. Do you remember when they were received in the Hawaiian Department?

General MOLLISON. I cannot remember exactly. It was in the spring of 1941 some time.

[814] 134. General FRANK. Spring or summer?

General MOLLISON. Not before spring; I know that.

135. General FRANK. Do you remember when the mobile sets, the 270's were received?

General MOLLISON. I could not give you any exact time on it, but it was about that time.

136. General FRANK. The mobile sets were deployed and operated

General MOLLISON. Not very effective. I do not think any of our on maneuvers or on exercises prior to the December 7th attack?

General MOLLISON. Yes.

137. General FRANK. Was their operation effective?

General MOLLISON. Not very effective. I do not think any of our radar over there was worth much.

138. General FRANK. What do you mean by "not worth much"? Compared with what?

General MOLLISON. We were getting so many fixed echoes on them, or echoes of some kind, that they got to seeing airplanes all over the place when no airplanes were in the air. Apparently they did not know enough about the installation of them or the operation to leave anybody with any confidence in them.

139. General FRANK. Who made these reports to you with respect to the unsatisfactoriness of these sets?

General MOLLISON. Generally, my conversation with Powell on them. You see, they had been turned over to us, to the Air Force at

the time the war started. There was a lot of bickering and wrangling about the things. Our Signal Officer attempted to take hold of them and he could not, and Powell did not want to give them up, and he did not, and so forth.

140. General FRANK. Here is a chart which is already part of the record of the Board (handing chart to the witness), which shows how the radar picked up the incoming attack and followed [815] it in. That would indicate a degree of effectiveness, would it not?

General MOLLISON. Do we have a scale on this, General, showing the distances?

141. General FRANK. That is about 120 miles.

General MOLLISON. I would be inclined to think, and I always have thought, that that was our own B-17's coming in. I cannot prove that to you, but that is my feeling.

142. General FRANK. The radio stations were in operation, were they not?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

143. General FRANK. If the radio stations were in operation did not the B-17's coming in have radio equipment so that they could hold on to the radio?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir; but some of them came in from just exactly that direction (indicating).

144. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not there was any dissatisfaction with respect to the rapidity with which the radio stations were being built?

General MOLLISON. I do not think it was expressed at any time over there in my presence, General. They were having difficulty with one of them, but that was in the getting of some equipment to put the elevator in up there.

General FRANK. A cableway?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

[816] 146. General FRANK. Were there any underground gasoline tanks at Bellows Field?

General MOLLISON. There were none of sufficient size to amount to anything.

147. General FRANK. There was gasoline storage over there, however?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir; that is right. Later on we put in quite an extensive underground system at Bellows, after the war started.

148. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not on the morning of December 7th a lack of gasoline prevented any take-offs?

General MOLLISON. At Bellows?

149. General FRANK. Yes.

General MOLLISON. No, sir, I do not. I could not subscribe to that, because there were only about three planes that tried to get off over there, and they were promptly shot down on take-off. Kaneohe and Bellows were hit just about at the same time, these planes right above them.

150. General FRANK. Have you any information other than that that has been brought out that is pertinent to the situation, that you can offer to the Board?

General MOLLISON. I saw the number of planes that were wrecked over on Ford Island after the attack was over, and it looked to me

as though that was every PBY that was in the Department; and, while I could not swear to it, I do not think any PBYs went out that morning for offshore patrol, and I think that that had quite a bearing on the whole thing if it is true that those PBYs did not go out that morning.

151. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not it was habitual [817] for them to go out every morning?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir. They took off right by my quarters, General, about 5:30 to 6 o'clock in the morning. On this particular morning I did not hear them, but sometime you get in the habit of this noise and it doesn't disturb you, but I don't believe—I didn't see any PBYs trying to come back in during or after the attack.

152. General FRANK. Did the Navy prior to this time habitually conduct reconnaissance on Sunday mornings?

General MOLLISON. I could not say as to that, sir.

153. General GRUNERT. When they do go out, do they cover all the directions of the compass?

General MOLLISON. I think that they were covering in sectors of somewhere in the neighborhood of 140 degrees.

154. General GRUNERT. Did that include the arc in which the attack was made?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir. Almost all of our plans were worked out on patrolling this area to be able to pick up anything suspicious at the 600-mile limit, and we figured on normal carrier speeds and plane speeds, that if we could get them at the 600-mile limit we could be ready for them by the time they came into Hawaii. With an 800-mile limit you were just that much more better off; if you have any kind of visibility at all, you ought to be able to pick up anything that is in there in force.

155. General GRUNERT. Even if you were in a concentrated position on the field, such as Alert No. 1 carried, you could have gotten in the air if you had picked them up at 600 miles?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

[818] 156. General GRUNERT. I want to clear up one point. I understood you to say that if you were in Alert No. 1 your men were all present, and if you had been in Alert 2 there would have been a number of them off in civil communities doing guard work; is that right?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir; that was the plan, that we had trained some of these 500-man battalions of ours to go into different locations for the defense of Oahu.

(Excerpts from standing operating procedure of November 5, 1941, were read, as follows:)

157. General GRUNERT. I want to read to you the pertinent parts of the S. O. P. of the 5th of November on this subject.

Paragraph 6 states:

Security.—Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces. See paragraphs 233 to 273, inclusive, FM 100-5.

That is under the subject of "General."

"Alerts," 14 a: Alert 1:

This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

And under paragraph f of "Alerts":

The Hawaiian Air Force will:

- (1) Protect all vital installations on posts on Oahu garrisoned by air forces.
- (2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 14 g.

[819] 14 g reads as follows:

The District Commanders, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil community.

Therefore, under Alert No. 1 you would have had that distribution, and maintained order in the civil community.

Now, Alert 2:

This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

Under that, in paragraph f:

The Hawaiian Air Force will:

- (1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters. See paragraph 17.
- (2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.
- (3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.
- (4) Disperse bombers with crews.
- (5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
- (6) Protect all vital installations on posts on Oahu garrisoned by air forces.
- (7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying [820] islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 g.

15 g provides:

The District Commanders, assisted by the air corps troops detachments within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

Therefore, that direction about maintaining order in civil communities is applicable both to 1 and 2.

General MOLLISON. That is right.

158. General GRUNERT. So in either case, following these instructions, you would have had some air corps troops in civil communities, and not only in one case or the other, but in both cases? That is the point I want to get straightened out.

General MOLLISON. That is right. That is true on the outlying islands, General. That is all that applies to. Before, we were supposed to take over these specified spots in Honolulu, but I think that was changed just before the—what is the date of that, General? Is that November?

159. General GRUNERT. November 5, 1941.

General MOLLISON. I believe that was changed.

160. General GRUNERT. Which was supposed to be the "bible" at that time.

General MOLLISON. That is right.

161. General GRUNERT. You interpreted, then, this, "The District Commanders, assisted by the air corps troop detachments within the districts, will maintain order in the civil community"—you interpreted that to mean just on outlying islands?

[821] General MOLLISON. Yes, sir; that is the way I interpreted that.

162. General GRUNERT. But that is under both 1 and 2, so it would be under sabotage alert and alert against air raid.

General MOLLISON. That is right.

163. General GRUNERT. I interpret that to mean on Oahu as well as outlying islands. But, as you say, you may have received different instructions; I do not know.

164. General RUSSELL. Did you actually have these three battalions out on this alert that was begun on November 27th?

General MOLLISON. No, sir; we did not.

165. General FRANK. You said that under normal conditions you had a certain number of the planes in each squadron, or certain squadrons that were designated as alert squadrons?

General MOLLISON. That would not be under normal; that was under alert conditions, I should have said, General: under conditions of alert.

166. General GRUNERT. But not under conditions of Alert 1?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

167. General GRUNERT. Sabotage?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir. There were alert squadrons, alert crews.

168. General FRANK. How long did it take you to get those planes off the ground in case of emergency?

General MOLLISON. Those were supposed to be ready to go in thirty minutes, General. You see, that is Alert A or Condition of Readiness A

169. General FRANK. Where did the crews sleep?

General MOLLISON. The crews slept in tents or hutments [822] immediately adjacent to the planes when the bombers were in dispersed position. When they were on the line they slept in the operations rooms and hangars.

170. General FRANK. Is that where the pilots also slept?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

171. General FRANK. So there were certain pilots and crews sleeping on the line?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir. May I add that that could not help matters at all that morning during the attack because these things were on everybody before there was a possibility of doing anything about it; they were just going down the line.

172. General RUSSELL. The 4-minute alert would not have helped you, would it, General?

General MOLLISON. A 5-second alert would not have helped, because if they are on top of you you can't take a plane off without being shot down if you have got a bunch of Zeros sitting up there waiting for you to take off.

173. General GRUNERT. Then, the only effect, as far as I can gather from your testimony, is that the difference between Alerts Nos. 1 and 2 as to protection against what happened, would have been a certain amount of dispersion?

General MOLLISON. That is all. It would not have helped a bit, unless you had warning of from 30 minutes to two hours before these people are going to attack you, because when they are sitting up there looking down your throat you can't take an airplane off the ground.

174. General GRUNERT. Then, your only source of warning would have been the air warning service or information from the Navy; is that correct?

[823] General MOLLISON. Yes, sir, that is true.

175. General GRUNERT. Or possibly such as your own inshore reconnaissance might have given had it been in the air?

General MOLLISON. Well, that would not do any good because, you see, that is limited to 20 miles from the shore line. Inshore patrol is absolutely valueless to you because by the time you radio a message in, that 20 miles is covered by a Zero in about five minutes.

176. General GRUNERT. Of course, they can see farther; if they are out 20 miles they can probably see what? 50 or 60 more?

General MOLLISON. It is all according to your altitude and your visibility. I would say generally you can see about 10 to 12 miles. If you see airplanes in the air 10 to 12 miles away you are doing very well.

177. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

178. General RUSSELL. Yes; I have two or three, very briefly.

Were you out there in 1940?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

179. General RUSSELL. You recall the alert which was an all-out alert that was instituted about the 17th day of June, 1940?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir.

180. General RUSSELL. That alert just dwindled out, didn't it?

General MOLLISON. It did.

181. General RUSSELL. Now, along at the tail end of that alert and probably in the fall do you recall an order to the Air Force which required reconnaissance for this inshore patrol only as a matter of training?

General MOLLISON. I do not recall that now.

[824] 182. General RUSSELL. Do you know, General, whether or not beginning there sometime in October, as I remember, of 1940 and extending on till the time of this attack on December 7, '41, that the air people, the air forces, did maintain an inshore patrol largely as a matter of training?

General MOLLISON. That would be a token payment only.

183. General RUSSELL. I was interested in the testimony which you gave a moment ago about the planes on Ford Island. I have never served over there, and have labored somewhat under a handicap here. Where is Ford Island?

General MOLLISON. This is Ford Island here (indicating on map).

184. General RUSSELL. I looked all over those maps and I could not find it.

185. General GRUNERT. The place you indicated is practically in the middle of Pearl Harbor?

General MOLLISON. Yes, sir. It used to be our old Luke Field, but we turned it over to the Navy completely.

186. General RUSSELL. Do you know how many planes the naval people had in there, General?

General MOLLISON. Well, I talked to Captain Davis, the aviation officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff, and I had the impression that he had somewhere in the neighborhood of 100 PBVs.

187. General RUSSELL. Was that a fighting plane or a reconnaissance plane, or what is it?

General MOLLISON. It is a reconnaissance plane.

188. General RUSSELL. Purely a reconnaissance plane?

[825] General MOLLISON. Long-range patrol bomber; that is what it is.

189. General GRUNERT. Did that pertain to the Fleet or to the District?

General MOLLISON. That was the District. This is under the District, Patwing 2 and Patwing 1.

190. General GRUNERT. Patwing what?

General MOLLISON. I think they turned them over to the Fleet at some time. It was either just before or just after the war started; I think it was just after the war started.

191. General GRUNERT. What do the letters p-a-t mean?

General MOLLISON. Patrol wing. "Pat" is patrol.

192. General GRUNERT. Patrol?

General MOLLISON. P-a-t is for patrol; yes, sir.

193. General RUSSELL. General, how many other types of aircraft did the naval people have there at Pearl Harbor at the time of this attack?

General MOLLISON. I would not know, General. They had several other types there, but I wouldn't even know how to—

194. General RUSSELL. Where were they? On the carriers or cruisers or where?

General MOLLISON. Well, of course they have the carrier type planes and their cruiser type planes. They had also some of the smaller utility planes as well.

195. General RUSSELL. I was attempting to develop, and probably I should ask it that way, the effective fighting force that the Navy had in aircraft out there?

General MOLLISON. Well, they had one squadron of marine fighters, which I think was the one that was sent to Midway [826] and to Wake in place of our P-40s, and that is about all they had land-based. They had them at Ewa for a while.

196. General RUSSELL. Something has been said in the testimony here to the effect that the Navy had some of its planes dispersed and they were all destroyed.

General MOLLISON. Well, they hit Ewa, of course, and they hit Kaneohe. I think they destroyed almost everything at Kaneohe.

197. General RUSSELL. You do not know whether those were dispersed or not?

General MOLLISON. I do not think they were dispersed.

198. General RUSSELL. You say you heard these PBYs going out on this morning patrol. How many did they send out ordinarily?

General MOLLISON. Oh, it would be an estimate, but I should say about 25 or 30.

199. General RUSSELL. Now, a moment ago, in reply to a question from General Frank, you stated that you could not prove it but you had a pretty strong idea that planes that were followed in the morning of the attack were our planes, by that AWS station.

General MOLLISON. Well, this lad that landed—I can't remember his name but we can get it from the records over there—that landed at Kahuku, he came in from almost directly on that course at just about that time. I think General Landon's course was considerably north of

Oahu, and he turned almost directly south. There were several that I talked to that seemed to think that that is just about the direction that they came from.

[827] 200. General RUSSELL. The Navy had a lot of new tanks out there for storing oil or gas, did they not? Do you know about that?

General MOLLISON. No, sir, I do not know.

201. General RUSSELL. You have no information?

General MOLLISON. I have no information on it.

202. General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

203. General GRUNERT. These planes of ours that came from Hamilton Field to Honolulu or Oahu, I understand they came in groups of six each. Did all the first group get there?

General MOLLISON. No, sir. They started out with 12 planes, General, and I had a call about midnight from Colonel Howard Ramey. He said, "Don't look for 12. Look for 11 planes." One of them turned back and landed at Hamilton Field about midnight, midnight of our time, so he was only probably out or gone an hour. So they took off at intervals of perhaps 10 minutes, and they started in arriving in Oahu just about 8 to 8:15. I called the tower at 7:45 and asked if they had made any contact or had heard anything of our B-17s, and they told me that they were in contact with some of them but the static was so bad that they could not make out what they were trying to say.

204. General GRUNERT. You do not know how many planes were supposed to be in the Japanese attack that hit there about that time from that particular direction?

General MOLLISON. From the number of planes that were over Hickam Field on that first wave I should say that there were somewhere between 60 and 80. That is just my estimate.

205. General GRUNERT. Would not the Air Warning Service radar show the difference between 11 planes and 50 planes coming from [828] approximately the same direction?

General MOLLISON. I do not believe they can, General, at a distance.

206. General FRANK. Another thing about this, these B-17's were arriving singly; they were not arriving in a formation.

General MOLLISON. That is right.

207. General FRANK. If they arrived in the manner in which they departed from Hamilton Field, they would arrive at about ten-minute intervals.

General MOLLISON. Yes. Well, there were several of them that came in there right together, General, at about 8 to 8:15.

208. General FRANK. In formation?

General MOLLISON. Well, they were not in formation, but they were pretty close together. They made a pass at Landon as he was coming over Bellows, just about Bellows Field, and this doctor that he had with him, who was killed, thought that that was somebody trying to play, and he got up there in one of his blisters and got this camera out, and this Jap just took off as if he were being shot at. But there were about three or four planes that landed about the time that Landon did, and of course Landon's plane was hit just as it hit the runway, and they happened to hit him right in the pyrotechnic compartment, and he just burned in two and the tail stayed here and the

front end rolled on up here (indicating). We saved all the engines on that one, but the medico was killed. And there were several others that these Jap planes made a pass at, but they got away. They could move away from them: they had enough speed to get away from them.

209. General GRUNERT. General, what is the estimate now by [829] the air people as to the number of hostile aircraft participating in that attack?

General MOLLISON. Well, my own estimate on the thing, which most of the Army people seem to agree with, was about 180 planes total. It may have run a little higher than that or a little less, but you see these high-altitude horizontal bombers going by you in 9-ship formations, and you see all of these zeros and dive bombers and your torpedo bombers; it looked to me as though there were probably 180 to 200 planes.

210. General RUSSELL. Suppose that you people had had ample warning of the approach of these hostile aircraft but there had been no interference with their take-off from the points from which they did depart: did you have any defensive means to have repelled the attack of dive bombers on the naval craft, naval ships?

General MOLLISON. Oh, I think we could have done a lot of damage to them. I think that we could have kept almost all of those slow-moving torpedo bombers out. Those things were just like shooting fish; they were going along at, I should say, a hundred and ten miles an hour. They didn't look to me as though they were a bit faster than that. The dive bombers were faster. They were probably 160 to 170. And the zero, the little fighter, was a good fast airplane.

211. General RUSSELL. What type of aircraft produced the great damage to our naval ships?

General MOLLISON. The torpedo bomber was the one that caused the most damage to the largest number of ships. The most positive damage that was done was done by high-altitude horizontal bombing on the battleship Arizona. They just [830] happened to get some lucky hits down the stack of the Arizona, and she went up.

212. General RUSSELL. Those were the people who were 10,000 feet up?

General MOLLISON. They were, I should say, between eight and ten thousand feet. All of our antiaircraft was hitting way below and behind these planes.

213. General RUSSELL. The question the General has stated is that if ample warning of the attack had been given the effect of the attack could have been greatly minimized, if not completely eliminated.

General MOLLISON. I think there is no doubt about that. If we could have put 50 fighters in the air that morning and we could have if we had had ample warning—I do not think we could have done a thing against them offensively as far as their carriers were concerned; we did not have the type of aircraft with which to do it. But we could certainly have raised Cain with their formations that came in if we had 50 fighters in the air.

214. General RUSSELL. And you had more than 50 fighters available?

General MOLLISON. We had 105; 103 P-40s and we had something like 22 P-36s, but, strangely enough, that P-36 would not have been any good at all, but the chap in the P-36 did shoot down one plane. We had about 14 fighters in the air that morning, total.

215. General RUSSELL. How did the Japs happen to miss on one airfield?

General MOLLISON. The Haleiwa does not look like an airfield, General. You would guess a long time before you would [831] think that it was one, and these people were over there for maneuvers and gunnery practice, and of course the Japs didn't know they were there.

216. General RUSSELL. That is all.

217. General GRUNERT. Have you any further questions?

(No response.)

There appear to be no further questions. Thank you very much for coming up.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

218. General GRUNERT. We shall take a five-minute recess.

(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.)

[832] **TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. W. E. FARTHING, 07122, ATLANTIC OVERSEAS SERVICE COMMAND, PORT OF NEWARK; NEWARK, N. J.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

General FARTHING. William E. Farthing, 07122, Atlantic Overseas Air Service Command, Port of Newark; Newark, N. J.

2. General GRUNERT. General, this Board is after facts and also after the background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. Particularly, I want to develop what you know about the attack, the conditions prior thereto, in your assigned position. What were you, and what were your duties in Hawaii, late in 1941?

General FARTHING. I was Commanding Officer at Hickam Field.

3. General GRUNERT. As Commanding Officer of Hickam Field, what did you do at Hickam Field in compliance with this paragraph of the Standing Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department?

6. *Security*.—Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces. (See Paragraphs 233–273, inclusive, FM–100–5).

General FARTHING. We took the necessary steps to prevent sabotage of our equipment.

4. General GRUNERT. Will you explain to me what weapons and ammunition you had for defense, particularly against aircraft; and what other protective measures, such as air-raid shelters, or slit trenches, or fire-fighting measures. If so, was there an SOP on it? Also tell us how your defense tied in with the [833] general antiaircraft defense of the Department.

General FARTHING. I was Base Commander of Hickam Field, and had taken command on the 27th day of November, the Tactical Commander being General Rudolph. As Base Commander I had the housekeeping of the field, not the tactical defense of the field. As a Base Commander we drew the airplanes in at night, and we would put a guard around them and lights around them, and there was a perimeter, a guard.

5. General FRANK. It was a perimeter guard around the perimeter of what—the airplanes, or the field.

General FARTHING. Of the airfield—of both places. That guard was under Colonel Herman. We had some few machine guns. We had no antiaircraft artillery, and at the time of the attack, to the best of my memory, there were no slit trenches.

6. General GRUNERT. There was no antiaircraft defense of the field?

General FARTHING. The antiaircraft defense of the field was a part of the antiaircraft defense of the Hawaiian Islands.

7. General GRUNERT. Of the area?

General FARTHING. Of the area.

8. General GRUNERT. But you did have the machine guns set up for local defense?

General FARTHING. We had some machine guns. Some of the machine guns were sighted for the defense of the airplanes. The Air Corps did have some few machine guns in its table of organization, and those guns were used, were out. Most of the machine guns as I remember it were sighted for the defense of the airplanes against sabotage.

9. General FRANK. Were they on mounts so that they could be [834] used for either air or ground defense?

General FARTHING. I don't remember. I think they were on the ground, and they were not sighted as for air defense. We were defending against sabotage and not air attack.

10. General GRUNERT. If you had not been put on alert No. 1 what would have been your defense normally of Hickam Field?

General FARTHING. We would have dispersed our aircraft over the field.

11. General GRUNERT. But how about your weapons? How would you have used them?

General FARTHING. The weapons were on the airplanes, of course. Some of them are capable of being sighted for anti-aircraft fire. The Air Corps didn't have very many machine guns for that purpose; some few .50s—I have forgotten the exact number.

12. General GRUNERT. Outside of the actual crew and the ground crew for the plane, did you have a guard for the station, itself, which handled the various sorts of weapons for defensive purposes?

General FARTHING. Yes, we had a guard for the field itself, as a part of the base command.

13. General GRUNERT. What did that consist of?

General FARTHING. I have forgotten the exact numbers, but about 300 men, I believe it was, that we had taken from the other air units there. We had no defense command, set up as such, that was organized as such.

14. General GRUNERT. What were these 200-odd men doing, normally?

General FARTHING. They were the post guard.

[835] 15. General GRUNERT. They were armed with machine guns, were they?

General FARTHING. No, they were not. They were armed with pistols.

16. General GRUNERT. Were there any machine guns available to them?

General FARTHING. No.

17. General GRUNERT. Ordinarily, the Standing Operating Procedure is the type of instruction that tells people what to do under various circumstances. Now, what were the orders of this guard in the line of defense? What did they have to do? How did they defend the Post, or how were they supposed to defend the post?

General FARTHING. There was a plan in existence. These guards were on their posts, the regular plan for the guard.

18. General GRUNERT. Was most of the guard for materiel, or how much of it should be used for actual defense?

General FARTHING. The guards for the materiel were furnished by the tactical units. They guarded their own materiel.

19. General GRUNERT. And you had 200 men that could be used for defensive purposes?

General FARTHING. No, sir, General. They were the guards. They were the guards that were used for the guarding of the Post and the patrolling of the Post, and so forth. I am wrong—wait a minute. At that time we had taken 500 men from the tactical commands and had trained them into detachments. That was done prior to the time that I was Base Commander.

[836] To get my story clear, I had better start back. When I went to Hawaii, I was Commander of the 5th Group, a heavy bombardment outfit. It was under the command of General Frank. In September I left Hickam Field and went over and took command of Bellows Field on the east side of the Island, and I was there until November 27th. Then I was brought back to command Hickam Field. Prior to the time that I left Hickam Field, the tactical units, they had taken these people out of the tactical units and had trained them for defense duties, and I think there were something like 500 of them, and they have positions to go, and they did have these places, and on top of the hangars were part of them. Out in the fields they had machine-gun places.

20. General GRUNERT. They could be used against ground or air attack?

General FARTHING. Yes, sir; that is correct. I was wrong before. I was talking about the other boys.

21. General GRUNERT. How did they perform when the attack came on?

General FARTHING. I couldn't answer that question. When the attack came on, I was in the tower and in position to have observed that, and I saw the attack start. I was waiting in the tower to receive that reconnaissance squadron from Hawaii that had been following the flight across the ocean, till 12 o'clock, and it was due in between 5:30 and 6, and I went down to the tower with Colonel Chaney Bertholf, to see that it was received.

I saw the attack start, saw it coming in, saw it develop, and took most of it. The attack—but that is volunteering [837] information. I will go back to your question.

The airplanes were flying all over the field. There was a lot of firing. Now, as to exactly what the effect of that firing was, I couldn't tell you. Within a short time, not too short, an hour's time, antiaircraft artillery did arrive at the Post, and there was much firing.

22. General GRUNERT. When you took over, what protective measures did you find there? Did they have any air-raid shelters?

General FARTHING. No.

23. General GRUNERT. Were there any slit trenches? Were there any fire-fighting measures, in case of an attack? Generally, what were those conditions in that line?

General FARTHING. They were building some, getting ready to build some revetments for the airplanes.

24. General GRUNERT. That is what they call "bunkers"?

General FARTHING. "Bunkers," yes.

25. General GRUNERT. There were women and children on the Post, were there not?

General FARTHING. That is right.

26. General GRUNERT. What measures were taken for those, in case of emergency? What were the plans for taking care of them and protecting them?

General FARTHING. There was a plan, the "Hawaiian Plan." I have forgotten exactly what it was, at this time.

27. General GRUNERT. But what was done right after the attack, in that line?

General FARTHING. As quick as I got back, we got all the women and children off the Post and sent them into the hills.

[838] 28. General GRUNERT. Was that according to plan?

General FARTHING. No, sir. That was not according to plan.

29. General GRUNERT. What protective measures were taken as an afterthought, after the attack, to avoid anything like that happening again?

General FARTHING. The guard—everything—our whole idea there was, we thought it was going to be sabotage, and we expected the natives to uprising and come in. The heavy guard was put around the perimeter, and a guard put around; there were cane fields, one side, very close, and that part of the field had heavy guards around.

30. General GRUNERT. Did they construct any air-raid shelters afterward?

General FARTHING. Yes.

31. General GRUNERT. Did they dig any slit trenches?

General FARTHING. Yes. We used every entrenching, ditch-digging machine we could get.

32. General GRUNERT. Do you know why those measures had not been taken before, instead of afterward?

General FARTHING. We did not expect an attack.

33. General GRUNERT. True, you did not expect it, because you put on a sabotage alert; but ordinarily, for self-defense, suppose they put you on No. 2, or No. 3 alert, then what? You could not do that overnight. You could not prepare yourself in a short time. Just because you were not alerted 2, or 3, you were just alerted for sabotage, then these measures were taken afterwards. It would appear that they should have been taken before.

[839] General FARTHING. That is correct; they should have been.

34. General GRUNERT. They were not taken?

General FARTHING. They were not taken.

35. General GRUNERT. Who was in command of the field, before? Who was the Base Commander before you?

General FARTHING. General Rudolph.

36. General GRUNERT. At the time of the attack, Rudolph was in charge of the command of the tactical bombers?

General FARTHING. On the wing; yes, sir.

37. General GRUNERT. Whose responsibility was it to have these measures taken for the general protection of the field—the Base Commander, or the Tactical Commander, or both, or what?

General FARTHING. We were a part of the Hawaiian Air Force. By that answer I am not trying to escape any responsibility on my part.

38. General GRUNERT. But you took over, November 27?

General FARTHING. Yes, sir.

39. General GRUNERT. Prior to that, General Rudolph was in command?

General FARTHING. Yes, sir.

40. General GRUNERT. Then, after you took over, you were still under Rudolph's command, or were you a separate command, directly under General Martin?

General FARTHING. I was under General Martin, sir.

41. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions?

42. General RUSSELL. General, the answer you gave a minute ago indicated that after this attack had developed at Hickam Field, anti-aircraft artillery arrived.

General FARTHING. It did.

[840] 43. General GRUNERT. Where did it come from?

General FARTHING. It happened to be that there was a Major of the Antiaircraft Field Artillery spending the night on the Post, and he spent the night with Colonel Bertholf. I can't recall his name. He was there when the attack occurred, and he went to the phone and ordered his battalion ready and to move immediately, and he met them and brought them into the field.

4. General RUSSELL. Where did they come from?

General FARTHING. They came from Shafter.

45. General GRUNERT. Was there an anti-aircraft position on or near the field, that was in the general scheme of anti-aircraft protection, that he could occupy that position, or was he doing that on his own, or what, do you know?

General FARTHING. I think that he was according to plan.

46. General RUSSELL. They came back for two additional attacks after this Major got in there with his anti-aircraft?

General FARTHING. No, I didn't say that. I said that the anti-aircraft arrived later. Exactly when that anti-aircraft arrived, I do not know.

47. General RUSSELL. But you did say that there was considerable shooting after it got there?

General FARTHING. I said there was considerable shooting after the attack started, and shooting after. There was shooting during the attack.

48. General RUSSELL. Did this man get there in time to get in on the shooting? That is the part I wanted to clear up.

General FARTHING. I think he did. I am not certain on that point.

49. General RUSSELL. That is all.

[841] 50. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions, General Frank?

51. General FRANK. Yes. It was not an easy thing to dig trenches at Hickam Field?

General FARTHING. Hickam Field is on a coral foundation, filled, and you can't dig with a shovel, you have to dig with power equipment, or with the "bulldozer." We dug a lot of them.

52. General FRANK. With mechanical, compressed-air equipment?
General FARTHING. Mechanical; that's correct.

53. General GRUNERT. Then the slit trenches as such were practically out?

General FARTHING. They were out, sir. You couldn't dig them overnight.

54. General GRUNERT. In lieu thereof, you would have to put up revetments to afford protection, would you?

General FARTHING. Hickam Field was just a very few feet above the water, and when you dug down any distance at all you got into the water, and when we had to put our revetments up for our bunkers, for our airplanes, we had to bring the dirt in.

55. General GRUNERT. The same thing would apply if you had individual protection?

General FARTHING. Yes, sir; if you dug down, you would go into the water.

56. General FRANK. You stated a little while ago that you did not anticipate the attack.

General FARTHING. No; I did not anticipate a bombing attack.

57. General FRANK. Why?

General FARTHING. I had just completed a study, a short time before. Until we had gone into the thing and gotten the [842] Post—the G-2, anyway, had—where the Navy said that they knew where everyone of the ships were, we constantly were on the alert, or off the alert. Every time they said that they had lost a carrier, or lost a battleship, and every time they lost a Japanese ship of any type, we went on the alert until that was located.

58. General GRUNERT. You mean, lost track of them?

General FARTHING. Yes, sir; and for the whole period, there, we were on alert, or off the alert—just one endless thing; part of the time sleeping under the wings of the airplanes, or with everybody on alert. It was a continuous thing.

59. General FRANK. You felt confident, then, that you were secure in the protection of the Navy?

General FARTHING. No, sir.

60. General FRANK. Then why did you think that there would not be an airplane attack?

General FARTHING. I didn't think that we had enough equipment over there to be confident of it. It was a daring plan that was carried out. It was not according to the information furnished us, which was supposed to have been reliable, that there was nothing in the vicinity, that they knew where it all was.

61. General FRANK. Then you did have confidence in the Navy?

General FARTHING. I have never had confidence in the Navy!

62. General FRANK. What led you to the belief that there would not be an attack? There must be some logic behind it.

General FARTHING. Yes. This is not Monday, but it is Tuesday: and I am a "Monday man" of the quarterbacks—I now know that I was wrong.

[843] 63. General FRANK. You were wrong?

General FARTHING. I was wrong. Anybody that thought we would not be attacked by the Japanese Air were wrong; circumstances proved that.

64. General FRANK. You still have not answered why you believed that you would not be attacked.

General FARTHING. I didn't think they could do it. I didn't think they had that ability. I thought, I really thought, that we knew where most of their carriers were. I personally thought they knew where most of them were, although prior to this time I wrote and conducted a map maneuver, just shortly after you left, where we pulled this same thing that they did on us, and then we talked it all out and had a big critique about it; and General Herron; one of his last official things before he left. General Martin had just taken over. General Ryan, then Colonel Ryan, was his Chief of Staff. We let the ships come in with carriers just like that, and did the same thing, in a maneuver, and handled our Air Force, too, to try to counter it; and we sent our troops out and took their positions.

65. General FRANK. What really led you to the conclusion that there could not be an attack was, in the first place, that you did not think that the Japs could do it, because you believed you were sufficiently well protected by the Navy?

General FARTHING. That is right.

66. General FRANK. Is that correct?

General FARTHING. Yes, sir.

67. General FRANK. I am having a hard time getting that. Who, in the Navy, told you that they knew where the Japanese naval [844] craft were?

General FARTHING. I can't quite answer your question as to that. I don't remember who told me, but the Navy has their information service—I mean their G-2—and in making this study, we made these investigations, and they said that they knew where they were.

68. General FRANK. How close would the Japanese carrier force have to be for you to be apprehensive about it?

General FARTHING. 900 miles. If they were coming in, 900 miles, we would be in danger. We should be apprehensive if you don't know where they are, any time that you lose track of it.

69. General FRANK. Do you believe it was reasonable to be apprehensive, if they had discovered a Japanese force at Jaluit in the Marshalls?

General FARTHING. I think we should be very apprehensive. That is a little bit beyond that range.

70. General FRANK. Do you think that the presence of the Japanese carrier force in the Marshalls, at Jaluit, would have been reason to be very apprehensive?

General FARTHING. That wasn't its normal station.

[845] General FRANK. The Navy did not turn loose any information with reference to a Jap force of several carriers, between the 25th and 30th of November?

General FARTHING. If they did, sir, it would have gone into the tactical command, and I was not told about it.

72. General FRANK. These maneuvers of which you spoke just a few minutes ago—when were they held? In the spring of 1941?

General FARTHING. You can help me refresh my memory on that. Martin got there at what time?

73. General FRANK. He got there in November.

General FARTHING. They were held before Christmas, then.

74. General FRANK. Before Christmas of 1940?

General FARTHING. Yes, sir. That was one of the first jobs I had to do.

75. General FRANK. Did you disperse your airplanes during that maneuver?

General FARTHING. Yes, sir. General Street was my assistant, and General Walker, deceased, was my other assistant. We drew the whole thing up.

76. General FRANK. Did the Navy ever tell you, or did it come to your attention, anything about the frequency with which they sent out task forces?

General FARTHING. They sent them out frequently. When I was tactical commander we were all the time going out trying to locate them. That was a regular occurrence.

77. General FRANK. But when they went out on reconnaissance to determine the location of any Japanese craft, did they ever tell you where they went?

General FARTHING. No, sir; they did not. I do not know that answer.

[846] 78. General FRANK. Did any information sent over by the Navy ever reach your A-2 in your group?

General FARTHING. No, sir.

79. General FRANK. Do you know how many planes there were in the Japanese attacking force, as an estimate?

General FARTHING. I do not. I would say there were something like a hundred. They came over in many waves. Would you care for me to tell you exactly what I saw from the tower?

80. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

General FARTHING. We were at the tower watching for this reconnaissance squadron to come in. It was a little late.

81. General FRANK. A reconnaissance squadron of B-17's?

General FARTHING. Yes, sir; 13 of them coming in. They missed the island. Part of them, of course, were chased in by the Japs. They came in on the beam. While we were in the tower we saw many Navy ships, or what we took to be Navy ships, flying off the island and coming around to the Navy base to the east of the island, and we heard a bunch of airplanes diving in, coming from about 10,000 feet with the clouds. We knew they were not Army planes, and we thought it must be Marines. They dived down on Pearl Harbor. I saw a black object leave the first and hit with an explosion. The first airplane turned its wings up and I could see the Rising Sun on its wings. That airplane immediately came to Hickam Field. I was in the tower. Colonel Bertholf gave the alarm at that time. When he went down to give the alarm I went down from the tower and arrived just after this airplane was coming up at about 25 feet, firing 25-mm. cannon, and he hit No. 3 motor on a B-17 and set it afire. The burning oil dropped down on the rubber tires. He set some B-18's afire at the same time. The planes were so [847] close together that you could not taxi them out. They tried to get

them in as small bunches as they could, with lights under them. They caught fire. The Jap went off and turned and came back. I was the only person out on the mat at that time. They turned and came back across the field and fired at me, and there were other airplanes coming in at the same time. About that time another airplane came in with bombs. He came in from Kam and started bombing the roadside. There were no bombs—I think I am correct in this—that were dropped on the flying field proper. That had a very important bearing on what we did afterwards, because they made no effort to destroy our landing field; and all the hangars that were bombed were the roadside hangars. We were continually getting machine gun bullets of all the planes that dropped their bombs on Pearl Harbor.

After this attack was over, then came the torpedo attack. The ships were not too fast; they leisurely came in over Kam across our field. They went to the Navy from the vicinity of our main gate, very, very low, and dropped their torpedoes. We got their machine gun bullets, too.

Then came a high level attack. Throughout this whole attack there were airplanes at high altitudes, and they bombed Pearl Harbor; and at the same time this one was going on—

82. General GRUNERT. This high-level attack?

General FARTHING. Yes—a low-level attack came in against Hickam. This was the principal bombing attack at Hickam, and it started from Kam. While on the mat I saw the commanding officer of the 38th Reconnaissance Squadron. He was shot down and landed right on our mat. His co-pilot ran to him and the following Jap ship killed them. He failed to pull up and hit [848] the ground, crushing his belly tank. He had given the ship the motor. I was close enough to see its numbers. Later on that ship was brought back into the field. It had crashed into the mountains.

After this attack was over I caused a survey to be made of the field and every bomb crater to be plotted. The location did not make sense to us; so we figured that if we put it on some of our old maps they might make sense. Going back about two years we found a set of blueprints that they fit. It showed that the last two hangars were not built and that the control tower was an officers' club. The control tower got no fire and the last two hangars got none. All the rest of the hangars were shot at. So that, in my mind, dates their information. Every bomb that they place definitely had its target, and the man knew where it was going to be put. The attack was made so low that there was no possibility of missing. They just flew right above the buildings and turned loose. They learned something that we had not learned—that if you hit your objective you do not have any splinters.

83. General GRUNERT. If there are no further questions, we thank you very much, General.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF H. RALPH BURTON, GENERAL COUNSEL FOR THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WASHINGTON, D. C. (ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN H. WEINER, INVESTIGATOR FOR THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS AND RICHARD WINFREY)

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you state to the Board your name, address and occupation?

[849] Mr. BURTON. H. Ralph Burton. I am general counsel for the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives and, in such capacity, I have charge of investigations conducted by the Committee under H. R. Resolution 30.

2. General GRUNERT. Mr. Burton, the Board is after facts and wants to get a background on the various things that it has been charged to do. One of those is to look into such phases of the interim report of the House that may have connections with the attack on Pearl Harbor. With that in view, we thought it would be wise for the Board to have you give us such background so that we could more intelligently approach the problem with which we are charged. Major Clausen, who has been detailed as Assistant Recorder to the Board, having a greater knowledge of what has gone before in connection with this particular phase, will lead in propounding the questions, and then the other members of the Board will fill in with such questions as occur to us.

3. Major CLAUSEN. You are an attorney at law?

Mr. BURTON. Yes, sir.

4. Major CLAUSEN. And you have practiced in Washington how many years, sir?

Mr. BURTON. Since 1908.

5. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, you were born in Washington; is that correct?

Mr. BURTON. I was; yes, sir.

6. Major CLAUSEN. You are the general counsel for the House Military Affairs Committee?

Mr. BURTON. That is right.

7. Major CLAUSEN. And have been for what period of time?

Mr. BURTON. I can only approximate that, sir—about two [850] years.

8. Major CLAUSEN. Before that time you have investigated for the Senate and the House, on occasions, with regard to other committees?

Mr. BURTON. Yes, sir. I was with the Senate Campaign Expenditures Committee in 1908 and conducted investigations in Kentucky, Arkansas, North Dakota, Maryland, Indiana, and other States that I do not now recall.

I might very briefly add that subsequent to that I was with the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives and conducted an investigation into W. P. A. activities in New York City and New York State. Later I was with the Senate Campaign Expenditures Committee, in 1940, and conducted investigations in a number of different States.

9. Major CLAUSEN. You have shown me heretofore in your office various documents which back up the Committee's report. I wonder if you will produce at this time the volume which contains certain exhibits consisting of affidavits, interviews, and, I believe, in part, some testimony?

Mr. BURTON. Yes, sir.

10. Major CLAUSEN. In addition to that volume you also showed me other volumes. I will commence with this particular document (indicating). I believe that has as its first exhibit an affidavit dated the 18th of December, 1943, by Alice Anstey. Is that correct?

Mr. BURTON. Yes, sir.

11. Major CLAUSEN. For the information of the Board, the documents in this volume that Mr. Burton is now examining are set forth on Exhibit A of the study which I have made and which has already been submitted to members of the Board.

[851] There are various ways to proceed. I might ask Mr. Burton to read portions of the documents or the whole of the documents, or it might be that we can take the volume, if Mr. Burton will make it available, and read it at our leisure later on. Whichever way the Board wishes to proceed I will follow.

There were some of these documents, for example the first affidavit that I just referred to, which I have on my list, and there is one which pertains to the activities of Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl at the Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles. The next is on a different subject and so forth. The third statement in there is the statement of Mr. Connolly, a partner of Mr. Rohl.

Mr. BURTON. That is an important statement.

12. Major CLAUSEN. For example, the 15th document in there is the interview of John N. Martin. Mr. Burton could read these statements into the record now—I think they are all pertinent—or, if you wish, you could consider them read.

[852] (Excerpts from order appointing Army Pearl Harbor Board were read, as follows:)

13. General GRUNERT. Mr. Burton, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper. That order was amended to include:

will consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, as directed by the Acting Secretary of War in his memorandum for the Judge Advocate General, 12 July 1944.

Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General of July 12 reads as follows:

(Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General, July 12, 1944, by Acting Secretary of War, was read as follows:)

Subject: Report of House Military Affairs Committee alleging neglect and misconduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and others, concerning Hawaiian and Canadian Defense Projects.

1. The recommendations contained in paragraph 5 of the memorandum dated July 10, 1944, of Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., to Mr. Amberg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, on the above subject, are approved. Major Clausen is directed to continue his investigation of the above matter and to co-

operate with the House Military Affairs Committee in its investigation of this matter in the way described in paragraph 5 of Major Clausen's memorandum.

2. Immediately upon the appointment of a board of officers pursuant to Public Law 339, 78th Congress, to investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor [852-A] catastrophe, the phases of the present matter relating thereto will be referred to such board for investigation and such other action as may be proper under the directive appointing such board. As it is understood Major Clausen will be detailed as assistant recorder of this board, he will continue in that capacity to coordinate the activities referred to paragraph 1 hereof with the activities of the Pearl Harbor board in the present case.

(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON,
Acting Secretary of War.

[853] That, then, limits this Board to those phases which related to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, and we do not want to wander afield in that report, and we would like to have you understand on behalf of the House Committee that we shall only go into such phases as are related there to Colonel Wyman. We have power to ask for witnesses, but we have no power to demand them nor to subpoena witnesses. So we want you to realize, please, the limitations of this Board: as much as we can find out of the matters which relate to the Pearl Harbor Disaster, yes. Wherever any information is contained in your investigation that will throw light on those phases that pertain to the Pearl Harbor Disaster we consider it our duty to go into it. Except for those phases, we shall not. I do not consider that the Board's duty is to complete your investigation insofar as Hawaii is concerned. There are probably many things that the House Committee would go into that do not pertain directly to those phases. So we do not want you to expect too much of this Board in the line of developing matters that do not pertain to the Pearl Harbor Disaster.

Now, anything you may have there that will bear directly on the phases which we are charged with going into, we should have, and those matters that are extraneous to that particular mission, we have no power to go into, and our report will probably not cover such other phases.

Now, with that in view we would like to have any background that will assist us in going into those phases. I just wanted you to understand thoroughly the limitations of our Board and what we are charged with. That is why I wanted to get that [854] part in the record.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Burton, will you just give a statement with such references to the basis for the statement as you deem pertinent, please?

Mr. BURTON. Sometime early in 1943 it came to the attention of the Committee on Military Affairs that a contract had been entered into between the War Department and the group of contractors known as the Hawaiian Constructors, and that the dominant company was the Rohl-Connolly Company of Los Angeles, California; that the dominant factor with the Rohl-Connolly Company was Hans Wilhelm Rohl, who at the time the contract was signed on December 21, 1940, was an unnaturalized German alien. That aroused the interest of the Committee, and when certain other information was brought to our attention coming from various confidential sources, I was instructed to proceed with an investigation and instructed to ascertain the facts

surrounding the awarding of that contract and what took place in reference to it afterward.

I ascertained definitely that there was a contract entered into between the Hawaiian Constructors, composed of the Rohl-Connolly Company, the Gunther & Shirley Company, and the W. E. Callahan Company; that that contract was entered into on December 21, 1940. It was recommended and negotiated by Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., who had been instructed by General Hannum, then Colonel Hannum, to come to the mainland from Hawaii to negotiate the contracts for defense projects for the Territory of Hawaii.

I then began to look into the background of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, and I found that he came to this country in 1913 from [855] Germany, that he was born and educated in Germany; that although he had several times filed—at least once filed—application for naturalization papers, he had never pursued it; that he had represented himself on various occasions as a citizen of the United States, particularly in income tax returns; and I then called upon the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization to supply me with a complete record of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, which they did, and I would like to submit for the record the letter from the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, which is contained in the document before me, if it is approved by the Board.

15. General FRANK. How long is it?

Mr. BURTON. It is four single-space printed pages altogether, including the statements which were submitted by the Bureau at the time that Hans Wilhelm Rohl's case was heard on September 15, 1941.

16. General FRANK. Can you give us a digest of it here now?

Mr. BURTON. I think so, sir.

The records show that Hans Wilhelm Rohl, who sometimes signs the translated name of John William Rohl, did reside at 8159 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, California. He filed a petition for naturalization in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California on March 10, 1941. That was under the provisions of Section 310 of the Nationality Act of 1940. I will say, without reading, that that permitted him to file a petition upon the ground that he was married to an American citizen, and it very much short-cut the final granting of the petition and did not require the usual period of five years.

[856] In that petition he stated that he was a contractor, that he was born at Lubeck, Germany, on September 29, 1886, and that he was of the German race and German nationality. He alleged that on August 26, 1925, at San Francisco he was married, that the name of his wife was Floy Edith, that she was born in Iola, Kansas, on October 27, 1890, and that she then resided with him.

This petition also showed that he had lived with a woman prior to that, he claimed, as his common-law wife, by whom he had several children; that he entered into an agreement to take care of the children before he married his present wife.

17. General FRANK. But all of these things do not affect the consideration of the Pearl Harbor situation?

Mr. BURTON. Well, it is very difficult, sir, to eliminate all of these. I am going to tell in a very few words the rest of this.

The petition, as you will see when you read it, referred to a number of exits and entries into the United States of which there is no record. It shows that he bought several yachts, and finally owned the Vega, and then the reports goes on to show that he did appear in Court on September 15, 1941, and that then he was admitted to citizenship in the Federal Court.

I think it should be mentioned here that there is in the record a letter from John J. Kingman, Brigadier General, dated August 28, 1941, urging the admission.

18. General FRANK. We are familiar with that.

Mr. BURTON. You are familiar with that; yes, sir.

19. General RUSSELL. I believe you said, Mr. Burton, it would not trouble you to be interrupted.

[857] Mr. BURTON. Not at all, sir.

(Excerpt from letter of Brigadier General John J. Kingman was read as follows:)

20. General RUSSELL. There is in the letter of General Kingman a statement,

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question.

The committee has been concerned somewhat as to what facts or representations were made to these people about that, and we have not developed that as yet. We may be able to develop it on our own account, but I am asking you if you have made any investigation to determine upon what facts that statement was made.

Mr. BURTON. I have not inquired of General Kingman because he has not been before the committee, and I have been unable to elicit from any of the witnesses with whom we have talked any recollection of Hans Wilhelm Rohl at all.

21. General RUSSELL. Definitely, what we had in mind was who conveyed to the Chief of Engineers' office here any statements as to Rohl's loyalty to the United States, and we wondered if your investigation had explored that.

Mr. BURTON. I have talked with a number of officers, among them General Schley and I think it is Colonel Gesler, and others I don't recall right now, in an effort to ascertain what they could tell us about the negotiations leading up to this contract and the inquiries conducted by the Engineers' office as to Hans Wilhelm Rohl, but so far that has drawn a blank.

22. General GRUNERT. In your investigation did the name of one Martin come up?

Mr. BURTON. In the investigation the name of John Martin, attorney for Hans Wilhelm Rohl, came up.

[858] 23. General GRUNERT. Does it show anywhere in your investigation that he came to the Chief of Engineers' office advocating the naturalization of Rohl?

Mr. BURTON. No, sir, not in our investigation.

24. General GRUNERT. And you do not know, as far as he is concerned, whether he, Martin, had anything to do with this statement?

Mr. BURTON. No, sir, I do not know. I know that we asked General Schley, who was the Chief of Engineers at that time, if he could recall any of the details concerning the negotiations, but he could not.

25. General RUSSELL. We have gone over that ground very thoroughly, Mr. Burton, and we were hoping that maybe you had discovered something that we had not. Apparently not.

26. Major CLAUSEN. May I ask Mr. Burton to turn to that volume if he wants to, and there is a statement in there by John M. Martin; whether there is anything in that statement on the subject, particularly a statement about arranging for that letter from General John J. Kingman referred to on page 5 of the committee's report.

Mr. BURTON. I do not see, unless I do not read it properly.

27. Major CLAUSEN. Let me see the statement.

28. General RUSSELL. While probably we shall have it after a little, you seem to have no independent recollection of it, and I do not see why we should disturb you.

Mr. BURTON. As I remember it, Mr. Martin told me, either in this statement of record or off the record, that General Kingman did write such a letter, but I think that is all that he told me about it. I then made inquiries from the Bureau of [859] Immigration and Naturalization and obtained a copy of the letter which is in the report.

29. General RUSSELL. Well, I am sorry I disturbed you.

Mr. BURTON. No disturbance at all, sir.

30. General GRUNERT. I wanted to get that point straightened out anyway; I had some questions. Will you proceed?

31. Major CLAUSEN. It is right here, sir.

32. General FRANK. We want to clear this up on Martin.

33. Major CLAUSEN. There is a reference right at the bottom of this page over here where he saw General Robins and General Kingman.

Mr. BURTON. As I say, if it is in here, why, then—

34. General FRANK. Will you identify the paper, first?

Mr. BURTON. This is the record of an interview dated February 3, 1944, at which there were present Herman J. Galloway of the firm of King & King, lawyers, John M. Martin, H. Ralph Burton, and Joseph G. Colgan; and on page 6 Mr. Martin, speaking, said:

(Excerpts from report of interview of February 3, 1944, of John M. Martin were read as follows:)

I advised Mr. Rohl he shouldn't attempt to assume responsibility for a secret project at a time when he wasn't a citizen of the United States. Mr. Rohl asked me if I would explain to General Robins why Mr. Rohl was not obeying that request of Colonel Wyman. I told him I would and I think there was a lapse of probably several months. Other subsequent requests had been made by Colonel Wyman who apparently was rowing with Paul Grafe, in which Rohl was again requested to come to the Islands and it drifted along until about August 1941 when I had come to Washington [860] and handed to General Robins a photostatic order directing that Rohl go to the Islands and I believe that Colonel Lorence and a civilian attorney for the Chief of Engineers named Stelphen were there. It is my recollection that General Kingman, who was then Acting Chief of Engineers, was brought into the discussion and that Kingman thereupon wrote a letter to Mr. Schofield.

And then he says:

Was it Schofield? The letter was dated about August 28, 1941, and Mr. Schofield was head of the Department of Immigration in which General Kingman stated that there could be no question of Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States; that his services were badly needed in the islands; and that he understood he had a petition pending with the court in Los Angeles for his natural-

zation and would they do what they could to expedite the hearing on its merits by the Federal Court.

35. Major CLAUSEN. There are other pertinent references in that statement to December, 1940, that the Board might want to consider at another time.

36. General RUSSELL. Well, as I got that, Mr. Burton, as I heard the reading of that, it is a memorandum which purports to set forth the substance of a conference between these people who are named, and states rather emphatically that General Kingman came into that conference and as a result of his participation in the conference he wrote a letter to Mr. Schofield. Now, is that what that says?

37. Major CLAUSEN. That is what it says; yes, sir.

38. General RUSSELL. That is what I thought.

39. Major CLAUSEN. We have arranged to follow that up, sir.

[861] General RUSSELL. All right.

40. Major CLAUSEN. And was that a sworn statement or a signed statement of Mr. Martin?

Mr. BURTON. This statement of Martin's is one that was—I don't recall whether it is signed or initialed by Martin.

41. Major CLAUSEN. Pardon the interruption. I just wanted to call attention to the fact, I recall having read it and it is my memorandum. I think you might proceed at the point that you were going.

Mr. BURTON. After finding out about the background of Mr. Rohl and the things which I have just mentioned to the Board, it seemed to me very pertinent to ascertain as much as possible about the relationship of Rohl and Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., so I began inquiries in the city of Los Angeles. John H. Weiner of our staff went to Los Angeles for that purpose, following leads which I gave him, and having been received by the committee from varied sources. The first of the first affidavits he obtained is that of Alice [redacted] and I read just a part of that, and then with the permission of the Board's staff that for the record. She states that she lives in Los Angeles and that she had been employed as a hotel maid by the Biltmore Hotel for 15 years, and was still employed in that capacity. During the last four years, she has been working on the ninth floor, where there are apartments, as well as suites. I will now quote:

I first saw Hans Wilhelm Rohl about four years ago, when he used to occupy Apartment Z. He usually would have dinner at about 8:30 P. M. About four years ago last February, I know Rohl gave a big dinner party in Apartment Z, and I know the man whose picture you now show me was present. (John H. [redacted] shows picture of Theodore Wyman, Jr., to affiant, with Wyman's name [redacted] I don't recall any other men at that party except Rohl and Wyman, and [redacted] were extremely drunk. The liquor was brought up there by the case. [redacted] the course of the evening there were about 20 young girls who kept coming in and out of the apartment all evening, and the party was still in progress when I left to go off duty at about 10:30 p. m. The girls appeared to be cheap, commercial party girls of the type that frequent the Main Street bars and night places.

After this first party, I saw Rohl and Wyman on a great many occasions when they had wild drinking parties of the same general type. The same cheap-looking type of young girls paraded in and out all evening.

I will just read extracts, if that is what the Board [863] approves.

At these subsequent parties, there would usually be four or five girls during the evening. While the parties were under way, I could never get into the

bedrooms because they were always locked. Mr. Rohl always called Wyman "Ted" or "Teddy". On each and every occasion when these parties occurred, I have seen girls sitting on Rohl's lap and Wyman's lap, and all the indications that would naturally lead me to believe that these girls were simply being hired to cater to the sexual whims of the two men, because different girls were used from time to time, and as I was maid on that floor, I went in to take fresh supplies of towels and had ample opportunity to observe what went on. * * *

That is signed "Alice Anstey," on December 18, 1943.

I now read from an affidavit of one Juanita Blackwell:

Juanita Blackwell, first being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I went to work for Hans W. Rohl approximately 16 years ago, on Rodeo Drive in Beverly Hills, then to Shaddow Place, then to the Talmadge Apartments, then to their present residence. I was cook and cared for the house. At 8159 Hollywood Boulevard, Theodore Wyman, Jr., was a guest. Mr. Rohl often spoke of Wyman when we were living in the Talmadge Apartments in about 1936. It was shortly after we had moved from the Apartments that Mr. Rohl took Dr. Lewis and his wife on a cruise aboard the yacht "Vega," to the Hawaiian Islands. Major Wyman never remained overnight. He usually discussed business with [864] Mr. Rohl during these visits, and used to stay for dinner. Every other day or so Major Wyman would telephone Mr. Rohl, and I would answer the phone, and he would, of course, tell me who he was. Major Wyman frequently was driven to the Rohl residence by a soldier in an army car.

Werner Plack used to telephone infrequently, would ask for Mr. Rohl, and would, of course, tell me his name when I answered the telephone.

Many times after Wyman went to Honolulu, he and Mr. Rohl would talk for quite a long time on the long-distance telephone, and I have heard Rohl swear at him during these conversations. Rohl certainly wasn't afraid of Mr. Wyman at all. During these long-distance conversations Wyman and Rohl would discuss business, and I heard Rohl speak of hangars, runways, and landing-fields. Mr. Paul Grafe also used to phone Mr. Rohl from Honolulu about business, too.

I would like to make a statement at this point about this affidavit. This affidavit was taken in the presence of John A. Weiner and W. Bruce Pine, a resident of Los Angeles, a man of considerable means, who became very much interested in the investigation concerning Pearl Harbor, but who was associated principally with what is known as the Tenney Committee, or Joint Fact-Finding Committee of the California Legislature. And the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before R. E. Combs, who was the counsel for that State Fact-Finding Committee on un-American Activities, and as such authorized by the legislature of California to take acknowledgments as a notary.

At a later date, in order to get probably a little better-written affidavit—this is written in longhand—and for certain [865] other reasons, I asked Mr. Weiner to get a second affidavit and to have it acknowledged before another notary, who had taken other affidavits. He did go out to take that affidavit, but because the notary was not present, I did not use that affidavit. Mr. Weiner took it to the notary who was accustomed to taking acknowledgments—I am speaking of the second affidavit—and because it was practically a duplicate of this affidavit, she took the acknowledgment, but when I heard that she was not present I rejected that affidavit and kept the original one, even though it was handwritten and on foolscap paper.

I say that because it is very possible that some witness may bring in a copy of the second affidavit and attempt to confuse the Board; but this is the exact explanation, and this is the original affidavit, and the one which is used in the report.

I think it might be well at this point to say to the Board that we have original copies of telephone slips, which show the conversations

between Hans Wilhelm Rohl and Colonel Wyman, the length of the conversation, the dates, and the other details of a telephone ticket. With the Board's approval, I would like to submit these photostats of those tickets for the use of the Board.

42. Major CLAUSEN. Just one question: Do some of these reflect telephone conversations between Colonel Wyman, in Honolulu, and Mr. Rohl, in Los Angeles, during the early part of 1941?

Mr. BURTON. They do. Originals of these photostats are in the committee files, and at any time, if the Board would like to have them exhibited, we would be very glad to do so.

I think at this point we should refer to other affidavits just briefly, on the relationship between Rohl and Wyman. I [866] quote now from an affidavit of Cyril J. Harrington, of Los Angeles, California, who was employed by the Biltmore Hotel from September 20, 1936, to November 5, 1940, as house officer. He states that he knows Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and while at the Biltmore Hotel he had occasion to meet him and Hans Wilhelm Rohl, whom he also knew. I now quote from the affidavit:

Question. Do you know of your own knowledge if Mr. Rohl had, from time to time, been a guest at the hotel?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Would Mr. Rohl retain a room or a suite?

Answer. It would be a suite or apartment—an apartment, if available.

Question. Did you develop quite an acquaintance with Mr. Rohl?

Answer. Yes.

Question. For that reason, you had many opportunities to visit his suite?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Did you ever see Colonel Wyman there?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What would usually be the condition of Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman on your visits?

Answer. I would say that Rohl, most of the time, was apparently drinking. Of course there was always liquor there and usually Rohl and Wyman would be in conversation.

Question. Have you ever seen girls in Mr. Rohl's suite or apartment?

Answer. Numerous times—many times.

[867] Question. Would these parties last late?

Answer. Yes, because I didn't go on duty until 11:30 p. m.

Question. Do you know Mr. Svendrup?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Will you please state the time or times that you saw Mr. Svendrup, while he was registered at the hotel, in the company of Mr. Rohl or Colonel Wyman?

I think I should state here that Svendrup is Lief J. Svendrup, now Colonel Svendrup, of the Engineer Corps of the United States Army. Colonel Svendrup was a member of the firm of Svendrup & Parcels, Architectural Engineers, St. Louis, Mo. That firm received a great many contracts from Colonel Wyman in connection with architectural engineering in Hawaii and in the Pacific Islands. There will be more brought out in the report, but I mention that now in order to identify Colonel Svendrup.

Answer. Mr. Svendrup was in Mr. Rohl's apartment and he called requesting that his suite be cleaned during his absence. Ray Moore, handyman around the hotel, was sent to Svendrup's room to clean it and he found a purse. Ray Moore called me and I found approximately \$3 in the purse, and I knew that Mr. Svendrup and the girls were visiting in Mr. Rohl's apartment. I took the purse to Rohl's apartment and turned it over to them and Svendrup was very much perturbed, saying that I should have left the purse in his room and that

I should not touch anything in the room. At this point, Mr. Rohl ordered Mr. Svendrup to leave his apartment and go back to his own room and take his girl friend. Mr. Rohl resented the fact that Mr. Svendrup talked to me the way he did.

[868] Question. Did Mr. Svendrup leave and take his girl friend?

Answer. I don't know that he left at that moment, but he did leave shortly thereafter.

Question. Had you seen these girls around the hotel previously?

Answer. Yes, three or four times.

Question. What would you say the occupation of these girls might be?

Answer. My opinion is that they were good-time girls. I had seen them in the rooms of Rohl and Svendrup at different times.

Question. Did you ever see Colonel Wyman in Svendrup's apartment?

Answer. To the best of my knowledge, I only saw him there once.

Question. Do you recall about what time it was?

Answer. About 7 a. m.

Question. Had he been there all night?

Answer. Apparently.

Question. What was his condition?

Answer. He had been drinking. Of course, I wasn't employed at the hotel at this time, but I had been at the hotel the night before and had met Svendrup who had told me to be at his apartment at 7 the next morning, stating that he wanted to talk to Mr. Rohl about a position I was to get in Honolulu and the reason I had to be there so early was because Svendrup told me he was leaving the city early.

[869] That affidavit is signed by Cyril J. Harrington and acknowledged before a notary on December 22, 1943.

I read now from the affidavit of Mrs. Gertrude Marcus:

I reside at 2007 W. Third Street, Los Angeles; have been employed for the last 17 years by the Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles; for the last four years have been desk clerk assigned to the ninth floor.

I have known Hans Wilhelm Rohl for several years as a patron; he most usually requested quarters on my floor, since one of the suites has a refrigerator. He most always was drunk, and it was a common practice for him to have cheap-looking girls visiting him; they would stop at my desk for directions, but after a while they got wise and came up the back elevator.

His male companion on these parties was the man whose picture Mr. Weiner showed me. Mr. Rohl would sometimes call him "Ted" and sometimes "Mr. Smith." I now know his name is Colonel Wyman, but I have not seen him recently. When Wyman and Rohl would leave together, they would be pretty "plastered." When Mr. Rohl was here about a month ago the bellboy, Charles Hays, said:

"You ought to see how Rohl is bleeding; you know he was operated on for gall bladder."

That was signed before a notary public, December 24, 1943, by Mrs. Gertrude Marcus.

I read from an affidavit of Lt. L. M. Staub, Los Angeles, Calif., U. S. Naval Reserve:

I first met Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., about 1938; I have seen him on H. W. Rohl's yacht, the VEGA, four [870] or five times, and on each and every occasion Wyman was so drunk that he was utterly obnoxious and incapable of transacting any business; when I was first introduced to him, Colonel Wyman criticized my appearance and was very insulting to me; he would pour whisky on the floor and drop his burning cigarettes on the carpet.

Mrs. Floy Rohl—

That is Mrs. Hans Wilhelm Rohl—

once stated to me that she didn't like Wyman, but that H. W. Rohl, her husband, had to tolerate him for business reasons.

I was acquainted with Werner Plack, having met him in about 1935 or 1936, and know that he spent most of his time at Gert Von Gundhardt's home in Beverly Hills. Plack also told me that he visited at Frank Morgan's home in Beverly Hills.

That was signed on the 24th of December, 1943, by L. M. Staub. I think it should be stated for the record, here, that Werner Plack was a German official, that he was connected with the German Consulate in Los Angeles, and evidently moved about quite a bit in social circles in Los Angeles. An examination of the files at the State Department by the Committee showed that he left California with a number of other Nazi representatives in 1940, that they went by way of Japan, and that certain documents were taken from them by the FBI and returned to them on their departure from Japan. There isn't any question, from the inquiries which were made by the committee, that he was a Nazi official.

This is a statement of Emil Zucca, of San Bernardino, [871] Calif. He was interviewed by John H. Weiner, investigator for the committee. He states that his name is Emil Zucca, that he resides in San Bernardino, Calif., is employed by the San Bernardino Air Service Command as Senior Aircraft Mechanic, and that he was an employee of the U. S. Engineer Department, South Pacific Division, Los Angeles, and that his duties were those of chauffeur, assigned to Major Theodore Wyman, Jr.; that he started in February 1936 and worked until 1942, and drove for Major Wyman for 3 years and 7 months, and that it was a government car he drove.

He states that he was acquainted with the first Mrs. Wyman, Ella Wyman, and the second Mrs. Wyman, Ruth Wyman, and that he knows Hans Wilhelm Rohl; had occasion to drive Major Wyman in the evenings and early mornings. I will now quote:

Q. Did you ever have occasions to drive Major Wyman to the Biltmore Hotel?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What would be these occasions?

A. On different occasions, I have gone to Mr. Rohl's apartment to take Major Wyman cigarettes, and his brief case—on occasions.

Q. Who would be in the apartment on these occasions?

A. Mr. Rohl, Major Wyman, sometimes would be alone; and on other occasions, there would be Mr. Svendrup, and Paul Grafe.

Q. As a rule, would you have to wait for Major Wyman?

A. Yes.

[872] Q. How late, if you remember, would you have to wait for him on some occasions?

A. Oh, anywhere from 9 until 2.

Q. Where would you then take him?

A. Home.

Q. Do you remember the address?

A. 221 Woodruff, West Los Angeles.

Q. It was also customary, was it not, for you also to drive Major Wyman and his friends around to the various night clubs?

A. I have, on occasion. Yes.

Q. Please name some of the night clubs that you have taken Major Wyman and his guests.

A. Earl Carroll's, Cafe La Maze, Little Jane Jones' Club, the Trocadero, and the Ambassador Hotel.

Q. Who would usually be along on these parties?

A. Mr. Rohl, Major Wyman, Mr. Svendrup, Captain George Withers, Captain Clatterbos, Paul Grafe. There was also one man whose name I don't remember—medium build.

Q. On these trips, Mr. Zucca, you always used the government car, did you not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Would you then have to wait until the party was over and take them home?

A. Most of the time.

Q. How late would you have to wait to take the parties home?

A. Around midnight or one o'clock.

Q. But there have been occasions that you just took [873] out Mr. Rohl and Major Wyman to the same type of places?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Would you be paid extra for this work?

A. Occasionally I received a tip.

Q. Please state the various night clubs or country clubs where you took Mr. and Mrs. Rohl and Major and Mrs. Wyman?

A. The Bel-Air Country Club. Different hotels. It is impossible for me to remember all the names.

That is the end of the quotation, there.

He also states that he took Mrs. Wyman shopping, and they used the government car for that purpose; he gives the names of the various banks where he took Major Wyman or Mrs. Wyman. I quote again:

Q. On your visit to Mr. Rohl's apartment in the hotel, while Major Wyman and these men were there, did you see evidences of liquor?

A. I have, on occasions.

Q. Have you ever driven Major Wyman down to the Los Angeles Yacht Club?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know who he was to meet there?

A. I presume, Mr. Rohl.

Q. Have you ever been on the VEGA?

A. No, but I have seen it.

Q. Have you ever taken Major Wyman from the hotel to homes other than his own?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whose homes you took him to?

[874] A. I drove him to Mr. Rohl's home, and Captain Clatterbos' home, and Captain Withers'. Those are the only ones that I recall.

Following the development of these facts, I thought it advisable to make inquiries of those who were connected in a business way with Mr. Rohl, so we sought an interview with Mr. T. E. Connolly, his partner, and that interview was held by Mr. Weiner, December 11, 1943. The statement is signed by T. E. Connolly, but not acknowledged. It is witnessed by John H. Wyman.

In this, Mr. Connolly states: That he lives in San Francisco; that he first met H. W. Rohl some time prior to 1925, he does not remember the exact date, or circumstances; that he knows Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and that he does not recall the year and date, but he first met him when he came to Los Angeles as a Captain of the U. S. Army Engineers, and was in charge of construction activities in that area. Now, I will quote:

Q. Do you remember who introduced you to him?

A. It was very possible that I introduced myself. If a formal introduction was arranged, I don't think that was so. I would rather say that I went over there to get some plans or offer a bid. I certainly met him in his office in an official capacity.

Q. In other words, it is possible that you went over to discuss with him contracts, and so forth?

A. Certainly. I have done that many times.

Q. It is a fact, it is not, that you are a stockholder in the Rohl-Connolly Co., a Nevada corporation [875] doing business in California?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where is the principal place of business?

A. Los Angeles, Calif.

Q. Wasn't it formed in 1932 by Frank S. Cliff, F. E. Leader, and a man named Peterson? Who are these gentlemen?

A. I don't know. Of course, it was formed in Nevada—they may be the attorneys, those must be the qualifying directors—absolutely unknown to me.

Q. Isn't the corporation's principal place of business 511 N. Carson Street, Carson City, Nevada?

A. It might be so recorded, but our principal place of operations has been Los Angeles.

Q. Didn't the California Commissioner of Corporations in May of 1932 issue a permit for the sale of 40,000 shares of the capital stock of the concern to H. W. Rohl, Irma Dickey and yourself?

A. If so, I don't think that was acted upon. My recollection is there is only 20,000 shares out.

I will stop the quotation there, and merely state that there were some questions following, that had to do with the corporation.

43. General FRANK. Did you ever look up to find out who owned that stock?

Mr. BURTON. Yes, sir; it is all a matter of record, here. I mean we have a full record of the ownership.

44. Major CLAUSEN. Doesn't Mr. Connolly state, or Mr. Martin?

Mr. BURTON. I think it is Martin in his interview that [876] gives that.

45. Major CLAUSEN. Martin gives all those facts.

[877] Mr. BURTON. I quote again:

Question. Did Rohl ever state to you that he knew Wyman prior to meeting you?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Was it your general custom to confer with Rohl from time to time on important projects in which your firm was engaged?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Are you acquainted with General Virgil Lee Peterson of Washington, D. C.?

Answer. I met General Peterson, who was then Colonel Peterson, when he was in charge of the Los Angeles District when we bid our first section of the Los Angeles-Long Beach breakwater.

Question. Were you in Washington on December 18, 1940?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were you in Washington on January 17, 1941?

Answer. I was there on the evening of that day. I was in a plane from Los Angeles to Washington during the day January 17th.

Question. Were you in Washington, January 21, 1941?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. While you were in Washington on these dates, Mr. Connolly, isn't it a fact that you were there discussing the contracts that you had in the Hawaiian Islands?

Answer. No, sir. When I was there in December we were discussing the Hawaiian contracts. When I was there on January 17th to appear before the naval board on January [878] 18th regarding the building of naval bases and Bermuda installations was mentioned, but we had gone there to try and obtain construction of a dry dock at San Diego. We prepared questionnaires and on January 22nd we appeared before the naval board and made our submission regarding the construction of the dry dock at San Diego and refused our consideration of any work in Bermuda or Newfoundland.

Question. While you were in Washington, did you receive any long distance calls from Mr. Rohl?

Answer. Whether I received them or not—I talked to him. If I didn't receive them, I made them.

Question. During your visits to Washington to either negotiate or conclude government contracts for your firm for installation of fortifications in the Hawaiian Islands, Mr. Rohl called you in Washington?

Answer. I had telephonic communications with Mr. Rohl when I was in Washington concerning these contracts. Whether he called or I called, I cannot state, but we did have telephone conversations.

Question. Regarding the contracts?

Answer. Yes. The first knowledge I had of a potential contract in the Hawaiian Islands was on Monday, December 16, 1940, when I was called in Denver, Colo-

rado by Mr. Rohl from San Francisco who stated that Colonel Wyman was here from the Hawaiian Islands seeking contractors to perform certain work over there and that he, Rohl, wished me to meet a certain plane at Cheyenne and go on east with Colonel Wyman and endeavor to get the contracts. I asked what type of contracts they were and Rohl answered that the Colonel would explain that to me. I was unable to [879] get on a plane at Cheyenne so I flew to Chicago and got on a plane with Colonel Wyman and flew from Chicago down to Washington. We went to the Carlton Hotel where we could get no rooms and we were expecting Mr. Paul Grafe. He had not arrived so we occupied his room. I met John Martin, Mr. Rohl's attorney, who told me he was in Washington in the interests of acquiring citizenship or further citizenship applications for Mr. H. W. Rohl. When I thought that there was a likelihood that we would acquire the contract I further thought that I should have Mr. Rohl resign as an officer of the Rohl-Connolly Co. and substitute myself and so I phoned him and it was so done, and he was neither officer nor a director of the Rohl-Connolly Co. until after he obtained his naturalization papers.

Question. In other words, Mr. Connolly, at your insistence he resigned as an officer or a director of the company?

Answer. That's right.

Question. But he still retained his stock?

Answer. That is right.

Question. Subsequent to receiving the contract for the Hawaiian Islands, did Mr. Rohl discuss with you the nature of the contract, etc.?

Answer. No. There was no detailed discussion of this contract at all. Personally I never saw a written description of it or a blueprint on any part of it. Rohl and I discussed the necessary financial arrangements, advancement of moneys because after all we were financing this. We were building certain airfields. We knew what that meant, just simply movement of materials and stabi- [880] lization of a base without a blueprint at all. When you are told to run a 7500 runway we knew what it takes.

Question. But it would be most usual for him to discuss with you the nature and type of contract that you received for the Hawaiian Islands?

Answer. Yes. I don't doubt but what we mentioned building an airport there. I don't think that we ever got into some of these installations out there, I don't think Rohl and I ever discussed anything of that nature. We talked of those warning stations because I was curious as to what they were. That's all that I know that we ever got into any detail about.

Question. I believe that's all, Mr. Connolly.

46. General GRUNERT. It seems to me that everything I have heard so far I have read before. Apparently it was all referred to in this report. Is it not wasting your time and ours to reread these things? If you just tell us about what the gist is, and then refer to the evidence, that can be made available.

Mr. BURTON. Yes, sir. The reason I read some in full was that they are not quoted in full in the report. Some things have been left out. But I would like to submit it for the record.

47. General GRUNERT. If the documents are submitted for the record we must study the record, anyway. I have gotten a very good idea by just reading this report. If there is anything additional to be pointed out that we can go into ourselves, it would probably save your time and our time if you did not have to read such lengthy papers, if they are available for us to go over.

48. Major CLAUSEN. The next document is one that I think is [881] quoted in the report. The following one is an interview with Colonel Gesler.

49. General GRUNERT. That is new to me.

50. Major CLAUSEN. I would suggest that Mr. Burton read that, if he will.

There is a certain affidavit here, and it might be well for the Board to hear it before we proceed with other testimony by the witness.

51. General GRUNERT. How long is it going to take to finish it?

52. Major CLAUSEN. It will take some time, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Which document do you have in mind?

53. Major CLAUSEN. The next is Colonel Gesler. It follows the statement of Mr. Foley which follows Mr. Connolly's statement.

Mr. BURTON. Here is the Foley statement and here is the Gesler statement (producing documents).

54. General GRUNERT. Are these things to be made available for the Board?

Mr. BURTON. Yes, sir; this entire book (indicating).

55. General GRUNERT. Then, of what value is Mr. Burton's evidence except to give us a narrative form that we cannot get out of the evidence shown to the Board?

56. General RUSSELL. I was wondering if Mr. Burton had gone out to Hawaii and got any evidence about what developed out there as a result of these relations. We are interested in that. I have not seen anything on that.

57. General GRUNERT. If we can get from Mr. Burton anything that is not contained in the documentary evidence that we can read and digest, or if he has any particular thing that he wants [882] to call our attention to, without consuming much time, he may do so.

Mr. BURTON. I submitted a request to the War Department for permission to send a member of our staff to Hawaii, and that he be furnished transportation, indicating that we would like transportation by air; and it was my intention to send a member of the staff who was an engineer and an accountant. The answer came, first, that they refused permission. Later on the request was renewed, and permission was granted for a staff representative to go by water to Hawaii. It was then too late, for a number of reasons, to accept that. It would require too long a time for a man to go by such transportation. So we never did send a representative to Hawaii. However, I called for copies of the contracts. There was a basic contract, the one that was signed on December 21, 1940, and there have been 53 supplements following that. The first 43 supplements have to do largely with construction. Those running from 44 to 50, if I remember correctly, or 51, were subsequently eliminated. Supplements 52 and 53 had to do with contract termination and final settlement.

I examined these contracts very carefully and then concluded to obtain the services of an engineer, and I made a request for Mr. Case B. Rafter, of the Veterans Bureau, whom I knew to be a qualified engineer and to have been an engineer officer in the First World War. After he had analyzed these contracts I then asked him if he would specify just what documents should be called for in order to determine the character of performance of those contracts. I then prepared a letter to the War Department and called for the documents that were necessary. They were analyzed. The results are shown in the report, [883] and I believe that the Board is well acquainted with what the job orders and the progress charts show. I will be very glad to state what I know about it if you care to have me do so.

58. General GRUNERT. I believe, General Frank, that you have all that information and will follow it up to a conclusion.

59. General FRANK. At Honolulu.

Mr. BURTON. I think it might be well for me to state, gentlemen, that I made a number of inquiries relative to warning stations. The results of them are not of record in detail, because they consisted of conversations. I finally reached the conclusion that there was a vast difference between what might be termed a temporary aircraft warning station and a permanent warning station. I know the committee supports me in this, that the difference between the permanent air raid warning station and the temporary one is that the permanent station has more complete service so far as electrical equipment is concerned; that it has 24-hour personnel assigned to it; that it is usually located in a strategic position, such as high elevation, and that, above all, it has telephone communication, in this case, to every part of the Islands, so that instant warning could be given. I think it is unnecessary to say to you gentlemen that the higher the elevation the wider is the range; and I think you will find in the testimony that the stations which were to be placed in the most strategic positions were the ones that were the farthest from completion. That is the reason why it was felt that had the contractors been required to complete the contract for air raid warning stations and for gasoline storage tanks within the time specified in the contract, the basic contract of December 21, 1940, the Army would have been in better position to defend Pearl Harbor at the time of its attack, [884] because it would have been warned of the approach of planes and gasoline would have been accessible.

As the reports will show, the completion date was repeatedly moved up by the engineer. As a matter of fact, the job orders to begin construction of the air raid warning stations—some of them were not issued until nearly six months after the original contract, and that was the time when this contract should have been completed.

There were 24 gasoline storage tanks to be completed, if I remember correctly, and there were not any of them completed.

60. General FRANK. Did your committee have any information to the effect that aircraft operations were held up or prevented because of the lack of installation of any underground storage tanks? Did you have any information of flights which were prevented from taking off because of the lack of those tanks?

Mr. BURTON. There was some testimony by Robert Hoffman to that effect, and the transcript of record will be submitted for the use of the Board.

61. General GRUNERT. Do you have him on your list?

62. Major CLAUSEN. He is supposed to be in Mexico. The testimony that is referred to is on my list and is in one of the documents that I want Mr. Burton to read.

63. General GRUNERT. Do you contemplate putting his testimony in as an exhibit to the record?

64. Major CLAUSEN. I was going to take this up in order. After Mr. Burton concludes his statement I would like to ask him for specific documents and then put the documents in as exhibits so that we will have them in continuity.

65. General GRUNERT. That will not require him to read them, will it?

[885] 66. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir.

67. General RUSSELL. I was very much interested in the last statement, because I think Mr. Burton's line of reasoning is following along

the same channels that the Board has been following in the last two or three days. But I was particularly anxious to know whether or not the committee had gathered specific evidence indicating that the delays out there were caused by those contractors of whom he states that this man Rohl was the dominant personality and apparently dominated the entire situation. We had arrived, Mr. Burton, at somewhat the same general conclusions, or were thinking along the same lines that you are.

68. General GRUNERT. We have not arrived at any definite conclusions as yet. These are just objectives to be investigated so as to give us data on which to arrive at conclusions.

69. General RUSSELL. But we were following the same train of thought. What we were attempting to ascertain was whether or not you had any specific evidence.

Mr. BURTON. There are two affidavits, one by King and the other by Wickiser, which I think are very definite evidence of delay and inefficiency and indifference on the part of the contractors and of the engineers in charge.

70. General GRUNERT. That will also be covered by you, will it?

71. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. They are on General Frank's list.

Mr. BURTON. They are included in this volume which I am submitting to the Board.

72. General GRUNERT. Mr. Burton, do you wish to continue your statement, or has your statement been concluded, and may we develop it further [886] by questioning?

Mr. BURTON. I think I have covered the principal points and that anything else could be very easily brought out by questioning. I will be glad to answer your questions.

73. General GRUNERT. Then I will give give General Russell and General Frank a chance to ask such questions as occur to them now.

74. General RUSSELL. I think I have no questions.

75. General FRANK. The history of the job orders, in so far as we have been able to pursue them here, has indicated that the work on the job orders was not concluded on the estimated completion date. Was your committee enabled to determine the cause of the delay? Did they know whether or not priorities interfered? Did they know whether or not shipping was available? Did they know whether or not materials could be obtained or whether there was any delay in obtaining them?

Mr. BURTON. I made a special inquiry of the War Department as to whether or not any complaint had ever been made on the part of the Engineer Corps of the Army about the delays, and the answer was in the negative, that they had not. There has been no evidence submitted by the War Department one way or the other about either the lack of materials or the difficulty in obtaining them. I submitted to them a direct question as to when the instruments for the air raid warning stations had been received on the Island, and that question they have never answered. I had in mind, too, that there might have been some delay, but there has never been any evidence submitted to the committee nor any evidence developed by the committee, so far as that is concerned. I think it would be a matter of judicial notice on the part of the committee that anything required by [887] the Army for national defense would receive the highest priority,

and that instruments for aircraft warning stations would be brought by air if necessary.

76. General FRANK. They are too big.

77. General GRUNERT. All those phases will be gone into. Inquiries are already started and will be prosecuted to completion. That is why your testimony is of such value to us, to give us leads and to show us how much of the ground has been covered by the committee.

Mr. BURTON. I have, since this report was filed, obtained a complete list of all of the equipment which was purchased by the Hawaiian Constructors, amounting to pretty close to \$2,000,000 worth, if I remember correctly, leased by the government and then recaptured; and there was evidently no difficulty about getting all of that heavy equipment to Hawaii. So that it would seem rather unreasonable that the equipment for permanent aircraft warning stations could not be received on time.

78. General FRANK. I have no further questions.

79. General GRUNERT. Will you, Major Clausen, continue your development of this matter, and then the Board will determine whether there are any additional questions.

80. Major CLAUSEN. May the record show that Mr. Burton hands me this volume from which he has read affidavits and statements which are contained in my Exhibit A to the memorandum from Mr. Amberg, dated July 10.

I offer this volume as our Exhibit No. 6.

(Volume entitled "Exhibits Rohl-Wyman Contracts" was marked Exhibit No. 6 and received in evidence.)

I will ask Mr. Burton to hand me the transcript of hearings before the California State Legislature's Joint Fact Finding [888] Committee on UnAmerican Activities in the Matter of Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

May the record show that Mr. Burton has handed me the transcript referred to, and I offer it as our Exhibit 7.

(Transcript of hearings before the California State Legislature's Joint Fact Finding Committee on UnAmerican Activities was marked Exhibit No. 7 and received in evidence.)

I will ask Mr. Burton to hand me the testimony of Robert Hoffman before the House Committee on Military Affairs, given on 24 January, 1944, which includes his statement of 29 April, 1942, which has been referred to in the testimony.

May the record show that Mr. Burton hands me two transcripts, Volumes 49 and 50, of testimony given on January 24 and 27, 1944, by Robert Hoffman, and a copy of a statement by Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area, Bellows Field, dated 29 April, 1942, which I offer as Exhibits.

(Volume 49 of testimony of Robert Hoffman before House Committee on Military Affairs was marked Exhibit 8 and received in evidence.)

(Volume 50 of testimony of Robert Hoffman before House Committee on Military Affairs was marked Exhibit 8-A and received in evidence.)

(Copy of statement by Robert Hoffman dated April 29, 1942, was marked Exhibit 8-B and received in evidence.)

Will you hand me the statement of the witness Olsen made in December, 1943?

Mr. BURTON. I will have to have photostats made of that. You can mark it as submitted, and I will sent it to you tomorrow.

81. Major CLAUSEN. May the record show that the witness hands [889] me the original of this statement of Olsen, dated the 19th of December, 1943, and I ask that it be received as Exhibit No. 9.

(Original of statement of Olsen dated December 19, 1943, was not marked but was received in evidence as Exhibit 9.)

Will you hand me the transcript of the testimony of George H. Moody.

Let the record show that the witness has handed me transcript of interview of George H. Moody dated April 4, 1944, which we offer as Exhibit 10.

(Original transcript of interview of George H. Moody, dated April 4, 1944, was not marked, but was received in evidence as Exhibit No. 10.)

May I have the two volumes of testimony of Major General Julian L. Schley given before the House Military Affairs Committee on 9 February, 1944, and 4 May, 1944.

May the record show that the witness has handed me these two volumes which we offer in evidence.

(Two volumes of testimony of Major General Julian L. Schley, respectively dated February 9, 1944, and May 4, 1944, were respectively marked Exhibit No. 11 and Exhibit No. 11-A and received in evidence.)

I now ask for the folder of the Hotel Biltmore records showing the withdrawals of funds and accounts of Colonel Wyman and Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

Mr. Burton. You can enter them and I will see that copies are supplied to you.

82. Major CLAUSEN. May the record show that the witness has handed me a folder containing the records to which I have referred, and I will offer it as our Exhibit 12.

[890] (Folder of Hotel Biltmore records was marked Exhibit No. 12 and received in evidence.)

Will you hand me the statement of Colonel Wyman with regard to having never trusted Rohl, because of having sold out his country, and so forth?

Mr. BURTON. I have that here. I will have to make a copy of that and give it to you.

83. Major CLAUSEN. May the record show that the witness has handed me this statement which is indicated as a lead, and we offer this one page. I do not know what the rest of the document is.

84. Colonel WEST. Can you describe that a little more particularly?

85. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. It is a statement to the effect that there has been an admission by Colonel Wyman that he made while drunk or had been drinking with some people in the spring of 1942, to the effect that he should never have trusted Rohl; that Rohl sold out our country to his German friends and that what he should do is to take his service revolver and go out and shoot Rohl and then shoot himself.

(Statement of Colonel Wyman with regard to Hans Wilhelm Rohl was not marked, but was received in evidence as Exhibit No. 13.)

The documents that you have now handed me are photostatic copies of telephone calls?

Mr. BURTON. These (indicating) are the telephone calls between Rohl and Wyman from Honolulu to Los Angeles.

86. Major CLAUSEN. Do you have sets of telephone calls of Mr. Rohl to Washington during December, 1940?

Mr. BURTON. They will appear on the Biltmore photostats.

[897] 87. Major CLAUSEN. I see. In other words, the folder you have already handed me. Are there any of these others—

Mr. BURTON. Now, just off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

88. Major CLAUSEN. Well, then, for the present purposes, you have handed me an envelope with some stubs of telephone calls.

Mr. BURTON. They are photostats of original telephone tickets, record slips.

89. Major CLAUSEN. All right, sir. We offer these as our exhibit next in order.

(Envelope containing telephone record slips was marked Exhibit No. 14 and received in evidence.)

Mr. BURTON. I submit as an exhibit photostat copies of the accounts of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and Paul Grafe at the Carlton Hotel in December of 1940, showing that a bill amounting to \$16.50 of Colonel Theodore Wyman was charged to the account of Paul Grafe and later paid by Paul Grafe, who was the attorney in fact for the three companies participating in the Hawaiian Constructors and who was the representative of the Hawaiian Constructors in Hawaii later.

90. General FRANK. May I ask a question there: Did you take any steps to find out whether or not at a later date Grafe was reimbursed by Wyman for his share of the bill?

Mr. BURTON. No, sir, I did not, but that is set forth in the Interim Report of the Committee which was filed on June 14, 1944, and to this date there has been no denial.

91. General RUSSELL. Has any investigation been made of this Colonel Wyman's income tax returns and bank accounts to determine whether or not he flourished at any period during his [892] late years?

Mr. BURTON. A rather complete investigation of Colonel Wyman's bank account was made by the Committee, and photostat copies of what was found are in the Committee files, and photostat copies of those will be submitted to the Board if desired. They do not show any unreasonable affluence at any time, although it is very evident from the accounts and from a general survey of what Colonel Wyman spent that he could not have stayed within a Major's income.

92. General GRUNERT. Does that show whether he had any outside income outside of his Army pay?

Mr. BURTON. Quite the contrary, sir, because when he purchased a house and it became necessary for him to make a payment, he cashed a bonus certificate. Pardon me. Is that what it is at the Veterans Administration?

93. Major CLAUSEN. I think so.

Mr. BURTON. A bonus certificate.

94. Major CLAUSEN. Or insurance.

Mr. BURTON. And he received some insurance, in order to make up the amount necessary to pay on the house, and he also borrowed \$500 from an individual in order to make up the full amount.

95. Major CLAUSEN. Do you want to tell the Board anything about large withdrawals of cash by Mr. Rohl from the hotel, running as high as \$5,000 a month?

Mr. BURTON. The records of the Biltmore Hotel indicate that Rohl was in the habit of drawing very large sums of money in cash at the desk in the Biltmore Hotel. For instance, on November 28, 1942, he drew \$500, on the 30th of December he [893] drew \$300, February 28 he drew a thousand dollars, and March 23 he withdrew \$300, 7th of July, \$500, and so on, running through his account over quite a long period and beginning in 1941.

96. General FRANK. Do you think those are excessive amounts for a man to draw who is worth a million dollars?

Mr. BURTON. I would say they were rather large amounts to go to to the hotel desk and draw in cash, and evidently they were drawn during the periods when these parties were being held.

97. General FRANK. It certainly indicates his credit was good.

Mr. BURTON. There isn't any question about Mr. Rohl's credit. He has had enough Government contracts, and if you would follow through, as I have, the payments to him and the settlements that have been made to him, you would not wonder that he had all the money he needs.

98. General FRANK. That is correct. But his financial standing is such that perhaps his drawing a \$300 check was like my drawing a \$3 check.

Mr. BURTON. Well, you understand, General, that this is not from the bank.

99. General FRANK. Yes, I understand.

Mr. BURTON. That these are: he walks up to the desk on the 5th of November and draws a thousand dollars, and four days later five hundred, and a few days later two hundred and fifty, and a little while later five hundred?

100. General FRANK. Yes, but as long as he had the money to pay it, how is that incriminatory?

[894] Mr. BURTON. It is not, sir. There is no allegation so far as the Committee is concerned that there is anything criminal on the part of anyone, and the entire report is for the purpose of bringing to the attention of the public and the War Department the relationship which was cultivated by Mr. Rohl for Colonel Wyman over a long period of time, and that as a result of that cultivation of relationship, of relations, between Mr. Rohl, who was a contractor seeking Government contracts, and Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., who was an engineer who had the contracts, who was in a position to give the contracts, and to show that the contracts were given to Mr. Rohl's companies as against the whole field—that is the purpose of the report; and that he was a German alien, General, at the time.

101. General FRANK. I know. We know all this.

Mr. BURTON. Yes, sir.

102. General FRANK. We know all this.

Mr. BURTON. But I am just answering you why we filed the report.

103. General FRANK. But I am trying to tie a fact with some definite

connection with Wyman. Now, has there been followed any connection between these withdrawals of money by Rohl to Wyman?

[895] Mr. BURTON. No, sir, but I would venture that if Mr. Rohl wanted to give any money to Colonel Wyman he would not do so by check.

104. General FRANK. That is very true, but a man is not convicted on inference; he is convicted on fact.

Mr. BURTON. That is true, sir, but there is no attempt on the part of the committee to convict anybody. The committee is a fact-finding committee and has no other jurisdiction, but when it gathers facts of this kind which, taken together, present a quick picture which is dubious at least, all it can do is to put those facts together with a degree of continuity and coordination and relationship so that the War Department can at least deduce that all is not just as it should be and proceed with its investigation as it should do. That is all the committee can do. It has no power to convict; it has no power to render an opinion, or rather, to render a verdict or a judgment. It does not attempt to do that, sir. Only presents the facts as it finds them.

105. General RUSSELL. Mr. Burton, I may be mistaken in following the statement that you made some time earlier. We were discussing the delay out in Hawaii.

Mr. BURTON. The what, sir?

106. General RUSSELL. Some delay in the work in Hawaii which might result from this man Rohl's association with the work out there. As I recall, you stated that there were these general deductions that we did discuss, and then you made some statement about having talked with a number of people, and I think it was in connection with this possible delay in Hawaii.

Mr. BURTON. I think you refer to my having stated that I talked with a number of persons about the difference between [896] a permanent air raid warning station and a temporary one.

107. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. As to its efficiency and its value so far as receiving the warning and communicating it to the various military posts is concerned.

108. General RUSSELL. Well, possibly that was the follow-up on that.

109. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? (No response.)

Mr. Burton, the Board very much appreciates the leads you have given it in what the committee has done with a view to paving the way where we can do as we are required to do so. We thank you for coming down and helping us out and being so generous with your records.

Mr. BURTON. Well, on behalf of the committee, sir, I want to say, and in behalf of the chairman, Mr. May, I wish to say, that they were very definite in their desire, in their expressions of desire, to cooperate with the Board, and instructed me to submit any evidence which was in the files of the committee that the Board might desire to have.

110. General GRUNERT. All right. Thank you very much. As I have tried to make clear to you, so that the committee would also have that understanding, we are limited as to our scope and limited as to our time. I believe you understood that, Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. Yes, sir; I appreciate that very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 6:25 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

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[898] **PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD**

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 16, 1944

**MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.**

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

**TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM BRYDEN, U. S. REGULAR
ARMY; SEPARATIONS BOARD; WASHINGTON, D. C.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

Colonel WEST. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

General BRYDEN. William Bryden, Major General, U. S. Regular Army; stationed here in Washington, on duty in the Secretary of War's Separations Board.

2. General GRUNERT. General, the Board, in an attempt to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor [899] attack. It is hoped that, because of your assignment at that time, as Deputy Chief of Staff, you can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover so large a field in the limited time available, individual Board Members have been assigned objectives or phases for special investigation, although the entire Board will pass on all objectives and phases. General Russell has this particular phase, so he will lead in propounding the questions, and the other Members of the Board will assist him in developing it. So I turn you over to General Russell.

3. General RUSSELL. General Bryden, what was your assignment in November and December 1941?

General BRYDEN. Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army.

4. General RUSSELL. How many Deputy Chiefs of Staff were on duty at that time?

General BRYDEN. I think Gen. R. C. Moore was the additional Deputy at that time, and whether or not General Arnold had been designated as another Deputy, I do not remember. He was designated at some time.

5. General RUSSELL. Were you Senior among these Deputy Chiefs of Staff?

General BRYDEN. I was considered as such, although Moore antedated me by a day or so, I think, in promotion.

6. General RUSSELL. The point at issue is: Who was Acting Chief of Staff in the absence of the Chief from Washington?

General BRYDEN. Yes, I was, when the Chief went away.

7. General RUSSELL. Was that true on the 27th and 28th days of November 1941, that you would act as Chief of Staff in the event General Marshall was away?

[900] General BRYDEN. Yes.

8. General RUSSELL. Do you recall whether or not General Marshall was away on the 27th of November 1941?

General BRYDEN. No, I don't remember.

9. General RUSSELL. General, I believe that it has been testified by General Marshall that he left Washington, on the afternoon of November 26, and was in the Carolina maneuvers on the 27th of November. If that testimony is true, then you would have been Acting Chief of Staff, on the 27th. On that day, a message was sent out to General Short, of the Hawaiian Department, which message is being investigated by the Board. It contained certain enemy information and certain directives or instructions to General Short. Are you familiar with that message?

General BRYDEN. No, I don't remember the message.

10. General RUSSELL. In the testimony of General Gerow, before the Roberts Commission, he stated that it was prepared by himself and a Colonel Bundy, and thereafter, a conference was had on that message. He names, as people at the conference, the Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, and Admiral Stark. The Board was anxious to know whether or not you were at that conference?

General BRYDEN. I don't remember being at any such conference as that.

11. General RUSSELL. If a message, later on that day of November 27, 1941, was sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, signed "Marshall," and if General Marshall was away from Washington at that time, should you have seen that message, or did it lie within the power of General Gerow [901] to send it out, without submitting it to you?

General BRYDEN. I had not been concerned with any such messages before, and he might have shown it to me, or he might not. He could have sent it on his own authority from General Marshall, if he had such authority.

12. General RUSSELL. That is the point—do you know whether or not he had such authority?

General BRYDEN. No, I don't know. General Marshall dealt, very frequently, directly with the War Plans Division; in fact, with all the G's.

13. General RUSSELL. Would you say, or not, that there was vested in General Gerow, as Chief of the War Plans Division, authority to send messages over the signature of General Marshall, without the necessity of discussing such messages with General Marshall, or, in his absence, with the Acting Chief of Staff?

General BRYDEN. A for sending them without, if General Marshall were present he undoubtedly would have taken them up with him, although I am not familiar with just how General Marshall worked with the War Plans Division in such cases. As I say, he worked directly with them. In case General Marshall were away and any question would come up in Gerow's mind, whether or not to send it, he probably would have seen me about it; but if he felt that he had authority to send it, he would have sent it, if General Marshall had told him.

14. General RUSSELL. The answer, therefore, to the question which I asked, as to whether or not Gerow, as Chief of the War Plans Division, had authority to sign General Marshall's name to messages, is, that you do not know?

[902] General BRYDEN. I don't know what instructions General Marshall may have given him.

15. General RUSSELL. You knew of no such general instructions as that?

General BRYDEN. No.

16. General RUSSELL. General Bryden, I will show you the original message, to see if, by reference to it, you can refresh your memory and tell us whether or not you saw that message before it was sent.

17. General FRANK. Is that the original War Department message of November 27?

18. General RUSSELL. Yes.

General BRYDEN. It is so dated.

I don't remember whether I saw that before, or not, whether I had seen it before, or not. You see, I wasn't working on those subjects at all, and if it was shown to me, at the time General Marshall was out, I may have seen it, I may not have seen it; I can't say, now.

19. General RUSSELL. Did you have certain limits on your activities there, or was a certain part of the work assigned to you?

General BRYDEN. Well, I carried on the routine work, you might say, of the War Department, and that concerned with mobilization in this continental United States, with the exception of the supply end of it, which was handled by General Moore, as Deputy; and General Arnold handled the Air part of it. That was the way of dividing it, when they had the three of us as Deputies.

20. General RUSSELL. It may have been, then, that General [903] Marshall left some specific directions with General Gerow, under which he was acting at the time that this message was prepared and sent?

General BRYDEN. He undoubtedly must have, because it was nothing that I had a part in working up; and if it was shown to me while General Marshall was away, it didn't make any particular impression upon me.

21. General RUSSELL. Now, General, the message which you have just read, being No. 472, dated November 27, 1941, directed the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to report measures taken. On the same day, November 27, 1941, a message was received from General Short, addressed to the Chief of Staff, in which he stated that the Department had been alerted to prevent sabotage, and liaison with the Navy had been established.

I want to show you that message from General Short. It has endorsed on it the initials of Secretary of War Stimson, then it has a

stamp, "Noted: Chief of Staff," and under that, "Noted: War Plans Division, LTG"—General Gerow. Do you remember seeing that report as it passed through the office of the Chief of Staff?

General BRYDEN. No; I do not remember seeing this.

22. General RUSSELL. Were you familiar with the practice, if in fact there was such a practice, in the office of the Chief of Staff, by which his stamp was placed on papers?

General BRYDEN. The stamp was placed on there when a paper had been shown to him. That's what that stamp would mean to me.

23. General RUSSELL. It indicates that General Marshall had [904] seen the report?

General BRYDEN. Yes.

24. General RUSSELL. But you did not see this?

General BRYDEN. I don't remember it, now.

25. General GRUNERT. By whom is that stamp usually placed on there? by Marshall, himself, or by his secretary?

General BRYDEN. No, he wouldn't put it on, himself, but some of the secretaries outside, or—I imagine there are several of those stamps around there; there used to be six—put on by some clerk.

26. General GRUNERT. When he sees a thing in person, does he initial it, as a rule, do you know?

General BRYDEN. I think he usually does.

27. General GRUNERT. Do his initials appear on that particular message?

General BRYDEN. No; I don't see them. I don't know that—that stamp might not have been placed on there until after he had seen it. I don't know when it was put on.

28. General RUSSELL. General Bryden, the fact that I, at least, was attempting to establish, is whether or not it was the practice for papers to be stamped this way, which the Chief of Staff had not seen.

General BRYDEN. Well, they were not supposed to be, because that is supposed to mean to the Office that he has seen it. Now, whether anybody was using that stamp loosely or not, I can't say.

29. General FRANK. May I ask a question? Was it the normal practice to sign a message "Marshall" and send it out, when [905] he wasn't in the office, as on this occasion?

General BRYDEN. Yes, I think so, as long as he was in the country, within close touch.

30. General FRANK. In other words, we will assume that General Gerow prepared this message. It was a vital wartime message, and it was perfectly normal for this message to have been signed "Marshall"?

General BRYDEN. Yes.

31. General FRANK. And sent out, without his ever having seen it?

General BRYDEN. I think so; yes.

32. General FRANK. All right.

33. General GRUNERT. Does the signature that appears on the message signify anything? For instance, if a message is signed by the name of the Adjutant General, or the name of the Chief of Staff, does the name of the Chief of Staff signify anything in the importance of the message, or what was the practice?

General BRYDEN. Well, I think that, to my mind, a message signed by "Marshall" would be considered of more importance than one

signed by the Adjutant General, especially in a case of instructions to commanders.

34. General GRUNERT. But there were instructions given to the Commanders, such as a Department Commander, that were signed by the Adjutant General, were there not?

General BRYDEN. There must have been.

35. General RUSSELL. General Bryden, do you recall having had to do with any other messages that went out to General Short, on or about the 27th or 28th?

General BRYDEN. No; I don't remember any.

[906] 36. General RUSSELL. And thus it is a fair generalization to say that those matters which were handled between the War Department and the Hawaiian Department on the 27th and 28th of November were not brought to your attention, and you did not participate in them?

General BRYDEN. I don't remember participating in the making up of those messages, and whether or not they were shown to me before they went out, I don't remember, but normally the War Plans Division worked directly with the Chief of Staff on such matters, and he might not have felt it necessary to bring them to me, because I wouldn't have known the background, or couldn't have helped him.

37. General RUSSELL. You were more or less acquainted with the details of the situation in the Far East, were you not?

General BRYDEN. No, I was not. I didn't see any secret communications they had with reference to the situation out there. I was concerned with things in this country.

38. General RUSSELL. I think those are all the questions I have on that subject.

General Bryden, on the 28th of November, a message was sent by the Adjutant General to various installations throughout continental United States, and some overseas installations, in which Commanders were directed to take precautions against sabotage, and in which security was stressed. There were directions in this message that no illegal measures should be taken, and that such measures as were taken would be limited to security. To connect the message up a little further, historically, it was proposed by General Arnold, for the Air Corps, submitted to G-2, and some discussions took place between Air [907] Corps representatives and officers in the office of G-2. The question now is, did you participate in any of the conferences leading up to and which resulted in sending the message which I have briefly described?

General BRYDEN. I don't remember any such conference, but, if there had been a disagreement between the Air Forces and G-2 in the wording, they might have brought it to me and I might have participated. I can't remember at this time.

39. General RUSSELL. It might be helpful if you could read that message, which is numbered 482, dated the 28th of November, directed to the Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii, and signed "Adams."

General BRYDEN. I do not remember whether I saw that when it went out, before it went out, or not.

40. General RUSSELL. You do not remember any discussions with these Generals whose names have been given as having prepared the message?

General BRYDEN. I don't remember; but, as I say, it is quite possible that if there had been a disagreement on the wording, they might have brought it down to my office and we decided on the wording, although I do not remember. Normally, I was not working on those subjects, and it would not necessarily have come through me.

41. General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, General, if you had not been shown the confidential data relating to our relations in the Pacific, you would not have been in a position to pass very intelligently on these questions?

General BRYDEN. No, no; it would have been just a question of getting the wording so it was clear, or something [908] of that kind, and getting a compromise solution between the two people concerned, to get the message out. No, I didn't have the information for background on those things.

42. General RUSSELL. That is all.

43. General GRUNERT. There is a subject in which the Board is interested, on which you might be able to throw some light and that is the state of mind of the War Department regarding the possibility or probability of an attack on Hawaii, late in November, or early in December. In other words, do you know whether or not the War Department thought that such an attack was highly improbable, and whether or not that attack came as a surprise to the higher-ups in the War Department?

General BRYDEN. Those communications, which were secret, were kept pretty tight. I never saw them, and the matter would not have been discussed in my office. Personally, the attack on Hawaii was a surprise to me. I had no information upon which to go, to presume that there was going to be one.

44. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

45. General FRANK. Do you feel that that was the general state of mind of the people with whom you were associated in the War Department?

General BRYDEN. I think that with the people in my echelon, lower down, who were not engaged in that particular work, that was probably the idea; but as to the people that were concerned with working on that subject and had access to whatever secret files there were, I don't know what their state of mind was.

46. General FRANK. In other words, they did not expect a Japanese attack at that time on the Island of Oahu?

General BRYDEN. I cannot say what other people might have [909] thought.

47. General FRANK. But that was your feeling about it?

General BRYDEN. Personally, it was a surprise to me when it was pulled off; but those secret communications were kept very tight.

48. General GRUNERT. There appearing to be no other questions, thank you for coming up and assisting us.

General BRYDEN. I am afraid I am not much help.

49. General GRUNERT. Our next witness is scheduled for 11 o'clock. (Brief recess.)

[910]

**TESTIMONY OF COLONEL ERLE M. WILSON,
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, would you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel WILSON. Erle M. Wilson, Infantry, Retired, on active duty, Washington, D.C.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is after facts, that is, prior and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped, because of your assignment in Hawaii at that time, that you can throw some light on the subject.

What was your assignment during 1941 up to and possibly including December 7, 1941?

Colonel WILSON. I had two assignments. First, I was Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Division, which was inactivated October 1st.

3. General FRANK. The year?

Colonel WILSON. 1941. After that I became Commanding Officer at Schofield Barracks, from October 1, 1941, until February 17, '42. I had had a prior tour of duty in Hawaii from July '36 to July '38. I arrived in Hawaii September '40.

4. General GRUNERT. Then, you were Post Commander of Schofield Barracks. What was Schofield Barracks used for? What did the garrison consist of?

Colonel WILSON. That is a matter of record, of course, but from memory I can only tell you generally.

5. General GRUNERT. Generally speaking, what was at Schofield Barracks?

Colonel WILSON. It was the home station of the new 24th [911] and 25th Divisions and certain other troops which just prior to December 7 and after December 7 were arriving there in considerable numbers.

6. General GRUNERT. Where was it located with respect to Honolulu?

Colonel WILSON. About 18 or 20 miles to Honolulu, up towards the north shore, in the generally central part of the Island and on the plateau between the north and south shores.

7. General GRUNERT. Then, the garrison there had a number of tactical units who had separate commanders, over whom you had no control, or the troops you had no control over; is that right?

Colonel WILSON. Yes.

8. General GRUNERT. Who were they, the higher commanders?

Colonel WILSON. The 24th Division was commanded by General Durwood Wilson, the 25th Division by General Maxwell Murray.

9. General GRUNERT. Then you had the post activities not connected with tactical command; is that correct?

Colonel WILSON. The only tactical functions that I had were the interior guard of the post and post facilities; close-in guard, they call it.

10. General GRUNERT. Then, you had command of the defense—

Colonel WILSON. Of Schofield Barracks proper.

11. General GRUNERT. Of Schofield Barracks proper; that is right. Now, in that defense what plan of defense was there? Did you have an S. O. P. showing what should be done in an emergency or an attack?

[912] Colonel WILSON. Oh, yes. That was really routine. They went into that, oh, in various maneuvers while we were over there.

12. General GRUNERT. What was your condition as to preparedness to meet any attack, in the defense of that post? Just what were some of the provisions for such defense?

Colonel WILSON. Well, a battalion of one of the divisions, I forget which now, but the battalions alternated from time to time, were assigned to that duty.

13. General GRUNERT. What preparations were there made in the line of air raid shelters or slit trenches or special measures regarding fire fighting? Were there any special measures or what were the instructions regarding those things that are necessary for a defense in case of an air raid?

Colonel WILSON. For fire fighting we had the ordinary fire equipment there at Schofield Barracks which was considerable, consisted of a number of vehicles and engines. I forget; I couldn't name that equipment, but it was considerable: the average equipment of a post that size. And then the force they employed there: it was a fire chief and, oh, half a dozen employees, civilian employees; and then in addition to that that was augmented by the assignment of a number of the internees. We operated an internment or a selective service training. Trainees I should have said. And the fire department was augmented by the detail from time to time of, oh, 50 or 60 of those boys.

14. General GRUNERT. What preparations were there in the line of defense against an air attack?

Colonel WILSON. Machine gun emplacements on the roofs of [913] various barracks throughout the post. There were some emplacements located at the best positions.

15. General GRUNERT. Were there any air raid shelters, as such?

Colonel WILSON. Yes.

16. General GRUNERT. What were they? Any special construction?

Colonel WILSON. Special trench, trench construction. It was varied.

17. General GRUNERT. Is that in the line of slit trenches, or what?

Colonel WILSON. In some cases, yes; I remember one place distinctly where there was a slit trench dug and machine guns mounted, sand-bagged.

18. General GRUNERT. What were the instructions about the non-combatant population of Schofield? What were they to do in case of an air raid? What were the instructions in that respect?

Colonel WILSON. Well, only the general instructions that were provided for their evacuation to Honolulu.

19. General GRUNERT. And there were provisions to evacuate the noncombatant personnel from Schofield to Honolulu?

Colonel WILSON. Schofield Barracks to Honolulu.

20. General FRANK. This was on the assumption, however, that you would have some notice of an impending crisis?

Colonel WILSON. That is right.

21. General FRANK. And upon such notice, that you would accomplish this?

Colonel WILSON. That is right.

[914] 22. General GRUNERT. Did you anticipate the possibility of an air raid?

Colonel WILSON. I don't think it was; I did not personally. I think that I am no exception in rather feeling that we would have an hour or more's notice of an impending attack.

23. General GRUNERT. Where were you to get that notice?

Colonel WILSON. From the department headquarters.

24. General GRUNERT. The department. Were you actually raided at Schofield?

Colonel WILSON. Actually raided? Yes, indeed.

25. General GRUNERT. And were there some casualties there?

Colonel WILSON. No casualties. I don't know why. I have often marveled at it.

26. General GRUNERT. In the defensive measures had there been practice and drills in taking defense positions against aircraft?

Colonel WILSON. Oh, yes. Machine guns were firing on the planes within, I would say, a very few minutes.

27. General GRUNERT. What measures did you take after December 7th that had not been taken prior to December 7th?

Colonel WILSON. On December the 7th we began to dig slit trenches, and slit trenches were dug.

28. General GRUNERT. Then, there were no slit trenches before that?

Colonel WILSON. No slit trenches dug before December 7.

29. General GRUNERT. Before that: Were there air raid shelters before that?

Colonel WILSON. Only at machine gun positions; that is all; [915] the ones that I mentioned.

30. General GRUNERT. Then, why did they take these measures afterward and not before December 7th? Who ordered such measures taken?

Colonel WILSON. I do not remember that.

31. General GRUNERT. You do not know who ordered the measures?

Colonel WILSON. I do not remember whether it was taken on my initiative or whether we received orders from headquarters. I cannot remember that. I know it was done.

32. General GRUNERT. Are you familiar with the provisions of Field Manual 10-5 which charged each such camp, post, and station with its own security?

Colonel WILSON. Yes, I think I am.

33. General GRUNERT. Then, there were measures taken after December 7, '41, which were considered necessary for defense, which were not taken prior thereto?

Colonel WILSON. Yes.

34. General GRUNERT. Did that indicate that there appeared to be more danger after December 7th than there was before or on December 7th?

Colonel WILSON. Well, their need was a great deal more apparent after December 7th than it was prior to December 7th.

35. General GRUNERT. Then, it seems to indicate that the powers that be, whoever ordered the measures taken after December 7th, were

more conscious of the necessity of such measures than they were before.

Colonel WILSON. I presume that is a fact.

36. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not some of these [916] instructions for measures to be taken after December 7 came from the department?

Colonel WILSON. I could not answer that. I think, however, it would be a matter of record.

37. General GRUNERT. Has the Board any questions?

38. General RUSSELL. Colonel, I understood an answer a moment ago to one of General Grunert's questions by you was to the effect that the machine guns fired in a few minutes after the planes appeared.

Colonel WILSON. Yes, sir.

39. General RUSSELL. You are discussing now the machine guns which were——

Colonel WILSON. Right around Schofield Barracks.

40. General RUSSELL. Just in the perimeter?

Colonel WILSON. Yes.

41. General RUSSELL. Within the realm and scope of your fire?

Colonel WILSON. Yes.

42. General RUSSELL. Those machine guns were under your control and manned by post complement personnel?

Colonel WILSON. Well, yes, they were. They were manned by certain guard, the interior guard.

43. General RUSSELL. It was a function of the interior guard, then, to man these antiaircraft machine guns?

Colonel WILSON. In the immediate vicinity.

44. General RUSSELL. In the immediate vicinity, yes. Was any damage done to the Japanese aircraft by your machine guns?

Colonel WILSON. Yes, there was some. One aircraft was hit and grounded and burned near the deep well that is over in [917] the outskirts of Wahiawa.

45. General RUSSELL. Was considerable damage done to the post?

Colonel WILSON. To the post?

46. General RUSSELL. By this attack, Jap plane attack.

Colonel WILSON. Schofield Barracks proper, no, I would say not. There were several motor vehicles hit. Every high ranking officer's house was either bombed or machine-gunned. My own, for instance, I live—I don't know whether you are familiar with Schofield Barracks or not, but those of you who are, there were three houses in the generals' loop. I lived in one, the aide lived on the other flank, and the old Division Commander lived in the center one. Apparently his set of quarters was aimed at but was not hit. There was a bomb landed in front of my set of quarters, which was right next door, about 75 feet from the house, I guess. Fragments of the bomb went into the house, and a number of machine-gun bullets were found later in the roof of my set of quarters. They, a few days after, had a rain, and they sent a man up on the roof to repair the roof, and he came down with a pocketful of machine-gun bullets, fragments. The aide's house on the other side was hit. Trees in the yard were hit by shell fragments and machine-gun bullets. The foliage of the planting around my house was clipped off in some places like you had taken a pair of shears. We didn't notice it for several days after, until the branches began to wilt.

47. General RUSSELL. What conclusions if any were drawn by the military personnel at the barracks as to the information which the invading force had of installation on the barracks, at Schofield Barracks?

[918] Colonel WILSON. I don't know; that is the only indication that I have. I believe that they knew quite well where the high ranking officers lived.

[919] 48. General RUSSELL. General Grunert asked you a question about measures taken after December 7.

Colonel WILSON. About the only measures that were taken after December 7 that were not taken before December 7 were the digging of slit trenches.

49. General RUSSELL. After the attack everybody was a little more conscious of the possibility of an attack?

Colonel WILSON. There is no question about that.

50. General FRANK. At the time of this attack what was the status of defense with respect to the existence of an alert? Were you on some sort of an alert?

Colonel WILSON. We were on what was called an alert against sabotage. I think it was Alert No. 1; but that is a matter of record. That identifies the alert we were on.

51. General FRANK. To what extent were you familiar with the acuteness or tenseness of the international situation between the United States and Japan?

Colonel WILSON. Well, not to any particular extent. The division commanders had been warned, I know.

52. General FRANK. Had been warned about what?

Colonel WILSON. About the tenseness of the international situation. I know they had been called to headquarters and had been warned about the tenseness of the situation.

53. General FRANK. Had you been advised that war was probable?

Colonel WILSON. I knew generally that it was; yes.

54. General FRANK. You felt that war with Japan was imminent?

Colonel WILSON. I think we were notified. It is very difficult for me to separate just what was in mind on [920] December 7th from what thoughts I had on the subject since December 7th. Any evidence I am giving you now I give with that thought in mind.

We had general information that things were not going any too well in Washington, and I think there was some caution about not taking any action that might bring on international complications. There was that feeling.

55. General FRANK. Did you feel that an acute situation existed?

Colonel WILSON. Yes, I did. I felt that we were getting into fairly deep water; but I did not feel that the situation was nearly as acute as it was. I do not know whether that is much help or not.

56. General FRANK. Since you had been ordered into an alert against sabotage you must have felt that there was some tenseness about the situation?

Colonel WILSON. Oh, yes; that is right. There was a tenseness. Everybody had a tenseness.

57. General FRANK. If acts of sabotage were about to take place, an act of sabotage would be an act of war, would it not?

Colonel WILSON. Yes.

58. General FRANK. Then, if there were about to be an act of war take place, it was about to be manifested by an attack some place. Did you not feel that way?

Colonel WILSON. The attack came as a distinct surprise to me—if that is what you are trying to get.

59. General FRANK. If that attack came as a distinct surprise did you not feel that war with Japan was in the offing?

Colonel WILSON. My first sensation on December 7, which may have something to do with my answer to your question, was that General Short had sprung a surprise maneuver on us, because we were used to being alerted over there; an alert was a routine matter over there.

60. General FRANK. If General Short had sprung—

61. General RUSSELL. I think you ought to let the Colonel follow out that line of thought. I think the witness is entitled to finish his answer, in fairness to the witness.

Colonel WILSON. I am in the hands of the Board.

62. General FRANK. Would you mind letting me handle the answers to my questions, please?

63. General RUSSELL. I think the witness ought to be protected.

64. General GRUNERT. Complete your answer to the last question. Read the last question and answer, Mr. Reporter.

(The question and answer referred to were read by the reporter, as above recorded.)

65. General GRUNERT. Did you complete your answer?

Colonel WILSON. I was going to add to that, that just previous to that I had knowledge that some arrangements were being made to acquire some pineapple land between Wheeler Field and Waianae Range for maneuver purposes. I had no knowledge that the arrangements had been consummated. When the first bomb dropped it was about eight o'clock. I jumped out of my bed. I had been in bed two days with a cold and was just feeling sorry for myself and was going to hole in and have [922] Sunday in bed. But I jumped out of my bed and looked out the front window where I could see toward the Waianae Mountains, and I saw a stick of bombs falling from a plane. My first impression was, "My God! They are getting too close to Wheeler Field." That was when I thought, Well, the land deal has gone through and a surprise maneuver or an alert has been ordered. They are getting too close to Wheeler Field. Then, when the bombs landed and the smoke rose I could see they were on Wheeler Field; and then I turned to my wife and said, "This is the real thing."

I believe that every military-minded person or generally informed person felt that war was imminent.

66. General FRANK. Will you go back to my former question, Mr. Reporter, and read it.

(The reporter read as follows:)

If that attack came as a distinct surprise did you not feel that war with Japan was in the offing?

Colonel WILSON. I feel that every person who was military-minded or who was generally informed felt that war was impending.

67. General FRANK. Did you or did you not know that there had been some warning messages received from the War Department?

Colonel WILSON. I knew through hearsay that one warning message had been received.

68. General FRANK. As a student of military history were you familiar with the manner in which Japan had traditionally started wars, namely, by attacking and having the attack constitute a declaration of war?

Colonel WILSON. Yes. That is the way they began the war with Russia.

[923] 69. General FRANK. If war with Japan were imminent, where did you think the initial attack was going to be made?

Colonel WILSON. This is only my opinion, but I thought probably they would hit the Philippines.

70. General FRANK. This is opinion, of course, and I realize that, but in preparing for any emergency the commander in any theater in any area is responsible for the steps taken for defense. In determining the steps to be taken he assembles all the information that is available and, in one way or another, establishes an estimate of the situation. That is traditional in military procedure, is it not?

Colonel WILSON. That is right.

71. General FRANK. Then, having determined the situation, he makes his decision. In making that decision it is normal for him to determine the steps that the enemy can take against him. Is that correct?

Colonel WILSON. That is the first thing you would consider in an estimate of the situation.

72. General FRANK. The steps that the enemy can take against him?

Colonel WILSON. Yes, sir.

73. General FRANK. And in making preparations to meet the steps that the enemy can take against him, our military teachings and practice generally lead us to take what steps—steps to meet what situation with respect to the enemy?

Colonel WILSON. To counter the most dangerous steps that the enemy may take.

74. General FRANK. That is exactly what I am after.

Colonel WILSON. Let me add to that. That is what was [924] done, to my knowledge, from 1936 to 1938, and from 1940 to 1941, while I was over there, and just what you have said resulted in the various defense plans that were made for the defense of Oahu upon which all of the maneuvers over there during those periods, to my knowledge, were based. That is exactly what was the basis of those defense plans.

75. General FRANK. In this situation what was the most dangerous thing that the enemy could do to the force in Oahu? Was it this attack or something similar to it?

Colonel WILSON. Yes; but the nature of the attack I do not think was as well defined prior to the attack as it was on December 7th or 8th.

76. General FRANK. The point I am trying to make is this: Normal military preparations call for determining the most dangerous thing that the enemy can pull and then taking steps to meet it; is not that a fact?

Colonel WILSON. That is correct.

77. General FRANK. Was that done in this case?

Colonel WILSON. Yes; I think it was. I think the precautions that were determined by the best minds in Oahu, to my knowledge, from 1936 to 1940, were taken.

78. General FRANK. If steps had been taken to have met this kind of a raid that happened, would not an alert where fighter planes would have been immediately available to take off provided better protection?

Colonel WILSON. I have always wondered why there were not planes in the air. I thought it was common procedure always to have planes in the air, and especially the dawn patrol. I do [925] not know whether there were or not, of my own knowledge.

79. General FRANK. Do you know what Alert 3 would have provided?

Colonel WILSON. Only very generally. The men would have physically been in their battle positions and physically been on their arms and had their ammunition with them, and a certain quota of ammunition in position.

80. General FRANK. And the planes would have been dispersed and ready to take off?

Colonel WILSON. That is right; and I think there would have been planes in the air.

81. General FRANK. That would have been a more effective defense, would it not?

Colonel WILSON. In my opinion, yes.

82. General FRANK. That would have been a measure to meet the worst thing that the Japs could have done?

Colonel WILSON. If in the judgment of the Commander that was his estimate of the situation, it would have been.

83. General FRANK. But an alert purely against sabotage and not against such an attack did not provide against the most dangerous action of the enemy, did it?

Colonel WILSON. As it proved; looking at it with hindsight, I would say it did not.

84. General FRANK. That is all.

85. General RUSSELL. I think there is something in the record that should be straightened out. General Frank asked you if an act of sabotage was not an act of war, and you replied yes.

Colonel WILSON. I would like to change that reply. No.

[926] 86. General RUSSELL. I wanted to give you an opportunity to do that.

Colonel WILSON. Yes; I would like to change that reply to "No," because we were constantly on the qui vive for sabotage, regularly so, and we could not tell whether it was an effort to sabotage or whether it was just some crank. I know that sometime before December 7 there were some cases. The Catholic Chapel was desecrated, and we did not know whether that was sabotage or not. I do know that there were some rumors from Wheeler Field that we took seriously enough to put our G-2s on, where it was thought that there was an effort made to tamper with the gasoline in some places. I do not know whether that ever materialized or not, but I know we took all the steps that were available to use in G-2 to try to deal with it, such as setting traps for them and that sort of thing.

87. General RUSSELL. Acts of sabotage on the part of individuals connected directly with the Japanese Government would be an act of war?

Colonel WILSON. That is correct.

88. General FRANK. Do you think that an act of sabotage that could be connected with the Japanese Government would be an indication of impending war?

Colonel WILSON. I think the question is hypothetical. I think that you have got to have it definitely determined whether or not the Japanese Nation is connected with it. That is just what we were trying to determine over there for some time. We had our facilities right on the heels of some very suspicious things that were happening over there on the [927] defense positions and all sorts of places. My G-2 talked with me over several occurrences that were quite suspicious. We came near capturing a civilian. We did not get close enough to get him, but we came very near getting him.

89. General FRANK. What had he done?

Colonel WILSON. Just acting suspicious around gun positions up on the north shore, enough to excite suspicion. I think there is no question but what there were spies over there, and that is generally admitted. We thought we were right behind one, and I believe we were. What we would have done with him if we had gotten him I do not know.

90. General GRUNERT. Were you surprised when you went on Alert No. 1 that it was not No. 2 or No. 3?

Colonel WILSON. No, sir.

91. General GRUNERT. In view of the information you had as to the tenseness of the situation, from at least one warning message that you referred to, were you not surprised that they did not take an alert of greater protection than No. 1?

Colonel WILSON. No. I was not surprised at all, because I felt that the powers that be were being informed of the situation to a much greater degree than I was. Certainly I had no direct line of information. I had to look to the department heads for my information.

92. General GRUNERT. One more question. How frequently did the department staff come to Schofield to look into the defense measures taken for local protection, if at all?

Colonel WILSON. The department staff were frequent visitors at Schofield.

[928] 93. General GRUNERT. Did they examine into your plans?

Colonel WILSON. Oh, yes.

94. General GRUNERT. Did they test out those plans as to whether or not they were workable?

Colonel WILSON. Yes, they did. General Short arrived over there about in the spring, I think it was, of 1941. It is hard to tell. There are no seasons over there, and there is nothing to tie to; but it was early in 1941. As soon as he got over there he was very active. He made an intensive active study of the defenses of the Island, to orient himself, I am quite certain. Prior to General Short's designation there had been a continuity of command in the department commanding generals. For instance, I went through a period with General Drum, who was relieved by General Moses, and General Moses having had a tour in command of the division there, he was relieved by Gen-

eral Herron who, in turn, had commanded the division just previously. So there was a continuity of thought and a chain of command. General Wilson, who, following that scheme out, would have been in command of the department, was over age and was retired. So General Short was sent over. So, after this intense period of orientation—I judge that is what it was—he made frequent visits all around. His staff did the same thing. Then there was a period through which the defense plan was translated into standard procedure, and that consumed some time.

95. General GRUNERT. You were there, then, during the time that they had just one type of alert, and did not have three?

Colonel WILSON. Yes, sir.

[929] 96. General GRUNERT. And then later, after General Short came, they had three types of alert, Nos. 1, 2, and 3?

Colonel WILSON. Yes, sir.

97. General GRUNERT. Which do you think answered the purposes of defense the better: the 1 type or the 3 type?

Colonel WILSON. That is a question purely of opinion. I think they both were adequate.

98. General GRUNERT. If you had been alerted at all under the No. 1 type of alert would you have gone into all-out alert?

Colonel WILSON. Yes, sir.

99. General GRUNERT. And under the No. 3 it was a question of decision as to who ordered it?

Colonel WILSON. Yes, sir.

100. General GRUNERT. Do you have anything else that you desire to offer to the Board which may be of help to it? If so, you may proceed.

Colonel WILSON. Shortly following General Short's arrival over there was the regular time for the annual maneuvers. Those maneuvers were held, but they differed from the ordinary maneuver in this respect. The period that was assigned to the regiments and brigades to take regimental and brigade maneuvers was assigned to the actual construction of defenses. They did not have the maneuvers. They dug where they thought the various defenses should be located. The locations of these defenses were verified. They were all prescribed by the plan of defense, and they were verified by intensive reconnaissances on the part of the department staff, division staffs, and the commanders determined their locations. The first period of the maneuver was devoted to digging. The [930] only maneuver period that was used in the ordinary sense was taken advantage of to test out, actually test out, those various positions. The digging could not be completed in the time specified, but at the conclusion of the maneuver General Short ordered that this digging was to be continued until completed, regardless of other duties. That was given first priority.

In the construction over there I noted a vast improvement, in my estimation, in the defenses of the Island. When I got back there in 1940 changes had been made in the plan, which change, I thought, in my own estimation, was an important change.

When General Short came and went through this period of digging, the Army reserve supply of sand bags, wire, and that sort of thing—certain parts—began to get pretty scarce. General Short

was able to do a great deal; I think he was in position to do more than any other department commander, because of the fact that things were getting easier to get. He turned out this war reserve and augmented it by the purchase of sugar sacks, and even went to the extreme of using refuse, crushed cane stalks, and that sort of thing, to see whether they would do for revetment, and absolutely denuded all of the dumps over there from Pearl Harbor, Schofield Barracks, and all of the Army posts, in search of revetment material. Things were not as easy to get as they are now. They were not allowed to dig every place, because many of the smaller works are in people's front yard and occupy ground used for sugar land and pineapple land and that sort of thing, and there was a great [931] deal of opposition to that on the part of the Big Five and the owners of the properties. But arrangements were immediately instituted to get that land, and they were more or less successful in some of that.

From then until the time I left over there on February 17 they were still perfecting many of these defense works, and I am sure that General Emmons continued that when he came on, on December 15, or whenever it was.

101. General GRUNERT. All right, Colonel. Thank you very much for coming over and helping us out.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 12:05 p. m. a recess was taken until 2 o'clock of the same day.)

[932]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board, at 2:25 o'clock, p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)

General GRUNERT. The witness has arrived. The Board will come to order.

**TESTIMONY OF COLONEL EARL E. GESLER, CORPS OF ENGINEERS;
DIVISION ENGINEER, MIDDLE ATLANTIC DIVISION; BALTIMORE,
MD.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board, in attempting to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoint prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. We hope that you can throw some light on the situation because of your assignment in Washington in 1940 and possibly in 1941. General Frank will lead for the Board in propounding the questions, and the Board will supplement his inquiry. General Frank.

2. General FRANK. Colonel Gesler, on what duty were you, on or about 20th of December, 1940?

Colonel GESLER. I was Chief of the Finance Section, Office of the Chief of Engineers.

3. General FRANK. What were your duties at that time?

Colonel GESLER. As Chief of the Finance Section, I reported to General Robins, and had charge of activities in finance accounting, auditing, cost accounting, civilian personnel, and contracts and claims.

4. General FRANK. Do you remember a contract identified as W-414-eng-602, which was drawn with the Hawaiian Constructors, which was the base contract for certain defense contracts for [933] the Hawaiian Islands, at that time?

Colonel GESLER. I remember there was such a contract. I would have to refresh my memory, though, to talk in detail about it.

5. General FRANK. That contract was consummated in Washington on December 20, 1940. Did you participate in the final drawing up of that contract?

Colonel GESLER. No, sir; not in the preparation of the contract, itself.

6. General FRANK. Well, did you have anything to do with it?

Colonel GESLER. My duties required the review of the contract after it had been prepared and before submitting to the Chief of Engineers for approval.

7. General FRANK. Do you remember having conferences with any of the contractor personnel that were interested in the contract?

Colonel GESLER. No, sir.

8. General FRANK. Do you remember meeting a Mr. Paul Grafe?

Colonel GESLER. I do not remember meeting him. It is possible I met him, but I never conducted any business with him.

9. General FRANK. Do you remember ever meeting Mr. Martin, who was an attorney for one Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel GESLER. I don't remember.

10. General FRANK. Did you ever meet Mr. Rohl?

Colonel GESLER. No, sir.

11. General FRANK. Did you ever meet Mr. Connolly, of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Colonel GESLER. No, sir. The same remark applies to those. I might have met them, but I have never conducted any business [934] with them.

12. General FRANK. And there is nothing about those names that brings back any memory of having done business with them, at that time?

Colonel GESLER. Not from business. I know their names, because of their association with the contract.

13. General FRANK. Exactly what did you do with respect to the contract?

Colonel GESLER. I examined what my assistants had done, to see that the proper people had seen it, and checked it over generally to see that it conformed to policy and principle.

14. General FRANK. Do you remember of a letter having been written in your section about expediting the citizenship papers of one Mr. Rohl?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

15. General FRANK. Here is a photostat copy of that letter that was written. It has already been introduced as evidence. Will you look at that and tell me if that is the letter to which you refer?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

16. General FRANK. Are those your initials at the bottom, there?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

17. General FRANK. I suggest you read it, to yourself, there, in order to refresh your memory.

You have a memory of that letter, now, do you?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir; I remember it.

18. General FRANK. You will notice, down in next to the last paragraph, it states:

[935] It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question.

On what was that based?

Colonel GESLER. I can only give you general impressions on that, now, sir. That letter was prepared by a lawyer on my staff.

19. General FRANK. What is his name?

Colonel GESLER. Mr. Stilphen.

20. General FRANK. Where is he, now?

Colonel GESLER. The last I heard, he was retired from the Navy as a commander—Benjamin L. Stilphen. I think I discussed it with him. I know I discussed it with someone, at the time, and I believe Mr. Stilphen discussed it also probably with that gentleman to whom it is addressed, in the Department of Justice. We were not taking the attitude that we were certifying to his "loyalty," I believe it is, but rather that that information was in the Department of Justice. They had been investigating him in connection with his final clearance or final papers, and that therefore what we requested was that he would have those papers expedited.

21. General FRANK. Colonel, this sentence reads:

It is the understanding of *this office* that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question.

"This office," in this instance, is the Office of the Chief of Engineers, and this letter was signed by General Kingman, as Acting Chief of Engineers; and General Kingman, before this Board the other day, referred to you as the officer under whose immediate jurisdiction the letter had been prepared.

Colonel GESLER. That's right. It was prepared by Mr. [936] Stilphen, on my staff.

22. General FRANK. Whose immediate responsibility was it that the statements in this letter were according to fact?

Colonel GESLER. I initiated it. I believe it is according to fact, there; yes, sir.

23. General FRANK. It was your responsibility, then?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

24. General FRANK. What background did you have for making this statement about Rohl's loyalty?

Colonel GESLER. I am not saying anything about his loyalty. I repeat, the information we got I believe was based on a telephone conversation between Mr. Stilphen and the Department of Justice, and the purpose of this letter was to ask them to hurry up on the handling of the case, with the information they had, and it was our understanding as the result of that conversation that there wasn't any question about his loyalty at the time.

25. General FRANK. Now, wait a minute. This letter is not written to the Department of Justice. It is written to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, asking them to expedite the issuance of Mr. Rohl's citizenship papers.

Colonel GESLER. Well, that's my error, then. It is this Department I am referring to.

26. General FRANK. And this statement in this letter, prepared under your jurisdiction, is:

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question.

Now, there seems to be a finality about that, does there not?

Colonel GESLER. In my opinion it is, as I stated, that [937] it did not represent a separate investigation by our office; otherwise, we would have said so.

27. General FRANK. Did Rohl or any agent of his see Stilphen prior to or during the writing of this letter?

Colonel GESLER. I doubt it.

28. General FRANK. Did you ever know a Mr. Martin, who was Rohl's attorney?

Colonel GESLER. I don't remember him; no, sir.

29. General FRANK. Mr. Stilphen was a civilian?

Colonel GESLER. At that time; yes, sir.

30. General FRANK. What responsibility did he have?

Colonel GESLER. Well, he was in charge principally of labor-relations cases in the Contracts and Claims branch, particularly those cases under the Bacon-Davis Act, and this seemed to be more or less his type of work and involved contacts which he had, and therefore he handled it.

31. General FRANK. Did you ever have any other instances of trying to give a foreigner citizenship so that you could give him Government business?

Colonel GESLER. I don't believe so. I don't remember any. May I correct that statement, just a little bit, though, General? We were not trying to give him citizenship. We were asking this Department to expedite their action on it, whether positive or negative.

32. General FRANK. I think the witness is mistaken.

Read paragraph 2 of that letter.

Colonel GESLER. All right.

33. General FRANK. And read the last sentence of paragraph 3.

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

[938] 34. General FRANK. What you are asking for is the expediting of positive action on that, is it not?

Colonel GESLER. That's the tenor of the letter; yes, sir.

35. General FRANK. Then you were trying to get citizenship for this man so you could give him Government business?

Colonel GESLER. That's right. He couldn't do that business in Hawaii without his citizenship papers.

36. General FRANK. Is it within your power to throw any light on the background that you got for this statement about his loyalty being beyond question?

Colonel GESLER. Well, at this time, the only impression I have is that Mr. Stilphen discussed it with this Department. I believe we also had a letter addressed to us from the Pacific Division, asking us to assist in processing, getting the Department of Immigration and Naturalization to expedite the case.

37. General FRANK. Do you think you could locate that letter?

Colonel GESLER. No, sir; I don't believe I can. I know they have searched for it over in the Chief of Engineers' Office, and it has not

been found, and I say that is my impression. I might even be wrong, there.

38. General FRANK. Who would have written such a letter?

Colonel GESLER. The division engineer of the Pacific Division, Colonel Hannum.

39. General FRANK. Where did Stilphen come from?

Colonel GESLER. I can't answer that, sir. He is in this general locality, I believe.

40. General FRANK. Was he an American citizen?

[939] Colonel GESLER. I believe he was; yes, sir.

41. General FRANK. Did General Newman (then Major Newman) have anything to do with this letter?

Colonel GESLER. Possibly. I don't know. He was busy on other things, and it's a possibility he didn't see it.

42. General FRANK. Recently, have you investigated the circumstances surrounding the writing of this letter?

Colonel GESLER. I have discussed it with the Office, Chief of Engineers, and I was told they couldn't find anything else in the file concerning this letter.

43. General FRANK. Who told you that?

Colonel GESLER. Mr. McKay—Mr. Douglas McKay.

44. General FRANK. You said you checked the contract to see if it conformed to policy. What policy?

Colonel GESLER. The use of the "cost-plus-fixed-fee" contract, a War Department policy in existence at that time, including the question of fees involved, and the general nature of the clauses which were required under statute and War Department regulation.

45. General FRANK. What subordinates of yours worked on the contract, whose work you checked; do you remember?

Colonel GESLER. I don't remember. In the normal course of work, Major Newman would be that one. He was the Chief of that Contracts and Claims branch.

46. General FRANK. Was there any question, as you remember, about the contract, when they came?

Colonel GESLER. No, sir.

47. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not Mr. Stilphen was acquainted with Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

[940] Colonel GESLER. I don't know, but I wouldn't think he had any connection with him.

48. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not Mr. Stilphen knew Mr. John Martin, who was Mr. Rohl's attorney?

Colonel GESLER. I doubt it.

49. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not Mr. John Martin had any contact with Mr. Stilphen prior to Stilphen's preparing this letter?

Colonel GESLER. I don't know.

50. General FRANK. Was there nothing unusual about a German alien's getting citizenship so that he could be given Government business, that would require you to look into this situation to a greater extent?

Colonel GESLER. The only purpose of getting his citizenship papers was to permit him personally to go to Hawaii to supervise some of the work. I do not believe there was any government policy which pre-

vented award of contracts to domestic corporations, some of whose officers might have been aliens.

51. General FRANK. I think at that time Mr. Rohl was, or he just had been, president and principal stockholder in that organization, so he was not a casual member of it.

Colonel GESLER. I understand that's the case, yes, sir—prior to this particular contract.

52. General FRANK. I have no further questions.

53. General GRUNERT. I have one, here. Did you expect that letter that was signed by General Kingman to influence the immigration authorities either toward actually granting the citizenship or toward merely expediting action thereon?

Colonel GESLER. Well, that's hard to say, General.

[941] 54. General GRUNERT. Why was the letter written?

Colonel GESLER. To get action on it so that we could use him, or else learn definitely he was not going to be available.

55. General GRUNERT. If that letter had not been written, would there have been delay? Do you know whether there would have been a delay in getting that citizenship, or whether there would have been a question about giving it to him?

Colonel GESLER. I do know that it had been pending for some time.

56. General GRUNERT. In other words, can you tell us whether or not a letter from the Office of the Chief of Engineers would assist in influencing those who granted him citizenship?

Colonel GESLER. I do not believe so. I believe they would use independent judgment, there, sir.

57. General GRUNERT. You do not think, then, the letter would have any influence? If so, why was the letter written?

Colonel GESLER. To ask them to give it attention and get it through just as soon as possible. It was holding up work in the Hawaiian Islands. As Mr. Rohl was known to be a very fine operator, as that letter indicated, and if his services with his company were to be of any value, he should have gone over.

58. General GRUNERT. Well, was the contract not progressing rapidly enough? He at that time apparently was not an active official in the company operating in Hawaii. Did you have any reports that the progress on the contract was slow, or could not proceed without him?

Colonel GESLER. I can't answer that from the record, [942] General, but I believe that was the general impression.

59. General GRUNERT. I have no further questions.

60. General FRANK. You stated that the process of obtaining citizenship for Rohl had been pending for some time?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

61. General FRANK. Do you know why it had been pending for some time?

Colonel GESLER. No, sir; except I have read your report, there, that would indicate that there were certain things which the Immigration authorities were aware of.

62. General FRANK. In the face of that, do you think that there was sufficient investigation made of him to warrant the writing of this letter?

Colonel GESLER. Well, in my opinion, the letter, itself, was not advancing any theory of the War Department, or giving any information which the Immigration Department didn't have better already.

63. General FRANK. Then why did you write that letter?

Colonel GESLER. To ask them to hurry it up. The naturalization was being made by that Department. They had all the information. There was nothing which we would require, provided he were made a full citizen. That, in itself, would establish his qualification.

64. General FRANK. Then why were you giving it your moral support?

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty is beyond question.

Colonel GESLER. That was our general understanding.

65. General FRANK. What steps did you take to find out?

[943] Colonel GESLER. We had no other steps, except this informal conversation which I believe Mr. Stilphen had with the Immigration Bureau.

66. General FRANK. You do not know?

Colonel GESLER. No, sir.

67. General FRANK. Yet you initialed the letter as giving it authenticity from your section?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir; because after discussion with him, I was satisfied that it was all right.

68. General GRUNERT. In this conversation that he had with the immigration authorities, did they ask him to present such a letter? Evidently, you had a conversation with them over the phone. Why wasn't that sufficient, without the letter? Or did they want it backed up by a letter from the Chief of Engineers? Do you remember whether that conversation included that?

Colonel GESLER. I really don't remember, but that's a logical conclusion, General.

69. General GRUNERT. Nothing more.

70. General RUSSELL. You discussed Mr. Rohl, a moment ago, Colonel, stating that he was regarded as a good operator.

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

71. General RUSSELL. Did you know that, when you initialed the letter seeking to hasten his citizenship application?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

72. General RUSSELL. And that letter was written, as I recall, in August 1941, this letter that we are discussing.

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

73. General RUSSELL. Now, how long had you had the information [944] that Mr. Rohl was a good operator?

Colonel GESLER. Well, I personally never had had any relations with that contracting firm, but I knew of the reputation of it along the Pacific Coast.

74. General RUSSELL. And that reputation had existed in the Office of the Chief of Engineers over some years?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

75. General RUSSELL. And you knew then that this man, Rohl, was the dominant character in that operation?

Colonel GESLER. That was my impression; yes, sir.

76. General RUSSELL. Now, I believe you say that your responsibility in connection with the execution of contracts, of which this is a type, was to check largely for form.

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

77. General RUSSELL. The substance of the contract, including the negotiations and the compliance with the specifications, and things of that type, was the function of some other division or section of the Chief of Engineers' Office?

Colonel GESLER. Well, in a very general way, I checked the terms of the contract, what the Government was getting out of it, but I had legal assistants to take care of the details.

78. General RUSSELL. It came to you as a completed, executed contract?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

79. General RUSSELL. And before it became effective and binding on the Government, it had to have your approval?

Colonel GESLER. Well, the approval of the Chief of Engineers; and he approved it, on my recommendation, as a rule.

[945] 80. General RUSSELL. Do you know where this contract is signed, on behalf of the Hawaiian Constructors?

81. Major CLAUSEN. That is four pages from the last.

82. General FRANK. "Paul Grafe."

83. General RUSSELL. It was signed by a man named Grafe?

Colonel GESLER. Just one individual.

84. General RUSSELL. "Hawaiian Constructors, W. E. Callahan Construction Co., contractor, by Paul Grafe," and business address. Is there anything out of the ordinary in the execution of that, Colonel?

Colonel GESLER. Well, it is not exceptional to have one individual authorized to sign for two or three companies. That can be arranged, and, I believe, it must have been arranged in that case.

85. General RUSSELL. Did you consider it as extraordinary that Hawaiian Constructors would appear, and then one of the group, to-wit, the W. E. Callahan Construction Co., and that the other two of the group, to-wit, Gunther & Shirley Co., and the Rohl-Connolly Co., and Ralph E. Woolley, three of them, were left off of this execution, or were left off of the part of the contract in which the execution occurs?

Colonel GESLER. I don't quite understand. You mean the question about its being complete?

86. General RUSSELL. In the recitation at the beginning of the contract it is "Hawaiian Constructors," and these other people are given under there as constituting the Hawaiian Constructors.

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

87. General RUSSELL. I am just wondering now if in checking the form of this contract you concluded that the Hawaiian Constructors had any legal existence, at all. [946]

Colonel GESLER. Well, we determined that, before it was signed, I am sure.

88. General RUSSELL. Apparently, if "Hawaiian Constructors" was neither a partnership nor a corporation nor an individual, the Government was signing a contract with some non-existent something.

Colonel GESLER. It is a co-adventure, and we have handled those.

89. General RUSSELL. You know what it takes to constitute a valid contract, do you not?

Colonel GESLER. I think so.

90. General RUSSELL. The Contractor is the Hawaiian Constructors. They consist of Callahan—there is your legal entity?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

91. General RUSSELL. Gunther & Shirley Co. is a legal entity; Rohl-Connolly Co. is a legal entity, and Ralph E. Woolley is an individual. Now, when the contract is executed, it is executed in the name of the Hawaiian Constructors. Immediately under that is one of the entities comprising that, the Callahan Construction Company, as a contractor, signed by Paul Grafe; but it occurs to me as rather peculiar that the contract should not have been executed in the name of the people who were parties to it. I am asking these questions without being thoroughly cognizant of all of the terms of the contract, just drawing the conclusion from those things that I have seen on the contract.

Colonel GESLER. I know that practice has been followed, and the principal purpose is to avoid delay in getting many [947] signatures on one instrument; and it is arranged by some separate paper which gives this individual authority to sign for each of them.

[948] 92. General RUSSELL. Now, I take the position, or I am asking you if it is true, that the Rohl-Connolly Company is not bound by that contract as it was executed there on the 21st day of December, 1940.

Colonel GESLER. Well, that is a legal opinion; General. I am not a lawyer, but in my opinion, however, I think it is all right.

93. General RUSSELL. Didn't you have some lawyers on your staff?

Colonel GESLER. Oh, yes. They checked it.

94. General RUSSELL. And approved it as to form?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

95. General RUSSELL. Do you happen to know whether the power of attorney for this man Grafe to sign for whomever he did sign for, is in this file?

Colonel GESLER. It must be somewhere, the General Accounting Office or anywhere else.

96. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, did you know the Callahan Construction Company?

Colonel GESLER. Only by name, sir.

97. General RUSSELL. You knew nothing of their responsibility or reputation as operators?

Colonel GESLER. Well, except in a general way; I knew they had been large contractors on the West Coast.

98. General RUSSELL. Similarly with the Gunther-Shirley Company?

Colonel GESLER. Which one, sir?

99. General RUSSELL. Gunther & Shirley Company.

Colonel GESLER. I don't know that name, really.

[949] 100. General RUSSELL. Or Ralph E. Woolly; do you know anything about him?

Colonel GESLER. No, sir.

101. General RUSSELL. In this entire group of the Hawaiian Constructors the one firm or corporation which stood out as operators on its reputation in the Office of the Chief of Engineers was the Rohl-Connolly Company; is that true?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

102. General RUSSELL. And the dominant factor in the Rohl-Connolly Company was a man named Rohl; did you know that then?

Colonel GESLER. I cannot say I knew that much in detail.

103. General RUSSELL. Yes. Now, Colonel, did Rohl come to Washington when this contract was made?

Colonel GESLER. I understand he did.

104. General RUSSELL. Did you see him?

Colonel GESLER. No, sir.

105. General RUSSELL. Have you ever seen him?

Colonel GESLER. Not to my knowledge.

106. General RUSSELL. In answer to a question by General Frank a little while ago, you stated that you knew that it was contrary to law to grant or to give to a nonresident alien work on a defense project.

Colonel GESLER. That is not exactly what I said, General.

107. General RUSSELL. Well, what did you say?

Colonel GESLER. I said that there was nothing in the law which prevented awarding a contract to a domestic corporation some of whose officers may be alien.

108. General RUSSELL. Yes. Well, now I will ask you the other question: Did you know that it was contrary to law to give to [950] an individual who was a nonresident alien a contract to do defensive work, work on defensive projects?

Colonel GESLER. I believe that is true, yes, sir.

109. General RUSSELL. I am asking you what you knew about it at the time of the execution of this contract on December 20, 1940.

Colonel GESLER. I am trying to express it as what I knew in 1940. I think that is what I knew then.

110. General RUSSELL. All right. You knew two things then: that you could not give the sort of work that was going to be done under this contract to a nonresident, or to an alien; you knew that?

Colonel GESLER. As a contractor.

111. General RUSSELL. As a contractor. But you knew that you could give it to a corporation in which he was an not officer but was a stockholder?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir. We do that all the time.

112. General RUSSELL. You have contracts that you grant to corporations with alien stockholders?

Colonel GESLER. We never question stockholders in corporations.

113. General RUSSELL. Did it occur to you as peculiar that Rohl was no longer an officer in the Rohl-Connolly Company when you gave this contract?

Colonel GESLER. I do not believe I knew that at the time, sir.

114. General RUSSELL. Well, did you know Rohl was an alien then?

Colonel GESLER. No, sir.

[951] 115. General RUSSELL. When did you first—

Colonel GESLER. That question never came up. I don't remember now that I had any knowledge of it, that it meant anything at the time.

116. General RUSSELL. Now, just as a matter of policy down in the Engineers Office, would it make any difference in granting to a corporation a contract if you knew that the president of that corporation and the dominant figure in that corporation was an alien?

Colonel GESLER. It probably would now. In 1940 that question was never raised.

117. General RUSSELL. I want to get clear on this, Colonel. In 1940, had it been known that Mr. Rohl was continuing as president of the Rohl-Connolly Company, the dominant factor, the principal operator in that corporation, seeking to get a contract to do defensive work in Hawaii, you would have granted it to the corporation?

Colonel GESLER. I believe we would at that time. Not only that, but you remember that all contractors at that time were cleared by two War Department boards here, the Construction Advisory Committee in the Office of Quartermaster General at that time, and another board; I have forgotten the exact title of it. I know Mr. Harrison is a member of it. General Harrison.

118. General RUSSELL. Now, isn't it true that General Knudsen was clearing those contracts then?

Colonel GESLER. He probably was too. There was a time when he was doing it.

[952] 119. General RUSSELL. I want to go back to the execution of this contract for a minute, Colonel. Were you present when it was signed?

Colonel GESLER. By General Schley, you mean?

120. General RUSSELL. No. When it was signed by this man Grafe.

Colonel GESLER. I don't remember; no reason why I should have been present.

121. General RUSSELL. I want your opinion on the form of the execution. It occurs to me on a second reading that the name of W. E. Callahan Construction Company was written and then stricken from the contract (handing document to witness). Does it appear that way to you?

Colonel GESLER. It looks like that on the photostat. You would have to see the original to see what that really was, I believe, sir.

122. General RUSSELL. If that is true, what occurred was that this term "Hawaiian Constructors" was written on the typewriter; thereunder was written, "W. E. Callahan Construction Company," which appears on the second line in describing the contractors, and then that was written out.

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

123. General RUSSELL. For some reason. So it left only the Hawaiian Constructors there. Now, you believe that this letter here originated as the result of a request from the field?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir. And I think it was a written request, although I am also under the impression I had a telephone call from the West Coast.

124. General RUSSELL. Do you think it came from—was he [953]
Colonel Hannum at that time?

Colonel GESLER. Yes.

125. General RUSSELL. From Colonel Hannum or from Colonel Wyman?

Colonel GESLER. I believe Wyman was in Hawaii at the time. I believe it must have been Colonel Hannum.

126. General RUSSELL. Colonel Hannum. Do you remember whether about this time this man Martin, who was an attorney for the Rohl interests, was in Washington?

Colonel GESLER. I have heard he was, but I don't remember Mr. Martin at all.

127. General RUSSELL. He did not come into your section about that time?

Colonel GESLER. Not that I remember, no, sir.

128. General RUSSELL. You could not state definitely whether this letter of request for hastening Rohl's citizenship papers was brought into your office or into the Office of the Chief of Engineers by this man Martin?

Colonel GESLER. I do not know. I do not believe it could have been, though.

129. General RUSSELL. You think it reached you through the mail?

Colonel GESLER. As I remember, it was the regular mail.

130. General RUSSELL. Reached you through the mail?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

131. General RUSSELL. We are interested in this man who did the operating in your branch in connection with promoting this citizenship application. His name was Stelphen?

[954] Colonel GESLER. Stilphen, S-t-i-l-p-h-e-n. He was acting under my instructions. He was not promoting it, I wouldn't say, sir.

132. General RUSSELL. He did the actual work in connection with it?

Colonel GESLER. Yes.

133. General RUSSELL. And, you think, rang up these people, or a Mr. Schofield who had to do with them?

Colonel GESLER. Yes.

134. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, after all is said and done, did it occur to you as being a matter which deserved the most serious consideration by the Chief of Engineers, having a man who had been in this country for a number of years, to promote his application for citizenship in order that he might go into work which was very important from the defensive standpoint?

Colonel GESLER. My impression there, sir, is that this was his third and last paper. He had been in the country some time; he had done some very fine contracting work; he could help us in the present contract by his presence in Hawaii, and his citizenship was being held up only on a technicality that should be cleared promptly so that he could be put to work.

135. General RUSSELL. With the risk of repetition in the record, I want to propound the question which General Grunert asked you a little while ago: There was a definite impression, then, in the Office of the Chief of Engineers that the work out there in Hawaii was lagging and needed attention?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir. I cannot say that from any recorded progress, but we were attempting to help any [955] contractor, any District Engineer, in those days, who needed help and asked for it.

136. General RUSSELL. I think you ran around me a little bit, Colonel. I am asking not about your general policy of helping the engineer in the field. I am asking about this specific case. Was there such lagging or such delay out there that you felt called upon to sign this letter upon a telephone conversation, making the German available to go out there? Didn't that indicate that there was pretty bad lagging in Hawaii?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir; that is what it indicates, and that must have been the story. I don't recall definitely what the story was, but it must have been that there was need for expedition.

137. General RUSSELL. And it indicates that the Hawaiian Constructors needed very badly the driving power of this German, Rohl?

Colonel GESLER. That is right.

138. General RUSSELL. I believe that is all.

139. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

140. General FRANK. Just a minute.

Did you ever serve on the Pacific Coast with the Engineers?

Colonel GESLER. No, sir. I visited the Pacific Coast but never served there.

141. General FRANK. You did not know Rohl?

Colonel GESLER. No, sir.

142. General FRANK. With respect to this Paul Grafe signing the contract, some one individual had to be designated to sign the contract?

[956] Colonel GESLER. That is true, unless all of them signed.

143. General FRANK. Yes. And normally it would be a man who was interested in the firms constituting the Hawaiian contractors?

Colonel GESLER. Well, not only that one line; it would have to be interested in all of them, the Hawaiian Constructors as a separate group, yes.

144. General FRANK. Yes, but the point I am trying to make is, if he didn't belong to the Callahan firm he would have belonged to some other firm?

Colonel GESLER. He would have belonged to one of those firms listed, yes.

145. General FRANK. What is Stilphen's first name and present address?

Colonel GESLER. It is Benjamin L. Stilphen. I do not know his present address. The last I heard he was in New York.

146. General RUSSELL. Colonel, there have just been called to my attention certain changes in this contract of December 20, 1940, where the initials P. G. and T. W. appear. A hasty survey indicates that that is true in some five places here on two pages. Was it possible for this contract to be amended in the field by the District Engineer T. W.?

Colonel GESLER. The minor amendments could have been made before it was finally filed.

147. General RUSSELL. I do not get what you mean, "before it was finally filed."

Colonel GESLER. Before it was finally filed with the General Accounting Office.

148. General RUSSELL. Now, this became a binding contract upon [957] the Government and the Hawaiian Constructors on the date of its execution?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

149. General RUSSELL. Thereafter Wyman representing the Government, and the proper party representing the Hawaiian Constructors, could amend this contract without reference to Washington?

Colonel GESLER. I didn't mean that, sir. Those amendments, initials were made undoubtedly before they were sent in to the Chief's office for distribution.

150. General RUSSELL. Before the execution?

Colonel GESLER. Before distribution. Our procedure then was to have the main contract signed, and if there were only minor amendments the Chief of Engineers would approve it, but in our instructions to the field we would point out that minor irregularities should be corrected. Those irregularities are corrected and initialed, and all the copies required in Washington were processed through the Office of the Chief of Engineers. We sent the one on to the General Accounting Office. Those initials should have been added, of course, before the original signature, but it could have been done the other way too.

151. General RUSSELL. Where was this contract prepared?

Colonel GESLER. I understand it was prepared in Washington, sir.

152. General RUSSELL. In Washington?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

153. General RUSSELL. So as a matter of fact wasn't there quite a group of people who came into Washington about the [958] time that this contract was made, in connection with promoting the interests of the Hawaiian Constructors and giving the contract?

Colonel GESLER. I believe there was, yes, sir.

(Excerpts from construction contract were read as follows:)

154. General RUSSELL. Here is the first one. I will read it merely as an example:

Rent actually paid by the contractor at rates not to exceed those approved by the contracting office.

Now, that is the changed contract?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

155. General RUSSELL. I am merely exploring the contract on the spot, as it were.

Now, the language which has been stricken was, mentioned in the schedule of rental rates to Appendix B hereto attached and made a part hereof, except as hereinafter set forth.

Now, to get just what Wyman was doing to this contract possibly we had better read the unamended contract and then read the amendment and see the difference. The unamended contract, prior to the time that Wyman initialed it, was in this language:

Rent actually paid by the contractor at rates not to exceed those mentioned in the schedule of rental rates in Appendix B hereto attached and made a part hereof, except as hereinafter set forth.

Now, as amended it reads this way:

Rental actually paid by the contractor at [959] rates not to exceed those approved by the contracting officer.

Now, isn't the effect of that amendment to abolish the rates established in the appendix, as qualified, and make Wyman, the contracting officer, the judge as to what rates would be paid?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

156. General RUSSELL. In other words, Wyman amended the contract so he could change the price of rentals at least?

Colonel GESLER. Well, he amended the contract by the authority of the Chief of Engineers, though, sir.

157. General RUSSELL. Where would that authority be?

Colonel GESLER. The signature of the Chief of Engineers on approval indicates that it has been approved.

158. General RUSSELL. Where is that old contract?

159. General FRANK. The changes in the contract put power in Wyman to determine rates and compensation of the contractor, didn't they?

Colonel GESLER. To put what is that again, sir?

160. General FRANK. Gave Wyman the power to determine rates and compensation to the contractor?

Colonel GESLER. That is right; yes, sir.

161. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, to go back to what we were talking about, the approval by the Chief of Engineers of these changes, I am not sure that what you exhibited to me approved such changes as are initialled here. Will you go back and explain that to us, please, sir?

Colonel GESLER. The instrument as it stands, I believe, [960] is a proper legal document, and it shows approval by the Chief of Engineers of everything in there, these changes.

162. General RUSSELL. Now, the Chief of Engineers could not approve a change before it was made, could he?

Colonel GESLER. Well, not exactly that, sir, but we indicate the changes which will be required before it will be accepted by the Office Chief of Engineers. This change is not necessarily one that Wyman himself wanted. What you read first there is the standard form of contract which they had in those days and applicable to work in this country. For some reason it was probably understood that that clause would not be practical for work in Hawaii, so that alternate phrase was inserted. Since the standard form was changed—I believe this is probably a mimeographed form that was changed—it required initial.

163. General GRUNERT. Why didn't the Chief of Engineers initial the change? He signed the contract, didn't he?

Colonel GESLER. Well, he only approves it; he doesn't initial every change.

164. General GRUNERT. Only approves it?

Colonel GESLER. The Chief of Engineers only approves the entire contract. His name appears only once.

165. General RUSSELL. Colonel, the thing we are attempting to get in the record, and I don't think there should be any equivocation about it—I mean by that, I don't think there should be confusion about it—it was possible and it did happen that this man Wyman took that contract, made changes in it, initialed it, and thereby made those changes effective as between him and the other contractors, between the Government [961] and the contracting parties, didn't he?

Colonel GESLER. That is impossible without the knowledge of the Chief of Engineers, sir.

166. General RUSSELL. How did the Chief of Engineers come to know that Wyman had made these changes in that contract?

Colonel GESLER. Our procedure provided either that this was fixed up before General Schley signed it or, if there were some very minor changes which were called for, to save sending papers back and forth to the field several times, by administrative direction in our endorsement to the field we indicated the changes which would be required,

and those changes were put in there and initialed by the parties in the field and returned to our office before we distributed it. That did not become a proper contract until it was ready for distribution to the General Accounting Office.

167. General RUSSELL. Now, let us be careful. Is it your testimony now that before one of these changes was made, before any one of them was made by Wyman, that he had directions from the Chief of Engineers to make that change?

Colonel GESLER. Either directions or approval of the Chief of Engineers to make it.

168. General RUSSELL. Is the approval or direction attached to this contract?

Colonel GESLER. It is indicated by the document itself, sir, because the Chief of Engineers has approved it.

169. General RUSSELL. Where?

Colonel GESLER. Just the mere fact that the Chief of Engineers' signature is there, I believe, also covers everything that is above it.

[962] 170. General RUSSELL. When was the Chief of Engineers' signature placed on that contract?

Colonel GESLER. December 28, I believe it is, 1940.

171. General RUSSELL. December 28. The contract was signed December 20th, 21st. Now, had that contract gone to the field and had these changes made with Wyman's initials and come back here and then approved by the Chief of Engineers?

Colonel GESLER. That is possible, unless it were made here in Washington, as I believe it was, in which case all those changes were prepared and initialed before it was submitted to General Schley.

172. General RUSSELL. All right. Now, the final question that I want to ask you is this: Is it your evidence that Wyman was without authority to change and initial this contract and thereby make it effective as against the Government?

Colonel GESLER. That is true; he is without authority on his own responsibility.

173. General RUSSELL. And each specific change has been approved by the Chief of Engineers?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir.

174. General RUSSELL. Do you regard the approval of the contract on the 28th day of December, 1940, by the Chief of Engineers as that approval?

Colonel GESLER. Yes, sir; approval of everything in the contract.

175. General RUSSELL. Changes made thereafter, what would be their status?

Colonel GESLER. Unless he had been directed to make changes by the Chief of Engineers before returning the contract [963] for final distribution, no such change could be made. It would have required a change order or supplemental agreement.

176. General RUSSELL. Would there be in the files of the Engineers this correspondence granting to Wyman authority to make changes in the contract?

Colonel GESLER. If that was what was required, there would be. I suspect that the contract was negotiated in Washington and all those changes were inserted before it was submitted for approval.

177. General RUSSELL. Was Wyman here?

Colonel GESLER. I understand he was.

178. General RUSSELL. Why were Wyman's initials put on there if the Chief of Engineers was going to approve the changed contract?

Colonel GESLER. Because Colonel Wyman was the contracting officer. Both the contracting officer and the contractor have to initial all changes.

179. General GRUNERT. It shows here that on behalf of the United States of America Theodore Wyman signed the contract and Paul Grafe signed the contract. Then it was approved by the Chief of Engineers. So Wyman represented the United States in making the contract. I didn't know that.

180. General RUSSELL. I knew that and was not surprised about it, but what I was interested in was whether or not after he got into the field he could continue to contract with these people without reference to the Chief of Engineers Office.

181. General GRUNERT. I presume that the changes made here and initialed by the two contracting parties, Wyman and Grafe, were made prior to the approval of the Chief of Engineers?

[964] Colonel GESLER. That is right.

182. General GRUNERT. That is the assumption?

Colonel GESLER. That is right.

183. General GRUNERT. If any changes were made after that approval, unless the Chief of Engineers authorized such changes to be made, in a document so stating, it would not have been according to Hoyle; is that right?

Colonel GESLER. That is correct.

184. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, we have testimony from witnesses from the Office of Chief of Engineers that Wyman was in here when the contract was signed.

185. General RUSSELL. Yes; the Colonel said he was.

186. General FRANK. Furthermore, I think that we shall find that there were 53 supplements to this contract, 53 supplemental agreements.

187. General GRUNERT. This is just the basic contract.

188. General RUSSELL. You wanted to know where and when those changes were made.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[965] **TESTIMONY OF COLONEL EUGENE B. WALKER, COAST
ARTILLERY CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The witness was sworn by the recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel WALKER. Eugene B. Walker; Colonel, Coast Artillery Corps; at present on duty with Army Ground Forces, as Editor of the Coast Artillery Journal.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is endeavoring to get at facts, both as to the background and what led up to the Pearl Harbor attack; in fact, about the attack itself. Because of your assignment in Hawaii it has called you as a witness with the hope that you can throw some light on the subject. Just what was your assignment in Hawaii during 1941?

Colonel WALKER. I was commanding officer of the harbor defenses at Pearl Harbor.

3. General GRUNERT. Just what did that embrace? Any particular posts?

Colonel WALKER. It included Fort Barrett, Fort Weaver, and Fort Kamehameha, with outlying observation posts around the entire perimeter of the Island, with the exception of one end on the north coast which had not been fully developed. That is it, in general.

4. General GRUNERT. During what period was this; what dates?

Colonel WALKER. From the date I arrived there, which was in October, until I left in April, 1942.

5. General GRUNERT. Who was your immediate superior?

Colonel WALKER. General F. Q. C. Gardner.

6. General GRUNERT. Who was your immediate superior just [966] prior to Pearl Harbor? Or is he still your immediate superior?

Colonel WALKER. No, sir; he had departed just shortly before that; and at that time, General Burgin. I have forgotten his first name.

7. General GRUNERT. What was his position?

Colonel WALKER. At that time he was commanding officer of the Coast Artillery brigade and operating directly under the Department.

8. General GRUNERT. Then you, as commanding officer of the harbor defenses, were directly under General Burgin?

Colonel WALKER. Yes, sir.

9. General FRANK. How do you spell that name?

Colonel WALKER. I think it is B-e-r-g-u-n.

10. General GRUNERT. It is B-u-r-g-i-n.

What light can you throw on the state of the defenses of your command about the latter part of November or early in December in the line of preparedness to defend your command from outside aggression, just generally speaking? I will develop the subject a little more later on.

Colonel WALKER. As far as training was concerned, I would say they were excellent and superior; that is, in the tactical and technical training with their weapons as coast artillerymen.

11. General GRUNERT. Did that include anti-aircraft weapons?

Colonel WALKER. I do not remember the inclusive dates, but for a while we had dual assignments in certain of the batteries. The battery at Fort Barrett and Fort Weaver had 12-inch barbette guns and had dual assignments. We were very short of personnel. In case of a major air threat we were to drop the sea coast batteries and run to the anti-aircraft batteries and man those. If the sea coast threat was the major threat we would [967] drop the anti-aircraft and man the sea coast batteries. However, the anti-aircraft defense was taken out from under the coast defense and operated under its own personnel.

12. General GRUNERT. Then you no longer had command of it from approximately what time in 1941, prior to or after November 27?

Colonel WALKER. I would say it was prior to November 27 that the anti-aircraft command was turned over. I do not recall the date.

13. General GRUNERT. Then you no longer had that dual mission?

Colonel WALKER. I did not.

14. General GRUNERT. Then you cannot give me any information as to the preparedness of the anti-aircraft batteries themselves?

Colonel WALKER. I was only indirectly concerned with observing them as they were on my own post.

15. General GRUNERT. Under you, you had various posts and post commanders; is that right?

Colonel WALKER. They were not posts in the full sense of the word; that is, they did not have the staff that we normally expect on a post, of Adjutant General, Quartermaster, and so on. They were sub-posts under me as artillery commands only. For instance, at Fort Barrett they had a six-inch gun battery. Commanding there was the senior officer present. He had no administrative duties other than those devolving on a commander. We supplied ammunition, and so on. The same as Fort Weaver.

16. General GRUNERT. In addition to your duties as harbor defense commander, you were a post commander also?

Colonel WALKER. I was.

17. General GRUNERT. Of which post?

Colonel WALKER. Fort Kamehameha.

[968] 18. General GRUNERT. Can you tell me now about the posts in general under your supervision, and particularly about Fort Kamehameha, as to its state of preparedness to defend itself from the air and the ground, and what measures were taken to assure that defense?

Colonel WALKER. The only protection we had against air attack was the antiaircraft batteries which were located on our post, and the .50-caliber machine guns which were manned by one of the batteries. At that time we only had, as I remember five .50-caliber machine guns available.

19. General GRUNERT. Was that for the entire harbor defenses or for your particular post?

Colonel WALKER. For the entire harbor defense. We were very short.

20. General GRUNERT. Had you received any Department instruction—and by that I mean Hawaiian Department instruction—as to the measures you should take in preparation for defense, or was that left to you to take such measures as you saw fit?

Colonel WALKER. That was left to me. I recall no order at that time giving any requirement or direction about preparation for defense against air attack.

21. General GRUNERT. After the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th did you receive such instructions; and, if so, what, generally, did they cover?

Colonel WALKER. What instructions I received would have come down through the Coast Artillery brigade; and I recall no specific instructions, but merely general instructions to guard our own installations and to prepare ourselves to resist, with the batteries we had, against air attack.

22. General GRUNERT. Had you, prior to December 7 or there-
[969] after, constructed or provided for air raid shelters for the protection of personnel, or slit trenches or any other measures, including the evacuation of personnel, in the line of protective measures?

Colonel WALKER. I cannot remember the date when we dug trenches. I feel sure that no trenches were dug prior to December 7. That was done after December 7.

23. General GRUNERT. Then you did not consider it necessary in your own command to take particular steps in the protection of your command and the noncombatants in your command; or did you?

Colonel WALKER. We had made plans for taking care of the non-combatants on the post itself. There had been no plans either by other commands or our own for evacuating, although I understood that plans had been discussed of making some central camp to take care of them. But nothing had been done. Our plans were to take all the noncombatants, in case of a surprise, and put them in a mortar battery, which was the only protection we had at Fort Kam, or evacuate them into the interior parts of the Island.

24. General GRUNERT. How was that plan carried out during the attack? First, tell me this: Were you attacked?

Colonel WALKER. Well, I will modify what I have to say on that. I was not actually on the post during the air attack; I was up in the Waianae Range, in the Waianae pocket, so that what I can state with regard to the attack is what I observed when I returned to the post.

The fort itself had not been attacked. There had been some minor damage done. One bomb had hit in the road, a small bomb, and made a hole probably four inches deep and a foot and a [970] half across. Another one had hit the eaves of my quarters but had done no damage. It was hard to find even where the fragments had gone. Otherwise, I do not think any of the damage that occurred was due to hostile action. There was damage in one of the barracks and in one of the sets of quarters, but I think that was due to anti-aircraft fire by naval personnel.

25. General FRANK. Were your quarters the only quarters on the post that were hit?

Colonel WALKER. Yes; and that was a small bomb that hit the eaves and burst right in the patio. There was no mark. One of the fragments went into the kitchen and lodged in the ice box. That was the only one I could find.

26. General GRUNERT. So far as you were concerned, was this attack on December 7 a surprise to you?

Colonel WALKER. Yes, in the fact that it occurred just as it did. I will go back and say this, that we had discussed the thing in the family in a sort of joking way, but, at the same time, with a little seriousness behind it, in June. The Honolulu paper had a weather report, and even back as far as June there was a remark in the paper—we cut it out; I have it at home—to the effect that “We hope if the Japanese ever attack they will attack some day other than Wednesday or week-ends.” And at home we said we agreed with that thoroughly. We agreed that if an attack came it should come on a Sunday. Of course, we did not select the Sunday for that. But the attack itself, of course, was a big surprise to everybody, because we could not believe that our sources of information were so meager that we would not have knowledge of the approach of any hostile fleet.

27. General GRUNERT. What information did you have and what [971] sources of information could you expect information from?

Colonel WALKER. The only sources we had were through official channels, and none was forthcoming as regards that attack until the attack was delivered.

28. General GRUNERT. Did General Burgin ever discuss the possibility or probability of an attack, or did he transmit or inform you of any warning or information that had been received in late November or early December?

Colonel WALKER. I was present at a conference in which it was stated that the situation was serious and that we would go on alert, as I remember, No. 3, which was merely a sabotage alert in which we were to protect our installations within the Island.

29. General GRUNERT. Are you sure it was No. 3 or might it have been No. 1?

Colonel WALKER. I think at one time it was No. 1, and then later on it was changed to No. 3; but whatever the number was, it was a sabotage alert against internal sabotage and not against external violence.

30. General GRUNERT. In view of the information you had, were you surprised that they should go on just a sabotage alert and not on one of greater gravity?

Colonel WALKER. Yes; I was; but I thought that the situation was justified from the fact that sources of information must have been open to the Navy, with its surface and sub-surface ships, and to the War and State Departments. I presumed it was information which made the situation secure so far as we were concerned. So that none of us expected the attack when it came.

31. General GRUNERT. Did you know that in such a situation, in view of the lack of information, or no information, the defense [972] command should be prepared to meet the gravest emergency?

Colonel WALKER. That I presume is theoretical and ideal.

32. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming down, Colonel.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 3:55 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

[973]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[974] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

THURSDAY, AUGUST 17, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

**TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. H. E. BROOKS, REPLACEMENT SCHOOL
COMMAND, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel BROOKS. Lieutenant Colonel H. E. Brooks, Replacement School Command, Birmingham, Alabama.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is after facts relating to the background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. Because of your assignment in [975] Hawaii we thought that you might have information or leads that would assist the Board in its mission.

Tell us, first, what your assignment was in Hawaii in 1941.

Colonel BROOKS. In 1941 I was Battery Commander, Battery A, 15th Field Artillery Battalion, in the 24th Division, the streamlined division.

3. General GRUNERT. Stationed where?

Colonel BROOKS. Schofield Barracks.

4. General GRUNERT. Between what dates were you at Schofield Barracks?

Colonel BROOKS. From July—I do not remember the exact date in July, but somewhere around the middle of July 1941—until the war broke out; and although Schofield Barracks was my station, from that time on I was actually out in the woods until about the 18th of August, 1942.

5. General GRUNERT. Then you were present during the attack on December 7, 1941?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir.

6. General GRUNERT. You were actually at Schofield Barracks?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir.

7. General GRUNERT. Can you tell the Board the feeling among the junior officers as to the imminence of war in the latter part of November or early December? What was the impression among the junior officers?

Colonel BROOKS. I do not think they realized that the war was about to happen, sir. That is, not the fact; that is the impression.

8. General GRUNERT. What did you have to base such an [976] opinion upon?

Colonel BROOKS. The fact that they did not talk about it very much. If there was an impression that there would be a war, I believe, sir, it would be this way, that they felt that a war was coming on, but they did not know how soon, and I do not believe any of us felt that Hawaii would be hit at that time.

9. General GRUNERT. What was the particular assignment of your battery in the defense of Schofield or in the defense of the Island of Oahu?

Colonel BROOKS. We had the mission of going north, back from the north shore, and we had a battery position selected and we were to stay in that position and to fire upon the beaches and a short distance out to sea.

10. General GRUNERT. What was the armament of your battalion?

Colonel BROOKS. At that time we had British 75 guns. Four of those were to be separated from my battery and assigned to the infantry for direct fire, and four were to be retained by my battery and were to be used in ordinary field artillery missions back 3,000 yards, approximately, from the shore, so as to protect the landing beaches.

11. General GRUNERT. Tell me what you know of the classes of alerts that were in effect at the time.

Colonel BROOKS. The alert that was in effect at the time—I do not know the exact number of it, but it was an alert to prevent sabotage, and it entailed having guards around cable stations, around planes at the airfields, and around installations around the post and about the post that might be military objectives.

[977] To go further on that, I believe it was 50 percent of the officers that had to be on the post at all times. However, we were all on the post and all our guns and ammunition, and so forth, were on the post.

12. General GRUNERT. What provisions had been made or what instructions existed as to the actual defense and protection of Schofield Barracks itself?

Colonel BROOKS. That I am not positive of, sir, because I was not detailed on that. My mission was to go into the field, away from Schofield Barracks, and protect the shore.

13. General GRUNERT. Were you married and did you have a family??

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir.

14. General GRUNERT. Where were they?

Colonel BROOKS. They were at Schofield Barracks with me.

15. General GRUNERT. Did they know what to do in case of attack?

Colonel BROOKS. My wife knew she had to go to the hospital and have a baby right away.

16. General GRUNERT. I mean, for her own protection against bombing or an attack on the post.

Colonel BROOKS. No, sir; there was no provision.

17. General GRUNERT. Did they have any air raid shelters?

Colonel BROOKS. No, sir.

18. General GRUNERT. Any slit trenches?

Colonel BROOKS. No, sir.

19. General GRUNERT. Any scheme to go to the hills in a hurry?

Colonel BROOKS. They may have had that scheme worked out, sir. I did not know about it. They probably did.

[978] 20. General GRUNERT. If anything broke and you left to go to your position, your family would not have known exactly what to do?

Colonel BROOKS. Well, sir, they had the plan worked out, evidently, because they took care of that when it happened. I went out into the field, but there were officers detailed to take care of the families, and they took them and put them in concrete buildings, on the ground floor.

21. General GRUNERT. That had been worked out beforehand?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir. However, I had no knowledge of it. It was taken care of as soon as this happened.

22. General GRUNERT. It was taken care of, but the information was evidently not given to the families to know just what to do when it happened, without being told afterwards?

Colonel BROOKS. That is right, sir.

23. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not any other protective measures were taken after December 7 that had not been taken before?

Colonel BROOKS. Many measures were taken afterwards away from the post. First, they strung barbed wire, dug foxholes, dug gun emplacements. That had not been done before. Some had been, but very few; and the ones that were dug in could not be used, in many cases, because they were in the wrong places.

24. General GRUNERT. You and your family had no fears of attack at that time?

Colonel BROOKS. Not on Hawaii; I can say that.

25. General GRUNERT. You mean, the Island of Oahu?

Colonel BROOKS. We were too dumb to realize that they might hit the Island, sir. I think there was a feeling that [979] war was imminent, but not at Hawaii.

26. General FRANK. I would like to go back to the answer that you gave in which you stated or inferred that one reason you did not feel that war was imminent was because there was no conversation about it among the senior officers.

Colonel BROOKS. No, sir; the junior officers.

27. General FRANK. Did you hear any conversation among the senior officers?

Colonel BROOKS. Not about war in Hawaii, sir. We did talk about war being imminent, yes, sir; but not about war being imminent in Hawaii.

28. General FRANK. You say "we talked about it." Whom do you mean?

Colonel BROOKS. Junior officers, sir.

29. General FRANK. What contact did you have with the senior officers? Did they advise you or analyze the situation for you in any way?

Colonel BROOKS. No, sir, not more than you would get in casual conversation. We had our standing operating procedures, however, in case of war, so that we should know exactly what to do with our equipment and where we would go when we occupied the positions.

30. General FRANK. There was no attempt on the part of the top control to develop or instill a war attitude?

Colonel BROOKS. I believe you are correct, sir; I think you are very correct there.

31. General FRANK. Did you know that the period in late November and early December was a very critical international [280] period between the United States and Japan?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir.

32. General FRANK. You realized that?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir; I did, because I read Time magazine.

33. General FRANK. The junior group generally realized it?

Colonel BROOKS. I believe so. Maybe I have not made myself clear, sir. I believe the junior group realized that war was imminent, because we of course read magazines. However, they did not believe in any case that Hawaii would be involved.

34. General FRANK. Why did your conclusions lead you to believe that Hawaii would not be involved?

Colonel BROOKS. The reason for that, sir, was that it just did not come up. We did not believe that the Japanese would come that far. Our idea was that the attack would be made in the Far East. We seemed too far away from Japan. We at that time had the idea that Japan was not much of a nation.

35. General FRANK. Let us go back a moment. We had a pretty good-sized force in Hawaii, did we not?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir.

36. General FRANK. All arms of the Ground Army, all components of the Air Force, and all components of the Fleet?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. And you had a lot of plans for the defense of Oahu?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir.

37. General FRANK. Did you ever stop to think, in the presence of all that background, that there must have been some sort of an apprehension among the high command of an attack on [281] the Island?

Colonel BROOKS. It was not evident, sir, to the junior officers. If there was apprehension it was not made evident to us. As a matter of fact, it was just the other way. As you know, sir, someone said that the Air Corps could stop any Japs that were coming in, and also the Coast Artillery, I believe—No, it was the Air Corps and the Navy. That came out in the papers over there. I think that is the evidence which tended to make people too complacent, perhaps. It seems as if we were well set up and that no attack would be made on the Island of

Oahu. Perhaps we thought this, sir, that if war started, eventually they might hit Hawaii, but that did not seem to be the first focal point, and we did not believe it would be.

38. General FRANK. There was nothing said or done to develop a warmindedness in the command?

Colonel BROOKS. That is right, sir.

39. General FRANK. Do you think that would help?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir.

40. General FRANK. In what way?

Colonel BROOKS. Well, sir, we went ahead and did our work in the morning, the normal work, and that included regular drill, going out in near-by areas, and mock problems, and so forth; but there was no digging in, no warlike attitude in the division. In most cases the men were put on fatigue duties in the afternoon. We retained most of our non-coms. We had to give them schools of some sort. We did not have any working force; we had no one to work with, but we would give [982] the non-coms some sort of gunnery schools. But there was no warlike attitude. It was just a peacetime attitude that we had all the time. In fact, because it was in the tropics we did very little work in the afternoon. It was just the opposite of a warlike attitude.

41. General GRUNERT. The actual things that went on in the military line would be like anything in the United States?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir.

42. General FRANK. Did you have any blackouts?

Colonel BROOKS. Not before the attack, sir, I do not believe—Yes, they did, sir. They had a few alerts and they had a few blackouts. Just for a short time they had some practice blackouts; I remember now.

43. General FRANK. Do you remember when they were?

Colonel BROOKS. No, sir, I do not, very well. I think they happened three or four times for a few hours each.

44. General FRANK. However, you knew what to do in case of a blackout?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir; we all knew what to do. The families were told about it, too.

45. General RUSSELL. Colonel, what was your grade?

Colonel BROOKS. I was a permanent Captain, sir.

46. General RUSSELL. Commanding this battery?

Colonel BROOKS. Battery A of the 15th Battalion, Field Artillery. We had British 75s.

47. General RUSSELL. The estimate that was placed on the part they would play in case of an invasion was rather a third-line defense?

Colonel BROOKS. Apparently, from what the papers said that [983] came out over there, the Air Corps would be our first-line, the Navy the second, and ground troops the third.

48. General RUSSELL. You were getting all your military information of what was going to happen from the newspapers?

Colonel BROOKS. We did get our broad picture from them; yes.

49. General RUSSELL. The battalion commander, the regimental commander, and the high officers did not tell you that, did they?

Colonel BROOKS. Sir, I went up to my battalion commander a few times and talked this over. I knew my battalion commander fairly well, and he seemed to have about the same information as I had.

50. General RUSSELL. Were there any rumors among the junior officers on the battalion level or company level that the negotiations between the Japanese Ambassador and his representatives in Washington and our Government were rapidly deteriorating in late November or early December, 1941?

Colonel BROOKS. I think there was probably some small talk on that, sir; just what we got from newspapers and things.

51. General RUSSELL. But through military channels nothing was brought to your attention or to the attention of the other junior officers about these negotiations?

Colonel BROOKS. No, sir.

52. General RUSSELL. But the public effect of the negotiations between the two governments, and thereafter the possibility of war—none of that came from official sources at all?

Colonel BROOKS. No, sir. The only thing that was done [984] there was that we were called in and told the classes of alerts and what to do in case of various types of alert. We were given those instructions thoroughly. Those were part of our standing operating procedure. We did have that down, but as to the talk, no, we did not get it.

[985] 53. General RUSSELL. Were there any Japanese people around Schofield Barracks?

Colonel BROOKS. Oh, yes, sir; many of them.

54. General RUSSELL. Colonel, you have testified that no information reached you from official sources indicating just what was going on in our relations with Japan, or nothing was done to inculcate into the minds of the junior officers the war spirit. You were very definite about that?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir.

55. General RUSSELL. Did anything reach you from official sources which impressed on the junior officers the necessity for being very careful not to offend the Japanese population or do anything which might disclose to them that you thought war might be probable?

Colonel BROOKS. The only thing that came up, sir, in regard to us and the Japanese, was that we were told to be very careful of any military information, to see that our family and ourself did not repeat any information we might happen to have, in the presence of the Japanese, as a number of the families had Japanese servants, and there were Japanese servants at the club; and we did have that down. That was the only thing that came up with us in our relations with the Japanese.

56. General RUSSELL. But there were no instructions issued down, that told the junior officers to tread softly in their relations with the Japanese?

Colonel BROOKS. No, sir.

57. General RUSSELL. There was a feeling of security among the junior officers that any attack which the Japs might [986] attempt to launch against Oahu could be successfully met by the Air Forces of the Navy?

Colonel BROOKS. I probably gave a little wrong impression, there. That's what the papers said. I don't believe that came up. I know that a few of the junior officers, at least, believed that we should have more field training and get our positions prepared. Now, I do not believe that was for the protection of Hawaii, though. I am a little confused, there. I think we did not feel that there would be an attack on Hawaii, but we felt we should have more war training and be going out into the fields more; but I believe we probably thought, if we had thought about it at all, that probably the Air Corps and the Navy would stop them, or at least give us sufficient time so that we would be ready for them.

58. General RUSSELL. How far were your defensive gun positions from the barracks?

Colonel BROOKS. Just about twenty miles, sir.

59. General RUSSELL. You were motor-drawn at that time?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir. We had been issued a number of new GMC trucks. They had just been broken in. In addition, we had most of our old Dodges, so we were well taken care of as far as motor vehicles were concerned.

60. General RUSSELL. How long did it take you after the attack on December 7 to get into position?

Colonel BROOKS. We didn't leave the post until about 12 noon.

61. General FRANK. Where, on that map, was your battery position?

Colonel BROOKS. There (indicating) is Schofield Barracks. [987] This is the Ashley Station road. Up in here you can see Kawaihoa Camp and Waimea Camp. My position was just opposite Waimea Camp, up in here; this being Schofield Barracks.

62. General RUSSELL. Now, when you left Schofield Barracks at noon that day, how long did it take you to get into position and get ready to fire?

Colonel BROOKS. To get really ready to fire, sir, it took me, I would say, about 4½ hours, for this reason: There was no road to my position. It had been selected just a few days before. I had taken my battery out to see the position, on foot, and I had surveyed the position in, about two days before. I had gone out in the afternoon and taken my noncommissioned officers and surveyed the position in, so we knew that road, but there was no road to the position. I had to go ahead with my trucks, and just dig a road out as I went along; and so that is why it took me about 4½ hours before I was ready to fire. I had the first gun in position in about an hour and a half to two hours.

63. General RUSSELL. Had you never been in a maneuver prior to December 7, in which your battery discharged its mission in connection with the defense of Oahu?

Colonel BROOKS. We had gone out a number of times, sir, and occupied what was then our normal position, and assimilated fire missions. We couldn't fire at that time from those positions, because of safety regulations, but we did occupy positions. It just happened, in this case, that I had been given a new position just before that time. My old position was still there, and could have been occupied.

64. General RUSSELL. How far was it from the new position?

[988] Colonel BROOKS. The old position was about 3 miles from the new position, sir.

65. General RUSSELL. Had this change in your position for the defensive mission been a part of a reworking of the entire defensive plan, or was the change applicable only to your battery?

Colonel BROOKS. I think probably it was a change of position for the artillery of that division.

66. General RUSSELL. Involving all elements of the artillery?

Colonel BROOKS. Of the 24th Division. There were a few changes made, sir, but I believe that they had gone over that plan for the artillery, and so on; and the Battalion Commander and I went out on reconnaissance. We were told to find the best positions, so that's why I think it was part of a general artillery plan of the division. We went out and found this position in, just before Pearl Harbor, and I immediately went to work and orientated my men as to where it was and as to where all the installations would be, and went out and surveyed it right away—and very fortunately! because Pearl Harbor happened before we expected anything.

67. General RUSSELL. How many times had you taken your battery into the old positions that you expected to occupy prior to this change in position?

Colonel BROOKS. I imagine a half a dozen times, sir. They knew them thoroughly, and they could have functioned at night, right away, in the old position.

68. General RUSSELL. You made some suggestion a moment ago, Colonel, that in your opinion other maneuvers, or more maneuvers, looking to the defense of Oahu, would have been beneficial to the organizations, there.

[989] Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir. Here is the reason for that: I was trying to bring out a point, sir. We did not expect Hawaii to be attacked, but we realized that war was imminent. We felt we needed more training so that we could properly conduct a war.

69. General RUSSELL. Just what type of training, Colonel?

Colonel BROOKS. War training, sir, to get out into the field. We were having plenty of gun drill and things around the barracks, but we didn't get into the field enough.

70. General RUSSELL. You mean, for maneuvers involving the tactical employment of the artillery?

Colonel BROOKS. Out in the field; yes.

71. General RUSSELL. Now, you state, Colonel, that you were out in the woods with your battery, from December 7 until you were relieved from duty, as I understood your evidence.

Colonel BROOKS. Well, sir, until I was relieved as a Battery Commander, sir. I was in this position, moved to one other position, and then I was put on a battalion staff; but I was in the woods all the time; yes, sir.

72. General RUSSELL. The point I was attempting to develop is this—that after the attack of December 7, and until you left Hawaii, your division was out in defensive positions?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir; all the time.

73. General RUSSELL. You remained out there all the time?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir.

74. General RUSSELL. And that was for how long, after December 7?

Colonel BROOKS. I left about the 18th, I believe it was, of August, sir, and it was still out there then.

[990] 75. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, between the date of November 27 and December 7, if you can fix that time definitely; if not, we will say from the middle of November until the attack, was there any change at all in your operations?

Colonel BROOKS. Just the alert, sir, that we were put on.

76. General RUSSELL. And that was when? On or about the 27th?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir; on or about; some time around there. Now, these figures I gave you, about 50% of the officers staying on the Post, may have been wrong; it may have been that 90% had to stay on; but I knew that a certain percentage had to stay on the Post at all times, and that was part of our alert plan.

77. General RUSSELL. To what extent did this sabotage alert affect or interfere with your normal training, such as it was at that time?

Colonel BROOKS. It did not interfere at all, sir. We went right ahead with the training, and if we had to go off the Post that was all right, because we had our guns and everything with us.

78. General RUSSELL. I think those are the only questions I have. That is all.

79. General GRUNERT. On this selection of a new position, was it normal to select new positions from time to time, in order that, in case the old positions might have been located by Japanese agents, the new positions would have been available, or were these new positions selected because they gave a better field of fire and gave you a better chance to carry out your mission?

Colonel BROOKS. Well, sir, I think we would call this [991] more or less a continuing process. Occasionally we would go out on trips with the Battalion Commander, or without him, and the Battalion Commander would go out by himself, and we would search the area for battery positions. We had to do that in many cases where we could not occupy the positions, because, as you know, many of them, much of the land was field—sugar cane and pineapple and things like that—and we couldn't go through those areas. However, we could select battery positions that we might occupy in the future, and we did that; and it just happened that in the first field, on one of these trips, we found this very fine location for a battery position, the Battalion Commander and myself. We immediately made arrangements to use it, although I doubt that we would have been able to use it in peacetime, because they would not let us. That is why we could not build the road. We had to go through private property.

80. General FRANK. From time to time, the crops would change, and you had to change your plans accordingly, is that correct?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir. Very fortunately, this position we selected, being a very fine one, did not depend upon the crops, sir. This was one of the few that it wouldn't make any difference whether the cane was there or cut down.

81. General GRUNERT. I have one more question. I believe you stated, or you gave me the impression, that you got most of your information about the international situation and the imminence of war from the papers.

Colonel BROOKS. And magazines; yes, sir.

82. General GRUNERT. It was stated that in one of the Hawaiian papers, on November 30, there appeared a big headline to the [992] effect that there might be an attack on Hawaii within the next week;

which is practically what happened. Do you happen to recall that scare headline?

Colonel BROOKS. I don't recall that one, sir, but I realized that things like that had been said. I don't believe any of us realized how true that was.

83. General FRANK. Did you know how naval operations fitted into the defense picture?

Colonel BROOKS. No, sir; just in a very general way. No, sir; I didn't know that.

84. General FRANK. Was there some understanding or belief with respect to that?

Colonel BROOKS. I understand only, sir, that the Navy made their patrols, and they had one third of their force at sea at all times. I did know, because I talked to some naval officers.

85. General FRANK. Was there some understanding or belief among the rank and file of the officers, that the naval patrols were sufficiently effective, that you could expect a warning of an impending attack?

Colonel BROOKS. No, sir; I didn't ever believe that, sir.

86. General FRANK. Did you think you would get some sort of warning before an attack came?

Colonel BROOKS. I will say I would think that there would be a good chance of that, but not definite; no, sir.

87. General FRANK. I am trying to analyze a little bit this statement that you made in which you said that you just didn't ever think that there would be an attack on Oahu.

Colonel BROOKS. An original attack; that's right sir. [993] We thought if there was an attack it would be made somewhere else, first, and might develop to Hawaii. We did not realize the initial attack. In other words, we felt we had plenty of time to prepare the ground defenses, if we thought much about it, at all, but because of the fact the attack would be made somewhere else, first: That was perhaps the prevailing thought, there; and, as I say, that is just an impression. I may be wrong, but I think that is the way most of them thought.

88. General FRANK. For the air defense, was your aviation operating? They had to have some sort of warning?

Colonel BROOKS. We knew of their patrol, sir. We saw these PBYS flying around on their regular patrol, and we knew that they made these dawn patrols all the time.

89. General FRANK. Did you see those? You felt that they were going out almost daily?

Colonel BROOKS. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. We had been told they were. That is, not officially, but I had been told. I talked to the aviators. We all swam at the same pool, and so forth, and they talked about their dawn patrols, these PBYS, and how they went around there. In fact, the lieutenants were very sure that nothing could happen, because they had their PBYS out there.

90. General GRUNERT. What was the feeling about Sundays? Was that an off day for everybody?

Colonel BROOKS. We didn't work. We would play tennis and various other things. Yes, sir; it was.

91. General GRUNERT. Did you see any PBYS making reconnaissances on Sunday?

Colonel BROOKS. I saw planes flying, many a Sunday; [994] yes, sir.

92. General GRUNERT. Did you see any flying, that Sunday, December 7?

Colonel BROOKS. Not before that time. The first plane—well, I wasn't out, sir; I wouldn't know. I didn't come out until I heard some explosions and looked out; and they were Jap planes that I saw.

93. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? There appear to be none. Thank you very much for coming up and giving us what you know about that picture.

We will meet again in about ten minutes, when the next witness comes.

(Brief recess.)

STATEMENT OF SERGEANT GEORGE E. ELLIOTT, HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, STATION COMPLEMENT; CAMP LEE, VA.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Sergeant, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. Sergeant George E. Elliott, Headquarters Company, Station Complement; Camp Lee, Va.

2. General GRUNERT. Sergeant, this Board is attempting to get at the facts, both as to what happened before and as to what led up to Pearl Harbor. Through a study of the congressional hearings on a resolution which indirectly brought this Board into being, we found, there, a reference to your name and your assignment in Hawaii at the time, and we understood from that reference that you, at the time, were connected with the Air Warning Service, and probably were with Sergeant [995] Lockard at the radar station known as Opana.

Sergeant ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

3. General GRUNERT. So we asked you to come up here to tell us about that, and to answer our questions concerning it.

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

4. General GRUNERT. General Frank will ask you some questions, and we hope to get at some facts through those questions.

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. Sir, I would like to make one correction. Sergeant Lockard was not a Sergeant at the time. He was a private.

5. General GRUNERT. He was a private, at the time?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. At the time of Pearl Harbor; yes, sir.

6. General GRUNERT. All right.

7. General FRANK. Sergeant, what was your rank, on the morning of December 7, 1941?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I was a private, sir.

8. General FRANK. To what organization did you belong?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I belonged, sir, to the Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

9. General FRANK. What were your duties on that morning?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. That particular morning, we had a problem, and my duties were to plot the approach of targets that we picked up on

our detector—to plot them and send them in to our information center.

10. General FRANK. Let us be a little more specific as to what your duties were. Did you operate the machine called the oscilloscope?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir; I did not.

[996] 11. General FRANK. You were the plotter?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

12. General FRANK. From whom did you get your information, to make your plots?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I received information from Private Lockard, as to the plots I would make.

13. General FRANK. How much training had you had?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I had two weeks' training on plotting, at that particular time.

14. General FRANK. Did your assignment require you to have any technical knowledge of the operation of the radar equipment.

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir; it did not. I might add, sir, that having technical knowledge would make one a better operator.

15. General FRANK. But it did not affect your plotting?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir.

16. General FRANK. How frequently had you been on this duty?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, sir, I had only been on it the two weeks previous to Pearl Harbor.

17. General FRANK. How many times had you been doing this work?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I might clear that up, sir, by saying that I had only been in the outfit for about three months, and actually, on a detector, I had only had about two weeks, actually, in operation.

18. General FRANK. As a plotter?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. The other time was spent in setting up the unit and doing regular company duty, [997] previously to that.

19. General FRANK. Prior to the morning in question, how much activity had you had in the operation of the station? How much daily activity had you had, early in the morning?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, sir, I didn't operate every day, but at that time we were operating three hours a day.

20. General FRANK. On the days on which you operated, how much activity did you have early in the morning?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Sir, do you mean as to the targets that were received?

21. General FRANK. Yes, as to the number of planes that were out, that you picked up.

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, sir, I don't exactly remember.

22. General FRANK. What I am trying to ascertain is whether, on the morning of December 7, there was more activity than usual, or whether there was less activity than usual; or was it average?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, sir, during our problem, on Sunday, there was practically no activity, at all.

23. General FRANK. Prior to this time?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Prior to 7 o'clock; yes, sir. We had no plots to send in to our information center, and had no targets.

24. General FRANK. That is, on this morning of December 7?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. Previously, on days before that, there were, I would say, probably around 25 targets sent in. I don't remember for sure, but just a guess.

25. General FRANK. That is, on weekdays?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

[998] 26. General FRANK. There was general conversation around the operating room as to the manner and the satisfactoriness of the operation of the set, was there?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir; the set was operating satisfactorily during the problem. However, we had had trouble with the oil pump on the generator, previously; that is, the day before Pearl Harbor; and from the time we reported on the air, which was about 4:15 in the morning, till 7 o'clock, we had no discrepancies in operation.

[999] 27. General GRUNERT. Was that oil pump just a temporary disability?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

28. General GRUNERT. That could easily be fixed and was fixed?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

29. General FRANK. That was an oil pump on the engine of your generating set?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir, on the engine, to generate power.

30. General FRANK. Yes. How did your communications work between your radar set and the information center?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Very well, sir. We had direct communication. We had two lines of communication. We had a tactical line on which we sent the plots in directly to the information center, and we also had an administrative line.

31. General FRANK. Did you communicate the plotted positions?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes.

32. General FRANK. Or did somebody else do that?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, sir, at that time there were no plots to send in, as I remember.

33. General FRANK. But when there were plots to send in, you did that?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. The plotter has the head set that is connected with the information center.

34. General FRANK. There were no difficulties with your 270 radar set on that morning?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. None that I know of, sir.

35. General FRANK. All right. It was operated by motor [1000] generator rather than by commercial current?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

36. General FRANK. Had your motor generator been working all right except for that oil pump trouble the day before?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Previously, yes, sir.

37. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not that were plenty of spare parts and spare tubes for the set?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. That, I am sure there were, sir.

38. General FRANK. Did you consider the set dependable?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Very much, sir.

39. General FRANK. Where was the location of the set at Opana Point with respect to the Kahuku Point radio station?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I believe, sir, it was between two and three miles.

40. General FRANK. Back toward the hills?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

41. General FRANK. Was it on an elevation so that the line of sight was above the Kahuku Point radio towers?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I believe it was, sir. Yes, sir. It was 526 feet above sea level.

42. General FRANK. All right. There was no interference with the Kahuku Point radio station, with the operation of the set?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. That, sir, I can't answer that, although there may possibly have been, at that particular azimuth.

43. General FRANK. Who was operating the set?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. At what time, sir?

44. General FRANK. Who was operating the set when you first [1001] picked up any planes? You stated that it was very quiet and you didn't pick up any airplanes prior to about 7 o'clock?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

45. General FRANK. And who was operating the set when you did pick up some airplanes?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, that, sir, is: after our problem was over at 7 o'clock, I was to get further instruction in the operation of the oscilloscope, and at that time I was at the controls. However, Lockard was instructing me as to the different echoes that I would see, and it was at that time that the flight was noticed by Private Lockard.

46. General FRANK. Well, when he first noticed the flight did he take over the operation of the oscilloscope, or did he leave you with it?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; he took over the operation of the oscilloscope because it was just something completely out of the ordinary.

47. General FRANK. And unusual?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

48. General FRANK. All right. And you remember about what time that was?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; by our clock at the unit it was two minutes after seven.

49. General FRANK. Was a plotting made of the planes that they picked up?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. After insisting for quite some time on my part, there was a plot made.

50. General FRANK. Well, who made the plots?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I made the plots, sir, and sent them [1002] in. I spoke to the switchboard operator at the information center. I spoke over the administrative telephone line.

51. General FRANK. Will you look at that (indicating)? Is that a copy of your plot sheet?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; this one starting here (indicating a plot).

52. General FRANK. You made that on this morning?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. This one particular flight, yes, sir. The others were entered after this particular flight was marked.

53. General FRANK. And after you went off duty?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

54. General FRANK. We shall mark that as the next exhibit and put it in the record.

Please have the record show that this is the same plotting sheet to which General Colton referred in his testimony, and the witness has testified that he made the plot starting from north of Oahu at 7:02 a. m. and extending down to 7:30 a. m.

(Radar plotting sheet of December 7, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 15 and received in evidence.)

55. General FRANK. Will you please give a description of the sequence of events as they developed from the time you picked up that flight coming in?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. After picking up the flight Private Lockard took over the controls of the oscilloscope. I went to the plotting table and asked Private Lockard to give me a target on it, which he did. After getting the plot I suggested that we send it in to our information centers; and [1003] since our problem had been over at 7 o'clock, Private Lockard looked at me and laughed and told me I was crazy for wanting to send in that reading.

56. General FRANK. Why?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. That I do not know, sir. I presume, sir, that it was because our problem had been over at 7 o'clock. But I kept talking about the plot and sending it in; and, as an example, I stated that even if it was the Navy planes coming in, that if the Army was to send up interceptors to intercept those planes it would make a fine problem. And finally, after talking about it for a while, why, he told me to go ahead and send it in if I wanted to, which I did.

I called the information center on the administrative line and spoke to the switchboard operation at the information center, who was Corporal McDonald. He was Private McDonald at that time. I explained to him what we had picked up, and he stated that he didn't know what to do about it, as there wasn't anybody at the information center. I asked him to get somebody that would know what to do. So with that we hung up.

Later, Private McDonald called back to the unit. At this time Private Lockard answered the phone, and he spoke to the officer referred to in the Roberts report; and the information given Lockard—it was told to me through Lockard—was to forget it; and after he was given that information to forget it, he wanted to shut the unit down.

57. General FRANK. Who wanted to shut it down?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Private Lockard wanted to shut the unit down, and since I was to get the instruction on it I wanted to continue operation. Finally, after insisting on that, we did [1004] continue the flight and completing the flight on this chart which you have just shown me before, sir, and we followed the flight all the way in until it was approximately 15 or 25 miles from the Island of Oahu, and the flight was lost. It was lost due to technical reasons, that it was an impossibility to detect it any further.

The oscilloscope, from the beam that is sent out, has a back echo, and at that particular spot the oscilloscope is blank, and it is impossible to pick up any flight whatsoever at that particular point, and that was as far as we could follow the flight, and at approximately

7:39 is when we started to shut down the unit, and at 7:45 our truck came from our camp (incidentally, which was nine miles away from the unit) to pick us up to take us to breakfast, and upon arriving at the camp, why, we had found out what had happened at Pearl Harbor.

58. General FRANK. What had happened?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, the Japanese had struck, sir.

59. General FRANK. Did you make any attempt to look for the planes in the direction in which they had come in on your plot from the Opana position?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir.

60. General FRANK. You didn't have any suspicion?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

61. General FRANK. That they were Japanese planes?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, at the time, no, sir, we didn't have any suspicion they were Japanese planes, although it was just something out of the ordinary and did create a curiosity in us; and, however, we did, as I remember it now, go outside of the unit, and tried to see planes from our location at the [1005] unit, although we couldn't see any.

62. General FRANK. Well, if there was no suspicion of their being Japanese planes, and you wanted to get instruction in the operation of the oscilloscope, why did Lockard take it away from you?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, that, sir, I do not know, because I never went back to the oscilloscope until after.

63. General FRANK. If it was instruction that you were after, that was a right good opportunity to get it, wasn't it?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. Incidentally, sir, the reason why I could not get the instruction during the problem was the fact that it would take an experienced man to operate that unit and pick up those flights efficiently. But I was just as pleased, sir, to be able to plot it, because it actually was the first flight that was out at that distance that I was able to plot.

64. General FRANK. How far out did you pick it up; do you remember?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, at the very beginning, sir, it was 137 miles.

65. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions?

66. General RUSSELL. Sergeant, was there any interruption in the operation of the oscilloscope that morning?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. None that I know of, sir.

67. General RUSSELL. Then, it would be a legitimate conclusion that just as soon as these planes came within range you would pick them up?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

68. General RUSSELL. The point I was attempting to make [1006] definite is that there wasn't any period of time there between the end of the problem and your continued practice when the oscilloscope was not functioning.

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir, there was no time. I am sure there wasn't. Another point, sir, that I might bring out, our clock at the unit I said showed 7:02 at the time that we sent in the first plot. However, when I was ordered, over the plotting set while we were operating the problem, to shut down, the time by the clock there

was 6:54, and I can't remember as to whether we had made any time check whatsoever that morning.

69. General RUSSELL. Now, Sergeant, had you been on any Sunday problem prior to this morning of December 7th?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I really can't recall whether I was, sir. I don't believe so.

70. General RUSSELL. Could you tell the Board on how many problems you had been, on any days prior to December 7, 1941?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I believe, sir, that that actually was the first problem that I had been on, although I had operated.

71. General RUSSELL. At this same station?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

72. General RUSSELL. Well, about how many other mornings had you operated?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, the only time that I operated, sir, was when I was having regular instruction after the operating time of the problem.

73. General RUSSELL. Then, that would be after 7 o'clock?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

[1007] 74. General RUSSELL. Early in your testimony you referred to the fact that on other occasions—I believe you described those occasions as ordinary days.

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

75. General RUSSELL. —you would pick up as many as 25 targets?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

76. General RUSSELL. Had that been true on all of the other occasions when you had been receiving instruction out there?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Pretty much, sir. Yes, sir.

77. General RUSSELL. Do you know what those targets were that you had picked up on these other days?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, no, sir, other than that they were just routine flights and planes in the air.

78. General RUSSELL. About how long were those periods when you would pick up as many as 25 targets?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, sir, I would say that was within a 2- or 3-hour period.

79. General RUSSELL. Beginning after 7 o'clock each time?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

80. General RUSSELL. Then, you had not been on one of the operating sets prior to 7 o'clock before this morning of December 7th?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir. My memory isn't quite clear on that, but I don't believe I was, sir.

81. General FRANK. But you had been a plotter?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir, I had been a plotter.

82. General RUSSELL. Do you know why you were sent out on this particular Sunday morning, Sergeant?

[1008] Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We were sent out there on Saturday afternoon. We were sent out there for the purpose of—well, at that time during peacetime it wasn't guarding the unit, although we had a firearm out there; we had a .45 pistol and I believe it was seven rounds of ammunition, but the purpose in our being out there was just to be on the unit in case any prowlers or anyone should come around. It wasn't a regular guard post or a walking post or

anything of that nature, but it did call for two men to be present at all times at the unit.

83. General RUSSELL. The equipment was left out there continuously, then?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

84. General RUSSELL. Your presence was antisabotage, was it?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

85. General RUSSELL. Now, how long had that set been in at this point, if you know?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. We had started putting it in, sir, about two weeks before Pearl Harbor. No, sir. We moved out to that location in November, the early part of November, and setting up the unit took about two weeks, and the other two weeks was previous to Pearl Harbor.

86. General RUSSELL. Now, how long had you been with this signal outfit?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, just a period of three months before Pearl Harbor, sir.

87. General RUSSELL. Do you recall when the first mobile sets were received and installed?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. That, sir, I couldn't answer, as I was [1009] in the Air Corps at that time, and when I was transferred to the signal company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, they had already had some of their location picked out and other units in operation.

88. General RUSSELL. When was that?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, upon my transfer it was the 15th of September in '40, sir; '41.

89. General RUSSELL. When you were transferred over to the signal outfit from the Air Corps—I want to get this definite and know that you are accurate in the statement—some locations had been selected and some of the units were in operation?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; they were.

90. General RUSSELL. And that was in September?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

91. General RUSSELL. Sergeant, in reporting these flights or targets that you had discovered out there on ordinary days, did you know or were you told what any of these flights were?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I don't quite get your point, sir. You mean?

92. General RUSSELL. You discovered the flights after 7 o'clock?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

93. General RUSSELL. Every target that you had discovered or worked out here before had been after 7 o'clock in the morning?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I am sure it was, yes, sir.

94. General RUSSELL. And this is the first target that you had ever discovered before 7 o'clock, because it was the first time you had been on duty before 7 o'clock?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. You are referring, sir, to the enemy [1010] planes that we picked up on the morning of the 7th?

95. General RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; I think it was shortly after 7 o'clock, sir.

96. General RUSSELL. Yes, but prior to this morning you had never been on duty before 7 o'clock?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I am sure that I wasn't sir.

97. General FRANK. Do you mean that this is the first time that you ever went on duty around 4 o'clock?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. I am sure it was; yes, sir.

98. General FRANK. Well, what time were you on duty this morning?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. You see, sir, we were on duty from 4 until 7 operating the unit, but we had been out at the station since Saturday afternoon at 12 o'clock, the day before Sunday.

99. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not this unit was operated daily?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir, it was.

100. General FRANK. Starting at what time?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, at that time I don't remember, sir, just how long we had been operating from 4 to 7. I don't believe it was long. But that was the operating time that we had been operating.

101. General FRANK. From 4 to 7?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

102. General FRANK. But you had not been out there before at 4 o'clock?

[1011] Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir.

103. General FRANK. Were you a regular plotter?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir; still in the process of learning. This covers a period of two weeks that I learned the plotter's duty. This two weeks' time, sir, was during the daytime when there was no problem scheduled where it called for experienced men to be operating.

104. General FRANK. Oh. Well, then, you were not the regularly assigned plotter? You just happened to be there getting instruction; is that correct?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, I had had my instruction; I was a qualified plotter at that time.

105. General FRANK. But you were not the regular, assigned plotter for that station; is that correct?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, no, sir. We never actually had a regular, assigned plotter, sir. The men that had the duty were just men that were assigned. They may not be assigned at the same time each time they were assigned. It was just those that were called to make up a crew for the particular time that we operated. We didn't have enough men to make complete groups.

106. General FRANK. I have nothing further.

[1012] 107. Colonel GRUNERT. The problems you referred to were the exercises between 4 and 7 each morning; is that correct?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

108. General GRUNERT. The rest of the day was spent in instruction and training, quite often spent on the set; not particularly engaged in trying to get any particular thing out of the air or any problem out of the air?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir, other than just for purposes of training.

109. General GRUNERT. As a plotter at the radar station it was none of your business to be informed as to what was in the air, whether Navy, Marine, or Army craft?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir.

110. General GRUNERT. You plotted everything you found there?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

111. General GRUNERT. And sent that to the information center, and it was their business to know what was in the air, whether it was friendly or enemy craft?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. At the information center, sir, they had officers from the Navy, the Army, the Coast Artillery, and so forth, and Air Corps officers, and so forth, and they all had information as to the flights that their particular branch was sending out. But after that is plotted on the plotting table, any flight that they cannot account for, any one of the different branches, it is considered an enemy plane. That was the procedure. We were never notified out there as to what the target was that we had picked up.

112. General GRUNERT. Can you tell from the radar how many [1013] planes there are in a certain flight?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir.

113. General GRUNERT. Can you tell whether there are a lot of planes or just one?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. In the case of the morning of the 7th, when there was such a large flight, we knew it was a large flight.

114. General GRUNERT. How did you know it was a large flight if the machine did not tell you?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Just by the appearance on the oscilloscope, sir.

115. General GRUNERT. Then you can tell whether it is a volume of planes or a single plane?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. At particular distances, sir, if there was only one or a few planes we could tell they were only a few. However, if there is a large number of planes we could tell that there was a large number of planes and know that it was not just a few.

116. General GRUNERT. Do you suppose that that is what excited Lockard when the machine showed there was a large number of planes and he took it over for himself?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Sir, as to exactly what happened there: The oscilloscope has a main pulse. That main pulse to the extreme left is the zero point in the mileage scale; and what Lockard thought that morning was that the mileage scale was off, and he went to check it from the main pulse and found that what he thought was the main pulse was this flight, and he checked it and rechecked it and found that it was not the main pulse; that it was actually a flight. It was from then on that [1014] Private Lockard operated.

117. General GRUNERT. One more question: Did you know anything about some bombers or planes expected from the mainland on that morning?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. No, sir; we did not know that. I did not know it at that time.

118. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming up, Sergeant, and giving us that information.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF FIRST LT. JOSEPH L. LOCKARD, SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Joseph L. Lockard, First Lieutenant, Signal Corps, O1634176, 934th Signal Battalion, Esler Field, Louisiana.

2. General GRUNERT. The Board is trying to get at the facts about what happened before or just prior to and leading up to the attack on Hawaii. We understand, from reports of the Roberts Commission, that you have information that will be of assistance to the Board, particularly as to what happened at the radar station, known, I believe, as Opana; and that you have some information about the information center of the air warning system in Hawaii at that time. In your testimony please be careful to give us what you actually remember of that time, and not colored by what has happened since.

[1015] Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.

3. General GRUNERT. General Frank will propound the questions.

4. General FRANK. What was your rank on the morning of December 7, 1941?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I was a third-class specialist, sir.

5. General FRANK. A private?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Under the old specialist system I had a third-class specialist rating.

6. General FRANK. To what organization did you belong at that time?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. S. C., A. W., H.—Signal Corps, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, was all the designation we knew at that time.

7. General FRANK. What were your duties on that morning? Did you have any regularly assigned duties?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir. Under the hours we were working at that time, Sundays and holidays called for operation from 4 until 7 o'clock; that is, a. m. I was assigned, and Private Elliott and myself were sent to operate the station for that particular Sunday, those particular hours.

8. General FRANK. How long had you been on duty with that station?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. We moved that station from Schofield Barracks and set it up around Thanksgiving time. I cannot give you the exact date.

9. General FRANK. Was it in September or October?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. It was in November. It had formerly [1016] been set up in Schofield, and they were planning a more appropriate coverage with the equipment.

10. General FRANK. Do you remember when those sets arrived from the mainland?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I cannot be exactly definite about that. It was the latter part of July or the first part of August. That is the first I knew.

11. General FRANK. That is the best your memory serves you?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir.

12. General FRANK. How long had you been there?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I landed there on the 10th of December, 1940.

13. General FRANK. How long had you been on this type of work?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Since we had the equipment.

14. General FRANK. How much training had you had?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. As far as any school was concerned, we did not have any.

15. General FRANK. How did you get your instruction?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Instruction was by actual work with the equipment.

16. General FRANK. Somebody must have explained it to you.

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Well, sir, there were three or four that knew the equipment, and they trained the rest of the crews in the operation of it.

17. General FRANK. At Schofield Barracks?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir.

18. General FRANK. When did you start on this work?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. You mean, on operation?

[1017] 19. General FRANK. Yes.

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Around the first part of August.

20. General FRANK. You had been in training and operating it since August?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir.

21. General FRANK. The set itself had been set up and in condition to be operated for how long?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. This particular set?

22. General FRANK. Yes; up until the 7th of December.

Lieutenant LOCKARD. The one at Opana?

23. General FRANK. Yes.

Lieutenant LOCKARD. We installed it right around Thanksgiving, in November, and of course it was in operation from then on.

24. General FRANK. Had they had some exercises or maneuvers along the first part of November in which they used this set?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I do not know whether they had maneuvers. I know we were making special tracks.

25. General FRANK. Were you the regular assigned operator of the set, or only one of several who operated the set?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Well, sir, that particular unit had a crew of six.

26. General FRANK. Six operators, or six total?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Total, sir.

27. General FRANK. How many operators?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. They were all operators and everything else too.

28. General FRANK. You were all under training for those jobs?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Well, sir, at that time we were [1018] getting in some more men from other units whom we were supposed to train to the extent of our knowledge.

29. General FRANK. Was the set operating efficiently?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir; it had been said before that it was the best operating set of the seven that we had.

30. General FRANK. How did your communications work from the radar site at Opana to the information center?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. They seemed to work all right, sir.

31. General FRANK. No difficulty?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. No, sir; we had field wire down to the highway where it tied in with one of the cables.

32. General FRANK. Did you have any difficulty with the 270 radar set itself?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. At that time?

33. General FRANK. Yes.

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Well, minor difficulties: yes, sir. It was rather a crude set, and there were certain little things that they probably had not been able to see beforehand which made operation a little difficult at times.

34. General FRANK. You are saying it was a rather crude set?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I did not mean it exactly that way, sir.

35. General FRANK. That is in the light of your having seen much better sets in the meantime, is it not?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir.

36. General FRANK. At the time you were operating it you thought it was a pretty good set, did you not?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir.

37. General FRANK. Was it operated by commercial current or [1019] by current from the motor generator?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. We had commercial power installed when we first went there. When we first went up there to that site we were operating off LeRoys, but shortly after that we got commercial power.

38. General FRANK. Shortly after what?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Shortly after we were completely set up.

39. General FRANK. On what date were you completely set up?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Around Thanksgiving.

40. General FRANK. On December 7 was the set being operated by commercial current or current from a motor generator?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Commercial current.

41. General FRANK. Sergeant Elliott was a witness here a few minutes ago, and he stated that they had some trouble with the set the day before. That would be on the 6th of December. He said the oil pump went out on the motor generator.

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Oh, yes, sir. I think it was the battery generator; I am not sure. I cannot say for sure, sir, which it was.

42. General FRANK. What I am trying to get at is this: Were you operating with a motor generator or were you using commercial current?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. We had to run the generator; we had to keep it in operating condition. We had to run it every day.

43. General FRANK. But it was not in continuous operation, was it?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. No, sir.

[1020] 44. General FRANK. Did you have plenty of spare parts and spare tubes for your radar sets?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. No, sir; we did not. Some of the most essential parts were rather scarce on the Island, such as the rectifier tubes and transmitter tubes.

45. General FRANK. Did you ever have to put the set out of commission for lack of spare parts or for lack of tubes?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. We did not put it out of commission, sir. We had a rectifier tube go out on us, and we ran it on one rectifier tube, which it will do. You only get about 6 kva out of it, but it did give us some operation until we could get down to Kawela and get a tube.

46. General FRANK. There were spare parts and tubes on the Island, were there not?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I do not know, sir. All I know is that we did not have one. There was some sort of an arrangement whereby, if the tubes went out, as they went out the stations that were least important would be shut down and those other stations would use their tubes.

47. General FRANK. Let us get back to another question I asked you. Did you ever have to close down that station or that set because of the lack of spare parts or tubes? Do you remember?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I do not think I can truthfully say one way or the other, sir.

48. General FRANK. You do not remember, that is, ever having been closed down for lack of spare parts or tubes?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. No, sir.

49. General FRANK. Or do you?

[1021] Lieutenant LOCKARD. I cannot say, sir.

50. General FRANK. You do not remember?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. No, sir.

51. General FRANK. Did you consider the set a dependable set?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. At that time?

52. General FRANK. Yes, of course.

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir; I thought it was pretty good. I think everybody else did.

53. General FRANK. How high above sea level was the site on which the set was installed?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. 230 feet, sir.

54. General FRANK. Was that high enough to get it above the Kahuku Point radio tower?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Do you mean above the towers themselves?

55. General FRANK. Yes. Was there anything in front of you to blanket the set?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Directly in front?

56. General FRANK. Any place in front of you, that would blanket the set.

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Well, sir, we had back and side echoes, no matter which way the antenna was pointing, and it would produce a dead area approximately, bearing upon the azimuth, from 14 to 22 miles. It would strike the mountains around us and cause this area of deadness.

57. General FRANK. But the Kahuku Point radio towers did not blanket your set, did they?

[1022] Lieutenant LOCKARD. Not that I can remember, sir.

58. General FRANK. Did the location of the set at Opana Point result in any unusual radio phenomena?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. About the only thing that would be unusual about it was our reception. Most of the men were in accord that it probably was the best site they had.

59. General FRANK. Was there any interference from planes taking off from the Kahuku Field?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Not any interference; no, sir.

60. General FRANK. That was right in front of you, was it not?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. No, sir; it was not right in front of us. My geography is a little hazy.

61. General FRANK. It was in your line or sight, was it not?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. May I look on the map?

62. General FRANK. Yes.

Lieutenant Lockard (after referring to map). I cannot recall its presenting us with any problem.

63. General FRANK. You were at the set on the morning of December 7, were you?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir.

64. General FRANK. When did you go there?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. We went up the night before.

65. General FRANK. Did the set start operating on the morning of December 7th?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir. We started operation.

66. General FRANK. What time?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Around four o'clock.

[1023] General FRANK. Who operated the set? Who was at the oscilloscope?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I was.

68. General FRANK. From what time until what time?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. The whole period.

69. General FRANK. When did you start?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. At what time?

70. General FRANK. Yes.

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Around four o'clock.

71. General FRANK. What was picked up that morning and at what times, so far as your memory will serve you?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. It was a rather dull morning. There was not much activity.

72. General FRANK. Up until what time? Did you pick up any planes before seven o'clock?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. If we did, sir, it was one or two or a small number.

73. General FRANK. When did you pick up this flight that was coming in from the north?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Around 7:02.

74. General FRANK. What were the circumstances surrounding the situation as it existed? Were you at the oscilloscope, or was Elliott?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I was still at the oscilloscope, sir. We were going to close down, but we figured that we might as well play around, because the truck had not come in yet to take us back for chow. So I was just checking the adjustments and was going to let Elliott operate them a while. He had not been in the outfit very long; he was a new man with [1024] us. I was going to let him operate. To me it looked like two main pulses. That is why I thought there was something wrong with the equipment, and I was checking to see if there was anything wrong. Apparently there was not.

75. General FRANK. Proceed and tell us what happened.

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Well, I showed it to Elliott. I fooled around some more trying to determine exactly whether it was something coming in or whether it was a defect in the equipment, and finally decided that it must be a flight of some sort. Since it was the only activity we had had that morning, I decided to plot it. Elliott plotted it.

76. General FRANK. Who did the plotting?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Elliott. We picked it up at 136 miles, and when it got to 132 we called the information center—it was just a few

minutes after seven—and there was no one. I knew the switchboard operator there, and I asked if there was anyone around.

77. General FRANK. You called the information center, or did the other man?

[1025] Lieutenant LOCKARD. No, sir. I was watching the track, and he made the phone call, and the switchboard operator told us there was no one around; so we asked him to look around; and, contrary to regulations, he left the switchboard and looked, and he found someone; but first, we told him about what we had, and he told this individual.

78. General FRANK. Do you know who that was?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. No, sir; I had never seen him.

79. General FRANK. You do not know whom he told?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I know his name. I think I know his name.

80. General FRANK. What was it?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Miller. I believe he was a liaison officer.

81. General FRANK. Miller, or Twler?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. The best that I can remember, sir, it was Miller.

82. General FRANK. All right.

Lieutenant LOCKARD. This individual—well, the switchboard operator came back and said that, "O. K.—it's all right," something to that effect. I can't tell you the conversation any more, because I haven't too good a memory; and we insisted—I asked—

83. General FRANK. You insisted what?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I asked the switchboard operator if I couldn't speak to this person; which I did; and I gave him all the information that we had—the direction, the mileage, and the apparent size of whatever it was; and that was about the end of it, right there.

[1026] 84. General FRANK. What did he tell you?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Well—

85. General GRUNERT. You are not incriminating anybody. Tell us. What did he tell you? Did he say, "Forget it," or that it did not amount to anything, or what?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Something to that effect. I mean, "O. K."

86. General FRANK. Did he tell you to forget it, or what did he say?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Well, he didn't—he wasn't very committal. He just said, "O. K.," or something to that effect—"You needn't"—

87. General FRANK. When you picked it up and had followed it, so that it had come from 137 or thereabouts down to a shorter distance from the sight, what did the oscilloscope show? Did it show that it was a single plane, or that it was a large group of planes? What was your interpretation of it?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Well, sir, it was the largest group I had ever seen on the oscilloscope. It looked, as I said, like a main pulse, and that is why I was confused, at first, as to whether it was a flight or not. I had never seen one. It maybe was the exceptional reception in that particular spot, but it still produced the largest echo on the 'scope that I had seen.

88. General FRANK. Did you tell the man, then, at the information center, that it looked like an unusually large number of planes?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir.

89. General FRANK. And that didn't seem to excite him in any way? [1027]

Lieutenant LOCKARD. No, sir.

90. General FRANK. What followed from then on? Did you continue?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Well, sir, we went as far as we thought was reasonably safe in our argument.

91. General FRANK. What do you mean? In your argument with whom? With the man at the information center?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir.

92. General FRANK. All right.

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Then we continued to follow the flight, and to plot it, till it got within about 22 miles—20 to 22 miles of the Island, at which time we lost it in this blacked-out area. Then we proceeded to close down the station and go back to Kawaiiloa for breakfast. The truck had arrived—or, had not arrived, yet, but there was nothing else working.

93. General FRANK. There were no additional targets in the distance behind that, were there? Do you remember whether or not you attempted to find out if there were any additional planes in the distance?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Well, we more or less concentrated on this one flight. We looked around a little, but as I recall, I don't believe we noticed anything else. We would have plotted it, I believe, if we had.

94. General FRANK. Do you remember whether you attempted to find out if there were any more coming in?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Oh, we looked around somewhat.

95. General FRANK. Would you know the plot if you saw it? I show you Exhibit 15. Is that the plot of the planes coming in, that morning? I refer to the one starting at the top, at 7:02. [1028]

Did you see the plot, that morning, that Private Elliott was making?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I glanced at it, sir; but I didn't give it any particular—

96. General FRANK. Attention?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. —attention; no, sir.

97. General FRANK. And you would not remember whether or not that was the plot, then?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. This plot (indicating)? Well, I know it is the plot.

98. General FRANK. The witness identifies the plot in this Exhibit 15.

When did you find out that there had been an air attack on Pearl Harbor?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. When we got to Kawaiiloa, sir.

99. General FRANK. Did you connect the air attack on Pearl Harbor with this flight that you had traced in?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Almost immediately. Sergeant Elliott and myself almost simultaneously seemed to connect it with what we had previously picked up.

100. General FRANK. Did you go back to the station?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir; immediately. We passed the rest of our crew, going to the station, as we were coming back. They had all their field equipment, and we blew the horn for them to stop,

but they paid no attention, they kept right on going; so we thought something was queer, but we had no idea what it was until we got to Kawaiiloa.

101. General FRANK. As soon as you got breakfast, you went [1029] back to Opana?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir.

102. General FRANK. Was the set operated the rest of the morning?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir; it was operated from then on.

103. General FRANK. When did you act as an operator after that? Did you act as an operator any more that morning, or do you not remember?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I went up and operated in my regular shift, then.

104. General FRANK. When did your shift start, do you remember?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Well, sir, each group had four hours on, and—let's see—we were divided into three groups, four hours on and eight hours off; but we had four hours on the 'scope, then four hours guard, then we had four hours off.

105. General FRANK. Did you operate that again, that morning?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I didn't operate it in the morning; no, sir.

106. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

107. General RUSSELL. How long were you out there, Lieutenant, after December 7?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I left, the 22nd of February, sir.

108. General RUSSELL. Did you continue in the work with radar, from then on?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Up till about two weeks, three weeks, before I left; we got seventy some men in our camp area, there, which was an old, deserted pineapple plantation. There was Sergeant Hilton—

108. General RUSSELL. That is not of very much interest, [1030] Lieutenant. I just wondered if you stayed on radar from then on until you left.

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I was; yes.

110. General RUSSELL. Do you remember receiving, out there, thereafter, or prior to the time that you left, any of those permanent radar sets?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. The radar permanent, 271?

111. General RUSSELL. The 271s?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I know they were putting one at—I am not quite certain, sir. They were taking them out, taking the equipment out of the vans, and making permanent installations out of them. They had that pretty well accomplished when I left Opana.

112. General RUSSELL. 271s? Did you operate a 271 before you left, out there?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. No, sir.

113. General RUSSELL. Have you remained in radar work until now?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. No, sir.

114. General RUSSELL. You quit radar work when you left the Island?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. It amounts to that, sir.

115. General RUSSELL. Some time prior to December 7, you testified as far back as August, these mobile sets had been set up and had been operated at different points on the Island?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir.

116. General RUSSELL. You had been on duty with them constantly, or considerably?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir.

[1031] 117. General RUSSELL. You had tracked flights of planes previously?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir.

118. General RUSSELL. Had you been on duty, on Sunday mornings, prior to December 7, 1941?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I may have been, sir. There was no—I can't say definitely.

119. General RUSSELL. You cannot remember that? Now, had you been on duty prior to December 7, 1941, between 4 and 7 a. m., on any morning?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I don't believe so, sir.

120. General RUSSELL. Do you think that this is the only morning that you had ever been on between 4 and 7 o'clock?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. As nearly as I can recall.

121. General RUSSELL. You had been on, on other mornings, after 7 o'clock in the morning?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir; we started out at 7 in the morning, on weekdays.

122. General RUSSELL. Did you pick up a lot of targets on these other mornings, after 7 o'clock?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir; we usually had quite a bit of activity.

123. General RUSSELL. What was that activity, do you know?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. The purpose of it?

124. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Well, there was a patrol that used to fly.

125. General RUSSELL. A patrol?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. The CLIPPER we used to track all the [1032] time.

126. General RUSSELL. You followed the patrols and CLIPPERS. Now, what else?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. The practicing aircraft, which may fly to another island, or around the immediate vicinity.

127. General RUSSELL. How far out would you follow these patrols?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Until we lost them, sir.

128. General RUSSELL. How far would that be?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. It varied anywhere from 60 to 110, 120 miles, depending upon their altitude over the water.

129. General RUSSELL. Were these mobile sets set up with cover and camouflage?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. No, sir. They had started sandbagging them. They didn't start that, though, until after the war started.

130. General RUSSELL. On this particular morning, Lieutenant, did you pick up any patrol aircraft at all, on the morning of December 7?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Not that I could identify as such. There may have been.

131. General RUSSELL. Did you pick up any flight, from 4 o'clock that morning until you came off at 7:42 or 7:43, whenever you did come off?

132. General FRANK. That was going away from the Island?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. That was going away? Not that I can remember.

133. General RUSSELL. As nearly as you recall, the only flight that you picked up, on this morning, was this one flight that [1033] you have described to us?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. The question was asked, before, and as near as I can remember, there may have been one or two flights.

134. General GRUNERT. If there were, they were recorded, were they? Were they plotted and sent in to the information center?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir.

135. General GRUNERT. And they should be of record there, if those records have been kept?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Yes, sir.

136. General RUSSELL. But you have no independent recollection?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I can't remember, sir.

137. General RUSSELL. I have one more question. Lieutenant, you were at that time a noncommissioned officer, were you?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. On the 7th, sir?

138. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I was not a noncommissioned officer, sir. I was in charge of my particular shift. I had a "third-class, specialist."

139. General RUSSELL. You knew nothing about the imminence of war, and you had not been directed to be on the lookout for Japanese or other hostile planes in that vicinity?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. No, sir.

140. General RUSSELL. In other words, you were not "in the know"?

Lieutenant LOCKARD. I was not "in the know."

141. General GRUNERT. All right. Are there any other questions? Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming up here to help us out.

[1034] (The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

142. General GRUNERT. The Board will take up other work, now, until the witness comes, at 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 11:18 o'clock a. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m.)

[1035]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. PYE, UNITED STATES NAVY, RETIRED

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Admiral, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Admiral PYE. William S. Pye, Vice Admiral, United States Navy. Retired; at present on active duty as President of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

2. General GRUNERT. Admiral, the Board, in an attempt to get at facts, is looking into the background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that because of your assignment with the Pacific Fleet, I understand, in 1941, you can throw some light upon the subject. Our inquiries are limited to a large extent to any happenings that pertain to the Army, and with that in view we shall go ahead on some of the questions that have come up in our study of the Roberts Commission report, together with what testimony we have had heretofore.

Will you please state to the Board just what your position was with the Pacific Fleet, giving the dates, from any time in 1941 up to and including December 7?

Admiral PYE. On January 31, 1941, I was appointed Commander Battle Force, United States Pacific Fleet, having been for the year previous Commander Battleships. I was still acting in this capacity and, as such, second in command of the Fleet on December 7. In a previous order issued by the [1036] Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet primarily concerning operations I was also detailed as Commander Task Force 1.

3. General GRUNERT. During the latter part of 1941, we will say from about the middle of November until the attack on December 7, the Fleet was based on Honolulu, Pearl Harbor, was it?

Admiral PYE. It was so based, but a large part of the Fleet was at sea during a portion of this period.

4. General GRUNERT. That Fleet I understand at that time had three task forces.

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

5. General GRUNERT. In any of this testimony you give, Admiral, if that testimony would be of value to the enemy in future operations, I wish you would bring that to our attention before you put it in the record. All this will be secret, of course, but the more we can guard that the better, by having conversation off the record if necessary. I just thought I would bring that to your attention. I do not think anything will come up, but it may.

Admiral PYE. I do not consider that it would be of any advantage to a future enemy or to the present enemies in this war.

6. General GRUNERT. Now, were these three task forces in and out of Pearl Harbor from time to time during that latter period?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir. The schedule as arranged was that one task force was at sea practically all the time, that is, one of the three task forces, leaving a period normally of about eight days at sea and about fourteen days in port. The [1037] task forces were organized primarily for training purposes.

Task Force 1, which I commanded, consisted of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, and the primary mission of the commander of this task force was the development and practice in tactics for the conduct of a major action. The schedule usually provided that one of the other two task forces was at sea with me for one or two days of the period my task force was at sea, in order that we might have more forces for the conduct of tactical exercises.

Task Force 2 comprised carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. This task force was primarily to train in the use of carrier-based aviation.

The 3d Task Force consisted of one battleship division, the heavy

cruisers of the Fleet, and one squadron of destroyers. Their task was primarily to train for the work of reconnaissance for which the cruisers were designed.

7. General GRUNERT. How about aircraft carriers? Were they part of the task force or assigned to task forces?

Admiral PYE. As I said, sir, the aircraft carriers were part of Task Force 2.

8. General GRUNERT. Task Force 2?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir. And their principal mission was the training of the carrier-based aviation, but we worked that in such a way that when my task force was out I would have the carrier force with them, Task Force 2, maybe one or two days so that we could work the carriers in with the battleships. The next time I would go out I would have the cruisers with me one day out of the time, in order to work the cruisers in. Usually at some period in each six weeks the schedule was so arranged [1038] that all task forces would be at sea simultaneously for exercise and fleet evolutions.

9. General GRUNERT. There were, I understand, three of such aircraft carriers, were there?

Admiral PYE. On December 7 there were actually only two in the force, the sum total of which comprised the third. One, assigned to the task force, was on the West Coast under overhaul.

10. General GRUNERT. Have you any knowledge of the responsibility for and the scheme of distant reconnaissance as far as the plans for defense of Hawaii were concerned? In other words, who was charged with that distant reconnaissance? Was it the Fleet Commander or the Naval District Commander?

Admiral PYE. I should prefer not to give my opinion on that, as I was never in a position to be concerned with it. The base defense, including the reconnaissance which was by aircraft under the base defense officer, was entirely an independent command.

11. General GRUNERT. When these task forces went out did they do any reconnoitering of their own as a general security measure, or just for the problems you were then engaged in?

Admiral PYE. Depending upon the nature of the operations, the battleships and heavy cruisers carried observation planes. These planes were used at times for reconnaissance work, but most of the time for training in connection with the actual operations being performed by the vessels of the task force, either as gunnery observation or antisubmarine observation or in exercises that were of that particular nature.

12. General GRUNERT. Then, they appeared to be primarily [1039] for your own purposes?

Admiral PYE. For our own purposes. A reconnaissance was carried out over the operating areas by the patrol planes.

13. General GRUNERT. The PBYs were long-distance patrol aircraft?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir. There were no PBYs under my command.

14. General GRUNERT. And do you know whether or not the PBYs pertained to the Naval District Commanders?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

15. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether the Naval District Commander, in his scheme of distant reconnaissance, considered the

areas operated in or occupied by the task forces as being reconnoitered to the extent that he would not have to cover that same ground, or same sea?

Admiral PYE. I think that he did feel that he should cover the same ground with the available aircraft of the patrol type, and the areas in which the Fleet units were operating were patrolled by PBYS, patrol aircraft, within the reasonable limits of the available aircraft.

16. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether this was a rather constant patrolling, or periodic?

Admiral PYE. I believe it was constant within the limits of the aircraft available: usually a morning patrol and, if aircraft were available, an evening patrol.

17. General GRUNERT. Would it have been reasonable to assume, in the areas in which a task force operated, that the enemy could not well approach with aircraft carriers to make an [1040] attack on the mainland?

Admiral PYE. I think there was no particular reason to believe that those areas would have been more useful to an enemy than other areas in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands. I think it should be recalled that we were not in a state of war and that the patrol was primarily to determine the possible presence of submarines.

18. General GRUNERT. Then, the patrol was primarily for submarine?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

19. General GRUNERT. And if we were not in a state of war, what danger was there from submarines?

Admiral PYE. I will explain the difference there. An attack by a submarine, if fired when the submarine is submerged and the submarine is not definitely sighted, cannot be proven. If attacks had been made by submarines, and the submarine not sighted or sunk or captured, there would have been no way for us to prove definitely that it was not an internal explosion in the ship rather than a torpedo. In addition to that there was always the possibility that German crews might man Japanese submarines or might, in the last analysis, even bring their submarines to the Hawaiian Islands in order to try to force us into war. It was therefore considered that the possibility of submarine attack was greater than any other form of attack, of which the nature could not be uncertain.

20. General GRUNERT. Admiral, were you acquainted with or informed of the message from the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on November 27 which started out by saying, "This is a war warning," and which was [1041] directed to be transmitted to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department? Were you generally acquainted with that message?

Admiral PYE. I was at sea with my task force at the time this message was received by the Commander-in-Chief. I should like it to be noted that this message had two addressees: Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet as well as Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet. Upon the receipt of that message my Commander-in-Chief informed me by radio that there was possible danger of attack, and to take all essential measures for the defense of my task force at sea. These measures were fully carried out, and my task force returned to port on Thursday. I have to check whether that is about the 29th. Have you any dates there?

21. General GRUNERT. I might be able to find it in your testimony.

Admiral PYE. I think it was two days later, having exercised all possible precautions against attack during the period we were at sea.

(Excerpt from testimony of Admiral Pye before the Roberts Commission is as follows:)

22. General GRUNERT. Your testimony here in the Roberts report says,

I was cognizant of it after it had been received for about four days. My task force was at sea at that time.

Will you proceed?

Admiral PYE. Well, I was going on to explain that. It was received by him, as I recall it, by the 27th; I think that was Tuesday. On a Thursday I returned to port with my task force, but I was not informed of this message until the following [1042] Saturday. That was four days, as I recall it, from the time it was received. On that Saturday morning I was not called to see the Chief of Staff, but I went to see him in relation to some work to be undertaken during the following week, and was shown this message.

23. General FRANK. May I ask just a question there?

24. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

25. General FRANK. While you were still at sea with your task force, however, you were warned of a tense situation?

Admiral PYE. I cannot tell you the exact message—I have no copy of it—but the implication to me and to my staff was that there was great danger of a submarine attack. We had had during the period of operation there several occasions in which destroyers picked up contacts which they thought might be enemy submarines. There were definite rules for procedure when those contacts were made, and it was my impression, until I saw the message on the following Saturday, that the nature of the information was similar to that which on several occasions before had been the cause of instructions to take particular care concerning enemy submarines.

26. General GRUNERT. Did you consider your task force in less danger while in the harbor or while out at sea?

Admiral PYE. Much less danger in port, primarily because there could be no submarine attack while we were in port, with the entrance to the channel guarded by nets and patrol craft.

27. General GRUNERT. Then, it would appear from what testimony we have had to date that the Army was sabotage-minded and the Navy may have been submarine-minded.

Admiral PYE. I think there is no question but what the [1043] Navy was submarine-minded.

28. General GRUNERT. Now, while your vessels are in port, on what do you depend for warning as to the imminence of an attack by air?

Admiral PYE. The instructions in force under our base defense order issued by the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet stated that the commander of the base defense, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, would advise the senior officer embarked as to the condition of readiness to be maintained.

29. General FRANK. That is the condition of readiness of the Fleet units?

Admiral PYE. Of the antiaircraft battery in the Fleet, yes.

30. General GRUNERT. Were the batteries aboard your vessels integrated in the antiaircraft defense on short, do you know, at that time?

Admiral PYE. I should say not; only to this extent; that we anticipated receiving from the shore the necessary warnings. There were orders to maintain certain guns manned, ready for action, and certain sectors assigned to the ships in port which they were particularly to guard against attack.

31. General GRUNERT. Then, you looked to the 14th Naval District and to the Army to give you warning of the approach of aircraft?

Admiral PYE. We did.

32. General GRUNERT. What at that time was your understanding as to the ability to give you such warning?

Admiral PYE. It was as my understanding that the Army had many observation posts in the periphery of the Island from [1044] which it would be possible to sight any approaching aircraft, and that we in the ships in port could certainly count on from three to five minutes' warning of any possible aviation attack. We had had air-raid drills in which the notice of the approach of aircraft had always been received from the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. This was the standard practice.

33. General GRUNERT. You received that information from the 14th Naval District?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

34. General GRUNERT. You had no means of getting it directly from the Army air warning system?

Admiral PYE. No, sir.

35. General GRUNERT. You do not know where the 14th Naval District got its information?

Admiral PYE. No, sir; I should prefer not to answer any questions with relation to that.

36. General GRUNERT. Did you understand that these observation posts were ground observation posts: that was as distinguished from the radar system of observation?

Admiral PYE. Up to the time of the attack my only knowledge as regards the Army radar was that the installation was in progress and that various Army personnel were being trained in the radar in the ships.

37. General GRUNERT. This information that you got through drills and practice, from the 14th Naval District, do you know where that came from, whether from the Army air warning system or from these ground observation posts?

Admiral PYE. I cannot tell you, sir.

38. General FRANK. May I ask a question?

[1045] 39. General GRUNERT. Yes.

40. General FRANK. You said that the Army personnel was getting training in the radar in the ships. You mean in the Naval craft?

Admiral PYE. Yes. We had a radar for some time in the ships. In order to facilitate this training, we had offered the services to train the radar personnel in the ships.

41. General GRUNERT. You took over command of the Pacific Fleet after the attack, didn't you, a little later?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir; I think it was the 13th of December, and retained it for two weeks until Admiral Nimitz arrived.

42. General GRUNERT. Did you receive any such warning on December 7 as to the incoming Japanese planes?

Admiral PYE. I was not on board my flagship on the morning of December 7 until about 8:40. My Chief of Staff, however, reported to me that no such warning had been received.

43. General GRUNERT. Since December 7 has the same system of having task forces go out, or certain ones in and certain ones out, been kept up, or after the attack did they keep them out of the harbor most of the time?

Admiral PYE. They were kept out of the harbor fairly continuously for a period of about two weeks until it became fairly certain that the attacking force had retired from the immediate area. From that time on it became absolutely essential to permit the task forces to remain in port for periods up to a week or ten days in order properly to overhaul their materiel and receive supplies.

[1046] 44. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything else that might assist the Board in getting facts about the Army that you would like to tell us, any leads on anything? We are after facts and we want to find out where they exist.

Admiral PYE. May I express personal opinions?

45. General GRUNERT. Absolutely.

Admiral PYE. I have served three times on the Joint Army and Navy Planning Committee. I served on the first Joint Army and Navy Planning Committee that was ever formed, which was in 1919. I served again from 1924 to 1927 on that committee. I was director of War Plans of the Navy in 1934 and Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and, as such, a member of the Joint Board from 1935 to 1937. I assisted in the first write-up of joint Army and Navy action in 1925, and again in 1935 I assisted in revising it. I have always been a great believer in unity of command and, in all these periods, continuously attempted to obtain a definite statement that in time of war the Hawaiian Islands would be put under unity of command. That was brought up before the Joint Board on several occasions, but we were never able to obtain a definite plan and put it into effect in advance of an act of war. I consider that the mutual cooperation which was in effect on December 7 was possibly as good as the Departments might have had reason to expect. I believe that there was very little difference between Admiral Kimmel and General Short as to their respective functions. Admiral Kimmel and his predecessor, Admiral Richardson, and, in fact, I think possibly all their predecessors in the Pacific, appeared to be of the opinion that a war in the Pacific could be fought from a ship as headquarters. I for many years had been constantly opposed to that idea and had continuously [1047] advocated that they recognize that in a war on the Pacific the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet would be merely a deputy of the Chief of Naval Operations in the Pacific Area. I had so advised Admiral Richardson while he was in command and advised him to move ashore and get at least one Army officer on his staff. He was relieved shortly thereafter, and when Admiral Kimmel took command I advised him the same thing. After about two or three months in command he became convinced that even with the approach of war he could not handle the necessary communications and the many details from the PENNSYLVANIA as his headquarters. He thereafter

moved his headquarters to the Submarine Base, and I became primarily responsible, as the senior officer afloat, for the training of the fleet. That was my particular function, to which I devoted all my time. I feel that the moving of the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters ashore greatly facilitated the cooperation between General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and that by Admiral Kimmel's direct order assigning the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District as Base Defense Officer he definitely assigned further responsibility for coordination with the Army in matters affecting base defense. Admiral Kimmel also, with General Short's concurrence, did much to improve the cooperation between the respective air forces.

I should say, then, that in my opinion had unity of command been put into effect at least six months earlier, the coordination of forces would have been better, and I believe that the system of receiving intelligence would have been coordinated so that one officer, the officer exercising unity of command, would have been the sole receiver of intelligence from the two Departments.

In other words, I think that the thing that was done [1048] immediately upon the outbreak of war should have been done at least six months earlier.

46. General GRUNERT. Assuming that they had unity of command, just what is in your mind when you say conditions could have been improved? You mentioned intelligence. Is there anything else beside intelligence, or is that the main thing that would have been improved?

Admiral PYE. I think it would have forced the two Departments to have gotten closer together had they had one man to deal with out there. In my opinion, the dealing of the naval officer with the Navy Department and the Army officer with the War Department left many things that could not be transmitted each to the other, and that consequently neither the General nor the Admiral was fully conversant with the situation as it appeared in Washington. I do not believe that the War Department and the Navy Department themselves had a common understanding of the situation. I think that had they had unity of command it would have forced the adoption of the system of the joint chiefs of staff of the Army and Navy and we would have had a better understanding of the situation.

47. General GRUNERT. Then the instruction to the Army or the Navy officer who had command under unity of command would stem from a joint source here, which would have been the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and not from their respective Chiefs of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral PYE. Of course, the Joint Board was supposed to have a function. Along that line they could make recommendations which, if approved by the Secretaries, went into effect.

48. General GRUNERT. Still, on November 27 a message went to the Navy and on November 27 a message went to the Army. If [1049] there had been unity of command there ought to have been one message to the Commander-in-Chief over there?

Admiral PYE. Those two messages—I never saw the Army message until after December 7th—certainly gave entirely different implications.

49. General GRUNERT. It was testified before this Board that a war warning to the Navy did not carry with it the import that, if they had used the same wording, it would carry to the Army. In other words, was that term used more frequently in the Navy?

Admiral PYE. I do not think that the term had any peculiar significance. It was not a standard term; but as early as the Secretary of Navy's visit to the fleet in September, 1940, when he first came out there, he was always telling us that we were going to have war. On several occasions other messages came which indicated a very serious situation, and yet nothing happened. The reason that I put in my statement that that dispatch had a multiple addressee is that it affected the Asiatic Fleet. A war warning would have a broader application, due to the necessity for neutrality.

There was no question in our minds but what there was danger of war, but there was not necessarily danger of war between Japan and the United States. Yet, as applied to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, with his fleet, even though we remained neutral, he had certain duties that he must carry out and must recognize the nature of the situation. To my mind the words "war warning" meant nothing really significant, when everybody knew that there was danger of war. The implication to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, to my mind, was much more important than it was to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. Had the message stated "War with Japan appears imminent", there [1050] could have been no misunderstanding.

50. General FRANK. Were you familiar, Admiral, with the arrangements for reconnaissance that had been worked out by the joint agreement between the two commanders?

Admiral PYE. Not sufficiently to be able to give any testimony with regard to it. My particular work was in training the fleet, and particularly the task force we had, and I had my hands full doing that. There are officers whose testimony would be much more accurate along that line than mine would be.

51. General GRUNERT. May I put a question in there in order that I may better understand the organization in the Navy? Take the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet: When that fleet, or part of it, is in the Fourteenth Naval District, is the Fourteenth Naval District then directly under the Commander-in-Chief, or if he goes out, is it under the Commander-in-Chief? I do not quite understand the relationship between the district and the fleet.

Admiral PYE. The District's only responsibility in regard to the fleet is in assisting in its entry and sorties from home. They provide an air cover and antisubmarine local units of minesweepers, and everything like that. As soon as the fleet gets out of the channel, it becomes a responsibility of the Task Force Commander. The Commander-in-Chief when he was afloat oftentimes would not take tactical command. Several times he did operate in the task force of which I had command; and before he had gone ashore permanently I was commander of the task force and had full tactical control. He would issue no orders whatsoever unless he returned it to himself by signalling "Commander-in-Chief now assumes tactical control." The minute the units [1051] get outside of the channel, the tactical control is in the task force commander.

52. General GRUNERT. The Admiral of the fleet being ashore and the District commander being ashore, in this system of cooperation and coordination it is then up to the Army commander to coordinate with both of them, or has he one naval man to look to for that cooperation for the Navy?

Admiral PYE. I should say he would have two functions.

53. General GRUNERT. Where is the division of functions, as far as the Navy is concerned between the Admiral of the fleet and the Admiral of the District?

Admiral PYE. Just about the same, I should say, as it probably is between General Eisenhower and General Bradley. The Commander-in-Chief is the over-all man for policies, organization, and general directions.

54. General FRANK. Even when the fleet was in Pearl Harbor and was under the shelter of the District commander, the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet would still have commanded his fleet?

Admiral PYE. The trouble is that Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet is a misnomer. If you will try to think of it, as to his functions and duty, as actually Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in the Pacific, because the fleet has been broken up into units so that no one can command them. Each task force commander is given an order before he goes out on a mission, as to what he has to do, and he is responsible for doing that.

At the time that we had these exercises, frequently those forces would be put under me, as I mentioned, for further training, such as the training of the air force. I was the one that did it. Although I was not Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, [1052] I was in command of all those forces at sea, and once or twice, even when the Commander-in-Chief went out with us, he simply rode around and I acted as tactical commander. The title of Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet was all right before the war. He was afloat. But the minute he moved ashore he really became Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.

55. General GRUNERT. There were two commanders ashore that the Army commander had to cooperate with?

Admiral PYE. I should say that the Commander-in-Chief, as regards policies, and the Commander of the Naval District as regards coordination of activities.

56. General GRUNERT. But he looked to both of them apparently to get information.

Admiral PYE. You mean, the Commander-in-Chief looked to both of them?

57. General GRUNERT. No; the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department looked to both of them to get information. They both had information services, did they not?

Admiral PYE. Yes; but the information service of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was a comparatively local service, whereas the intelligence service of the Commander-in-Chief was a broad picture.

58. General GRUNERT. When the Commander-in-Chief was afloat and went out, how then did the Army get information from that intelligence service?

Admiral PYE. That is one reason it would not work, and nobody else could get it—because oftentimes you have to have radio silence.

When they could send things to him he could not send anything back without giving away his position. That is the reason why many of us fully realized within the last 20 [1053] years that in a war in the Pacific the man that was going in over-all control out there had to be ashore where he could receive communications and where he could send them and where he could have a place and staff big enough to handle the work. There is not on board ship adequate space for the commander of a force of that nature.

59. General GRUNERT. Then there could have been times when intelligence that the Navy had could not be transmitted to the Army promptly or at all?

Admiral PYE. I think that would have been, of course, entirely up to the Commander-in-Chief, if they were at sea, as to whether he desired to break radio silence. If he thought it was of sufficient importance to break radio silence it could unquestionably have gotten to him. In addition to that, most information that came from the Navy Department came multiple addressed to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I presume he had orders to keep the General informed of what he had received.

60. General GRUNERT. If the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet were out with his staff, including his intelligence, then the source for the Army to look to was the District?

Admiral PYE. After he realized the difficulties that were going to be attendant on carrying out operations in the Pacific he immediately, after he moved ashore, enlarged his staff, and when he went to sea after that he took only about four of his staff officers with him in the ship and left the others ashore.

61. General GRUNERT. You being the first naval witness who has appeared here, we are likely to go far afield in getting our information from you.

62. General FRANK. I think I asked you the question, when I [1054] started, Admiral, if you were familiar with the agreement between the Army commander and the Navy commander out there with respect to the responsibility for reconnaissance.

Admiral PYE. It was two years and eight months ago; and whether I knew that before December 7th or not I do not know, but I certainly knew it on December 7th.

63. General FRANK. You were familiar with the fact that in accordance with that agreement the Navy took over responsibility for distant reconnaissance?

Admiral PYE. Yes.

64. General FRANK. And the Army conducted close-in reconnaissance which extended not more than about 30 miles from shore?

Admiral PYE. Yes.

65. General FRANK. It therefore was the responsibility of the Navy to give information of any source beyond a distance of about 30 miles?

Admiral PYE. I should say you could interpret it that way.

66. General GRUNERT. We might say, aside from the Army's own way of getting information through its own facilities, meaning radar.

67. General FRANK. I would like to develop a little bit for our own information the naval reconnaissance system. The Navy were sending out task forces continuously, were they not?

Admiral PYE. Yes.

68. General FRANK. They were under the commander of the fleet?

Admiral PYE. They were operating under orders from him, each, however, when at sea, directly under the responsibility of the task force commander.

69. General FRANK. But the task force commander's immediate superior was the fleet commander at Pearl Harbor?

[1055] Admiral PYE. The Commander-in-Chief; yes.

70. General FRANK. And in addition, the Navy was conducting a patrol with P. B. Y. boats?

Admiral PYE. That is correct.

71. General FRANK. And they were under the District commander?

Admiral PYE. They were under the District commander; yes.

72. General FRANK. What I would like to find out if I can is this: Did you depend primarily on P. B. Y. reconnaissance for the purpose of information and security against hostile attack, or primarily on surface reconnaissance of the task forces, or both? Do you see what I am trying to get?

Admiral PYE. I see what you are trying to get, but I think you are assuming that a condition of war existed, whereas it did not. I do not feel that there was any set definite reconnaissance against hostile attack other than observation to determine if possible the presence of enemy submarines. But you have right here Admiral Bloch, who was the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, and Admiral Bellinger, who is available, as commander of the air force.

73. General GRUNERT. You are the first one from the Navy that has appeared before us here.

Admiral PYE. If you want to go into details on that, you have witnesses available who are more capable of giving you information than I am, because, as I say, I was not primarily concerned with that part of it.

74. General FRANK. In view of the fact that the Navy was responsible for this distant reconnaissance and in view of the fact that you have just stated that you thought that unity of command would have helped this situation, I would like to ask [1056] this question: How do you think a unity of command situation would have altered the circumstances of the attack to have prevented it from being a surprise?

Admiral PYE. Only insofar as I feel quite convinced that had there been unity of command there the two departments also would have been better coordinated in the materiel and forces which they made available to their respective commanders; and in addition, there were available in Pearl Harbor several squadrons of B-24's which were perfectly capable of assisting the Navy and did assist the Navy from December 7th on, in making reconnaissance flights. These, though, were not used before December 7th because of the contention of the Air Force Commander that they were inadequately trained for long-distance reconnaissance.

75. General FRANK. That is, the Navy air force commander?

Admiral PYE. The Army Air Force Commander. These were B-24's.

76. General FRANK. The Army had B-24's?

Admiral PYE. Yes. You better check that up; but I am quite certain that there were some there that were not used.

77. General FRANK. I think the testimony indicates that they had something like 8 or 10 B-17's.

Admiral PYE. It was B-17's, not B-24's.

78. General FRANK. Admiral, you made a point of the fact that war had not been declared.

Admiral PYE. That is correct.

79. General FRANK. And we were still at peace. Do you know whether or not the officers of the Navy generally were familiar with the warning messages that had been sent from Washington to the fleet commander about the critical situation and imminence of war?

[1057] Admiral PYE. I do not know to what extent the Commander-in-Chief had informed other responsible Commanders.

80. General FRANK. What I am leading to is, what in your opinion was the frame of mind of the rank and file with respect to the immediate possibility of war, as to an immediate attack? Were they war-minded, at that time?

Admiral PYE. I should say no, they were not. I think their reason for this was due to the attitude taken by both the War and Navy Departments in respect to the requests for additional forces for the Pacific. Although, as early really as April 1941, the situation was said to be serious, in June of the same year the Navy Department detached from the Pacific Fleet one battleship division, one light cruiser division, and two destroyer divisions, to send into the Atlantic. It hardly seemed to the Commanders in the Pacific that if the situation was as bad as it was said to be, that was the time to be moving a large portion of our Fleet into the Atlantic, when the British Fleet, itself, was many times superior to the available German ships.

During this same period it became most difficult for the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet to obtain patrol planes or even to obtain carrier planes, and, up to December 7, not even all of the carriers were equipped with their normal number of planes.

81. General FRANK. That is, with their full complement?

Admiral PYE. Their full complement. They did not have them. All of these failures to indicate the importance, by acts rather than by words, I feel quite certain, led to the almost uniform opinion that while war probably was in the [1058] offing, if it came, it would be upon the initiative of the United States.

82. General FRANK. Were you familiar with the fact that, along somewhere between the 25th of November and the 1st of December, the Navy knew there was a Japanese task force at Jaluit?

Admiral PYE. I never have heard that.

83. General FRANK. You did not know that?

Admiral PYE. No.

84. General FRANK. And at that time you were second in command of the Fleet?

Admiral PYE. I do not know whether the Commander-in-Chief knew it, or not. I don't recall its ever having been mentioned to me.

85. General FRANK. I have nothing further.

Admiral PYE. There is one point that I would like to make, just as long as this is a general discussion of the thing.

There are quite a few people who seem to feel that the situation in Honolulu was quite similar to that which existed at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, at Port Arthur. I would just like to point out that there were several differences in the situations.

In the first place, even at Port Arthur, the Japanese had broken off diplomatic relations with the Russians, on February 6, two days before the attack at Port Arthur, and, in the letter breaking off those diplomatic relations, they informed the Russian Government that they reserved the right to take such independent action as they might deem necessary, or words [1059] to that effect. In other words, adequate notice was given, both of the fact that the negotiations were at an end, and that the Japanese Government intended to take independent action.

The second great difference was, that the Japanese, in order to obtain their objective, had to land in Korea, or in the vicinity of Port Arthur. The only forces which could oppose these landings effectively were the Russian ships in Port Arthur and at Chinnampo. Therefore, the attack on the fleet was a necessary and decisive tactical victory, which led to a favorable strategic situation; whereas the attack on the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor, although a tactical victory, was the worst thing that they could do, from the point of the long or broad strategical point of view, because it aroused the United States in a way in which no other action could have done. With the very uncertain political situation existing in the United States previous to December 7, it is quite possible that had the Japanese avoided attacking the Fleet in Honolulu or the Philippines, many months would have gone by before the United States would actually have entered the war.

It was also different in this respect, that under the conditions existing in the Philippines and in the Australian and New Zealand areas, in regard to fuel oil, it would have been impossible for the United States Fleet to operate in the vicinity of the Philippine Islands in such a way as to have assisted in its defense.

The fact that they did attack our Fleet was to my mind the biggest psychological blunder that any nation ever made, [1060] because it united our Nation in the war effort to an extent which made their ultimate victory impossible.

86. General GRUNERT. In that line, do you think it was necessary to have a disaster? If the attack had not been so successful as it was but had just been an attack with a certain amount of damage, do you think that it would have aroused the Nation to the extent necessary to make that a strategical error?

Admiral PYE. In all probability. I am not stating that we had to lose all those ships, in order to have that effect. I do consider, though, judging it from the point of view of enemy intentions, that it was a capability, but it was not one which one would normally anticipate their using if their psychology was the same as ours. I cannot conceive that we would have done such a thing, even from the point of view of its ill effect on the ultimate results of the war.

87. General GRUNERT. We are delighted to get all this, but possibly General Russell has some things more to the point.

88. General RUSSELL. There are two or three subjects I wanted to develop.

Admiral, in your appearance before the Roberts Commission, you discussed this subject of obtaining information on the movements of the Japanese Fleet and possible Japanese action at a distance away from Honolulu, in the Mandate Islands, and in the homelands of the Japanese, and you expressed, there, the sentiment or the belief

that it was a great handicap to the American operations, not to know what was going on in the Mandate and in the Japanese homeland.

Admiral PYE. It has been two years and eight months since that testimony, General!

[1061] 89. General RUSSELL. Well, let us get out of that meeting and get back to the Pacific, and see what we can work out.

Admiral PYE. Was that in relation to our inability to visit those islands during that long period in which they were preparing their defenses?

90. General RUSSELL. Yes. This approaches this particular problem from another angle entirely.

Is it true, or not, that if a Japanese convoy in which there might be as many as six carriers should get to within a distance from which planes could be launched for an attack on the Hawaiian Islands, is it not true that reaching that point with a relatively large number of carriers and fighter planes would insure more or less a successful operation to the Japanese?

Admiral PYE. You mean under the conditions that existed in so far as defense is concerned, on December 7?

91. General RUSSELL. Under the conditions that existed at Honolulu, if they could get to within 200 to 300 miles of the Islands with 175 to 200 planes on six carriers, and could launch those before being discovered, is it not a fact that they might expect a reasonable degree of success from that operation?

Admiral PYE. Yes; I think so.

92. General RUSSELL. Then is it not true, Admiral, that there was placed upon the Navy a very serious burden or mission of preventing a convoy of that kind from reaching a point from which this attack could be launched?

Admiral PYE. That also is true on the assumption that you are anticipating such an attack, and that you have [1062] adequate material with which to do it. I tried to point out that I believe the minds of the military people in Honolulu were exactly the same as it was in Washington. I do not believe the people in Washington expected the attack any more than the people in Honolulu.

93. General RUSSELL. Do you mean to say, Admiral, therefore, that the reason a convoy of that sort was permitted by the Navy to reach a point so near Hawaii was because you just did not expect that sort of convoy to come there?

Admiral PYE. I don't think we could have stopped it, General, if we had expected it, because there were not enough planes available, and for a month, the Commander-in-Chief had been trying to get more planes, so that, if the situation did arise, he would have enough; but there certainly were not enough, there, for several months.

After the attack, when we did try to extend the air patrol out to 800 miles, we did not have planes enough. We could not get planes enough to be sure that every sector was covered. We on all occasions had to use short-range planes for anywhere from a third to a half of the circle. Admiral Bellinger can give you the figures as to the required number of planes to complete such a reconnaissance each day, but it was far in excess of what the Navy had available on December 7.

94. General RUSSELL. Then as the situation existed in November, from the standpoint of equipment and matériel, it could have been reasonably anticipated that the Japanese could reach, with a convoy, a point near enough to Pearl Harbor to enable them to launch this attack?

Admiral PYE. Anticipated as a thing they didn't do.

[1063] 95. General RUSSELL. I do not think we are talking about the same thing, Admiral. You state it was impossible to have detected such a convoy moving to within striking distance of the Hawaiian Islands, because you just did not have the reconnaissance means to search it out and locate it?

Admiral PYE. No, General, I did not say it was impossible, had you happened to send out your reconnaissance planes that were available in that particular area. I said that there were an inadequate number of planes to assure that all the areas from which such an attack could be made were covered.

96. General RUSSELL. Then we come back to my question: Every-boy in the conferences between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commanding General of the Pacific Fleet, in their estimate of Japanese possibilities and probabilities, must have known that it was barely possible, but not probable, that the Japanese could get within striking distance of us, and we would not have known?

Admiral PYE. My personal opinion is in accord with yours; but as long as you have both of those gentlemen available for witnesses, I think you should ask them.

97. General RUSSELL. Admiral, you were commanding that Fleet, out there, at the time, and, later, you became the Commander of everything out there, did you not?

Admiral PYE. I was not in command of anything that pertained to the reconnaissance. I had nothing whatsoever to do with it.

98. General RUSSELL. When you put your ships into the Port at Pearl Harbor, you did not lose interest in the possibility of their being destroyed, I am sure.

[1064] Admiral PYE. I didn't lose interest in that. I lost confidence in the people whose job it was.

99. General RUSSELL. Whose job was it?

Admiral PYE. The Commander in charge of the Pacific Fleet, of course, had the overall responsibility, so far as the activities of naval forces were concerned. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District was in charge of all of the activities of the planes, including the available patrol planes. Under him was Admiral Bellinger, Commander of that portion of the Naval Air Force based on the shore. Those are the three who had direct responsibility for the reconnaissance.

100. General RUSSELL. Now, Admiral, to return to the possibility of the Japanese attack, do you think it was important, in determining what the Japanese might do, for the Navy or the Army, one or both, to have conducted rather active reconnaissance in the mandated islands?

Admiral PYE. Under the conditions that were existing at the time, no. I think that such an effort could or may have been made by the direct order of the Navy Department, but it might reasonably have been interpreted by the Japanese as an act of war.

101. General RUSSELL. Why would looking at what was going on in the mandated islands by us have been an act of war?

Admiral PYE. Primarily, because of the fact that for fifteen or twenty years the Navy Department had asked the State Department to get the Japanese permission for some of our ships to visit the Mandate Islands, and those requests had been constantly refused by the Japanese Government; and even at the time of the search for Amelia Earhart, they became very [1065] much put out because some of our planes entered that general area.

102. General RUSSELL. Admiral, in your appearance before the Roberts Commission, you testified, discussing the Mandates:

We had certain free ports, but Admiral Standley can verify that when we tried to get ships in there, we didn't have any luck. They were "free ports," but not to us.

Admiral PYE. That is correct. According to the treaty under which the mandates were given to Japan, we had the right to visit those places, but the State Department never stood up to our rights, and always, when a request was made for permission, it was turned down—time after time.

103. General RUSSELL. So as a fact, Admiral, it had come to pass that in those months prior to December 7, 1941, because of the experiences which you have just narrated, the Navy made no effort to determine what was going on in the mandated islands?

Admiral PYE. To the best of my knowledge, no particular efforts were made, with the exception, which I would like to have verified by Admiral Bellinger, that, on several occasions, I believe we did get the Pan American people to get off their course a little bit to see what they could see on their way down to Guam; but we never got very much from it.

104. General RUSSELL. In your testimony, discussing this matter with General Grunert or with General Frank, you stated that you needed three to five minutes' notice of the approach of a hostile air force. In estimating this time requirement, did you have in mind the condition of readiness of your ships, on [1066] the morning of December 7?

Admiral PYE. Yes. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had issued an order. I could not state the date, but it was early in the spring of 1941, he issued an order that certain antiaircraft guns should be manned, ready for action. That number was for two 5-inch guns and two machine guns on each capital ship. These guns and their control were manned in this respect, that the crews were on deck though not immediately at the guns, and were allowed to perform duty in the immediate vicinity of their guns. The ammunition for the guns was in ready boxes on the same deck, so that they were brought into action in a very short period of time. It was estimated that all of the ships had their guns operating in less than five minutes; some of them, much earlier.

105. General RUSSELL. Now, one other subject, Admiral. You state that on the 27th of November, or thereabout, with your task force at sea, you received an order from the Commander-in-Chief, directing that you take some action; and I believe that in your testimony before the Roberts Commission you referred to that as "going onto No. 3" defense, that was the lowest of the three. Do you recall that?

Admiral PYE. No, I don't recall that.

106. General RUSSELL. I hand you the record of your testimony, and I will ask you to state whether or not that refreshes your recollection on that matter.

Admiral PYE. That condition 3, it is true, is the lowest condition of readiness, but that is a condition which applies to the ships at sea and it is not the same as this condition of readiness of the base. Condition 1 is the "all battle stations [1067] manned;" condition 2 required half of the battle stations to be manned, including the main battery; and condition 3 required antiaircraft defense, but it did not require the main battery to go in.

107. General RUSSELL. This was not particularly familiar to me, and I am asking now if it was this defense 3 which you went into as a result of the message of November 27?

Admiral PYE. Yes.

108. General RUSSELL. And that was "antiair?"

Admiral PYE. "Antiair;" and of course those are doubling up their guns, and constitute for the most part the same defense against submarines, if you get a chance to shoot at them, although your primary defense against submarines of course is the destroyer torpedo, itself; but that is true, so far as the battleships are concerned.

109. General RUSSELL. Admiral Pye, up to the time that an approaching attacking force reached the limit of the reconnaissance of the Army forces, the task or the job of discovering and attacking that force was the mission of the Navy, was it not?

Admiral PYE. Yes, I think that can be stated.

110. General RUSSELL. That is all.

Admiral PYE. There is one thing along that line, though, that I think should be definitely pointed out—that the Army observation posts are fixed posts, supposed to be constantly manned, whereas reconnaissance by airplanes is not a permanent thing, and it can only be carried out to the limit of the facilities immediately available.

111. General GRUNERT. I have one more question.

On the assumption that the attack, under the conditions [1068] in consideration of the means available, could not have been prevented, is it not reasonable to assume that with adequate preparedness measures the enemy carriers after the attack could have been located and destroyed?

Admiral PYE. Hardly, within the capacity of the forces available. I think he stated the number of B-17s was something like eight or ten, and the number of Navy patrol planes was practically nil, after the attack. It was a very great question whether, even if the force could have been located, it could have been seriously damaged.

[1069] 112. General GRUNERT. The reason I put that question is that we have had some testimony or something read to the effect that various ones were being blamed for not back-tracking these returning attacking planes; and if nothing could be done about it, what is the use of back-tracking them?

Admiral PYE. There were other forces at sea: the two carriers of Task Force 2 which was several hundred miles to the westward of Pearl Harbor on the morning of this attack. One of those carriers had been out to Midway to put in some marine fighting planes, and the other one had been to Wake. Had we been able to locate the Japanese force of ships after the attack, it is quite possible that these two carriers would have been able to intercept them. One of the car-

riers did send up her planes for a complete reconnaissance, and late in the afternoon one of the planes reported contact with an enemy carrier. Upon receiving this report all bomber and torpedo planes of the carrier were launched to make the attack, but they found that the report was erroneous and the object which had been reported was in effect a low cloud on the horizon, rather than an enemy carrier.

Up to this time not many attempts had been made to land bombers and torpedo planes on board ship after dark, and these planes, when it was discovered that there really was no enemy there, were ordered to proceed to Pearl Harbor, and that is the group which, you may receive testimony, was fired upon by our own ships as they came in that night.

113. General GRUNERT. Are there any more questions?

114. General FRANK. Admiral, I take it from your testimony that you did not anticipate this attack, that it was a surprise.

[1070] Admiral PYE. It was.

115. General FRANK. Was that generally the situation among officers in the Navy?

Admiral PYE. I think so.

116. General FRANK. Another thing I gathered was that, from your viewpoint, the Navy did not have adequate means to prevent a surprise.

Admiral PYE. I believe that to be true, yes. In confirmation of my previous statement that I thought the attitude of the officers of the Fleet was just about the same as the attitude of the War and Navy Departments, I happened to be the first person to meet Secretary Knox upon his arrival in the Hawaiian Islands about the 10th of December, and the first thing he said to me was, "No one in Washington expected such an attack—even Kelly Turner." Admiral Kelly Turner was in the War Plans Division, was the most aggressive-minded of all. I believe that to be confirmation of the situation as it existed here in the Departments, and I do not think it was very far different than what existed in the Fleet.

117. General GRUNERT. Admiral, thank you very much. We appreciate your coming over.

Admiral PYE. Thank you, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[1071] **TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER WILLIAM E. G. TAYLOR,
QUONSET NAVAL AIR STATION, CHARLESTOWN, R. I.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Commander, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Commander TAYLOR. Commander William E. G. Taylor, attached to the staff of Commander Fleet Air, Quonset Naval Air Station, Charlestown, Rhode Island.

2. General GRUNERT. Commander, this Board is making an attempt to get at the facts as to the background and what led up to and what happened in the attack at Hawaii. Through reading of the Roberts Commission report we assume that you have some facts that will be of value to us, primarily along the line of your assistance to the Army, your being loaned to the Army, I believe, to assist in putting in the air warning service and toward the interceptor command.

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

3. General GRUNERT. And General Frank will lead in propounding the questions, and the other members will try to keep from butting in until he gets through, but then we shall expand on it if necessary.

4. General FRANK. To what organization in the Navy did you belong in October, November, December of 1941?

Commander TAYLOR. I was attached to the Bureau of Aeronautics and was on temporary duty with Admiral Halsey's staff.

5. General FRANK. You were associated with the Army in Honolulu, in Hawaii, in the establishment of the aircraft [1072] warning service, were you not?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir, at the request of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

6. General FRANK. Were you over there for full time or part time, or just what was the arrangement?

Commander TAYLOR. The arrangement was verbal and informal. I was told to report to Interceptor Command by Admiral Kimmel's staff, and I worked with them full time there.

7. General FRANK. With whom particularly did you work in association over there?

Commander TAYLOR. I worked very closely with the Operations Officer of the Interceptor Command; his name was Captain——

8. General FRANK. Bergquist?

Commander TAYLOR. Bergquist; yes, sir.

9. General FRANK. Tindal also?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

10. General GRUNERT. Captain Powell?

Commander TAYLOR. There was one Captain of the Signal Corps whose name I can't recall. Is that he?

11. General FRANK. Powell.

Commander TAYLOR. Captain Powell.

12. Major CLAUSEN. He is a Colonel now.

Commander TAYLOR. He may be.

13. General FRANK. He was then Captain, now Colonel, Powell.

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

14. General FRANK. When did you go over to assist the air force?

Commander TAYLOR. It was somewhere in the second week of [1073] November, sir. I am not sure of my dates.

15. General FRANK. At that time had the permanent radar sets, the 271s, arrived?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir. They had, I think it was, five 270s around the Island, no 271s. They were on their way; they had not arrived.

16. General FRANK. I see. Where was the information center? Shafter?

Commander TAYLOR. The information center was off the reservation at Shafter. They had set up a special temporary information center.

17. General FRANK. Just where was it? Underground? Above-ground?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir; this was above-ground, across the main road from Shafter, a temporary wooden house.

18. General FRANK. Over in the antiaircraft cantonment?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir; it was, I thought, a special cantonment of its own.

19. General FRANK. They did have a certain number of 270 sets?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, they had five, as I remember.

20. General FRANK. They had been placed in position?

Commander TAYLOR. When I joined the Interceptor Command they were in position. They had just been sighted. They had crews who were just learning to operate them. The communication lines were either all in, between the radar sets themselves and the information center, or were within the next few days; and there were a combination of either commercial land lines or Signal Corps field lines that were laid in.

21. General FRANK. So that they could be operated with commercial current? [1074]

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

22. General FRANK. All of them?

Commander TAYLOR. There were all in. Within 2 or 3 days of the time I got there there were communications established between the sets themselves and the communication center.

23. General FRANK. And could they all be operated with commercial current?

Commander TAYLOR. That I do not know, sir. I think they were almost all operated at that time with auxiliary power.

24. General FRANK. Yes. When was the first test at which time an effort was made to determine whether or not they could operate as a system, an integrated system?

Commander TAYLOR. There was never a complete test run, sir, until after the attack, because we never had all the positions manned. We had practice tests; I don't remember from what date.

25. General FRANK. That is what I mean.

Commander TAYLOR. I can approximate it from the date of a meeting that I have the briefs of here (referring to papers).

On the 24th of November we had a meeting consisting of Colonel Murphy, Acting Signal Officer of the Hawaiian Department; Lieutenant Commander Coe, from Patrol Wing 2; Major Tindal, 18th Bombardment Wing; myself; Captain Bergquist, 14th Pursuit Wing; Lieutenant White, Signal Corps, Hawaiian Department; Lieutenant Harville, 53rd Coast Artillery; and Lieutenant Thomas, 86th Observation Squadron (Support Command).

At the time of this meeting on 24 November the five 270s were operating with a skeleton crew. Communication lines were [1075] established between the 270s and the information center itself, but there were no communication lines from the information center itself to the various outlying activities.

26. General FRANK. That is, to the operating?

Commander TAYLOR. The operating. They had one main line to the switchboard at Wheeler Field, but the other lines were not in. They had positions for all of the liaison officers.

27. General FRANK. There were no lines in to the Navy and to the Anticraft and to Hickam Field, and so forth?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir. We had, I think, a sufficient number of plotters to man two watches only, who were untrained, and the number one object was to get those men to start training at once.

The first difficulty we found with the setup at the information center was, it was too large for the area that we could cope with. In

other words, it was set up very much like the Boston or the New York information center, which is a general air warning system rather than a combination air warning system and interception system. The main plotting table had the—I think they had a radius of roughly 200 miles, which was well outside of the radar search area. The plotting table itself was too small in scale to make interceptions on; so that we first of all had to make an overlay on a smaller scale of the Oahu area, and I imagine that it took something in the neighborhood of another week after 24 November before we got the new overlay painted on the table and got the plotters in for our first practice. From that time on we spent as much time plotting the aircraft in the vicinity, [1076] giving the plotters practice, giving the radar operators at the different 270s practice. We went to each one of the 270s in turn and discussed the method of reporting to the information center.

28. General FRANK. Were positive, vigorous efforts being made to train as rapidly as possible all of the people concerned with the operation of the A. W. S.?

Commander TAYLOR. As much as then Captain Paul Bergquist and myself could do. We had to spend a great deal of time in conferences with practically every activity in Hawaii, trying to get a general liaison between all of the activities that were being tied in with the information center, and to get the manpower to run it.

29. General FRANK. Were the plotters enlisted or civilian?

Commander TAYLOR. They were enlisted, sir.

30. General FRANK. Was any effort made to get girls?

Commander TAYLOR. Not at that time, sir. I do not think the question of bringing in girls had come up at that point.

31. General GRUNERT. I am afraid I shall have to butt in here with one thing. I am afraid I will miss the opportunity.

Had you known that war was in the offing or that the enemy might strike early in December, by working day and night or what was necessary to get that thing in shape, could it have been in shape?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. In this brief here we figure that if we had the manpower and the effort behind it we could have had the information center going satisfactorily within two weeks' time. There was only one weak point.

32. General FRANK. Within two weeks' time from when?

[1077] Commander TAYLOR. From the date of this conference, which was on 24 November.

33. General FRANK. That would have put the ultimate date when?

34. General RUSSELL. December 8th.

35. General FRANK. With respect to this meeting that you had for the purpose of organizing the details of the A. W. S. and coordinating its activities, will you give us a resume of what was covered at that meeting?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. It was decided that, although considerable equipment was on order and planned for the operation of the information center, the equipment would not be available for some time to come. Therefore every effort should be made to make the best use of the equipment on hand by the proper coordination of all various military and naval and civilian activities and equipment.

36. General FRANK. What equipment was it that was not going to be available?

Commander TAYLOR. It was mainly the proper permanent communications system for the air warning system, the permanent derax stations, the permanent communication lines, and mainly the physical communications throughout the radar equipment.

It was felt that the information center could be made to function adequately within the next two weeks. We found after that, after this, to qualify it, that that would be except for the air-to-ground radio communications. We learned that we could not keep contact with the fighter aircraft more than five miles offshore with the communication equipment we had at that time.

37. General FRANK. That was for intercepts?

[1078] Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. It was agreed that the function of the Information Center was of sufficient importance that the watch officers representing the various activities in this area should be carefully selected as principal, rather than excess officers, when assigned. In other words, they were willing to give us their excess officers if they could find them, but we wanted principal officers.

38. General FRANK. You wanted good ones?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. It was felt that intelligence and training in the Information Center, rather than age, rank and experience, would be desirable in the selection of these officers.

It was realized that a great deal of detail work is necessary to get the Information Center coordinated with outlying activities. It was therefore desirable to have the Information Center manned at the earliest possible moment so that all hands would be trained.

It was felt that the then present mobile R. D. F. equipment was not all that might be hoped for, and it was agreed that the anti-aircraft equipment might be tied in to it.

It was brought out that considerable confusion during recent exercises had been caused by the great number of airplanes operating around the Island at all times. They were not identified. It was felt that this could be brought under control in three ways:

(a) By having all aircraft flights reported to the Information Center by parent units through their Operations Rooms.

(b) By enforcing the Aircraft Approach Procedure.

(c) By requiring all planes approaching the Island of Oahu to report their position at least 60 miles at sea, before [1079] coming in.

39. General FRANK. In other words, to bring them under permissive control of the Interceptor Command?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. There was no other means of identifying him.

In this connection, it was brought out that the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, had ordered radio silence of all aircraft during joint exercises. It was suggested that this be discussed with the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, for decision as to the value of radio silence as security.

The question of IFF was raised as a possible solution to eliminate confusion in determining whether aircraft approaching the Island were friend or foe.

40. General FRANK. "IFF" means Identification, Friend or Foe?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. It was realized that it would be a very long time before all aircraft could be equipped with IFF, in addition to which it was believed that the present IFF did not operate on all these RDF frequencies, and it was therefore decided that this was not a reliable solution for some time to come.

It was brought out that considerable equipment had been withdrawn from the Interceptor Command and the Hawaiian Air Force for the use of the Ferry Command. This was mainly radio equipment.

41. General FRANK. I do not believe it is quite plain about IFF. Will you explain that very briefly as to the use of IFF so as to clear up the fact that through IFF you could identify the airplanes?

Commander TAYLOR. The airborne IFF is an electrical transmitting device used for the purpose of identifying friendly [1080] aircraft. In November, 1941, there were several various types of IFF in use, each one taking a special type of interrogating or challenging device.

It was decided of value to investigate the possibility of using the Information Center to operate Ferry Command, to eliminate any duplication and make available as much of this equipment as possible.

42. General FRANK. What was the nature of the equipment?

Commander TAYLOR. It was mainly radio equipment powerful enough to operate the device offshore. It also had direction-finding equipment.

43. General GRUNERT. By whose authority was this equipment so changed?

Commander TAYLOR. I do not really know who did it, sir.

44. General GRUNERT. You do not know whether it was the Commanding General of the Air Force or the Commanding General of the Department?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir. I do remember that at that time the Ferry Command enjoyed a very powerful and secret position and was able to get better equipment and that the Interceptor Command was not.

Without knowing all of the details of the Ferry Command's problems, the possibility of using the Information Center for this purpose was not clear. However, it was felt that the Information Center was probably better equipped to handle Ferry Command flights. In this connection it was brought out that Ferry Command operations are carried on under conditions of great secrecy. This was held to be no obstacle, as the Information Center could be operated with the greatest degree of security at all times.

[1081] The questions of gun control of ships in the harbor during air raids was discussed, and it was decided that this question should be taken up with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

It was felt that the air-to-ground radio equipment at present available was not the best that could be hoped for, and it was therefore decided to investigate the possibility of utilizing other Army, Navy, Coast Guard or civilian radio facilities in the event of an emergency, if not at present.

As there had been some difficulties in the procedure for requesting telephone circuits for the Information Center, that is, requests had to be made of each of the many activities on the far end of the circuits, this question was presented to Colonel Murphy. Colonel Murphy agreed that all requests for circuits should and could be made by the Information Center.

It was agreed that all air-to-ground and air-to-ship radio procedure, of fighters at least, should be standardized. In view of a recent Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department letter to this effect, it was believed that all naval fighter squadrons were using the British system.

It was decided that communications liaison was vitally important and therefore all activities should be approached with a view of coordinating communications facilities to the best advantage of all concerned.

It was decided to investigate the probability or possibility of using naval ship-board radar to supplement the land-based RDF under all conditions of emergency; also to determine the most efficient method of communications between the Ships Warning Net and the Information Center.

45. General FRANK. Generally speaking, what was the situation [1082] with respect to equipment and training, on December 7, with respect to the A. W. S.?

Commander TAYLOR. On December 7 the plotters were reasonably well trained to watch and able to do checking without any controller on the plane. The only source of controllers we could find was to see the Squadron Commander of the Pursuit Squadrons at Wheeler Field. They were themselves very busy training their squadrons and had just received new, green pilots and were trying to get them into shape and, therefore, could not spend much time learning their complicated organization. We had no liaison people to man any of the positions. Therefore none of them were trained.

46. General FRANK. What about equipment?

Commander TAYLOR. The equipment itself? On December 7 all the communication lines were in; the radar stations; the Derax equipment was working satisfactorily enough to give air warning and possibly to make interceptions. The air-to-ground radio equipment was not satisfactory for interception work, but it was possible that enough advance information could be given to pilots so that they could come back without being intercepted.

47. General FRANK. The radio equipment that would have enabled control through interception a reasonable distance offshore had been given to the Ferry Command?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

48. General FRANK. What was the situation with respect to the supply of spare parts and spare tubes for the radar equipment?

Commander TAYLOR. That I do not know, sir. The Derax station seemed to be operating satisfactorily during the periods we were operating. There were a few Marines Corps 270's on the Island, which we later got hold of and put into place the train- [1083] ing. We put one of them actually into operation. They had some source of supply there. I do not know how great their source of materials and supplies was at the time.

49. General FRANK. Generally speaking, then, the situation with respect to the organization and operation of the A. W. S. system was that it was about two weeks off?

Commander TAYLOR. Two weeks off. The only thing that was not carried through after this meeting to bring the thing into operation at the end of two weeks was the manpower to operate it.

50. General FRANK. And the training of that manpower?

Commander TAYLOR. And the training of the manpower; yes, sir.

51. General FRANK. Do you feel that under the circumstances it was proceeding under normal conditions in a satisfactory manner?

Commander TAYLOR. Not entirely, sir. We had a great deal of difficulty getting the proper impetus to get any material or personnel. We had nobody to head it up, and we ourselves then did not carry enough power to get the equipment and get the manpower we wanted.

52. General FRANK. Was that because that at that time it was operating under both the Signal Corps and the Air Corps?

Commander TAYLOR. That could be, sir, except that the two junior officers of the Signal Corps and the Air Force were both working very closely together; but it was never headed enough by enough power to give it impetus so they could get it going.

53. General FRANK. What about General Davidson?

Commander TAYLOR. He was in the United States the early part of the time. I do not remember what date he got back to [1084] Hawaii.

54. General FRANK. I think it was the fifth.

Commander TAYLOR. The fifth of what?

55. General FRANK. December.

Commander TAYLOR. It was pretty late by that time.

56. General FRANK. What was the general attitude toward the necessity for use of this against the enemy?

Commander TAYLOR. I do not think that anybody except possibly officers Bergquist and Powell, who had been to the Information Center School at Mitchel Field, realized exactly how important it was. It was something new. They did not understand a great deal about it; and it was sort of a foster child at that time, we felt.

57. General FRANK. Was there any feeling among the rank and file as to the immediate possibility of war?

Commander TAYLOR. It is very hard to recall. You would find that quite a good deal of it with the young aviators and with some staff officers, but each department had some special job they were preparing for, and this was a sideline. As an example, the Bomber Command, air support, or antiaircraft would be mainly concerned with training and the Information Center was another thing that took more of their manpower and more of their time.

58. General FRANK. The time had not arrived when the aircraft warning service and the Information Center were ready to go into operation on a regular schedule; is that correct?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

59. General FRANK. It had not?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.

60. General FRANK. Did you know that on the morning of [1085] December 7 a flight offshore a distance of about 130 miles had been picked up by the Opana Station?

Commander TAYLOR. I knew that afterwards; yes, sir. I did not get to the Information Center that morning until about 8:30 or 9 o'clock.

61. General FRANK. The report on that flight was made to the Information Center, but because of the fact that it was on a training basis rather than on a regular operating basis, the people to handle it were not there, and they had not even been regularly assigned to the organization. Is that correct?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. There ordinarily would be just a skeleton crew, a house-cleaning crew after 7 o'clock, because of instructions which came, which I understood General Short gave, to operate the Derax station only between 0400 and 0700, and the flight was picked up after that time by an operator that was operating the equipment in violation of orders, and the officer who picked up the information in the Information Center was a Squadron Commander serving his first tour of duty and he knew nothing about the set-up in any sense of the word. In addition to that, it would be impossible for anybody to decide whether a flight picked up 130 miles away was a Japanese attack, one of our own carrier groups coming in, or a flight of bombers from the United States. As a matter of fact, one of them did come in at the same time and just added to the confusion. If we had had the information center completely manned there would have been some method of identification. Anybody could have told what that flight was.

62. General GRUNERT. I believe that in your testimony before the Roberts Commission you said something to the same effect, that this flight, if it was made, would not have meant anything [1086] to you?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

63. General GRUNERT. Was it not sufficiently organized at that time so that the representatives of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Corps knew what flights they had in the air and could tell whether or not the interception of the flight meant that that was one of theirs?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir. At the time of the attack we had no liaison officers for the different aviation activities at all, and there was no liaison between their own operations and the Information Center. There was no procedure or system of identification established.

64. General GRUNERT. You were talking about your conference. This conference was held about November 24?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

65. General GRUNERT. Why was it not held on August 24 or September 10? Why November 24? Why did they wait that long to hold a conference on this important matter?

Commander TAYLOR. I do not know, sir. I called this conference.

66. General GRUNERT. When did they call on the Navy to give them assistance?

Commander TAYLOR. I think, not more than a week before that, sir.

67. General GRUNERT. Then you had no connection with it before about the middle of November, at the earliest?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.

68. General GRUNERT. And then you did not know what should have been done or what might have been done before you got there?
 [1087] Commander TAYLOR. No, sir. As a matter of fact, when I arrived I went straight to Wheeler Field, and the Information Center itself had just been completed. It was a question of two or three days one side or the other.

69. General GRUNERT. Who did you find there that knew enough about it to take action before you got there?

Commander TAYLOR. There were only two officers, Captain Powell and Captain Bergquist who had been through the Information Center School of Mitchel Field. But that school was at that time fairly sketchy for the scope of the work they had to accomplish.

70. General GRUNERT. Then it would not have made much difference if all the material had been on hand and all the stations ready; there was no personnel to actually organize it and operate it?

Commander TAYLOR. No sir.

71. General GRUNERT. What caused you to say you would be ready in two weeks? Was there any one cause that determined two weeks? Why not ten days? Why not five days?

[1088] Commander TAYLOR. We took a wrong figure. We probably could have had it going in two weeks or ten days, probably less. It is mainly a question of the minimum time we thought we could train people in order to get it going. In two weeks it would have meant a great deal of improvising.

72. General GRUNERT. But if somebody came down there and said, "We have got to get this thing going; anything is liable to pop any minute," you might have shortened up the time?

Commander TAYLOR. I think that both Bergquist and Powell had that attitude, but, unfortunately, we could not get that much interest out of the people we dealt with.

73. General GRUNERT. Could not Bergquist or Powell, or you, as far as the Navy was concerned, have had access to the Chief of Staff and said, "The most important thing is lagging; we have got to get it operating"?

Commander TAYLOR. We saw every Chief of Staff, but we found that somebody else was always responsible.

74. General GRUNERT. So they were not sufficiently impressed to make this their business or push it in comparison with all the other things they had to do?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir. They lacked the powerful backing to get it going.

75. General GRUNERT. General Short expressed himself as most concerned about getting this in. It seems to me, if you had approached him, he would have been able to do something about it. Do you know whether or not permanent radar equipment had been on the Island awaiting construction projects, such as roads, cables, and so forth?

[1089] Commander TAYLOR. It could be, sir, but not according to the Signal Corps. My information is from the Signal Corps officers on the station.

76. General GRUNERT. You could not have operated those permanent ones, anyway, unless they were in position?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.

77. General GRUNERT. There were no naval officers attached to that center at that time, were there?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.

78. General FRANK. Other than yourself?

Commander TAYLOR. I was just loaned to help set it up.

79. General GRUNERT. There was one remark that set me back when I saw it in your testimony. You said you never saw Short. Was he not the Commanding General and was he not around there?

Commander TAYLOR. I saw his Chief of Staff. I saw his Operations Officer. We were very closely tied in with his staff and the Air Force staff.

80. General GRUNERT. You also were afraid it was breaking down, and I think you said you changed to the auxiliary power equipment?

Commander TAYLOR. I did not say that, did I, sir?

81. General GRUNERT. It states in the record that the auxiliary power equipment was breaking down, and General Short's order was that the operation should be from 4 to 7 in the morning.

They did not install the commercial power?

Commander TAYLOR. I had forgotten that. I do not remember it now, sir.

[1090] 82. General GRUNERT. You did operate with the auxiliary power?

Commander TAYLOR. I know we operated with auxiliary power in at least three of the places, because there were no land lines out there.

83. General GRUNERT. I understand from your testimony that the permanent sets were the same as the mobile sets?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

84. General GRUNERT. And it was some time before commercial power would be put in. Was there no commercial power hook-up for radio stations at that time?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.

85. General GRUNERT. You said that telephone equipment had not arrived from the United States and that it would take two weeks to a month. That was equipment in addition to the complete radar itself?

Commander TAYLOR. That was the permanent telephone equipment necessary for intercommunication within the information center itself.

86. General GRUNERT. Could not that equipment have been taken out of some less important place and used?

Commander TAYLOR. The equipment we were using was more or less the last war type, field service equipment which, although not perfect, could be made to work.

87. General GRUNERT. Were you aiming at the ultimate, or only the best of what you had?

Commander TAYLOR. We were improvising; we had to improvise.

88. General RUSSELL. Where had you gotten your experience?

Commander TAYLOR. My experience, General, was mainly [1091] from the point of view of a fighter pilot, two years in England, one year with the British Navy, and one year with the Air Force.

89. General RUSSELL. In the American Army this was a new development, was it not?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

90. General RUSSELL. And the only people you found around the Hawaiian Islands who were capable, from the standpoint of training, to carry on, were those two men whose names you gave?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

91. General RUSSELL. Did you know that General Davidson, together with other officers, had been sent to the mainland to study this very thing and work out plans to set up what you were working out when you got there?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir; I did know that.

92. General RUSSELL. There was not very much impetus at all being given to the establishment of this center until you arrived on the scene and organized it?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.

93. General RUSSELL. So far as you know, everything was awaiting the return of General Davidson?

Commander TAYLOR. I would like to qualify that, sir, because the impetus was actually supplied, what there was it, by Colonel Bergquist, at whose request I was loaned from the Navy.

94. General RUSSELL. You were sent up there simply because you knew the subject and they did not?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir; at the request of Captain [1092] Bergquist.

95. General RUSSELL. It has occurred to me in reading the testimony that General Grunert referred to, and in hearing your testimony this afternoon, that you have taken the position that a condition precedent to the successful operation of this system in picking up enemy planes at sea was the existence of some means for identifying aircraft?

Commander TAYLOR. I do not understand your question.

96. General RUSSELL. In other words, if you picked up ships and did not know whether they were friendly or hostile, the information was of little value?

Commander TAYLOR. That is correct.

97. General RUSSELL. You did state that there was a type of equipment by which this could be done?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

98. General RUSSELL. Do you know when that equipment reached the Hawaiian Department?

Commander TAYLOR. The equipment at that time was of two or three different types, so that it would be of very little value. The Army was sure that the equipment could be delivered from the Army equipment, but it would not work the Navy equipment, and vice versa.

99. General RUSSELL. How long did you stay out there?

Commander TAYLOR. I was out there for four months, November to February.

100. General RUSSELL. When you left in February had equipment for identification purposes been received in the Islands?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.

[1093] 101. General RUSSELL. It had not been?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.

102. General RUSSELL. Therefore in February you did not have a satisfactory air warning service out there?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.

103. General GRUNERT. Was it not possible in the information center, through organization and having liaison officers there, to know what was in the air, after it was well organized?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. That was organized and did work once the emergency was there.

104. General RUSSELL. The people who were to give the information indicated by General Grunert could only give you information on their planes, the ones they knew about, could they not?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes; but we had to get all the activities together and get some coordination. We could not get them together.

[1094] 105. General GRUNERT. Could there be any friendly planes that somebody did not know about?

Commander TAYLOR. Occasionally, after the attack, when we had the identification system; but occasionally a friendly airplane would come in, in violation of the proper approach system, and they would then send an interceptor out to intercept it. In any case, we did not let it come in, and we would not use the air-raid siren ordinarily. It was not working 100%, but it worked very satisfactorily.

106. General RUSSELL. It was not essential?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir; it was not essential.

107. General RUSSELL. All right. I asked you if it was essential, and you said Yes.

Commander TAYLOR. I am sorry, sir.

108. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, that is true, even in England, where it is very highly organized?

Commander TAYLOR. Even now, it doesn't work.

109. General RUSSELL. That is all I have.

110. General GRUNERT. Is there anything else?

111. General FRANK. No.

112. General GRUNERT. Thank you, Commander. We appreciate your coming in and helping us out.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Brief recess.)

[1095] **TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. KERMIT A. TYLER,
AIR CORPS, ORLANDO, FLA., ARMY AIR FORCE BOARD**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is trying to get at the facts; that is, as to things leading up to what happened at Pearl Harbor. We asked you to come here because of your assignment to duty the day of the attack, with reference to the Air Warning Service, or the information center of the Interceptor Command. General Frank will lead in propounding the questions, and then the other members of the Board will fill in wherever they see fit. General Frank.

2. General FRANK. What was your assignment?

Colonel TYLER. My duty on that morning was "pursuit officer." That was the assignment that was written on the order assigning.

3. General FRANK. I know, but on what duty were you? What was your permanent assignment at that time?

Colonel TYLER. I was second ranking officer in the 78th Pursuit Squadron. It was then "pursuit", now "fighter".

4. General FRANK. How long had you been in Honolulu?

Colonel TYLER. On that duty, sir?

5. General TYLER. No. When did you arrive in the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel TYLER. On the 22nd of February 1941, sir.

6. General FRANK. You had been there about six months?

Colonel TYLER. More than that, sir; almost ten months.

7. General FRANK. They had a practice of sending officers down to the information center, to break them in in the various duties to which they would be assigned, when the information [1096] center became operative, is that correct?

Colonel TYLER. Sir, I believe that that was the intention, on the morning of the 7th, when I was assigned, there. I had been assigned there, one previous date, but there was only one other person there besides myself, and that was the telephone operator.

8. General FRANK. So you got little or no instruction on the previous date?

Colonel TYLER. That is right, sir. I had, however, been through the information center, once before. They took a tour of officers.

9. General FRANK. Were you familiar with the detailed operation of the information center?

Colonel TYLER. Well, I understood how the thing worked; yes, sir. I think I understood it quite well.

10. General FRANK. Had you had any instructions on the duties of a pursuit officer in the information center?

Colonel TYLER. I had no instruction before I went on this first tour of duty. At that time I reported for duty, and, there being only a telephone operator and myself, I called the operations officer, then Major Bergquist, now Colonel Bergquist, and asked him what my duties were, then, because, obviously, it seemed to me, I had no reason to be there, if there wasn't an operator there.

11. General GRUNERT. May I interrupt, here? Will you explain what a "pursuit officer in an information center" is? I know what a control officer is, but just what is a "pursuit officer in an information center"?

Colonel TYLER. At that time, the pursuit officer's duty [1097] was to assist the controller in actually controlling the planes in the air. The pursuit officer is the one who would give the actual instruction of the fighter planes after they were ordered off. A controller's job, however, was to order the planes off.

12. General FRANK. To be a little more specific, when an enemy plane was sighted, instructions were issued from the information center to provide what—an interception?

Colonel TYLER. The instruction that would come to me would be from the controller, to order a certain number of flights off, from such and such a squadron.

13. General FRANK. To accomplish what?

Colonel TYLER. To take off and make interception.

14. General FRANK. And from the time that they left the ground until the interception was made, who was giving them instructions?

Colonel TYLER. That was the pursuit officer's duty, sir, except at such time as the controller might.

15. General GRUNERT. That is what I wanted in the record.

General FRANK. So on this morning, you were assigned there for instructional purposes, to learn about being a pursuit officer?

Colonel TYLER. Yes, sir.

16. General FRANK. Who was there, this morning, to teach you anything about that?

Colonel TYLER. I was the senior—in fact, I was the only officer there, and all that I could learn would be what I would learn by observing. By that I mean, there were about five or six plotters placing the plots (arrows) on the board, and there [1098] was a—

17. General FRANK. Was it a very well organized activity for the purpose of giving you instruction?

Colonel TYLER. I would say that the previous tour that I had through the information center was clear enough in giving me a set-up of the thing, but actually, there being no officers there to identify plots, nor no senior controller there, then, I wouldn't say that I was very well instructed that morning.

18. General FRANK. All right. Was the aircraft warning service, including the information center, operating that morning?

Colonel TYLER. Yes, sir; it was.

19. General FRANK. Were there any plots made on the board prior to 7 o'clock?

Colonel TYLER. I am quite sure there were, sir. There were a number of plots around the Island. As to whether they were just before 7, or started appearing about 7, I am not certain as to that.

20. General FRANK. Do you remember the occasion on which a flight from the north was picked up by the Opana station?

Colonel TYLER. Yes, sir.

21. General FRANK. You remember that?

Colonel TYLER. Yes, sir.

22. General FRANK. Will you give us the circumstances surrounding that? Can you give us a narrative concerning it?

Colonel TYLER. Just as a matter of interest, I saw this lad who was keeping the historical record. There is a record made of every plot that comes into the station, and I had not [1099] yet observed that activity, so I went over to see what he was doing, and it happened to be just about 7 o'clock, or roughly thereabout; and he had these plots out probably 130 miles, which I looked at, and there were other plots on the board at that time. It was just about 7, or a little bit after, I think, and then, right at 7 o'clock, all the people who were in the information center, except the telephone operator, folded up their equipment and left. There were just the operator and myself again; and about 7:15, the radar operator from Opana called the telephone operator to say that he had a larger plot than he had ever seen before, on his 'scope, and the telephone operator relayed the call to me; so I took the call, and, inasmuch as I had no means of identifying friendly plots from enemy, nor was I led to believe that there would be any occasion to do so, I told him not to worry about it.

And the next warning I had was about 5 after 8, when we received a call that there was an attack on.

23. General FRANK. What did you assume this was that was coming in? It might have been what?

Colonel TYLER. As far as I was concerned, it could. I thought it most probable that it would be the B-17's which were coming from the mainland.

24. General FRANK. You knew there was a flight of B-17s due in?

Colonel TYLER. I didn't have official information. You see, I had a friend who was a bomber pilot, and he told me, any time that they play this Hawaiian music all night long, it is a very good indication that our B-17s were coming over from the mainland, because they use it for homing; and when I [1100] had reported for duty at 4 o'clock in the morning, I listened to this Hawaiian music all the way into town, and so I figured then that we had a flight of B-17s coming in; so that came to my mind as soon as I got this call from him.

25. General FRANK. Did you give any thought to the fact that it might be planes from a navy carrier?

Colonel TYLER. Yes, sir. In fact, I thought that was just about an equal probability of the two.

26. General FRANK. What did you do, from then on?

Colonel TYLER. Well, there was nothing to do between the call, until the attack came.

27. General FRANK. Where were you when the attack came?

Colonel TYLER. I was awaiting relief. I was due at 8 o'clock to be relieved, and there being nothing going on, I just stepped outside of the door. There was an outside door, there, and I got a breath of fresh air, and I actually saw the planes coming down on Pearl Harbor; but even then, I thought they were Navy planes; and I saw antiaircraft shooting, which I thought was practicing antiaircraft.

28. General FRANK. The last connection that you had with this station was when you told the operator up at Opana to "forget it," so to speak?

Colonel TYLER. Yes, sir.

29. General RUSSELL. How long had you been in the Air Corps, then, Colonel?

Colonel TYLER. I was first commissioned in 1937. I had it, just a little over four years, sir, at that time.

30. General RUSSELL. You knew something about the mission of fighter airplanes, did you?

[1101] Colonel TYLER. Yes, sir.

31. General RUSSELL. And you knew that the pursuit officer in that information center was there to get planes in the air, to intercept incoming hostile planes if they appeared, did you?

Colonel TYLER. Yes, sir.

32. General RUSSELL. And you knew the only thing you had to do was to get in touch with the people who could put those planes up, isn't that true?

Colonel TYLER. That is not exactly true, sir, because we had nothing on the alert. We had no planes.

33. General RUSSELL. Well, if you had had some planes on the alert, then your job was to call for the commander of those planes and tell him, "Here come some enemy planes—go get them!" Wasn't that your job, as the pursuit officer?

Colonel TYLER. That would be my job if I had any way of telling. There was no means of identifying.

34. General RUSSELL. There seemed to be a lot of mystery about a pursuit officer and your not being trained as a pursuit officer, and I am trying to see if I can solve that mystery. You had a telephone

in that place, on which you could talk to the commanders of the aircraft on the Islands?

Colonel TYLER. Well, my next higher, the first one there called would have been Major Bergquist. I would have called him in his quarters, I presume.

35. General RUSSELL. Then he was to tell the people to get into the planes and go get the enemy?

Colonel TYLER. That was his duty; yes, sir.

36. General RUSSELL. So it was a rather simple job, after all, wasn't it, Colonel?

[1102] Colonel TYLER. That's right; it would have been.

37. General RUSSELL. The only mystery about it was the fact that you did not know that there were any Jap planes coming in, there?

Colonel TYLER. Yes, sir.

38. General RUSSELL. And you had the information from this boy at the Opana radar station that he had picked up the biggest flight that he had ever picked up, is that right?

Colonel TYLER. Yes, sir.

39. General RUSSELL. Did he appear somewhat excited over the flight that was coming in?

Colonel TYLER. I would say that he seemed more than normal. Of course, I didn't know the fellow up there, but he seemed—I would say he was interested in it, all right, sir.

40. General RUSSELL. He had found something out there, that had impressed him to quite an extent?

Colonel TYLER. Yes, sir.

41. General RUSSELL. And you said, "Don't worry about it—don't bother"? That was your decision, is that right?

Colonel TYLER. Yes, sir.

42. General RUSSELL. Now, to go back to these other people who had been there, and who had folded up and gone away at 7 o'clock. It was their job, as I understand this information center, to evaluate the incoming information?

Colonel TYLER. No, sir; their job was to present it to the Board for evaluation by them.

43. General RUSSELL. Who was the man, there, to evaluate that information?

Colonel TYLER. The Navy liaison officer and the bomber [1103] liaison officers.

44. General RUSSELL. They were the people who would evaluate any information from one of these operating stations out on the Island?

Colonel TYLER. Yes, sir.

45. General RUSSELL. Were they there at all, that morning?

Colonel TYLER. No, sir.

46. General RUSSELL. They never had been?

Colonel TYLER. No, sir.

47. General RUSSELL. So there wasn't anybody there whose job it was, or whose duty it was, to evaluate this incoming information?

Colonel TYLER. That's right, sir.

48. General RUSSELL. Well, why were you up there, at all?

Colonel TYLER. Sir, I really don't know.

49. General RUSSELL. You were not to go into action as the pursuit officer, until these other people, who were going to evaluate the in-

formation, had evaluated it and told you that hostile aircraft was en route to the Island; that is the situation, isn't it?

Colonel TYLER. That is right, sir.

50. General RUSSELL. Therefore, it wasn't your job to evaluate this information, at all?

Colonel TYLER. No, sir; it wasn't.

51. General RUSSELL. I was interested, merely as a matter of information, in what you said as to the report of this chap out at that station, that he had "a big" something, and I missed that part.

Colonel TYLER. I don't know whether he said "a large [1104] flight of planes," or "an indication," or "a large blip on his radar." That is the word that is used, and that I have used considerably, since then, so I am not sure whether he said "blip."

52. General RUSSELL. "A large blip" indicated a lot of planes?

Colonel TYLER. Yes, sir. It means one and the same thing, sir.

53. General RUSSELL. That is all.

54. General GRUNERT. You say you were detailed to go up there as a pursuit officer, and you were to remain until 8 o'clock. Was it normal to relieve officers at 8 o'clock, or was that the end of the tour?

Colonel TYLER. There was a schedule made out. I think that information center was manned from the preceding Wednesday, and I know it was manned during all off-duty periods, and on holidays, starting at 4 a. m. I believe that there were officers on duty from 4 a. m. till 7 or 8 o'clock every day.

55. General GRUNERT. Every day? But that was the end of that tour for that day?

Colonel TYLER. Well, on Sunday, this being a holiday, then there was an officer who was due to relieve me.

56. General GRUNERT. There was an officer due to relieve you?

Colonel TYLER. Yes.

57. General GRUNERT. At 8 o'clock?

Colonel TYLER. Yes, sir.

58. General GRUNERT. He did not show up, did he?

Colonel TYLER. No, sir; I didn't see him.

59. General GRUNERT. But the rest of the personnel of the [1105] center left at 7?

Colonel TYLER. Yes, sir.

60. General GRUNERT. And there was nothing for you to do, there, between 7 and 8, but twiddle your thumbs?

Colonel TYLER. No, sir; there was nothing to do.

61. General GRUNERT. Then it appears that the organization seemed to be faulty, and its instruction faulty, and there seemed to be a lack of organization and common sense and reason on this. You went up there to do duty as a pursuit officer in the information center. There was nobody to do the work with, because the controller was not there, and the Navy liaison man wasn't there, and probably some others were missing, so you couldn't do your duty, as a pursuit officer, because there was nobody to do duty with; and then, at the end of the tour, at 7 o'clock, everybody disappeared except the telephone operator and you; and the telephone operator remainder there for apparently no reason. You had no particular duty, did you?

Colonel TYLER. No, sir; we hadn't.

62. General GRUNERT. It seems all "cock-eyed", to me—and that, on the record, too.

Are there any other questions? Thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 5 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day, and proceeded to other business.)

[1106]

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[1107] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

FRIDAY, AUGUST 18, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
CHIEF OF STAFF CORPS

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Walter C. Phillips, Colonel, General Staff Corps; serial number O7314. I am now G-3 in General Stilwell's staff, Myitkyina, North Burma.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel Phillips, what was your position and assignment in the Hawaiian Defense Command, December 7, 1941?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was Chief of Staff, sir.

[1108] 3. General GRUNERT. How long had you been Chief of Staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I became Chief of Staff on November 5, that year.

4. General GRUNERT. You had served on the Hawaiian Department Staff prior to that, had you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right; yes, sir. I was G-3.

5. General GRUNERT. For how long?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe, sir, I arrived in Hawaii in March of that year, and I had rotated through the various staff sections, in order to become thoroughly acquainted with the General Staff's set-up. I had been in G-3, I believe, since July of that year.

6. General GRUNERT. Then General Short really brought you over there to groom you to become Chief of Staff, did he?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

7. General GRUNERT. What was your military background prior to your going to Hawaii, in which you became qualified to become a Department Chief of Staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I had been G-3 of the First Division—I came from the First Division—for about three years prior to going there.

8. General FRANK. Where was that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. At New York; Fort Hamilton, N. Y. I had just completed the first two Army maneuvers, and the maneuver in Louisiana. We moved the First Division to Fort Benning.

9. General GRUNERT. And in what capacity?

Colonel PHILLIPS. G-3.

10. General GRUNERT. Had you had any G-1, -2, and -4 [1109] experience?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I had had G-2 experience here in the War Department, and also I was Assistant G-2 in the Ninth Division in the last World War. I have also had G-4 experience; not G-1, except Adjutant of a Regiment.

11. General GRUNERT. The relation of a Chief of Staff to a Commanding General is that of "right-hand bower," his advisor, his confidential assistant?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

12. General GRUNERT. The Board, by the study of documents and the hearing of testimony, has gotten a pretty thorough and broad picture, and also has gotten considerable details of various parts of that picture. With your help we hope to round out that picture, develop new facts, and possibly get some new leads to other facts. This morning I am going to approach the bringing out of this testimony in a bit different manner. Instead of asking questions about the component parts, I will take the problem as a whole and then take it apart, to see how it "ticks."

The Hawaiian Islands, on account of their location, constitute a strategic outpost for the United States. They lie across any path of attack against our west coast and against the Panama Canal, and they also afford a base for offensive action; hence they are of great importance. And, in that the Hawaiian Islands are an outpost, and an important one, they in the past have had high priority in getting equipment, matériel, and personnel, in preparing them for defense.

We started in with a Joint Army and Navy Plan made here in Washington, then that was followed by a Joint Army and Navy [1110] Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. You know of that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; I was familiar with that.

13. General GRUNERT. That plan was supplemented by a Joint Air Operation Plan. Now, why is the Army in this outpost? What is its primary mission? Can you tell me the primary mission of the Army in Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. General, I would like to introduce, right now, the fact that it has been two years and a half since I have read those plans, and all that I can state in the way of anything concrete or definite from those plans is from memory.

14. General GRUNERT. I will attempt to help you out. Is it your remembrance of that mission that it is "to protect Pearl Harbor naval and air base, the installations thereat, and the ships therein?"

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; that sounds very familiar. I believe that is correct.

15. General GRUNERT. Now, suppose we attempt to break this down into what they are out there to defend against. First, you might say, an attack from within; next, an attack from the air; then, next, surface attack, or a combination. Hence, probably that is why they had three alerts—No. 1, against attack from within, in the line of sabotage; No. 2, against air plus sabotage; and No. 3, against surface, air, and sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

16. General GRUNERT. You recall those three alerts?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. I wrote the Standing Operating Procedure on that, sir.

17. General GRUNERT. Now, the first, "against attack from [1111] within," mainly sabotage, apparently was well covered. They were alerted against sabotage, and so far there has been no evidence of sabotage at that time.

As to the third, "against surface attack, or a combination, sabotage, air, and surface," there appeared to be no threat.

That leaves the second, which I might break down again into three parts: The defense against an air attack. That, I will break down into information, air (meaning air forces), and antiaircraft; and permeating all three of these there would be the cooperation and coordination with the Navy.

So the nubbin of this whole thing appears to be, Why Alert 1 and not Alert 2? We will start with that and its many related matters, and my first question will be, Why was Alert No. 1 chosen, and why not Alert No. 2?

Colonel PHILLIPS. As I recall—I say, General, I have no notes, have kept no file or anything on this, whatsoever, it is purely from memory over a period of 2½ years—as I recall, November 27th, we received a message at the headquarters, to the effect that we would take provisions to prevent sabotage. There was a possibility of sabotage, with 165,000 Japanese in the Territory, and the alert, No. 1, or the sabotage alert, seemed to be just the thing required. It was the General's opinion at that time.

As soon as we got the message, we had a staff meeting.

18. General GRUNERT. Let me identify this message. Is that the message from the Chief of Staff, or the so-called "G-2" message to your G-2 over there? I can refresh your memory by reading you this message. This is a message from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, [1112] 27 November 1941:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot (repeat NOT) be avoided, United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not (repeat NOT) be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not (repeat NOT) to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit discussion of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

Was that the message which you got?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

19. General GRUNERT. Now, that message has nothing in it about sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

20. General GRUNERT. But the sabotage alert was decided on?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The sabotage alert was taken up as, at that time, deemed sufficient; and it was a very simple matter to change from one to the other. It was merely adding more troops.

21. General GRUNERT. Were you present at the conference that [1113] they had on this message with the Navy, do you recall?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was not, sir.

22. General GRUNERT. Do you know how soon after that conference the report was made on the action taken?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say. I am under the impression that it was very shortly thereafter. I mean that day or, at the latest, the next. I am not sure.

23. General GRUNERT. But when the Commanding General returned from his conference with the Navy, the testimony before the Roberts Commission appears to show that he called you in and the decision was made to adopt Alert No. 1, the sabotage alert.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

24. General GRUNERT. Was there anybody else in on that at the time they had the discussion?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I informed the heads of the General Staff sections.

25. General GRUNERT. You informed them?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, we had a little informal meeting in my office.

26. General GRUNERT. Prior to the decision?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not prior to the decision; no, sir. We were announcing the decision.

27. General GRUNERT. When the decision was made?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

28. General GRUNERT. How about the other Commanders, such as the Antiaircraft, the Air, the Division Commanders? Did they confer before or after the decision was made?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say as to that, sir.

29. General GRUNERT. But you do recall the conference with [1114] the Commanding General, in which that decision was made?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

40. General GRUNERT. Was anybody present except you and the Commanding General, then?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say as to that. I believe the General Staff section heads were there. I am not positive about that.

41. General GRUNERT. Then it was just a question of judgment as to which alert to take up at that particular time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

42. General GRUNERT. And you say that you could have changed to the other two alerts in a short time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; a very short time.

43. General GRUNERT. Was there any discussion as to the other two alerts?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say definitely as to that, sir, but I believe there was.

44. General GRUNERT. During that discussion, or prior to the Commanding General's making his decision, was there any expression of reasons for making that decision? If there was any discussion or any question as to whether or not it should go into 1, 2, or 3, then there must have been something argued, or else he just made the bald decision that he would go into the sabotage alert, without any discussion.

Colonel PHILLIPS. General, I cannot say. Those notes and the records of that were very clear to me 2½ years ago, but I just cannot say at this time. I can't give you those details. I don't remember.

45. General GRUNERT. Do you recall having received or having [1115] gotten information from the Navy on that same date, November 27, as to a message received from the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, which message started out to the effect that "This is a war warning," and it wound up by saying, "Transmit this information to the Army"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. That message was received by the General, and I believe it was read to us all. I am not positive about that, though.

46. General GRUNERT. I will read that, so as to put it in the record, and so it can be considered. This is a paraphrase of the dispatch:

Chief of Naval Operations, to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, November 27.

Consider this dispatch a war warning. Negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out all tasks assigned in WPL-46 only. Guam, Samoa, and the continental districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. Inform Naval District and Army authorities. British to be informed by SPENAVO.

Now, the only reference to sabotage in either of those messages is in this message, here, in which it states: [1116] "Guam, Samoa, and the continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage." You recall that message, and that the Army was informed?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

47. General GRUNERT. And also, on that same date, there was a G-2 message from the War Department G-2 to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department. That related primarily to sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

48. General GRUNERT. Do you know when that was received?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't say the hour. As I recall, it was the same day.

49. General GRUNERT. The same day? But the decision on the sabotage alert was made as a result of the conference on the two messages that I have read?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

50. General GRUNERT. Right after that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; I believe that is correct.

51. General GRUNERT. Does any Member of the Board want to develop the alert question any further?

What can you tell us about the state of mind of the Army and Navy particularly the higher commanders and staff, as to the probability or possibility or imminence of war?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In my opinion, General, we were all thoroughly alert and fully conscious of the possibility, the Navy as well as the Army. I do not speak for the Navy.

52. General GRUNERT. Did you expect an attack on Hawaii?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Did I?

53. General GRUNERT. Yes. You had better tell me what you expected, and not talk for the rest.

[1117] Colonel PHILLIPS. I was fully aware of the possibility of such a thing. It struck me as possible.

54. General GRUNERT. But still you concurred with the decision of the Commanding General as to alerts, that the alert against sabotage was the proper one?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was his decision, sir. We discussed the thing, as I recall, quite fully.

55. General GRUNERT. You discussed the pros and cons? Can you tell me the pros and cons of the discussion?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot tell you the details of that discussion; it is just too long ago.

56. General GRUNERT. All right. General Russell.

57. General RUSSELL. When you were discussing these probable enemy actions or hostile actions which the Japanese might inaugurate, which led you to this No. 1 Alert, did you tell General Grunert, a little while ago, that you had both General Marshall's message of the 27th and the Navy message of the 27th before you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. If I did that, I cannot be positive that that was the case. I cannot be positive about the naval message. We knew of the naval message, but whether we had General Marshall's here, and the naval message here [indicating, at his right and at his left], at that time, I cannot say.

58. General RUSSELL. How long did it take you and General Short to analyze this Marshall message on the 27th, if you did analyze it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't tell you about that, sir. You want facts. Those are details, sir, that I had, two years and a half ago, but I do not retain them, I have made no notes, [1118] I have no file, and I do not know.

59. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, is it not a fact that very shortly thereafter, certainly within ten days, you had a very destructive attack out there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

60. General RUSSELL. Is it not a fact that the selection of Alert No. 1, and ordering the department into that alert, contributed largely to the destructiveness of that attack? Is the question clear to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No.

61. General RUSSELL. Suppose you had adopted Alert No. 3 instead of Alert No. 1, would you not have been in a much better position to repel that attack on the morning of December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It is a matter of opinion, sir; I don't know. I would say I don't know about that; it is purely a matter of assumption.

62. General RUSSELL. You have no idea now about whether No. 3 would have been a more effective alert than No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. From the results we obtained that morning, during the attack, with the number of planes that were shot down, the estimated number of course, we thought we had done a very good job. No. 3 alert, or the entire all-out alert, was ordered, immediately, and it would be a matter of assumption to say what alert. I don't know.

[1119] 63. General RUSSELL. I am afraid I am branching out too far at this place in our investigation.

Now, when General Short analyzed this message of the 27th, do you recall your discussing the possibilities of the ending of negotiations here in Washington on the international situation, and its relation to the imminence of war?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am sure that was discussed.

64. General RUSSELL. What was said?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say.

65. General RUSSELL. Were you out there when the Japs came in and launched that attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I most assuredly was, sir.

66. General RUSSELL. How does it come to pass, then, if you had such a vivid and depressing experience shortly thereafter, that it did not leave on your memory some impression as to what went before?

Colonel PHILLIPS. General, I had it very clearly at that time. I stated a while ago, sir, that much has intervened. I have been very busy for the last two years and a half, and those details of the discussion or the documents that we had at that time were directly in front of me, and what the details of that discussion were at that particular time I am unable to say right now specifically.

67. General RUSSELL. I know, Colonel, but since that time it has not been so very easy for Pearl Harbor and the incidents leading up to Pearl Harbor to get away from you, has it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. Not very easy; no, sir. But, sir, you are asking specific, definite questions which I am unable to answer from memory.

[1120] 68. General RUSSELL. Well, you have no way to refresh your memory?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, I have no notes.

69. General FRANK. Have you any notes any place in the world, on this subject?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

70. General FRANK. Did you ever have any?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

71. General FRANK. What did you do with them?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I left Hawaii, sir; they are in the file. You will doubtless find a complete story in the file in Hawaii. We had quite a line-up of testimony for the Roberts Commission, before whom I appeared at that time.

72. General RUSSELL. Colonel, I will ask you whether or not the contents of this critical message of November 27 from the Chief of Staff were passed on to anyone other than to you and General Short.

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was passed on to the General Staff section chiefs, as I recall it, sir.

73. General RUSSELL. Are you positive about that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think so.

74. General RUSSELL. Do you think you read or showed this message to G-2, for example?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think so; G-1, 2, 3, and 4.

75. General RUSSELL. Now, was any injunction issued then as to the dissemination of the information in that message on down to these Commanders, the Division Commanders and the Antiaircraft, the Air Commander?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The General handled that himself [1121] directly, and I definitely instructed the section chiefs that it was highly confidential and that it would go no further.

76. General RUSSELL. Therefore, you have no information as to whether these interested commanders knew of this message and its contents?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Except, I have no definite information right now if they did.

77. General RUSSELL. But it was treated as a highly confidential document, and you instructed these General Staff officers not to divulge its contents?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

78. General RUSSELL. And so far as you know they were the only people to whom the contents of this message were given?

Colonel PHILLIPS. As far as I know, sir.

79. General RUSSELL. Have you any questions, General?

80. General FRANK. Yes.

Are you a product of the Army school system?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. Leavenworth.

81. General FRANK. Well, then you are familiar with the method of estimating the situation?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right; yes, sir.

82. General FRANK. And determining action to take; is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct; yes, sir.

83. General FRANK. In estimating the situation and determining action to take, what is the procedure?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, of course it is all in the book.

84. General FRANK. I want you to tell me.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. You estimate the situation. [1122] of course: the enemy's capabilities, what he has, what it is possible for him to do, with your means at hand and his means, and after a general, thorough discussion and or a consideration, I mean, you arrive at a definite decision so far as you possibly can, considering the capabilities, your means, and so forth.

85. General FRANK. What do you consider with respect to the enemy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. His capabilities and the means, the means available to him, as far as you can.

86. General FRANK. To do what? The means to what?

Colonel PHILLIPS. His means that he has to attack or do the worst to you that he possibly can.

87. General FRANK. Now you are getting down to it: to do the worst that he can to you.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

88. General FRANK. And in coming to your decision of steps to be taken, what action do you assume the enemy will take?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The worst action.

89. General FRANK. The worst action?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Absolutely.

90. General FRANK. You were Chief of Staff to General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

91. General FRANK. You were his adviser?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, in that capacity.

92. General FRANK. When this question came up of action to be taken, as a result of these messages of November 27, was there an estimate of the situation considered at that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think there was, sir; certainly no written estimate. There was no written estimate prepared, but [1123] of course we would naturally form an estimate, make an estimate of the situation, any phases of the situation.

93. General FRANK. This was one of the most critical situations with which you had been confronted?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

94. General FRANK. When these messages arrived, did you advise the Commander of various steps that the Japs might take, and did you give him any advice on the things that you considered necessary by way of action that should be taken by the Commanding General?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; that was thoroughly discussed at the time, but the detail of that—certainly the advice I was capable of giving was included in the discussion.

95. General FRANK. Did you concur with the Commanding General, or did you specially recommend Alert No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I most assuredly concurred after his decision was made.

96. General FRANK. Prior to his decision did you recommend it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Prior to his decision, as I recall, sir, all angles of the situation were discussed and gone into rather very thoroughly. Very thoroughly. Three alerts were discussed, possibility, the capabilities of the enemy, and a decision was arrived at after, I should say, a very thorough estimate of every phase of the situation.

97. General FRANK. As vital as that has been to the American public and as prominent as it has been before the people, do you mean to say you have forgotten what you thought about it at that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I haven't forgotten, sir. I haven't [1124] forgotten, but I cannot recall specific questions that you ask which require a yes or no answer. I cannot go into that that thoroughly.

98. General FRANK. Have you forgotten whether or not you considered the No. 1 Alert satisfactory?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was satisfactory, sir. The sabotage alert was adopted by the General, and I concurred.

99. General FRANK. What advice did you give him on it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. General, I cannot say specifically, other than the general discussion which we covered in discussing the entire situation. I advised him as to the possibility, and the possibility of an attack—of course it was possible—and we went into the thing, the pros and cons, very thoroughly, but specifically I cannot say.

100. General FRANK. You stated a minute ago that the normal procedure for a Commander in meeting a military situation is to make an estimate of the situation, consider the worst thing that the enemy can do to you, and make your decision to meet it.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

101. General FRANK. Do you feel that that was done in this case?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The worst thing that the enemy could do was certainly considered. That was the possibility of an attack on the Hawaiian Islands. But that was the worst possible thing that could occur.

102. General FRANK. You haven't answered my question.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Excuse me, sir. I misunderstood.

103. General FRANK. Do you consider that steps were taken to meet the worst situation with which the Japs could confront you?

[1125] Colonel PHILLIPS. I am thinking now in retrospect. I am going back from here. That is a very difficult question to answer, sir. At the time the General made a decision to put in the sabotage alert I thoroughly agreed with it.

104. General FRANK. You just will not answer that question, will you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't answer it specifically, sir.

105. General FRANK. Do you mean to tell me that, had Alert No. 3 been in effect, the damage would have been as great as it was?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It is a matter of assumption. I don't know. I am not in position to say.

106. General FRANK. You were Chief of Staff, weren't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly.

107. General FRANK. How long would it have taken the planes to have gotten into the air had they been on No. 3 Alert?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't say as to that. It wouldn't have taken as long as it did take, of course.

108. General FRANK. It would take about five to seven minutes?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

109. General FRANK. And if the fighters could have gotten in the air, around 80 of them, to have met this attack, do you think it would have been as devastating as it was?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Undoubtedly not.

110. General FRANK. All right. Then, had you made the decision to go on No. 3 Alert instead of on No. 1 Alert, you would have been in a better position to have met this, the worst type of attack that could have happened under the circumstances; is that correct?

[1126] Colonel PHILLIPS. I would say perhaps you are right, sir.

111. General FRANK. Yes. All right. Then, you did not follow the normal procedure in assuming the worst thing that the enemy could do, and meet it, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In making the estimate of the situation we considered the worst that the enemy could do, yes, sir.

112. General FRANK. Well, you didn't take steps to meet it, though?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That's—

113. General FRANK. Did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The sabotage alert was put in by the General, sir, in the situation.

114. General FRANK. I know all this.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

115. General FRANK. But in considering the worst thing that the enemy could do, which was an attack of this kind, you did not take steps to meet it, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. At that time it was the—it was our decision—

116. General FRANK. I know what your decision was.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

117. General FRANK. You tell me you are a graduate of Leavenworth?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

118. General FRANK. You are a part of the school system?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

119. General FRANK. You know the theory of arriving at these decisions?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[1127] 120. General FRANK. Either you know or you don't.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Sir?

121. General FRANK. Did you or did you not take steps to meet the worst situation that the Japs could bring against you?

How long did it take the airplanes to get in the air, all massed on the apron as they were, from a No. 1 Alert?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know about that, sir. It would take some time.

122. General FRANK. It says from two to four hours.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. Well, I don't know about that.

123. General FRANK. And in this situation you needed to get them in the air within a matter of a few minutes?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

124. General FRANK. Therefore, did you take the best measures to meet this attack by prescribing No. 1 Alert?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Apparently not, according to that. That was—the No. 1 Alert—

125. General FRANK. We know what the No. 1 Alert was.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

126. General FRANK. Do you know what it was?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

127. General FRANK. Do you know what No. 3 Alert was?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think so, yes, sir.

128. General FRANK. Had No. 3 Alert been in effect, your fighter planes could have gotten off in a matter of five or seven minutes?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[1128] 129. General FRANK. They could have met the attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

130. General FRANK. Therefore, you would have taken steps to have met this, the worst situation that the enemy could bring against you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

131. General FRANK. And you didn't do it, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Subsequent messages—

132. General FRANK. Now wait a minute. You didn't do it, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not at that particular time, sir.

133. General FRANK. No.

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

134. General FRANK. Well, that is the time that I am talking about, is that particular time.

Colonel PHILLIPS. The subsequent message from G-2 seemed to confirm our action as what was required. That had a great deal of weight in confirming the action that the General had taken at that time.

135. General FRANK. Yes, but you did not follow all this Leavenworth teaching that you were talking about here a little while ago, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir.

136. General FRANK. Now, did you consider a Jap attack of this nature possible?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

137. General FRANK. Did you consider it probable?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not probable.

138. General FRANK. What was your attitude toward such a possibility? Why was it not probable?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Due to the distance:

139. General FRANK. From where?

Colonel PHILLIPS. From Japan; the fact that we had our Navy there, and many aspects of the thing, many facts that we had at hand, including those that I have mentioned, induced me to believe that an attack was, of course, possible, but not immediately probable. I discussed—

140. General FRANK. Did you so advise General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, I did not. This is when I first went to Hawaii. I made my decision—I made my estimate of the situation as a G-3 at that time in regard to the possibility of the attack, the probability.

141. General FRANK. Did you so advise General Short at that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I advised him that the attack was possible.

142. General FRANK. Well, did you advise him that it was not probable?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not.

143. General FRANK. You weren't very positive as a Chief of Staff, were you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I tried to be, sir.

144. General FRANK. Is your memory in general, good or bad?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Fairly good.

145. General FRANK. In making your estimate as to whether this attack was probable or not, what information did you have from the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't say definitely what information [1130] we had at that time or that I had myself in my estimate. I had the plans available, and in my office as G-3 there was a naval officer there that was a liaison man with the Navy, and we discussed the plans. I discussed it with the staff as—this is prior to my taking over the position of Chief of Staff—as G-3. I discussed it with the Navy staff, and we had conferences back and forth very frequently, the chief thing being to acquaint me thoroughly with the situation in Hawaii.

146. General FRANK. I have no further questions at this time.

147. General GRUNERT. I would like to have some more information about the discussion which led up to the decision to adopt the sabotage alert and not the alert which would be defense against air, or the all-out alert. Now, probably I can refresh your mind a bit by giving you a concise summary of General Short's conclusions as to the radiogram of November 27.

He dwelt on not disclosing intent, not alarming the public, avoiding publicity. In his report to the Chief of Staff's message of November 27, which was sent from Hawaii that same afternoon of November 27, he dwelt on the fact that the War Department did not indicate other action except sabotage, which he considered as tacit consent to the report. And again he dwelt upon: He must obtain information from the Navy, that the Navy was responsible for distant reconnaissance, that the Navy feared no Jap attack nor a probable attack, that he had confidence in the Navy, that planes were sent, presumably by the War Department, from the mainland without ammunition, that the attack was a surprise to the Chief of Staff of the Army, that he received no oceanic telephone warning from the War Department, that the War Department failed to notify him, and [1131] that the Navy failed to give him information.

Now, with those leads, can you refresh your memory as to what the discussion was?

Suppose we take "disclose intent." Was that discussed as to whether or not, if you took a more vigorous and more protective alert than Alert No. 1, sabotage, that that might disclose intent? If so, what was in your mind or the mind at the conference, that any more vigorous action might disclose intent or alarm the public? Do you recall anything on those subjects?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, the G-2 message subsequent to this time prior—

148. General GRUNERT. Yes, but the decision was made on the Chief of Staff's message.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly. I do not know what the General refers to in that.

148. General GRUNERT. Well, the report rendered by the War Department—did you or the General expect the War Department to come back and tell you what to do?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not at all, but we—the General, after receiving the subsequent report from the War Department, and the G-2, assuming that that was official, took that as tacit approval of his action.

150. General GRUNERT. Then, you mean that G-2 report or the message to G-2 over there was taken as an indication of the War Department's tacit approval of your going on a No. 1 Alert, sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Sabotage alert, yes, sir; that was the General's opinion.

[1132] 151. General GRUNERT. Were you influenced, in the advice you gave to the Commanding General on the subject of what alert to take, by any way the Navy looked at this?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was not at the time, sir.

152. General GRUNERT. Did you have confidence in the Navy as to their protective measures as far as keeping anybody away from the Islands that you had to defend was concerned?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did. I had absolute confidence in them.

153. General GRUNERT. What was that based upon?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Knowledge of their plans, and various and sundry discussions with various and sundry members of their staff.

154. General GRUNERT. Knowledge of their plans?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was convinced that they were on the job.

155. General GRUNERT. I realize now that you cannot remember details—I don't expect you to—but I expect you to remember the larger events and generally what happened, and why. Was it your understanding that the Navy did not fear any attack or did not expect any attack, did not consider it probable?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was not.

156. General GRUNERT. At the time the decision was made to go into an alert for sabotage and not one of the other alerts which would have been more protection against an air attack, the planes coming from the mainland with no ammunition—was that brought up in discussion to decide what alert to go on?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not sure that that was discussed at that time, sir, the planes. That was a routine—

[1133] 157. General GRUNERT. Was the command war conscious, or peace-minded, or both?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think they were thoroughly war conscious, sir.

158. General GRUNERT. But you evidently thought war was in the distant future sometime?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Some did, perhaps; I did not.

159. General GRUNERT. You apparently were more afraid of sabotage and attack from within than from without?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is true. We had reorganized the entire Army garrison. The old Hawaiian Division had been broken down, as I recall, in October. In September we had reorganized and made two divisions, filling up all divisions and getting replacements, filling up the units; and that was occupying a great deal of our time, thought, and effort; and preparation for war and defense of the Island. We were doing everything possible.

160. General GRUNERT. The preparation was for war in the distant future, and not right around the corner, was it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Just as rapidly as we could prepare.

161. General GRUNERT. It has been brought out that there was considerable training activity and preparation taking place; but we are on the subject of why an alert against sabotage when there were warnings of not only a possible but almost a probable attack, and still the mind over there appeared to dwell only on sabotage at that particular time. Can you think of anything else that may throw light on this subject?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had 165,000 Japanese there.

[1134] 162. General GRUNERT. Had they been perpetrating acts of sabotage? Were they not sort of a bugaboo? You were afraid that something was going to happen, but you did not know what, and because there were a lot of Japanese nationals there you were afraid that they might turn you out of house and home?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was believed that they were the most probable danger.

163. General GRUNERT. If you had gone on Alert 2, defense against air, which included defense against sabotage, or if you had gone on Alert 3, which is an all-out defense, that also would have included defense against an air attack and against attack on the Island under the surface. That also includes sabotage, does it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

164. General GRUNERT. It would appear that you reached the decision or opinion, or at least concurred in the decision to take just the alert against sabotage. Why? Mainly because you thought it would interfere with training?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was one matter that was considered. That entered into the decision.

165. General GRUNERT. The interference with training was mainly against training of what? Air?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Training of air, training of ground troops; training units to operate as a triangular division.

166. General GRUNERT. Did not training against sabotage take more ground troops than ordinarily?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; that in itself.

167. General GRUNERT. I am just trying to see how you argued yourself into a certain frame of mind so that you would give the advice that you gave, if you did, or that you would concur. [1135] Of course you understand, and your teachings have shown you, that a good staff officer, no matter what his position, will give his commander the best he has and, if possible, will argue his points until the commander understands. Once the commander has made his decision there is nothing else to do. That is understood.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

168. General GRUNERT. But apparently you had nothing to argue about except what was in favor of what was decided.

Colonel PHILLIPS. As I said a while ago, sir, all phases of the situation were discussed and considered at the time, as I recall.

169. General GRUNERT. That is what I am trying to get. What were the phases?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Training; the presence of Japanese—those were two of them, at least—and the possibility of attack was positively discussed.

170. General FRANK. What kind of attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Landing, which was of first importance to us.

171. General FRANK. What do you mean by "landing"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Landing in the invasion of Oahu.

172. General FRANK. Was it not well known that since the European War started many landings were preceded by an air attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was discussed also.

173. General FRANK. If you were apprehensive about landing, why were you not also apprehensive about an air attack?

[1136] Colonel PHILLIPS. That was discussed at the time, sir.

174. General FRANK. What were your responsibilities as Chief of Staff? Let us get down to the basis of this thing.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Those were prescribed.

175. General FRANK. You were Chief of Staff, were you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

176. General FRANK. What were your responsibilities?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was to coordinate all staff activities, advise the General of everything that was going on in his command, and be as near to the General as I possibly could in thought and action, where possible.

177. General FRANK. And to advise him and to take responsibility for advising him?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly.

178. General FRANK. Therefore you did have some responsibility, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Great responsibility, sir.

179. General FRANK. Did you ever, during the time that you were Chief of Staff, make any positive recommendations to him?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am sure I have, sir.

180. General FRANK. Did you make any positive recommendations to him with respect to what the action should be to meet this particular crisis that was shown to be developing by the messages of November 27?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say as to that, sir. I am positive that I discussed all angles of the situation, or as many as we had at hand there; everything that we had in mind and at hand. The possibilities of the entire situation were thoroughly discussed with the General, the pros and cons, as I [1137] have said before. As to what specific recommendations I made to him, I merely brought to his attention the possibilities of attack, the reasons for this, that, and the other thing. We discussed it thoroughly, and the General arrived at his decision to go the sabotage alert.

181. General FRANK. With or without your assistance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Of course he had my assistance, as I was discussing it with him; but the workings of his mind, how they went on, sir, I cannot say. Whether it was with my assistance or not, he was my Commanding General and he made his own decisions.

182. General GRUNERT. Was he inclined to encourage advice and argument from his staff officers, or was he inclined to make decisions without seeking such advice and opinions?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He made decisions at times, sir, on his own. At other times my opinion was requested and the opinions of various staff officers. We had frequent staff meetings.

183. General GRUNERT. Did you, prior to this discussion with him, consult the General Staff heads, particularly G-2 and G-3, for their opinion and their advice and their information, so as to give you something on which to base yours?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was a running affair, General, from day to day. We kept very close staff connections there.

184. General GRUNERT. But here comes a radiogram from the Chief of Staff that has certain directives, certain warnings, certain instructions in it, that could not have been discussed in the ordinary routine. I know it is routine, and it ought to be, in a staff, to do those things. But here is something that comes up like this radiogram, and you would immediately summon [1138] the members of the staff, G-2, G-3, and what-not, and get the latest information and get their advice from every angle. Was that done?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We did that immediately, sir.

185. General GRUNERT. Immediately?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

186. General FRANK. What period of time was consumed in making this decision?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say as to that.

187. General FRANK. Was it two hours or five minutes?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Oh, no; it was perhaps an hour and a half. There was thorough discussion. I do not know how long, now.

188. General FRANK. After the attack, by whom and when was the all-out Alert No. 3 ordered on December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The General ordered the all-out alert at about 8 o'clock. It was immediately after the attack. 7:58, as I recall, was the time of the dropping of the first bomb.

189. General FRANK. Did you, all the time you were Chief of Staff, ever make a decision without referring it to the General?

Colonel PHILLIPS. On major matters, no.

190. General FRANK. On what sort of matters would it have been possible for you to make a decision?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Any minor staff matter, sir.

191. General FRANK. Such as?

Colonel PHILLIPS. All personnel matters. Everything came through the headquarters. Ordinary personnel matters, transferring small units from this station to that station.

[1139] 192. General FRANK. Like an Adjutant could make?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, something similar to that.

193. General FRANK. What was your last answer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Something similar.

194. General FRANK. As Chief of Staff what steps did you take to see that the actions ordered by General Short pursuant to the radiogram of November 27 were carried out? Do you know what was in that radiogram?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. I had my G-2 and G-3, G-3 particularly, turn out his entire office to see that the alert for sabotage was put into effect. He inspected the positions that were afterwards occupied. They remained there for daily inspection from that time on.

195. General FRANK. You had antiaircraft available in the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

196. General FRANK. Air force?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

197. General FRANK. Aircraft warning service?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

198. General FRANK. To what extent did you use those units in any sabotage activities when they were sent there and primarily trained for antiaircraft purposes, for fighting in the air, and the aircraft warning service for detecting units coming in from the sea? How did you use them for antisabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not sure of the detail of that, sir. The antisabotage consisted mostly of ground forces.

199. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, it would have been very easy to have carried on this antisabotage activity and, at [1140] the same time, have used the antiaircraft and air force and air warn-

ing service on an active alert so as to have been prepared for this air attack, would it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes. I am sure that could be done.

200. General FRANK. Did you think of that, as Chief of Staff, and so advise the Commanding General?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was Alert No. 2, as I recall.

201. General FRANK. And Alert No. 3?

Colonel PHILLIPS. And 3, where most of those units were used. Yes, sir; that was discussed.

202. General FRANK. How did you advise your Commanding General with respect to that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was covered in the selection of the alert by the General, what we covered in Alert No. 2, what we covered in Alert No. 3, the number of troops out and required under those alerts. We went into more or less detail.

203. General FRANK. Each time you come back and revert to what was done by the General.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

204. General FRANK. We are particularly interested in things that were done by the Chief of Staff, right now.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

205. General FRANK. Did you not feel that you had some responsibility?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did, very much, sir.

206. General FRANK. This message of November 27 carried the instruction—

Take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

[1141] What reconnaissance was ordered?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not recall that any reconnaissance was ordered, sir.

207. General FRANK. Did you have any reconnaissance squadrons?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In the Air Corps?

208. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had some heavy bombers used for patrolling. According to the naval plan they were turned over to the Navy for distant patrolling.

209. General FRANK. Did you not have a reconnaissance squadron at Bellows Field?

Colonel PHILLIPS. P-40?

210. General FRANK. No. O-47s, I think they were.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not positive about that, sir. The Air Corps, under General Martin, handled that.

211. General FRANK. Was there any report made to you with respect to instructions for carrying out the directives in the radiogram of November 27? Did you require reports to be made to you on the instructions that you gave?

Colonel PHILLIPS. As to putting on the sabotage alert, most assuredly, sir.

212. General FRANK. Is that the only thing you did—just order a sabotage alert in answer to that message?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We required ordinary staff reports. We required reports from the units, and also, as I said, the positions were in-

spected, the troops were inspected on position. They were there for 24 hours.

213. General FRANK. I asked you this: Did the order to institute Alert No. 1 comprise the only thing you did in compliance with [1142] the direction in that radiogram?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was one thing we did, sir. I cannot recall. I do not understand your question exactly. We required reports. Alert No. 1 was instituted and put into effect. I required reports when they occupied positions. We inspected the positions to see that the General's decision for the institution of Alert No. 1 was carried out to the letter.

214. General GRUNERT. I believe you stated that the message received by your G-2 you considered as sort of a tactic approval by the War Department of the action taken under the Chief of Staff's message of November 27?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

215. General GRUNERT. Is not a G-2 message a sort of staff communication which is not considered as a command decision?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It might be so considered. However, coming from the War Department we considered it came with authority.

216. General GRUNERT. With reference to the attack by air and the alert taken to meet the attack, I broke that down into the necessity of having information, which includes a number of points. It includes your air warning service, and then the next breakdown would be air, and antiaircraft. Those are the three principal means of defense against air attack. That all integrated into an interceptor command when and if established. Now I want to see what condition they were in had they been ordered into Alert 2.

What was the condition of the information service as far as the air warning service was concerned? What was the condition of that to function for such an alert?

[1143] Colonel PHILLIPS. We were merely starting that, sir.

217. General GRUNERT. Why were you merely starting it, when back in February 1941 air attacks were visualized by the Secretary of the Navy and concurred in by the Secretary of War, and the Commanding General out there was instructed to get together with the Navy and take as rapid action as possible and be prepared for such an attack, and it was stated that by June the air warning equipment would be there to be installed? Do you know when it arrived?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not.

218. General GRUNERT. Do you know what action was taken from time to time to speed up that very necessary element of defense?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I know that all possible staff action was being taken, through the Signal Corps people as well as the Air, to speed the installation.

219. General GRUNERT. Do you know how many times the Commanding General took it up with the War Department, if ever?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not.

220. General GRUNERT. Is not that part of the Chief of Staff's business, to advise the Commanding General of delay and advise action to overcome delay, especially in such an important thing as the air warning system whose function is to detect incoming aircraft so that you could defend against them?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; that is correct.

221. General GRUNERT. Whose particular business was it in your staff to look after that phase of it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The Signal people. The Engineers were installing it, and the Signal people were providing equipment.

222. General GRUNERT. How about your general staff? The [1144] general staff supervises the activities of all those things that pertain to certain functions. What general staff officer should have gotten on their necks and pushed it through?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was a G-4 proposition, and also G-3.

223. General GRUNERT. G-4, in the line of getting materiel, and so forth; and G-3, in the line of getting the thing in operation?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

224. General GRUNERT. Did they come to you and tell you, "This thing is not going rapidly enough. We are not getting material. We can't get this thing started."?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was done; yes, sir. At various and sundry times we discussed the matter. There were many things being pushed at that time in the Hawaiian Department.

225. General GRUNERT. But this was one of the most important?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

226. General GRUNERT. And the most important thing should be pushed the hardest and the most often. Of course all those things were discussed, but what was done? Did you go to the Commanding General and impress him with the seriousness of this matter?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

227. General GRUNERT. Did you prepare radiograms for the War Department and the Chief of Engineers, or what-not, in pushing it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is a matter of record, sir. I am not sure what specific action was taken.

228. General GRUNERT. Do you know when the majority of the equipment arrived? Do you know who was put in charge of the [1145] actual installation? Do you know what the progress was from month to month?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say now, sir. That is also in the record, I am sure.

229. General GRUNERT. We will go to the next subject. I believe you told me that you had a hand in or supervised the preparation of the S. O. P. of November 5?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

230. General GRUNERT. In which you outlined what would be done under certain circumstances, what this alert was, what that alert was, and so forth?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

231. General GRUNERT. And in which, tentatively at least, you established an interceptor command. Also, in Alert No. 1, the sabotage alert, it provided that the planes be concentrated, presumably to better guard them?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

232. General GRUNERT. That particular phase of it comes in strongly, because the airplanes were bunched and many of them were destroyed by fire of weapons and by fire itself. What discussion was had of the subject of dispersion or concentration? Why did you say

they should be concentrated instead of dispersed so as to give them more protection?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The concentration was done to provide or allow for an easier method of guarding them.

233. General GRUNERT. An easier method?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, and for fewer troops. Not easy in that respect, General, but for fewer troops. We did not have sufficient troops at that time to even fill the units.

[1146] 234. General GRUNERT. You appear to have had sufficient troops to order the Air Force to provide guards for civil installations.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was because we did not have sufficient troops to provide for guarding other units.

235. General GRUNERT. Did you have sufficient infantry at Schofield? You were strictly on a sabotage alert. Did you not have sufficient infantry at Schofield that, for the time being, was not so necessary as the Air Force? We will take it for granted that the Air Force should be trained.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

236. General GRUNERT. Trained to do various things, trained to be able to man their equipment so as to have protection against attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[1147] 237. General GRUNERT. But still you provide in the SOP that the Air Force troops shall be used for guarding and taking care of the civil population?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

238. General GRUNERT. You have elements that would not be necessary in Alert No. 1, because they do not come, practically, until Alert No. 3, except so far as sabotage is concerned?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

239. General GRUNERT. There was no reason for using the troops that you were trying to get ready, that you were trying to train, and use those for sabotage purposes?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

240. General GRUNERT. Did the Air Force Commander protest, do you recall, that part of the SOP? Was he in on it, in making it up?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am sure he was in on the discussion before the adoption of that. That was, as I recall, the decision of the Commanding General, that the Air Force assist.

241. General GRUNERT. Presumably, that decision must have been based on there being sufficient Air Forces to do their own work and that work in addition.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say as to that.

242. General GRUNERT. As to anti-aircraft, in that scheme of defense, especially in Alert 2, defense against an air attack, how were the anti-aircraft positions? Were they pretty well distributed in and around Pearl Harbor, on the perimeter?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They were; yes, sir.

243. General GRUNERT. Why would it have alarmed the public by allowing those forces to have live ammunition where they [1148] could grab it and get to work? That was brought up in the testimony, and I want to get your slant on it. Why couldn't they have been trained from time to time to make that a routine affair to have ammunition at their emplacements where their guns were, instead of having to

lug it from some distant place and thereby delay their putting fire on incoming aircraft? Had it ever been thought of that you should deceive the public by having the stuff in a truck nearby, or by having it camouflaged as "beans" or anything else? Did those things never occur, in the line of avoiding alarming the public, instead of placing uncased, live ammunition right next to the guns? Those things were possible, were they?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They were possible; yes, sir.

244. General GRUNERT. Then, mainly, the idea of not having the live ammunition close to the guns themselves was a question of alarming the public, showing intent, is that it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That perhaps was the chief reason.

245. General GRUNERT. Were you not also afraid, and did you not always have in the back of your mind, "Sabotage! They are liable to sabotage! They are liable to do this to the guns! They are liable to do this to the ammunition! or what not?"

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe that was true.

246. General GRUNERT. Were you not sabotage-minded, and not war-minded?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not think so, entirely, sir. I do not think that is entirely correct.

247. General GRUNERT. If you were war-minded, where did you think an attack was going to come?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, our mission was to defend Oahu [1149] from attack. The attack was coming on Oahu, if it came at all—the possibility.

248. General FRANK. Then why in the world did you not prepare for an attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was considered.

249. General FRANK. What did you think you had? You had some 8-inch guns, and you had some British 75s, and you had a lot of infantry around there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

250. General FRANK. You had those 8-inch guns and the British 75s, and all your infantry mortars, and the AWS system, and the bombers, and the fighter planes, and your antiaircraft shore defense batteries—and you think that was all put there against sabotage, do you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. That was for Alert 3, sir.

251. General FRANK. You say you were war-minded?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

252. General FRANK. And you had all these facilities to prepare for a war situation, and yet you did not prepare for a war situation, did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

253. General FRANK. Did you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, we adopted a sabotage alert, sir.

254. General FRANK. That is not a war situation?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No.

255. General FRANK. It is a local sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

256. General FRANK. In this message of November 27, it says:

The United States desires Japan to commit the first [1150] overt act.

Did you give any consideration to what that meant?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Oh, yes; yes, sir.

257. General FRANK. All right—what was it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, just exactly what it said—just exactly what it said.

258. General FRANK. I know that is what it said. What was the consideration that you gave to it?

259. General GRUNERT. In other words, what was your conclusion as to what it meant?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, that brought up the possibility of the attack, of course, on Oahu, but it was considered to be, by the General, not probable.

260. General FRANK. What did you think about it—you, as the Chief of Staff, one of whose duties it was to advise him? What did you think about it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. At that time, I agreed with the General, sir, thoroughly.

261. General FRANK. You agreed with him, but did you advise him?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did.

262. General FRANK. What did you tell him?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I told him of the possibility of an attack.

263. General FRANK. And what? What was the result of your consideration of this statement in the message:

The United States desires Japan to commit the first overt act.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, of course, we considered at that time, as I recall the attack, an attack on the Philippines [1151] was most likely.

264. General FRANK. In other words, you did not expect war in Oahu?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Possible, but not probable.

265. General FRANK. You thought it was not probable?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I agreed. I brought the possibility of attack on Oahu to the General.

266. General FRANK. Yes?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In his opinion, it was not probable.

267. General FRANK. What was your opinion?

Colonel PHILLIPS. My opinion was that it was not probable, at that time agreeing with him.

268. General FRANK. All right. Did he agree with you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know.

269. General FRANK. Did he have a chance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Did he have a chance?

270. General FRANK. Yes. Did you present him with an opinion, so it was possible for him to agree with you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I gave him no definite opinions.

271. General FRANK. Yet that was your duty as Chief of Staff, was it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly; if he desired it.

272. General FRANK. Now, there is another statement, referring to the words of the message.

The United States desires Japan to commit the first overt act, which says:

This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

Now, any alert except No. 1 would have pursued a course of [1152] action that would not so completely have jeopardized the defense against air attack, would it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, I believe so.

273. General FRANK. Did you analyze the statements in this message of November 27?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. As I recall, they were all gone over very thoroughly and an effort made at least to analyze them.

274. General FRANK. I would like at some time in these proceedings to go into this AWS.

275. General GRUNERT. All right, you may go into it now.

276. General FRANK. Was the aircraft warning system operative on December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not entirely so.

277. General FRANK. What do you mean by that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. On December 7, as I recall, we had one mobile station operating on a schedule, chiefly for instructional purposes, instructing operators.

278. General FRANK. Are you sure about your information, now?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The record of that is also in Hawaii, sir. I am not positive about this. It is purely from memory. I recall we had one station called the Opana station, on northern Oahu, operating that morning. I am not positive about that.

279. General FRANK. Well, did you not have a series of portable radar, identified as 270 sets, that were in position around the Island?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I think that was subsequent to December 7.

[1153] 280. General FRANK. Had you not had an exercise in which the aircraft warning service participated?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. These were mobile sets, however.

281. General FRANK. I know that.

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had no permanent installations at that time.

282. General FRANK. But your mobile sets?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Mobile sets; yes, sir.

283. General FRANK. How many of those did you have operating, do you know?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not sure about that.

284. General FRANK. Do you know when they arrived?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not.

285. General FRANK. Do you know anything about whether or not there was any delay in the installation of your permanent sets by the contractors?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I knew nothing at all about that, sir.

286. General FRANK. Do you remember whether or not there were any complaints made about delays?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not.

287. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not there were any contractors under suspicion for holding up completion of the work?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There were none to my knowledge.

288. General FRANK. What was the state of training of the personnel for operating the information center and the radar stations?

Colonel PHILLIPS. At that time?

[1154] 289. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I should say it was very mediocre. Every effort was being made to improve the situation.

290. General FRANK. Was sufficient personnel available and trained for the continuous use of the AWS with portable stations on December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say as to that, whether there was sufficient personnel. As I recall, there was insufficient personnel, trained personnel. We were making every effort to train them.

291. General FRANK. Were you familiar with the hours of operation of the AWS?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't recall the schedule that they were operating on at that time. It was more a training schedule than anything else.

292. General FRANK. It was not operated with any consideration of protecting the Island against an air attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was a training schedule, due to the fact that we did not have adequate trained personnel.

293. General FRANK. Did it start operating on December 7? Was it operating on December 8?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I feel sure it was.

294. General FRANK. Then it could have been operating on December 6, could it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not in full strength, I do not believe. I am not acquainted with those details.

295. General FRANK. Who directed the specific hours of operation, do you know?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe General Davidson, of the [1155] Air; I am not sure.

296. General FRANK. Our information indicates that those instructions came from the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not sure about that. That is also in the record. It was operating under the Signal Officer, and with the Air, under General Davidson. Now, who gave the instructions, I do not know.

297. General FRANK. General Davidson had just returned, on December 5, from a trip to the United States, had he not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know about that, sir.

298. General FRANK. He had not been present, until December 5, since the radar equipment had become operative in the Department?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't recall that, sir.

299. General FRANK. Who, if anybody, had been following this AWS project and using pressure to complete it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Signal Officer Colonel Powell.

300. General FRANK. Had any information been given out indicating a necessity for readiness of that at any particular time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know.

301. General GRUNERT. Was not the Navy much concerned in getting that thing started, and did they not put that up to the Army to push it along?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say as to that, sir.

302. General FRANK. Did you know whether or not there was a Commander Taylor loaned by the Navy to the Army to help them?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I knew Commander Taylor.

[1156] 303. General FRANK. You knew he was assisting the Army to install this station, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe I recall him; yes, sir.

304. General FRANK. In the operation of the AWS after the attack was there any evidence of an effort on the part of the local Japanese radio stations to conduct "jamming" activities that interfered with the operation of the AWS?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe there was, certainly not reported to me.

305. General FRANK. Do you know? It was not reported to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was not reported to me.

306. General FRANK. Do you have any knowledge concerning the failure of the contractor, Hawaiian Constructors, to complete construction of the defense projects within the time limits prescribed?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not.

307. General FRANK. Do you have any knowledge concerning the air-raid warning system's not having been completed on schedule?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not.

308. General FRANK. Do you have any knowledge as to whether any military personnel neglected their duty relating to this contract?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't.

309. General FRANK. Was any pressure given by Hawaiian Department headquarters to the district engineer to complete these defense projects as speedily as possible?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I recall no specific pressure.

310. General FRANK. Did you have any relations with Colonel Wyman?

[1157] Colonel PHILLIPS. He was the district engineer?

311. General FRANK. Did you have any relations with him?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I knew him quite well.

312. General FRANK. Still, did you have any official relations with him?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not, except to be acquainted with the various projects that he was installing, and the airfields, and so forth, he was building. He worked directly with General Short.

313. General FRANK. He did not coordinate his activities with the Chief of Staff, at all?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not generally.

314. General FRANK. Did you read the Air estimate prepared by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not recall. Undoubtedly I did. I can't say definitely.

315. General FRANK. It was submitted to the Department. It is a thing of a tactical and strategical nature?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

316. General FRANK. And if you had been going through the General Staff positions out there is certainly ought to have come to your attention.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't know the date that that was submitted, and I cannot say whether I even saw it. I wasn't, I don't believe, in the position of Chief of Staff at that time. I am not sure.

317. General FRANK. Prior to that time, however, you had been in the position of G-3?

Colonel PHILLIPS. G-3, G-2, and G-1.

[1158] 318. General FRANK. You should have known what the plans were for the defense?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; I undoubtedly saw it. I can't say.

319. General FRANK. You do not remember ever having seen such a document?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say definitely that I have ever seen it.

320. General FRANK. You have no memory of it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, I do have a memory of it. I remember it, but I can't say specifically what date, or that I have definitely read it. I feel sure that I have.

321. General FRANK. Those things usually are prepared as a guide or advice, and to point attention to the possibilities of development, are they not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

322. General FRANK. That estimate anticipated an air attack by the Japs exactly along the lines and in the manner in which it happened, and since that was a part of the evidence in the files of the Hawaiian Department, it constituted a recommendation for the defensive action to be taken in a critical situation, did it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; undoubtedly.

323. General FRANK. Shouldn't you then, as Chief of Staff, have been conscious of it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I undoubtedly should have known of it, but I must say again that I cannot recall ever having seen it.

324. General FRANK. And yet it was one of the outstanding plans, which, if carried out, would have prevented this catastrophe. And you don't remember it?

[1159] Colonel PHILLIPS. I don't think that I have seen it, sir. I don't believe I was in, as Chief of Staff, at that time. There was some other staff capacity. I don't recall that I have ever seen it, sir.

325. General FRANK. It still was a part of the plans for the defense of the Island?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

326. General FRANK. How often had you had alerts in the Department?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe, while I was there we had three maneuvers, and, I believe, two alerts; I am not sure; maybe more.

327. General FRANK. Did you have any blackouts?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe we did.

328. General FRANK. You don't remember?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not positive about that.

329. General FRANK. Had your alerts and maneuvers come sufficiently frequent to have become monotonous?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not at all; they were highly instructive.

330. General FRANK. In dealing with the different commands, and considering the probabilities of attack, was air attack ever emphasized to you or to General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The possibility of air attack? Yes, sir.

331. General FRANK. And you concluded that it was possible, but not probable, is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Possible, possible, an air attack.

332. General FRANK. You concluded it was possible but not probable, is that what you concluded?

[1160] Colonel PHILLIPS. That's right.

333. General FRANK. And that was your conclusion?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Agreement with the General.

334. General GRUNERT. We have another witness coming at 11 o'clock. I suggest we dismiss this witness, at present, and recall him; and as we have an extra hour this afternoon, we will recall him at 4 o'clock. The Board will recess. We will dismiss this witness, and request him to return at 4 o'clock.

(Brief recess.)

(The witness was excused until 4 o'clock p. m., with the request that he return at that time for further questioning.)

[1161] **TESTIMONY OF FULTON LEWIS, JR., WASHINGTON, D. C.
(ACCOMPANIED BY FRED MORRISON)**

(Theodore A. Huntley, Major, A. C., Bureau of Public Relations, entered the hearing room.)

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Lewis, will you state to the Board your name, address, and occupation?

Mr. LEWIS. Fulton Lewis, Jr., Mutual Broadcasting System. Business address?

2. Colonel WEST. That is right.

Mr. LEWIS. 1627 K Street, Washington, D. C.; radio news reporter.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Lewis, it came to the Board's attention that some time in the past you, as a radio news commentator, I think they called it, put out a series of broadcasts in which you reviewed the activities or some activities in Hawaii that concerned one Colonel Theodore Wyman. Unfortunately I never heard it, but it was called to my attention, and I asked the Board whether or not by having you in to testify before the Board we might get leads whereby we can get facts. That is the reason we requested that you come, to see if you could give us facts that we may not know and give us leads to facts that we may be able to get in our investigation, and you were kind enough to come up here.

So I shall ask General Frank to lead in propounding the questions, because this subject is so broad and our time is so limited that it is necessary to sort of parcel these special [1162] investigations out to members of the Board, although the entire Board will pass on all questions.

One more thing before going ahead: we, of course, shall want you to consider this as absolutely confidential, and not use it in any of your future work or make any mention of your having been here unless you get the P. R. O. War Department O. K. on mentioning that you have been a witness.

Mr. LEWIS. All right, sir.

4. General GRUNERT. And anything that occurs here, to not mention it, because we have no authority to make this public. I think you understand that.

Mr. LEWIS. I understand it perfectly, sir.

5. General GRUNERT. A Board member also suggested that I acquaint you with how this matter came up before this Board. This Board is a fact-finding body insofar as the attack on Hawaii is concerned. We had no sooner gotten started on that than we had added to us another burden, that of looking into so much of the so-called Wyman case as might have a bearing on the attack on Pearl Harbor. So we were directed to consider the interim report of the House of Representatives and take that and go into such phases thereof as pertain to the attack on Pearl Harbor. So we shall be a fact-finding board insofar as the so-called Wyman case pertains to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and no further.

Mr. LEWIS. And your interest in any testimony that I might have confines itself to the connections of Wyman or anyone else in the Pearl Harbor picture?

6. General GRUNERT. In the Pearl Harbor picture, plus possibly a bit of background that leads up to that Pearl Harbor [1163] picture, but nothing subsequent thereto.

Mr. LEWIS. All right.

7. General FRANK. Also, we are interested in the possible results of any of the association of Wyman and one Hans Wilhelm Rohl that might have affected construction work in Hawaii. As General Grunert has said, this is a Board investigating the circumstances surrounding Pearl Harbor.

Mr. LEWIS. That is right.

8. General FRANK. Therefore, in considering this we are trying to confine our consideration to those phases of the Wyman case that affect the Pearl Harbor situation.

With that as a background, will you give us a statement telling us information along the line that we have just indicated?

Mr. LEWIS. General Frank, my first knowledge of the name Hans Wilhelm Rohl, which led subsequently to my investigations and reporting on the subject of not only Mr. Rohl but Colonel Wyman, came as a result of a news broadcast I did in the latter part of October 1943, October of last year, at which time I made a factual report of certain investigations and hearings by the Truman Investigating Committee into the Canadian Canol project.

The next day I received a telephone call from a young man by the name of Bruce Pine who lived in Beverly Hills, California, who is an investigator at a dollar a year, I believe, a gentleman who is very well to do and who had contributed his services as a patriotic service to the so-called Tenney Investigating Committee of the Legislature of the State of California.

[1164] Mr. Pine asked me if the contractors on the Canol project included any of certain names, they being Rohl, Paul Grafe, Bechtel, or Callahan, and I didn't know. I contacted the Truman Committee and found out that they did contain certain of those names, they being Callahan and Bechtel and Grafe (Grafe being Callahan) the Callahan Company.

I then called Mr. Pine back and told him that they did, and he said that in that event he believed that he had some very valuable further

information on the subject; that the Tenney Investigating Committee had brought out in the course of hearings some months previous thereto information which the press had rather spurned and for some reason or other had never published except in a most desultory way, and the news had never been carried on the national news services at all.

That was on Tuesday before Thanksgiving of last year, and the following day Mr. Morrison and I set out for Los Angeles, and we arrived there on Sunday. We spent all day Sunday and all of a subsequent week in a very, very intensive review and study of the hearings and the testimony that had been adduced before this Tenney Investigating Committee, and throughout that week I reported over the air what had been found out.

That is the background. I give it to you to show you how I got into it.

Obviously, at that stage of the game it was almost impossible for us to do any personal investigation; we had to confine ourselves very largely to the Tenney report. Subsequent thereto, however, we both of us did a very considerable amount of personal investigation. I think it is unnecessary here to [1165] clutter the record with any summarization of what I reported in those broadcasts, because we have the exact transcripts of them here, sir; unless you feel otherwise. I shall be perfectly glad—

9. General FRANK. You have transcripts that you will make available to us?

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir; you may have the exact transcript of all those records. And of course, as you know, the complete transcript of all the hearings of the Tenney Committee is available to you. You probably have them. Therefore it seems unnecessary to merely repeat and paraphrase my paraphrasing of the certain essential parts of the Tenney Committee report.

As we went on through this procedure, as we presented these reports over the air, there began to come in an immediate flow of reports, letters, tips of all conceivable kinds from all over the State of California and all over the West, for that matter: individuals who said that they had worked on the Hawaiian projects, people who knew Rohl and who knew Wyman, people particularly in Southern California and in Beverly Hills and in the movie colony who had known these two characters, who had seen them around, because in their days when they were in Los Angeles they did considerable drinking and peregrination around the night clubs and the fast spots of Hollywood and the Los Angeles area.

George Murphy, a movie actor, was one who reported having seen the two together on many occasions. Bruce Pine himself had known Hansie Rohl, as they called him, and had known Wyman. There were many parties that Mr. Rohl had put on at which [1166] Colonel Wyman was present, and we gathered a general series of first-hand reports from the people who had been on those parties. It seemed unnecessary to use that material in the broadcast, because essentially their testimony was that Colonel Wyman was a very heavy drinker and so was Mr. Rohl, and they were just usual stories of wild parties, and I saw no reason to clutter up the radio broadcast with such material as that. Insofar as it was possible we tried to either trace down ourselves or turn over to the Military Affairs Committee of the House of Repre-

sentatives, who in the meantime had sent an investigator there, all of the letters and all of the leads that came in to us through the mail or through telephone conversations or through telegrams. We have here a file of letters, telegrams, and so forth. These two folders here comprise our complete permanent file except for just straight fan mail, which I am sure the committee would not want. It is a pile this high (indicating), and it doesn't contribute anything.

These two folders and the envelope there I think comprise essentially the important material that we received other than that which we turned over to the Military Affairs Committee. I am delighted for this Board to have the benefit of everything there is in here. I would want the file protected; I mean, so far as I am concerned I would want it available to me for my own future reference, but it can be all photostated, or if there is any way that the Board can take them and use them on loan, I am delighted to have you do that.

There may be still further leads in those letters that you would want to trace down. The way in which the Military Affairs [1167] Committee got into it was that after the second of these broadcasts I had communicated voluntarily on my part with Senator Truman before I went out there, telling him what I was going to do and suggesting that I would be delighted to make any reports to him that he might want, and suggesting that he may not need any. I had no idea whether the story was going to materialize into anything, and that perhaps Fred and I were just going out on a wild goose chase as you frequently do in news work.

Then after we got out there, after the second broadcast, or perhaps even the first, I received a telephone call from the counsel of the Military Affairs Committee staying that he was very much interested and was sending an investigator out there, Mr. John Weiner, who did arrive about Wednesday or Thursday, and I assume that Mr. Weiner either will be or has been called before this committee. He made a very extensive personal investigation of the matter.

10. General FRANK. May I ask a question there?

Mr. LEWIS. Yes. And if I am not carrying a train that you want, by all means guide me.

11. General FRANK. In your perusal of this did you ever run across the name of Werner Plack?

Mr. LEWIS. I did, sir.

12. General FRANK. Any information that you have, will you please include it?

Mr. LEWIS. In these broadcasts there is mention of Werner Plack, as you will see. We were told by Mr. Pine—I think he had several other friends there who also corroborated this—that Rohl and Werner Plack had been very close and intimate friends, that they had been seen together at night [1168] clubs on frequent occasions. The Tenney Committee was never able to get any admission out of Rohl that he had known Werner Plack. I think, as a matter of fact, he denied it, although these witnesses specifically stated that he had been present.

Now, there was Harry Flannery of the Columbia Broadcasting System, who had been in Germany just prior to the war; a very reliable radio news reporter, by the way. He had been in Germany just prior to the war. He was one of the last of the correspondents

to leave Berlin, and he reports that Werner Plack came back to Berlin after having left the West Coast and the associations of Rohl. He had stopped at Hawaii on the way out, had then stopped at Japan, and then had gone on into Germany; that when he got back to Berlin—it seems that Mr. Plack was somewhat of an addict to these spiritous liquors—that when he got back to Berlin, however, despite his ardent use of alcohol, he was given a job in the foreign office, and the correspondents there were rather amazed at the importance that the German Government seemed to attach to him.

That was all purely circumstantial. We had no facilities for investigating it further. But we were informed by the Committee representatives out there that Mr. Plack's effects had been searched by the F. B. I. a couple of times on the way across, and I believe some seizures had been made.

That is about all the light, sir, that I can throw on the matter of Werner Plack. Within my own conviction and from the people that I talked to in Southern California, Mr. Rohl's testimony to the contrary notwithstanding, I personally am satisfied Mr. Rohl did know Mr. Werner Plack and knew him quite [1169] well, and they were more or less frequent drinking companions and night club companions.

13. General FRANK. Were you able to draw any conclusions as a result of your investigation, from the governmental official point of view, that the association of Wyman and Rohl was not a healthy one?

Mr. LEWIS. Oh, yes, sir; unquestionably, I should have said. I should say it was a most unhealthy, and not only that, a most unsavory one. Here was a picture of an Army officer who had control of the award of contracts, and very important contracts, vital contracts. There were plenty of contractors, and excellent ones, on the West Coast, just as good, with just as fine standing and just as fine records of performance, and in most cases far better than Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

Here was a personal association—a pickled personal association so to speak—between an Army officer who had control of the award of these contracts, and the contractor. The fact remains that there were plenty of other contractors on the West Coast about whom there was no question of their fidelity, about whom there was no question of their sobriety, about whom there was no question as to their nationality and their allegiance; and as against that, for some still unexplained reason, the Government officer in charge of the award of these contracts continued to have only one person, and that was a man who even at that time was not even a naturalized American citizen, who was a German alien, and who had had an opportunity since 1924 to become a naturalized American citizen if he had any loyalty to this country. And Mr. Morrison reminds me, a very outspoken critic of democratic processes, a violent critic [1170] of the President. There are others who are, but it comes with far less grace from a German alien at a time when the country is distinctly at odds with Germany than it does from American citizens, and I have yet to hear an American citizen say any of the things about the President that Mr. Rohl is reported as having said.

14. General GRUNERT. Have you read the interim report of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives on their investigation?

Mr. LEWIS. I cannot say, sir, that I have read every word of it. I am familiar with the contents of it.

15. General GRUNERT. Much of what you have been telling us is just the line along which their report seems to go.

Mr. LEWIS. Exactly, sir.

16. General GRUNERT. I was wondering, if you had read it, whether there were any particular points that will elaborate on what they report, or any new points that they possibly did not touch upon. Do you know whether your news reports bring that to light? Of course, we have not read them.

Mr. LEWIS. My news reports at that time, sir, are almost—oh, I think entirely embodied in the report. I do not think there is any information that we had originally in the original series of stories that we did that is not contained in this report.

There is one phase of this question that I do not think is quite completely covered in that report. Are you familiar with the name of Robert Hoffman?

17. General FRANK. Yes.

[1171] 18. General GRUNERT. The name appears among those, and also his evidence is shown in this report. That is all we know about it, and we hope if he can be located that he will be a witness.

19. General FRANK. He is the man who is now in Mexico City.

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir.

20. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, we have his testimony given before the Committee.

21. General GRUNERT. We also have all the records that the House Committee has, which we have not yet been able to examine thoroughly.

Mr. LEWIS. If that is the case, I rather assume that you have all the information about Mr. Hoffman that I have. Mr. Morrison and I went to Mexico City. Mr. Hoffman was rather an elusive and mysterious figure in this case. He first came to light in an anonymous telegram that was sent to the Tenney Committee, and that telegram said, "If you want the full background story and the complete story about the Pearl Harbor contracts, get hold of Bob Hoffman. He knows it all and will spill his guts," or words to that effect.

They couldn't find out who Bob Hoffman was or where he was or anything else, and efforts were made to trace the telegram back. We couldn't find out who had sent the telegram, but the telegraph office that sent the telegram said that at the same time another telegram had been sent by the same individual to Mr. Paul Grafe, and that telegram was signed by the same name and told Paul Grafe that they had just tipped the Tenney Committee to find Bob Hoffman. It would seem to have been a bit of needling on the part of someone.

[1172] But subsequently we still couldn't—neither the Tenney Committee nor I or Fred could find out who Mr. Hoffman was. We subsequently got a letter signed by the same initials as had sent the telegram, a mere fan letter to me in Washington, saying that there was one person who could tell the whole story on this; he was a very fine person, that he had been superintendent in charge of construction; telling about his background, his past experience, and so forth, and his name was Robert Hoffman, and that I would find him in Mexico City at such and such an address.

Mr. Morrison and I got on an airplane and went to Mexico City and did find him there and persuaded him to come back and testify before the Military Affairs Committee of the House.

Incidentally, there is one thing that I do not believe came out in his testimony before the Committee. He said that he was asked to make a report as to his personal opinions and his personal impressions

of the performance of Colonel Wyman and the contract procedure at Pearl Harbor, that he made this report, turned it in to Army sources, and that some Army officer subsequently came to him and said that the report was not satisfactory and it couldn't be in the files of the Army.

Now, the anonymous letter that I received said that one copy of that report was still in Hoffman's hands and it was in a trunk in Los Angeles. That is one of the chief reasons that Mr. Morrison and I went to Southern California—to Mexico City. Hoffman said that there was such a report, that he had made it, that he had been told that the report should not be in the Army's files. He said it was a very critical report, and we [1173] finally persuaded him to go by way of Los Angeles on his way to Washington and to get the copy of the report and bring it here, and I believe he turned it over to—he made it available, at any rate, to the House Military Affairs Committee.

I do not want to editorialize and I do not want to give second-hand opinions. The counsel for the committee said that he was rather disappointed when he went over the report because he didn't find anything of particular importance in it, even though he got some engineers to survey it, and they couldn't find anything of particular importance in it.

22. General FRANK. Did your investigations at any time indicate, as a matter of fact, whether any advantage accrued to Wyman through this association?

Mr. LEWIS. To this extent, sir; we never were able to attain the slightest evidence of any kind that any financial benefit, any actual payments, any bribes, or anything of the sort had ever been paid to Colonel Wyman. I would like Mr. Morrison to express his own personal opinion on this, because this is opinion that you are asking for, and on this point I am merely giving my opinion. So far as I am concerned, I saw no concurrent circumstantial evidence to that effect. In other words, if a person is receiving bribes he is likely to live in a very much more profligate manner than he would if he is still living on his own salary, but there was no evidence that I was able to pick up that any such thing had happened. It unquestionably is true in my mind that Colonel Wyman received tremendous social benefits and tremendous emoluments of luxurious living. He was kept in liquor; many, many favors [1174] and courtesies, if you will. Such emoluments were certainly bestowed upon him in a most generous and lavish manner.

After all, sir, if you were in Hawaii in the early days of the war, when we were so short of ships and whatnot that we could hardly protect ourselves, and you were a little short of the liquor that you liked, and a yacht under escort came all the way from San Francisco to Hawaii, and its sole cargo was liquor—that, after all, is something of an emolument.

23. General FRANK. Did your delving into this situation result in any lead that would indicate any effort to delay the construction for which the Rohl Company had contracts? It is leads that we are after.

Mr. LEWIS. Hoffman's testimony and his information are material which, to me at least, are grounds for tremendous suspicion. That would be, in my language, a lead that we would have followed up had there been any way for us to follow it up.

24. General FRANK. Hoffman is the main lead along that line?

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir; and these various individuals who had charge of laying runways and tearing them up and relaying them and tearing them up again, and building hills and cutting them down, and then building them up again and cutting them down.

May I enlarge just one sentence, sir? To me, as a reporter, the preponderance of that evidence indicated that either there was the grossest sort of mismanagement and misdirection or that Rohl possibly was using Wyman as a dupe to deliberately delay the performance, or both.

25. General FRANK. Is there any evidence as to whether through the alleged inebriated nature of that association they caused [1175] any delay in the construction?

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir. From Hoffman's testimony and from the testimony of the other people who were first-hand witnesses on the scene there there seems to be no question, in my mind, as to that.

26. General FRANK. Did you get any information on the result of any of Plack's operations?

Mr. LEWIS. No, sir. Plack still remains the mysterious figure; Plack still remains an amiable, almost always inebriated picture of a fat German who loves to live well and who was either a very stupid oaf or a very clever individual, one of the two.

27. General FRANK. Did you ever meet him?

Mr. LEWIS. I never did.

28. General FRANK. As to this association of Rohl and Wyman, do you have any impression of over how long a period it extended?

Mr. LEWIS. That is all in the record, sir; either 1935 or late 1934, when Wyman was first sent to Southern California in charge of that district. It began at that time. Rohl's first big contract, and the one that he made his first stake on, was the Long Beach breakwater, and that contract was awarded to him by Wyman.

29. General FRANK. What I am getting around to is this: To your knowledge, this association had been continuing over a period of several years?

Mr. LEWIS. Oh, yes; continuing consistently.

30. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not it had ever come to the attention of any of Wyman's superiors?

Mr. LEWIS. I do not know, sir; nor do I know whether Wyman's escapades had ever come to the attention of his superiors.

[1176] As of what date? I am not sure that I got your question quite right.

31. General FRANK. As of any date, up to the point of your investigation.

Mr. LEWIS. Yea. Oh, yes. I think there was definite evidence that Wyman's condition in Hawaii had come to the attention of superior officers, and in Washington.

32. General FRANK. Have you anything to indicate that his superiors were conversant with this, and what action they took, if any?

Mr. LEWIS. I have not; and I do not know to what extent they were conversant with the details. I do not think there is any evidence in the record to show.

33. General FRANK. Have you any information as to the date on which Plack left the United States and when he reached Berlin?

Mr. LEWIS. I can dig it out for you, sir. It is in these files here (indicating). It was before Pearl Harbor, a considerable period of time before that, and before Germany's attack on Russia. It was a good long time.

34. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Lewis, you said that Rohl had a chance, since 1924, to become a United States citizen. Should that be 1913, sir.

Mr. LEWIS. Well, I would say yes. I was thinking about 1924 as the time when he went back. I think it was 1924 that he went back to Germany and came back. I should say 1913; yes.

35. Major CLAUSEN. Have you any leads or information concerning a Mr. Enright?

Mr. LEWIS. The name does not click with me.

[1177] Major CLAUSEN. Could you make a search of your office mail and fan mail to see if possibly you had received a communication from a Mr. Enright?

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir. Can you give me his first name?

37. Major CLAUSEN. I believe it is William Henry.

Mr. LEWIS. Those were not the initials on that communication to which I have referred. I do not know him.

38. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know anything of the activities of Mr. Rohl during the first World War?

Mr. LEWIS. I do not.

39. Major CLAUSEN. Did you get any leads on his possible activities during that time?

Mr. LEWIS. Not that I remember. I have no recollection of ever having heard about it.

40. General GRUNERT. The F. B. I. investigated him. The records there might show.

41. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not Plack passed through Hawaii while Wyman and Rohl were there, or before?

Mr. LEWIS. He passed through before they went in on this particular series of contracts. It was some months before that. Wyman and Rohl may have been there incidentally. Rohl was going to Hawaii on pleasure visits. I could not say about that. That is a matter of dates, and I am rusty on them.

42. General FRANK. May we have those papers (indicating) to put in evidence?

(The witness handed two volumes of correspondence to Major Clausen.)

43. Major CLAUSEN. At this time we offer as Exhibit No. 16 the broadcasts that have been identified by Mr. Lewis.

[1177-4]

ADDENDA

The Board at a meeting on 13 October, 1944, decided that Exhibits Nos. 16, 17, and 18, having served their desired purpose of furnishing

leads to evidence, directed that the mentioned Exhibits be withdrawn from the record and returned to the witness who furnished them, Mr. Fulton Lewis, Jr., by the Assistant Recorder.

[1178] (Volume of broadcasts identified by the witness was marked Exhibit No. 16 and received in evidence.)

44. Major CLAUSEN. At this time we offer in evidence the folder that Mr. Lewis has identified as the Canol Project folder, subject to the elimination of any unnecessary documents.

(Documents selected from folder of documents relating to the Canol Project were marked Exhibit No. 17 and received in evidence.)

45. General FRANK. Have you anything further, Mr. Lewis, that you want to submit?

Mr. LEWIS. This (indicating) is a folder of notes, letters, memorandums, and references from the personal files of my own office in regard to Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl and the projects in which they were involved.

46. Major CLAUSEN. I offer this file in evidence as Exhibit No. 18, on the same basis as that on which Exhibit No. 17 was offered.

(Documents selected from personal files of the witness were marked Exhibit No. 18 and received in evidence.)

47. General FRANK. Have you anything further, Mr. Lewis?

Mr. LEWIS. I was just asking Mr. Morrison if there is anything that comes to his mind.

There is one thing that did not appear in the record, a very small matter, perhaps, in a way. Perhaps it would not be germane because it was a relationship subsequently on Colonel Wyman's part to the Canadian Project, and not out in Hawaii.

48. Major CLAUSEN. Unless it is related indirectly.

Mr. LEWIS. I will be glad to tell it to you.

49. General FRANK. Suppose you narrate it.

[1179] Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Hoffman told Mr. Morrison and told me that—

50. General FRANK. Mr. Morrison is your associate?

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir; he is my associate. It was in Mexico City. He told us that a Mr. Turnbull, of Cleveland, who was one of the consultants on the Canadian Project—and let me interject here that this was apropos a question that we asked similar to the one you have asked, as to whether or not there was any evidence of Colonel Wyman's accepting any specific emoluments—that Mr. Turnbull, of Cleveland, who was one of the consultants on the Canadian Project, had come to him and had said that he certainly would like to do something for Colonel Wyman, but he did not know what to do, and Mr. Hoffman said that that was entirely up to Mr. Turnbull; it was not his affair. The net result of it was that Mr. Turnbull gave Colonel Wyman's wife a very handsome mink coat.

I do not know whether that is of any interest to you or not. The two cases, the Hawaiian contracts and the Canadian contracts on which both of these people worked, are so interwoven in my mind, as the reporter who worked on them, that it is difficult for me to extricate them for your individual purposes.

51. General FRANK. Is that the Turnbull Engineering Co. of Cleveland?

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir.

52. General RUSSELL. Mr. Lewis, when you went west did you make any investigation of these other corporations and individuals who have been identified as of the Hawaiian Constructors? I will name them so that you may refresh your memory:

W. E. Callahan Construction Company; Gunther & Shirley; Ralph E. Woolley.

[1180] Did you make any investigation of those people in connection with your western visit?

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir. I did not make any investigation of Woolley, but I investigated Gunther and Shirley and the Callahan Construction Company. Mr. Callahan was a very distinguished and much respected citizen of Dallas, Texas; in fact, I knew him. I had the pleasure of meeting him several times there. I believe that Mr. Grafe was his son-in-law, or some relative—his son-in-law, I think. I think Mr. Grafe married Mr. Callahan's daughter. Mr. Callahan had in recent years turned the company over to Mr. Grafe, who was a comparatively young man and was trying to build the company up. He seemed to be trying to get what business he could get.

I also investigated the Gunther & Shirley Company. I found that they all had their offices on the same floor of the same building. Mr. Morrison went down there personally and looked it over. Perhaps he could answer the question better, General, than I could, in so far as that specific phase is concerned.

53. General RUSSELL. There was a definite question to which I was attempting to get an answer, and that is that if you did make an investigation of these other contracting parties, state whether or not those people professionally and financially could have carried on this work irrespective of the association of the Rohl-Connolly Company with The Hawaiian Constructors.

Mr. LEWIS. I am afraid I am incompetent to answer that question, except by way of an impression, if that is all right. My impression is that they were certainly competent to carry it on.

54. General RUSSELL. It is in the record that this man Rohl [1181] did not go out to Hawaii until September, and that some time in August Army authorities intervened to hasten his citizenship application on the theory that Rohl's driving power and his capacity as an executive were needed to hasten along this construction work in Hawaii.

The questions which I have asked you heretofore were largely intended to determine whether or not it was necessary to have Rohl out there at that time, and I was wondering whether or not you developed that there were people among those other contractors who could have carried on the work out there without Rohl.

Mr. LEWIS. I think there is no question of that, sir. The simple fact remains that when they had the Canadian jobs to do they were able to find contractors that were competent to do it. Rohl was brought in merely as a very, very secondary sub-contractor and only because Colonel Wyman insisted that he be brought in, even then.

55. General GRUNERT. The contract had been let and was being executed in Hawaii. The idea was that apparently things were not going along as they should, so they demanded that Rohl come out and push things. It was not a question of getting other contractors, was it?

Mr. LEWIS. I think you will find that they began trying to push things for Rohl at the particular time that the contract was let. They did not have time to find out when they began pushing Rohl's citizenship whether the contract was going along satisfactorily or not.

56. General RUSSELL. I am going another step in the Hawaiian end of this situation. If the Callahan Company, the Gunther & Shorley Company, or whoever was operating for them, and Ralph [1182] E. Woolley, as an individual, were all out there participating in the construction work in Hawaii, I have been wondering just how this man Rohl, from an operating base on the west coast, could dominate that situation to the point that those three other contractors would delay the work out in Hawaii from the time they went to work until Rohl got out there in September.

Mr. LEWIS. I could not look into their minds, sir; I cannot answer that factually. I can only give you my own deduction.

57. General RUSSELL. Do you think that those other contractors were the type of people that would permit Rohl to stay in Los Angeles and cause them to tear up and rebuild runways and things of that sort in order to slow down the construction work in Hawaii?

Mr. LEWIS. Rohl unquestionably was the dominant figure in The Hawaiian Constructors.

58. General RUSSELL. We are talking about two things all in one sentence. The Hawaiian Constructors was a group of contractors. The Rohl-Connolly Company was a corporation. You have hit on the very part of the information that I am attempting to get. Did Rohl dominate The Hawaiian Constructors, or did he dominate the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. LEWIS. From the evidence we have, and all of the testimony and all of the interviews we have, there is no question about the fact that Rohl dominated both the Rohl-Connolly Company and The Hawaiian Constructors, through his association with Wyman. He was the contact man; he was the person who was close to the Colonel in charge.

59. General RUSSELL. Mr. Lewis has gone through the Tenney investigation in California and the investigation by the Congressional Committee here, and he has been out there and made a first-hand investigation of these other people, and I think it is extremely material to have in the record his impression of those people, such as the relation between Rohl and Wyman. All of those things I think are equally material in determining the major issue here.

Did Rohl's association with that outfit slow down construction in Hawaii?

Mr. LEWIS. Will you, so that I may answer your question and give you exactly what you want, ask it a little more specifically, General?

60. General RUSSELL. I thought I had asked the question, but I will repeat it so that there can be no doubt.

[1184] Do you think, based on your investigation and what you know of Callahan Construction Co., Gunther & Shirley Co., and Ralph E. Woolley, that Rohl could have dominated those other contractors to the point that they would have delayed the work which they were doing for the Government on the defensive projects in Hawaii?

Mr. LEWIS. If I may insert, there, "delayed, for one reason or another," I would be delighted to answer that question specifically. I don't want this answer to imply any final conviction on my part as to whether Rohl deliberately, from a sell-out-of-the-United-States standpoint, delayed those projects, or whether he delayed them in order to build up a high-cost job; because that, I don't know, and I am no one to pass judgment; but allowing the benefit of that doubt, my answer, sir, is that there isn't the slightest question in my mind at all that Rohl dominated these two concerns; first, the Rohl-Connelly Company, and then the Hawaiian Constructors, to the extent that he could do anything—he could have them do anything he wanted to do out there.

61. General RUSSELL. And he could do that by telephoning from Los Angeles?

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, he could do that by telephoning from Los Angeles; and the record shows that there were repeated telephone calls all through the summer and the early fall between Rohl and the project out in Hawaii, despite the provisions of law to the contrary.

62. General GRUNERT. Do I gather from your last answer that in your own mind you are convinced there were delays?

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir; unnecessary delays.

[1185] 63. General GRUNERT. From the information that you have?

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir.

64. General GRUNERT. From your viewpoint, without positively knowing all about what might have caused them?

Mr. LEWIS. That is right—from the information that I have.

65. General FRANK. And all that information has been made available to us?

Mr. LEWIS. All that is still in my hands, all that I haven't already turned over to the Military Affairs Committee of the House for their purposes; which of course is still available to you through them.

66. General GRUNERT. Mr. Lewis, I assume that you gather information primarily for news purposes?

Mr. LEWIS. That is correct, sir; solely for news purposes.

67. General GRUNERT. We must have evidence of facts on which conclusions can be drawn, for possible recommendations.

We appreciate your assistance in giving us a picture, and the data from which we may adduce evidence, or have a lead toward that goal.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, sir.

68. General GRUNERT. We thank you for coming, and appreciate it very much.

Mr. LEWIS. If there is anything further I can do, I would be delighted to do so.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 12:18 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m.)

[1186]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

**TESTIMONY OF COLONEL KENNETH P. BERGQUIST, A. U. S.,
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Kenneth P. Bergquist, Colonel, A. U. S., with the Army Air Forces; Executive Officer to the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operations, Commitments, and Requirements.

2. Colonel WEST. That is Washington, D. C.

Colonel BERGQUIST. Washington, D. C.?

3. General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is attempting to get at the facts as to the background and the viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack and also during the attack itself. We hope that you can throw some light on the subject and the position and assignment you occupied while in Hawaii during the latter part of the year 1941. General Frank will conduct the hearing, and the other members will ask such questions as they deem necessary to help develop the subject. General Frank.

4. General FRANK. On what duty were you in the latter part of November and the first part of December 1941?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I was Operations Officer of what was then known as the Hawaiian Interceptor Command.

5. General FRANK. Of what did the Interceptor Command consist?

Colonel BERGQUIST. It consisted of the two fighter [1187] groups, and later on it had operational control over all the air warning service.

6. General FRANK. Just at that time the Signal Officer was in charge of the A. W. S.?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

7. General FRANK. But you were working in there and using it?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

8. General FRANK. On a sort of cooperative basis?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

9. General FRANK. What were the number and locations of the permanent A. W. S. stations?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Before the 7th, sir? Before the 7th of December?

10. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel BERGQUIST. I don't know for sure now. I can't recall exactly, but if my memory is correct I believe we did not have any permanent radar stations set up at that time; they were all mobile.

11. General FRANK. Do you know what the locations were in which the permanent sets were to be installed?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I will give it as well as I can remember, from my memory of it. I believe one was to be at Kokee over on Kauai, as a permanent installation. One was to be up on a point on the northern shore of Kauai: Kilauea, was it?

12. Colonel WEST. Yes, sir.

Colonel BERGQUIST. Kilauea Point. I am not sure; I believe that was to be perhaps a mobile one. We were to put [1188] one on top of Kaala in Hawaii, which is the highest point in Hawaii.

13. General FRANK. You mean on Oahu.

Colonel BERGQUIST. I mean on Oahu, yes, sir. We were to put one up on near Kahuku Point, just back of Kahuku Point on some high ground. I have forgotten what we called that location. We were to put one on Mokapu Point. That is the point near Kaneohe Bay, as distinguished from Makapuu Point.

14. General FRANK. One is Mokapu, and the other is Makapuu.

Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right. This is Mokapu.

We were to put one back up from Barbers Point. Now, I don't recall very well which were to be mobile and which were to be fixed. I believe I do have a chart which would indicate it to me, in my files.

15. General FRANK. When they were going to put three fixed ones up, where were the three fixed ones going to be?

Colonel BERGQUIST. One on Kaala, one on Haleakala, and one on Kokee.

16. General FRANK. That is right. You stated that none of those sets was yet installed on the 7th of December?

Colonel BERGQUIST. As far as I know, that is correct, sir.

17. General FRANK. Had they arrived in the Department?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I don't think so, sir. I don't recall. I didn't check on that.

18. General FRANK. Do you know?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I do not know.

19. General FRANK. Did you have any 270 mobile sets in the Department at that time?

[1189] Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

20. General FRANK. How many? You had at least how many?

Colonel BERGQUIST. We had at least five.

21. General FRANK. When did they arrive?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Oh, I would say about July or August of 1941, as far as I can recall.

22. General FRANK. When were they set up and operating?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Well, as I recall, I think it was in perhaps July. They may have arrived a little sooner than July, but I believe it was approximately July or August when I conducted the first practice runs with two sets, one of which we had operating over at Waianae, and the other of which we had operating at Haleiwa, but I can't recall the exact date, sir.

23. General FRANK. All right. But did you have an exercise in which you had four or five of them operating later in the fall?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

24. General FRANK. When was that?

Colonel BERGQUIST. That was—

25. General FRANK. In November?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; in November we did that.

26. General FRANK. Will you look at that chart showing the Island of Oahu with those crosses on it (handing chart to the witness)? Was the location of those crosses generally the points where the mobile sets were set up?

Colonel BERGQUIST. That is correct, sir.

27. General FRANK. Well, will you state about where those were?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. We had one at Haleiwa, [1190] one at Kahuku Point, one at Kaala, and one at Koko Head, and one back up in the rear of Fort Shafter.

28. General FRANK. All right. Were they effective?

Colonel BERGQUIST. They were effective to a degree. We had not calibrated them all. There were a considerable number of loopholes, as we found out later when we did attempt to calibrate them, to find out every weakness we could about them. But they were effective to a fair degree.

29. General FRANK. How far?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I would say a maximum range of approximately 130 miles.

30. General FRANK. That might vary more or less under different conditions?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

31. General FRANK. All right.

Colonel BERGQUIST. And also with respect to the altitude of the target.

32. General FRANK. How were they operated? By motor generator sets or by commercial electricity?

Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir; at that time we were still operating them with the motor generator set, and we were attempting to get commercial lines put in.

33. General FRANK. Did you have plenty of spare parts and tubes?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I do not know the exact situation of that, sir.

34. General FRANK. Were you ever held up in operations for lack of spare parts?

Colonel BERGQUIST. As I recall, I believe we were.

[1191] 35. General FRANK. To any extent?

Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir. No, I would say not, offhand. It is not clear in my memory.

36. General FRANK. Was your information center organized?

Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir.

37. General FRANK. Was it operative?

Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir, it was not operative as an information center should be.

38. General FRANK. Could it have been used?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

39. General FRANK. Actually was it used on December 8?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

40. General RUSSELL. 7th?

41. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, it did get some information on December 7th, didn't it?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

42. General FRANK. Will you make a statement to the Board covering generally the state of training of the men assigned to the Aircraft Warning Service both for operation of the radar sets and for operation of the information center?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Well, I think we had had the sets operating in practice a sufficient length of time so that the radar scope operators that we had were fairly well trained. We had plotters and information

center personnel of the Signal Corps fairly well trained. I was in the process of training what I called pursuit officers, which is one of the positions on the board—on the control platform, that is—by running a roster of the fighter pilots in the Interceptor Command in [1192] order to do two things: to both train them to function as pursuit officers on the control board and to acquaint them with the workings of the board in order to better carry out instructions that they received from the board on flying missions. The only controllers that we had, we considered, that could operate, that were trained sufficiently, were myself, Major Tindal—I mean Colonel Tindal; he was a Major at that time—and I did have with me at that time Commander William E. G. Taylor of the Navy. The other positions on the control platform, we did have an anti-aircraft liaison officer, and had conducted problems with them so that they were in a fair state of training. We had not been able to get the Navy liaison officers assigned, so there was no one trained in that. The same applies to the bomber command liaison, the liaison officers with the Hawaiian Department headquarters.

43. General FRANK. What about civilian defense?

Colonel BERGQUIST. And also the civilian defense.

44. General GRUNERT. What was the second one you named after the Navy? Navy, headquarters, civilian defense, and what was the fourth one?

Colonel BERGQUIST. The bomber command. We were making all efforts to get the people assigned to man all these positions in order that I could train them and thus operate. We had a conference on the 24th of November, of which I have the notes, in which we had representatives from the Department Signal Office, Colonel Murphy I believe; we had Commander Coe from the Navy, who was then Operations Officer for Patwing 2, I believe it was; and we had Commander Taylor of the Navy, who was working with me; and we had Colonel Tetley and a couple of [1193] other officers. I forgot their names; I can't recall now. But at that time we brought out the fact that we wanted to get it on 24-hour operation as soon as possible. We asked that the Navy take the matter up immediately to get their liaison officers, and that the other agencies do likewise.

45. General FRANK. To whom was that communicated?

Colonel BERGQUIST. This was to be handled by each of the representatives whom we had there, to be handled verbally with their own organization to get it. There were no requests put through in writing that I recall.

46. General FRANK. Did you get any results out of this thing?

Colonel BERGQUIST. After the 7th, sir.

47. General FRANK. You got no results before the 7th?

Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right, sir.

48. General FRANK. And the 7th was just about two weeks later, wasn't it?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. If you like, I can—

49. General FRANK. How much cooperation did you get from the Department headquarters?

Colonel BERGQUIST. You want my opinion on that, sir?

50. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel BERGQUIST. Very little. I would like to state that perhaps the main reason for lack of cooperation from mostly the higher headquarters was a lack of education as to what air defense was and what it could do and what the setup could do.

51. General FRANK. Were you having difficulty putting your [1194] program through?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

52. General FRANK. What was the nature of that difficulty?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Getting the radar stations set up and operating.

53. General FRANK. You mean the permanent ones?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; the permanent as well as the necessary power and facilities for the mobile ones.

54. General FRANK. That is the commercial power for the mobile ones?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; getting the proper interest by the various agencies that had to cooperate with us on setting up and making this go; such as furnishing liaison officers, getting them to agree to putting operational control in our hands, in the hands of the Interceptor Command in the person of the controller to operate all the various agencies involved, such as the antiaircraft not only of the Army but of the Navy in Pearl Harbor, and controlling all the radio stations, commercial radio stations, controlling the movements of all aircraft; not so much to the exact telling of them what to do—for instance, the bombers—but to insure that they abide by the principles that we operated under, in that we would know at all times where they were so that we could filter out any plots that we received.

55. General FRANK. No only who they were but where they were?

Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right, sir.

56. General FRANK. With whom were you having difficulty putting this across?

[1195] Colonel BERGQUIST. All the Signal Corps activity was mostly handled—as far as I was concerned, my contacts were mainly with Colonel Tetley, occasionally with Colonel Murphy.

57. General FRANK. He is now deceased?

Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right, sir. And occasionally with Colonel Powell, the Department Signal Officer.

58. General FRANK. Who was your Commander at that time?

Colonel BERGQUIST. General Davidson.

59. General FRANK. Where was he?

Colonel BERGQUIST. At Wheeler Field.

60. General FRANK. Was he at Wheeler Field in November?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. I was too.

61. General FRANK. Well, when did he come back to the United States?

Colonel BERGQUIST. He didn't come back to the United States until—

62. General FRANK. Didn't he come back to the United States for a course of instruction?

Colonel BERGQUIST. He came back to observe a maneuver, as I recall now; that is right. And I believe he arrived back in Hawaii on the 5th of December, just in time to be there.

63. General FRANK. Well, did you ever make representations to him of the difficulties that you were having?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Occasionally, yes, sir. I tried to do most of this work of getting this up by verbal contacts and plugging along by myself, which was perhaps a lack of knowledge on my part; experience, rather.

64. General FRANK. Was the fact that this was not progressing satisfactorily ever taken up with Department headquarters to [1196] get some backing on it?

Colonel BERGQUIST. As I recall, I do not know definitely but I believe that General Martin had some discussions on it with the Department headquarters.

65. General FRANK. Get any results?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Very little as far as I could determine. One of the big arguments was: we wanted to take over the radar stations and get them set up and operating. The Signal Corps said no, that was their job; they wanted to set them up and get them operating and then turn them over to us for our operational control. The Department headquarters decided in favor of the Signal Corps.

66. General FRANK. Do you think that that delayed the ultimate completion of the system?

Colonel BERGQUIST. My personal opinion is that it did.

67. General FRANK. By how much?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I don't know, sir.

68. General FRANK. Well by five days, two months, or what?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Oh, I would say perhaps a month, thirty days.

69. General FRANK. About a month. All right.

What was the status of training of the enlisted personnel in the information center and in the radar sets, or was that under the Signal Corps?

Colonel BERGQUIST. That was under the Signal Corps, sir.

70. General FRANK. Well, are you conversant with the status of training?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I can only judge by the results we [1197] obtained and from the operations which I was directly connected with, and my opinion on that is that they were fairly well trained at that stage of the game.

71. General FRANK. How many did you have? What I mean by that, could you operate three shifts? Did you operate three shifts after December 7th?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

72. General FRANK. Well, the proof of the pudding is in the eating of it.

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; we did, but we were short. As I recall now, we were short of operators, trained operators, and some of the boys were ruining their eyes because we had to keep them on too long. I recall that now very clearly, that we were short of trained operators.

73. General FRANK. Were you having any trouble with your gasoline engines, power engines, folding up?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

74. General FRANK. Well, was it just ordinary engine trouble which was repairable in a short length of time, or was it serious trouble?

[1198] Colonel BERGQUIST. I think it was rather serious. In fact, as I recall, the design of the engine was not quite what it should

have been and was not able to hold up in the continuous operation that was required.

75. General FRANK. Where were you on the morning of December 7?

76. General GRUNERT. May I interrupt right there?

77. General FRANK. Certainly.

78. General GRUNERT. I have an extract here from the Roberts Commission report in which it appears that you stated that you wanted to have 24-hour service by November 24, that the mobile units could have stood it; the main failure was not the detector but the gas engine running them; had sufficient personnel to run 24 hours and could have run even with the gas engine failure.

I just wanted to recall that to your mind. That was the testimony you gave while it was still fresh in your mind.

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. We were having trouble with the engine, and I think my statement in there was correct, that we could have operated. Some of our stations may have gone out but still others could be operated.

79. General FRANK. Where were you on the morning of December 7th?

Colonel BERGQUIST. At 7:55, sir, I was in bed.

80. General GRUNERT. A. M. or P. M.?

Colonel BERGQUIST. A. M., sir.

81. General FRANK. What were the hours of operation of the A. W. S. at that time?

Colonel BERGQUIST. At that time, in accordance with an order that the air warning signal officer had received, as I [1199] understood it, from Department Headquarters, they were to operate the detector stations from 4 to 7 in the morning.

82. General FRANK. Had you ever made any recommendation with respect to the hours of operation?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Only from a training point of view.

83. General FRANK. Not from an operating point of view?

Colonel BERGQUIST. No; not from a warning point of view.

84. General FRANK. There was an officer there by the name of Tyler, was there not?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

85. General FRANK. How did he happen to be there?

Colonel BERGQUIST. He was on the roster of officers which I made up and had at the Information Center. The primary purpose was to train this officer to be a pursuit officer, to acquaint him with the system, and to be on hand during the time that the warning stations were operating. When I was informed that they had received orders to operate the stations from 4 to 7, I took it upon myself to have an officer down there, because I could see no reason why they should just operate the station and not do anything with the information that they got. So I did have an officer there each morning. My schedule was from 4 to 8, or the first watch.

86. General FRANK. Did you take any steps to give them any instructions as to their duties?

Colonel BERGQUIST. My only instructions to them, as I recall, were that the main purpose was to go down there and to learn as much as they could about the setup during the time they were on. I do

not recall specifically whether I pointed my finger at them and said, "Call me if anything comes up", but I had it in the back of my mind that if they got into trouble [1200] they should call me.

87. General FRANK. We had Lieutenant Tyler up here before the Board. He was the only officer down there, I think, on the morning of December 7.

Colonel BERGQUIST. I believe he was; yes, sir.

88. General FRANK. And the nature of his duties and responsibilities was pretty vague in his mind.

Since you were sending officers down there to become familiar with the system and to teach them to be pursuit officers, why did you not make a regular scheduled course of instruction to teach them about the system and give them a regular course of instruction on the duties and responsibilities of being pursuit officers?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I ran a school in October, sir. We began a school in October. I have the outline of that in my briefcase. I called it the Air Defense School, in which I included as many of the pursuit officers as I could. I also had Marine Corps officers in this school.

89. General FRANK. Had Lieutenant Tyler been a member of that?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I do not recall whether he had or not, but I think he was. I do not recall definitely whether he was or not, but I think he was.

90. General FRANK. For the Army Air Force were you carrying the load in an effort to get this thing in shape and operating?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

91. General FRANK. Aside from what the Signal Corps was doing?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

92. General FRANK. Did you receive any complaints, or did you have any complaints about the tardiness in the construction of these permanent sets and the failure of the constructors to get [1201] them finished on time?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, I did; I was continually harping to the Signal Corps people to get the stations up and get them operating. I do not know of having put anything down in writing on it.

93. General FRANK. You made your complaints to the Signal Corps?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

94. General FRANK. Did you ever make any complaints to your own immediate headquarters through channels?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Verbally, I kept General Davidson informed as to what I was doing.

95. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not he followed it up and made any official complaints?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I do not recall. I also worked through our own headquarters on Signal Corps matters with Colonel Hoppough, in the Air Force Headquarters.

96. General FRANK. Did you ever find out who was responsible for delays?

Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir.

97. General FRANK. You know that there were some delays, do you not?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

98. General FRANK. Was the communication between the radar sets and the Information Center satisfactory?

Colonel BERGQUIST. It was not good. Those on Oahu, where you could connect them up by telephone, were fairly good. Those on the other islands, where you had to rely on radio, were fair and improved greatly when we installed the F.M.'s, which was after December 7th.

[1202] 99. General GRUNERT. Were there five mobile sets on Oahu?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

100. General GRUNERT. I have not heard any evidence yet that there were any in active operation.

Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right, sir. Before the 7th of December there were not, as I recall.

101. General FRANK. Could hostile planes have been detected from any direction coming into Oahu?

Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir. There were some blank spaces.

102. General FRANK. In what direction?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I would say generally north of Molokai, about due east of Makapuu Point in a sector of about 20 degrees, perhaps. That was pretty much of a blank space. As I say, we had not had all those sets calibrated before the 7th, and we did not go definitely into the blank spaces. I am speaking now of what I found out afterwards when we did get them all set up and operating and began running checks on the stations.

103. General FRANK. You state that the Signal Officer was responsible for installing the equipment and training the Signal Corps personnel?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; that is my understanding.

104. General FRANK. And then turning it over to the Air Force?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

105. General FRANK. At the same time you were charged with the control of such operation as was incident to the training of your fighters, working with the A.W.S.?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

106. General FRANK. Was there ever any confusion because of this dual control?

Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir. I do not remember that I ever [1203] received any orders to do it. We just went ahead and did it. Colonel Tetley and I worked together very well. I think that if anyone built the whole business up it was Tetley and I; and we just went ahead and worked, and worked out our problems. He was very much interested in radar. I was very much interested in the whole system of getting the devices set up and handling problems, and we just went ahead and set up schedules and worked out problems and went ahead with our training.

107. General FRANK. Did you ever get any of the permanent sets in place and operating before you left?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. I believe the one at Halakeala was put in and operating.

108. General FRANK. What was the difference between the permanent set and the mobile set at that time?

Colonel BERGQUIST. There was practically no difference, only one was on a fixed base and the other on a mobile base.

109. General FRANK. What was the advantage of the fixed station?

Colonel BERGQUIST. The advantage of the fixed station was that you could construct it in a more inaccessible place, and I think you could perhaps get it calibrated more accurately.

110. General FRANK. You could get it higher so that you had less interference?

Colonel BERGQUIST. That is correct. I am not too well acquainted, or I do not recall now the technical differences. I think I knew them at one time, but I have forgotten them now.

111. General FRANK. What was your feeling with respect to the probability of an air attack at that time? Were you surprised?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; I was surprised.

112. General FRANK. Did you think an air attack was probable?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

[1204] 113. General FRANK. You thought it was probable?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; I thought it was. Generally, my view was that it was probable. That is why I was trying to get the thing operating on a 24-hour basis if I could.

114. General FRANK. Did you know at that time that there was a tense situation existing between the United States and Japan?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I did not know it was as tense as I do now. I did not realize it was that tense.

115. General FRANK. Was there any information passed down from higher military authorities at that time with respect to that period being an acute period?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Not that I know of, sir.

116. General FRANK. With respect to this alert, what is your point of view with respect to the advantages, so far as protection of airplanes against sabotage is concerned, of an alert where the planes were all massed on an apron as compared with dispersing the planes reasonably with the crews sleeping in the vicinity?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Well, if it was a matter of guarding the airplanes, it naturally is much easier to have them all together there. You do not have to have so many guards, particularly if the crews are not going to sleep with the airplanes, which they were not required to do at that time. If you have them dispersed with the crews actually at their alert huts, as we call them, then I believe that you would have sufficient guards to prevent sabotage, although a determined saboteur would have a much easier time if the airplanes were dispersed, because he could come in out of the bushes near the edge of the field.

117. General FRANK. You do not have to disperse them all right [1205] around the edge of the field.

Colonel BERGQUIST. No. That is where we had our dispersal point set up at that time, right back off the edge so we could operate from any position.

118. General FRANK. It would have been possible, however, to have provided a reasonable amount of defense against a saboteur and still have had the planes dispersed?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

119. General FRANK. It would have been possible to have had the crews sleeping in the vicinity, would it not?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

120. General RUSSELL. You stated that you went on duty 24 hours a day with the Interceptor Command as of December 8th?

Colonel BERGQUIST. As of December 7th.

121. General RUSSELL. After the attack on December 7th.

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

122. General RUSSELL. Did it function fairly well?

Colonel BERGQUIST. It took a few days, sir, to get everybody in there operating and get a roster going and get the people there trained.

123. General RUSSELL. How many days?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I do not recall, sir.

124. General RUSSELL. A week?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; I would say probably a week.

125. General RUSSELL. Was the problem to get them in or to get them trained, after December 7?

Colonel BERGQUIST. The first problem was to get them there.

126. General RUSSELL. How long did that take?

Colonel BERGQUIST. As I recall, it only took me a day or [1206] two to do that. After the 7th I just had to snap my fingers and I got what I wanted.

127. General RUSSELL. You had your Information Center, and then your stations in the field?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

128. General RUSSELL. Roughly, those were the two groupments of operations?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

129. General RUSSELL. You had no trouble on December 7 about the training of the people at the operational stations in the field; you had trained those people, had you not?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; they were fairly well trained.

130. General RUSSELL. Now, with reference to the Information Center, I have got the impression that you had a pursuit officer at one part of the Center, and then you had another group there which I understand consisted of the liaison officers for these organizations and the control officer you referred to. Is that correct?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

131. General RUSSELL. Who else?

Colonel BERGQUIST. May I have permission to show you a diagram?

132. General RUSSELL. No; I do not want to get confused. I am trying to get straightened out. I know these diagrams.

Colonel BERGQUIST. This diagram will show you the exact people.

133. General RUSSELL. Leave it out and us look at it. You had these control officers and this pursuit officer. Those were your commissioned people; is that right?

[1207] Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; a controller and a pursuit officer; and we had two antiaircraft men. One controls the searchlight and one controls the guns. Then we had a Navy liaison officer and a bomber command liaison officer. All those were commissioned officers. Then we had a Hawaiian Department Headquarters liaison officer.

134. General RUSSELL. What training did these liaison men have to have?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I had to train them on the job.

135. General RUSSELL. But what did they have to do?

Colonel BERGQUIST. The antiaircraft officer——

136. General RUSSELL. Is he a liaison officer?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir, in that he advises and suggests actions to the controller. The controller is the boss, however. He tells him when certain areas are released from antiaircraft fire.

137. General RUSSELL. He is just an ordinary liaison officer?

138. General FRANK. No; he is not. He is not supposed to be. He is specially trained in the system to function in accordance with the method of operating. You cannot take any "bohunk" and put him in there and expect to get the desired results.

139. General GRUNERT. One just hangs around and gets something to transmit, but these liaison officers in the Information Center have almost a constant job of transmitting information from the Control Officer; is that right?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

140. General FRANK. They were operators.

Colonel BERGQUIST. Another important thing he does is this: The antiaircraft have stations all around Oahu, so they [1208] have a lot of men who are lookouts and who send in information if they see an airplane, a submarine, or anything else. In other words, they are feeding information which also comes in through this liaison officer into the controller.

141. General RUSSELL. I think I know what a liaison officer is. Now, who was the controller?

Colonel BERGQUIST. The controllers were the ones I had selected and had to train on the job to be controllers. I was the first controller.

142. General RUSSELL. Where were you going to get them? All from the Air Corps?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

143. General RUSSELL. It was the Air Corps' job to select them and train them?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

144. General RUSSELL. And you did not have to go any further than that to get them?

Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir.

145. General RUSSELL. These other people who were liaison officers: You went to the heads of the respective branches to get them, including the Navy?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

146. General RUSSELL. That gives us the big picture at the Information Center?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

147. General RUSSELL. In about a week you were able to train them and get them going?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I believe so.

148. General RUSSELL. The problem up until then had been getting people into this place?

[1209] Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. I had been sent to the Air Defense School, at Mitchel Field, in April of 1941.

149. General RUSSELL. Who sent you there—the Air people or the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel BERGQUIST. It came as an order from headquarters here in Washington, I believe. They set up a school and got people from all

over, from Hawaii, Panama, and all the continental air forces. They went to Mitchel Field to be instructed in the air defense system which had been developed by the First Fighter Command as a result of their operations and training in England; and that was the system then that was put in all over. These people went from the school out to the continental air forces; some went out to the Philippines and to the south Pacific; and Colonel Tetley went back out to Hawaii.

150. General RUSSELL. When did you get there?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I left there on March 17 and arrived back on April 15.

151. General RUSSELL. When was the order for you to go over and take charge of this Information Center issued in Hawaii?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I did not quite get your question.

152. General RUSSELL. When you got back out there in April, did you immediately go on duty with this outfit?

Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir.

153. General RUSSELL. How long thereafter was it before you went on duty?

Colonel BERGQUIST. May I just recite what I did? I got back there in April and was placed on approximately two weeks special duty to write up a report on what should be done in Hawaii. I did that and submitted it, and I have never seen it since. I do not know whether you have it, or not. I was then [1210] issued orders that I was relieved to go back to normal duty. I was at that time still supposed to be in command of a fighter squadron. That was about in May, the first part of May. About the 22nd of May we started the Hawaiian Department maneuvers. I was with my squadron that morning ready to start operating with my squadron when about 10 o'clock I was called up to the Group Headquarters and asked to take control of operating the device. I relinquished command to my next senior in the squadron and went up and set up what was perhaps the first Information Center. It was not much, because I set it up in one hour. It was not really an information center; it was a fighter control center. I then operated during maneuvers that way.

154. General RUSSELL. All of the people that operated there were Air Force people?

Colonel BERQUIST. That is right, sir. After the maneuvers I was then assigned to the Wing as Assistant Operations Officer. I then began building on my own hook a little information center in the base of the headquarters building at Wheeler Field. I wanted to get something started so that we would have some kind of an information center going in case of attack. That was my idea. We set up this little information center down in the basement. It was not really authorized. We had an awful time trying to get equipment for it; but by the usual methods of chiseling here and there I got the stuff and that was when I had my first contact with actually putting something in writing, because I put in a request for some headsets for the controller and the pursuit officer to use, and got an indorsement back from headquarters of the Air Force asking me by what right I was setting up an information center. I mean, this was addressed to the commander, of course. They said I could not have the equipment.

[1211] I wrote up a 2-page endorsement for General Davidson to sign, which he did, which explained the position, that we had

one, that was the only one that was ready to operate, such as it was, and they also stated in their letter from the headquarters of the Air Forces that the Signal Corps was setting up an information center, and I knew that that one wasn't going to be ready for about six months, so that was my first contact I had with writing, and they did approve then my going ahead with this, and that was my first opening wedge to have a chance to educate headquarters, the Air Forces, at all, as to just what it was all about, and especially the Signal Officer, Colonel Hoppough.

Then I attempted this: We ran experiments down there, ran problems, with our fighters. I sent out airplanes to act as target airplanes. I worked with Colonel Tetley at that time, and we had two of his sets set up, and we began working problems.

155. General GRUNERT. Who was Tetley?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Tetley was in the Signal Corps, in the Department Signal Office, and was in charge of the radar. In fact, at that time I believe he was still up at Schofield Barracks in charge of this little plotting outfit they were training as plotters, and getting these radars set up.

156. General RUSSELL. When did you amalgamate those operations, yours and Tetley's?

Colonel BERGQUIST. That's right. Well, then we began. Tetley then told me that they had finally gotten an authorization to build an information center down near Fort Shafter. I then worked with him, and I drew up the design for the [1212] information center, and the Signal Corps went ahead and built it. Then, I guess it was probably in November, when we finally got the thing built and began putting in our communications into it. I am trying to get to your original question of when I took over. Actually, it wasn't until the 7th of December, maybe the 8th. You can say the 7th, because I went down there on the 7th, and, from then on, operated.

157. General RUSSELL. When did you move physically into this new building, which was completed in November?

Colonel BERGQUIST. We completed it in November, and we began running practice problems. In other words, we would go down there and open it up and operate it, to train and qualify them.

158. General RUSSELL. But you were merely representing the Air Forces, then?

Colonel BERGQUIST. That's right. Then, we actually moved our headquarters down, in December, after we started operating.

159. General RUSSELL. I want to connect up one link that is missing in my mind; it may be, in the record. When you went to this school, in April, I believe I asked you, but I do not remember the answer, were you sent there as a representative of the Hawaiian Department or by the Air Forces, or was that an Air Force school, or what sort of school was it?

Colonel BERGQUIST. It was an Air Force school. We did represent the Hawaiian Department. It was the Hawaiian Department issued the orders.

160. General RUSSELL. Were all those in that school Air Force people?

Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir; there were some Signal Corps [1213] and antiaircraft people.

161. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, the problem out there was to take away from these various branches those elements which were going to operate as part of this entire whole that we are discussing, now; is that true? You got some people from the Navy, some from the antiaircraft people, and some from other services, there?

Colonel BERGQUIST. That was a small part. They had to furnish a liaison officer, but they also had to agree to the method of operation, whereby I had control.

162. General RUSSELL. And that placed the command of relatively large elements of the Navy and of the other branches under the command of this coordinator?

Colonel BERGQUIST. The controller; yes, sir.

163. General RUSSELL. You stated a moment ago that there was opposition to turning over the command of these units to this central commander, who would have been General Davidson?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

164. General RUSSELL. That is one of the problems you had?

Colonel BERGQUIST. That was one of the problems; yes, sir.

165. General RUSSELL. And in so far as the naval elements went, that was a matter of cooperation, because there was not unity of command?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

166. General RUSSELL. Now, radar, as I understand your testimony, was more or less new, at the time?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Very much so; yes, sir.

167. General RUSSELL. These sets which arrived out there some time in the summer of July, August, or September, whenever they did arrive, were the first to appear on the Island?

[1214] Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

168. General RUSSELL. And it was necessary to start training from the ground up?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

169. General RUSSELL. Most of the training of operating personnel for the field stations was done by the Signal Corps?

Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right, sir.

170. General RUSSELL. Did Colonel Tetley "play ball," out there, with you?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Colonel Tetley? Yes, sir—to the utmost.

171. General RUSSELL. And I believe he was finally on the Staff of the Department?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

172. General RUSSELL. And he represented the Department Commander in the development of the Interceptor Command?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

173. General RUSSELL. One other question. We are now dealing, Colonel, with a good deal of philosophy, apparently. Had you had a complete set-up, with all of the people trained, and all of the command chain established, if they had been off duty beginning at 7 o'clock that morning, they would not have been helpful in this situation?

Colonel BERGQUIST. That's right; but your supposition that we had everybody, and had them all trained, would mean that we would be operating 24 hours a day.

174. General RUSSELL. I am bringing a supposition in, too, that they were all in bed, after 7 o'clock that morning, and it would have been to no effect?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Well, if they had been, yes; but as I [1215] stated, on this conference we had on the 24th of November, I wanted to get them on 24-hour duty.

175. General RUSSELL. That is all.

176. General GRUNERT. Did the lack of progress in getting the information started stem into the lack of being air-warning-service-minded, in the high command, do you suppose; or what?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I think that was the trouble, to a great extent.

177. General GRUNERT. We hear the expression quite frequently among the witnesses that they "made all efforts" to do so-and-so. Apparently the all-out effort they made after December 7 amounted to something because there was unity of purpose after that, caused by the attack.

Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right; yes, sir.

178. General GRUNERT. Apparently, before that, there was not the realization of the necessity nor the unity of purpose to push the things through that there was after December 7. Was Davidson air-warning-service-minded?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; I believe he was.

179. General GRUNERT. Was Rudolph so minded?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Perhaps to less extent. I do not think so. I think they say, in that, he was not.

180. General GRUNERT. He was the liaison officer, up there?

Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right. He was not educated into what it could do and what it meant. There was a stock phrase that I got from him.

181. General GRUNERT. Whose business was it to put this thing across, in the line of education? Was that Davidson? Was it Martin? Somebody had to educate the Department Commander and his staff, so that it could be pushed. Or was it the [1216] Departmental Commander's Signal Officer who should have been the air-warning-service man?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I believe, sir, it should have started with the report that Colonel Tindal and myself drew up when we got back, and turned in to the Air Force Headquarters.

182. General GRUNERT. Then it would appear that sending you two to the United States to go to a school was just another school detail, but when you came back and put in your report, there was nothing happened for several months?

Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right, sir.

183. General FRANK. What did you say General Rudolph's stock phrase was?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I was trying to get the liaison officers, and the stock phrase was, and the answer was, they "couldn't be spared."

184. General GRUNERT. There appears to have been issued on the 5th of November an SOP in which there was set up an Interceptor Command. Now, somebody had sold it to the Department Commander and to the Staff that got up this SOP that they put in there—

There will be an Interceptor Command

and they stated, I think, as I remember it, what it was; and it was well stated.

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

185. General GRUNERT. But it was not implemented until, really, December 7?

Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right, sir.

186. General FRANK. It really was not effective until December 17, was it?

Colonel BERGQUIST. The name was changed from—let's see—[1217] "The Hawaiian Interceptor Command"—that is right; I believe it was the 17th of December that it was officially changed from the Wing designation to the Interceptor Command designation.

187. General GRUNERT. But this November 5 SOP, when you read it, looks as if this goes into effect as soon as that order is received; and it appears, according to the testimony, to have misled the Navy into thinking that it was in being, when it was not really activated. Although it did operate December 7, it was not really activated finally until December 17.

Now, do you suppose some of that delay was caused by a sort of little jealousy between the Air Corps and the Signal Corps as to the Signal Corps' giving up something?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; I believe that contributed to it.

188. General GRUNERT. Or was it because they did not think the Air Corps, being a new and growing branch, was to be trusted with something as important as that; or was it a combination of that?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

189. General GRUNERT. Tell me about Tetley.

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

190. General GRUNERT. We are going to have Powell as a witness, but Tetley had not come into the picture, so far as I have seen. Who can give us the best information on the Signal Corps end of this Air Warning Service? * * * On the record, again:

Do you know anything about the sites for the permanent radar? Have you been on those sites? Do you know what [1218] difficulties there may be in getting to them, doing the construction work, and installing the permanent radar sets?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; I do. I was on the Board that selected the sites.

191. General GRUNERT. Do you know of any physical reason why those sites should not have been prepared prior to December 7, even if you did not have the permanent radar equipment? I mean, as to access to the sites, and the roads. In one place, they had a cable with which to haul stuff up to the top side.

Colonel BERGQUIST. I believe that some of those sites that we selected were very inaccessible and would require considerable time to put the stuff up in there. I am not in a position, I do not know enough of the facts or the engineering data, to know whether or not it could have been done before December 7.

192. General GRUNERT. I have forgotten whether you said they were there when they were completed, or not; but when the impetus was back of it, after December 7, the dirt started to fly and they got there, did they, or didn't they?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Well, you might say Yes, but they had started on the work before, and there were just men finishing it up. Now, naturally everyone was working a little harder after that, and perhaps it did get done a little faster.

193. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

194. General RUSSELL. Yes.

What happened to that report which you made when you came back from the school?

Colonel BERGQUIST. It was turned in to the Air Force [1219] Headquarters, and I have not seen it, since.

195. General RUSSELL. You do not know where it went from there?

Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir.

196. General RUSSELL. Do you know who wrote the SOP section for this Interceptor Command?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. If I recall correctly, Colonel Paul was the Air Corps Liaison Officer, in the G-3, the Hawaiian Department, at that time, when that was written up. He had received considerable information on what an "interceptor command" was and what it did, from me, as well as information through the normal channels, because Colonel Paul was the Operations Officer of the Fighter Wing at Wheeler Field, and I was his assistant from May through September.

197. General RUSSELL. Did he write that SOP section?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I am not sure; but I think he did.

198. General RUSSELL. When were the selections for the permanent radar sites made?

199. General FRANK. Were preparations made for the selection of those sites back in 1939?

Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir; not that I know of. I didn't know what a radar was until I came back from the school, in 1941.

200. General FRANK. Or 1940?

Colonel BERGQUIST. I wasn't acquainted with that, sir.

201. General RUSSELL. When did your group make these selections?

Colonel BERGQUIST. We made selections during the midsummer, I believe, of 1941, and then I believe they had to go back to the War Department for approval, and I don't know what the final date was when that actually was approved.

[1220] 202. General RUSSELL. Were they eventually installed at the sites that your group selected?

Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; I believe most of them were.

203. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for helping us.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Brief recess.)

[1221] **TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JACOB H. RUDOLPH, RETIRED,
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General RUDOLPH. Jacob H. Rudolph, Brigadier General of the Army, Retired. I am at my home now.

2. Colonel WEST. Is that in Washington?

General RUDOLPH. No. In Milwaukee, No. 14.

3. General GRUNERT. General, this Board is attempting to get at the facts and looking into the background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack and what happened there; and in view of your assignment at the time as Commanding General of a bomber wing—was it?

General RUDOLPH. 18th Bombardment Wing.

4. General GRUNERT. Of a bombardment wing. —we thought you could throw some light upon the subject.

Now, we have developed this subject considerably, so we are piecing out to a great extent, and so I will ask you some definite questions on what I gleaned mainly from the Roberts Commission report together with the testimony that has been brought out so far.

Your assignment was what while you were on duty in Hawaii?

General RUDOLPH. At that particular time I was just Commanding General of the Bombardment Wing; I had nothing to do with the post or any housekeeping duties.

5. General GRUNERT. You were tactical commander, then?

General RUDOLPH. Yes, sir.

[1222] 6. General GRUNERT. Then, you will not know anything about the security measures that were taken at the post? You had nothing to do with that?

General RUDOLPH. Well, I wouldn't say that I didn't know anything about it, because I did see the preparations, but it did not come directly under me.

7. General GRUNERT. It is stated in the testimony here that, about the measures taken for protection of materiel and personnel after the attack, there were certain measures taken, and it states: similarly measures were taken by General Rudolph at Hickam Field since December 7th as to blackout instructions, the issue of gas masks and sirens for air raid alarms, also regarding cooperation with the Navy on patrol.

Does that intimate that the things done at Hickam Field had not been done prior to December 7th, and this was something new? They were just starting in to wake up and do things?

General RUDOLPH. No. We had quite a series of alerts when everybody would be confined to the field, when all the combat crews would sleep right in the hangars. This was before December 7th.

8. General FRANK. May I interrupt? You say "we." Do you mean—

General RUDOLPH. I mean the 18th Bombardment Wing, by "we."

9. General FRANK. Was this alert just in the 18th Bombardment Wing, or the whole Department?

General RUDOLPH. Well, the whole Department. I beg your pardon. The whole Department, yes.

10. General GRUNERT. Now, what is that reference there: [1223] "also regarding cooperation with the Navy on patrols after December 7th"? Was there no such cooperation prior to December 7th?

General RUDOLPH. Well, after December 7th the Navy took us over body and soul.

11. General GRUNERT. And used you on distant patrol?

General RUDOLPH. We did exactly as they ordered us to. We were part of their naval air force so to speak.

12. General GRUNERT. Prior to that had there been any bombardment used for patrolling purposes?

General RUDOLPH. Not in the way it was used after December 7. Now, we had many maneuvers with the Navy, and I will say here before you gentlemen that they gave me the UTAH for three solid months, to bomb night and day, and they had a big teakwood covering, superstructure, that covered the whole deck; and as far as bombing practice is concerned, I don't think any bombardment wing in the whole air force had as fine practice as the 18th Bombardment Wing. We had many maneuvers. I sat in time and again with the naval officers there on maneuvers, and we worked with them. I thought the cooperation was very good.

13. General GRUNERT. From an air point of view it is not considered good practice to use bombers on reconnaissance missions, is it?

General RUDOLPH. Well, at that time we had one squadron that was called a reconnaissance squadron, as a part of the wing. That was the organization.

14. General GRUNERT. I see.

15. General FRANK. What kind of airplanes?

[1224] General RUDOLPH. We had B-17s and B-18s.

16. General GRUNERT. Now, while your bombers were in training did they have any reconnaissance mission prior to December 7th?

General RUDOLPH. Yes, one squadron had a considerable amount of reconnaissance training.

17. General GRUNERT. And was that worked into daily reconnaissance of certain areas, or was it just training?

General RUDOLPH. That was just training. We didn't cover the 360 degrees prior to December 7th as we did after, when the Navy took us over, but we did go out to Midway, we did go out to Wake, we went to Palmyra, we went to Christmas, on reconnaissance missions.

18. General FRANK. Before December 7th?

General RUDOLPH. Oh, yes.

19. General GRUNERT. On definite assigned reconnaissance missions? Who made those assignments?

General RUDOLPH. I had to get the squadron ready that went to the Philippines in September, and they had to know their navigation training combined with reconnaissance in those long overwater flights getting them ready to go to the Philippine Islands.

20. General GRUNERT. Then that was just a matter of training? It was not, then, a definite reconnaissance mission, was it? What I mean is now, the understanding that I have is that the Navy was charged with distant reconnaissance.

General RUDOLPH. True. Very true.

21. General GRUNERT. And any mission that you had for distant reconnaissance should have been assigned by the Navy?

General RUDOLPH. That is right.

[1225] 22. General GRUNERT. So that was not an assigned reconnaissance mission as such.

General RUDOLPH. I understand you now.

23. General GRUNERT. Now, when those bombers went out training toward the latter part of '41, were they armed and prepared to protect themselves?

General RUDOLPH. Some were and some were not.

24. General GRUNERT. What was the theory back of that, or what were the instructions? You gave them to them. Was there any fear of an attack or a possible interference while they were on such training mission, that they might have to take care of themselves?

General RUDOLPH. We had no such feeling, but there were some of the B-17s that came over without guns, and we had to fly them without guns until the guns arrived. Then we put those on to train the men in holding against the blast of the ship in flight.

25. General GRUNERT. I have a question here: Were the commanders of major units—and by major units I mean such commanders as General Martin of the Hawaiian Air Force, yourself of the Bomber Command, Davidson of the Interceptor Command, Burgin of the Antiaircraft, and so on. Were the commanders of such major units kept informed of the War and Navy Department so-called warning messages that were received? Were you kept so informed?

General RUDOLPH. Personally I was informed of nothing. I don't know about General Martin.

26. General GRUNERT. Even up to the day of the attack?

General RUDOLPH. I know nothing of the others, but [1226] certainly no one gave me any information of the condition of affairs.

27. General FRANK. May I ask a question?

28. General GRUNERT. Yes.

29. General FRANK. Did you have no information that the Department Commander had received notice of a critical situation existing?

General RUDOLPH. If I did, I do not recall it.

30. General FRANK. There was nothing communicated down to the lower echelons?

General RUDOLPH. I am honest in my statement that if it was communicated to me I have forgotten it.

31. General FRANK. You were placed on an alert?

General RUDOLPH. Many times.

32. General FRANK. Well, on the 27th of November?

General RUDOLPH. Well, I couldn't remember definitely, we had so many of them.

33. General FRANK. Well, the last alert before December 7th? You were on an alert on December 7th, Alert No. 1, for sabotage?

General RUDOLPH. That is right.

34. General FRANK. Well, what was your reaction to that alert at that time?

General RUDOLPH. I don't know just what you want.

35. General FRANK. Well, did you feel that there was real cause for it, or it was just another alert?

General RUDOLPH. Oh, no, no. We thought it was just another one. We had had so many of them that throughout my [1227] command there was a feeling that it was getting rather binding, one alert after another, and we didn't know the underlying reason for all the alerts because no one pointed out to me personally that the conditions were very critical.

36. General GRUNERT. Now, this is a general question to see what the form of command in the Department was. Were conferences held by the Commanding General of the Department or his Chief of Staff of the principal subordinate commanders wherein they were kept informed of the situation and in turn informed their commanding generals of the measures taken by them to meet such situation?

I will read the whole thing to give you the idea:

Were subordinate commanders informed of the imminent approach of probable hostilities as set forth in messages received late in November and early in December?

Were discussions held as to measures to be adopted in preparation for any such eventualities?

Were they questioned as to the adequacy of plans, S.O.P.s, and so forth?

Was the question of the type of alert to be taken discussed with them?

Were reports from them required as to their respective states of readiness to meet any anticipated eventualities?

In general, were such conferences held in the interests of keeping commanders informed, for the issuance of understandable instructions, and the preparation of adequate defenses?

General RUDOLPH. We did have conferences over at Fort Shafter. I attended quite a few of them.

[1228] 37. General GRUNERT. Do you recall what those conferences were about toward the latter part of November or early in December, if any were held during that period?

General RUDOLPH. Well, we had to explain our training, what we were doing, and the type of airplanes we had; but I don't remember that the seriousness was brought out at any of these conferences or that we were particularly enjoined relative to taking every possible measure for the protection of our equipment.

38. General GRUNERT. You have testified that you don't recall having been informed as to anything particularly alarming, or information of the international situation along about that time, so evidently, if that were the case, in the conference you had at that time it was not impressed on your mind.

General RUDOLPH. That is very true. Now, we did have many other conferences, of course, with General Martin. There was a scheduled weekly or bi-weekly conference.

39. General GRUNERT. Did he bring forth any such situation?

General RUDOLPH. If he did, he failed to impress me with the seriousness, because I do not recall that. We had, sir, a great many conferences on the squadron going to the Philippines, and its training and getting it ready. We sent a squadron along in the fall, I think September, the last of September or early October.

40. General GRUNERT. I see here that you stated before the Roberts Commission something to the effect that you had no information as to the existing serious international situation. Evidently that was fresh in your mind at that time when you [1229] testified there.

General RUDOLPH. Much more so then than now.

41. General GRUNERT. Now, on the 27th of November, '41, the Department Commander ordered the Command to go into an alert known as No. 1, which is what they call the sabotage alert, and in that

alert under the instructions as I understand them airplanes on airfields were bunched, presumably in order to require a lesser number of guards to protect them from sabotage. Do you recall those instructions and that you bunched your airplanes for that purpose?

General RUDOLPH. Very definitely. It was very specific, to protect against sabotage from within, with no thought of an attack from without. We were directed to bunch them as tightly as we could and to throw out various different lines of resistance from that rectangle of airplanes, so that small hand bombs and what-not could not be tossed into this assembly of airplanes.

42. General GRUNERT. Those were definite orders. If you had been on your own, as I might call it, left to use your own judgment, would that have been the best method to handle your planes against sabotage?

General RUDOLPH. It doesn't appear so now.

43. General GRUNERT. How were you as to personnel? Could you have distributed them and still have protected them against sabotage?

General RUDOLPH. We would have had roving patrols—

44. General GRUNERT. It might not have given the same protection?

General RUDOLPH. —on concentric lines of approach, [1230] instead of a lot of fixed points.

45. General GRUNERT. Did you have sufficient area in which to disperse your planes in case they had not been ordered bunched?

General RUDOLPH. We had a good big area which we used immediately after we were bombed.

46. General GRUNERT. Now, in the Roberts report you stated as follows. I have a note which says, "That he had had no intimation of preceding trouble, and if he had then his planes would not have been bunched or concentrated, but would have been ready for any emergency, especially on a Sunday morning."

I have a question: Did not the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, or the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, inform you of warnings that had been received in the immediate past? It all goes back to almost the same line of questioning.

General RUDOLPH. If they did, they failed to impress me with the seriousness of it.

47. General GRUNERT. Now, as to concentration versus dispersion, how much more personnel would have been required had you dispersed your planes in order to guard them against sabotage? Would it have been 10 percent more, 20 percent, or what?

General RUDOLPH. Well, with our moving and roving patrols I think I had personnel enough to take care of aircraft I had, because I was nowhere near up to strength. Nowhere near.

48. General FRANK. Up to strength in what? Personnel or aircraft?

General RUDOLPH. Aircraft. You see, we never filled up the group to the number of the airplanes it should have had; [1231] I mean the wing.

49. General GRUNERT. Go ahead, General Frank.

50. General FRANK. You had been reading the papers, the Hawaiian papers, newspapers?

General RUDOLPH. The little Hawaiian Advertiser.

51. General FRANK. They were giving you certain information about the Japanese conferences being held in Washington, between our Government and the Japanese representatives?

General RUDOLPH. True.

52. General FRANK. There were things coming out in the headlines of the papers which indicated this sort of situation. Did that tend to build up any apprehension about the situation?

General RUDOLPH. If it did, it never came to my attention officially. It was not discussed among us.

53. General FRANK. I don't mean officially. I mean did it instill any apprehension in you personally? Was there a reaction in your mind about the newspaper headlines?

General RUDOLPH. There may have been a reaction.

54. General FRANK. Well, did you discount it to a certain extent because you had not received anything officially?

General RUDOLPH. It didn't strike me as very forcibly alarming.

55. General FRANK. All right. Now, can you tell me, did you anticipate an air attack?

General RUDOLPH. I did not.

56. General FRANK. Why didn't you anticipate it? Let us have the reasons.

General RUDOLPH. Well, I guess I felt like a great many others did, that Japan would never dare to.

[1232] 57. General FRANK. Well, what built up that state of mind? That is what I am after. Whose responsibility was it to give you a warning of an approach from a distance?

General RUDOLPH. It certainly should have come from higher authority.

58. General FRANK. Well, was it the Army or the Navy?

General RUDOLPH. I say the Navy, because they had the long range patrol boats.

59. General FRANK. To your knowledge were they conducting patrols constantly?

General RUDOLPH. On that particular Sunday morning I understood they didn't have a boat out—an airplane, seaplane.

60. General FRANK. But generally were they more or less continuously conducting reconnaissance to some distance?

General RUDOLPH. To some distance.

61. General FRANK. Do you know what that was?

General RUDOLPH. I don't think they ever went over 200, 250 miles.

62. General FRANK. Did you have any confidence in the positive security that the Navy furnished?

General RUDOLPH. Not with those old slow-going boats they had.

63. General FRANK. Did you feel that they had positive means to give you adequate warning?

General RUDOLPH. They could within their range of those boats.

64. General FRANK. Had they been out?

General RUDOLPH. Had they been out, certainly, 250, 300 miles.

[1233] 65. General FRANK. But you understand that they were not out on that morning?

General RUDOLPH. So I was informed.

66. General GRUNERT. If they had been patrolling they could not have covered 360 degrees, could they?

General RUDOLPH. Certainly not. They could not cover it when they took everything I had.

67. General FRANK. What was it operated to build up this frame of mind that led you to the belief that "it can't happen here"?

General RUDOLPH. I guess I was like a great many others. I never thought Japan would dare to do it.

68. General RUSSELL. You understand they did not have a boat out?

General RUDOLPH. That was the report there at that time.

69. General GRUNERT. When you speak of boats, you mean flying boats?

General RUDOLPH. The P.B.Y.'s.

70. General RUSSELL. Where did you get this report?

General RUDOLPH. It was common. They were all bunched right on the apron at Pearl Harbor, and they got every one of them.

71. General GRUNERT. On Ford Island?

General RUDOLPH. Yes; just like mine were caught, only they were worse off; they did not save any of them.

72. General RUSSELL. Was that just common talk?

General RUDOLPH. Yes; that there was not a P.B.Y. out.

73. General RUSSELL. Can you recall any specific Navy man who told you that?

General RUDOLPH. No, sir; I cannot. I will qualify that. Later on I had a liaison officer with them all the time, and he [1234] reported to me. They were changing frequently; I do not know which one it was. But one of those liaison officers said they did not have any patrol out on that Sunday morning.

74. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not it was hearsay?

General RUDOLPH. He worked right with them all the time.

75. General GRUNERT. Before December 7th?

General RUDOLPH. Some before and all the time after.

76. General GRUNERT. What was his name?

General RUDOLPH. I do not remember now. I tried to think of it. I had several of them. I used to rotate them, so I do not remember just who was the liaison officer, because we used to rotate them for experience.

77. General RUSSELL. General Rudolph, after this attack or this series of attacks on the morning of December 7, did you visit Ford Island in Pearl Harbor?

General RUDOLPH. I do not remember definitely how soon after, but every officer of my wing visited Pearl Harbor and saw all the battle-ships on the bottom and turned upside down, and the P.B.Y.'s burned up on the apron of Ford Island.

78. General RUSSELL. You, along with your officers, went there and personally saw just what you have described?

General RUDOLPH. Yes.

79. General RUSSELL. Based on the P.B.Y.'s that you saw on the apron of the field at Ford Island, what was the conclusion reached by you as to the number of P.B.Y.'s out on reconnaissance on the morning of December 7, 1941?

General RUDOLPH. There could have been precious few, because, if my memory serves me correctly, there were about 20-odd P.B.Y.'s

burned up and that was most of the airplanes they [1235] had for patrolling.

80. General RUSSELL. Did they not have as many as a 100 P.B.Y.'s on Ford Island?

General RUDOLPH. I do not think they had at that time. They brought over a lot right after that, when they started the 360-degree patrolling.

81. General FRANK. Were you familiar with the aircraft warning service and the Information Center?

General RUDOLPH. I had quite a bit of contact with them after; not much before. I did work a lot with the antiaircraft, Colonel Burgin's outfit. We worked a lot with him.

82. General FRANK. But you had no bombardment liaison officers in training for the Information Center prior to December 7?

General RUDOLPH. If I did, I do not recall them. He may have had some one individual on that work, but I know it was emphasized decidedly afterwards.

83. General FRANK. Prior to December 7 were you very familiar with the details of the aircraft warning service?

General RUDOLPH. No; I was not.

84. General FRANK. Had there been any effort on the part of the top command to explain its operations to you or to the officers in general?

General RUDOLPH. We did have at the point just east of Honolulu harbor—before we got the B-18's we had to dip the wing of the old B-17 three times to let them know we were friendly aircraft.

85. General FRANK. But you did not know anything about the details and method of operation of the Information Center?

General RUDOLPH. No; I did not.

There is one thing I would like to say, General. We were [1236] having a course in the identification of aircraft by a naval officer who taught at the tactical school after Browning. I have forgotten his name. But he gave me two afternoons a week on his own time. At four o'clock when his day's work was over, they let him come over, after his day's work was done, and every one of my younger officers who had never had that course were having that course of instruction by this Navy officer in the identification of our battleships, naval vessels of all kinds, and the Japanese vessels.

86. General GRUNERT. That had no connection with the air warning service?

General RUDOLPH. Not a bit.

87. General FRANK. What was the state of training of your combat crews?

General RUDOLPH. Of course, we were shy of .50 caliber guns in the beginning; and the first lower turret on the B-17 never did work. They had to throw it out because dirt would get under the collector ring and short-circuit it, and they had to throw them all away. They did not prove feasible.

88. General FRANK. Let us get back to the training of the crews.

General RUDOLPH. It was the gunners that we were trying to train. I do not think any wing had the opportunity to train that the 18th Bombardment did, for we bombed three months, night and day, against

a moving battleship, and the pilot never knew which way the skipper was going to kick the rudder.

89. General FRANK. There has been some testimony before the Board to the effect that there was difficulty in completing the training of the crews to fly the B-17's.

General RUDOLPH. Not the pilots; the co-pilot and engineer. [1237] The gunners were the ones who did not have training in gunnery.

90. General FRANK. You had plenty of pilots, did you?

General RUDOLPH. I only had a few ships. I had more pilots than I had airplanes. We were flying that Sunday morning, or we were getting ready to fly, some of the youngsters who had not finished B-18 training. That is how they happened to kill 22 in one hangar and cut the legs off the other two. There were 24 in one hangar getting the ships out. They were due out at 8 o'clock, and a little before 8 the Japanese attacked and killed 22 outright. They were going up at 8 for one extra hour. All you have to do is to look at the record and see the number of hours they were flying.

91. General FRANK. The squadron that was sent to the Philippines in September still left you plenty of trained personnel?

General RUDOLPH. Of course I must be honest and say that I picked the best of the whole wing to go in that squadron, the pick of the whole wing.

92. General FRANK. But you were not handicapped in your operations from lack of trained people except gunners?

General RUDOLPH. No; we were not. We went to San Francisco and ferried them over. We brought them over and we did not lose a ship.

93. General GRUNERT. One of the reasons given for going on Alert 1, the sabotage alert, instead of a more protective alert, such as 2 or 3, was that if they had gone on 2 or 3 it would have taken Air Corps personnel away from their training, especially those who were being trained to take B-17's, I believe, to the Philippines. So we got the impression that that training was for the purpose of getting enough of them trained to put on the B-17's to take them across. That is the reason [1238] for our interest in knowing about this particular training.

General RUDOLPH. I would like to qualify that just a little. That was my first priority, to get that squadron ready for the Philippines. Everything else was secondary.

94. General GRUNERT. What squadron was that?

General RUDOLPH. The one that was selected to go to the Philippine Islands with the B-17's.

95. General FRANK. But you had others that were going to this school later on?

General RUDOLPH. Yes. It could not help but hurt, because I picked the best out of the wing. You could not help but hurt your command, picking out the best of the wing. That was a crack outfit. We kept right on training. All you have to do is to look at the records of the training hours. They were piling up hundreds of hours.

96. General GRUNERT. How much would you have been handicapped had you gone on Alert No. 2, which was against air attack, plus sabo-

tage? How much would it have handicapped you in carrying out the mission you had of training crews to take the B-17's across?

General RUDOLPH. I was never one to believe much in being handicapped. We had a first priority and we were going to shove it through. If we had changed to another alert we would have changed the guard system. They would not have so much fixed; we would have had much more roving. There was a lot of growling and grumbling about this and that. It never made much of an impression on me. I felt we should work hard. This was long before any threat at all.

97. General GRUNERT. How much would that sort of an alert, Alert No. 2, which is the alert against an air attack, have [1239] retarded your training? What training could you have done while on such an alert?

General RUDOLPH. We could go right ahead flying. We were flying on all the alerts. But the crews slept right in the hangar. We went on with our flying training. Some of the ground men had to watch the ships. We had to take members of the crew and rotate them. We had to keep one man on every airplane, just the way they are doing now.

98. General FRANK. Alert 2 or 3 would not have impeded your training in any way?

General RUDOLPH. If it had, it would not have been such that I would have been crying over it at all. We would have gone ahead with the training.

99. General GRUNERT. How much did Alert 3 after December 7 handicap your training?

General RUDOLPH. They trained all the time, night and day. Every ship we could get into the air would be out, and they came in at all hours of the night to the limit of their gas capacity. We lost one or two.

100. General GRUNERT. And they kept it up right along?

General RUDOLPH. Until I left there in February. We could never keep enough in the air to satisfy the Navy, because those youngsters were burning up tires faster than they could ship them over to us, and they were comparatively new ships. Additional parts were coming out, but they were not coming over to us. The Navy was displeased at times, I know, because I could not get enough parts to keep more planes in the air. We would rob one and get five going, in spite of General Martin's orders not to. He came over and said, "I can see that you have to do it."

[1240] 101. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming here to help us out.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER C. PHILLIPS, CHIEF OF STAFF CORPS—Resumed

335. Colonel WEST. The witness is reminded that he is still under oath. It will not be necessary to repeat it.

336. General GRUNERT. Colonel, I have a few subjects that I want you to open up, and then I want to skip around here and there to check up on some facts stated in the Roberts Commission Report.

On the subject of Coordination and Cooperation, were there any staff meetings between the Navy and the Army staffs? I do not mean, between the two commanders, but between you as Chief of Staff and the corresponding officer of the Navy and members of the Army Staff and members of the Navy Staff.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not a meeting as a whole; no, sir. Individually, yes, sir.

337. General GRUNERT. Was the fleet staff ashore or afloat?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe they were ashore. They had headquarters ashore, I believe.

338. General GRUNERT. Then the District staff was ashore?

Colonel PHILLIPS.. Yes, sir; Admiral Bloch's staff.

339. General GRUNERT. With which did you have the most business, the fleet or the district?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We worked with both staffs, sir. I do not know which we had the most to do with. The fleet was out a good deal. I would expect, perhaps, we had the most to do with the district staff.

340. General GRUNERT. In the testimony before the Roberts [1241] Commission you stated that you never consulted the Navy between November 27 and December 7; you never asked the Navy regarding their distant reconnaissance, and you never knew whether the fleet was in or out. Is that still your recollection?

Colonel PHILLIPS. After November 27?

341. General GRUNERT. Prior to December 7.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. But I do not recall that testimony, sir. It must have been correct if I stated it at that time.

342. General GRUNERT. Admiral Kimmel testified that he received no information from the Army regarding measures taken by the Army after November 27, presumably as a result of the Chief of Staff's message of November 27. Do you know anything about that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have always been under the impression that General Short advised the Navy as to everything we had done.

343. General GRUNERT. Admiral Bloch, the District Commander, says he did not know anything regarding the Army inshore air patrol, whether it was actually patrolling, or not. He also stated that he did not know what Alert 1 meant. He thought Alert 1, which is antisabotage, but did not know whether it meant the same as the Navy's Alert 1 which corresponded to the Army's all-out alert, No. 3. He apparently did not know that.

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had a naval officer on duty on our staff, G-3, whose sole duty it was to inform the Navy of everything, particularly of an operational nature.

344. General GRUNERT. What was his name?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Lieutenant Burr.

345. General GRUNERT. Did you figure that anything the Navy should know as far as the Army was concerned would be transmitted to the Navy by your liaison officer?

[1242] Colonel PHILLIPS. That was my understanding. I thought that was his job; I believe it was. We had also an officer from G-3 Coast Artillery Corps. I cannot recall his name, because they were changed from time to time, and at the same time he was on duty with the Navy. That was their daily task.

346. General GRUNERT. Did this subject ever come up for discussion or consideration? There being two Navy staffs, the fleet and the district, and an Army staff in the same general locality, that they should establish joint headquarters and cooperate by close association? Did that ever come up?

Colonel PHILLIPS. For discussion? Not to my knowledge, on my tour of duty, sir.

347. General GRUNERT. It never occurred to any of you to get closer cooperation. It would seem as if that would be about the closest you could get.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes; it certainly would be.

348. General GRUNERT. You recall S. O. P. No. 5 which described the various alerts and other things. I believe you said you had a hand in getting it up?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

349. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not the Navy was supplied with that S. O. P.? Was it informed as to its contents?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I feel sure that it was; yes, sir.

350. General GRUNERT. It appears here that your G-2 on December 6th reported in a staff meeting that the Japanese Consulate was burning papers, and he said that no attention was paid to his report. That is according to the Roberts Commission report. We have not seen him yet. Do you recall a report to that effect?

[1243] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

351. General GRUNERT. He said no attention was paid to it. What did you do about it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot deny his statement, but it is not correct. The General was informed of that situation, and it was given much consideration as to the reasons for that.

352. General GRUNERT. Do you know the conclusions reached as to that information? This was on December 6th. What did the Commanding General decide? That the information was of no particular significance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not recall the decision on that. He was informed of it.

353. General GRUNERT. Do you recall what you thought of it at that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was far from routine. It was a matter that of course increased our apprehension.

354. General GRUNERT. I have some questions as to your handling of the staff. Did you hold staff meetings?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

355. General GRUNERT. How often did you hold them? Were they periodic, or when needed, or what?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I had a staff meeting of the general staff and of administrative staff heads every week, and we had staff meetings of the general staff heads—we were all in the same building, and they oftentimes occurred two or three or four times a day, for that matter.

356. General GRUNERT. Was each staff head required to perform his assigned functions without special dictation from higher up? In other words, were they given a job and were they then free to do it, or were they told what to do frequently?

[1244] Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; they were given a job and they did it.

357. General GRUNERT. Did the heads of the general staff sections have access to the Commanding General on special occasions, if necessary?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; at any time.

358. General GRUNERT. Did they make use of that frequently?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They did.

359. General GRUNERT. Was the G-2 required to submit periodic estimates of the situation?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

360. General GRUNERT. After November 27 were they increasing or were they just as they had been before?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say as to that.

361. General FRANK. Were there any regular G-2 estimates of the situation prepared by your G-2?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am positive there were; yes. I may be wrong on that, but I do not believe, sir, we had regular G-2 periodical reports.

362. General GRUNERT. Who had general supervision, so far as the Hawaiian Department was concerned, concerning air warning signal installations?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The District Engineer, I believe.

363. General GRUNERT. Do you mean the Department Engineer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman at that time.

364. General GRUNERT. I mean, as to the radar installations of the air warning service. Who had charge of that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The District Engineer, I believe.

365. General GRUNERT. Are you sure that your Signal Officer did [1245] not have charge of it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The Signal Officer had general supervision. He was supplying the equipment; but the exact arrangement between the two I cannot state now. I have known it, but I do not recall it now.

366. General GRUNERT. What section of the General Staff had supervision of constructions in which the Commanding General was particularly interested? In other words, when the Commanding General wanted to follow up constructions, on whom did he depend; what staff member?

Colonel PHILLIPS. G-4.

367. General GRUNERT. What was his name?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Marsden, who was the Signal Officer.

368. General GRUNERT. Had the Commanding General expressed any anxiety concerning the air warning service and the progress being made on its installation?

[1246] Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe he did. I cannot recall definitely.

369. General GRUNERT. Who in the Staff contacted and followed up the work of the district engineer on matters that were vital to the defense? Was there any particular member of the staff charged with that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. G-4 was charged with construction work, in that, and G-3, of course, inspected the progress on such work as fortifications.

370. General GRUNERT. What staff inspections and observations were there of tests, tactical maneuvers, defense preparation, follow-up of orders and SOP, on the subject of defense?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had, I believe a total of three maneuvers during my time in the Territory, and that was of course all with the idea of improving the state of training, with the object of defense of Oahu.

371. General GRUNERT. Did the Staff spend most of its time at headquarters, or most of the time out among troops and installations?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In the field entirely, the large maneuver.

372. General GRUNERT. Entirely? You mean at maneuvers?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

373. General GRUNERT. I mean generally.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Generally, we were; particularly G-3 was out of the office much of the time. G-3 was assisting us. We had assistance for that.

374. General GRUNERT. How about you? Did you get out much?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did.

[1247] 375. General GRUNERT. Or, was the Commanding General out most of the time, and you, in most of the time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In my capacity as G-3, sir.

376. General GRUNERT. As Chief of Staff.

Colonel PHILLIPS. As Chief of Staff? I didn't get out a great deal as Chief of Staff. It was rather exceptional that I got out of the office.

377. General GRUNERT. Was the General Staff called upon, or free to advise as to defense measures and means, as to their contact with it, and so forth?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They were free to advise, at any time; yes, sir; had access to the General at all times.

378. General GRUNERT. Now, on the subject of cooperation, Admiral Pye testified. He said that after he became Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet—this was after December 7—he said, speaking about himself and Emmons:

"We really got together."

Now, there is an intimation, there, that there wasn't sufficient "getting together" prior to December 7.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

379. General GRUNERT. How long did you remain as Chief of Staff, after December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Till December 18. I was Deputy Chief of Staff, thereafter, under General Emmons, at his request, for ten months.

380. General FRANK. Who was Chief of Staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Colonel Collins was Chief of Staff. He relieved me at the time that General Emmons came.

381. General GRUNERT. General Emmons brought him as Chief of Staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He brought him as Chief of Staff, December 18. He was later relieved, during my tour, by General Boyd.

382. General FRANK. In your testimony you have stated that there was an interchange of information between General Short and various officers of the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

383. General FRANK. Did you, as Chief of Staff, have any system for checking the interchange of information between General Short and the Naval top command, so that there would be some official record of it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not, sir. I did not. General Short and Admiral Kimmel were very friendly, on friendly terms. Admiral Kimmel's family I believe was not present in Oahu, and he would call on the Shorts, officially, I know. The General has called me in, once or twice, in the evenings when he would come socially. They would start official conversations. They also played golf infrequently. I have played, making up a foursome, once or twice.

384. General FRANK. But still there was no record to indicate what exchange of information there was?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct.

385. General FRANK. Whatever exchange of information there was, it did the command no good, because it didn't get down into the Staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Ordinarily, the General would inform the staff—myself, as well as the Staff.

386. General FRANK. He would inform you of what?

[1249] Colonel PHILLIPS. As to the outcome of his conferences.

387. General FRANK. Well, what about this information that he exchanged with Admiral Kimmel on all these occasions?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; sometimes we were informed of their conferences; other times, I don't know.

388. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, you do not know how much you were informed, and how much you were not, do you, if you didn't keep any record of it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is true, we had no record. We had no system of making records, at all, in regard to the exchange of information between the Staffs.

389. General FRANK. You stated that the engineers were charged with the installation of that equipment. As a matter of fact, the Signal Corps had the technicians, and the only technicians, who were familiar with that technical equipment, and who could install it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct; yes, sir.

390. General FRANK. And therefore, in order to get it straight in the record, the engineers constructed the installations of buildings, and the foundations, and so forth?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

391. General FRANK. And the Signal Corps made the technical installation of the technical equipment, is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; I think that is right.

392. General FRANK. Now, there was some kind of operating order.

393. General GRUNERT. I have it, here. I can ask that question, because I have the name and everything, right here.

394. General FRANK. All right. Go ahead.

395. General GRUNERT. The record of the Roberts Commission [1250] shows that you were Senior Army Member of the Local Joint Planning Committee, since November 6; is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right; by virtue of office; by virtue of being Chief of Staff,

396. General GRUNERT. All right. Now, go ahead.

397. General FRANK. What were the duties of that Board?

Colonel PHILLIPS. As I understood it, sir—

398. General FRANK. You were head of it.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right. And my duties were passed on to me by Colonel "Phil" Hayes, whom I relieved, and it was a joint board to consider any changes or modifications of the plans that were then in existence.

399. General FRANK. Concerning what?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The Joint Army and Navy—

400. General FRANK. Cooperation?

Colonel PHILLIPS. —cooperation; yes, sir.

401. General FRANK. Here was a time when a crises was about to take place. Was there any meeting of that Board held?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We never convened the Board, so far as I know, during my time.

402. General FRANK. And yet, here was a situation that arose, when you had a war warning?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

403. General FRANK. And hostilities were about to commence; and you still had no meeting of the Board?

Colonel Phillips. I do not believe the Board met. I am sure the Board never convened with me as head of the Board. The matter was taken up at the time.

404. General FRANK. You were responsible for calling the meetings [1251] of the Board, weren't you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. At the direction of the General; yes, sir; and that matter was taken up at the time.

405. General FRANK. Now, why do you always reason back, and side-step the General? Why don't you back him up, instead of stepping out from under him?

Colonel Phillips. I want to back him up, sir.

406. General FRANK. All right.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did, from the very beginning. I am sorry I gave that impression.

407. General FRANK. All right.

408. General GRUNERT. May I interpose, here, to suggest, that committee may have been the same as the committee I have now in the Eastern Defense Command. That committee is called upon when any changes of any sort in the plans or agreements between the Army and Navy are up for consideration. The duties do not pertain to cooperation except when one party or the other proposes some change in the then existing set-up.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

409. General RUSSELL. I want to ask one question. This morning, you testified, Colonel, that you served in the First Division, for a time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

410. General RUSSELL. That was as G-3?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

411. General RUSSELL. Was General Short the Commanding General of the First Division during any of that period of time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He was,

412. General RUSSELL. For about how long?

[1252] Colonel PHILLIPS. I should say, about the first year and a half of my service, there; perhaps the first, maybe two years; I am not positive.

413. General RUSSELL. Then, for about a year and a half or two years, you served in the same division with General Short, as his G-3?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is hight.

414. General RUSSELL. That is all.

415. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? There appear to be none.

Thank you very much for helping us out.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 4:42 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day, and proceeded to other business.)

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[1254] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

SATURDAY, AUGUST 19, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL ROBERT J. FLEMING, JR., CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel FLEMING. Robert J. Fleming, Jr., Colonel, Corps of Engineers, Serial 01795, Headquarters 22, Fort DuPont, Delaware.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is after facts, both as to what happened before and what happened at the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, on December 7. Through the testimony [1255] that the Board has had, your name came up as having occupied a position and as having been liaison officer for General Short in connection with certain construction work, and so forth. So we want you to throw some light on this subject; and General Frank will propound the questions and the other members of the Board will later question you.

3. General FRANK. On what duty were you in November and December, 1941?

Colonel FLEMING. I was on the General Staff at that time, sir. I was placed on the General Staff in August 1941, ostensibly in the G-4 section. Actually I did very, very little formal G-4 work, but, under then Colonel Hayes, who was Chief of Staff, I was given more or less of a special section on all Army construction work, the planning phase of it and the supervision of the execution.

If I may go into a little bit of the development of this, the Corps of Engineers took over from the Constructing Quartermaster the construction on airfields. At that time the Engineers had no staff engineer set up in the air force units. At that particular time I was Assistant Department Engineer.

4. General FRANK. Assistant to Colonel Lyman?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; the Department Engineer being a dual assignment. Colonel Lyman was Department Engineer in name, but was Regimental Commander of the 3rd Engineers at Schofield Barracks.

5. General GRUNERT. How do you spell his name?

Colonel FLEMING. L-y-m-a-n. That is L. K. Lyman, who died in September of 1942.

[1256] He was at Schofield Barracks and spent all his time out there. I was Engineer representative at headquarters. When this transfer of Air Force construction engineers took place there was no Air Force Engineer, and at that time I was made, in addition to all my other work, what amounted to Air Force Engineer on the planning phase of it, and the job developed from that, sir.

6. General FRANK. Let me hook you into the Air Force phase of this matter. As Air Force Engineer did you work as adviser to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir. General Ryan was the Chief of Staff of the Air Force when this started, and General Flood was the G-4 of the Air Force, and on all the planning between the Engineers and the Air Force people the three of us, General Ryan, General Flood and myself, used to act together. I would find out what they wanted from an Air Force standpoint and work out the preliminary plans and take them down to the District Engineer in Honolulu and the thing from the engineering standpoint would then be planned.

7. General FRANK. What I am trying to clear up is this: You said you were the Air Force Engineer. What you meant was that you were the Engineer on the staff of the Department Commander handling Air Force construction projects?

Colonel FLEMING. That is right. There was no Air Force Engineer, sir, until later on.

In the development, due to the shortage of engineers over there, this thing developed so that eventually General Short pulled me out of the Department Engineer's office and had my [1257] orders extended to stay over there and, under Colonel Hayes, Chief of Staff at that time, I headed up more or less a special section on the staff which handled all sorts of construction matters for the Department Commander. It also developed into the handling of all Navy liaison matters as related to construction, because before the war began there was a tremendous increase in the construction program over there, and the Army and Navy found themselves competing for workmen. The Navy was bringing them in on one boat and we would be bringing them in on another boat, and there was a tremendous amount of potential conflict between the two services on matters of wage rates, conditions of employment, and such things as that.

So that is how this job developed, sir. Ostensibly I was a member of the G-4 section but actually never did any G-4 work.

8. General FRANK. Were you a member of the group that selected the sites for the permanent Aircraft Warning Service?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. That started, I think, about February of 1940, and the first board on that consisted of Colonel Van Deusen, now General Van Deusen, of the Signal Corps, who was Hawaiian Department Signal Officer. General Lynn of the Air Force, I think

was the Air Force member. I was the Engineer member.. I do not know whether there were any other members or not.

9. General FRANK. Will you tell us the sites that were selected at that time?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. We had very little information; [1258] no one had any information about the technical aspects of this A. W. S. equipment, and the only information we had from the War Department was that Hawaii would be allotted, depending on what the board finally recommended, about eight of these sets. That was their tentative study on the matter. We were also told that the characteristics of this device were that it was more or less a beam line of sight proposition. It went out the same way that light did, but not the same wave lengths, and therefore the range that it would be effective would depend entirely upon the height of the station. Of course you know that horizon distance is the function of the height above sea level. The range at that time was supposed to be 90 miles, and the Signal Corps had promised that it would be developed up to a range of about 120 to 140 miles. So our instructions were to locate feasible locations for it and, of course, since the range depended upon altitude, to pick those places as high up as we could get them.

The only site on the Island of Oahu which met those considerations was on top of Mt. Kaala; and we got into a terrific argument with various people around there because they said it was feasibly uneconomical to get up on top of that mountain. But we finally got that through in the board.

The next primary one would have been on top of Haleakala. On the Island of Hawaii there were to be two stations, and we recommended one at Mauna Loa, on the upper slopes of the military camp on Pahoia; one at a place called Kokee, and another one on Oahu at Pali; another one on Maui on the road leading up to Haleakala.

10. General FRANK. That finally resolved itself down, in 1941, [1259] into how many main stations?

Colonel FLEMING. Three. They had another board. They came in and reviewed it. They learned more about this thing. It resolved itself into the main stations being at Kokee, Kaala, and Haleakala, one on Hawaii at a place called Pahoia, and another one about 20 miles north of Morse Field. In addition, they had mobile stations put in at various other places to cover the spread.

11. General FRANK. At that time there were allotted to the Hawaiian Department how many fixed stations?

Colonel FLEMING. The one at Kokee was to be fixed. There were four, sir.

12. General FRANK. There were four sites picked, but how many sets were allotted at that time?

Colonel FLEMING. None, sir. I do not think any were over there.

13. General FRANK. At what time?

Colonel FLEMING. To the best of my recollection—I was not in on the Signal Corps end of it—I do not think any of the fixed equipment was delivered until well after October of 1941.

14. General FRANK. Do you remember that it did arrive?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; it did arrive. Whether it was all there or not I do not know; but I base the statement that it did arrive on remembering that the power unit that the Signal Corps supplied was

an old power unit that somebody picked up, and it only operated on white gasoline. I remember before the war we were having a lot of discussions around about these power units. If anybody would buy anything they expected it to operate on white gasoline. We finally got that changed [1260] by going out through Engineer channels and buying some Diesel 25-kw sets.

15. General FRANK. Do you remember when the 270 mobile sets arrived?

Colonel FLEMING. I would not be sure of the dates, but they were there on the Island at least four months before the war started.

16. General FRANK. Before December 7?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes; because they were playing around with them at that time, and I remember having seen one of them.

17. General FRANK. They arrived, then, about in July?

Colonel FLEMING. About then; yes, sir.

18. General FRANK. Do you remember about contracts having been let for the construction of base camp facilities for Kokee, Kaala, and Haleakala? If so, will you discuss the accessory work that had to be done, such as roads leading into the sites, cableways, who received the contracts, and any changes that were made in the contracts, and the necessity therefor? Do you have sufficient memory of the situation to discuss that?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; I think I have.

At Kaala, in order to get on top of the mountain, it was necessary to build a cableway which was about 7,000 feet long. This (indicating on map) is the Kolehale Pass Road, and right here (indicating) the road took off at Firebreak. The top of Mt. Kaala is here (indicating), and from a point about here on the map—this is about an inch and a half on the map—we had to build a cableway, and the only place was about 1,500 feet. It was probably about 1,900 feet from this point up to the top. That cableway had to be designed to carry a ton per hour, and [1261] we had to build a road from this point (indicating) all the way around in through there (indicating). It was a rather difficult range. The trail wound around, and over here (indicating) we improved that Firebreak trail. One of the points that delayed it a little bit was the fact that this take-off point of the cableway was right at Schofield Barracks artillery range, and there was much discussion about where we would locate this take-off point and whether it would interfere with artillery fire. So, finally we had to guarantee to them that we would put this in beyond their target limit and then splinter-proof the installation so that there would be no damage. The cableway having been selected and designed, had to be procured, and about that time steel was critical, and it took some time to get it over there. This material started arriving for the cableway sometime in October 1941. To the best of my knowledge the thing was not finished before the war, although it was well under construction. I base that statement on the fact that there was a very bad accident that occurred on this cableway, killing about three or four men at the upper terminus, and I think that happened along about in February or March, 1942. At that time it was in operation. It took a considerable amount of time to build it, so I would say it was about half or 75 per cent completed at the time the war started.

19. General FRANK. Aside from the delay in procuring the material, in your argument with the Artillery about its interfering with their range, was there any other delay? Was there any delay in building the road along the Firebreak road?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. This is entirely a matter of opinion, but I think that the people who executed this went in [1262] built a much more elaborate road than would have been necessary.

20. General FRANK. Do you remember who had the contract for that particular installation?

Colonel FLEMING. I do not believe there was a special contract for that, sir. I would like to go into the contract if I may, sir.

The Engineers took over this work and it was decided to open up a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. The reason for having a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract at that time was that the restrictions on Government procurement were so rigid that we could not get anything done in a hurry. That was the experience all over the country. In buying equipment, for example, the contractor could buy the equipment, just exactly what we needed, and have it delivered to the Engineers somewhere in about ten or fifteen days, and we could get it on a rental-purchase agreement. If we had to do it otherwise, we would have been restricted to certain kinds of equipment and surrounded with a lot of red tape. So the Engineers and the Constructing Quartermasters went into these contracts all over the country. To the best of my knowledge I think that the contract that the Engineers had over there was a blanket contract; that the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract entered into by the District Engineer's Office and approved directly by the Chief of Engineer's Office was a blanket contract which covered not only this aircraft warning project but all other engineering work that we had to do over there.

21. General FRANK. We have had a history of that and an explanation of it before the Board. It was a blanket contract, and then specific contracts were covered by job orders?

[1263] Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; job orders under this contract.

22. General FRANK. The blanket contract was made with the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

23. General FRANK. There were various firms who were co-adventurers in the Hawaiian Constructors, were there not?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

24. General FRANK. And those firms were the W. E. Callahan Company, Gunther & Shirley, the Rohl-Connolly Company, and Ralph E. Woolley?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

25. General FRANK. When a job order was drawn up do you know whether or not that job order was given to the Hawaiian Constructors as one organization, or whether the job order was given so that some one of these firms was responsible for the construction as a firm?

Colonel FLEMING. I have no definite knowledge of that, sir. I had nothing to do with the execution and operation of the contract. But the best of my information, from talking with other people that did, is that it was given to the Hawaiian Constructors as a firm and not sublet.

26. General FRANK. You do not know how the determination was made as to exactly who was going to do what work?

Colonel FLEMING. It was more or less dependent upon the character of the work, sir.

27. General FRANK. Do you know what contractor was on this road and cableway construction going into Kaala?

Colonel FLEMING. The details of it, no, sir. I just know that the Hawaiian Constructors did the work. There was [1264] a subcontract let on the cableway.

28. General FRANK. To whom?

Colonel FLEMING. I believe, the Roebling Wire & Cable Company; but it could have been some of those special cableway people. General Electric makes them, and Roebling makes them.

29. General GRUNERT. Do I understand that the subcontractor was to furnish the material but not to do the work?

Colonel FLEMING. In this particular case, General, the cableway was a separate thing, but you had to hire a special engineer to do it. The people who furnished the material sent over engineers to supervise the work.

30. General FRANK. Do you know when this station was finished?

Colonel FLEMING. It was never finished, sir, to the best of my knowledge. I left Hawaii in September 1943, and up to that time it had never been used as an aircraft warning station. That was not due to the incompleteness of the facilities, but after we got this station in operation we found out that the preliminary information we had had from the Signal Corps technical people that the range depended on the height was in error, apparently. It would get out to the horizon the higher we got it, but when you got up into higher altitudes there was too much interference. When we put it up on one of these high mountains, instead of picking up an airplane or ship at sea, it would pick up to many reflections from secondary waves from the surrounding terrain. The station at Haleakala was completed first, and they took a mobile station up there, one of these Army portable units.

31. General FRANK. The 270s?

[1265] Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. They tried that for a while, and that did not work well. So they then installed all of the fixed equipment. There was a great argument about that fixed equipment on Mt. Haleakala, by the way. The board never wanted it. We wanted a mobile set there. When they got that over there the Signal Corps worked and worked and worked; they had special radar people over. They would come back from England; and then they had some people called electronics experts who came out and talked very wisely about this thing, but they could never get the station to work. The reason for that was that the station at Haleakala was right up on Kolekole Peak.

[1266] 32. General FRANK. There was already a road up there, wasn't there?

Colonel FLEMING. There was a road up to the observation tower, sir, and then we had to build a road that was about a mile long up on top of that one little knob that stuck up. The elevation on this knob was ten twenty-five, and there was another one over here ten fourteen or something like that. But anyway, this station, you could ac-

tually see the horizon from this point all the way around except for being blanketed by the high ground on the Island of Molokai; so the only dead space theoretically on the station was a little core that came out along through there (indicating) and went up the windward side of Oahu.

Theoretically, then, this station up here (indicating) was ideal. You could go up there and you could use this in any direction, almost 360 degrees traverse on that thing. But it never worked out, because—I am not an expert on radar, but what the Signal Corps explained to me was that when your main beam that went out this way there was an auxiliary beam that went out of this thing; another node went out of this thing, and that one went out to the rear from this antenna, and as this thing swung around in trying to pick up a plane, say in this direction (indicating), these auxiliary beams would pick up these high mountains on the Island of Hawaii, and there was so much difference in the terrain between this one little bump up here on Haleakala and these high mountains out in here (indicating) that as that thing swung around and the secondary beams picked up these, what the Signal Corps call echoes, they could never chart them into the oscilloscope on this device: [1267] they could never get them entered in there as standard interferences and eliminate them.

So as a result of that they finally decided to abandon the station on Haleakala; and just on a guess that they would find the same condition on Mt. Kaala, they never put the aircraft warning station up there. The decision on Kaala and also on Haleakala to abandon those was also based upon the fact that they had developed a supplemental communications equipment which was a direct-talking telephone system to pursuit planes, and also a very ultrahigh-frequency telephone communication between the various islands, and both of these places became key points in the communications network; and, as the Signal Corps and the authorities apparently wanted them for that purpose, why, neither of them was ever used as an aircraft warning station.

33. General FRANK. So that the money expended to develop them did bear fruit because, while they were not used as radar stations, they were used as communication centers?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. In fact, the people told me that the development of those as communication centers, as far as fighter control and also talking back and forth for permanent use, was probably much more valuable than radar; that the radar could pick the stuff up by duplicating a station down below, but you wouldn't be able to duplicate them for communications.

34. General FRANK. All right. Did you have any direct contact with Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

35. General FRANK. Did you have any complaints to make with respect to delay in construction?

Colonel FLEMING. On this particular project, sir?

[1268] 36. General FRANK. On any defense project. Did you have any complaints to make with respect to delays in construction of the A. W. S. system any place, at any time?

Colonel FLEMING. What do you mean by "complaints," sir?

37. General FRANK. Complaints. Well, did you consider that any part of this construction was being unnecessarily delayed?

Colonel FLEMING. By the constructing people, sir?

38. General FRANK. Yes, sir.

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir. I knew the factors which were facing those people and the things that they were—the things that all of us were trying to do in spite of delays. Some of those things, for example, were the Army-Navy competition. As far as labor was concerned it was a sellers' market; we were importing labor as fast as we could. We had a terrible time with the Engineers, the Army Engineers, and the Navy public works people; we had a terrible time building up organizations to do this work.

39. General FRANK. Do you feel that there were delays that in normal times could have been eliminated?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

40. General FRANK. Will you make a list of those?

Colonel FLEMING. Well, one I think was the procurement—

41. General FRANK. Take your time there and enumerate them, and then we will put them in the record.

Colonel FLEMING. One was the procurement of labor; two was procurement of materials; three were transportation.

42. General FRANK. From the mainland?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; transportation trans-Pacific. Four I think was this question of priorities back on the [1269] mainland, and five was the question of approvals.

43. General FRANK. Where and by whom?

Colonel FLEMING. By the War Department, sir.

44. General FRANK. Were there delays in those approvals?

Colonel FLEMING. To those of us sitting out there, we thought there were, yes, sir.

45. General FRANK. Were complaints made to the headquarters who had those approvals in hand?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

46. General FRANK. Complaints were made?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

47. General FRANK. When you made complaints did you get action?

Colonel FLEMING. In the majority of cases, yes, sir.

48. General FRANK. Well, then the delays in approvals were not so serious? Or were they?

Colonel FLEMING. I think they were, sir, some of them. I mean that is just a worm's-eye opinion, sir. For one thing, let us take the case of Haleakala. That station was located in a national park. We had to get on top of this mountain, which unfortunately was the most visible thing in the national park, and there was a long delay in there about getting the right of entry.

49. General FRANK. From whom?

Colonel FLEMING. From the National Park Service, sir.

50. General FRANK. Department of Parks?

Colonel FLEMING. Department of the Interior.

51. General FRANK. Who was Secretary of the Interior? Do you remember?

Colonel FLEMING. Mr. Ickes, sir. The local man out there [1270] in charge of that park was a man named Wingate. Mr. Wingate.

52. General FRANK. He was in charge of all national parks in the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; the one on Haleakala and then the one down in—

53. General FRANK. At Hawaii?

Colonel FLEMING. The one down at Hawaii. There had been a considerable amount of contacts back and forth with Mr. Wingate by the Army. For instance, the Air Corps wanted a bombing range down at what is known as the Kau Desert down in the Island of Hawaii, right in through here (indicating on map). I think that all this area is just absolutely worthless as far as anything except scenery is concerned. It wasn't very good for scenery because there were no roads into it.

54. General FRANK. They were all old lava beds?

Colonel FLEMING. All old lava beds. You couldn't go through there. I think you could walk through there. And I remember before the war we were trying to get that bombing range in there from the National Park Service and had a tremendous amount of difficulty on that. I don't think we ever did get it, unless we got it with so many restrictions that we couldn't use it.

But when we wanted to get in Haleakala, when we wanted to start work up there, the question immediately came up as to what damage this installation was going to do to the scenery in view of the Hawaii National Park. And that started before General Herron left the Islands, and he left in February 1941, I think; February or early March; and we wrote letters back and forth about this thing and tried to get Mr. Wingate to agree, [1271] and every time we would write Mr. Wingate a letter he would apparently refer it back to his people in Washington, and it dragged on and on, and the only commitment we could get was that we would have to design this station completely and submit all plans, architectural drawings of the buildings, and everything like that to Mr. Wingate, who would then forward them to the National Park Service people so they could pass on them from an architectural standpoint.

Well, obviously, if we were trying to build something in a hurry we couldn't wait around until the National Park Service approved these plans from an architectural standpoint. So we finally resolved that argument: I remember General Short sent a special telegram (it was one of these "eyes alone" telegrams) to General Marshall asking him to please secure the necessary permits to proceed with the construction of that station; and as a result of that appeal, why, we got authority to go into Haleakala and start work building the road and constructing buildings and submit the plans later on; that we would guarantee to make the buildings look like what the Park Service wanted us to, provided we could put the buildings where we wanted to.

55. General GRUNERT. When did you get that permission?

Colonel FLEMING. I don't remember, General. I think to the best of my knowledge it was sometime after General Short got there, and he arrived in February. I think that exchange of radios probably took place about in, oh, I would say in May of 1941, because I remember I had to explain this thing in great detail to General Short, to give him all the background and show to him that we had exhausted the local possibility of getting the thing done, before he would sign the radio.

[1272] 56. General FRANK. What about Kokee?

Colonel FLEMING. Kokee we didn't have any trouble with, sir. That is on the Island of Kauai, and it was located, fortunately, in territorial land. We had excellent relationships with the Territorial Department of Forestry, I think it was, controlled it.

57. General FRANK. Was there any delay in the construction of that once the job order was let?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

58. General FRANK. What was it?

Colonel FLEMING. The delay on that was that originally the fixed stations—and this is the reason we didn't like the fixed stations, sir—the fixed stations were supposed to be built with the detector building and the detector tower, the antenna gadget, all in the same building. In other words, the framework for the building was made sufficiently strong to hold this tower up on the top. Well, in furnishing the first people in this board we had no idea—we suspect that nobody else had any idea—how this thing was going to work. We thought we might have to move it maybe a hundred feet or a couple of hundred feet in various directions to get the best place to locate it. Also we had no detailed plans for the footings of the supports for this tower. The buildings sort of stuck up like this, of course, with the tower coming out where my pencil does (indicating), and that building and the tower were supported by heavy steel members inside of the building.

The only thing we had was the location of where the tower was, on the top of the building, and where the concrete [1273] foundations would have to go to support this structure. Of course, in building construction we have to have a lot more detailed information than that. You have got to either have your detail design of the footings of that tower so you can cast your bolts in the concrete when you pour it, or else you have got to have a template accompanying this thing.

Right in the middle of that one they found out that this gadget would not measure height or something on approaching planes, as I recall it, with the tower which was only 35 feet high, so they increased—

59. General FRANK. What do you mean by "this gadget"? What gadget? The tower?

Colonel FLEMING. The radar, sir.

60. General FRANK. The radar?

Colonel FLEMING. The radar.

61. General FRANK. The oscilloscope?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

So they increased the height of the antenna to a hundred-foot tower at this one particular station. And I don't know how long it took us to get the actual detailed design of the footings of that tower so we could start pouring that concrete. I remember that there was a lot of correspondence back and forth about that, trying to find out just exactly how that tower should be poured and what the relationship between the tower and the buildings was going to be after the hundred-foot tower was decided on.

62. General FRANK. Who determined those details that you needed to make this change in construction that was causing [1274] the delay?

Colonel FLEMING. That was done somewhere in this country, sir.

63. General FRANK. What branch of the service? Signal Corps?

Colonel FLEMING. Signal Corps; yes, sir.

64. General FRANK. It was the Signal Corps' responsibility to prepare the plans and specifications on which you should proceed with the construction?

Colonel FLEMING. It was our responsibility, sir, for preparing the—rather, the Engineers'. I was the General Staff Officer, but it was the Engineers' responsibility for designing the buildings in the thing and making all the layout except for this one building, the detector building.

65. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel FLEMING. That was a specially screened building. The Signal Corps furnished the tower and all the equipment that is in it, furnished everything complete for it.

66. General FRANK. Well, who was responsible for the plans that caused the delay?

Colonel FLEMING. I think the Signal Corps was, sir.

67. General FRANK. All right. Now, you have told us about the delays at Kokee and the delays at Kaala and the delays at Haleakala. In any of these delays were the contractors in any way responsible for those or any other delays?

Colonel FLEMING. I don't think so, sir. There may have been inefficiencies in management which would decrease the speed at which the work was going on, but I don't think there were any particular delays that the contractor had to do with. [1275] For example, the contractor couldn't proceed with that Kaala cableway until the thing had been designed and he was told where to put it.

68. General FRANK. Did you have any delays in getting plans from the Engineers?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

69. General FRANK. Where?

Colonel FLEMING. On that Kaala cableway.

70. General FRANK. What Engineers?

Colonel FLEMING. That was the District Engineer down at Kam in Honolulu, sir.

71. General FRANK. Well, give us the background of it.

Colonel FLEMING. Well, I just thought in there that I remember on that one particular thing that we had given them from our preliminary design dope what we wanted. We wanted a cableway which would haul about a ton every hour up this inclined railway.

72. General FRANK. How much of a concentrated load would it carry?

Colonel FLEMING. I think the ultimate in load on that, sir, was 1,500 pounds, but I am not sure. I remember in order to get this equipment up over the cableway it had to be broken down into loads which didn't exceed a certain amount; I think that figure is 1,500 pounds. The rate of flow was a ton per hour up it.

73. General FRANK. Well, get back to this delay in plans caused by the Engineer Office.

Colonel FLEMING. Well, after we gave them this original [1276] dope it seems to me, just as I recall it, that the experts to design this thing, after we gave them the starting point, the terminal point, and

the rate at which we wanted it to go in—that the experts to actually do the design work were not called in as soon as they could have been.

74. General FRANK. Do you know the intervening period there between the time that you gave them your requirements and the time the experts were called in?

Colonel FLEMING. I don't remember, sir. I remember that we reconnoitered there.

75. General FRANK. What?

Colonel FLEMING. We reconnoitered that route, sir, and got everybody to agree to it. Colonel Van Deusen and I reconnoitered that thing in, oh, I would say along about July or August of 1940.

76. General FRANK. Did that District Engineer's office, because of the nature of its operations cause any other delays?

Colonel FLEMING. I don't think so, sir. As I mentioned before, I think that the quality of the road that they put in from this point out on Kolekole Road until they got around to the take-off point was—it was a much finer road than the needs required. That delayed it a little bit.

77. General FRANK. Were you ever in the District Engineer's Office?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir.

78. General FRANK. You were never in his office?

Colonel FLEMING. Did I ever work there, sir?

79. General FRANK. No. Did you ever visit it? Did you [1277] ever go there?

Colonel FLEMING. Oh, yes, sir. I was down there about, I would say, on the average of four or five times a week.

80. General FRANK. Was it well organized?

Colonel FLEMING. I think so, yes, sir.

81. General FRANK. In your opinion? Orderly?

Colonel FLEMING. Before the war, yes, sir. It was located in two places. Before the war it was located down at Pier No. 2 in Honolulu, and the top floor of the Alexander Young Building. It was orderly and appeared to be well organized. The clerks, for example, the Civil Service clerks they had over there, a large number were Chinese. They had Chinese stenographers, Chinese-Hawaiian stenographers, and I think it was efficiently and well organized.

82. General FRANK. Did you know Colonel Wyman?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

83. General FRANK. Very well?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

84. General FRANK. Did you get along well with him?

Colonel FLEMING. Officially, sir?

85. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel FLEMING. Well, I was in a very peculiar spot. As I said before, the Department Engineer was Colonel Lyman, A. K. B. Lyman; and the District Engineer from about—I don't know when he went down there, sir. I don't remember whether it was in August—

86. General FRANK. What do you mean, "he went down there"? Was he on duty up in the Engineer Regiment?

[1278] Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. Wyman came over there originally and went to duty at Schofield Barracks. I believe that he was at Schofield in the 3rd Engineers when Colonel Lyman arrived in

the Department. I am pretty sure he was; I think he was out there under Colonel Hodges, and Lyman and Wyman had known each other before, and when Colonel Lyman arrived over there to take command of the regiment, why, I remember all of us junior officers were sort of laughing about this thing.

87. General FRANK. Why?

Colonel FLEMING. Well, because they didn't get along so well together, and we more or less had a pool up as to how long Wyman would stay on the regiment, how long it would take him to get out from under Colonel Lyman, and it didn't take him very long. I think he went down to become District Engineer in Honolulu about, oh, somewhere around September of 1940. Colonel Lyman arrived in Hawaii about in June of 1940.

Well, that, frankly, as far as the Engineers were concerned, put me on the spot because Lyman was ostensibly my boss, although he didn't get down there very often, and Wyman down in the District Engineer's Office, and there was supposed to be cooperation between the Department Engineer, of course, and the District Engineer. Well, I found myself the middleman in a feud, and that lasted for quite some time. So I say I know Colonel Wyman very well. I have known him since 1934.

88. General FRANK. Did that feud result in any delays?

Colonel FLEMING. Oh, it would certainly prolong discussions, General. There happened to be another Engineer [1279] officer down on duty, down on the District Engineer's, who was Wyman's executive officer.

89. General FRANK. Who was that?

Colonel FLEMING. A man named Robinson, sir. Bernard L. Robinson. He went out to Australia, and he is out there now. He has been out there ever since shortly after the war began.

90. General FRANK. What about him?

Colonel FLEMING. Well, I know Robbie very well. In fact, we had been fairly intimate when we were younger. And he would get the job of listening to the feud from the Wyman side, and I would listen to it from the Lyman side, and occasionally we would switch and get caught in this thing, but Robbie and I were working back and forth on the thing. Now, as I say, it delayed things because I think there was an undue amount of time taken up while we heard what the difficulties with the other party in the feud were, but at the same time it didn't—it was just one of those situations that we were in, sir.

91. General FRANK. Was there any relationship between Robinson and Wyman?

Colonel FLEMING. Robinson was Wyman's immediate subordinate, sir.

92. General FRANK. No. I am talking about personal relationship. Was one of them somebody's brother-in-law?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir. Robinson married a girl from Spokane.

93. General FRANK. Robinson was not Wyman's brother-in-law?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir.

94. General FRANK. How long did this feud last?

[1280] Colonel FLEMING. Until Colonel Wyman's relief from the Department, sir.

95. General FRANK. Until Colonel Wyman's relief?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. They remained in that position of Department Engineer and District Engineer until about—well, I would say about March or April of 1942.

96. General FRANK. When did Wyman leave there?

Colonel FLEMING. About April of 1942, sir.

97. General FRANK. What caused his relief? Do you know?

Colonel FLEMING. General Emmons had been over there long enough then to size up the situation very well, and I just think he got a little bit annoyed at the situation, and he decided that one of the two of them would have to leave the Islands for the peace of mind of everybody concerned, and Wyman was relieved at that particular time.

98. General FRANK. How did it come to be Wyman instead of Lyman that left? Do you know?

Colonel FLEMING. Well, Wyman is not the world's greatest diplomat, sir. He is a bull in a china shop, and he zigged when he should have zagged more than once. He just got himself crosswise in an awful hurry.

99. General FRANK. Did this relationship between Lyman and Wyman ever come to General Short's attention?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

100. General FRANK. Did he ever have a conference with them to try to straighten it out?

Colonel FLEMING. I don't know whether he had a conference or not, sir, whether he had them both in. I know that just [1281] before the war started—I have a remembrance there it was just before the war started, General Short called me in one day and asked me about this thing and what I thought about each one of the two officers, and frankly I demurred on answering his question and told him that I didn't think it was up to my place to criticize my superiors, and so he told me that he had been talking it over with both officers and knew that I had a pretty fair knowledge of both of them, and wanted to get a private opinion, which I gave to him. Now, that would indicate to me that General Short was cognizant of the situation and was trying to straighten it out. This was just before the war started.

[1282] 101. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not he did anything about it?

Colonel FLEMING. I am pretty sure he talked to both of them, sir. I don't think he ever took any official action. He may have written some personal letters back to people in the War Department requesting changes, or something like that; but I don't know.

102. General FRANK. What was your personal opinion that was given to Short?

Colonel FLEMING. To the best of my recollection, sir, I told both General Short and Colonel Hayes that Wyman had a reputation of getting the work done, but that he was about the most impossible persons personally that we had in the engineers; that he was just one of those people who made everybody mad at him being always—he was just a "bull in a china shop."

103. General FRANK. You say that General Short had a talk with Wyman and with Lyman?

Colonel FLEMING. I assume that he did, sir, because I know he asked me my opinion, because he was very cognizant. He was apparently

cognizant of the difficulties between the two of them, these personal difficulties, and had apparently given enough thought to it that he called in a very junior officer to ask him his opinion. He asked me my opinion of both of them.

104. General FRANK. Well, he called you in with little consideration of your being a junior officer, but because of your position and of your intimate knowledge, as his representative dealing with the two of them; isn't that correct?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. I remember at the beginning of the conversation I told him that I thought it was putting me in a rather embarrassing position, because I was discussing [1283] my superiors.

105. General FRANK. How long had General Short known of this feud, do you know?

Colonel FLEMING. I would say it got very bad, sir, oh, around the 1st of November, 1941.

106. General FRANK. Do you know of any specific projects that were held up as a result of this feud?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir; I don't think any were held up as a result of it. I think that the only thing it resulted in was making my work and making Colonel Robinson's work a lot more difficult than it otherwise would have been.

107. General FRANK. Were you on friendly terms with Wyman?

Colonel FLEMING. Not socially, sir. I was, officially, and I think I got along with him well.

108. General FRANK. What was his reputation?

Colonel FLEMING. Socially, sir?

109. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel FLEMING. Well, his reputation socially, sir, just wasn't good. He had the reputation of being a person who was absolutely without any polish. When he went to a party you always felt rather embarrassed for what might happen next, and I think all of the engineer officers over there at that particular time avoided contact socially as much as we could.

110. General FRANK. What was his reputation with respect to drinking?

Colonel FLEMING. He has had a very bad reputation for drinking, sir. I would like to amplify that statement, however. I think that was one of the reasons why Wyman got out of the Third Engineers. Lyman had had previous knowledge of [1284] Wyman's drinking. Of course everybody else had, too. We knew he liked to "hoist one" every once in a while, but I think that Lyman must have found Wyman with too much aboard one time and just gave him hell. I know that Colonel Lyman told me that he had discussed it with Colonel Wyman, and that Wyman had signed the pledge. I think he had enough on him that he just about had to.

Well, to the best of my recollection, then, sir, when he came down from Schofield to Honolulu, frankly, I do not know whether he ever drank to excess or not, because we weren't with him socially, and we were not on the same kind of parties, and I think, however, he had pretty well laid off the heavy drinking by that time—as far as his reputation was concerned.

111. General FRANK. As the result of your having been down there so frequently, did it ever occur to you that his drinking was interfering with the performance of his duty?

Colonel FLEMING. I don't think so, General.

112. General FRANK. Not at any time during the period that he was over there?

Colonel FLEMING. Before the war, sir?

113. General FRANK. At any time during the period.

Colonel FLEMING. I don't recall any time at which I could say that Colonel Wyman's drinking was affecting his duties.

114. General FRANK. When was this discussion about signing the pledge?

Colonel FLEMING. That was about—oh, around about October or November 1940, sir.

115. General FRANK. 1940?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

116. General FRANK. That was the year before Pearl Harbor.

[1285] Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. It was about the time that Wyman was relieved from the Third Engineers and sent down to Honolulu as the district engineer, down there.

117. General GRUNERT. When you say "the pledge," you mean a pledge not to drink to excess, or what?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; a pledge not to drink to excess, sir. don't you know?

Colonel FLEMING. I don't know, sir.

119. General GRUNERT. I wanted to get it in the record, as to what a "pledge" is, that was all. It referred to drinking.

Colonel FLEMING. All I know is that Colonel Lyman told me that

118. General FRANK. Not to drink, or not to drink to excess? Or he had this discussion with Colonel Wyman, and that he thought that he would stop drinking to excess.

120. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not General Short knew about this?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir; I don't think he did, sir. That happened before General Short came over there, and Wyman stayed pretty well "up to the pole," sir, until after the war began. That is the best of my knowledge. I never saw him on any "wild toots," and I never heard of him being on, and I think he was fairly well "up to the pole," until after the war started.

121. General FRANK. And after the war started, what?

Colonel FLEMING. Well, I was at one party out at General Tincher's quarters, when there was some liquor going around.

122. General FRANK. And what?

Colonel FLEMING. And that was just shortly before Wyman [1286] was relieved, sir.

123. General FRANK. Did he become intoxicated, in your opinion?

Colonel FLEMING. He had too much to drink, sir, and made some very regrettable statements, which caused certain newly arrived Air Generals to get extremely irked at the engineers, I remember.

124. General FRANK. Who were those Generals?

Colonel FLEMING. It was General Hale, sir, and it was a welcoming party for General Hale.

125. General FRANK. Do you remember what those statements were?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

126. General FRANK. What were they?

Colonel FLEMING. The party was called, sir, to celebrate the opening of the ferry project, this southern airways route to Australia, and Wyman ended up by making some "crack" indicating that the engineers were the only outfit in the Army, and that any time General Hale got in trouble with his new command, why, just to call on Colonel Wyman, and he would come over and help him, and run it for him. Well, I don't think Colonel Hale appreciated it very much, and neither did I, because I was trying to stop the conversation.

The only members present at that party, sir, were—General Tincher and Colonel Mollison gave the party, and what they wanted it for was to get General Hale and Colonel Wyman together, and they used this excuse of completing the southern airways route. I think General Tincher had just about come back from the inspection of it at that time, and the people present were General Tincher, Colonel Mollison, who was the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Hale, General Tincher's aide [1287] and myself.

127. General FRANK. Now, during the period that you were over there, did you ever run onto a man by the name of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. I had known Mr. Rohl by reputation only, sir, and to the best of my knowledge I never met him before the war started. The executive officer of the Hawaiian Constructors Contracting Company—

128. General FRANK. What was—?

Colonel FLEMING. —who was a man naved Paul Grafe—G-r-a-e-f-e—and I met Mr. Grafe several times at—oh, just the usual backyard barbecue party. I thing he was at a couple that the Robinsons gave. My wife and I and the Robinsons were fairly—we got to know each other fairly well.

129. General FRANK. The Robinsons now lived up in the Nuuanu Valley?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir; the Robinsons lived on Kahala, and we lived on Kaimuka, fairly close together, so it was one of those arrangements where we would get together and we played bridge in the evening, stuff like that; and I met Grafe a couple of times over there at the Robinsons'. They had backyard barbecues at which they cooked steaks on the fire.

130. General FRANK. Grafe was a member of what firm?

Colonel FLEMING. I don't know, sir. I think that he belonged to the Callahan outfit, although that is just my recollection of it; but as far as I knew, Grafe was the man who was chairman of that executive committee until—well, after the war started. I don't know when he disappeared, and I never saw Mr. Rohl until—I had heard about him, but I didn't [1288] meet him until after the war.

131. General FRANK. After the war?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

132. General FRANK. Was he in Honolulu?

Colonel FLEMING. He had been in Honolulu prior to that, sir. I know he was there in October.

133. General FRANK. You said you had heard of him, by reputation. What was that reputation?

Colonel FLEMING. Just as the Rohl-Connolly Constructing Corporation, sir, and a rather prominent contractor.

134. General FRANK. Did you know anything about him, other than his being President of that organization?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir.

135. General FRANK. Did you ever meet him?

Colonel FLEMING. I met him, after the war, sir.

136. General FRANK. How did you come to meet him?

Colonel FLEMING. In the course of my business down there with the district engineer's office, I met him several times, and my attention was particularly called to Mr. Rohl, I think it was—well, near, probably around February 1942. No, it was earlier than that, sir. He had been back to the mainland. He had been back and forth, and Colonel Wyman was trying to get him an air priority on a CLIPPER to come back to Honolulu, and the first time Mr. Rohl was ever particularly brought to my consciousness was the fact when Wyman called me up this one time and wanted some help in getting Mr. Rohl a priority back on the CLIPPER, and he rather emphatically stated his case and told me I had better, a damned sight, get the priority on the CLIPPER out of the Navy. The Navy, by the way, was [1289] controlling priorities on the CLIPPER. They didn't know who Mr. Rohl was, and they had a lot of people they wanted to bring back. That was, I think, in early January or February 1942, the first time I particularly came to know of Rohl.

137. General FRANK. What was the relationship between Rohl and Wyman? Was there any relationship?

Colonel FLEMING. I only am familiar with that by hearsay, sir.

138. General FRANK. Well, what is your hearsay?

Colonel FLEMING. There has been a lot of discussion in the engineers, sir, for years, on the fact that a lot of people have always believed that Colonel Wyman was a little bit too familiar with the contractors.

139. General FRANK. With the contractors?

Colonel FLEMING. With contractors on these various jobs, sir. He had been district engineer in Kansas City, and from there he went out to Los Angeles. I was in Los Angeles at the same time that Colonel Wyman was. He was the district engineer in Los Angeles. The engineers were running the relief business out there. General Donald H. Connolly was then Lieutenant Colonel, and was the administrator of the Works Progress Administration in southern California. We were sent out there for four months' temporary duty.

140. General FRANK. Were you with General Connolly?

Colonel FLEMING. I was with General Connolly, with the WPA, sir. We stayed there for 3½ years, and I left there to go to Hawaii. Wyman came over about a year later. I know that in Los Angeles there had been discussions. I heard that from General Connolly, that they didn't get along very well in the [1290] relationship with contracting people. They thought that he had too many social relationships with the various contractors on the jobs.

141. General FRANK. What was the reputation of that social relationship between Wyman and Rohl in Honolulu?

Colonel FLEMING. I don't know what it was before the war, sir.

142. General FRANK. What was it after the war?

Colonel FLEMING. After the war—well, I think after the war a lot of people thought that they were together too much of the time.

143. General FRANK. Were they drinking?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

144. General FRANK. To excess?

Colonel FLEMING. I don't know, sir. I never saw them.

145. General FRANK. What were the reports circulating about that drinking?

Colonel FLEMING. Oh, there were all sorts of reports circulated about it, sir, but I think everybody in the Territory was mad at Colonel Wyman, about that time.

146. General FRANK. Everybody was what?

Colonel FLEMING. Was mad at Colonel Wyman.

147. General FRANK. Well, let us get back to what were the reports about that drinking.

Colonel FLEMING. There were rumors that there was excessive drinking going on. Personally, outside of that one time that I thought Wyman had too much, when he was talking to General Hale, I personally never saw him.

148. General FRANK. About how many times did you ever come in [1291] contact with him?

Colonel FLEMING. I think prior to the war, sir, when he came over there, that was about a year and a half, from the summer of 1940 until December. I don't believe I saw Colonel Wyman socially at a party more than five times, in all that time, with the one at Schofield, I remember, and there was another one down-town, and we gave a cocktail party at our house one time and invited them, but I would believe five times would be the limit.

149. General FRANK. Were these five large or small affairs?

Colonel FLEMING. Mostly large, sir.

150. General FRANK. Was Rohl at any of these parties?

Colonel FLEMING. Not that I know of, sir. To the best of my knowledge I never met Rohl until after the war started.

151. General FRANK. Did you ever meet him at a party?

Colonel FLEMING. After the war?

152. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

153. General FRANK. You met Rohl at a party?

Colonel FLEMING. I met Rohl at a party, after the war; yes, sir.

154. General FRANK. How often?

Colonel FLEMING. He was going back and forth between there and the mainland quite frequently, sir. I remember particularly seeing him at a party down at the Pleasanton Hotel. I also saw him again the night that Colonel Wyman left. We had a farewell "luau" party, and I saw Mr. Rohl at that.

155. General FRANK. At the Willows?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir; it was at the Pleasanton, which [1292] is a hotel up near Punahou.

156. General FRANK. When the Hawaiian Constructors first started to operate, who was the representative between the Hawaiian Constructors and the District Engineer?

Colonel FLEMING. There were two of them, sir. There was Mr. Grafe, who was chairman of this executive board, and the man by the name of Middleton, I believe, who was more or less a local manager, personnel manager, in Honolulu.

157. General FRANK. Did Mr. Rohl ever come into a dominant position in Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

158. General FRANK. When?

Colonel FLEMING. After the war, sir, to the best of my knowledge. He may have had the controlling interest, and Grafe may have been just his man over there; I don't know; but I do know that after the war started, Rohl—this thing was apparently a syndicate, sir, and I think Rohl had a very large interest in the syndicate. Grafe may have been an employee. I don't know, when he went in, whether he was or not; but after the war started, Grafe more or less disappeared from this executive-committee business. I don't know where he went, and Rohl came over and sat down right there in Hawaii and was more or less the contractors' man, the one with final authority.

159. General FRANK. Did Rohl have an office near Wyman's?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; the contractors had a building in the Puuhale campus. The engineers took over the Puuhale school and the entire area, as I was advised, and one of the buildings on Puuhale campus was an office of this Hawaiian Constructors.

[1293] 160. General FRANK. Was there anything ever said about Wyman's leaning on Rohl for advice, or about Rohl's having special influence with Wyman on construction projects, that you learned?

Colonel FLEMING. I think there was plenty said about it, sir; but I don't know whether there was any truth to it, or not.

161. General FRANK. Well, what was being said?

Colonel FLEMING. Well, there was a lot of talk about it, but generally—

162. General FRANK. What was it? What was the tenor of it?

Colonel FLEMING. The tenor of that talk was that Rohl, over there, as a local man in the Hawaiian Constructors, would have to approve of one of these projects, or approve of some of the questions before the Hawaiian Constructors would start pushing it. Now, unless you knew the set-up, sir, it would be difficult to explain what it was. The personnel, for example, would be hired by the Hawaiian Constructors. The Government was paying all of the pay roll of that outfit except for certain key individuals; and all their laborers, and everything like that, were actually paid directly on a government pay roll. The Government paid directly all the bills for purchases of materials on this contract, and bills would have to be certified by the Hawaiian Constructors, and then they would have to be approved by the contracting officer; and the rumors, the talk was to the effect that Mr. Rohl was the boss man, or, over there in the Hawaiian Constructors, he was actually running the show.

163. General FRANK. How was he running it. Was he having [1294] an undue influence on Wyman?

Colonel FLEMING. I don't think so, sir. I don't know. I wasn't around him, but I know Colonel Wyman.

164. General FRANK. What was your feeling, and what was the general feeling with relation to the question as to whether or not the

association of Rohl and Wyman was a healthful one for the Government?

Colonel FLEMING. It was entirely personal, General, but I felt that it was not a healthful one.

165. General FRANK. That it was not a healthful one?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

166. General FRANK. Why?

Colonel FLEMING. Well, I just don't believe that in—I was trained in the engineers by officers with a little bit different viewpoint.

167. General FRANK. With higher standards, you mean?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir—General Larkin and General Connolly—and I know darned well that neither one of those two would have been so intimate with one of their contractors.

168. General FRANK. Was there any indication at any time of any graft or illegal profit?

Colonel FLEMING. On the Hawaiian Constructors, sir?

169. General FRANK. Yes, sir.

Colonel FLEMING. I don't think so, sir. I think there were indications of an awful lot of inefficiency in the set-up. That is a fault which is inherent in those "cost-plus-fixed-fee" contracts. They were grand things, and they were very necessary for the progress of work, as long as we had a big job to do. If we had a lot of big construction work, like building an [1295] airport, that organization could have done it. It was to our advantage, to the Government's advantage, to have that contract, just to avoid this business of the "red tape," that we never could have gotten this work done if we had been hampered by all the procurement regulations.

The minute that our work in Hawaii changed from concentrating on several, but still a relatively small number, of large projects, and our engineering work over there shifted to doing at one time and pushing a lot of small jobs all over the Island, and trying to get them all pushed at the same time, then that contract I believe became inherently—it became inherently inefficient, because those people down there among the contractors' employees, they just weren't interested in it. For instance, we, from a military engineering standpoint, would be trying to get a water line, just a ¾-inch water line, run off to some company, to furnish them water, and trying to get these contractors to do it. They wouldn't do it. All this little, small, piddling stuff that they couldn't go out and make a big organization of, was neglected. They still wanted to do the big contracting jobs, but of course we didn't have many of that kind of work after that, and there was a whole lot of little jobs being pushed and rushed just as fast as we could do it, and that organization wasn't suited. The minute it became that sort of program, then the contractor was out of the picture—should have been out of the picture.

[1296] 170. General FRANK. A cost-plus contract, therefore, requires more than the usual reliance upon the honesty of the contractor?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, I think it does, sir. The contractor is not spending his own money. He does not get cost plus a percentage. This was cost plus a flat fee. In a cost plus percentage I do not think there is any tendency to be dishonest unless there is a hook-up between the contractor and one of the purchasing people. But there is cer-

tainly not the care in operating under these contracts as there would be if the contractor were spending his own money.

171. General FRANK. Was Wyman having difficulty with Grafe?

Colonel FLEMING. I do not know, sir; I was never close enough to see. I do not think he was.

172. General FRANK. Do you know of any rumors that Wyman wanted Rohl in Hawaii because Wyman was rowing with Grafe?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir; I do not know anything about that.

173. General FRANK. What was Rohl's reputation for drinking?

Colonel FLEMING. He had a pretty good reputation too, sir.

174. General GRUNERT. A pretty good reputation or a pretty bad reputation?

Colonel FLEMING. He had a pretty good reputation for his capacity. He could take on quite a bit.

175. General FRANK. Did it incapacitate him?

Colonel FLEMING. I never knew him well enough to find out.

176. General FRANK. Were there any rumors as to his being incapacitated prior to December 7th because of his drinking?

[1297] Colonel FLEMING. I never heard any, sir. I did not know him before December 7th.

177. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not Rohl and Wyman lived anywhere near each other?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir. Wyman at that time lived in the Nuuanu Valley.

178. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not they had adjoining rooms at the Pleasanton Hotel?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. They did that, I think, after the war started.

179. General FRANK. Did the Army take over the Pleasanton Hotel?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir. That was another thing that we got into trouble about, that Pleasanton Hotel, more trouble than anything I know about. Actually it was taken over by the Hawaiian Constructors. They took it over to provide living accommodations for certain of their employees. The hotel was owned by a Jap family. I would call it in those days a second-class hotel, right near the Napua.

180. General FRANK. Diagonally across?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. The Hawaiian Constructors took over the hotel for the benefit of their employees, and then they ran a cafe in the place and rented out rooms to Army officers who had been evacuated from their houses. Wyman's room and Rohl's room were not absolutely adjacent. They were on the second floor of the hotel, and Wyman had a room in one corner and Rohl one in the other corner, and between the two were two rooms that they used as offices. I would say the [1298] entrances of the rooms were maybe 75 feet apart. They were the only two people in that particular section of the building. Colonel Robinson had another room on that floor, but he was in the back.

The Pleasanton Hotel is just one of those things. It was a swell idea; the contractor had to take care of his employees, and that, under the terms of the contract, I think, was one of the things that was reimbursable as far as the Government was concerned. But the

Government got into the hotel business indirectly by paying the bills of the Hawaiian Constructors. There have been more investigations into that hotel than anything I know of.

181. General FRANK. Do you know anything about the results of those investigations?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. One of the results was that General Emmons took it up and they changed a lot of the setups down there and found a lot of details that the Constructors were doing which did not agree with Army regulations, and a lot of expenditures being made and receipts not being collected, and the usual deficiencies that you would expect to find when a bunch of people like that go into the hotel business without any regard to Army regulations.

182. General FRANK. Was Rowe there?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; he was the Inspector General at that time. Colonel Ely, or Colonel Baldwin—I think it was Colonel Ely, who was the Department finance officer—put in all these transfers. One of the transfers was made after the war started. Mixed up in the transfers was Quartermaster work for [1299] the Engineers, and the Quartermaster trying to back up their accounts, and also a transfer in the Engineers' disbursement system. Up to that time the Engineers had always done their own financing, but in this streamlining business they transferred all the financing over to the finance people. These arguments came up because the new disbursing officer would not pay the bills. I am pretty sure Colonel Ely was the finance officer. That is where the thing started.

183. General FRANK. Do you know where Rohl was between the 6th and 8th of December?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir.

[1300] 184. General FRANK. When the war started was there any change in the method of handling the contracts; do you know?

Colonel FLEMING. Not in the contracts, sir. I don't know about the method of handling the contracts, sir. There was a very definite change in the Engineer setup; yes, sir.

185. General FRANK. What was it?

Colonel FLEMING. Colonel Lyman then had been spending more and more time at Shafter. I was pulled out of the Department Engineer Office, as I said, in August of 1941, and from that time on Colonel Lyman began spending more and more time at Fort Shafter, and in all the war plans immediately on the outbreak of the war, why, the Department Engineer would assume control over all construction work in the Department.

186. General FRANK. Because they were principally defense projects?

Colonel FLEMING. Defense projects then; yes, sir. So General Short immediately authorized us to put that into effect.

187. General FRANK. To put what into effect?

Colonel FLEMING. The previous organization, sir, which set the Department Engineer up as the ruling boss of everything, of all these military construction and all civilian construction under him, or rather, civilian-executed construction; and the District Engineer became a subordinate of the Department Engineer.

188. General FRANK. That was starting when?

Colonel FLEMING. It was as of December 7th, sir.

189. General FRANK. Then on December 7th Wyman became a [1301] subordinate of Lyman?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. I dictated the order, and I think on the 7th or the 8th, as soon as we could get around to it, we formalized it. And, however, the District Engineer was a part of the Engineer Department setup.

190. General FRANK. What Engineer Department?

Colonel FLEMING. The Engineer Department, sir; I mean that the Engineer Department is organized under the Corps of Engineers. The Chief of Engineers is the head of it, and he has these Division Engineers all around the country, and District Engineers under the Division Engineers. Now, Wyman's immediate superior was the Division Engineer in San Francisco, and he was never under the command of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. His orders were to just cooperate with him. That same setup was true in Panama. It wasn't true in the Philippines. In the Philippines the Department Engineer was actually the District Engineer also.

So, while over there in Hawaii in putting into effect this war plan Wyman came under Lyman, it was not a complete command arrangement because Wyman was still responsible through his Engineer Department channels, through the Division Engineer, and back to the Chief of Engineers, and that was not finally changed until about March of 1942 when the War Department issued instructions that all Engineers in the theaters of operations would be directly under the Commanding Generals of that, and they wiped out the Engineer Department channels at that particular time, and it was at that time that Colonel Wyman was relieved. General Emmons decided that since he had orders to consolidate the thing and he could pick—the orders were, or [1302] the instructions from the War Department were, when that thing came out, that by statute—certain things by statute have to be done by a person called the District Engineer. Those are rivers and harbors projects and flood-control projects, and on those two particular things the Chief of Engineers is directly responsible to Congress, not through the War Department; he is more or less separate from the War Department. And when the order came out the Chief of Engineers—or rather, the War Department stated that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department would pick his Engineer and that the Chief of Engineers would then turn around and make whoever the Commanding General picked—would make him the District Engineer so he could continue handling these purely—

191. General FRANK. Statutory projects?

Colonel FLEMING. Statutory projects. And it was at that time that Wyman was relieved and sent back to the mainland, and I think that was about in March. There was about a three months' time, sir, that—

192. General FRANK. That was in March?

Colonel FLEMING. That is right.

193. General FRANK. However, immediately after December 7th the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department issued orders to bring the District Engineer under the Department Engineer?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

194. General FRANK. He did that without any authority from the mainland?

Colonel FLEMING. Without any direct authority; no, sir. However, that was part of the Hawaiian Department Defense Plan, or whatever it was; I forget the name of it.

[1303] 195. General FRANK. Could that have been done prior to December 7th?

Colonel FLEMING. I don't know, sir. I think that if the question had ever been raised possibly the War Department would have approved it. I don't think that they would have changed the relationship between the District Engineer, the Division Engineer, and the Chief of Engineers prior to the war because I said it took them from December until sometime in March to make that change. Wyman, even after the war started, was still getting instructions direct through his Engineer channels. There was one project before the war, the only project to the best of my knowledge—there was only one project for which the Commanding General was made directly responsible, and that was for the construction of what I call the ferry project, and that is the construction of this chain of air bases from Hawaii to the Philippines, and in that—

196. General GRUNERT. May I develop that a little bit?

197. General FRANK. Just let me ask one question.

Go ahead. You were going to say something.

Colonel FLEMING. In that project the directive came out stating that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was responsible for all the construction down to and including Australia. The Commanding General of the Philippine Department was responsible for all construction north of Australia and into the Philippines. And our instructions in Hawaii were that the District Engineer had been given orders by the Chief of Engineers to place himself at the disposal of the Commanding General for that one project.

198. General FRANK. When war started—that was from December [1304] 7th on—did all contracts merge in the Hawaiian Constructors on recommendation of Colonel Wyman?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

199. General FRANK. That was a change, then?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir, it was a change.

200. General FRANK. What did that change involve?

Colonel FLEMING. At that time, sir, I said we were taking over the Quartermaster work. Now, my memory is not entirely clear on all of these things. We had taken over all of their contracts before the war which had to do with Air Corps construction on air force posts. The next thing we took over was the work of the Quartermaster as far as rentals, leases, and utilities; and then the next thing which was transferred, and we got orders on this transfer I think just before the war—I may have had my chronology or my time a little bit wrong here, but just before the war we got orders to take over all other Constructing Quartermaster's contracts. There was a lot of them going on. There was a big housing program for the increase in the antiaircraft garrison. There were several permanent projects under construction; two great big barracks at Fort Shafter, I remember. And when that turnover occurred the war

came along then and of course added to the difficulties of transferring these things from the Quartermasters over to the Engineers.

Certain types of projects were stopped. We stopped all of the permanent type of construction and continued the temporary types of construction; and on the termination of contracts the work of certain of these old Constructing Quartermaster contractors was just stopped. The other work, in order to— [1305] well, I don't know why it was done, but anyway the other temporary type of work was eventually closed out under the contracts which had previously been in force, and some of it was picked up by the Hawaiian Constructors. I do not think, sir, that it was a question of actually transferring a job from the Quartermaster contractor over to these Hawaiian Constructors. As I recall the thing, we stopped practically all of them, and they were all stopped for about, oh, I would say anywhere from two to three months, and then the picture clarified. We went back and picked up some of them again, see; so when they picked them up the Hawaiian Constructors picked them up rather than the old Quartermaster contractors.

201. General FRANK. All right.

202. General GRUNERT. When the District Engineer was placed under the Department Engineer as of December 7, was that part of the approved war plan, that that would be done in time of war?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. That was in the Engineer Plan; I don't know whether the Mobilization Plan or the Hawaiian Department Defense Project.

203. General GRUNERT. I see. For all purposes except those determined by law, which required a decision in Washington and which was made a directive after the war started?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; made about March 1942. Later than that: about March or April.

204. General GRUNERT. Then, even if the Department Commander was merely concerned about construction projects during the [1306] imminence of war, that could not have been done except by Washington?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; it would have required War Department approval, sir.

205. General GRUNERT. Had that approval been requested?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir. I am sure I would have known had it been requested. It had not been requested.

206. General FRANK. Now, there was something brought out about the general knowledge of Colonel Wyman's constant and intimate association with Mr. Rohl over a period of years.

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

207. General FRANK. You knew about that?

Colonel FLEMING. I didn't know about it, sir, until after the war occurred. I never met Mr. Rohl before the war. I went back afterward and talked to my friend Colonel Robinson down there; and just chewing—well, just gossiping the way people will, I then found out that this Rohl-Connolly Corporation I think is a Los Angeles corporation.

208. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel FLEMING. And apparently there had been plenty of relationships between Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman when Wyman was the District Engineer in Los Angeles, but when I was in Los An-

geles with General Connolly we had no relationship with the district office other than furnishing them relief labor. They were our biggest customer actually for the employment of labor in the Los Angeles metropolitan area.

209. General FRANK. Well, you had known of this personal association from the time that you had been in Southern California with Connolly?

[1307] Colonel FLEMING. Not with Mr. Rohl, sir.

210. General FRANK. You didn't?

Colonel FLEMING. Not with Mr. Rohl as an individual, sir. I think I said a little while ago that I had had personal knowledge that in my opinion Colonel Wyman associated too much with contractors.

211. General FRANK. Oh, yes.

Colonel FLEMING. I didn't intend to convey the impression that I knew about any relationship with Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman prior to that time.

212. General FRANK. After December 7th was there any talk or discussion about the association of Wyman and Rohl?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir, there was plenty of—

213. General FRANK. Did you have something further to say?

Colonel FLEMING. I was just going to explain that statement, sir.

214. General FRANK. Go ahead.

Colonel FLEMING. There was plenty of talk about it, sir. That is when I first got to know Mr. Rohl. As I said, the first time I knew anything about Mr. Rohl was when I was getting in that airplane priority, trying to, out of the Navy. But there was a lot of discussion, and I think that was one of the reasons why General Emmons finally decided—when this unification of the Engineer setup was made, why, he finally decided to request Colonel Wyman's relief.

215. General FRANK. Was there any curiosity or wonderment as to why higher authority allowed this intimate association of Rohl and Wyman to continue?

Colonel FLEMING. I don't think so, sir. Rohl was not a [1308] well known figure in Hawaii until after the war started. As I said, there was this investigation of the Pleasanton Hotel business, for example. Well, that brought out a lot. That made General Emmons rather concerned about the whole situation, to put it mildly; and later on there was the incident of the famous yacht VEGA, and about that time I think that—I don't believe that General Emmons ever wrote to the War Department asking for Wyman's relief, but I know that he talked it over with Lyman and that Lyman wrote a personal letter to the Chief of Engineer's Office stating that General Emmons considered Wyman to be no longer officially welcome, and suggesting they get him out. He was relieved on that then, and that all happened just about the time this unification business came down.

216. General FRANK. What do you know about the VEGA?

Colonel FLEMING. I was introduced to the VEGA very sharply and abruptly, sir. There is another VEGA. To make my story clear in this thing, there are two ships called the VEGA. One of them is this yacht, and the other VEGA is a Navy supply ship called—well, like the SIRIUS and that crowd, we had it over there in Hawaii before the war.

217. General FRANK. I would like to know about this yacht.

Colonel FLEMING. The yacht VEGA? Well, I never heard of the yacht VEGA until suddenly General Emmons called me in one day and wanted to know what I knew about the VEGA, and I told him the VEGA just arrived in the last convoy and it was towing over a dredge that belonged to us, and the General told me that maybe I had better go down and look at the VEGA. So I went down [1309] and took a look at the VEGA and it was this yacht. It was about a 75- or 80-foot yacht, sailboat.

Well, I had seen the names on the convoy list, and I used to keep General Emmons advised as to what was coming in in the convoy, and this thing was in a very slow convoy, a 4-knot convoy, and we had been having arrangement with the Navy to get a dredge towed over from San Francisco or San Diego or some place like that, and the Navy had been planning on towing this dredge with their boat, the VEGA, which is a supply ship. When I saw the name of the VEGA in the convoy list it never occurred to me to investigate what the VEGA was; I thought it was this supply ship.

Well, apparently at that time we had not completed but at least opened for traffic this southern route of airways. Those things all ran down from Hawaii here, or rather Oahu—the Island of Christmas on this may would be right up in here (indicating)—to Christmas and Palmyra. The next jump was down to Canton here, then down to Nandi and Suva, which is right there (indicating); New Caledonia. Our field in Australia was at Townsville. We had finished that thing, but there was a rather defensive attitude in the whole Pacific at this particular time, and they were afraid particularly that the field at Canton would be knocked out and the one at Fiji would be taken out. So they wanted to get a still further south air route which would be farther away from the Jap bases, and the only way of doing that—the map is not complete, but south of Christmas there is another island called Penrhyn, and another south of that called Aitutaki, and by going a jump [1310] to those two we could then jump from there down to Tonga and into New Zealand and into Australia that way. That was the southern and easternmost airline.

They wanted somebody to go down and make a survey of this particular route. Apparently Colonel Wyman had decided he needed a boat for it, and the boat that they selected to bring over to Hawaii to make this survey, for the survey party, and put them on, was this yacht VEGA.

Now, the VEGA didn't officially belong to Mr. Rohl; it belonged to Mrs. Rohl. It was registered in her name. And it came over in this convoy, this 4-knot convoy, and suddenly appeared in Honolulu, and I don't think General Emmons knew anything about it. Nobody had said anything to him about it. I didn't know the thing was coming over. As a matter of fact, I didn't know it until General Emmons chased me down to look at this VEGA that was supposed to be towing over a dredge, and here it was this 80- or 100-foot yacht.

Well, the deal on the thing was that Mrs. Rohl would rent that to the Hawaiian Constructors for one dollar per year, and the Hawaiian Constructors would then hire the crew and pay the insurance and pay the operating expense, of course all this expense being reimbursable by the Government because all of their expenses were reimbursable by the Government on this cost-plus-fixed-fee contract; and

the Hawaiian Constructors in turn would rent this boat to the Government for this tour around these islands, Penrhyn and Aitutaki and down in through that area.

When General Emmons found out about that he was really irate, and not only ordered the contract or agreement with [1311] the Hawaiian Constructors for the yacht be terminated but ordered that it be sent back to the mainland by the next available convoy, and refused to authorize any of the expenses for it, and the yacht left about—well, I think it was over there for about two weeks, sir, tied up at one of the piers in Honolulu. It was that yacht incident and a few other things that I had in mind when I said there had been quite a bit of discussion about the relationships.

218. General FRANK. Was the yacht ever used?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir.

219. General FRANK. Did they every have any parties on the yacht?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; I think they had several parties on the yacht. I never went to them.

220. General FRANK. Who had the parties?

Colonel FLEMING. I think Mr. Rohl had them, sir.

221. General FRANK. What was the cargo when it came over?

Colonel FLEMING. Well, it had quite a lot of stuff on it, sir. There were several cases of liquor aboard.

222. General FRANK. Had a good cargo of liquor?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

223. General FRANK. Was that part of the stocking of the boat or was that a consignment? Do you know?

Colonel FLEMING. It wasn't consigned to anybody, sir; it was just—it wasn't stocking for the boat, no, sir. I never saw the boat unloaded, but from what I hear they had cases of liquor in about every available place they could stick it on the boat. I don't know how much there was, but there was a considerable amount of liquor came in on that ship, and it wasn't a cargo vessel, sir.

[1312] 224. General FRANK. I know.

Colonel FLEMING. It was purely a pleasure vessel. As I get the story all the staterooms were filled with the stuff, and every place they could stick it on board.

225. General FRANK. Have you anything else that concerns the operations of the Hawaiian Constructors, Colonel Wyman's operations and behavior, or anything about Rohl that you can state to the Board that has not been brought out?

Colonel FLEMING. I would like to bring out the fact that I don't think that that contract when it was entered into, the Hawaiian Constructors' contract, was ever approved or referred to the military people over in Hawaii. I think that was an arrangement directly between the Engineer in Hawaii, going right back to Engineer Department channels, and was approved in the Chief of Engineer's Office.

226. General GRUNERT. You mean the basic contract?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. Now, the War Department ordered, on all of these cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, a running inspection by an Inspector General, and I remember that the Hawaiian Department was ordered to put an Inspector General on the routine checking and—well, you couldn't call it an audit, but it was a routine check of that contract, and we had one officer specially detailed in

our Inspector General's Department before the war for that purpose. To the best of my knowledge I don't believe that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had anything officially to do with the operation of that contract until after the Engineer channels were completely eliminated and the whole thing was put under his command, 'because I remember after that time these change [1313] orders used to come up and we would have to analyze those, the change orders and the additions, eliminations, and things like that, in the contract.

227. General FRANK. Was there any inspection, either from the Division Engineer's Office or from the Chief of Engineer's Office here in Washington, of the activities of the District Engineer in Honolulu?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

[1314] 228. General FRANK. Who made those?

Colonel FLEMING. General Hannum, sir—Warren T. Hannum—was the division engineer in San Francisco, and I know that General Hannum was over in Hawaii several times before the war started.

229. General FRANK. Did anybody from Washington ever come out to look over the activities?

Colonel FLEMING. I don't remember, sir. There may have been, but I really don't remember.

230. General FRANK. After the Department Commander took over the control of the district engineers, did that result in considerably closer supervision and a general tightening up on the activities?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. That resulted, as you say, in closer control and tightening up; and also, you might say, as a development of time, there had grown up this feeling among several of us who had anything to do with it, that that contract should have been terminated. The actual termination work on the contract was started by Colonel Lyman after Wyman's relief and return to the mainland. For instance, they cut out more and more their work on the small jobs and started to do those by force-account directly. The big jobs were not terminated, however, and the contractors were still on that. Lyman was working along this line, when he died very suddenly. He died; I don't remember whether it was in August or September, 1942. He had just been nominated to be BG, and it was announced—he was a Hawaiian, of course; he was born in the Island of Hawaii—and he went down to Hawaii on a Friday on an inspection trip, and this thing was published while he was down at his [1315] "old home town" island. Well, of course it was quite a celebration. He had had a pretty bad heart, anyway. He came back and died Sunday night or Monday morning, I don't know which; so he was starting on that at the time of his death.

231. General FRANK. Who was Wyman's successor, when he left?

Colonel FLEMING. Wyman's successor was Lyman, sir.

232. General FRANK. Oh, Lyman took over?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. They just abolished, sir, the district engineer, completely, and General Emmons cut Lyman in on the whole works, and so Lyman went down there and started running that contract.

233. General GRUNERT. They did the same thing they did in the Philippines, where the Department engineer was the officer and the district engineer.

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. And Lyman, as I say, was put right in the middle of this thing. General Kramer came over, some time after that, and Kramer finally closed out those contracts, oh, I think about—he got there and got onto his job and onto the details of it very hurriedly, and they were closed out either late in 1942 or early in 1943, sir.

234. General FRANK. Do you know what were the regulations about bringing liquor into Hawaii?

Colonel FLEMING. I do not know that there were any regulations about bringing it in, sir.

235. General FRANK. You do not know?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. I know I don't think there were any regulations about bringing it in. Hawaii was being run by the Military Governor. We didn't have anything such as import requirements, or anything like that. There was an [1316] office set up under the Military Governor. They called it, down there, the "Division of Priorities and Planning," I think, and it was run by an Army officer, and he had the job of determining. From the Hawaiian Department we allotted tonnage. We worked under a system of allocations, and figured out, and got word from San Francisco, how much tonnage was going to be available for the next succeeding month, or their best "horseback estimate" of that. We then allocated to the various supply branches the amount of tonnage that they could have coming over there, and also allocated to the civilians what amount they could have. The loading, back in San Francisco, was then controlled by the allocations which we made. The civilian allocations were controlled, the sub-allotments were controlled by this Division of Planning and Priorities, under the office of the Military Governor, and he issued the actual shipping permits.

236. General GRUNERT. Who was the Military Governor?

Colonel FLEMING. General Emmons was the Military Governor. General Emmons' organization over there, sir, after he got there, he had a "three-cornered hat." He was the Office of Military Governor, and General Green was the executive down there. He was also the Tactical Commander, and he had a command post there, where the Chief of Staff was located, and then he was the Administrative and Base Commander for the Hawaiian Department, and that was run as what we called a "rear echelon department headquarters," and G-4, and G-1 section was back there; and the other people were up in this tunnel; and General Emmons as an individual headed each one of those sections; but there wasn't a close—the tactical side of the [1317] picture knew nothing at all about the Military Governor's picture, and he didn't have an awful lot to do with us, back in the supply end of Supply and Construction.

237. General GRUNERT. How do you suppose, if it was handled on a tonnage basis, and if it was not authorized by a priority, that liquor was put aboard the VEGA and brought over to Hawaii?

Colonel FLEMING. Because the priority, sir, only applied to ships which were loaded under the supervision of the General commanding the port of embarkation. That is why I said I knew particularly there was no prohibition against bringing or shipping liquor in. I don't think they violated any law by bringing it in, because the tonnage wasn't under our control. However, there were no other imports of

liquor into the Department at that time, except what the Navy was bringing over.

238. General FRANK. All right.

239. General GRUNERT. General Russell, have you some questions?

240. General RUSSELL. Assuming, Colonel, that it had been desired to concentrate on the completion of these Air Warning Service stations, what would have been necessary, to have gotten additional people to work on them?

241. General FRANK. Would additional people have expedited it, or would it have required something else?

Colonel FLEMING. Not on those three projects—the ones you have been talking about. I do not think additional people would have expedited it.

242. General RUSSELL. I will enlarge the question, then. What would have expedited work on those stations?

Colonel FLEMING. Faster work on the design of that cable, in the erection of it. We couldn't do anything at the top of [1318] the mountain, sir, until we got the cable.

243. General RUSSELL. Is it true or not, Colonel, that after these three permanent stations that had been selected, and which you described in considerable detail, had been completed, it was discovered that all three were impracticable as radar stations?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir. We discovered that one of them was impractical. That was the one at Haleakala. To the best of my knowledge, when I left there that was the only place that they had actually tested the equipment in, and discarded it; and on the basis of the results at Haleakala, the Air Force, who at that time had taken over the radar system, decided they did not want them to do the same monkeying around with a station on Mt. Kaala. However, a station at Kokee was put into operation and always operated, and they never had any trouble with that.

244. General RUSSELL. Now, I wanted to get some dates in connection with this Lyman-Wyman feud, if I could. Wyman was under Lyman, so long as Wyman was in the Hawaiian Department, under Department command?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir; no, sir. Wyman came over to Hawaii, to the best of my knowledge, about in November 1939. He went out to the regiment at Schofield Barracks and served out there.

245. General FRANK. Commanded by whom?

Colonel FLEMING. Commanded by Colonel Hodges. Colonel Lyman came over to relieve Hodges in July 1940. That is when we were betting how long the relationship would continue. I think then that Wyman went down to take over the district [1319] down in Honolulu about in November 1940. So he was probably under Lyman's command, oh, for possibly three months, out at Schofield barracks. Then, when he went down to be the district engineer, Colonel Lyman had no more to do with him officially—I mean he wasn't under his command; they were in a cooperating relationship—up until December 7; and after the declaration of war, then, by just issuing an order putting the war plan into effect, Wyman then became a subordinate to Lyman again.

246. General RUSSELL. But all of this time you were in the Hawaiian Department, and you and Lyman had substantially the same relation to Wyman?

Colonel FLEMING. I do not understand your question, sir.

247. General RUSSELL. And during all that time, you were representing the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in the supervision of construction, there, to the extent that he could supervise it, and you and Lyman therefore had substantially the same relation toward Wyman; that is, just a cooperative relationship?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. My relationship with Wyman was not the same as Lyman's relationship to Wyman, because, while ostensibly up until August 1941 I was the Assistant Department Engineer, and supposed to be working for Colonel Lyman, actually I did all my work directly for the Commanding General of the Department. That was both for General Herron and General Short, and it continued.

248. General RUSSELL. General Short and General Herron relied on you for their contacts with Wyman much more than they relied on Lyman, is that right?

Colonel FLEMING. On the detail of the contracts? Yes, sir; [1320] because Lyman wasn't at the headquarters daily, I know, until after I got relieved from the Engineer Office in August 1941.

249. General RUSSELL. Now, I think General Grunert asked some question a little while ago about whether or not the Hawaiian Commander made a request to have the district engineer placed under his control, prior to December 7, 1941.

Colonel FLEMING. I am sure he did not, sir.

250. General RUSSELL. Do you know whether any such relationship as that existed in the Army before December 7, 1941?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; it did. There was one place only, and that was in the Philippine Department of the foreign service departments, at that time. We had the three—Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines. In Panama there was no district engineer. The engineers ran the Panama Canal. The Governor of the Panama Canal was the engineer officer. The Governor of the Panama Canal and the engineer for maintenance down there were not under the control of the Commanding General of the Panama Department, until there was some slight difference developed, there. I don't remember when it was. I wasn't in Panama, although I remember some talk about it. In the Philippines, there was no river-and-harbor work under the American Government. There was some being done under the Philippine Government, and we had engineer officers over there who had been loaned to the Philippine Government. One of them was General Clay, who is now over here in the Service Forces; and General Casey went out to the Philippines to replace General Clay, I think, shortly before the war; but those were loans to the Philippine Government.

The only work that there was in the Philippine Department, [1321] by the Federal Government, all our work for which the engineers were responsible, by statute or law or Army regulations, was the maintenance and repair and construction of fortifications; so there was no district engineer over there. The Department engineer was representing not only the Commanding General but also the Chief of Engineers in the discharge of it.

In Hawaii we had a district engineer's office. We were different from the other two.

251. General RUSSELL. Was that because of the difference in the character of the work to be done there?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; there had always been, since Honolulu was one of our major American ports, there had always been a district, a river-and-harbor district, in Honolulu; at least back since the last war, at any rate.

252. General FRANK. In other words, the organization there was just the same as if it had been a part of the mainland of the United States?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. The organization was exactly the same as if it had been San Francisco, sir, with the Department Headquarters sitting at the Presidio, and the district engineer for San Francisco, doing cooperative work for him, but not under the command of the General.

253. General RUSSELL. And that maintenance of a separate engineering office, under a division engineer, was dictated by the character of the work that was to be done?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. It was the result of paralleling the organization over there which had been in existence on the mainland.

254. General GRUNERT. However, most of these contracts that [1322] we had been speaking about during 1941 were defense contracts, in which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was most definitely concerned, and it might have been expedient or desirable on his part to have more of a direct control over the district engineer?

Colonel FLEMING. It might have been; yes, sir.

255. General RUSSELL. In your contacts with the Department Commander out there, did you tell him that the delays were occurring in that construction work because of this feud between Lyman and Wyman?

Colonel FLEMING. I think I did.

256. General RUSSELL. Did you not testify in answer to a question by General Frank that no delays were occurring on that account?

Colonel FLEMING. I testified to General Frank, sir, that I don't think any delays were occurring in the prosecution of the work. I may misunderstand your question to me. I undoubtedly discussed the thing with General Short and told him that we were having a lot of trouble on account of this feud.

257. General RUSSELL. That was about when, that you and Short were talking?

Colonel FLEMING. I would say somewhere between, oh, the 1st of November and the beginning of the war, sir, because it was after the development of this ferry project, this southern airways route over to the Philippines.

58. General RUSSELL. You had not discussed the interference with the work, if any existed, because of the Lyman and Wyman feud, prior to November 1, 1941, with General Short?

Colonel FLEMING. I don't think so, sir.

[1323] 259. General RUSSELL. You were his representative, were you, not, in supervising the details of construction?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; I think I was.

260. General RUSSELL. You thought no situation had arisen, prior to November 1, 1941, therefore, which required your going to General Short about it?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir; because up to that time Colonel Lyman had not been down there, sir. You see, I had been running the engineer office, sitting right at Fort Shafter, since July 1, 1939. I was not pulled out of that office and placed on the General Staff, until, I would say, about August 1941. About that time, in August 1941, that is when Colonel Lyman started coming down there more.

261. General GRUNERT. From where?

Colonel FLEMING. From Schofield barracks, sir. He maintained his residence at Schofield barracks, and continued in command of the Third Engineers. He still had a dual assignment. He was the division engineer, out there, and lived out there. Now, there was an officer came over and replaced me in the engineer office. Obviously, so much of this work depended upon knowing who said what, to whom, some time ago; so when I went up on this station, although my position changed, and my title changed, I was still doing essentially the same kind of work, and instead of going into the G-4 office, where I think—I don't know what General Short intended on this thing—at least that is where I was assigned—I never did any G-4 work at all. I kept tied up with the special stuff.

Now, it took between about August and, I say the date was November—it may have been in October somewhere, along in there—[1324] for Colonel Lyman to come down and start picking up. It took him about that long to get onto all this background stuff, and also for the thing to develop to the point where, instead of cooperating like this, they were now swinging around, and this fued was coming around in its infancy.

262. General RUSSELL. That was some time in October or November, 1941?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. I remember we had the discussion. General Short and I had a discussion, when he asked me frankly what my opinion of the two of them was, and the only way I can date it now, sir, is by knowing it was some time after we started building that air route. We got the directive to build that air route to the South Pacific. Up to that time, I went in to see General Short only when the Chief of Staff told me to go in and take a paper in to be signed. After that time, I don't know, I guess I was up there.

263. General RUSSELL. You talked about this man Grafe.

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

264. General RUSSELL. He dominated the situation out there until Rohl came out?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

265. General RUSSELL. What was your impression of that man as an executive of the contracting group?

Colonel FLEMING. I don't know enough about him officially to have an opinion of him as an engineer.

266. General RUSSELL. I was not talking particularly about his technical ability, but about his ability to get work done, as an executive. Was he a strong man, or a weak man? How did he impress you?

[1325] Colonel FLEMING. My impression, there, sir, would be, I would say, negative.

267. General RUSSELL. That he was of the negative type?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. I don't think he was particularly a strong man. I don't know enough about him to say, as an individual, but just from meeting him at these casual parties, I don't think he was a man that would get up and hammer on the desk, and stuff like that.

268. General RUSSELL. He was entirely different from Rohl and Wyman—very cool?

Colonel FLEMING. He was entirely different from Wyman. Rohl, I think, was very positive, but Rohl was never brusque. He was never rude.

269. General RUSSELL. This contract grew considerably, and much work was being done under it, after December 7, that was not contemplated when the basic contract was signed in December 1940, isn't that true, Colonel?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

270. General RUSSELL. Did those people continue to operate on this fixed-fee basis afterwards?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; but their fee was reduced.

271. General RUSSELL. Where was the contract on the fees made—out there, or here in Washington?

Colonel FLEMING. The initial fee, sir, was made here in Washington, or wherever it was, whatever channel it went through. After the termination of that engineer department or engineer channel relationship between the district engineer, out there, and the chief of engineers, in Washington, then all the changes in that contract began coming through the Department [1326] Commander, through command channels; and every time an addition or a change order or something like that was made in this particular contract, which increased the total value of the work to be done, or estimated value of the work to be done, then there had to be a readjudication of the fee to be paid, and that fee was on a sliding scale—the more of the work, the less the percent.

272. General RUSSELL. To one of General Frank's questions, the effect of which question was,

Did you think that Wyman was influenced by Rohl?

as I recall, you began to answer that question in substantially this language:

I don't think that Colonel Wyman was influenced by Rohl.

You hesitated, and another question on another subject was answered, and I am not sure that that full answer has been gotten into the record. Now, what is your impression of the influencing of Wyman by Rohl?

Colonel FLEMING. I do not have any direct knowledge of the relationships between Wyman and Rohl. I started to answer General Frank's question. I think it was a question with a connotation as to whether that influence had resulted in any delay, sir. I can answer it that way. I do not think that the relationship between Wyman and Rohl resulted specifically, or that as a result of that specific thing, there were delays in that contract, in the prosecution of the work.

In the other question, I think somebody asked me what my general

opinion of that relationship was. I can say this, that I do not believe that that relationship ever should have existed. I do not think it was the kind of relationship that a [1327] contracting officer should have with a contractor.

273. General RUSSELL. That is all.

274. General GRUNERT. In your position, representing the Department Commander, you could just cooperate and coordinate, but you could not direct; is that right?

Colonel FLEMING. That is correct; yes, sir.

275. General GRUNERT. You were really a liaison officer, to find out what was going on, and you could not tell them what to do, even if you found out something was not going according to the Department Commander's wishes?

Colonel FLEMING. I could report that to the Department Commander, sir.

276. General GRUNERT. Were there any such times that you found out things were being delayed or not pushed, that you did make such reports to the Department Commander?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

277. General GRUNERT. Do you remember any particular occasion, any particular type of work, or any particular work order?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir; I don't remember the particulars. I remember one thing, I got involved in an argument with the district engineer's office on the design of some fortification structures, on which I did not agree with their design.

278. General GRUNERT. Were there any occasions where you had to make such a report to him regarding the installations pertaining to the Air Warning Service?

Colonel FLEMING. About delays in the district engineer's office, sir?

279. General GRUNERT. Delays in construction, so as to get that Air Warning Service in shape to operate?

[1328] Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; I think there were. There were some cases undoubtedly in there, which I reported. The one thing I do remember as a specific instance, sir, was the question of that road. I still maintain that the road they built from that Kolekole road around the firebreak, there, was a highway with banked curves and a grade limited to 4 percent, and we didn't need anything like that. The rate that the stuff could be delivered by the cable way, as long as it worked on that trail, there, we could have hauled it up there. The specifications on that road were entirely much more refined than the job required.

[1329] 280. General GRUNERT. Did General Short give you any particular instructions which evidenced his concern about the slowness in getting that construction work that pertained to the Air Warning Service done and getting the system started?

Colonel FLEMING. Specifically, I do not remember the General ever having mentioned that particular project, sir. I do know that we kept for him and he used to look through in detail a series of charts which showed the exact status of all these projects as closely as we could find out.

281. General GRUNERT. All those construction projects had to do with defense. Did General Short ever discuss with you anything to

the effect that "We have got to get these things completed; the international situation is tightening up"?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

282. General GRUNERT. What did you then attempt to do to expedite these things?

Colonel FLEMING. I used to run the inspections. That is why I used to be down at the District Engineer's Office four or five times a week.

283. General GRUNERT. Did these people work every day? Did they work Sundays?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

284. General GRUNERT. And at nights?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

285. General GRUNERT. Did they have double shifts in order to try to get these things completed?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir; most of them. We had double-shift work, and finally pushed it into three-shift work.

[1330] 286. General GRUNERT. This was prior to December 7?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. Construction work at night on a thing like that is very inefficient, unless you have all the lights in the world; and we did not. I can tell you this, sir, that as far as being emphatic in speeding some of these things up, I think that that was General Short's main interest over there.

287. General GRUNERT. And then, when things were not apparently speeded up, what action did he take?

Colonel FLEMING. He used to call on Colonel Wyman.

288. General GRUNERT. And then what?

Colonel FLEMING. He usually got action.

289. General GRUNERT. The action that was gotten was satisfactory to General Short and, in your opinion from an engineer's viewpoint, was satisfactory as to progress?

Colonel FLEMING. We are talking about this particular project, sir?

290. General GRUNERT. I am talking primarily about the defense construction, particularly the air warning service construction, prior to December 7.

Colonel FLEMING. Particularly the air warning service?

291. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Colonel FLEMING. The air warning system has received a lot of publicity lately in the papers; but that project was only one of the very small things we were doing over there. Certainly General Short never mentioned it to me, and I don't recall his having called me in and saying anything about this particular thing, without at the same time bringing in another project, because, coupled with the air warning system [1331] was also the development of other defense projects in the Islands. The main one was the development of airfields, sir. At the beginning of the war there was only one airfield in the entire Hawaiian Department from which a bombardment plane could operate. That was also true on the day of December 7th. There was only one runway in the entire Department from which a B-17 could take off, and that was at Hickam Field. On the afternoon of Thursday, following December 7, whatever date that may be, they had a 5,000-foot runway at Bellows Field, on a field which was never authorized or approved by the War Department.

292. General GRUNERT. When was that started?

Colonel FLEMING. That was started long before the war, sir. In August, I would say, 1940.

293. General GRUNERT. It appears that as far as the rapidity of construction work on defense projects was concerned, they did a great deal more in less time after December 7 than they did before. Is that your experience?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir.

294. General GRUNERT. It is not?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir. I think they did a lot more before December 7th. They caught up some places after December 7th.

295. General GRUNERT. In the record somewhere we have had testimony, or intimation at least, that there were changes made. For instance, somebody said something about the tearing up of runways and their relocation elsewhere, which caused delay. Do you recall anything of that sort?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

296. General GRUNERT. How did that come about?

[1332] Colonel FLEMING. I would like, before answering that question, to expand somewhat on my preceding answer.

297. General GRUNERT. If it is pertinent to the issue. We do not want to learn all that you know about the Engineers in the Hawaiian Department in the last two or three years. But if it is pertinent to the question I asked you, you may proceed.

Colonel FLEMING. I would like to state this: You asked me if General Short had ever been satisfied with the progress that had been made, and I asked you if you referred specifically to this particular project.

298. General GRUNERT. I referred more to the progress of the work.

Colonel FLEMING. I do not think that General Short ever was satisfied with the progress that was being made. He was continually pushing all the time on those projects. I would also like to state, sir, as far as this particular project that we have been talking about is concerned, the aircraft warning project, that I do not remember his having singled that particular one out. He was always on me about all the work, the airfields, and that matter, and various other jobs we had.

299. General GRUNERT. Was he on the neck of the War Department where help could be obtained from this end?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. We wrote letter after letter from the Hawaiian Department trying to get approval of the project for additional airfields. We were told time and time again that we would get money appropriated for ten additional airfields in the Hawaiian Department.

[1333] 300. General GRUNERT. When you did not get quick action by letter, did you cable and radio?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. We telegraphed. They kept promising that it would be in the supply bill.

301. General GRUNERT. Is there any record of those communications and those radiograms?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. There are records in the Hawaiian Department.

302. General GRUNERT. They ought to be available in the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

303. General GRUNERT. Now, we go back to the question of the intimation we have had to the effect that runways were built and then they would tear them up and start another. Do you have any information on that?

[1334] Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. That actually happened in an airfield up at Mokuleia. The day that General Emmons arrived there, sir, we took him out—he was interested in airfields, and we took him out and said, "Here is a swell place to build an airfield." He said, "All right. Go to work." So we started it. We built it in an awful hurry. After it was built it was found that the drainage conditions through there (indicating on map) were very bad. They actually used it for three months before the drainage started interfering with it.

304. General GRUNERT. That was used after December 7th?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

305. General GRUNERT. How about prior to December 7th?

Colonel FLEMING. Prior to December 7 the only airfield we had started on, we did not have any funds for. General Short started to build this at Bellows Field. It is located right here (indicating on map). We improved it without any War Department approval. That is why I say that the only runway, the second runway in the Department, that could be utilized had been started prior to December 7 and was ready five days afterward.

306. General GRUNERT. The intimation is that somebody did not use good judgment in doing this and it was all love's labor lost, and they had to tear it up and start somewhere else, as if somebody was doing that so as to cause intentional delay. Do you know anything about that?

Colonel FLEMING. I do not know of any such instance. The only runway that we were working on before the war, to the best of my knowledge, was this one right here (indicating) at Bellows Field. We were also doing a little work down at South Cape.

[1335] 307. General GRUNERT. You stated that delays were due to labor?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

308. General GRUNERT. How could such delays due to labor be avoided? Could they have used engineer troops in lieu of other labor, because of the shortage of labor?

Colonel FLEMING. We were using all the engineer troops we had available, sir. We had written to the War Department and asked them to send over additional engineer troops, because it was our opinion that in training the Army back on the mainland they would go through and just get training, but over in Hawaii we could actually use them on work projects.

309. General GRUNERT. You asked for them. Did you get them or did you not?

Colonel FLEMING. We got one battalion of aviation engineers.

310. General GRUNERT. Let us take it seriatim. With reference to materials, who obtained materials? Who was responsible for getting materials? Was the District Engineer responsible for that?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. The District Engineer bought those materials through this cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. The Procurement Office was operated in San Francisco, and I believe it was operated by the Division Engineer's office.

311. General GRUNERT. Did the Division Engineer, so far as you know, use due diligence in going after materials and pushing to try to get them?

Colonel FLEMING. I think he did; yes, sir.

312. General GRUNERT. Do you think we could get more information on that subject from the Division Engineer's office in San Francisco?

[1336] Colonel FLEMING. I think you will have access to the files, sir, showing constant telephone calls and radiograms.

313. General GRUNERT. As to transportation, who was responsible for shipping delays, if there were any? Who handled that matter? Where was it handled—in Washington, San Francisco, or where?

Colonel FLEMING. I think that was handled through the Division Engineer's office in San Francisco, arranging for space on any kind of vessel he could get.

314. General GRUNERT. Then we can get more detailed information from the Division Engineer's office in San Francisco?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

315. General GRUNERT. Now, as to priorities. Who prescribed the priorities and who could change them?

Colonel FLEMING. I meant by priorities the old system of priorities that the Office of Production Management had.

316. General GRUNERT. They prescribed them, and you got them through the Chief of Engineers' office?

Colonel FLEMING. It was a purchase priority. You could get a priority A-1 or A-1-j.

317. General GRUNERT. If they made any change it had to come through the Chief of Engineers?

Colonel FLEMING. We could write up priorities over there. We had a priority assigned to the project. We could then write a purchase order or a purchase certificate, citing the priority number of the project. I blame priorities for some of the delays, because it got the point under O. P. M. that everything became an A-1 priority, and while you could write them you could not buy anything with them.

[1337] 318. General GRUNERT. Did the government as represented by the District Engineer have to get materials for the contractor, or what was the contractor's responsibility in getting materials to work with?

Colonel FLEMING. Actually, sir, most of the procurement, or a large part of it, was done by Engineer channels. The Engineers would go out and purchase ordinary materials, like cement, asphalt, and stuff like that. The contractor purchased the machinery. Where we had to advertise for bids and give specifications and all that sort of thing he purchased the material, and he would turn around and rent it on a rental-purchase agreement. If they needed a certain piece of machinery for a job, the contractor would get it and rent it to the government on his rental-purchase agreement. Lumber, for example, was bought direct by the government.

319. General GRUNERT. Where did the delay come in? In what the contractor got or what the government got for the contractor?

Colone FLEMING. The delay came in, on those materials, sir, through the fact that everybody was trying to get materials. Materials were awfully short. For some time, as I recall it, before the war we were constantly in a state of emergency because we were always lending lumber to the natives. The natives would run out of it and borrow from us, and we would run out and borrow it back from the natives, because we could not get it over there fast enough.

320. General GRUNERT: Do you know anything that would indicate that the contractors as such delayed completion of these projects through their failure in getting materials?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir.

321. General GRUNERT. You have nothing on that?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir.

[1338] 322. General GRUNERT. Or as to delay due to approval? That means the approval of those work sheets or job orders under the general contract.

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir. You mean, delays in approval by the War Department?

323. General GRUNERT. Delays in the time it took from the time you sent your requests in to the time they got back.

Colonel FLEMING. I am not talking about the contract, sir. I am just saying that there were a lot of things that the people in Hawaii knew should be done, which had been planned for years, and we had been talking about them, and we would never get authority from the War Department to proceed.

May I expand a little on that, sir?

324. General GRUNERT. Expand, but make it a general expansion.

Colonel FLEMING. On the airfield project, we knew we needed a field on the Island of Kauai. On the Island of Oahu we had one runway that could take a bombing plane. That was Hickam Field. But there was so much dirt kicked up that it ruined the motors all the time. We had a field on Molokai, but no gasoline storage. The Municipal-Territorial Airport was a Navy and Army development, and we had no authority to proceed on that. We finally got authority through the Civil Aeronautics Authority. On the Island of Hawaii we had three fields.

325. General GRUNERT. I understand you had a number of projects; but was it mainly a matter of money?

Colonel FLEMING. I think it was mainly, sir, not money, because they were all the time throwing money around. I think it was mainly that Hawaii itself had a low priority compared with the Philippines and Panama, sir.

[1339] 326. General GRUNERT. For what?

Colonel FLEMING. For construction work.

327. General GRUNERT. This is the first time I have heard—I do not know about the other members of the Board—that Hawaii was not on the highest priority, and that the only thing that was a lower priority as compared with the Philippines was the matter of getting some B-17's ferried across.

Colonel FLEMING. I do not know, sir, whether anyone else had a higher priority, but we started work on those 10 airfields, and with all

the money the government was spending we never did get any statement that that money was included and we never got any appropriation. General Short authorized me to go ahead with two projects, on his own authorization, using other money.

328. General GRUNERT. Did he ever put someone in a plane and send him over here and tell him to find out whether the War Department understood the problem, why they could not get action on these things, whether it was a question of money or whether it was a question of understanding what was needed, or not? Or was everybody content with just writing letters?

Colonel FLEMING. I do not know, sir. I was not high enough in the hierarchy to know about that.

329. General GRUNERT. Now I want to open up one or two other subjects.

As to this feud which has been mentioned: Did they delay getting action in the line of approval or in the line of cooperation, or in the line of getting work started? Did it delay progress in the work because of the fact that the Department Engineer and the District Engineer did not like each other?

Colonel FLEMING. I do not think it delayed the work, sir. [1340] I answered General Russell that I thought it made my work actually more difficult.

330. General GRUNERT. You testified something to the effect that Rohl, as head of The Hawaiian Constructors or one of their principal officers, had to approve what The Hawaiian Constructors did, how they pushed the work, or something like that. Do you know of any evidence to the effect that Rohl purposely delayed the prosecution of the work?

Colonel FLEMING. I have no knowledge of it.

331. General GRUNERT. Do you have any suspicion that he did?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir. I think there was a lot of difficulty in dealing with them, but I do not think there was any delay caused.

332. General GRUNERT. Do you know that a congressional investigation committee intimates in its report that such was the case, that Rohl, through pressure, attempted to delay or did delay defense projects in Hawaii?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes; I know that. I was interviewed by that committee.

333. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not, during your time over there, he did or did not?

Colonel FLEMING. I have no knowledge of whether he did or did not. My opinion is that he did not.

334. General GRUNERT. Were there many changes that were made that would interrupt the progress of a project, for instance, by having to use the machinery or materials on another project?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

335. General GRUNERT. That would cause delay in getting the original project done?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

[1341] 336. General GRUNERT. Who was responsible for such changes?

Colonel FLEMING. I will say, just the run of events, sir. For example, to take one thing: I know there was a lot of publicity about

the Bellows Field paving job. We had a lot of asphalt plants over there to pave the field. The rock supply ran out and we could not get any more rock around there, so we had to open up another quarry some place else, near Wheeler Field. We had a delay while we moved the asphalt plant over to Wheeler Field.

337. General GRUNERT. You spoke of a comparatively long delay where authority from Washington had to be procured in order for you to construct something in connection with a park system. Was that delay material in eventually getting the installation in the place you wanted it?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir.

338. General GRUNERT. In other words, was there somebody to blame here who prevented the Hawaiian Department from doing something in the defense line that was material to the Pearl Harbor disaster?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir. The particular place I am talking about, they found that that particular radar set never would work.

339. General GRUNERT. Did they know at the time that the delay took place that it definitely would not work?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir.

340. General GRUNERT. I am interested in the estimated dates of completion. I find in the record that there is a job order saying that the estimated date of completion will be about six months hence, and that is extended about three months more. What generally, was the reason for those extensions, generally speaking— [1342] ing? Can you throw some light on that?

Colonel FLEMING. The question of materials was one, sir. Take the Bellows Field runway: We had a joint contract with the rock quarry out there, the Navy and the Army, the Navy developing Kaneohe air base and the Army developing Bellows Field.

341. General GRUNERT. It is quite natural under that sort of a contract and job order to have some delay, is it not?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. On another big project for gasoline storage we changed the design.

342. General GRUNERT. Have you ever thought that if you had been District Engineer and had had this construction work to do, you or anyone else of good engineering ability could have done a better job than was done, or a quicker job than was done?

Colonel FLEMING. That is a difficult question to answer, sir.

343. General GRUNERT. It is a matter of opinion. If you answer it yes, I will ask you why.

Colonel FLEMING. I do not have ability as an engineer. I am a very junior officer. I think that if somebody with ability as an engineer had been District Engineer and could have been quick to find out what the military side of the picture had been, I think some of the things might have been speeded up a little bit.

344. General GRUNERT. Here was Wyman, who, from what we can find out, was what was known as a "go-getter" and the Chief of Engineers' office apparently thought highly of his ability to get things done.

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

345. General GRUNERT. Here he was. Unless there was something [1343] that delayed him, why could somebody else do a better job than he did if a better job could be done?

Colonel FLEMING. Sir, somebody with equal engineering ability could have at times been more cooperative with other people.

346. General GRUNERT. Then, in your opinion, it was not his engineering ability; it was his lack of being able to get along with other people?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

347. General GRUNERT. That answers my question. Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 12:26 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

[1344]

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[1345] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

MONDAY, AUGUST 21, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Saturday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

**TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL DURWARD S. WILSON, COMMAND-
ING SOUTHEASTERN SECTOR, EASTERN DEFENSE COMMAND,
RALEIGH, N. C.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

General WILSON. Durward S. Wilson, Major General, commanding Southeastern Sector, Eastern Defense Command; Raleigh, North Carolina.

2. General GRUNERT. General, the Board is after facts, as to what took place both before and during the Pearl Harbor attack. We hope that because of your assignment in Hawaii in 1941, and during the attack, you may be able to throw some light on the [1346] subject.

Just what was your assignment, position, and station, while in Hawaii in 1941?

General WILSON. On October 1, 1941, the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division was organized, and I took command of that. Prior to that time, in 1941, I had been commanding the Twenty-First Infantry Brigade, and at the time of the Japanese attack, I was in command of the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division.

3. General GRUNERT. That was stationed where?

General WILSON. At Schofield Barracks.

4. General GRUNERT. Was that an independent tactical command, directly under the Department Commander, or was it under someone else?

General WILSON. Directly under the Department Commander, sir.

5. General GRUNERT. Then you were, as Commanding General of

the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division, directly under General Short, the Department Commander?

General WILSON. Yes, sir.

6. General GRUNERT. Were the Commanders of major units—and by “major units” I mean your unit—kept informed of the War Department and Navy Department messages, that you might call warning messages, that came to the Department, from about November 24 to about December 6?

General WILSON. Yes, sir.

7. General GRUNERT. You were informed of their contents?

General WILSON. I was informed. Now, I cannot state that I was informed of all of them, because I do not know what the Department Commander received, but I distinctly remember, on [1347] about the 29th of November, General Short sent an officer courier out to Schofield Barracks, who orally delivered a message to me.

8. General GRUNERT. Do you recall that message?

General WILSON. Yes, sir; the purport of it. It was, that information had been received from the War Department that negotiations with the Japanese had reached a deadlock, and that our Government would take no aggressive action; in other words, to use a slang expression, they would “stand pat,” and await whatever action the Japanese took.

9. General GRUNERT. That was the gist of it? This is the Chief of Staff's message to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, November 27, 1941. I want you to listen to it carefully, because I am going to ask you questions about it, as to whether or not you knew of the contents of this message, and whether or not this is the message to which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department probably referred:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out [1348] so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit discussion of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

Is that the gist of what was given to you?

General WILSON. Yes, sir. The message as delivered to me did not cover as many details, as I remember it, as are given there; but the purport was in general as you have indicated, there.

10. General GRUNERT. Do you recall whether the message said, or whether you were informed, that—

If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act?

General WILSON. I think so, sir. My recollection is that if there was any action taken, they preferred to let Japan commit the first act.

11. General GRUNERT. And did you know anything about this particular phrase?

This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

General WILSON. General, I cannot state about that.

12. General GRUNERT. See if this is approximately the idea that was conveyed to you:

The negotiations have practically fallen by the wayside. Now, we just have to sit back and wait, until [1349] Japan commits the first overt act.

General WILSON. To wait. In other words, not necessarily that Japan would do it, but that if a hostile act was going to be committed, we were to allow the Japanese to do it first.

13. General GRUNERT. Do you remember whether or not you were directed to take any reconnaissance or any other measures in preparing for the future, as a result of that particular message?

General WILSON. No, sir; not as a result of that particular message; but we had plans that had been formulated in advance of that, and we were working at all times under one of the alerts.

14. General GRUNERT. Do you recall having received, or did the Commanding General of the Department transmit to you, information about a Navy message received on the same day, which was passed to him, in which occurred the phrase—

Consider this dispatch a war warning?

General WILSON. No, sir; I did not receive that information.

15. General GRUNERT. I will read the rest of that Navy dispatch, because I want to find out whether or not the gist of it was transmitted to you, or whether or not it may have been that the information transmitted to you was intended to cover both these messages received. This dispatch of November 27, 1941, from the Navy to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, reads as follows:

Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either Philippines, Thai, or the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 only. Guam, Samoa, and continental districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval districts and Army authorities. British to be informed by SPENNOVA.

Did you get any information along those lines?

General WILSON. No, sir; information in reference to that message was not furnished to me.

16. General GRUNERT. When was your command alerted as against sabotage? That was the No. 1 alert.

General WILSON. I cannot remember, General, just when that took place. We had been under an alert for some time prior to December 7, and at the time of the Japanese attack, we had been functioning under the sabotage alert, for some time.

17. General GRUNERT. In view of the information you had, did you consider that a sabotage alert covered the ground demanded, or possibly indicated, by the warnings received?

General WILSON. In so far as we were concerned, I felt that it did, because our measures primarily consisted of the guarding of bridges and the patrolling of our sector; and by those means, plus the plan which had been prepared for the defense, we were in a position to

occupy our defensive positions [1351] in a very short period of time.

18. General GRUNERT. What was that short period of time, approximately?

General WILSON. Well, a few hours, sir.

19. General GRUNERT. And how much of that plan did you carry out during the attack?

General WILSON. Oh, we actually moved into position, just as soon as the Japanese attacked. And I had estimated that with the air patrols—I didn't know what they were, but with the air patrols and the naval inshore and offshore patrols, it would be impossible for the Japanese to make a land attack suddenly; and since our plans had all been perfected and our emplacements actually constructed, on December 7, we had machine-gun emplacements constructed all over the northern sector and the southern sector. We had done that in the period between May and December; so, in so far as our troops were concerned, I felt that with the patrol action we were taking, that was all that was essential.

20. General GRUNERT. You had nothing to do with the Air?

General WILSON. No.

21. General GRUNERT. Or with the anti-Air?

General WILSON. No, sir.

(Brief recess.)

[1352] 22. General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

Then, as I understand you, you were not particularly concerned about any immediate danger because your part in the defense of the Islands, the part of your unit, consisted in taking positions to ward off a surface attack; is that right?

General WILSON. That is right; yes, sir.

23. General GRUNERT. And therefore an alert position at that time seemed to be all right to you?

General WILSON. Yes, sir.

24. General GRUNERT. That is, alert position against sabotage at that time seemed to be all right to you?

General WILSON. In other words, General, I personally did not feel that it was necessary for us to go out under Alert 3, which would have been to go out, occupy our positions, and stay constantly in the field. With our patrols and the feeling that in case of a land attack we would most certainly have some warning and we would be able to occupy our positions well ahead of time, I did not feel that it was essential.

25. General GRUNERT. What was the basis of your expecting warning? Where was it to come from, in what form was it to be, and approximately what time would it take to get it to you?

General WILSON. You mean warning as to a condition, a change in alert? From Department Headquarters, sir?

26. General GRUNERT. Yes, but you said you felt that you would get that notice.

General WILSON. Yes.

27. General GRUNERT. Now, did you know of your own knowledge whether or not there was actual distant reconnaissance, whether there was actual information being received from the Navy?

[1353] General WILSON. I did not, sir.

28. General GRUNERT. You did not?

General WILSON. I assumed that it was in effect. I was not informed on it.

29. General GRUNERT. You assumed that everything was being done, that you would get ample warning from the Department in order to be able to carry out your assigned mission.

General WILSON. That is right; yes, sir.

30. General GRUNERT. Now, normally what was the status of the ammunition as to your troops, as to its availability, as to what was in the hands of the troops; and if you didn't have enough in the hands of your troops how were you going to get it, to turn out in a hurry?

General WILSON. The infantry ammunition, General, as nearly as I can remember, we had a sufficient amount on hand readily accessible for the troops to take right into the field. The artillery had a limited amount, but I remember distinctly that on December the 7th after we went in the field we continued to haul ammunition. There was no difficulty at all in supply features; that had been arranged so that we could promptly get it. But it takes a considerable period of time to put in an adequate amount of artillery ammunition in field positions.

31. General GRUNERT. Now, your unit, the 24th Infantry Division, was a triangular division, was it?

General WILSON. That is right; yes, sir.

32. General GRUNERT. And its component parts consisted of infantry and artillery, and anything else? What calibers of artillery?

[1354] General WILSON. 105s.

33. General GRUNERT. 105s. You had nothing to do with defense against air except you own local troops?

General WILSON. That is right. We had some 75s also that we used for beach defense.

34. General GRUNERT. Then, by the time you got to your assigned position could you then have gotten the ammunition from the source it was supposed to come from to the positions in order to fire when you were in position with your artillery?

General WILSON. Initially, yes.

35. General GRUNERT. Initially.

General WILSON. We would have taken it right out with us. But I mean, to lay in the supply that you would want in defense, you had to continue to haul ammunition. We did actually continue hauling.

36. General GRUNERT. And you do not think the ammunition situation as far as your division was concerned proved to be acute in any way?

General WILSON. No, sir.

37. General GRUNERT. Or might have been acute had there been a real surface attack?

General WILSON. Well, General, had the Japanese been able to make a land attack without our knowing a thing until they landed, I still think that we would have been able to meet the situation, but it is entirely possible that—I can't conceive of that situation, though, such a situation happening, their coming in, even with the events as they did happen; I can't conceive of a land attack being made until we knew, without our knowing a thing about it.

[1355] 38. General FRANK. Did you conceive of this air attack happening?

General WILSON. No. No, I did not.

39. General GRUNERT. That seemed to be beyond the conception of most everybody.

What is the difference between an air attack and a surface attack, in the line of your getting more advanced notice?

General WILSON. Well, of course, in order to bring troops in, surface troops, it takes ships to bring them in, and they come in more slowly, whereas planes can come in from a distance and make an air raid in a very short period of time.

40. General GRUNERT. There was no attempt made, was there, during this air raid to land any troops of any kind?

General WILSON. No, sir. It might be interesting in that connection, sir, to state that as soon as we got wind of this attack by the bombing, my Chief of Staff, who got to the command post a few minutes ahead of time—we both, of course, as soon as the attack started, went to the command post, and he immediately gave directions for the troops to move into the field. We didn't wait then for instructions from Department Headquarters. However, instructions from Department Headquarters did come in a very short period of time, that we would go into Alert No. 3, which was an all-out defense.

41. General GRUNERT. As far as you were concerned, did it make any difference in carrying out your mission or in minimizing the danger to your command whether they had been on Alert 2 or 3?

[1356] General WILSON. I don't really think so, General.

42. General GRUNERT. Was your ammunition assigned to your division?

General WILSON. That is right.

43. General GRUNERT. Now, as to whether or not you were kept informed or sufficiently informed, were conferences held by the Commanding General or his Chief of Staff with the principal subordinate commanders wherein they were kept informed of the situation and in turn took measures to meet such situation? In other words, what was the scheme of informing the Commanding Generals of large subordinate units, and how was it done, not this particular time but generally about that time?

General WILSON. I understand, sir. General, it is very difficult for me to remember. I know after Pearl Harbor that there were several conferences of senior commanders at Department Headquarters. I cannot state that conferences of division commanders were not held prior to Pearl Harbor. The best I can state is, at this particular time I cannot remember conferences that were held. In other words, we knew what the alerts were, and there were certain things laid down that we were to carry out during those alerts, and we had quite elaborate maneuvers. We worked constantly from May. Up until May we had no fortifications, infantry fortifications, in Hawaii. General Short started us in in May during the department maneuvers digging in, and we continued that right up to December the 7th and of course after that added to it. So that at the time of the attack infantry machine gun emplacements and other type automatic weapon emplacements were [1357] actually constructed. We had no money to do it with. We went to the salvage yards and got all the material we

could, but we actually had them, and General Short personally made inspection of them, and I have talked to General Short, but I cannot remember specifically conferences that were held. But I do remember this officer courier coming out to see me personally in the evening on about the 27th, 28th, or 29th; I cannot remember the exact date.

44. General GRUNERT. Well, the fact that an officer courier came out to you to convey this message to you would sort of indicate that you had not attended a conference on that subject, would it not?

General WILSON. Oh, I am sure we didn't have any conference in reference to this message. No, sir, we did not. The information I gained was, just as I indicated, through an officer courier who gave it to me by word of mouth.

45. General GRUNERT. Then, you were not in on any discussion as to whether to take Alert 1, 2, or 3, or what?

General WILSON. No, sir. That was decided by the Department Commander.

46. General GRUNERT. Were you in on any discussions as to the adequacy of the plans or the S. O. P. that they put out, or did you get the thing as an accomplished fact without having been consulted about the terms of plans and S. O. P.s?

General WILSON. No, not in reference to the S. O. P.s. I have talked to General Short about the plans, because at the time the northern sector, for which I was responsible, was in my opinion very, very weak, and I used to talk to General Short about it. I talked to him about it at times, and he said that [1358] he realized it but the troops were just not available. Our regiments were under strength, and some had to be held in central reserve.

47. General GRUNERT. Now, in your testimony before the Roberts Commission it is recorded that you stated that you had never been called into conference or consultation regarding the warning message of November 27th.

General WILSON. That is right, sir.

48. General GRUNERT. Also that you felt safe because of the patrol system, knew nothing about it, that you thought the Navy had an inshore and offshore patrol, and the Navy had an inshore and offshore patrol?

General WILSON. I did think so, sir.

49. General GRUNERT. Yes. You thought then that if all these things were working that you should get ample information in order to carry out your part of the mission?

General WILSON. Yes, sir.

50. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions?

51. General FRANK. Yes.

Were you there when General Herron was in command?

General WILSON. Yes, a short time. General Herron left a few months after I arrived.

52. General FRANK. Did you know of the arrangement he had for having a meeting every week with the next layer of his commanders?

General WILSON. I am not certain. It seems to me I do remember—I, of course, was a subordinate then and not directly under him—it seems to me I do remember that the then Division Commander of the Hawaiian Division did go down for a conference [1359] with him once a week.

53. General FRANK. Every Monday?

General WILSON. That is right.

54. General FRANK. What I am trying to arrive at: Was there any such arrangement that General Short had? When the Hawaiian Division that was there when General Herron was there was later split up, it became two divisions?

General WILSON. That is right.

55. General FRANK. And at that time, instead of there being one commander at Schofield, there were two commanders of which you were one?

General WILSON. Two tactical commanders; that is correct.

56. General FRANK. Was there any arrangement whereby every week you had a conference with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

General WILSON. There was not.

57. General FRANK. Or did you go to him regularly in any interval of time?

General WILSON. No, I did not. You see, there was only a period there of two months after the first of October to the first of December when I was an independent commander under General Short. I have a vague impression that prior to that time General Short did hold meetings similar to those that General Herron held, but after the Hawaiian Division was split up into two triangular divisions, I do not remember; I am certain that there was no specified period of time when we went down; I am sure, though, that during the period of time between October the first and December there must have been at least one occasion on which I did attend a conference at [1960] General Short's headquarters.

58. General FRANK. Did you have any anti-aircraft weapons in the division?

General WILSON. Well, we had only the normal .50 caliber machine guns and .30 caliber machine guns. We had some of those for anti-aircraft purposes.

59. General FRANK. Were they in position on the morning of December 7th?

General WILSON. No, not in the division.

60. General FRANK. Sabotage alert would not require them to be in position?

General WILSON. That is right.

61. General FRANK. How long did it take you to get into your field positions?

General WILSON. Well, that is rather difficult to say.

62. General FRANK. Well, about how long?

General WILSON. I would say three or four hours for all of the troops to get out.

63. General FRANK. Being a lower echelon, you assumed that thorough and efficient efforts were being made to provide you with any adequate warning?

General WILSON. That is correct.

64. General FRANK. When the air attack came without warning, what was your reaction?

General WILSON. Well, one of great surprise that the Japanese could have gotten in for an air attack without our having some warning of it. That was followed by immediate action to get our troops out.

[1961] 65. General GRUNERT. If you had your units in your battle positions under Alert 3 when the air raid took place, what could you have done toward stopping that raid or minimizing its effect?

General WILSON. In my opinion, General, nothing.

66. General GRUNERT. That is because you were an infantry division and really had defensive positions to repel a surface attack, was it?

General WILSON. That is right, sir. And the reason we went out was, we didn't know but what this air attack was preliminary to a surface attack, so we wanted to get into position promptly. But had we been in position, I think we would have gained nothing.

67. General GRUNERT. What was your state of mind as to the probability or possibility of an attack on the Island by either air or surface or a combined attack by Japan on the Island of Oahu at about that time it did happen?

General WILSON. I did not think it would take place, sir.

68. General GRUNERT. What governed that line of thinking?

General WILSON. Well, that was mainly from my feeling about the big picture. I did not think for a moment Japan would attack the United States. That was my personal opinion.

69. General GRUNERT. But the Island of Oahu and that group of islands is an outpost to protect the mainland, isn't it?

General WILSON. Yes, sir.

70. General GRUNERT. And on an outpost our teachings have always been that we must be on the alert no matter whether they are asleep at home or not.

General WILSON. Yes, sir.

[1962] 71. General GRUNERT. In other words, an outpost is out there in order that that people at home can go to sleep.

General WILSON. And our plans were complete for the all-out attack by the Japanese. Of course we were quite weak in strength, but complete plans had been perfected.

72. General GRUNERT. Well, plans, of course, are good if you implement them; if you don't, they are not worth a damn. Now, suppose you had gone into Alert 2 or 3; then they might have had some chance of warding off this attack, might they not?

General WILSON. Well, General, I can only express my personal opinion about the other activities or the other defensive measures.

73. General GRUNERT. You were not concerned in Alert 2 except that it meant sabotage also?

General WILSON. That is correct.

74. General GRUNERT. But you were concerned in Alert No. 3?

General WILSON. Yes, sir.

75. General GRUNERT. And if they didn't go into Alert No. 3 it really didn't make much difference to you except you had to take care of sabotage; is that correct?

General WILSON. Well, I wouldn't say it didn't make any difference to me. I mean, insofar as the accomplishment of my mission was concerned, I felt that the measures that had been taken were adequate. I still feel so, insofar as I am concerned.

76. General GRUNERT. Have you ever asked yourself that, had you been Commander of the Department, you would have taken Alert 1, 2, or 3, or what you would have done?

General WILSON. Well, I'll tell you, I would not—I mean [1363] I have, of course, thought about that, but I don't know just exactly what information General Short had.

77. General GRUNERT. Then, it would have depended on the information he had. But if you knew that war was imminent or suspected, as an outpost weren't you supposed to be prepared to meet any emergency, even if you had no information?

General WILSON. Yes, sir. Of course, it is very easy, sort of as hindsight, to say it would have been much better if I had planes.

78. General GRUNERT. Looking forward to what your command may be in the future, and if you are given no information, you must be prepared to meet what?

General WILSON. Meet any situation, of course.

79. General GRUNERT. That is not hindsight; that is looking forward.

General WILSON. No, but I meant just talking now as we look back on this situation.

80. General GRUNERT. But that is a military axiom.

General WILSON. Oh, yes. Yes, sir.

81. General GRUNERT. General Russell.

82. General RUSSELL. Do you recall any information which was brought to your attention, General, in the middle of October relating to the relations between the Japanese Government and the American Government?

General WILSON. I do not.

83. General RUSSELL. You had become a Division Commander [1364] about October 1?

General WILSON. October 1st; that is right.

84. General RUSSELL. So you were under the immediate command of the Department Commander from that time. Had you been on alerts prior to November 27th, '41?

General WILSON. Oh, yes. I couldn't tell you just how far back. General, we had been on one of the alerts, but for some time prior to the attack.

85. General RUSSELL. Prior to the alert which was in force at the date of the attack, had there been any other alerts out there in which you had participated?

General WILSON. I know we had had patrols out and we had been guarding bridges for quite a while prior to the attack by the Japanese, and my impression is that at one time—I am not quite certain—at one time the air force had their planes spread out, but at the time of the attack, as you know, we were functioning directly under a sabotage alert.

86. General RUSSELL. Was there anything on the Island, the conduct of the native Japanese people or anything else, which indicated to you that the relations between the Japanese Government and the American Government were growing more tense: if as a matter of fact it was growing more tense?

General WILSON. No, not in reference to the Japanese population.

87. General RUSSELL. General, I rather got the impression from the replies that you made to General Grunert's questions that you were somewhat familiar with the general situation, and from that you had made a deduction that an attack on Oahu or any [1365] island in the Hawaiian group probably would not occur.

General WILSON. That was just my personal opinion.

88. General RUSSELL. Well, now, what do you mean by familiarity with the general situation? What do you mean by "general situation"?

General WILSON. Well, I meant the over-all picture, that I didn't feel that the Japanese were strong enough to go to war with the United States.

89. General RUSSELL. In other words, on the morning of December 7th prior to this attack by the Japs you didn't believe that war was imminent?

General WILSON. No, I did not. However, I would like for it to be made clear here that insofar as the operation of my division was concerned we were prepared to meet any eventuality, because we had our plans complete, we had practiced them, we had had maneuvers in which we moved troops from one place to another. We had the emplacements constructed, range cards prepared. In other words, we were ready to meet any eventuality.

90. General RUSSELL. But the information which was brought to your attention by the courier in late November was not of such nature as to change your thinking about the general situation and to convince you or to lead you to think that war might be imminent?

General WILSON. No, I didn't think so.

91. General RUSSELL. General, you had considerable experience from the time that you went out with the troops of the divisions, first the Hawaiian Division and then later as the commander of [1366] one of the triangular divisions. Were new troops constantly coming into those divisions, or was the personnel fairly fixed all along?

General WILSON. The personnel was pretty well fixed.

92. General RUSSELL. From the beginning?

General WILSON. From the time I arrived there; and of course we had good men going back to the United States and a certain number of men replacing them, and officers, too; but in general, to answer your question, our troops were well trained, we thought. That is, our organization was.

93. General RUSSELL. You did not have any big burden of recruit training during that period of time?

General WILSON. No, sir.

94. General RUSSELL. If you had gone on Alert No. 3 in the spring of 1941, the time you went out there, and remained on it until December 1941, what effect on the morale and training of the troops do you think that would have had?

General WILSON. It would have had a very adverse effect. We found that after December 7th our troops were in the field and stayed in the field constantly, and we soon found that the troops were getting rusty in their training. That was brought to the Department Commander's attention, and by and by a scheme was arrived at to use certain battalions from his reserve—the 34th Infantry was available—that would come in and take over a battalion sector and let us bring that battalion back into Schofield and put them in training

again. Also, it was a fine morale factor, too, in that they got a chance to get hot baths in barracks, and have some recreation, and so on. But the principal thing was that training suffered by virtue of the fact that out there in the field they were digging and perfecting dug- [1367] outs for themselves, construction work, and so on, and the training suffered.

95. General GRUNERT. What training was there to suffer?

General WILSON. All of the technique, General. They even got to the point where they got rusty on the use of their weapons, because, while they were out there and had their weapons in position, the ammunition question was quite acute then so that we could not get it for firing purposes, and they needed to be whipped back into shape.

96. General GRUNERT. Could they not have done that part of it while they were in position?

General WILSON. They were constantly in position in small groups. We would have them on the firing line. There were a number of machine gun emplacements with three or four men there constantly, day and night, on the alert, and we put so many men on that type of work that it had a decided adverse effect on training.

97. General GRUNERT. That is what you were out there for, to be in that sort of work. Of course it interferes with nicely-planned training where all conditions are what they ought to be. But from December 7th they had to carry on, and I presume they are still carrying on to a great extent.

General WILSON. We did as much training as we could, but nothing like as much as we needed. While we had the installations for the weapons, we had no quarters for our men.

98. General GRUNERT. That is not supposed to be a hardship, is it?

General WILSON. If you have troops and put them in the field and keep them constantly there, rained upon, and so on, you know, of course, that it is going to have an effect.

[1368] 99. General GRUNERT. Unless they actually have a chance to do some fighting?

General WILSON. That is right. Actual work along that line was started as soon as possible.

100. General RUSSELL. General Grunert has discussed with you the wisdom of regarding Hawaii and the other islands as an outpost to protect the western coast and the necessity for being constantly on the alert out there, to accomplish the maximum and to meet the worst. If that policy had been followed from the beginning of 1940 until December, 1941, with the troops constantly on the alert for two years waiting for an enemy which did not come, and being deprived of the type of training about which you have been speaking, what effect on the command's morale and state of efficiency would such a long and continuous alert have had?

General WILSON. I just answered that, General, for a shorter period. Of course, for a longer period it would have the same effect, an adverse effect.

101. General GRUNERT. Would it have been necessary to have all the troops always in position? Why could they not have been alerted without always occupying positions or without a hundred per cent being in position?

General WILSON. They probably could have, sir.

102. General GRUNERT. Could they not have been alerted with one-third of them in position and thus have taken away the strain and the effect on training and morale? I realize that you cannot keep troops in one place doing the same thing over and over again. But that is why we have senior officers; they have to look at those things and do what they can with what they have.

[1369] General WILSON. General, we did do that during our training periods. For instance, in May, 1941, when we had our Department maneuvers, General Short very definitely and deliberately made them very strenuous. He felt—and I think he is right—that prior to that time our maneuvers had not been strenuous enough; and we had maneuvers of the strenuous type. Following that, up and until December 7, we had our groups occupy their sectors as part of their training for short periods of time.

103. General RUSSELL. Could you have operated under Alert No. 3 with only a third of your people in the field?

General WILSON. No.

104. General RUSSELL. In other words, if you had to become effective to the maximum you had to turn out the entire personnel?

General WILSON. Yes, General, because the sectors were so big and the strength of the troops in my sector, the northern sector, at the time of the attack was, in my opinion, too small; but it was the best that could be done under the circumstances.

105. General GRUNERT. What information did you get from the local newspapers or newscasts or broadcasts from the United States about the state of international relations between the United States and Japan during this so-called critical period from about November 24 to December 7? Did you not get any information?

General WILSON. Oh, yes. I read the papers, sir, and listened to broadcasts.

106. General GRUNERT. But they did not impress on you that war was imminent?

General WILSON. No, General.

107. General GRUNERT. Or did they impress you that there might [1370] be war, but it would not come to you?

General WILSON. I have to be honest about it. I did not feel that the Japanese would attack the United States.

108. General GRUNERT. But, still, that was what we were in being for—to be prepared in case they did.

General WILSON. I would like to make one thing clear in that connection. That was my personal opinion. Of course I was working under a directive from Department Headquarters, and I wish to repeat that I did not go on my personal opinion. In other words, being a soldier, I realized that we had to be prepared for any eventuality.

109. General GRUNERT. You considered yourself pretty well prepared as far as your own unit was concerned?

General WILSON. Yes. In so far as the troops we had were available I felt that we were ready to meet any eventuality.

110. General FRANK. In the message of November 27 from the War Department to General Short is this statement:

There measures should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population.

Was anything said to you about that?

General WILSON. Yes; I remember that.

111. General FRANK. You remember it?

General WILSON. I remember something about in whatever measures we took to avoid alarming the civil population.

112. General FRANK. We have a file of Honolulu papers in the office, and there have been copied the headlines from Sunday, the 30th of November, through to Sunday, the 7th of December. Read just the first line under each date heading, please, to refresh your memory. Read the top line on each one (handing papers to the witness).

[1371] General WILSON (after reading as requested). Yes, General.

113. General FRANK. Those headlines read, consecutively from the 30th of November to December 7:

Japanese May Strike Over Weekend.

The next day:

Hull, Kurusu in Crucial Meeting Today.

On Tuesday:

Japan Still Hopeful of Making Peace With U. S.

Wednesday:

Huge Pincer Attack on United States by Japan, France Predicted.

The fifth of December:

Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today.

The sixth of December:

America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo-China.

Another headline on the same day:

Japanese Navy Moving South.

Again on Saturday, the 6th:

Detailed Plans Completed for M-day Setup.

Sunday, the 7th of December:

F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis.

As a result of those newspaper headlines is it or is it not your opinion that the civil population were somewhat stirred up?

General WILSON. Oh, Yes.

114. General FRANK. Through the newspaper headlines generally the civil population had been alarmed, then, had they not?

General WILSON. I think so.

115. General FRANK. If they were already alarmed through the [1372] newspaper headlines, what advantage did the military people have in playing down the situation?

General WILSON. I am not in position to answer that. In other words, the message that came to General Short telling him to avoid stirring up the civil population—I don't know. They sought, perhaps, to make the situation as easy as possible and not stir things up. But what I think of it is immaterial, of course. These instructions were given by higher authority.

116. General FRANK. The civil population was already stirred up?

General WILSON. Certainly.

117. General FRANK. While the commercial newspapers were stirring up the population, do you think, or have you any opinion, as to whether this attitude that the military establishment had had any effect of any sort in calming the military population?

General WILSON. I do not quite understand your question.

118. General FRANK. While the newspapers were stirring up the pot, do you think that the military efforts were influential in calming them?

General WILSON. They may have had some effect on it.

119. General FRANK. Did the absence of any information coming from higher authority to you on this situation, when there was so much comment in the newspapers, cause any reaction on your part?

General WILSON. Oh, yes. I thought about the matter, of course, as a commander having the responsibility for a sector; but, as I have stated before, I felt that the plans that we had made, with the troops we had available, enabled us to meet any situation that might arise as well as we could with the number [1373] of troops we had. I would have felt much better at that time had we had more troops.

120. General FRANK. What was the state of mind of the rank and file of the military personnel with respect to the probability of war?

General WILSON. It would be very difficult for me to express an opinion on that. My impression at this stage, after three years, more or less, is that a great many people felt that while the situation was critical, the Japanese probably would not attack the United States.

121. Major CLAUSEN. May the record show that the witness has been reading from a document consisting of three pages, headed "Items Appearing in the Honolulu Advertiser," which we offer in evidence as Exhibit 19.

(Document headed "Items Appearing in the Honolulu Advertiser" was marked Exhibit No. 19 and received in evidence.)

122. General RUSSELL. General Frank has read to you certain headlines that purport to have appeared in one of the local papers in Honolulu beginning Sunday, November 30th, and extending through December 7th. This paper is identified on the document from which you read as The Honolulu Advertiser. It is my impression, based on certain facts which have developed during the investigation, that The Honolulu Advertiser was the big paper out there?

General WILSON. That is right.

123. General RUSSELL. And it had a larger circulation, probably reached more people on the island, than any other periodical or publication there; is that true?

General WILSON. I imagine it did. It was one of the leading papers there. [1374]

124. General FRANK. Was it a morning or afternoon paper?

General WILSON. A morning paper, as I remember it.

125. General FRANK. Was there an afternoon paper?

General WILSON. I have forgotten—yes; they had a morning and an afternoon paper.

126. General FRANK. Was that The Star Bulletin?

General WILSON. I am not certain.

127. General FRANK. The Star Bulletin had a large circulation. too, did it not?

General WILSON. Yes.

128. General RUSSELL. General, the effect, as you told General Frank, on the population, including the Japanese elements of the population, of these headlines, was to make them conscious of the fact that the relations between the Japanese Government and the American Government were becoming more critical or were not entirely all that could be desired. I believe you told General Frank also that the effect of these news items on the population was to more or less excite them or stir them up?

General WILSON. I would imagine so. That is only an opinion.

129. General RUSSELL. It is not based on facts, but is just an assumption from a process of reasoning?

General WILSON. Yes.

130. General RUSSELL. If the Japanese elements on the island which the Department was instructed not to excite were already war conscious, do you think that manning the guns, hauling out live ammunition and turning out all the troops to a position of readiness to avert whatever might come along would have added to the excitement and the tenseness of the local situation, or [1975] would it have had some opposite effect?

General WILSON. I think it probably would.

131. General RUSSELL. Would what?

General WILSON. Would have added to it.

132. General RUSSELL. Which would have been to an extent in violation of the order to avoid alarming the civil population?

General WILSON. I do not personally think that, General. You have got to use your own discretion about the application of that provision on exciting the population. In other words—and this is my opinion—if the Department Commander felt that the situation justified going into Alert 3 and moving his troops into the field, he would have ignored the possibility of exciting the civilians.

133. General RUSSELL. You, then, take the position that it might not have added to the excitement, but a situation might have arisen where going into Alert No. 3 was more important than refraining from alarming the population?

General WILSON. That is right.

134. General RUSSELL. With reference to this injunction about not disclosing intent, a situation might have risen where it was better to disclose intent and take positive action?

General WILSON. Yes. But I do not think they had to disclose intent by occupying the positions, and so on.

135. General RUSSELL. Based on your experience out there, General, what is the meaning in this message of the words "Do not disclose intent"?

General WILSON. I would like, if I might, to have that message read again.

136. General GRUNERT. You may read it for yourself. It starts at the bottom of the page (handing a paper to the witness).

[1976] General WILSON. I do not know how to answer that question about intent, unless it has reference to our putting into effect a full defensive organization. But surely the Department Commander, if, as I said before, he felt it was necessary to go into Alert 3, would not let the alarming of the civil population or the intent to take defensive measures against outward attack interfere with his doing it.

137. General RUSSELL. Since we are speculating, General, suppose you had received a message in which, prior to hostilities, you were told that you should carry out any measures that you deemed necessary, referring specifically to reconnaissance as one of those measures, but that they should not be carried out so as to alarm the civil population: What, in your opinion, would that injunction to carry out the measures so as not to alarm the civilian population have meant?

General WILSON. Well, for me to attempt to interpret a message that came from higher authority, of course I—might have one idea and you might have another; but there is a possible restriction there, you might say a theoretical restriction against General Short doing what he thinks he ought to do.

138. General GRUNERT. Had you been commander and had you received that message, what would be your mental reaction to what was required?

General WILSON. My idea of what they meant is not to go into an all-out defense; in other words, make such reconnaissance you need, but hold your troops more or less intact so as to avoid alarming the population and to avoid knowledge that you had gone into a full defense.

139. General GRUNERT. How do you, then, interpret this:

[1377] This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action which might jeopardize your defense.

General WILSON. General, in other words, that message, to me, is telling him at one time don't do so-and-so, but of course we don't want to restrict your action. In other words, that is somewhat inconsistent, and I think General Short should have been free to do whatever was necessary.

140. General GRUNERT. If there were inconsistencies did not that leave him free to do what he thought was necessary?

General WILSON. I would think so, sir; yes.

141. General GRUNERT. In other words, you got do's and you got don't's, and therefore in the last analysis you had to decide?

General WILSON. Yes.

142. General RUSSELL. General, this message deals with what is to be done in the event of hostilities, and says:

If hostilities cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

143. General Grunert called your attention to the fact that that is not to be required to the point where it restricts defense, that is, in the event of hostilities; that we must not commit the first overt act. You were out there and cognizant of the situation and knew what was going on. What do you think that meant?

General WILSON. I think that means definitely that we should not go seeking the Japs out and attacking them by air or surface or whatnot.

144. General RUSSELL. Do you think it was necessary to tell the Department Commander not to start a war on Japan?

[1378] General WILSON. The impression I gained when that message was given to me was that it was simply informative, that our government had decided that, not that they had expected anybody out there to do it, but to let them know what the policy of the government was.

145. General RUSSELL. Did it impress you when the courier officer came to you that the main reason for moving out was the breakdown in the negotiations between the Japanese Government and our government?

General WILSON. Yes, and to inform General Short of the situation and alert him.

146. General RUSSELL. The alerting was necessary because of the breakdown in the negotiations between the two governments?

General WILSON. Yes.

147. General RUSSELL. General Frank has read to you these headlines from the Honolulu Advertiser. Did they not indicate very clearly that the negotiations were being continued after this message was received?

General WILSON. Oh, yes; and it was definitely understood that a representative of the Japanese Government was on his way to Washington, and later arrived in Washington, and, if I remember correctly, he was supposed to have been in discussion with the President when the attack took place.

[1379] 148. General RUSSELL. General, was the normal chain of command, by which you were advised of the enemy situation, through the Hawaiian Department, or through the ADVERTISER?

General WILSON. Well, of course, the Department Commander kept us informed.

149. General RUSSELL. That is all.

150. General FRANK. We have, here, a résumé of the headlines in the Honolulu STAR-BULLETIN, from the 29th of November through to the 6th of December, copied from a file of Honolulu papers that we have here in the office. Those headlines read as follows:

Saturday, 29 November:

U. S. Waits Japan Reply.

Monday, 1 December:

U. S. Army Alerted in Manila, Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows.

Monday, 1 December, again:

Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension.

Monday, 1 December, again:

War Fears Grow in Philippines.

Thursday, 4 December:

Japan Spurns U. S. Program.

Saturday, 6 December:

Singapore on War Footing.

Saturday, 6 December:

New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo.

Saturday, 6 December:

Civilians Urged to Leave Manila.

151. Major CLAUSEN. We offer, as the exhibit next in order, 19-A, this document from which General Frank just read, consisting of two pages.

(The résumé of headlines referred to, was marked as Exhibit 19-A, and was received in evidence.)

[1380] 152. General FRANK. Do you remember generally having read those items?

General WILSON. I am not certain that I read those particular items. I certainly read the papers during that period.

153. General FRANK. You remember having gained the impression that they convey?

General WILSON. I can't remember the impressions given by any specific paper, but I read them at the time and I probably read that, because my impression is that I took both the morning and the afternoon papers.

154. General FRANK. Do you remember generally having gained the impression that those headlines convey?

General WILSON. Yes.

155. General GRUNERT. General, in the last analysis, is it not true that if Alert 2 or Alert 3 had been ordered it would have at least minimized the effects of the attack?

General WILSON. General, my impression is that we were operating under Alert No. 2. As I remember it, protection from sabotage was Alert 2. That is the one under which we were operating, as I remember it.—Was it 1?

156. General GRUNERT. That was really Alert No. 1. The alerts, as they ran, were:

No. 1 was the so-called "sabotage alert."

No. 2 was, to be prepared for Air attack, plus sabotage.

No. 3 was, to be prepared against surface attack, air attack, and sabotage, or the "all-out" defense.

General WILSON. I see. Well, I don't think there is any question, General, but what, had we been under Alert 2 or [1381] Alert 3, it would have minimized our losses. I think that is obvious.

157. General GRUNERT. That is primarily because you then would have been more ready to repel an air attack?

General WILSON. That is right. The planes would have been scattered, for instance.

158. General GRUNERT. There appear to be no more questions. Thank you for coming down.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

159. General GRUNERT. We will go, now, to other business.

(Thereupon, at 10:40 a. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the morning, and proceeded to other business.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board, at 2 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. ROLAND WALSH, ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES; COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILADELPHIA QUARTERMASTER DEPOT

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

General WALSH. Roland Walsh, Brigadier General, A. U. S.; Commanding General, Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot.

2. General GRUNERT. General, the Board is after facts, both as to background and viewpoints, prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. We hope that because of your assignment [1382] in Hawaii in 1941 you may throw some light on the situation or may give us some leads from which we can develop more facts.

What was your assignment in Hawaii, in 1941?

General WALSH. I was commanding the Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot. That included the post of Fort Armstrong.

3. General GRUNERT. What defensive measures against air attack, or any other sort of attack, were prescribed for Fort Armstrong?

General WALSH. We were on an alert on the 7th, and had been, for about ten days. As I remember it, it was what we called the "No. 1 Alert" against sabotage.

4. General GRUNERT. Now, what protective measures had you taken, or what measures were prescribed, at Fort Armstrong, to protect your own garrison, under the Field Manual 100-5, which, in effect, says that each command shall take care of itself?

General WALSH. Of course, my troops, as you understand, were Quartermaster troops. There were two truck companies and two maintenance companies; one light company and one heavy. Most of my people were civilians—I am answering this question by a little preliminary—and in an alert, all we could do was to put on additional sentries, and have cars move around, or trucks, with men armed on them, that would go around the warehouses and around the Post. We had no equipment for antiaircraft.

5. General GRUNERT. You had no defensive equipment for antiaircraft? Did you have any other means of protection outside of small arms?

General WALSH. No other equipment, whatsoever.

6. General GRUNERT. Was there any plan prescribed, either by [1383] the Department or by the command, that would inform the personnel of the command just what to do in the event of any kind of alert?

General WALSH. We had a regular "SOP", as they called it—a Standing Operating Procedure.

7. General GRUNERT. Was that your own, or was that the Department's?

General WALSH. That was my own plan. It was drawn up, of course, under orders from the Department, but it was my own plan.

8. General GRUNERT. What were some of those measures that you took, that that SOP required?

General WALSH. As I mentioned before, it was a question of putting the additional sentries on.

9. General GRUNERT. But how about the noncombatants on the Post? What did they do? How were they protected?

General WALSH. There was no real plan to take care of the non-combatants on the Post. There were very few, of course.

10. General GRUNERT. Did they have air-raid shelters?

General WALSH. They had no air-raid shelter. Fortunately, at my post we had a battery tiernen, which is an old mine-defense battery, two 3-inch guns, and in there, of course, there was some pro-

tection against bombs. This place was ordinarily used as a mortuary, but it could be and was used as a shelter against bombs.

11. General GRUNERT. Of their own volition, or according to plan?

General WALSH. Of their own volition.

12. General GRUNERT. There were no slit trenches?

[1384] General WALSH. No trenches.

13. General GRUNERT. Could they have been dug on the Post?

General WALSH. Yes, sir.

14. General GRUNERT. Did your protective measures, such as your warehouses, and so forth, envisage any additional fire hazards that should have been planned for, and that you did plan for?

General WALSH. We had pretty good protection against fire. We had sand at some places. We had our own fire engine, just one, but for the depot we had one fire engine, and it was tried out very frequently, and we could get to a fire in just a few moments.

15. General GRUNERT. Was there any thought in your mind as to whether an attack was probable or possible, or not to be expected?

General WALSH. If you want to complete my ideas on it, I was more afraid of sabotage, myself, than anything else; and of course, being an officer responsible for government property, and having but a few troops under me, all that I could do was to protect against sabotage.

16. General GRUNERT. Were you kept informed of the international situation, or were you given any information that was sent to the Commanding General of Hawaii, that might show the existent condition, along the latter part of November and in December?

General WALSH. That is a pretty hard question for me to answer. I, of course, felt the tension, and I was informed of the growing tension, and the need to be more and more on the alert.

[1385] 17. General GRUNERT. How did you get that information—from the newspapers, from official sources, or what?

General WALSH. We were told, about November 27, I should say, to be on a very strict alert.

18. General GRUNERT. By a "strict alert," you mean what?

General WALSH. I meant an alert against sabotage.

19. General GRUNERT. Then everybody seemed to be sabotage-minded but not actually warminded, is that true?

General WALSH. I do not know exactly what you mean by the "warminded."

20. General GRUNERT. In other words, you did anticipate and had instructions to be sure to guard against sabotage, but you did not envisage anything beyond sabotage, did you?

General WALSH. That is correct.

21. General GRUNERT. What was your source of official information? With what section of the General Staff did you deal?

General WALSH. It usually came to me from the Department Quartermaster.

22. General FRANK. Who was that?

General WALSH. Colonel William R. White, now Brigadier General.

23. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions? Is there anything else, General, any information you have that might give us leads or throw some light on our mission to find out what happened prior to and during the attack? We want to exhaust every possible source,

and so we took a chance on your having some information which you might impart to us.

General WALSH. I don't think that I have anything that would assist you.

[1386] 24. General FRANK. Were you totally surprised by the attacks?

General WALSH. Yes.

25. General FRANK. Did you have the least conception that there would be such an attack?

General WALSH. I did not.

26. General FRANK. Did you feel a tension in the international situation at that time?

General WALSH. Very definitely.

27. General FRANK. What caused it?

General WALSH. One of the outstanding things that caused it was the Japanese ships' not putting into Hawaii any more. That, to me, was a definite sign that the tension had increased considerably.

28. General FRANK. Do you remember the newspapers, about that time?

General WALSH. Well, I can't say that I remember anything specific about that.

29. General FRANK. What I am trying to bring out is whether or not this tension was caused by information that you got through official sources or through other than official sources.

General WALSH. It was from both; both the newspapers, and information that came from the headquarters.

30. General FRANK. And from your general observations of the Port?

General WALSH. Yes.

31. General GRUNERT. When did the Japanese ships cease coming into the harbor, approximately, do you remember? Was it in the summer, or in the fall?

[1387] General WALSH. I would say it was about two months before. That is a very rough estimate—about two months before.

32. General GRUNERT. Prior to that they made regular stops in there?

General WALSH. That is correct.

33. General GRUNERT. Does anybody else think of anything? That appears to be all. Thank you very much.

General WALSH. Thank you.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.

(There was a brief recess.)

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL RUSSELL C. THROCKMORTON, INFANTRY, CAMP BRECKINRIDGE, KENTUCKY

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Russell C. Throckmorton, O5140, Colonel, Infantry, Commanding Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is after facts, and you, having been a general staff officer of the Hawaiian Department

General Staff in 1941, may help us in developing facts and giving us leads as to where we can probably dig up some more.

What was your assignment in 1941? And give us the dates.

Colonel THROCKMORTON. My assignments in 1941 from July 28—well, General, may I give you my entire General Staff history, because from July 9, 1940, I was G-4.

3. General GRUNERT. Of what?

[1388] Colonel THROCKMORTON. Of the Hawaiian Department, and then on September 16, 1940, I became G-3 of the Hawaiian Department, and then on July 28 I became G-1 of the Hawaiian Department.

4. General FRANK. Still 1940?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. 1942.

5. General RUSSELL. 1941.

Colonel THROCKMORTON. From July 9 to September 16 I was G-4. From September 16 to July 28, 1941, I was G-3—July 9 to September 16 I was G-3, and from September 16 to July 28 I was G-1.

6. General FRANK. But you left out the years there.

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir.

7. General FRANK. That is rather confusing.

8. General GRUNERT. Yes. Go over that again and give the year each time.

Colonel THROCKMORTON. From July 9, 1940, until September 16, 1940, I was G-4, and from September 16, 1940, until July 28, 1941, I was G-3, and from July 28 until departure from Hawaii May 24 I was G-1.

9. General GRUNERT. May 24, 1942?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. 1942.

10. General GRUNERT. I think you were G-1, then, from September of 1941 until May of 1942; is that right?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Well, approximately so, General. Actually it was from July 28, 1941.

11. General FRANK. And what was your assignment just prior to the G-1 assignment?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I was the G-3 for a period of ten [1389] months from September 16, 1940, to July 28, 1941.

12. General GRUNERT. Were you the Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 and the Assistant Chief of Staff G-1, or were you the Assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I was Assistant Chief of Staff G-4, G-3, and G-1.

13. General GRUNERT. Then, you served under two Chiefs of Staff, did you?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. That is correct, sir.

14. General GRUNERT. The first one being Colonel Hayes and the second one Colonel Phillips?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. And then even a third, General. I served under General (now General, then Colonel) Joseph Collins.

15. General GRUNERT. While Colonel Phillips was Chief of Staff did he hold any staff conferences?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. On Saturday mornings there was a general meeting. It was standing operating procedure that a staff conference would be called on Saturday mornings at 8 o'clock, and all

staff members contributed items that might be of interest to the staff in general. That included the special staff as well. That was a carry-over from a policy Colonel Hayes, now General Hayes, followed.

16. General GRUNERT. And that was a routine matter to have a staff meeting once a week?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir.

17. General GRUNERT. Did you have any particular staff meeting on November 27th or thereabouts? Were there any special staff meetings outside the routine in the latter part [1390] of November and early in December?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Not to my knowledge, as a result of that radio which we received on November 27. However, I as an individual was informed of its content by Colonel Phillips. Now, as to whether or not he held subsequent staff meetings relative to it, I am unable to say.

18. General GRUNERT. And you do not know how many were so informed as you were informed?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I do not, sir.

19. General GRUNERT. That message of November 27th ended up with the following sentence:

(Excerpt from radio message of November 27, 1941, is as follows:)

Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

Then, you do not know how many officers were so informed on that directive, do you?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. No, sir, I do not, but it appeared to be common knowledge among staff officers who should know about such things.

20. General GRUNERT. What was your particular interest in that message? As G-1?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. My particular interest was the strength of the Department. Our authorized war garrison at that time, as I remember the figures now—I may be in error one way or another—was 194,000, and we had not approached those figures at that time. that strength.

21. General GRUNERT. Then, this message was just of information for you? You had no particular specific duties [1391] thereunder; is that right?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. That is correct, sir.

22. General GRUNERT. Now, to go back about how that staff was handled: Were you allowed a free hand in following out your duties in G-1? By "a free hand" I mean were you required to perform your assigned duties without specific dictation or numbered instruction as to just how you should do it?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. As long as general policies had been established I felt that I had a free hand, though I was inclined at all times to keep the General Staff informed of what actions I had taken.

23. General GRUNERT. Did you have access to the Commanding General when you thought it was necessary that you bring something to his particular attention?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I never had the feeling that I thought I was withheld from seeing the Commanding General. That question

has never occurred to me, but it seems now that if I had asked to see the Commanding General I would have been permitted to have seen him.

24. General GRUNERT. As G-3 and following then as G-1, did you have any particular occasions to confer with the naval staff of the District or of the Fleet on any particular things?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir. When I took over the duties of G-3, the framework for the joint agreement had tentatively been decided upon by my predecessor representing the Army, Colonel Carl Banks. Having taken over my duties as G-3, I followed through the joint agreement to its completeness and finally its signature by all people concerned, that is, both the Navy and the Army.

[1392] 25. General GRUNERT. Who relieved you as G-4?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. There was an interchange in those two staff sections: Colonel Banks was G-3; he became G-4, and I became G-3.

26. General GRUNERT. Then when you were relieved as G-3, who became G-3?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Colonel Phillips.

27. General GRUNERT. Phillips?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. For a short period of time.

28. General GRUNERT. And then who followed him?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Colonel William Donegan.

29. General GRUNERT. Then, you were in G-3 during the time of the preparation of the Hawaiian joint coastal frontier defense plan?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir.

30. General GRUNERT. And were you also G-3 when the joint air operations agreement with the two addendums was put into effect?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. As I remember it, the joint air was a part of the joint Army-Navy agreement.

31. General GRUNERT. It was a part of that?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir. That is, my memory places it so.

32. General GRUNERT. Was the General Staff called upon or free to advise the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General as to the defense means and measures and as to their accuracy?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I should say so, General. General Short for the most part took the initiative on that sort of thing; and so that I should say that there was considerable. [1393] liaison between the Staff and the General.

33. General GRUNERT. Were you present at the discussion, if there was a discussion, as to what should be done under the Chief of Staff's message of November 27th?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I was not, sir. I was informed of the decision that had been made.

34. General GRUNERT. That was to what effect?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. That was that we would assume defensive measures under Standing Operating Procedure No. 1, which was sabotage defense.

35. General GRUNERT. Had you previously been kept pretty well informed of the international situation, particularly that which dealt with the negotiations with Japan?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I believe so. I remember that I was personally interested in it and by means of press and radio, and so on,

kept myself informed; and such secret documents as came through I perused and kept myself informed. I believe I did.

38. General GRUNERT. Did you know or have you seen or been informed of the message of November 27th that came to the Navy, and in that message it was directed the Army be informed, and the message started out to the effect that, "This is a war warning"? Do you remember that?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I cannot testify to that personally, General. I heard that such a message was received by the Navy, but I neither saw it nor was I officially informed of it.

37. General GRUNERT. From what you did learn from these various sources, and having been G-3 and having been concerned [1394] in the various plans, did you think the decision to go on Alert No. 1 filled the bill?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. In view of one provision of the message which came to the Army on November 27, I felt that General Short's decision in that case was more or less restricted to a sabotage status, a defense-against-sabotage status.

38. General GRUNERT. What gave you that impression? What particular part of the message gave you that impression?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. As I remember it, there was a statement made in it that no measure would be taken which might arouse local apprehension, or something to that effect. Then, too, having read over the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Department for a number of years, there crept into all the plans references to periods or a period of strained relationship. Perhaps some of us were indoctrinated with that. So that when the message on November 27th came, I know myself I felt that, Here is a period of strained relationship, and particularly after the caution in the radio that no action would be taken which might arouse public apprehension.

38. General FRANK. In other words, they were preparing for war in accordance with a pattern; is that right?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Well, I apply that to myself only, General, and not to any of my contemporaries. If they felt as I did, I don't know. I speak only for myself, sir.

40. General GRUNERT. I shall refresh your memory on this message of the 27th of November, '41. This says:

[1395] (Radio message of November 27, 1941, is as follows:)

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

That states in there:

If hostilities cannot be avoided, United States desires Japan to commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

Did it ever occur to you that just going on alert against sabotage, doing that and nothing more, might jeopardize the defense.

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir; I can see how it would.

[1396] 41. General FRANK. The answer is not quite clear to me.

42. General GRUNERT. I understood the answer to be——

43. General FRANK. He can see how it would. How what would do what?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. How that a sabotage alert only would jeopardize the defense of the Hawaiian Islands under the provisions of that radio.

44. General FRANK. All right.

45. General GRUNERT. Then, it appears that over there you all were sabotage-minded but hardly war-minded; is that about a correct statement?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I can speak only for myself, General, and I must say that I felt that that statement in that radio fitted right into the old doctrine which permeated practically all of the plans.

46. General GRUNERT. But there was nothing in the message about sabotage?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. No, sir, there isn't, but it would seem to have gone any further than we did might have violated the provisions in there that nothing would be done which might—to quote the radio, in the presence of that.

47. General GRUNERT. What measures in that respect would in your opinion have alarmed the public if you took Alert 2 or Alert 3? Where would the alarm of the public come in?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Well, it would have required more movement of troops to have gone into the next phase.

48. General GRUNERT. Had not troops been moving right along?

49. General FRANK. I didn't get the answer to the question [1397] before. Would the reporter read it, please?

The REPORTER (reading):

General GRUNERT. But there was nothing in the message about sabotage?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. No, sir, there isn't, but it would seem to have gone any further than we did might have violated the provisions in there that nothing would be done which might—to quote the radio, in the presence of that.

50. General FRANK. That left the answer in the air.

51. General GRUNERT. To quote that part of the radio, that referred to what?

52. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel THROCKMORTON. That referred to the alarm or the apprehension. I am not choosing the words of the text there; that is all; because I don't know them.

53. General FRANK. The alarm or apprehension of the civilian population; is that what you mean?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes.

54. General FRANK. All right.

55. General GRUNERT. All right. Now would you read the last that you have, Mr. Reporter?

The REPORTER (reading):

General GRUNERT. What measures in that respect would in your opinion have alarmed the public if you took Alert 2 or Alert 3? Where would the alarm of the public come in?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Well, it would have [1398] required
ment of troops to have gone into the next phase.

General GRUNERT. Had not troops been moving right along?

56. General GRUNERT. Had not troops been moving right
ing maneuvers?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir, they had.

57. General GRUNERT. Did that alarm the public who
troops moved?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Apparently not. But to have
their next phase from the status we had at the time the re-
ceived would have meant the occupation of gun positions, at
gun positions, the dispersion of planes on the field; but aside
under the standing operating procedures the Department
about as well prepared for the defense of the Island as it co-
wise have been.

58. General GRUNERT. If you had gone into Alert 2, for
that Alert 2 covered preparations to meet an air attack; in-
ferred sabotage?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir; it was a continuation.

59. General GRUNERT. Continuation, yes. Then, the al-
the public or the fear of alarming the public or aggravation
tion appeared to be uppermost in your mind, at least?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Well, General, as I observe it :
lieve that in trying to turn over in my mind the cause or
for General Shorts decision, it was based on that; I w-
thought it was based on that, though I never discussed it.
Being a G-1, I had no occasion to [1399] discuss it.

60. General GRUNERT. I was banking on your past knowl-
G-3 more than your present knowledge of G-1, as to what
you considered that that filled the bill.

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir.

61. General GRUNERT. (Addressing Board Members).
any questions?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. May I answer that more fully ()
General GRUNERT. All right.

62. Colonel THROCKMORTON. At any time I didn't quest-
course, in the light of subsequent events I realize that it wa-

63. General FRANK. Were you reading the newspapers at
then?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir.

64. General FRANK. Were not the newspapers carrying
headlines to alarm the public with respect to the situation?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I think they were, General; yes.

65. General FRANK. Well, the civil population already w-
then, wasn't it?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I quite agree with you, sir.

66. General FRANK. Well, was there any point in taking
measures to calm them down?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Nothing had happened or they
mitted no overt act which indicated that there was any requi-
time.

67. General RUSSELL. Colonel, you were there when [1400]
occurred; is that true?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir.

68. General RUSSELL. You had been G-3 for a time, and gone from that office into G-1, and you were serving as G-1 at the moment of the attack?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir.

69. General RUSSELL. Did you observe the operations of the troops in and about Honolulu at the time of the attack?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. At the time of the attack?

70. General RUSSELL. Yes, and subsequent, shortly thereafter?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. No, sir, I did not, because I was tied down to my desk pretty well, handling personnel matters. We were very short of officers to carry out a 24-hour tour, and it was necessary to get sufficient reserve officers immediately available, called to active duty, and fit them into places where they were best qualified to serve; and the late afternoon of the day of the attack General Short gave me a directive to have all the women and children evacuated from the posts of Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, and Schofield Barracks, and that that would be accomplished by Monday morning.

[1401] 71. General RUSSELL. Did you have plans for that prior to the attack?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. There was a plan being worked up by Colonel Lyman, the Department Engineer, that had not been delegated to me as my responsibility, but I believe that the basis for that was the fact that it required considerable public relationship, and Colonel Lyman being native-born and a native Hawaiian, the General probably thought best to turn that job over to him, the formulation of the evacuation plan. It was not completed, however, when the attack took place. Such plans as we actually carried into effect to get the women and children off to those posts were done almost on the spot.

72. General RUSSELL. When did the preparation of this plan for the evacuation of the women and children begin?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I cannot answer that, General, but I can say that I heard it discussed some three or four months prior to the date of attack.

73. General RUSSELL. General Grunert talked to you about the message which is identified as the message of November 27, and you seemed to understand the message that he was talking about?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir.

74. General RUSSELL. I do not know that I followed your answers well in that connection. There is one sentence in that message as to what was to be done before hostile Japanese action, and only one. It says:

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm the population.

And then it says to report the action taken. The other says [1402] to report measures taken. Those two sentences seem to relate to what went on prior to Japanese action.

You said that there was tenseness, and you thought that during this state of tenseness antisabotage was what was indicated. Is that right?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. The term used, General, was "a period of strained relationship." That is the term that was used throughout all the plans.

75. General RUSSELL. Even in the "prior to hostile action" sentence there is a statement emphasizing reconnaissance measures. Did you interpret these restrictions or limitations as in any way limiting action of the Department Commander about reconnaissance measures?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. As a matter of fact, General, I did not give that particular point consideration, but I do not believe not that it should.

76. General RUSSELL. You had been G-3?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir. I think perhaps, General, if I may digress here a bit, that if I had still been G-3 and had had access to a copy of that radio, with the privilege of sitting down and studying it, I might have come to a different conclusion. It was almost wholly a G-3 problem. That did not mean that I was not interested at all; but when I heard about it I was given the message and I read it over once, maybe twice—I have forgotten; it has been so long ago—and then I did not have an opportunity, though I suppose could, if I had asked for it, to read it again. But I do not believe that I read it again. I remember that the Chief of Staff sent for me and informed me of the receipt of it and let me read it. Whether I read it once or read it twice, I at least did not [1403] digress it. And then he told me of the decision of the Department Commander.

77. General FRANK. The decision had already been made before you read the message?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. It had already been made; yes, sir. I believe that because I was not intimately concerned with it, perhaps, was not taken into the picture too much, except just in an informational way.

78. General GRUNERT. Can you think of anything else that would through your long and varied experience with the general staff in the Hawaiian Department throw more light on the situation? Have you anything in mind that you think the Board ought to know ought to consider, from such experience?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir; I have.

79. General GRUNERT. Will you tell us, please?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Though I do not think it would have affected the final outcome of what took place, as I feel that there was a state of frustration, at least in my own mind, due to the fact that in October of 1941—and the attack took place only two months later—the Hawaiian Division, the old square division, was reorganized from a square division to two triangular divisions, the 24th and 25th. This was done from forces immediately available. This took place while I was G-3. Every attempt was made by General Short to triangulate the old square division into two, and it finally got down to the point where the War Department granted him authority, but would not give him additional troops. I felt that it was poor judgment to skeletonize those two divisions in order to create the two divisions. I felt that our mission in Hawaii could be well and efficiently performed under the old setup, perhaps more [1404] efficiently performed. With war imminent it hardly gave an opportunity for

the troops of the new divisions to get oriented or settled down, and particularly when there was such a tremendous shortage of strength within the two. The defense of the Island did not require a war maneuver except for local reserves, or perhaps one general reserve; so that the benefit of having two triangular divisions was defeated, it seems to me. I think that it was a poor choice at that particular time. I think the decision was made, however, before General Short ever reached Hawaii, and I think he was encouraged by his Chief of Staff.

80. General FRANK. Which one?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Colonel Phillips.

Then there was another thing that took place about that time of which I disapproved, though not violently, but as much as I thought I dared.

When Colonel Phillips came to Hawaii there was no vacancy for him in a position where General Short apparently wanted to use him.

81. General FRANK. Which was that?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. He was sent in as my assistant in the G-3 office. Not as such; that is, the orders did not read that way, but we looked on him as sort of a tactical aide. I felt that he spoke the General's mind.

The first thing, or one of the early things, that he wanted to do was to change Field Order No. 1, which in itself was the standing operating procedure. F. O. No. 1 was based on the thought of some of the best military brains we had ever had in Hawaii. I am sure that it dated back to the time of General Drum, General Connor, maybe, General William R. Smith, down through, perhaps, General Bryant Wells' time. It was in the [1405] process of modification or, rather, revision, to bring it up to date when I took over the G-3 office, and I remember that I completed the job. I felt that to throw that out at that particular time was a bad idea, because everyone was so familiar with the old F. O. No. 1; and the talking point or argument of the Chief of Staff was that they wanted standing operating procedures. In my opinion and in the opinion of everyone to whom I talked F. O. No. 1 was a standard operating procedure, though it was not called that; but in effect, it was.

82. General GRUNERT. And that Chief of Staff was Colonel Hayes?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. No. That was Colonel Phillips.

83. General GRUNERT. You started out talking about his coming in as assistant to you.

Colonel THROCKMORTON. If I may go back, General: Colonel Phillips as the General's representative in the G-3's office, awaiting Colonel Phillip Hayes' departure as Chief of Staff. Colonel Hayes' department was delayed somewhat, and for a considerable period of time; and during that period Colonel Adam E. Potts, who was the then G-1, left the Department headquarters, and I took over his job.

84. General FRANK. As what?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. As G-1; whereupon Colonel Phillips went up to become Chief of Staff, and one of my other assistants, Colonel William E. Donegan, became the G-3.

85. General FRANK. Was not Colonel Phillips G-3?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. He was, for a very short period of time, General. From the time I went into the G-1 office until Colonel Hayes left, he was G-3.

86. General FRANK. About how long?

[1406] Colonel THROCKMORTON. I would be guessing, sir; it would be about two months.

87. General FRANK. Will you proceed with the development of F. O. No. 1?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I do not believe I know just what the question is, General. Proceed with the development of it?

88. General FRANK. Yes. Or had you finished?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir; I thought I had completed the picture.

89. General GRUNERT. Then I will develop it somewhat. Field Order No. 1 that you considered just about the right time, but instead of having Field Order No. 1 the same standing operating procedures. Under Field Order No. 1 there three types of alert?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Three types of alert; yes, sir.

90. General GRUNERT. Suppose Field Order No. 1 had not existed and in force as of December 7: Would it have made any difference?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. It would not have affected the result made.

91. General FRANK. There would have been only one type of alert in effect, and therefore the aircraft would have been alerted to an attack.

92. General GRUNERT. That is what I expected his answer to be, but he told that under Field Order No. 1 there were three types of alert.

Colonel THROCKMORTON. As I remember the old field order, the first phase was that of alert; that is, sabotage alertness.

93. General FRANK. Are you sure about that?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. As I say, General, as I remember [1407] It has been a long time ago.

94. General GRUNERT. Then you do not recall the S. O. 1 that brought three kinds of alert into existence. We were given to understand that formerly there was one type of alert, and one on which there was no sabotage, no air, no surface; it was all just one alert, and we were to be ready for business. Then they came along with three types of alert. You do not know just when they came in, do you?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. This is the first thought that I have on this particular question for a long time, General. I hate to talk about things that I do not remember and am not too sure of; but you have brought up the point, there was a phase in the field order. I believe it was the white phase—which had to do with protection against riots and that sort of thing. So that what you say may be true, sir. It had been so long ago that I do not remember.

The reason that I brought the point up of changing Field Order No. 1 was because at that particular time I thought it was a bad change over when everyone was familiar and indoctrinated with Field Order No. 1. It seemed quite a useless thing to do.

95. General GRUNERT. Now, taking a square division and two triangular divisions of it—that did not seem to make any difference as far as just what happened on December 7 was concerned, did it?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. No, sir; I cannot say that it did.

General GRUNERT. Again, these shifts in the general staff: Was there any ill feeling about the shifts taking place? Was the staff divided and working staff, or did it have a few cliques in it and a bitterness? I am just wondering [1408] whether that was actually the fact, or not.

Colonel THROCKMORTON. There was no feeling on my part when Colonel Banks was interchanged with me, and I am sure that there was none on his part. We both agreed that it was just "one of those things", and we made no attempt to try to figure out why.

General GRUNERT. Was it General Short's policy to switch his general staff heads periodically?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. No, sir; not as a routine matter, not as a matter of education of individuals.

General GRUNERT. I gather from what you have told us that you brought with him one Phillips whom he was going to place, presumably later on, as chief of staff, and he eventually did so?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. And in the meantime he used him as assistant G-3?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. That is correct, sir.

Q. General GRUNERT. And then when the opportunity came he made him Chief of Staff?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir.

A. General GRUNERT. Would you care to express your opinion on Phillips as Chief of Staff as compared with other chiefs of staff for whom you have served?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I never at any time, General, felt that Colonel Phillips was qualified to perform those important duties. I felt that he neither had the temperament nor the sense of judgment, perhaps, the basic knowledge; and I am frank to say that I did not have a great deal of respect for him in his capacity as chief of staff, as compared with Colonel [1409] Hayes and others of my acquaintance.

Q. General FRANK. Who had been chiefs of staff?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Who had been chiefs of staff; yes, sir.

A. General FRANK. The fact has not come out yet that General Short started after, which is this: Was that general staff a happy one?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I would say it was, General, for the most part. Of course, on every staff you have little differences of opinion, but they are just a daily routine. There was nothing deep-rooted, as far as I am a member. When Colonel Hayes was Chief of Staff he insisted that we get along, and I think we did. I think we harmonized beautifully, and I think Colonel Hayes will feel that way. Such disharmony as existed under Phillips I do not think was of a serious enough nature to have affected what happened on December 7. I mean, it was not to the extent that anyone failed to give cooperation, and so on.

Q. General GRUNERT. Did the cooperation of the Navy suffer, or was there any change from the time that Phillips took over as commander with when Hayes was in there?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I had very little, if any, opportunity I was G-1 to observe the relationship between the Navy and Army staffs. I can speak only of when I was G-3, and there was complete liaison between our G-3 office and the office of the Navy. There was a time when considerable effort was to be brought to get the Navy to sit down at a table and actually put the framework of the joint agreement into it, then get Admiral Bloch to sign it. Captain Gill—I do not know his first name or [1410] middle initial—was the Officer.

105. General FRANK. For the Fourteenth Naval District?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir. I felt many times that related to the extent that one day General Herron asked me to go to get the joint agreement signed, and I told him many times I had been down, and that the next time that I went to make the proposal that the Army write the agreement and submit it to the Navy to see if we could not hasten this, I made the proposal to Captain Gill he was delighted. I wrote the agreement without the aid of the Navy and I and, with just a few minor changes, Admiral Bloch signed it. General Herron having signed it previously.

106. General GRUNERT. In thorough agreement with?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir.

107. General GRUNERT. It was not a question of different terms, but just a question of somebody doing the work.

Colonel THROCKMORTON. That was the idea.

108. General FRANK. Did the Army on its own initiative make provision in that joint agreement to turn all its heavy equipment over to the Navy?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. That was approved by the Commander.

109. General FRANK. The Army did that on its own initiative or ever went to the Navy?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. There had been a long period of discussion about the provisions of the joint agreement, and when it was written it was written to conform with what all concerned have agreed upon. The Navy was rather hard [1411] to get anything out of in those days, General.

110. General GRUNERT. Have you any knowledge of the information received from Naval Intelligence? You had G-2 or had any connection with them?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. No, sir; I have no knowledge.

111. General GRUNERT. What did the staff think of Colonel the G-2?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I can only speak for myself. I felt that they had a better G-2 in Colonel Marsden than in Colonel Fielder.

112. General GRUNERT. Tell us about Colonel Donegan, G-3 at the time the attack took place and shortly before. Would he be a good source of information for the Board?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I think he will be a very good source.

113. General GRUNERT. Marsden was G-4. You thought of him, did you?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Very highly.

4. General GRUNERT. You knew them both quite intimately, did not?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I knew all the members of the staff rather intimately.

5. General GRUNERT. Did you know one Colonel Wyman, District Engineer, intimately?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir; I did.

6. General RUSSELL. Did you know the Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir; I knew him quite well.

7. General RUSSELL. Did you rate him along with Marsden?

412] Colonel THROCKMORTON. I thought he was a capable man. I would not rate him with Marsden.

8. General RUSSELL. A safe, sound fellow?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I think so; yes, sir. I think he made Marsden an excellent assistant.

9. General RUSSELL. As G-2?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. As Assistant G-2. He stayed on with Fielder, after Fielder took over.

10. General GRUNERT. Do you think of anything else that might be at the Board, now that we have opened up your mind a little bit and there?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. General, those are the only two items that I feel morally obliged to report to the Board, those that I have told about.

11. General GRUNERT. There appears to be no more questions. We thank you very much.

The witness was excused with the usual admonition)

3] **TESTIMONY OF COLONEL GEORGE W. BICKNELL, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, G-2, M. I. S.; WASHINGTON, D. C.**

The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights (per Article of War 24.)

Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel BICKNELL. George W. Bicknell, Colonel, Military Intelligence. My present station is G-2, M. I. S., Washington.

General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is after facts and leads in this matter, and from one thing in the report of the Roberts Commission here, I decided that I wanted to ask you on that subject. There may be others, as they develop, and I hope you can give us some leads. This particular thing referred to the time that you were Assistant of the Hawaiian Department. Were you such?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes.

General GRUNERT. Between what dates?

Colonel BICKNELL. I was Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department in charge of counter intelligence, from October 1940 until April

General GRUNERT. And, just prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, and following, and shortly after that, who was your immediate chief?

Colonel BICKNELL. Colonel Fielder, Department G-2.

5. General GRUNERT. There is shown, here, in the Roberts Commission statement to the effect that Lt. Col. Bicknell, Assistant Chief of the Hawaiian Department, informed the staff, at a meeting on December 6, 1941, that the Japs were burning papers on December 6, saying it meant to him [1414] that war was imminent. Do you recall that testimony that you gave to the Roberts Commission?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

6. General GRUNERT. Now, as to that, tell us about what was at that staff meeting—who was present, and just what was the information, and what happened about that information, if any.

Colonel BICKNELL. There was a practice in the Hawaiian Department of General Short's having a meeting of his entire staff and his special staff, every Saturday morning, at which time any information or of interest that had occurred during the week were brought up for discussion for the benefit of the staff. General Short did not attend those meetings, but his Chief of Staff, Mr. Phillips, officiated, and on that morning of December 6 I made the statement that I had received information to the effect that the Japanese consuls were burning their papers; and to me that was a serious intent; it would at least show that something was going to happen, somewhere.

That statement was made before all of the staff officers were present. What happened to it, after that, I don't know.

General GRUNERT. Was your immediate chief the Chief of Staff, Mr. Phillips?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

8. General GRUNERT. Did he discuss it with you after that? Did he go into it, do you know, as to whether or not what you said was a fact, or had anything to back it up?

Colonel BICKNELL. Not to my recollection.

9. General GRUNERT. Was there any discussion of it which took place in the staff meeting?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

10. General GRUNERT. Then it was just a routine report which apparently was not taken seriously at the time?

Colonel BICKNELL. It was just that—just a routine report.

11. General GRUNERT. No one said, "We burn papers, why shouldn't the Japanese consul burn any papers"?

Colonel BICKNELL. Didn't raise any discussion; no, sir.

12. General GRUNERT. Can you give us any more of the information into just what that information was that you got? Were the papers were they burning? Who found them burning? So forth?

Colonel BICKNELL. The information came to me through the staff.

13. General GRUNERT. From whom, in the FBI?

Colonel BICKNELL. The Chief of the—a special agent in charge of the FBI in Honolulu, Mr. Shivers, out there.

14. General GRUNERT. Mr. Shivers gave you that information?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

15. General GRUNERT. Why did he give it to you and not to the Chief of Staff?

Colonel BICKNELL. Because the set-up was that I handled all matters pertaining to counter-intelligence. They were handled by me, we had our offices—

6. General GRUNERT. Did Mr. Shivers express himself as to what he thought the intent or the seriousness of this was?

Colonel BICKNELL. Well, he made the same statement to me that I made, that this looked as though something was about [1416] happen pretty soon.

7. General GRUNERT. And did you tell him that you were going to take it up with the staff?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

8. General GRUNERT. Did he afterwards ask you what happened when you took it up with them, or didn't it come up again?

Colonel BICKNELL. I don't think that came up again. That ended

9. General GRUNERT. All right. Are there any questions on that particular phase?

10. General RUSSELL. Did you talk to Colonel Fielder about this report from the FBI before you went to the staff meeting?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

11. General RUSSELL. Did you talk to him after you came back?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

12. General RUSSELL. Was your office with Fielder?

Colonel BICKNELL. My office was not located physically with Colonel Fielder's. Mine was located down-town in the same building with the [redacted], in adjoining offices, and all of our counter-intelligence activities were handled in that downtown office, commonly known in those days as the "contact office," and was not at Department headquarters.

13. General FRANK. Did you wear a uniform, or civilian clothes?

Colonel BICKNELL. Civilian clothes.

14. General RUSSELL. Did you come immediately from your downtown office to this staff meeting?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

15. General RUSSELL. So there was no occasion for you to [redacted] talk to Colonel Fielder about it?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

16. General RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not the burning of papers by the Japanese people in their consulate was something unusual?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

17. General RUSSELL. And with no evidence prior thereto of their burning papers?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

18. General RUSSELL. That is all.

19. General GRUNERT. On another occasion, did you take a message to General Short, something similar to this message, to his office?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

20. General GRUNERT. Tell us about that occasion, and what happened.

Colonel BICKNELL. About 4 o'clock on Saturday afternoon, December 6, Mr. Shivers, of the FBI, telephoned to me at my home and that he had something of immediate importance, and asked me

to come to town as soon as possible. I went to Honolulu. I did not even stop to change clothes.

31. General FRANK. Where did you live?

Colonel BICKNELL. At Aiea Heights. And Mr. S gave me a transcript of a telephone conversation which had taken place between one Doctor Mori, a Japanese dentist in Honolulu, and a respondent of a newspaper in Tokyo. This telephone conversation took place in Tokyo, and Mrs. Mori, Doctor Mori's wife, was present at the talking. This call had been intercepted by the Japanese, and was transcribed on records, and had taken place some time during the early morning of December 5. The records had been translated from Japanese into English, and finally transcribed, and that had not been completed until Saturday afternoon.

This conversation, to me, was very irregular and suspicious. They asked questions regarding the flying of planes that day. They asked whether or not any planes were flying, whether the searchlights were turned on during the attack, and how many soldiers were seen around town. Were there any in Pearl Harbor? and many other points. I don't remember them at the present time. And then suddenly in the conversation the party in Tokyo asked Mrs. Mori, "Were the hibiscus blooming in Hawaii, today?" Mrs. Mori said, "No, the poinsettias." Then there was considerable discussion by the party in Tokyo as to how poinsettias could be blooming in Hawaii. They could not understand the hibiscus, but the poinsettias were a very strange thing to them.

Then the conversation went on with more details regarding the weather; and after reading this message it was impossible to properly evaluate it. I just received it. Just from my conversation it sounded to me as though there was something very significant in this; so I phoned to Colonel Fielder, it then being about 10 o'clock, and told him that it was very necessary that I come to the office with General Short, immediately, that I had some information that was considered to be of the utmost importance.

Colonel Fielder called me back and said that he and General Short were going to dinner to Schofield Barracks, and that they were all ready to go, and the thing had better be done tomorrow; and I stated that I thought it was too important to wait until tomorrow, I had to see them, right now! So I went, and I told that if I could get out there in ten minutes, they would wait, and I made it in ten minutes, and I handed this message to General Short, and Colonel Fielder also read it; and I stated that I could not evaluate the message, it was new, but it was suspicious, and it had to me every indication that someone was blowing in the wind, "in the wind," I didn't have any idea what, but from an angle I did feel that the message did have some portents, and that we were not able at the moment either to unravel or decide.

Both Colonel Fielder and General Short seemed to feel that it was rather perhaps too "intelligence conscious," and that this was quite, quite in order, that it did describe the situation in Hawaii, and that possibly there was nothing very much to be learned about in the content of the message; and that was all that I thought of it.

2. General GRUNERT. In the hearing before the House on the resolution which called for investigation by the Army and Navy, if I recall it correctly, there was a statement made that when this message was delivered to General Short's house there was a party going and that General Short "cussed out" the messenger and practically threw him out. Is there any truth in that?

Colonel BICKNELL. That is absolutely untrue.

3. General GRUNERT. How long was this message? Was it of considerable length?

Colonel BICKNELL. It was of some considerable length. [1420] I don't remember exactly the length, but I, off-hand, would say that it ran about, if I am not mistaken, five or six pages of double-space rewriting.

4. General GRUNERT. Did General Short and Colonel Fielder go into a huddle, to discuss each part of this message?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

5. General GRUNERT. Or did they look at it in a hurry and then "eat it" to their party?

Colonel BICKNELL. They read it through. General Short said that he thought it was quite an ordinary message, he didn't see that there was anything very bad about it; and then they handed it back to me, and went their way.

6. General GRUNERT. At any time afterwards, before the attack occurred, was that message called for again, and examined, or studied?

Colonel BICKNELL. Not to my knowledge; and I had it with me.

7. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions on that phase?

General RUSSELL. I have two or three.

Did you and General Short and Colonel Fielder go over to Fielder's house to look at that message, or where did you go, to look at it?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir; we went to General Short's house.

I beg your pardon—it was Colonel Fielder's house, because they lived next door; and General Short came to Colonel Fielder's house.

9. General RUSSELL. Oh, Short came over to Fielder's house, didn't he?

Colonel BICKNELL. They are right side-by-side, the [1421] houses of them.

10. General RUSSELL. The three of you did not get together and go over to Fielder's office, at headquarters, and talk about it?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

11. General RUSSELL. How long did the conference last, in which this message was considered, Colonel?

Colonel BICKNELL. The actual telephone conversation?

12. General RUSSELL. No. After you got in touch with Fielder and Fielder, how long did you people consider this message, before they handed it back to you and went their way?

Colonel BICKNELL. Oh, maybe five minutes.

13. General RUSSELL. Not over five minutes?

Colonel BICKNELL. I shouldn't say so.

14. General RUSSELL. You were very closely in touch with the FBI?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

15. General RUSSELL. You were then the military representative of the War Department to whom messages from the FBI would have been sent?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

46. General RUSSELL. And you were in there for some months to December 7?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

47. General RUSSELL. You were there in that connection, in contact with the Army?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

48. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, consider carefully this. Tell us whether or not, prior to December 7, you [14] received from the representatives of the FBI other messages of information which the FBI had intercepted on telephone or in Japan—stolen information from telephone calls.

Colonel BICKNELL. To the best of my knowledge, I can't think of but one other instance, and that did not in any way enter into the national security picture. It was simply on an individual suspect, where some information had been picked up from an intercepted telephone conversation.

49. General RUSSELL. Do you remember a message which came from the Hawaiian Department some time after the attack on Pearl Harbor which there were certain signs and symbols that the Japanese were using?

Colonel BICKNELL. That was not a telephone message, that was a radio message. That was a message that we seized on the morning of December 7, after the war had started. I went down and commandeered the files of the Radio Corporation of America, and I found messages which had been sent by the Japanese consul to Japan, and all messages he had received from Japan, and a sheaf, a large number of radio messages, all in code, which I retained. Those were taken out to the Field Intelligence Center. The one which he had made some progress on breaking the Japanese code of those messages was the one to which you refer, in which there was mention of the same case that I mentioned before, the case of Kuhn, where Kuhn had arranged this system of prearranged messages which he had given to the Japanese consulate, and they had transmitted it to Japan, as a suggestion from Kuhn as to what information could be sent from the Island.

50. General FRANK. To whom?

[1423] Colonel BICKNELL. To anyone offshore.

51. General FRANK. Who was Kuhn?

Colonel BICKNELL. Otto Kuhn is the German who is now in life imprisonment on this case, an espionage case; a German agent, down there at Lanikai.

52. General FRANK. Was he a citizen?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir. But that didn't come from the Army. That came through the messages which were intercepted of messages which the Japanese had sent, and it was decoded by the Navy Intelligence people.

53. General RUSSELL. Colonel, all of these messages in that you are talking about now were messages that had been previously, of which copies had been retained by the Japanese, destroyed, and you seized them after the war started?

Colonel BICKNELL. We got some of those that we grabbed also subpoenaed or demanded the actual carbon copies of the messages and file with the Radio Corporation of America which had been

ted for the Japanese; so that we had not only those in the material
ch came from the Japanese consulate, and in which we found a por-
of a code book; there was enough material to add to what the
y already had to make possible the decipherment of these messages.

4. General RUSSELL. Where are those messages now, do you
w?

Colonel BICKNELL. There is quite a file of them. The FBI has a
plete file.

5. General FRANK. Where?

Colonel BICKNELL. The OWI has a complete file, too.

1424] 56. General FRANK. Where, in the FBI Department?

Colonel BICKNELL. I imagine they have them here, sir. We also
e them. They were in my files in Honolulu when I left.

7. General RUSSELL. Do you think we should be able to get our
ds on those translated messages when we get out there?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir; yes, sir.

8. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, so far as you know, however,
I go back to that question, this one message here is the only one
t had been delivered to you by the FBI prior to the attack on
ember 7?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

9. General RUSSELL. Will you glance over the message, a copy of
ch I have just handed you, and identify that, if possible, as the
sage about which you have testified, or state that it is not that
sage?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir; I think this is the message.

10. General RUSSELL. Did you tell General Short what you thought
message meant?

Colonel BICKNELL. I told him, sir, that I couldn't evaluate the
sage. I had the paper in my hand.

11. General RUSSELL. I believe you testified that you could not.
ow, in the light of the subsequent history out there, referring to
conversation about "flowers," have you reached any conclusions
o what might have been meant by the two types of flowers that
e blooming there, and the expression of surprise by the man in
homeland as to one type of flower being in bloom?

1425] Colonel BICKNELL. I have reached a theory, as it might
alled. I don't think we will ever know the answer, unless, after
war is over, we get the story from the Japanese; but one "hypoth-
' I might call it, hit me in the eye, and the thing that impressed
more than anything else were these "poinsettias" and "hibiscus."
wife tells me that, on the morning of December 7, when I stood
he lanai, watching this attack, she asked me, the next time I saw
some week later, she said, "What in the world were you mumb-
about these 'poinsettias and hibiscus' while all this fighting was
g on?" It suddenly came to me—again, this has nothing to base
I, but the fact that the "poinsettias" and the "hibiscus" might have
types of "ships". The cruisers were all in, that morning, or a
e proportion of the cruisers were in, as well as the battleships, but
carriers were present. Now, a Navy man might say, "Why are
e cruisers there, and no carrier? It doesn't make sense." That
perhaps to some extent corroborated by the information which
contained in the submarine data which was obtained after this

submarine had been sunk at Pearl Harbor, in which they had made observations on their chart, their observations that they had taken, and it confirmed the fact that no carriers were in Pearl Harbor on the morning of the attack.

As I say, that is simply a thought, there is nothing that I can put it up to and say it is true, but that thought did run through my mind.

62. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, this transcript of the telephone conversation has written on it, with red pencil, here:

[1426] Of December 3, 1941, between a citizen in Honolulu and a military or a naval officer in Tokyo; translated, and available to military, until * December 5, 1944.

There is something there that is illegible.

Now, this attack occurred on the morning of the 7th, and this conversation took place on December 3; is that true?

Colonel BICKNELL. That I won't say. I don't remember enough about it to be sure of the dates.

63. General RUSSELL. You cannot identify it? That would be about four days?

Colonel BICKNELL. Four days.

64. General RUSSELL. That is, between the date of this and the time the planes arrived at Honolulu?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

65. General RUSSELL. Colonel, without divulging any of the secret means used to get this message, would you explain to the Board why this type of message, which now seems to have been a very important one, should have been selected and picked up? Was it a matter of accident, in the operations, out there?

Colonel BICKNELL. You mean the actual picking up of that particular message?

66. General RUSSELL. Yes. Were there other messages, and was this selected by the FBI because they considered it more pertinent material than other messages?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir; I think that that was due to the fact that they were just getting into a position where they were technically able to do it. This was one of the first really successful intercepts of that type.

67. General RUSSELL. Had they been making efforts prior thereto, to intercept those messages? [1427]

Colonel BICKNELL. Such efforts had been made; yes, sir.

68. General RUSSELL. Thereafter, between December 3 and December 7, 1941, no other important message was picked up?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

69. General RUSSELL. Were those efforts continued, from December 3 on to December 7?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir; not only that, but I also supplemented them with my own; and I am positive that nothing came out of the consulate by talking, from that date on.

70. General RUSSELL. A lot of this message, as a matter of fact, Colonel, was perfectly inane, innocuous, and meaningless?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir. There is one part that it might be of interest to bear in mind about that message. I think that General Short asked me about that, afterward, and that was the fact that I brought out, that this message, this conversation, took place between

yo and Hawaii. I reminded the General that that was quite true, that this message was also "scrambled," but the Japanese had the "scrambler" in Tokyo to "unscramble" this commercial message, and there is no reason to believe that they didn't have another "unscrambler" aboard any task force that might be in the vicinity, which was perfectly able to intercept that message and withdraw from it any information which would be of use to them.

1. General RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not there have been other studies made of this message, except the one made by you, in effort to determine what it meant?

Colonel BICKNELL. I don't believe there are, sir; not to my knowledge.

1428] 72. General RUSSELL. I want to identify for the purpose the record this message about which we have questioned the Colonel. (Discussion off the record.)

1429] 73. General FRANK. Are you through?

General RUSSELL. Yes.

4. General FRANK. Was this conversation radio or cable?

Colonel BICKNELL. Radio telephone.

5. General FRANK. Radio telephone?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

6. General FRANK. It could have been picked up, then, by stations less distance from Honolulu than Tokyo?

Colonel BICKNELL. True.

7. General FRANK. Following the attack was this message evaluated further to tie into the attack? You said you talked to General Hart about it another time?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, we talked about the message, and he said, "Well, Bicknell, you couldn't prove anything by that, that it meant something."

"Well," I said, "I still can't prove anything by it. I can't prove anything now, and we never will be able to."

8. General FRANK. You never did evaluate the message fully?

Colonel BICKNELL. Couldn't. There wasn't any—enough to be sure; no, sir.

9. General FRANK. Yes. Now, down there in your capacity as a staff officer did you ever run across a Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel BICKNELL. Oh, yes.

10. General FRANK. Did you ever determine whether Rohl knew German Kuhn or not?

Colonel BICKNELL. He did not know him.

11. General FRANK. He did not know him?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

12. General FRANK. What is the story on the information that you got on Rohl?

1430] Colonel BICKNELL. To the best of all the investigations we carried out on Rohl, plus those that the F. B. I. carried out in Hawaii, Rohl was a no-good drunkard but had committed no subversive acts that we could discover, or took no subversive action at all. He was badly mixed up in irregularities, and the case was turned over by me to the Inspector General for handling in his office, as it was not a subversive case.

13. General FRANK. What kind of irregularities?

Colonel BICKNELL. Mostly financial, together with a Engineer and the contractors, and all mixed up in funny b

84. General FRANK. Did you ever run across a Werner Colonel BICKNELL. Werner Plack? I don't remember.

85. General FRANK. P-l-a-c-k.

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir; I don't remember.

86. General FRANK. If he had shown up in the investigations, would there be a record of him in Honolulu?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir; he would be in the card file.

87. General FRANK. You stated that Rohl's drinking acti well known to you?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

88. General FRANK. Did you know Wyman?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

89. General FRANK. What was his reputation with drinking?

Colonel BICKNELL. I never knew at any time of Colonel General Wyman ever being addicted to drinking.

90. General FRANK. Not Lyman.

Colonel BICKNELL. Wyman.

91. General FRANK. Wyman?

[1431] Colonel BICKNELL. Yes; Ted Wyman.

92. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, your assignmen cipally to do with civilian activities?

Colonel BICKNELL. Civilian and subversive activity; ye

93. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel BICKNELL. The only dealings I ever had wit Wyman when we—

94. General FRANK. Colonel Wyman.

Colonel BICKNELL. Colonel Wyman at that time.—suspe aging of a dredge down there. That was the only time I ca tact with him.

95. General FRANK. What did you find out about that?

Colonel BICKNELL. Well, he ordered us off the job an wouldn't have any G-2 investigation of it.

96. General FRANK. Colonel Wyman?

Colonel BICKNELL. That is right.

97. General FRANK. Who directed you to go on the job?

Colonel BICKNELL. I went on the job because it was sabo fell under our jurisdiction for subversive activities.

98. General FRANK. Well, did you go to Department he to get authority to go back on again?

Colonel BICKNELL. I reported it to the Department head

99. General FRANK. To whom in Department headqua

Colonel BICKNELL. Fielder. Colonel Fielder.

100. General FRANK. What was done about it?

Colonel BICKNELL. The matter was referred to Washi

101. General FRANK. And what happened to it?

Colonel BICKNELL. Eventually two months later w [1432] case back and we were told to reopen it, and we it was too late, too cold; we couldn't do anything two mo ward.

02. General GRUNERT. Why was it necessary to refer that case to Washington?

Colonel BICKNELL. Because the Department Engineer——

03. General GRUNERT. District Engineer?

Colonel BICKNELL. —was not under the jurisdiction of the Department commander.

04. General FRANK. I have nothing further.

General GRUNERT. I have one more subject here:

The Board heard something about a report that you are alleged to have made or information gathered about certain social activities in Honolulu or the Hawaiian Department which, so far as I can hear, you were going to send to the United States, but you had trouble in getting it out of the Department. What is that all about?

Colonel BICKNELL. I don't quite understand, sir.

05. General GRUNERT. Unless my information is not accurate, I understand that there was some sort of a report on social activities in Honolulu or the Hawaiian Department that you attempted to get out; why, I don't know, but you had trouble in getting it out, and finally mailed it to yourself and in that way got it out. What is that all about, or is that news to you?

Colonel BICKNELL. That is a brand new one to me, never heard of before.

06. General GRUNERT. Then we shall drop this question. I know nothing else about it, but your name was mentioned as probably being one. You know nothing about it?

1433] Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

07. General GRUNERT. Well, neither do I.

Are there any other questions?

08. General FRANK. Do you know anything as to whether Rohl's was of intoxicating liquor incapacitated him to do his work?

Colonel BICKNELL. It did.

09. General FRANK. It did?

Colonel BICKNELL. There were many days I tried to get him at the office; we couldn't even get him out of the hotel; he was just——

10. General GRUNERT. Well, did that stop the work or delay the work, or just incapacitate him personally?

Colonel BICKNELL. That incapacitated him personally. As to what it did——

11. General GRUNERT. But the work went on apparently?

Colonel BICKNELL. The work went on.

12. General GRUNERT. As far as you know.

13. Major CLAUSEN. General Frank has asked that I ask a few questions.

When did you first receive that information?

Colonel BICKNELL. Which information?

14. Major CLAUSEN. About Rohl's drinking.

Colonel BICKNELL. Oh, this case came up early in '42, I believe, when we got on Rohl's trail for—I can't remember the dates, but when he finally got—he had made the statement that he was an American citizen, and I asked the F. B. I. to check the veracity of that statement. We found that he was not an American citizen, and then shortly thereafter that his citizenship did come through in San Francisco, and I had to get him into the office to have talks with him, and that was

when I ran into [1434] this difficulty about his cause he just was in no condition to get him in anywhere.

115. General FRANK. Where did he live?

Colonel BICKNELL. He lived out at the Moana Hotel.

116. Major CLAUSEN. Did you see him before the 7th of December?

Colonel BICKNELL. Never even knew the man before December.

117. Major CLAUSEN. And the information you had about him being a citizen was received after?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir. It came up in the course of looking up on all Germans to see what their status was as it started.

118. Major CLAUSEN. Had you known theretofore that he was German?

Colonel BICKNELL. I knew that he was either a naturalized citizen or was—I knew he was German born.

119. Major CLAUSEN. Did he talk with a German accent?

Colonel BICKNELL. I don't think I ever heard him talk with an accent. I don't know what accent he had. He was usually pretty well-mannered under the influence when I did see him, and I didn't notice anything at that time.

120. Major CLAUSEN. During, extending over what period of time was he in this drunken condition?

Colonel BICKNELL. Oh, he didn't go out for a week or more of time.

121. General FRANK. After December 7th?

Colonel BICKNELL. Oh, yes.

122. Major CLAUSEN. And this was over what period of time?

Colonel BICKNELL. Oh, I should say we were in that condition [1435] the case for a matter of a couple months.

123. Major CLAUSEN. And during that whole time he was in that condition?

Colonel BICKNELL. Well, he wasn't in that condition the entire time, but there would be spells of a week or so where maybe a week he would be all right, but most of my information about him came through one of the local contractors who was connected with Rohl, and I would ask him in what condition he was and whether it was worth while calling him up, and he would say yes or no.

124. General FRANK. Who was that?

Colonel BICKNELL. Ralph Woolley.

125. Major CLAUSEN. Did this condition continue throughout the period of the same two months after the 7th of December?

Colonel BICKNELL. That was the time that I was interested in that it was so.

126. Major CLAUSEN. Did you make a report to the committee concerning it?

Colonel BICKNELL. Did what?

127. Major CLAUSEN. Did you make a report to your committee concerning the drinking?

Colonel BICKNELL. No reason to.

28. General FRANK. Didn't he head up the Hawaiian Construction?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes.

29. General FRANK. He was responsible for their getting the work?

Colonel BICKNELL. The work was going on. It was not dependent on Rohl's ability to do any work as to whether the job progressed or not. He had plenty of other people there [1436] that were working on the work.

30. Major CLAUSEN. Did you meet a Colonel Hunt of the I. G. when he made an investigation in Hawaii?

Colonel BICKNELL. I don't remember that name.

31. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

32. General GRUNERT. Anything further? (No response.)

Is there anything that occurs to you that you can tell the Board as to throw more light on the situation in Hawaii prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack that might give us leads or give us more information on the subject? In other words, something in your mind that you can tell us that we have not brought out by our questions?

[1437] Colonel BICKNELL. I think there is one thought that should be borne in mind throughout as having a great bearing on our activities in Hawaii, that being the fact that we had a very limited view of this entire picture, and the only picture that we could draw of the larger international situation was what meager bits of information we could pick up from sources in Hawaii or sources coming to Hawaii; and to make any evaluation of a situation as serious as this without the benefit of at least all of the story which was available in Washington was an extremely difficult job.

33. General GRUNERT. Then, I assume that you didn't get periodic information from G-2 sources in Washington that would assist you in your work; is that a correct assumption?

Colonel BICKNELL. There was never enough information from Washington as to what was going on in the other theaters other than in the Hawaiian theater. We had very little that came to us on activities in Manila, that is, the intelligence activities.

34. General GRUNERT. What information would you have liked to have had if you could have said, Give me information on this or that?

Colonel BICKNELL. I would have liked to have known more information about the sudden cessation of Japanese shipping in the Pacific.

35. General GRUNERT. Whereabouts particularly in the Pacific?

Colonel BICKNELL. We knew, of course, that they were not coming to Hawaii, but I would like to have known whether or not the Japanese shipping to South America had either stopped [1438] entirely or had diminished or was discontinued.

36. General GRUNERT. Did it ever occur to you that you might want that if you asked for it?

Colonel BICKNELL. I think that request was made.

37. General GRUNERT. Through Fielder?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir. That request was made by the F. B. I.

38. General GRUNERT. To their F. B. I. sources here, presumably?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

139. General GRUNERT. To their F. B. I. sources in Colonel BICKNELL. There is one great advantage in this F. B. I. business in Hawaii that might give a little of our activities.

140. General FRANK. One advantage or disadvantage Colonel BICKNELL. One great advantage, was the fact the F. B. I. came to Hawaii in '39 I was then in civilian still greatly interested in G-2 from the last war, and I Mr. Shivers on the establishment of his outfit down there very gracious in taking the suggestions as to the method of his system in Hawaii, and I worked on the basis that came it would be absolutely imperative that we be able to have coordination between the investigative agencies of the Government, the F. B. I., and O. N. I.; and going on duty in 1940 a series of weekly conferences that were attended every District Intelligence Officer of the Navy, by Mr. Shivers and myself; and all of the [1439] information as to methods of obtaining information and all the plans were between the three agencies long before there was any discussion of hostilities coming out to Hawaii.

It was done so completely that even our plans for the suspect aliens and Japanese had been completed and was sent to Washington, early in November under three alt Plan 3 was put into effect at 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 7th and was completed by midnight. The contact office had been placed physically in the same building with the other in adjacent offices, and with the declaration of martial law became a portion of our Intelligence. Under martial law we turned part of G-2 to all intents and purposes, their people worked for me, and we immediately augmented our counterintelligence staff by taking over the F. B. I. in toto. So that it was possible to get more information through the F. B. I. than they had almost daily telephone conversations with us, and if we wanted something in a hurry it was possible to get the F. B. I. to call Washington and get it by phone, where radio circuits were so cluttered up that if we sent a radio message we got an answer for three or four days.

141. General FRANK. Did the Army ever give you any information after you asked for it?

Colonel BICKNELL. Well, we didn't get any great amount of information that we could find. There is a record in Hawaii; I believe it is in the November in my weekly intelligence summary: the [144] decision was made that from all information which had been received in our office in Hawaii it looked as though hostilities could break out either by the end of November or, if not, then not until spring.

142. General GRUNERT. That evaluated information was given to your Chief?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

143. General GRUNERT. Did he make an estimate and send it to the Commanding General; do you know?

Colonel BICKNELL. I don't know, sir. I know that it was I made those weekly summaries, which were mimeographed.

There were some forty copies distributed to the Army, the Navy, and F. B. I.

44. General GRUNERT. Those were your personal summaries, or did anyone else collaborate with you in making such summaries?

Colonel BICKNELL. They were the collaboration of my officers and noncommissioned officers. I had one noncommissioned officer who had a great deal of experience with Japanese and spoke the language fluently. I had two Japanese officers who were very good. I also had this information was always worked out in collaboration with the F. B. I.

45. General FRANK. How many civilians did you have working in your office for you?

Colonel BICKNELL. You mean civilians as such?

46. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel BICKNELL. Or C. I. G., men in civilian clothes?

47. General FRANK. No; I am talking about civilians now, first.

1441] Colonel Bicknell. Oh, about eight.

48. General FRANK. How many military personnel, total, did you have working for you in your counter-intelligence work?

Colonel BICKNELL. In December, on the morning of December 7th I believe I had 39.

49. General FRANK. That made a total, civilian and military of?

Colonel BICKNELL. 47.

50. General FRANK. 47.

Colonel BICKNELL. 48. That figure later went up to around 125.

51. General GRUNERT. That appears to close the subject, unless you can remember something else that you think might help us.

Colonel BICKNELL. I think that perhaps a careful examination of the G-2 files or the counter-intelligence files in Hawaii might be of some help while.

52. General GRUNERT. And how much of a job would that be?

Colonel BICKNELL. I don't know the condition of the files now, but I could say it would probably be maybe three or four hours' work.

53. General RUSSELL. Where would these files be, Colonel?

Colonel BICKNELL. They would be in the Dillingham Building.

54. General RUSSELL. Downtown?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

55. General RUSSELL. They would not be at the G-2 office in Hawaii?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

56. General RUSSELL. Do you know who is out there operating in that office now?

Colonel BICKNELL. I believe there is a Major Meurlott, M-e-u-r-l-o-t.

57. General RUSSELL. How long would it take to go through them if you had them? Are there a lot of them? That is what I was after.

Colonel BICKNELL. A lot of them. Practically all of the information that is in those files, of importance, is also in the F. B. I. files. I don't know whether you have access to those.

58. General RUSSELL. That is all I have to ask.

59. General GRUNERT. There appear to be no more questions. Thank you very much, Colonel.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.
General GRUNERT. We have a letter from General Miles
of 18 August 1944, in reference to his testimony of 8
starting on page 91, which will be marked Exhibit No.

(Letter of August 18, 1944, from General Miles to General
was marked Exhibit No. 20, and received in evidence.)

(Addendum to General Miles' testimony will be found
132-A.)

(Thereupon, at 5:40 p. m., the Board concluded their
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

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4] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, president of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Sell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Jensen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL LOUIS W. TRUMAN, CHIEF OF STAFF,
84TH DIVISION, CAMP CLAIBORNE, LOUISIANA

The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights (per Article of War 24.)

Colonel WEST. Will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel TRUMAN. Louis W. Truman, Colonel, Chief of Staff, 84th Division, Camp Claiborne, Louisiana.

General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is after facts about what happened prior to and during the attack on Pearl Harbor, and we hope through your assignment at that time you may [1445] possibly give us some facts or give us some leads toward other facts.

What was your assignment while you were on duty in Hawaii in 1941?

Colonel TRUMAN. I was assigned as Aide to Lieutenant General Short. On the 1st of March, 1941. I arrived in Hawaii on the 28th of February, 1941, and from that time until the 28th of February, 1942, I was assigned as Aide-de-camp. I returned to the mainland with General Short on the 12th day of January, 1942.

General GRUNERT. Is it true that he always took you with him when he went to have conferences with the Navy?

Colonel TRUMAN. It is true, sir. I can remember no time that General Short went to a conference without my going along. I will not say, however, that I did not sit in on the conferences. I went with him to all Navy conferences and usually stayed out with the flag when he was enant.

General GRUNERT. Then you do not know what they conferred about?

Colonel TRUMAN. I do not, sir.

5. General GRUNERT. Where were these conferences u

Colonel TRUMAN. The conferences were held in Adm office at Pearl Harbor, as well as at Admiral Bloch's office

6. General GRUNERT. Their offices ashore?

Colonel TRUMAN. Their offices ashore; that is right, si

7. General GRUNERT. And you were not in on the conf [1446]

8. Colonel TRUMAN. I was not, sir.

General GRUNERT. Were you informed of what took conferences?

Colonel TRUMAN. Only one time, and that was wh planning a photographic mission over the Marshall Is

9. General GRUNERT. That was the only time he d you what took place at the conferences?

Colonel TRUMAN. That is correct, sir.

10. General GRUNERT. How frequent were those co you recall?

Colonel TRUMAN. I have been trying to remember would have to give an educated guess, because I have no v From the time that the radiogram was received, eithe or 28th of November—I do not remember the exact dat conferences held in Admiral Kimmel's office at which (attended and, as I remember, he took his G-3 or his (with him. These conferences, one in particular, I rem well over an hour. That was in Admiral Kimmel's pers remember that Captain Smith, the Chief of Staff of A mel, was in on that conference, as well as other officers.

11. General GRUNERT. Do you recall whether Genera there?

Colonel TRUMAN. I believe that he was; yes, sir. I b To the best of my recollection, I believe that he was, sir.

12. General GRUNERT. Was it your understanding tha ence was being held to discuss messages received eith by the Navy or General Short as to the situation over time?

Colonel TRUMAN. I cannot definitely state exactly v pose of the meeting was. It was my understanding at the that it was for the purpose of conferring on such a m But for me to state definitely that it was called for th cannot do that; I do not remember. It was my understar that they were conferring on that matter. I do not kno on inside the room, sir.

13. General GRUNERT. Do you recall how many conf of General Short with Admiral Kimmel or of Genera Admiral Bloch, were held after the November 27th con the date of the attack?

Colonel TRUMAN. For me to state definitely, sir, I c believe there was more than one; I believe there were But if I may state this: that when the Roberts Commis ing over there, Colonel Fleming and I sat down and pre ment for General Short, and in that statement are the dates that these conferences were held. I cannot state

ve there was more than one. I do not believe there were more three.

. General GRUNERT. Did General Short and Admiral Kimmel, or eral Short and Admiral Bloch, get together frequently, aside from e formal conferences?

olonel TRUMAN. Yes, sir. They played golf numerous times on day mornings.

. General GRUNERT. All three of them?

448] Colonel TRUMAN. At one time I believe Admiral Bloch Admiral Kimmel played golf with General Short. I am certain Admiral Bloch played golf with General Short on Sunday morn- more than once. I know that Admiral Kimmel played golf with eral Short on Sunday mornings, because I was a member of the some. The relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel e always friendly, and the same as far as Admiral Bloch was con- ed. As far as I can determine—and I have thought over it many s since then—there were never any strained relations between n; none whatsoever, sir, that I could determine.

. General GRUNERT. We had hoped that you knew something t what took place in those conferences; but apparently you do

olonel TRUMAN. No, sir; I do not.

. General GRUNERT. Is there anything relating to this matter that think might be of assistance to the Board or that you would like ring to the Board's attention?

olonel TRUMAN. The only thing that I can state, sir, is that as as I can determine, and as far as I know, there were no strained ions between the Army and Navy in Hawaii. I believe—this is own personal opinion—that they got together.

. General GRUNERT. Were you in a position to know to what nt they got together?

olonel TRUMAN. None more than I believe that had there been any ined relations I would certainly have known about it, sir.

. General GRUNERT. Outside of wanting to know, of course, 49] how they got along, we would like to know how much ing along was being done.

olonel TRUMAN. I cannot state that, sir; I do not know.

. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not they had fre- at conferences between the respective staffs?

olonel TRUMAN. They had a liaison officer over at Department dquarters practically all the time.

. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not they had fre- at or infrequent gatherings of the various members of the staff iscuss this or that?

olonel TRUMAN. It is my opinion that the gatherings were be- en General Short and Admiral Kimmel. With him, of course, at erent times was General Martin, the Air Commander over there,

. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything about a discussion took place, if one did take place, as to what type of alert to take result of this message of November 27?

olonel TRUMAN. There was a meeting in the office of the Chief of f around two-thirty on the day that that message was received.

At that time the members of the General Staff and Special there. I was present.

23. General FRANK. This was on Saturday?

Colonel TRUMAN. As soon as they received the message,

24. General GRUNERT. It was after the receipt of that n

Colonel TRUMAN. Yes, sir.

25. General GRUNERT. Was it after the conference had with the Navy?

Colonel TRUMAN. That, sir, I cannot say; I do not reme

[1450] 26. General GRUNERT. All right. Go ahead.

Colonel TRUMAN. The General and Special Staffs were the seriousness or, rather, of the strained relations, and at it was decided that Alert No. 1 would be put into effect.

27. General GRUNERT. Was General Short present at ference?

Colonel TRUMAN. I believe he was, sir. He might have l other room. Again I will have to state that it is rather h mind.

28. General GRUNERT. Was there a discussion about wha should be taken, or was it just an announcement of the deci

Colonel TRUMAN. An announcement of the decision, as I it, sir.

29. General GRUNERT. This staff meeting was an annou the decision?

Colonel TRUMAN. That is right, sir.

30. General FRANK. It was not a discussion as to should do?

Colonel TRUMAN. I believe they had a discussion before l sir. When I arrived they were giving their decision. there must have been a staff meeting before.

31. General GRUNERT. You do not know whether ther discussion about the type of alert?

Colonel TRUMAN. I am sure there was not, sir. I will ha that my knowledge of exactly what these meetings were with—I did not get in on any of them, except [1451] know that there were meetings held between the Army between General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and betwe Short and Admiral Bloch.

32. General FRANK. I would like to ask a couple of quest Admirals Kimmel and Bloch ever come over to Genei headquarters for conference?

Colonel TRUMAN. Yes, sir; reasonably frequently, sir. say once every week or two weeks. There were numerous t they came over to the Shafter headquarters, as well as Ger going over to Pearl Harbor to Admiral Bloch's and Adm mel's offices.

33. General FRANK. Who was the naval liaison officer ment Headquarters? Was it Lieutenant Burr?

Colonel TRUMAN. Yes, sir.

34. General FRANK. Did you know him?

Colonel TRUMAN. Reasonably well; yes, sir.

35. General FRANK. Was he an active, alert, "go-getti officer, or was his presence over there more in the nature c

Colonel TRUMAN. I do not believe it was token at all. When we were on the maneuvers he was quite active. I don't believe he was a deadhead."

General FRANK. He was sufficiently active so that he was alive with things that were happening to such an extent that you feel he would go out of his way to see that the Navy got everything that was opened at Department Headquarters?

Colonel TRUMAN. I think so, sir; and I also think that the G-3 would have thrown him out if he had not been.

[452] 37. General FRANK. What G-3?

Colonel TRUMAN. Colonel Donegan, who was the G-3 of the Department. He worked in the G-3 office.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, do you remember General Short's going to a dinner at Schofield Barracks on the night of December 6?

Colonel TRUMAN. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Did you go with him?

Colonel TRUMAN. No, sir.

General RUSSELL. Do you remember about what time he left the night?

Colonel TRUMAN. I would say he arrived back about nine-thirty that night, sir. I think he went to Colonel Roosma's that night at Schofield Barracks.

General RUSSELL. I was not interested in that end of it.

Do you remember Colonel Bicknell?

Colonel TRUMAN. Yes, sir; very well.

General RUSSELL. Were you present when he came out late in the afternoon of December 6 to have a conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder?

Colonel TRUMAN. No, sir; I was not present. I might have been at the headquarters, but I was not present at any conference they had.

General RUSSELL. Did you live over at General Short's house?

Colonel TRUMAN. No, sir; I lived next door, at Department Headquarters. I had quarters No. 10.

General RUSSELL. General Short came home about nine-thirty that night?

[453] Colonel TRUMAN. As I remember, he did.

General RUSSELL. Who went with him?

Colonel TRUMAN. I believe that Mrs. Short went out there with him.

General RUSSELL. That is all.

General GRUNERT. There is nothing else that occurs to you that you think might help the Board?

Colonel TRUMAN. No, sir. The only thing I can say is that I believe there were no strained relations between the Army and Navy at that time. I am certain of that, sir.

General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming. We are very glad that you cannot give us more information.

Colonel TRUMAN. I am too.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

The Board took a brief recess, at the conclusion of which the following proceedings took place:)

[1454] **TESTIMONY OF SERGEANT LOWELL V. KLATT**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advise under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Sergeant, will you state to the Board your grade, organization, and station?

Sergeant KLATT. First Sergeant Lowell V. Klatt, Battery, Gun Battalion, Semimobile.

2. General GRUNERT. Sergeant, the Board is after finding out what happened prior to and during the Pearl Harbor attack. The reason I asked that you be sent here was that it appeared in the Commission report that you had been a witness and made some statements here on which I want a little more information.

What was your actual assignment or position, in what organization and where, during the attack of December 7th?

Sergeant KLATT. Well, I was Communications Sergeant, in Headquarters Battery, 1st Battalion, 98th Coast Artillery, stationed at Schofield Barracks.

3. General GRUNERT. Schofield Barracks?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir.

4. General GRUNERT. Who was your immediate Commander? What regiment did you serve?

Sergeant KLATT. The regiment I was in was the 98th Coast Artillery, and Colonel——

5. General GRUNERT. Well, if you have forgotten his name, it will make much difference.

Sergeant KLATT. It slips my mind just now, sir.

6. General GRUNERT. And that organization, [1455] aircraft organization, was it?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir.

7. General GRUNERT. And what did the organization do? Was there a full regiment with a certain number of batteries?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir; it was a regiment of anti-aircraft searchlights, and automatic weapons.

8. General GRUNERT. And they were stationed at Schofield Barracks, is that right?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir.

9. General GRUNERT. What did the plans call for in case of an attack?

Sergeant KLATT. Well, we had our field positions at Wheeler Field, also at Schofield Barracks there, and in case of an attack our job was to go man those field positions.

10. General GRUNERT. Then, as I understand, Wheeler Field and Schofield?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir, just about a mile and a half from Schofield Barracks; it is still in the same reservation.

11. General GRUNERT. And then when your notice came to go down in positions already selected in and about Wheeler Field?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir.

12. General GRUNERT. To ward off any air attacks?

Sergeant KLATT. Right, sir.

13. General GRUNERT. Now describe to us a little of the equipment that was for anti-aircraft purposes.

Sergeant KLATT. Well, the gun battalions at the time were 3-inch
s. Shortly after the war started we received 90-millimeter, and
had searchlights and .50-caliber machine [1456] guns, .30-
per machine guns, for antiaircraft defense.

6. General GRUNERT. Just what did you have charge of?

Sergeant KLATT. I was in charge of the communication section for
1st Battalion, sir.

5. General GRUNERT. And in that communication section what
movement was it necessary to move down or near position, or what
movement did you have to move and where did you have to move
in order to get into action?

Sergeant KLATT. I had communication lines strung to each battery
position from the Battalion C. P., which was located at Wahiawa,
on the outskirts of Schofield Barracks, in an old C. C. camp.

3. General GRUNERT. Then you had your communications equip-
ment in, but you had to go from Schofield to that C. P. to start
operating?

Sergeant KLATT. That is right, sir.

7. General FRANK. May I ask him a question?

General GRUNERT. Yes.

8. General FRANK. How many battalions in this regiment?

Sergeant KLATT. Three, sir.

9. General FRANK. What were they?

Sergeant KLATT. Two gun battalions and a searchlight and auto-
matic weapon battalion.

10. General FRANK. Two of the large antiaircraft, 3-inch?

Sergeant KLATT. That is right.

11. General FRANK. Two 3-inch gun battalions.

Sergeant KLATT. Two 3-inch gun battalions, and then another bat-
talion made up of automatic weapons and searchlights.

12. General FRANK. How many batteries in the gun battalions?

[1457] Sergeant KLATT. There were six gun batteries.

13. General FRANK. Per battalion?

Sergeant KLATT. No; that was three per battalion, and a head-
quarters battery, each battalion.

14. General FRANK. Three gun batteries. And how many guns in
each battery?

Sergeant KLATT. Four, sir.

15. General FRANK. So that was 24 guns?

Sergeant KLATT. That is right, sir.

16. General FRANK. Now let us get down to the other battalion.
What was in it?

Sergeant KLATT. That was made up of one battery of searchlights.

17. General FRANK. How many searchlights?

Sergeant KLATT. I believe there were 32, sir. And the other three
batteries were made up of automatic weapons: that would be .50-
caliber machine guns, and at that time we had the 37-millimeter
side-firing antiaircraft guns.

18. General FRANK. How many batteries of machine guns?

Sergeant KLATT. Well, the batteries were made up of four 37-
millimeter and four .50-caliber machine guns to each battery.

19. General FRANK. And how many batteries?

Sergeant KLATT. Three batteries of those, sir.

'30. General FRANK. Three batteries of 37-millimeter?
Sergeant KLATT. That is right.

31. General FRANK. And three batteries of .50-caliber
Sergeant KLATT. No, sir. The .50-caliber and 37-mill together in each battery.

[1458] 32. General FRANK. Therefore you had how many batteries in that battalion?

Sergeant KLATT. In that battalion there was one searchlight and three gun batteries.

33. General FRANK. That is four batteries?

Sergeant KLATT. Four batteries altogether; right, sir.

34. General FRANK. Plus the headquarters battery?

Sergeant KLATT. Plus the headquarters battery.

35. General FRANK. All right. Now, in which battalion?

Sergeant KLATT. 1st Battalion, sir.

36. General FRANK. What did they have?

Sergeant KLATT. They had the 3-inch guns.

37. General GRUNERT. Did you have to take any equipment to Schofield to the command post in order to operate?

Sergeant KLATT. No, sir, we did not. Our equipment was there at the time.

38. General FRANK. In position?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir. It was set up in this old C. P. building.

39. General GRUNERT. Now, we have this statement of the Roberts Commission to the effect that you said that the switchboard and the battle post telephone were in the supply room installed.

Sergeant KLATT. Well, sir, that was a precaution against theft. We had our wires all in, all tagged, ready. It took a matter of maybe three minutes to connect all telephone switchboards up; three to five [1459] minutes with that is the only reason we didn't have the telephones and so on. In other words, it was a matter of theft, because we didn't have them stolen, because we did not have equipment guards.

40. General GRUNERT. Then all the equipment was installed? Some of it was in the supply room?

Sergeant KLATT. That is right.

41. General GRUNERT. Where was the supply room?

Sergeant KLATT. The supply room was at our battery, Schofield Barracks.

42. General GRUNERT. Schofield Barracks. And you had to take the switchboard and certain telephone equipment to C. P. to install it and get it operating?

Sergeant KLATT. That is right, sir.

43. General GRUNERT. Then about how long did that take?

Sergeant KLATT. It didn't take long. We had our equipment on our trucks and were down there in, oh, I wouldn't say more than a few minutes at the most, to get to our position.

44. General GRUNERT. Had you practiced getting that equipment in a hurry and making hurried connections?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir, we had. We had been doing that for weeks previous.

. General GRUNERT. That is one reason I wanted to question. If your switchboard and your battle post telephone equipment stored some place, it didn't look as if you were on the alert as far as being prepared to take immediate action was concerned. That was the reason I wanted to ask you these questions.

460] Now, then, under Alert No. 1, the so-called sabotage alert, it did not require you to occupy your positions, did it?

Lieutenant KLATT. No, sir.

. General GRUNERT. Therefore, you didn't occupy them until the attack started, and you were then under Alert 3; is that correct?

Lieutenant KLATT. That is right, sir.

. General GRUNERT. We will say the attack took place approximately at 7:55 on Sunday morning. About when were you instructed to go to battle position under Alert 3? About what time?

Lieutenant KLATT. My communications officer notified me—well, we were very close together there. He notified me, oh, I would say about twenty minutes or twenty-five minutes of eight, Sunday morning, to get my stuff together and go into the field.

. General GRUNERT. Twenty-five minutes of eight?

Lieutenant KLATT. Yes, sir.

. General GRUNERT. And that was before actual bombing started?

Lieutenant KLATT. I believe it was, sir.

. General GRUNERT. Do you know what source of information he had that something was going to happen?

Lieutenant KLATT. I do not, sir.

. General FRANK. Who was he?

Lieutenant KLATT. Lieutenant Saltsman.

. General FRANK. Saltsman.

. General GRUNERT. About when did you actually get in position to start firing?

Lieutenant KLATT. Well, sir, it wasn't our job to get into position for firing. My job was communications, and I was set up and ready for communications. I had communications to each battery before the batteries were there with their guns in the field themselves.

. General GRUNERT. Do you recall at about what time the guns got in position so that you had communications, all of them, ready for action?

Lieutenant KLATT. Well, that exact time, sir, I couldn't say to now.

. General GRUNERT. Was there any actual action after you were ready?

Lieutenant KLATT. Yes, sir.

. General GRUNERT. Did the battalion actually do any firing?

Lieutenant KLATT. Yes, sir, they did. We were strafed at approximately eight o'clock at our battery position by some planes that had dropped their bombs on Wheeler Field, and our battery battalion was in a direct line with the Wheeler Field runway, because they came down the runway along right over our battalion C. P., and a number of them had strafed us.

. General GRUNERT. Did you get in action against those planes?

Lieutenant KLATT. Yes, sir. The communications officer, Lieutenant

Saltman, and I were both fortunate enough to knock down with B. A. R. fire.

58. General GRUNERT. B. A. R. fire. How effective [1462] General FRANK. What does that stand for?

59. General RUSSELL. Browning automatic rifle.

Sergeant KLATT. Browning automatic rifle, sir.

60. General GRUNERT. How effective was this anti-aircraft against low-flying aircraft?

Sergeant KLATT. You mean of our large guns, sir?

61. General GRUNERT. Of all the equipment you had.

Sergeant KLATT. Most of it was over before they got and got ammunition, and so forth, to really do any firing that the battalion did was done that night on a sabotage that happened that night, later in the day, evening.

62. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions, General?

63. General RUSSELL. Sergeant, this movement into positions and bringing up the ammunition: I believe you saw probably that night before they were ready to fire?

Sergeant KLATT. That is right, sir. It was later on, noon and early evening, before they were ready to really fire. I know they had difficulty getting ammunition, or some of them.

64. General RUSSELL. Now, the guns were actually in position, is that true? You left the guns in position?

Sergeant KLATT. No, sir; the guns were in the barracks area.

65. General RUSSELL. They had to be taken out?

Sergeant KLATT. They had to be taken out to the gun park area, yes, sir.

66. General RUSSELL. How were they mounted?

Sergeant KLATT. They were a double bogie wheel [1463] towed by prime movers.

67. General RUSSELL. Prime movers?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir.

68. General FRANK. The 3-inch guns were in the barracks area.

Sergeant KLATT. They were not in the barracks. The gun park area, which was up in the barracks area.

69. General FRANK. I mean the barracks area.

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir.

70. General RUSSELL. Now, do you happen to know where the ammunition was?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir. The ammunition was in Schofield ammunition warehouses, which were in located down in the ammunition dumps.

71. General RUSSELL. How far were the guns from the ammunition warehouses?

Sergeant KLATT. You mean after they were set up in positions, sir?

72. General RUSSELL. No. In the gun park.

73. General RUSSELL. The ammunition warehouse.

Sergeant KLATT. About one mile down, sir.

74. General RUSSELL. And then these guns had to go through a number of chances to get into the different positions?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir.

5. General RUSSELL. Now, you said you had a prime mover. What locality was it? Do you know?

Sergeant KLATT. I believe it was around a 4½- or 5-ton prime mover, sir. I believe that it what we had at that time. They were betts.

464] 76. General RUSSELL. The men were all in the barracks when this alert came or when the orders came?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir; they were in the barrack area somewhere and, sir.

77. General RUSSELL. And they had to assemble the units and form up and then get the guns and get the ammunition and get into position?

Sergeant KLATT. That is correct, sir.

78. General RUSSELL. Sergeant, was there a night attack, or were you just shooting a little bit?

Sergeant KLATT. I believe it was just a shooting scare, sir.

79. General RUSSELL. Just started shooting at something?

Sergeant KLATT. Somebody got the idea there was something over the island and came over with the A. A. S., and they opened fire with gun series.

80. General RUSSELL. Did you have more than one attack up where the gun positions were that day?

Sergeant KLATT. Well, it all happened in the morning. There were at three different attacks that hit Wheeler Field, and then they moved upper Schofield that morning; probably three different waves of planes, I believe.

81. General RUSSELL. Now, you did not fire in one of these three night raids?

Sergeant KLATT. Not with the large guns, sir, no.

82. General RUSSELL. Just this automatic stuff?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir.

83. General RUSSELL. It must have been flying rather low for you to have gotten them with the B. A. R., wasn't it?

Sergeant KLATT. It was, sir. It was maybe about a hundred feet and not over one hundred and fifty feet away from us.

84. General RUSSELL. How long had you been on duty out there in the Islands?

Sergeant KLATT. Oh, I had arrived over there around July 11, sir, 1941.

85. General RUSSELL. Had there been any other alerts prior to this which began sometime in the latter part of November?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir. We had been out in the field positions at that time. We had been moved out into field positions, and we stayed there several days.

86. General RUSSELL. How many times from the date of your arrival until this one in late November had you been out in the field that day?

Sergeant KLATT. Well, we had been out on a couple of maneuvers before we had gone out in the field, set up established positions, maintained communications and everything else with the other gun battalions and moved in. They were only of a day or two duration, and in late in November I know we went out and we stayed several

days, because I remember it rained like the devil the were out.

87. General RUSSELL. So you recall three times you h
Sergeant KLATT. Approximately, sir. Yes, sir.

88. General RUSSELL. You do not know whether ther
eral alert in the Island or whether it was for the purpo
of training that antiaircraft outfit that you were in?

Sergeant KLATT. No, sir; I do not.

89. General RUSSELL. That is all.

90. General GRUNERT. The ammunition that was in sto
field, was there no ammunition that went directly with
the position?

Sergeant KLATT. No, sir; we had no ammunition, no
tion with the guns.

91. General GRUNERT. So when the guns went to their
they have to stop and get ammunition, or was ammur
directly to the guns from storage?

Sergeant KLATT. The guns went directly to their fi
and then the ammunition was hauled from the ammu
to them.

92. General GRUNERT. Then, whatever delay there wa
guns in position so they could fire was getting ammuni
was it?

Sergeant KLATT. I believe that took the longest, sir;
the ammunition to the guns, because it didn't take long
to reach their position and it doesn't take long to set up
to fire.

93. General GRUNERT. In your description before the I
mission as to bringing down the plane by B. A. R. fire,
that when you examined the plane brought down, betw
Lieutenant Saltsman you determined that the motor was
ican make.

Sergeant KLATT. It was a Wright engine, sir.

94. General GRUNERT. Wright engine. And that tl
[1467] was of an American manufacture?

Sergeant KLATT. I believe it was, sir.

95. General GRUNERT. You didn't by chance bring
our own planes, did you?

Sergeant KLATT. No, sir; it was a Japanese plane.

96. General GRUNERT. The plane, as far as you cou
had an American motor and an American propeller?

Sergeant KLATT. That is right, sir. It was a Hamilt
propeller or a propeller made under American patents

97. General RUSSELL. They weren't Americans in it,

Sergeant KLATT. No, sir; they weren't.

98. General RUSSELL. How many were in it?

Sergeant KLATT. Two.

99. General RUSSELL. They were both killed in the

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir.

100. General GRUNERT. Any other questions?

101. General RUSSELL. No.

102. General GRUNERT. Colonel, can you think of any

103. Colonel TOULMIN. No, sir.

4. General GRUNERT. Colonel West?

5. Colonel WEST. No, sir.

6. Major CLAUSEN. We offer in evidence a transcript of the telephone conversation that occurred on December 3, 1941, between a person in Honolulu, a Dr. Mori, and a person in Tokyo, which was introduced to yesterday by Colonel Bicknell of G-2, as the exhibit next number.

[468] (Photostatic copy of transcript of telephone conversation of December 3, 1941, between Dr. Mori and Tokyo, was marked as exhibit No. 21 and received in evidence.)

7. General GRUNERT. Now, at this point the Board proceeds to other business.

The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

Whereupon, at 11:25 o'clock a. m., the Board proceeded to other business.)

9]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The Board, at 4 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL CLAUDE C. BLOCH, U. S. NAVY (RETIRED); ON ACTIVE DUTY AS A MEMBER OF THE GENERAL BOARD

The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

Colonel WEST. Admiral, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Admiral BLOCH. My name is Claude C. Bloch; Admiral, U. S. Navy; retired; on active duty as a member of the General Board.

Understand my rights, and do I understand that this evidence can be used in judicial proceedings against me, in the Navy?

Colonel WEST. That would be a question for the Navy Department to determine.

Admiral BLOCH. You told me it was. You just told me it was. I would like to know if that is correct.

Colonel WEST. As a general proposition, any voluntary admissions are admissible before courts and boards. Now, I am not prepared to say whether some statutory provision or regulation of the Navy Department might exclude this.

Admiral BLOCH. All right.

General GRUNERT. That is our procedure in the Army. Whether it applies in the Navy or not, I know not.

General RUSSELL. I think the construction of that is that you cannot take that and introduce it into evidence so that it would become binding, but you can use anything he says in his testimony here as a basis for cross-examining him, to ask him if he did not so testify. In other words, it is not [1470] confidential, but it is not evidence that was introduced in the other trial and used, as stated by the Colonel, Admiral Bloch, but it may be used as a basis for impeachment. That is all that it amounts to.

General GRUNERT. Admiral, the Board is attempting to get at the facts as to what happened, both prior to and leading up to the attack and during the attack at Pearl Harbor, and we hope that be-

cause of your assignment at that time you will be able to throw some light on the subject and give us some facts, and give us leads to other facts.

Now, will you please state to the Board your assignments and generally your duties thereunder during the year 1941, generally?

Admiral BLOCH. I went to Pearl Harbor in April 1941. I was Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and also Commandant of the Navy Yard. As Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, I had a dual status under general orders of the Navy Department, that I was a Commandant of the District, acting under the Navy Department, and also I was an officer in the Fleet for assignment by the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet as he saw fit.

7. General GRUNERT. As Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, what was your official relationship to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department?

Admiral BLOCH. At that time I was a Rear Admiral. The Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet, who was also Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, was an Admiral. He was physically present from the time that he assumed command, in February 1941, until the date that he was detached, in December 1941. In my duties as an officer of the Fleet, he was my immediate superior in command and I was his subordinate.

The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was General Short. He took command of the Hawaiian Department in February 1941. General Short, as Commander of the Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, were cooperating with the view to attaining the best joint coastal frontier defense.

8. General FRANK. Admiral, you stated that, as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, you were available for assignment to the Admiral of the Fleet; but, as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, did that situation make the Admiral responsible for the operation of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Admiral BLOCH. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet commanded the Fleet. I was an officer of the Fleet. In my official status, I was an officer of the Fleet, so he was my superior in respect. All of those assignments as an officer of the Fleet were directly related to the preparations for offensive and defensive operations in time of war; to military matters, purely.

9. General FRANK. Who was your next superior in command in the administration of the District?

Admiral BLOCH. I was supposed to be a decentralized command for local affairs, acting under the instructions of the Navy Department direct. That work related almost entirely to administrative things like plans, buildings, work of the Navy Yard, repairing ships, buying land, building houses, and things like that.

10. General GRUNERT. But, in so far as the defense of the installations at Pearl Harbor was concerned, you were the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't want to burden you with more details of complicated set-up.

General GRUNERT. No, we just want to get an understanding of

Admiral BLOCH. And I have avoided mentioning the Hawaiian coastal sea frontier, which is another thing of which I had the command and was supposed to have a force for; but I think it is better to leave that out because I don't think it has much bearing. What we are concerned with in this matter, as I see it, is my duties as an officer of the fleet, with the Commander-in-Chief present at times, and I being his subordinate.

Now, I was also the Commandant of the District as related to the administrative duties—pay, and all those things; buildings, funds, and all that, and my subordinates there in the Navy Department; and the Commander-in-Chief had little or no interest in the department, but he did have an extreme interest in all the things that related to the base—its weapons, its facilities, its storage things, food, logistics, oil, docks, water, protection; and such services as I could render in the way of mine-sweeping, antisubmarine patrols, and things like that; and I had some small forces for that purpose. I think that's about as clear as I can put it.

General GRUNERT. Could he have relieved you as Commanding Officer, or as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, on his own authority, without reference to the Navy Department?

Admiral BLOCH. No. I think he could have done it, but he would have had to have the approval of the Navy.

General GRUNERT. Then he could only use you in your location, is that correct?

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct, sir.

General GRUNERT. He could not have suddenly ordered you out of the fleet, and assigned the district to somebody else; could he?

Admiral BLOCH. No; he could not.

General GRUNERT. As Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, do you recall having made a Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan with the Army?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

General GRUNERT. Do you recall when that plan was made operative, when it was made effective?

Admiral BLOCH. It was never made operative. It was effective as a Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan from the date of signature by General Short and myself, and I think that was in the latter part of 1941, or thereabout—effective as a plan, but it was never made operative, until December 7.

General GRUNERT. By its terms it provided that this plan should become operative upon M Day?

Admiral BLOCH. M Day, or, the order of the War and Navy Departments, or the mutual agreement of the local commanders.

General GRUNERT. So, that plan, except as a plan, and except agreements what to do, prior to its becoming operative [1474] was just a question of agreement between the two of you?

Admiral BLOCH. Not exactly, not exactly. The plan was not operative as a plan, because the War and Navy Departments ordered it to become operative, either in part or in whole, but the commanders never mutually agreed to have it become operative in part.

19. General GRUNERT. Could that have been done at the time hostilities demanded it be done?

Admiral BLOCH. I think that is a provision, a part of the plan; but the plan carried with it further in this respect: That plan was prepared in pursuance to the Rainbow War Plan. That is the reason we made the Rainbow War Plan, which was a joint Army and Navy plan, to make it. And we were duty-bound to have certain provisions which were laid down in joint action by the Army and the Navy, in 1935, which were the over-all policies of the agreements between the Army and the Navy, as to responsibilities of the joint coastal frontier defense, and that was a part of that plan.

20. General GRUNERT. Do you recall that there was an Operations Agreement, as of March 21, 1941, entered into by General Martin, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Islands, and Admiral Bellinger, of the Navy?

Admiral BLOCH. I think that was entered into by General Martin and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

21. General GRUNERT. What was Admiral Bellinger's position at the time?

Admiral BLOCH. Admiral Bellinger was an officer of the fleet. He commanded the patrol. He was with the fleet. He had some other titles, but he was generally known as the Commandant of Patrol Wing 2.

22. General GRUNERT. And he was not a direct subordinate of yours?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, no; he was not a direct subordinate. There was a tie-up between us, in this respect, that this joint plan which was signed by General Short and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District somewhere around the 1st of March, 1941, I don't remember the dates—

23. General FRANK. Who was the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District at the time?

Admiral BLOCH. It was I. That agreement was first a directive from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to remove the overlap between the Army and Navy, that would always occur where the Army would go and the Navy would go this way; but for each specific function, some other divers instructions, such as barrage balloons, antiaircraft warning systems, and so forth, and so on, and patrol boats. As I recall it, they had about five or six commandants. Admiral Bellinger was loaned to me by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, to act as my representative in negotiating an agreement with General Martin.

There was somebody from the fleet loaned to me to negotiate the arrangement about the balloon barrages, and some

et was loaned to help me with the arrangement about the smoke screens and the antiaircraft warning. There were a number of committees, with each committee confining itself to [1476] a certain part of this agreement, and when it was all drawn up, when all the agreements were agreed upon, it was brought to the Joint Planning Committees and to General Short and myself, and we went over, and we signed it as an agreement.

24. General FRANK. What was your relation to Patrol Wing 2?

Admiral BLOCH. My relation to Patrol Wing 2 enters into this situation a little later on, in this respect: We had something they called "Base Defense Air Force," and the Base Defense Air Force was commanded by Admiral Bellinger, who was the Commander of Patrol Wing 2, and he brought his patrol planes into this Base Defense Air Force. Now, the Base Defense Air Force wasn't a firm force. All the aircraft in that force had their own duties, their own missions, their own tasks, and their own jobs to do; but when we sounded an air-raid alarm, they all got together, and they became this thing, and went out for search, attack, or air combat. Do I make myself clear? They were what you might say, in a crude sort of way, a "volunteer fire department." You sounded an air-raid alarm, and all these planes, coming off these various forces, and each, through command forces, with their own duties, their own tasks, their own missions, they came over to Bellinger's, and all the fighters went to Martin; and from the air-raid alarm, all of Martin's bombers came over for search and attack.

25. General FRANK. Were the PBYs habitually under the Fourteenth Naval District, or habitually under the fleet?

Admiral BLOCH. The PBYs—the Fourteenth Naval District didn't have a patrol plane or any other aircraft except possibly one or two utility planes at the air station.

26. General FRANK. Under whom did this Base Defense Air Force [1477] operate?

Admiral BLOCH. Under Admiral Bellinger, insofar as it related to the part under the Navy's tactical command, and under General Martin, insofar as the pursuit planes and fighters.

27. General FRANK. And in that capacity, who was Bellinger's next superior?

Admiral BLOCH. He didn't have any superior. I think that the order said that I had supervisory control to coordinate operations for the Army through him. I think that is the way the order read, to coordinate operations with the Army and Navy through the Commander of Patrol Wing 2.

28. General GRUNERT. Then, as I understand it, under this joint agreement, entered into on behalf of the Navy by you, and on behalf of the Army by General Short, the Air Forces that were primarily fighters came under the jurisdiction of Short through his Air Force Commander, and what you might call "sea fighters" and patrols, or "over-the-sea," came under you, using Admiral Bellinger as the commander of that force?

Admiral BLOCH. I would prefer you state they came under Admiral Bellinger.

29. General GRUNERT. But Admiral Bellinger looked rectly for instructions or directions or supervision?

Admiral BLOCH. I had supervisory control over his related to coordinating his operations with the Army, plan for this force was drawn, and we had drill after the line that it was required to take, in order that the actions of this Air Force would be automatic and it would save to take valuable time to give orders in case of emergency. [1478]

30. General FRANK. When did this joint become operative?

Admiral BLOCH. Now, which one are you meaning joint plan? The joint air defense, or joint coastal force?

31. General FRANK. Well, what I am trying to find out is Did it require hostile action for this air plan to go into effect?

Admiral BLOCH. I think I can explain that.

32. General FRANK. The next question I want to ask is effect did the joint plan have on operations preparatory to action? Do you see what I am driving at?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, I see what you are driving at. I can probably do it, if I stick to the line of the question. There were two joint agreements. The first is known as the Joint Inter-Tier Defense Plan. That was based on the War Plan, and that was known as JCD-42. That is a Navy designation.

The joint air force was an additional joint agreement. General Short and myself, that had to do with the joint air force, barrage balloons, smoke screens, aircraft warning, and other things. That was signed by General Short, I think, even prior to JCD-42. I think that was the first agreement on and signed.

Now, when JCD-42 was signed, we made this air force an appendix of JCD-42. It was known as "Appendix 7." It would not be operative, unless the various conditions recited before were effective; but I think that General Short had mutually agreed to put in so much of that. [1479] In effect, as related to the use of these air forces interchangeably between the Army and the Navy, at once; and I think General Short, representing General Short, and Admiral Bellinger, representing the Navy, got up their own estimate of the situation, their own estimate of that.

Is that what you wanted to know?

33. General FRANK. Yes. What I was after was, the vision in the plan for these combined operations to be put into effect when there was fear of an impending attack, rather than wait for hostile action to take place?

Admiral BLOCH. There was a provision in the War Plan. The War Plan, Rainbow 5, says:

In case of strained relations, M Day can be declared, without

Now, they can say "M Day" three weeks before a war, two weeks, and the minute they say "M Day," JCD-42 is put into effect and that may have been what the people expected.

34. General FRANK. That is all.

35. General GRUNERT. Then there was no actual M Day ever declared?

Admiral BLOCH. Not till December 7.

36. General GRUNERT. Then how, under the existing cooperative plans, could the necessary reconnaissances and other protective measures be taken, except on your own initiative in behalf of the Army and Navy?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, I don't know whether the Army had any orders, or not; but I do know, in February 1941, the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet got out a confidential letter, [1480] which he headed "2-CL-41," and that letter was also revised under date of October 14th or 15th, 1941, and I don't think there were any substantial changes in it; and in that letter, of which some 20 or 30 copies were sent to the Commanding General, he states he proposes to support the Army in their defense of the naval base at Pearl Harbor.

37. General GRUNERT. Then all of these maneuvers and tests and drills that were held between the combined air forces were merely practice, so that in the event M Day was declared it could be put into effect; is that the idea?

Admiral BLOCH. No; that particular air-agreement feature was in effect the whole time, from the time the agreement was signed.

38. General GRUNERT. But, as part of the agreement, were not the Navy's responsibilities outlined, and the Army's responsibilities outlined, likewise? Were they not so outlined?

Admiral BLOCH. I think "joint action" gives the functions of both Army and the Navy, not specifically for Hawaii, but for the over-—everything. And I think those same functions were taken out of joint action and put into the joint agreement, JCD-42, specifically for Hawaii.

39. General GRUNERT. Under this joint Air agreement, was the Army charged with the technical control of Air operations over Hawaii, itself?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, I would rather refer to the agreement. I think the document is the best evidence you can get on that, sir.

40. General GRUNERT. Did the Navy ever check to see whether such control was being fully and satisfactorily exercised by [1481] Army?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't know; I don't know. Is that a part of the agreement, General? I am quite "at sea" as to what you want to know.

41. General GRUNERT. Paragraph 2 of the agreement states, in part, follows:

Defensive air operation over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be conducted under the tactical command of the Army. The naval base-defense officer will determine the navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat, or for the maintenance of the required alert status, until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is determined by the Navy base-defense officer to revert to Navy control.

Admiral BLOCH. Is that in the joint agreement, sir?

42. General GRUNERT. That is in the joint agreement of the 20th of March 1941. Now, whose business was it, on the part of the Navy,

to check to see whether the Army was prepared to meet their responsibilities under that agreement?

Admiral BLOCH. I didn't think Navy undertook any check of the Army for their responsibilities. This was turned over to the tactical control of the Army.

43. General GRUNERT. Wasn't the Navy concerned about whether or not the Army could fulfill its part of the agreement?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't think the Navy lacked confidence [1482] in the Army's ability to take the tactical control of the fighters.

44. General GRUNERT. Under this agreement, I believe that the Navy was charged with what we call "distant patrolling." As far as you know, did the Navy have sufficient means to carry out its responsibility in that respect?

Admiral BLOCH. Now, are you referring to this same agreement, or to other agreements?

45. General GRUNERT. This same agreement.

Admiral BLOCH. I don't remember that, in that same agreement. I remember it in the joint coastal frontier agreement.

46. General GRUNERT. I think probably you are correct that it does have a reference to it in paragraph 1 of the Joint Air Agreement, by saying:

Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission,

and so forth.

Admiral BLOCH. I think it might clarify the situation to say that this Joint Air Agreement, and the naval base defense air force, was for the purpose of breaking up an air raid which had happened, was happening, or which was imminent of happening, when the air-raid alarms sounded.

47. General GRUNERT. What I am trying to get at is this:

In guarding against attack, any preparatory measure to be taken, which in itself really constituted a strained relation, during the period of strained relations, such measure should be taken for the defense of the Navy and the defense of the Army; while the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, [1483] under paragraph 18, "NAVY," says:

The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

- a. An inshore patrol.
- b. An offshore patrol.
- c. An escort force.
- d. An attack force.

—and so forth.

Now, in fact, was this plan operative to the extent that the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District did provide offshore patrol?

Admiral BLOCH. Offshore? The only offshore patrol that was provided—and I want to be sure that you have got your term right, General. You mean the second one, "a" to "d", and this one, here?

48. General FRANK. Yes.

Admiral BLOCH. In order 2CL-41, the Commander-in-Chief stated what the inshore patrol was to consist of, and where the forces were

come from. I think you will find that in paragraph 3 (a), "Continuous Patrols," "inshore patrol."

1484] This states what the inshore patrol shall do and where forces shall come from; that is, 3 (B) intermittent patrols. The t is destroyer offshore patrol. That is supplied by the fleet under amand of the task force concerned. Then, under intermittent pa- s are certain air patrols which are prescribed, and under 3 sweeping mines. This was under the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval trict.

9. General GRUNERT. Did that apply both to surface vessels and craft?

Admiral BLOCH. Where it says surface vessels, they were surface sels; where it says aircraft, they were aircraft.

9. General GRUNERT. Then, according to the instructions under ch you were functioning you had no responsibility for distant air nnaissance?

Admiral BLOCH. There was no distant air reconnaissance ordered in t order. That is the only order that I know which was operative.

1. General GRUNERT. But, actually, was there some distant air nnaissance being made from time to time or continuously?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not know. I do not know whether there was ot. That would not be under me.

2. General GRUNERT. It was not your responsibility to see whether e was or not?

Admiral BLOCH. Not at that time. I was supposed to have under command 108 P. B. Y.'s for the purpose of performing distant nnaissance. I had asked time and time again for them, but the y had never furnished them. So I had no implements to perform ant reconnaissance in the Fourteenth Naval District force:

3. General GRUNERT. The P. B. Y.'s that were furnished were 35] under whose jurisdiction?

Admiral BLOCH. Rear Admiral Bellinger's. They were fleet es.

4. General GRUNERT. The P. B. Y.'s are land-based?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir; they are seaplanes.

5. General GRUNERT. But what I mean is that they are land-based; y are not carrier-based, are they?

Admiral BLOCH. No; they are based at an air station.

6. General GRUNERT. Where were they kept in the Fourteenth al District? What was their base there?

Admiral BLOCH. We had two air stations, one at Kaneohe and one d Island. Some were based on Kaneohe and some on Ford Island.

7. General GRUNERT. If any reconnaissance was made or supposed ave been made on the morning of December 7th, so far as the y was concerned it was under the jurisdiction of Admiral inger?

Admiral BLOCH. I think Admiral Bellinger would get his orders n the Commander-in-Chief to conduct it. Although Admiral inger had command of the patrol craft he could not order them ny mission or task that he saw fit, because that directive would e from the high command.

58. General GRUNERT. But the directive did not process through you; it would go direct from high command to Admiral Bellinger?

Admiral BLOCH. I think so.

59. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not any such instructions are covered in this document which you just mentioned?

Admiral BLOCH. So far as I know, this reconnaissance was not mentioned. The only place that any kind of search is [1486] mentioned under my duties is where it says:

The following procedure shall be followed by the task force, and so forth.

Then it provides for air search for enemy ships. That would be this volunteer air force.

60. General GRUNERT. But that was only in the event of an attack?

Admiral BLOCH. That is right, sir.

61. General GRUNERT. That was not preliminary?

Admiral BLOCH. That is right, sir.

62. General GRUNERT. Then, so far as you know, there were no instructions concerning a probable attack, in case of strained relations, or in anticipation of a probable attack?

Admiral BLOCH. Not so far as I know.

63. General FRANK. Whose responsibility was it to provide that reconnaissance? It must have been somebody's.

Admiral BLOCH. I suggest that you ask the Commander-in-Chief. Has he been before you?

64. General FRANK. No.

Admiral BLOCH. I think he can answer those questions better than I. I am just giving my understanding.

65. General RUSSELL. Now, Admiral, on the joint agreement, or the two joint agreements we have gotten in the record so far: In this joint agreement for air operations, signed between you and General Short, was reconnaissance mentioned at all?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not think it is.

66. General RUSSELL. The other agreement was this coastal defense plan in which missions were outlined and agreements on reconnaissance were reached?

[1487] Admiral BLOCH. That was a major responsibility if the plan became operative.

67. General RUSSELL. But while the plan was effective from early in the spring of 1941, it was never operative until December 7th, 1941?

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct, sir.

68. General RUSSELL. So that respecting missions of the Army and Navy, according to your construction of the agreement, reconnaissance missions were not effective until December 7, 1941?

Admiral BLOCH. Under the circumstances that obtained, that is the way it happened. I will say that I accepted the responsibility in that agreement for distant reconnaissance for the Navy, and I did my utmost to implement my responsibility by demanding patrol planes for that purpose, but I never had any; I never had one.

69. General RUSSELL. Admiral, what do you mean by "I accepted my responsibility" under the joint plan?

Admiral BLOCH. No; I said, when I signed it. I signed that joint agreement as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I think that is the way it reads.

70. General RUSSELL. J. C. D. 42 you are talking about now?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes. First, it says what the Hawaiian Department accepts as their responsibility, and then what the Navy accepts its responsibility. As to the Army, it says that the Commandant General, Hawaiian Department, shall provide for—and then it went on with 15 or 20 things for him to provide, and then came the Navy:

The Commandant, the Fourteenth Naval District, shall provide for—

[488] and under Item I, it says:

Distant reconnaissance.

Having accepted that responsibility, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District—in this agreement which I signed I did my best to implement that distant reconnaissance by patrol planes.

71. General RUSSELL. Admiral, I do not know that we understand each other. We are talking about J. C. D. 42?

Admiral BLOCH. I think it is.

72. General RUSSELL. You and General Short signed that?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

73. General RUSSELL. And it was not to become operative until certain conditions were met?

Admiral BLOCH. I will show you that. Have you seen it?

74. General RUSSELL. Yes; I have seen it. That was to become operative when certain conditions were met. In the meantime, between the time of the execution of J. C. D. 42 and the coming of war and the making of an agreement, which is the condition precedent making it operative in so far as the respective reconnaissance missions were concerned, both you and General Short accepted the missions and attempted to put them into effect immediately, before the plan became operative? Is that the testimony?

Admiral BLOCH. I did not say that, sir. I do not know what anyone else had said.

75. General RUSSELL. What do you say about that now?

Admiral BLOCH. I say that General Short and I signed this agreement, J. C. D. 42, in which the Army shall provide for certain things and the Navy shall provide for certain things, and that I, being the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, [1489] did my utmost to get the various craft, implements of all kinds, to meet my obligation, and I never was able to get them all. I never got a single patrol plane, although I had 108 promised.

76. General RUSSELL. When did you think under this agreement that your obligation for distant reconnaissance became binding?

Admiral BLOCH. My obligations for distant reconnaissance would not become binding until that plan was operative.

77. General RUSSELL. I think I understand you.

78. General FRANK. To whom did those P. B. Y's that were there belong, if they did not belong to you?

Admiral BLOCH. They belonged to the patwings of the United States Fleet, Patwing 1 and Patwing 2, both under the command of Rear Admiral Bellinger; and he was of the echelon of command of the Commander-in-Chief.

79. General FRANK. The commander of the fleet afloat had a patrol plane that was under his command that had to be based on land?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, two of them. One and two. They could be based on tenders when they went away. There were a number of tenders present; and if they went out to Samoa or to the Marshalls or some place where there was no place to land, they would have to base on tenders.

80. General FRANK. You signed this agreement, the Joint Coastal Defense Plan, with General Short, and you did not have the facilities with which to carry out your part of the agreement. Did you ever tell that to General Short?

Admiral BLOCH. I think General Short knew it perfectly well.

81. General FRANK. But did you ever tell him that you did not [1490] have the equipment with which to do it?

Admiral BLOCH. I cannot say that I have never told him and I cannot say that I did tell him.

82. General FRANK. A little while ago you stated that you never checked up on the Army to see if they were carrying out the things with which they were charged. If General Short had the same attitude of never checking up to find out whether or not the Navy was carrying out its responsibilities or whether it had the equipment with which to do it, if he never asked and if, on the other hand, you never told him, he did not know, did he?

Admiral BLOCH. I think we are at somewhat of a disagreement about that, General. In the first place, the question you asked me was whether I checked up combat efficiency of the fighters that were turned over to the Army for flying overland for the protection of Oahu, and I said I did not. That related entirely to this joint air agreement where the Navy fighters went to the Army for the defense of Oahu. I had complete confidence in the Army's ability to handle those planes in attacks. Every day the Army supplied the Navy with a list of bombers and, vice versa, the Navy supplied the Army with a list of fighters. I am not a flier. I could not tell you whether a fighter was doing a thing in the proper way or not. I did have very definite ideas. I knew how many fighters the Army had and I knew how many bombers the Army had; I knew whether they were modern or obsolete. So far as my knowledge is concerned, it related to numbers and types; but I feel quite certain that General Short had the same information.

83. General FRANK. Was there a carefully detailed, worked-out system of operations between the Army and the Navy in this [1491] defense situation?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not quite understand your question, sir.

84. General FRANK. This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was signed; and what I am trying to find out is whether this agreement was just a state of mind or whether there existed some place a carefully-detailed, worked-out system of operations that were arrived at by the working people sitting down around a table and determining what to do each with the other.

Admiral BLOCH. Of course that question is a question on which I could not, necessarily, have the information you want; but I will say it is my belief that General Martin, General Rudolph and General Davidson, and Admiral Bellinger and his subordinates—I do not remember their names—were very, very close to one another, and I further know that on several occasions a carrier came in from sea. There was a position indication—this was a drill—and in such cases

ey would have to search for her and they would find her and they could bomb her, and they had the usual things that you probably remember when you were there. There were some obscurities in communications and operations. Those were all carefully noted, analyzed, and remedied. So I believe that within the limits of our intelligence and ability we tried to make the thing a working scheme. But it had the limitation of being only for an air attack, in the case of a raid where we knew we had positive information and knew what was coming, presuming we had some information.

85. General GRUNERT. It seems that this joint plan made between you and General Short in certain respects, certainly as far as air search and distant reconnaissance are concerned, [1492] could have been made between the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet and General Short, inasmuch as you had nothing with which to supplement that part of the agreed-upon plan?

Admiral BLOCH. You are talking about the joint agreement?

86. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Admiral BLOCH. Had that plan become operative, we will say, on the 4th day of December, and the fleet had left there—suppose the fleet had all pulled out and taken everything with them—in our plan Admiral Kimmel had made a provision that two patrol squadrons belonging to the fleet would be left there for me to perform my obligation of distant reconnaissance. Of course you know two squadrons of patrol planes cannot perform a 360-degree reconnaissance a distance of 800 miles. It cannot be done. But that was what they were to leave me when that war plan went into effect. But I do not think that gave me a small force just because he wanted, but because he did not have a larger one. He did not have any more to give me.

87. General GRUNERT. Did General Short understand the conditions, first, the organization, then the responsibility as pertained to the Navy, as you have outlined it to us, and then did he understand that you did not have the means to carry out your responsibility under that joint plan?

Admiral BLOCH. I think General Short had better answer those questions. But I will say that I knew his deficiencies.

88. General GRUNERT. In this cooperative plan, it would appear necessary that both the commanders fully understand the situation of each command so as to be able to cooperate; and unless such things are explained by the commanders thereof it is difficult for the other commander to get an insight into what is being done or what can be done?

[1493] Admiral BLOCH. General Short had access to the Commander-in-Chief at all times, and he had conferences many, many times when I was not there; and while I believe that the Commander-in-Chief made a tremendous effort to tell us what was taking place, as to whether he omitted to tell me anything, I know that the Commander-in-Chief and General Short were in close contact all the time.

89. General GRUNERT. That is what is difficult for me to realize, that it did and did not take place. Here is the commanding general of the Department and here is the commander-in-chief of the fleet, and here is the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Just what should he do in relation and in cooperation and coordination with the fleet, as to what he should do certainly with you as Commandant of

the Fourteenth Naval District, do you think was clearly understood by General Short?

Admiral BLOCH. I cannot answer for General Short, but I do know, or it is my firm belief, that the cooperation was extremely good between the Commander-in-Chief and General Short. I know it was good between General Short and myself, from my side of it, and I hope he reciprocates the same feeling.

90. General GRUNERT. Does cooperation include a thorough understanding of the capabilities of all those commands?

Admiral BLOCH. I felt quite sure that I understood his capabilities, sir, and his deficiencies.

91. General FRANK. I have one question about the lack of patrol planes. Actually, Hawaii was without sufficient air patrol planes to provide adequate reconnaissance?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes. I say yes, and I am not an air man and I have not made the computations myself, but I heard someone say, who had made the computation, that to conduct a 360- [1494] degree reconnaissance for 800 miles, which is necessary for finding aircraft, it would require 170 aircraft and 350 pilots. I believe those are the figures. I might say further that I understand that a number of P. B. Y.'s that we had there were of a new type, and they were deficient in spare parts, and they were having difficulties with certain mechanical features. What, I do not know.

92. General GRUNERT. Did they make such reconnaissances as the available means permitted?

Admiral BLOCH. General, you better ask the Commander-in-Chief about that. I had no control over those things.

93. General GRUNERT. As far you know, you do not know whether they did or did not?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not know whether they did or did not, sir.

94. General GRUNERT. Do you know on the morning of the 7th of December whether any such planes were in the air on any reconnaissance mission?

Admiral BLOCH. I heard planes taking off. I do not know exactly what missions they were on, but there were planes in the air.

95. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not many of the P. B. Y.'s were caught on the ground and destroyed?

Admiral BLOCH. I understand that some were.

96. General GRUNERT. But you do not know of your own knowledge? Admiral BLOCH. No, sir.

97. General GRUNERT. The P. B. Y.'s were not your planes?

Admiral BLOCH. They were not under my command, my responsibility.

98. General GRUNERT. Whose responsibility was it to initiate [1495] and coordinate efforts against a hostile attack? Was it the Army's or the Navy's?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not quite understand you.

99. General GRUNERT. In case there was a hostile attack, as there was on December 7th, whose responsibility was it to initiate the offensive side of the defensive? In other words, as to aircraft, was it under the Navy, under the Army, or under both?

Admiral BLOCH. I cannot answer that question. It is hypothetical, and I do not understand it.

100. General GRUNERT. In case of a hostile attack, with reference to the plan that we call the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which became operative when there was a hostile attack, did the Navy and the Army have separate defenses, or attacks, you might call them? Were they initiated of their own accord, or was the Navy charged with meeting the attack, and then when it came over the Island of Oahu itself, then it became the Army's responsibility to take care of what was in the air? Was there a clear understanding of just how such a defense would be initiated and how it was to be carried out?

Admiral BLOCH. I am sorry; I have not the operation order on the part of the Navy Force, but it was covered in there. When the air raid alarm sounded there were two primary things to do: First, the aircraft that were going under the Army's control had to go to them, and vice versa, the Army aircraft that came under Navy Control had to come to them. The Navy called it search and attack. They went out and looked for carriers to try to find them and hit them, and the Army concentrated, according to their plans and doctrines, their pursuit and fighter planes to drive off and break up attacks of enemy planes; and I think [1496] it even went so far as to specify that they were to trail them back to their carriers so they could inform the Navy where the carriers were. Which was first, I do not know.

101. General GRUNERT. Does not that seem to indicate that had there been one distinct plan under unity of command there might have been better results?

Admiral BLOCH. I think so. That is a hypothetical question.

102. General GRUNERT. Then it appeared to be the Navy's mission to locate and destroy a hostile navy task force?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

103. General GRUNERT. And when the attack came, it was the Army's business to conduct the defense?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

[1497] 104. General GRUNERT. I believe you told me you were not informed of the Army's defensive measures; is that correct?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not know whether I said that or not. What do you mean by "measures," sir?

105. General GRUNERT. Well, did you know just how the Army intended to carry out its mission to defend Pearl Harbor by its installations, by its antiaircraft locations, by its interceptor command, including the air warning service, and so forth? Were you generally familiar with that setup?

Admiral BLOCH. I was familiar with that. I knew the locations of the guns.

106. General GRUNERT. Did the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, inform you as to any special measures he proposed to take that had adopted as the result of these so-called warning messages that were received late in November, early in December?

Admiral BLOCH. I believe that General Short told me that he was on Alert No. 1, and I think he said he was on Alert No. 1, and there is a possibility that I may have confused his Alert No. 1 with our Condition No. 1, because our Condition No. 1 is the most rigid, and his Alert No. 1 is the most less rigid.

107. General GRUNERT. That was quite another subject I had: whether or not you thoroughly understood that his Alert No. 1 was merely against sabotage.

Admiral BLOCH. Well, I do not know what I knew at that time. I know now, of course.

108. General GRUNERT. I believe that you testified before the Roberts Commission.

Admiral BLOCH. I think I told the Roberts Commission that [1498] I believed I knew they were on alert but I might have been mixed up in whether it was Alert 1 or Alert 3, because our numbers are different. I think I told them that. I am not sure.

109. General GRUNERT. As I recall your testimony, it was to the effect that you knew they were on Alert No. 1, but you understood or just thought that that was the same as your Alert No. 1.

Admiral BLOCH. Well, something to that effect.

110. General GRUNERT. And that you really didn't find out that they were on the lowest form of alert, while you were on the highest, until after the attack.

Admiral BLOCH. Possibly. That is the idea. There was some confusion in my mind about the thing.

111. General GRUNERT. Now, did the Fleet Commander keep you informed of the international situation and of the knowledge that he gleaned as to the Japanese Fleet from time to time?

Admiral BLOCH. I think the Commander-in-Chief tried to show me all the telegrams and correspondence that he had, but I do not want this Board to believe that the information he got represented the political situation, because it did not.

112. General GRUNERT. Did you know of the presence of a Japanese task force in the vicinity of Jaluit between November 27th and 30th?

Admiral BLOCH. We had received an intelligence report from Washington which referred to the presumed presence of certain types and numbers of ships in the Marshall Islands in the vicinity of Jaluit. This intelligence was the best that I [1499] had or that the Navy Department had, but I believe that its correctness is subject to some question.

113. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether this information was furnished to General Short?

Admiral BLOCH. No, I do not.

114. General RUSSELL. Were carriers indicated as being in that force? Did that message indicate that carriers were in that task force?

Admiral BLOCH. My recollection is that the intelligence dispatch stated that there were one or two carriers present there and that the remainder of the carriers, some eight or ten, and the capital ships, were in home waters, meaning Empire waters.

115. General GRUNERT. Were you kept advised of the movement of this force, and did you have knowledge of its whereabouts after December 1st?

Admiral BLOCH. This same intelligence report detailed very heavy movements of men-of-war, including one division of battleships to Indo-China and Thailand; also included large numbers of transports. After December 7th I had no knowledge of where they had gone or what had taken place.

116. General GRUNERT. Would it be out of consideration to figure out a task force would come to the Marshall Islands in order to go down toward Thailand or the Kra Peninsula?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, if I were running a task force, I wouldn't go to the Kra Peninsula via the Marshall Islands.

117. General GRUNERT. Was General Short kept informed of this naval intelligence; do you know?

[1500] Admiral BLOCH. I do not know whether he got it from the Commander-in-Chief or not, sir.

118. General GRUNERT. He did not get it from you?

Admiral BLOCH. So far as you know. I gave him some. I gave General Short some intelligence. On occasions he would come to my office and ask specific questions, and if I had any intelligence on the subject I would give it to him.

119. General GRUNERT. What was the customary procedure in passing out this intelligence? Only on request, or how?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, we had two types of intelligence. One type was handled by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and I believe that there was free interchange between this Intelligence and Military Intelligence, and that everything we got the Army got, and everything the Army got we got. This latter type of intelligence we have been speaking of had a very high secrecy classification, and only necessary people in the naval establishment were told even of its existence.

120. General GRUNERT. Then, normally the command would not be formed of this type of intelligence?

Admiral BLOCH. I think he was informed a great deal, sir. I think he was informed, but it was not sent in the mail or anything like that.

121. General GRUNERT. Well, as to such intelligence, who was the judge as to what would be told to General Short?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, so far as I was concerned, I usually gave intelligence to General Short of this nature in response to inquiries. What the Commander-in-Chief gave him or the Commander-in-Chief's intelligence officer gave him, I cannot [1501] testify; I don't know.

122. General GRUNERT. Then, normally were his sources of information both the Commander-in-Chief, the Commander-in-Chief's intelligence force, and your headquarters and your intelligence officer? Did he have those dual places to get intelligence from, or was whatever he got passed down through you to him?

Admiral BLOCH. No, I do not think it was passed through me to him.

123. General GRUNERT. Then, he had several sources to look to?

Admiral BLOCH. He had sources: I think he got intelligence from the Commander-in-Chief. I cannot say that he did and I cannot say that he didn't, but I believe he got information from the Commander-in-Chief. I gave him intelligence on one or two occasions that I remember, in response to inquiries. There was free and routine setup or interchange of Naval intelligence and M. I. D. intelligence. That was done through the respective intelligence officers.

124. General GRUNERT. But such matters as the issue we have just been discussing were not routine?

Admiral BLOCH. No.

125. General GRUNERT. That was ultrasecret?

Admiral BLOCH. That was not routine.

126. General GRUNERT. And ordinarily that would not be passed out except on special requests or on the initiative of those who had the intelligence, as to whether or not the other party should have it?

Admiral BLOCH. I think that is correct, sir.

[1502] 127. General FRANK. This type of information was picked up by an installation that was a part of the District, wasn't it? Wasn't that one of your activities as a Naval District Commander?

Admiral BLOCH. It was known as the District Combat Intelligence.

128. General FRANK. It therefore would come to you first and through your District Combat Intelligence to the C.-in-C. of the Fleet?

Admiral BLOCH. No; the Commander-in-Chief as a rule got it as soon as I got it, maybe sometimes sooner. It was sent to him immediately.

May I say for the understanding of the Board that this same type of intelligence is collected by the Army too and available to the Army. Whether they sent it to General Short or not, I do not know. They had all this same information here in Washington.

129. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether General Short expected better sources of information from the Navy than he had of his own?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not know. There is no reason why he should.

130. General GRUNERT. But with your District Intelligence setup, isn't it more probable that he should get such information about other naval forces from the Navy rather than from the Army?

Admiral BLOCH. I believe all the same information was possessed here in Washington by the Army Intelligence and was available for distribution by them in the same way that we got ours.

[1503] 131. General GRUNERT. But originally that intelligence came from Naval sources?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir. I don't know where it came from.

132. General GRUNERT. Well, do you know what efforts were made by the Navy to secure information of possible Japanese naval activity in the mandated islands?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't know, but we didn't have any luck.

133. General GRUNERT. But you did have some information apparently about the Japanese being in home waters. Where did that come from?

Admiral BLOCH. That was one of these speculative intelligence matters.

134. General GRUNERT. Did that come from Washington?

Admiral BLOCH. From Washington.

135. General GRUNERT. Or from your own sources?

Admiral BLOCH. It came from Washington; same source that the "fleet in Jaluit" came from.

136. General GRUNERT. Now, as to cooperation and so-called co-ordination—two overworked \$64 words—did you know whether or not the Army's air warning service was in operation, and did you know the details thereof?

Admiral BLOCH. I had some information which I thought to be good.

137. General GRUNERT. Did you make inquiries regarding it?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

138. General GRUNERT. Had you received General Short's standing operational procedure of November 5th about the types of alert and the interceptor scheme of operation?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't know. I don't think so. I am [1503-A] not sure. I never saw it at that time.

139. General FRANK. Had your liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, over at Hawaiian Department Headquarters, obtained copies of that at your establishment, would they have been delivered?

Admiral BLOCH. I believe they would have been delivered to the war plans or operations officer.

140. General FRANK. And that need not necessarily have been brought to your attention?

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct, sir.

141. General GRUNERT. Lieutenant Burr is a subordinate of yours is he?

Admiral BLOCH. He was then.

142. General GRUNERT. He was. And then he was the liaison man with the Army for the 14th Naval District, and not for the Fleet itself?

Admiral BLOCH. No; he was the 14th Naval District liaison officer.

143. General GRUNERT. Now, some questions as to these various messages received from October to December. There is one here October 16th. From that date, do you recall what that was?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, I think the 16th is about the fall of the Cabinet. That is when the Matsuoka Cabinet fell.

144. General GRUNERT. The Navy message of October 16th: (Navy message of October 16, 1941, was read as follows:)

The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which I have been directed to pass to you. Quote:

Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave [1503-B] situation. If a new cabinet is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic. If the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States. Either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and the U. S. are held responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack those two powers. View of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

Do you recall that message?

Admiral BLOCH. I remember the message.

145. General GRUNERT. That came to you through the Commander-in-Chief, or you were informed through the Commander-in-Chief?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't remember whether it was addressed to me as an information addressee or whether he gave me a copy of it, but I saw it.

146. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether General Short was informed as to that message?

Admiral BLOCH. I think he was. I didn't but I think the Commander-in-Chief did send it to him.

147. General GRUNERT. Now, the Navy message of November 24th, which reads as follows:

[1503-C] (Navy message of November 24, 1941, was read as follows:)

There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action.

Inform senior Army officers in respective areas utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action.

Do you know whether that message was transmitted to General Short or he was informed as to its contents?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not think that message was addressed to me, even. I think that was shown to me by the Commander-in-Chief. I believe he showed it to General Short. I don't know, of course.

148. General GRUNERT. Now, the Navy message of November 27, which starts out somewhat to the effect that; "This is a war warning." Do you recall that message?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, I recall it.

149. General FRANK. This last message is from CNO to CINCPF. Admiral BLOCH. That is the Commander-in-Chief Pacific.

150. General GRUNERT. Now let me ask you what that meant to the Navy: "This is a war warning." Did that mean to you naval people that war is in the immediate offing, or what?

[1504] Admiral BLOCH. I never heard it used in that sense before, sir.

151. General GRUNERT. Had it been used before? Is that a common expression in the Navy, or for certain purposes, or what?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't know. I never heard it before, used in that sense.

152. General FRANK. In what sense?

Admiral BLOCH. "This is a war warning," beginning a dispatch. The obvious conclusion is that that is naval phraseology, and it is not naval phraseology insofar as I know.

153. General FRANK. Well, if you had never seen it before, what did it mean to you?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, this dispatch was received late afternoon 27th of November. Admiral Kimmel telephoned for me. I was not available. My Chief of Staff got it and delivered it to me that night. This was one of many dispatches of the same tenor, and the next morning I believe, the 28th of November, Admiral Kimmel had a—I went over, and he had a number of officers in his office. This dispatch was discussed, what we should do, and so forth, and Admiral Kimmel made his decisions, what he would do and what the decision of the Commander-in-Chief would be in regard to all measures.

154. General FRANK. That is Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral BLOCH. Admiral Kimmel, the Commander-in-Chief. I had no reason for reaching any independent decision. I accepted Admiral Kimmel's decision; and furthermore, I had no information other than what he had, or any information that caused me to disagree with his conclusions.

[1505] 155. General FRANK. Well, you certainly had some professional reaction, having been in the Navy for 35 years.

Admiral BLOCH. Longer than that, sir.

(Message of November 27, 1941, was read as follows:)

156. General GRUNERT. This particular message of November 27th starts out by saying,

Consider this dispatch a war warning.

and continues:

Negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have failed. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. Amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 only. American Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and army authorities. British to be informed by navy.

Do you know whether this message was transmitted or the information therein transmitted to General Short?

Admiral BLOCH. The message was not addressed to me. I think in the body of the message it directs the Commander-in-Chief to show to the Commanding General.

157. General GRUNERT. Was General Short present at any [1506] discussion of this message; do you know?

Admiral BLOCH. I believe he was at a subsequent date, not on the 27th.

158. General GRUNERT. That was on the 27th?

Admiral BLOCH. No; it came late in the afternoon.

159. General GRUNERT. Do you recall the Army message of November 27th?

Admiral BLOCH. I have seen it.

160. General GRUNERT. Which reads as follows:

Army message of November 27, 1941, was read as follows:)

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and try to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential elements.

[1507] I understand there was a conference held on November 27th at which Admiral Kimmel and you, and, I believe, General Marshall and Colonel Mollison were present. Do you recall that conference?

Admiral BLOCH. I believe there was a conference held on the forenoon of the 27th.

161. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether at that time this message had been received?

Admiral BLOCH. It had not.

162. General GRUNERT. It had not?

Admiral BLOCH. No.

163. General GRUNERT. Had the message of November 27 been received?

Admiral BLOCH. No, it had not.

164. General GRUNERT. Then why the conference? What was it about?

Admiral BLOCH. Oh, something about island bases.

165. General GRUNERT. Then that was a discussion of the extension?

Admiral BLOCH. Something about planes, and soldiers going down and taking the place of the Marines' guns at Canton.

166. General FRANK. That was something about Midway and Wake.

Admiral BLOCH. And these conferences were frequently called by the Commander-in-Chief, with an agenda, but it was never confined to that agenda. Before we got through, we had usually talked and "boxed the compass."

167. General GRUNERT. Were these two messages of November 27, the Navy message, which starts out "consider this a war warning," and this Army message, which I have just read to [1508] you, ever the subject of a conference on that date, or subsequent thereto, that you know of?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't believe I ever saw the Army message, until the Navy Department repeated it to the Commander-in-Chief; and then I was furnished a copy.

168. General GRUNERT. That Navy message of the 27th said that the Chief of Staff, or the War Department—something to that effect—"is sending a similar message to the Army"?

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct.

169. General GRUNERT. Evidently, this message of November 27 was intended to be that "similar message"?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

170. General GRUNERT. Although differently worded?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. I think we got that on the 28th. We got it repeated by the Chief of Naval Operations to us on the 28th, and I believe that on November 28, a conference was had in the office of Admiral Kimmel, when the Navy dispatch of November 27 was discussed, and he reached his decisions as to what he would do.

171. General GRUNERT. We have had testimony to the effect that immediately after the conference on November 27, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, General Short, went back to his headquarters and made a decision on this message which we just read, and decided to go on Alert No. 1 for sabotage.

Admiral BLOCH. Well, my recollection is that the Navy dispatch did not arrive at Pearl Harbor, until somewhere around 4 or 4:30 in the afternoon, Honolulu time, and it is also my recollection that the conference was held in the [1509] forenoon of the 27th, and stopped about noon, or a little after noon.

172. General GRUNERT. Then neither one of these messages could have been received at that time?

Admiral BLOCH. That is my belief, sir; and I believe the conference was held the next day.

173. General GRUNERT. Are you pretty well convinced that that conference was held on the morning of the 27th, and that there was no conference held on the afternoon of the 27th?

Admiral BLOCH. That's my belief, sir.

174. General GRUNERT. And what seems to convince you that your memory is correct on that subject?

Admiral BLOCH. Because I had to go to Queen's Hospital, at 3:30 in the afternoon, to visit a patient; and I left the Yard at 3:30, and in my absence, the Navy message arrived. And I didn't know it, until my return from the hospital.

175. General GRUNERT. When did you first know of this November 27 Army message?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't believe that I saw that until the Navy Department repeated it to the Commander-in-Chief.

176. General GRUNERT. Then, as far as you know, there was no discussion of the two messages in conference?

Admiral BLOCH. I wouldn't say that, because I am quite certain that General Short sent Admiral Kimmel a copy of the Army dispatch; but I don't believe he sent me one.

177. General GRUNERT. What I am getting at is your reaction to these two messages in conference, which I understood they discussed in conference. If you do not recall any such conference, I can't get that reaction.

[1510] Admiral BLOCH. I recall a conference on November 28, and I remember that discussions were had about the navy message, and particularly there was some doubt in the minds of someone present as to what a "defensive deployment" was, because we do not use that term in the Navy. That is not one of the precise terms that we use in the naval tactics. I remember that incident, and I believe that Admiral Kimmel had made his decisions at that conference; in fact, I know he made his decisions at that conference, and decided that he would pursue the same schedules of employment that he had already had in force; which was along the lines of intensive training, material upkeep, and operations. Whether the Army message was discussed by analogy, or in comparison, I have no recollection about that; and can't supply you any information with regard to that.

178. General GRUNERT. Then you have no recollection of the measures taken by Short, on the Army message being discussed at that November 28th conference?

Admiral BLOCH. On the November 28 message?

179. General GRUNERT. No, the November 28 conference.

Admiral BLOCH. Oh, I believe General Short declared his alert on the 27th, late in the afternoon.

180. General GRUNERT. He did, but that was a matter of discussion with the Navy, later on?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't recall that.

181. General GRUNERT. That is, as to its adequacy, or as to whether or not it covered what you Navy people thought ought to be done?

Admiral BLOCH. He didn't discuss it with me. I have no [1511] recollection. I know that I knew the Army had an alert No. 1, and I have said before that I think, as I recall it, there was some confusion in my mind, that I thought maybe it was something else; but I knew it was Alert No. 1.

182. General GRUNERT. Certainly the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and you, as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, had an interest in the measures taken by the Army to protect Pearl Harbor, and I thought possibly that might have been discussed

in conference, as to whether General Short's actions in taking Alert No. 1, which was just for sabotage, was enough to protect your Navy and the fleet, or what variations of it there might be in Pearl Harbor.

Admiral BLOCH. I think that the Commander-in-Chief's reactions on this should be obtained from him, sir.

183. General GRUNERT. But your reactions?

Admiral BLOCH. I have no recollection of any discussion on that.

184. General GRUNERT. Are you at liberty to tell us about WPL-46, or would that disclose information that might be of value to the enemy?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, so far as I remember it, I can tell you. I think it is secret, but I don't think it has any particular bearing on this war, now.

185. General GRUNERT. In other words, this message of November 27 says:

You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned by WPL-46 only.

So it is of interest to the Board to know what "defensive deployments only" you could take.

[1512] Admiral BLOCH. Well, the Army, like the Navy, is a service in which they necessarily must use very precise terms, very precise terminology, particularly those relating to tactics and movements, in the Navy. It is very important because, moving ships, if they are not governed with great definiteness, it will do a good deal of damage. So far as I know, the term "defensive deployment" has never been used in any textbooks, tactical books, or tactical instructions and orders that I know of, in the Navy.

WPL-46 is a Joint War Plan. It is not only joint between the Army and the Navy, but it is based on mutual understanding with the Allied Nations; and you must have a copy of it; and while your tasks would be the Army tasks, in our WPL we have the Navy tasks, and they took the Navy Department WPL-46, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had to break that down, to get the Pacific Fleet separated in their idea. Then, I had to break it down, to get my share in it; and so forth, all the way down.

186. General FRANK. This is the first time we have run across that phraseology.

Admiral BLOCH. Now, I don't know whether you would call that the same name. The real name is "Rainbow 5." You know it by that name, unquestionably.

187. General GRUNERT. Well, that answers our question.

188. General FRANK. That answers our question. This is the first time we have had that cleared up.

189. General GRUNERT. There appear to be three more messages about which I would like to ask some questions, all three of them from the Navy to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and dated December 3, December 4, and December 6. [1513]

Admiral KIMMEL said, here:

On 3d December we have,
"OpNav informs"—

this is a paraphrase, you understand, sir.

* * * —informs CinC Asiatic, CinCPac, Combat 14-16 that highly reliable information has been received that instructions were sent Japanese diplomatic

consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Washington, and London destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn secret documents."

Do you recall that message?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

190. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether that was transmitted General Short, or the information given?

Admiral BLOCH. I did not transmit it. I do not know whether Admiral Kimmel did, or not.

191. General GRUNERT. Do you recall having had a conference on December 3 with Admiral Kimmel and General Short?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, it is pretty difficult to set the days. As I recall it, we had a conference on the forenoon of the 27th; I think there was a conference on the forenoon of the 28th—that was on Friday—I think there was a conference in Admiral Kimmel's office, on December 1. Now, I believe on December 2 and December 3 Admiral Kimmel went to General Short's office, and I didn't accompany him. That is the best of my recollection.

192. General GRUNERT. Now, there is also contained in the report of the Roberts Commission the following reference:

The Navy Department sent three messages to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet: [1514]

The first, of December 3, stated it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents.

The second, of December 4, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential documents and means of confidential communications, retaining only such as were necessary, the latter to be destroyed in the event of emergency (This was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only);

The third, of December 6, directing that in view of the tense situation, the naval command on the outlying Pacific Islands might be authorized to destroy confidential papers, then, or later; that under conditions of greater emergency, those essential to continued operation should be retained until the last moment.

Do you recall those three messages?

Admiral BLOCH. I think I do.

193. General GRUNERT. Or words to that effect?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes; I think I do.

194. General GRUNERT. You were concerned when it came to the possible destruction of documents, and so forth?

Admiral BLOCH. Not very much, sir.

195. General GRUNERT. Not as much as the Fleet Commander, I presume?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, I can't speak for him, but I wasn't much concerned.

196. General GRUNERT. By that I mean, did you have in your position certain things that should be destroyed, to keep [1515] them from getting into the possession of an enemy?

Admiral BLOCH. I had thousands of them. I was the distributing agent.

197. General GRUNERT. But you were not concerned about their getting into the hands of the enemy?

Admiral BLOCH. I had no orders to destroy any of mine.

198. General GRUNERT. Those were not orders, but they were cautions, in a way?

Admiral BLOCH. No, they were applied to a different locality.

199. General GRUNERT. You understood that did not apply to the Island of Hawaii?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't think so. I think it applied to Guam and some other place—outlying islands.

200. General GRUNERT. Is Hawaii considered an outlying island?

Admiral BLOCH. Oh, no.

201. General GRUNERT. It is not part of the mainland.

Admiral BLOCH. Well, it is a primary fleet base, at any rate.

202. General FRANK. It states, here, this was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. "for information only."

Admiral BLOCH. Which one was that?

203. General GRUNERT. That referred to the one message, evidently.

204. General FRANK. Yes.

Admiral BLOCH. The one to Guam?

205. General FRANK. "The second, of December 4, 1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential documents and means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were [1516] necessary, the latter to be destroyed in the event of emergency (This was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only);"

206. General GRUNERT. That seems to run the gamut of all the messages received that are of record.

Now, did that create any particular alarm in your mind, or what was your reaction to this combination of messages received, and of information received?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, our method of disposing of obsolete and compromised codes is to burn them. Many of them expire on certain dates, and they are burned. Moreover, although the dispatch says "categoric and authentic information," and so forth, I didn't know what the nature of the codes were, exactly where, or what the circumstances were, and I could make no intelligent deduction.

In Hawaii, located as I was, my horizon expired at the navy yard's wall. My perspective wasn't very big. I was submerged in local matters—matters of considerable importance locally. I had supreme confidence in the fact that if the Navy Department got information, knew the sources, and the reliability of the sources, that they would evaluate it and tell us what it meant.

207. General GRUNERT. Then you didn't consider these messages sent as doing that which you envisaged?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir. Furthermore, the dispatches to Guam were perfectly natural dispatches to send, because two or three times in these warning dispatches they had mentioned the possibility of Guam and the Philippines. In the dispatch of November 27 that was mentioned. Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, was never [1517] mentioned. The mere fact that they mentioned Guam and the Philippines, the only United States possessions, and didn't say anything about any other place, excluded them. Now, Guam had been mentioned several times. We knew it had no fortifications. We knew it was bound to fall. It was the only natural thing, if they had a war, to get rid of the cipher and codes. It didn't make any impression on me, at all.

208. General GRUNERT. Now, about the message. Did you consider this a war warning?

Admiral BLOCH. That is the one I was talking about—the 27th of November. It says:

Consider this a war warning.

and it went ahead, to say—

They are going to have the war in southeastern China, with possibilities of the Philippines and Guam.

209. General GRUNERT. And you just considered that as a general notice that—

A war is likely to take place, but not necessarily; and this warns you that a war is likely to hit you in Hawaii?

Admiral BLOCH. It didn't warn us, at all. It was not sent to us specifically. It was sent to four or five people, and it wasn't sent to "Admiral Kimmel," it was sent to "Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific"; it was sent to "Admiral Hart, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic;" and it was sent to "Admiral King, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic." And it went to all of them.

210. General GRUNERT. Well, in the Army we are taught that in case you have no information, you ought to be prepared for the worst; and in an outpost like Hawaii they are always supposed to be awake and prepared for anything—that is why it is an outpost, so that people on the mainland can go to sleep.

Admiral BLOCH. Well, mind you, I am not defending anything that took place, there. I am telling you what I recollect about this thing as fully and truthfully as I can, and the people to decide are someone else.

211. General GRUNERT. The gist of these messages did not create a particular war consciousness on your part?

Admiral BLOCH. Not to me.

212. General FRANK. Was the attack a complete surprise to you?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

213. General GRUNERT. Now, I have a question, here, on the subject of conferences and cooperation. In framing it, it was not intended to hurt anybody's feelings, but I would like to get the reaction.

Is it a fact that you and General Short mutually, whilst maintaining the utmost in cordial personal relationship, felt such a delicacy as to be interested in one another's affairs that neither of you really got down to the details of your respective responsibilities and inquired into each other's business, so that there was a lack of true teamwork and cooperation based upon definite factual knowledge of exactly what was happening?

Admiral BLOCH. I can't speak for General Short, of course. I can speak for myself. When I wanted to know anything, I asked him. While I felt that our cooperation was close, and while I thought our personal relations were extremely cordial, we many times had differences of opinion on a thing. I then had no more reason to believe that he was right than he—a [1519] difference of opinion.

214. General GRUNERT. As far as you were concerned, you felt that you had all the information you needed to carry out your responsibilities as to what the Army knew and was doing, is that right?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, I don't know whether I did or not. It is a pretty broad question. I felt that I knew the Army's capabilities.

For example, I knew that they didn't have the personnel that the Commanding General wanted. I didn't believe they had sufficient, either in numbers or types, of antiaircraft guns. I felt that they were deficient in bombers, numbers and types. I didn't think they had enough pursuit planes, in certain types. I think General Short knew that those were my sentiments, and I think that he tried to get the conditions improved. I don't think he tried to do it because I asked him about it, and he and I talked about it, but I think he was making an effort to do it.

Now, I want you to understand that Admiral Kimmel had a great deal of contact with General Short, and, after all, Admiral Kimmel was an Admiral, and General Short is a military general, and I was a rear admiral; and while General Short and I would have been the same level of echelon if it hadn't been there, because I had been the senior man in the Navy, and he had been the senior in the Army. He did have access to Admiral Kimmel, and Admiral Kimmel had access to him freely, and I have no criticism in the world to make of that. I think it is perfectly right and proper that they should; but, frequently about some thing he would come to me; sometimes I would talk to Admiral Kimmel about something before I would take it up with [1520] General Short, and I was sure not to get my "wires crossed."

I don't think there was any reluctance on the part of either of us to talk freely and fully and frankly, if that is what you mean.

215. General GRUNERT. That is partially what I mean, but the gist of the thing, more than anything else, is to know each other's capabilities and limitations, actually what can be done and what will be done under such capabilities and limitations. In other words, in ordinary language, outside of getting along well together and not having particular fights or anything, did you actually know each other's business to that extent where it might affect your business?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, I think that I had a very good understanding of his business as General. I couldn't understand the details of it, but in a general way, I understood his business.

216. General GRUNERT. You would not have had any hesitancy in asking him? You didn't feel that "well, that's none of my business, I ought not to butt into his," if you really thought you ought to know something for your own responsibility?

Admiral BLOCH. Oh, no; I wouldn't.

217. General GRUNERT. Have you any question?

218. General FRANK. I would like to ask one, about Bellinger. Who was Bellinger's next superior?

Admiral BLOCH. Bellinger's next superior was Vice Admiral Brown, Commander of the scouting force. Now, I may be in error, there, because at some time, Bellinger's entire command was set up in a task force—I think, task force 9—in which case he would come under Admiral Kimmel, direct—that is, for [1521] operations. Administratively, he would be under Vice Admiral Brown.

219. General FRANK. In conducting this base defense air force, under whom did he operate?

Admiral BLOCH. He was under my supervisory control, but his directives were contained in that older order, 2CL-41, I think, and he got out his operation order and his plan of operations for that base defense air force, and that was a joint agreement between Bellinger

and Martin, and I approved it, and I passed it, I authenticated it, passed it on to the Commander-in-Chief.

[1522] 220. General FRANK. Let us assume that he had violated one of the provisions of that agreement under which he was operating: Who would have taken action against him?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, it would not be under me to take disciplinary action; it would be under the Commander-in-Chief.

221. General FRANK. But the Admiral in command of the Fourteenth Naval District was the man who was responsible for carrying out the task that Bellinger was charged with carrying out, was he not?

Admiral BLOCH. Bellinger had a task, you see; he had the task, and had a supervisory control over him. Bellinger was an air man. He knew the technicalities of it. He and Martin drew up the joint estimates; he and Martin drew up the joint operations, and I passed it on to the Commander-in-Chief and approved it, and he approved it. The whole thing was approved all the way through.

222. General FRANK. Bellinger did not report to you?

Admiral BLOCH. Oh, I had certain supervisory duties in connection with him. I was called upon to designate to condition of readiness of the aircraft. That was one of my duties. My duties were specified very clearly in that order.

223. General FRANK. In what order?

Admiral BLOCH. 2-CL-41. I think you will find it in paragraph -6.

224. General GRUNERT. Who would the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet hold responsible in case something went wrong? Would he hold you or Bellinger?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not know.

225. General GRUNERT. That never happened?

Admiral BLOCH. If there was some error or omission of [1523] line he would probably have held me. If it was on the part of Bellinger he would probably have held him.

226. General GRUNERT. You do not think that he would hold you for something that Bellinger did?

Admiral BLOCH. No; I do not.

227. General RUSSELL. Admiral, I want to be very clear on this matter of reconnaissance. I believe I understand the situation. I am just going to repeat it for the purpose of confirming what I am talking about.

The only prescribed reconnaissance to be conducted by naval forces, either from Pearl Harbor or by the fleet based on Pearl Harbor, as described and set forth in this letter 2-CL-41?

Admiral BLOCH. I think that is correct, sir.

228. General RUSSELL. That letter was issued as routine in the main of command in the Navy?

Admiral BLOCH. Issued by the Commander-in-Chief; yes, sir.

229. General RUSSELL. It was not based on any agreement with the Army?

Admiral BLOCH. No, except the air agreement.

230. General RUSSELL. The air agreement you testified earlier made no reference to missions of the Army and Navy for reconnaissance?

Admiral BLOCH. That is right.

231. General RUSSELL. Therefore, the portions of this letter 2-CL-41 which relate to reconnaissance had no application to any agreement with the Army at all?

Admiral BLOCH. So far as I know, the word "reconnaissance" is not used in that letter anywhere.

232. General RUSSELL. Patrol?

Admiral BLOCH. Patrol, search.

[1524] 233. General RUSSELL. What does an air patrol go out for?

Admiral BLOCH. There is a difference between distant reconnaissance and an air patrol, because an air patrol may be restricted or may be extensive.

234. General GRUNERT. Does the word "search" cover distant reconnaissance or both close and distant?

Admiral BLOCH. It might be distant and it might be short; it might be anything.

235. General RUSSELL. Is there anything in the letter 2-CL-41 which provides for obtaining information at a distance from Hawaii—call it distant reconnaissance or distant patrol or what?

Admiral BLOCH. I think not. May I look at that just one second?

236. General RUSSELL. Certainly (handing a paper to the witness).

Admiral BLOCH. No. So far as I know, the word "reconnaissance" is not used in that order.

237. General RUSSELL. Is there any language used in there relating to patrols that might be analogized to distant reconnaissance?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes; in paragraph (B) I think, it says that Patrol Wing 2 shall search assigned operating areas and vicinity prior to entry therein by operating forces in early morning, and that an air patrol shall be established at least two hours prior to the sortie of the first heavy ship, and so forth.

238. General RUSSELL. But the distant patrolling which may be analogized to distant reconnaissance was directed under the provisions of this letter 2-CL-41 for the protection of the fleet, [1525] or elements of the Pacific Fleet, after it had gone away from the base at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not quite get that, sir.

239. General RUSSELL. I was just quoting what you referred to a moment ago.

Admiral BLOCH. That is done every day; that is something that is done every day.

240. General RUSSELL. These planes went out every morning, then?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. I think three patrol planes went out every morning and searched the operating areas for enemy vessels and submarines. But I would not call that reconnaissance because I think probably 200 miles or 300 miles would cover the whole radius.

241. General RUSSELL. And the purpose of that patrolling was to clear areas in which elements of the fleet were going to operate?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

242. General GRUNERT. It had no particular relation, then, to patrolling for the defense of Hawaii?

Admiral BLOCH. No; it was for a specific purpose. I might say that if you have a distant reconnaissance, as I understand it, it is something that you send out during a period every day. You start it out as early as you can in the morning and run it out 600 or 700 or 800 miles and turn them around and they would come back and form a pattern. That would be predicated on a mathematical solution of the problem. But if you went that far, or if there were any enemies seen, they could not possibly get in to attack you before you started out the next morning.

[1526] 243. General GRUNERT. That is my conception.

Admiral BLOCH. And that is my conception of a distant reconnaissance. That was not done, and I was not the person to do it, because I did not have the tools to do it.

244. General RUSSELL. Where is contained the agreement that the Army's and the Navy's mission is to search for hostile transport or movement of troops and destroy them?

Admiral BLOCH. I am not acquainted with that mission. Where is that, sir?

245. General RUSSELL. I understood you to testify in answer to a question by General Grunert that it was the mission of the Navy to discover hostile convoys at a distance from Hawaii and to destroy them.

Admiral BLOCH. I do not remember that, sir.

246. General GRUNERT. The question I asked was this: Was it the Navy's mission to locate and destroy hostile naval task forces?

Admiral BLOCH. And I said that when the air raid alarm sounds all of the fighters went to the Army and all of the heavy ships went to the Navy, and the Navy went out to search and to attack the naval force, and the Army planes broke up the air attacks that came overland. That was my answer.

247. General RUSSELL. Let us talk cases for a moment. Let us assume that there was a hostile task force in the Marshalls and that that task force left the Marshalls for a point at which it could launch airplanes and attack our naval base. When did it become the Navy's duty to search out that task force and destroy it, if ever?

Admiral BLOCH. Would we know whether it left the Marshalls?

248. General RUSSELL. Assuming that you did not know that it [1527] had left the Marshalls?

Admiral BLOCH. Then our knowing the presence or imminence of an attack would depend on the information we got as to when this task force arrived at some given point.

249. General FRANK. Actually, there had not existed a reconnaissance defense of Oahu at any time, had there?

Admiral BLOCH. I think we had done it in fleet maneuvers and exercises and found that the number of P. B. Y.'s we had could not do it. They would break down and we would always lose a lot of them. We did not have enough. Of course at this particular time you are discussing now there was a squadron of planes and they did make a reconnaissance on this very same Sunday forenoon. Admiral Halsey had a task force some 200 miles west of Oahu, and I believe that he had a large reconnaissance fleet of his own out searching. Admiral Brown was 400 miles southeast of Midway, and he conducted recon-

naissance with aircraft. So there were reconnaissances in particular localities going out.

250. General FRANK. But those two task forces were making reconnaissances which were a part of the operation of those two task forces?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes; clearing the waters for themselves; that is right.

251. General FRANK. But so far as there having been a reconnaissance for the actual protection of Oahu, such continuous reconnaissance had not been done?

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct; and that was a matter subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. I think that might as well be clear. He would be the man to order that, in my opinion.

252. General RUSSELL. Admiral, just one other subject that I [1528] want to ask you about. When witnesses are asked about making reconnaissance with regard to the mandated islands they always say that they had no success at all, that they could not get in there. I am just wondering if, in your experience out in the Pacific, you were ever interested in efforts to get into the mandated islands and find out what was going on there.

Admiral BLOCH. General, I would like to get the premises straightened out. You are talking about reconnaissance, and the question was asked me, did we ever get intelligence from them. We may mean the same thing, but they are different words.

253. General RUSSELL. I think we have dealt with premises too much. I can state what I am thinking about without quibbling.

Admiral BLOCH. You mean, somebody to go ashore in the mandated islands and get some information?

254. General RUSSELL. That is right.

Admiral BLOCH. That information, when it comes to us, is intelligence.

255. General RUSSELL. But that is not what I was asking you about. I was asking you as to efforts which had been made under your supervision to get such information in the mandated islands.

Admiral BLOCH. I do not think that I was ever in a position to make an effort to get such information in the mandated islands. I know that an effort was made to get information from the mandates without success.

256. General RUSSELL. Do you know what those efforts were?

Admiral BLOCH. I know that the Navy Department asked the Government of Japan to permit certain ships going to the westward and coming to the eastward of Hawaii, to the Philippines, to go in there and anchor, calling attention to the fact that [1529] we permitted them to have tankers and things come to Hawaii and Oahu; but they always refused to permit us to go in there.

257. General RUSSELL. Were those applications made directly by the Navy Department, or did they go through the State Department?

Admiral BLOCH. Through the State Department.

258. General RUSSELL. And that was a general application to be permitted to use those ports?

Admiral BLOCH. No; I think it was a specific application for specific ships at specific times.

259. General RUSSELL. And those applications were always turned down?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes. I think we did get a ship in there around 1929 or thereabouts. I believe one of the cruisers got into one of the ports in there at some time.

260. General RUSSELL. That was about 12 years prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

261. General RUSSELL. Admiral, I have been interested in the line of questioning of General Grunert about the cooperation out there between the Army and Navy, the actual tactical cooperation. Were you out there in 1940?

Admiral BLOCH. I arrived there in April, 1940.

262. General RUSSELL. At some time in July the Army forces went on an all-out alert, in 1940?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

263. General RUSSELL. Do you remember that?

Admiral BLOCH. I remember all about it.

264. General RUSSELL. The Navy did not go on an alert at that time? [1530] Admiral BLOCH. No.

265. General RUSSELL. It came to pass that the Army would operate on a defensive all-out alert, and that the procedure in the Navy would not be changed at all?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not know about that feature, but I will say this, that in the summer of 1940 the Commanding General came to me one day and said he had received instructions from the War Department to go on an all-out alert against a raid from the west or northwest. He said, "This is not a drill; I do not think it is a drill. It is the real thing, because it came from the Chief of Staff, and I want to know what you know about it." I said, "I have never heard of it." He said—and I think you better listen to this, because it is right up the alley you have been inquiring about.

266. General RUSSELL. I am listening.

Admiral BLOCH. He said, "I think we ought to have a distant reconnaissance." I said, "I agree with you, but I cannot order it. We will go to see the Senior Officer Present." The Commander-in-Chief was at sea, so we took a car and went to see Vice Admiral Andrews, and I told him what I thought in general terms, and told him about this, and Admiral Andrews gave the order for, I think, a 600-mile reconnaissance. I do not think he had enough aircraft to make it all the way around, but he made it to the north and northwest where the attack was indicated. That was ordered and put into effect by the Senior Officer Present, and the Commander-in-Chief, who was at sea, was informed and he flew in that night. He did not know about it, and he came in. He did not know where he stood. He sent a dispatch to the Navy Department, told them the circumstances and asked them about it, and to the best of my belief and knowledge [1531] they never answered him.

267. General RUSSELL. To make this illustration that we are thinking about a little clearer, on November 27 the Commander-in-Chief had a war warning message. A few hours earlier General Short had received a message of November 27 telling him that anything might be expected. Each was supreme in his own sphere then to place such interpretations as they might see fit and take such action as they saw fit, without respect to the other?

Admiral BLOCH. That is what the Roberts Commission said.

268. General RUSSELL. I am asking you if that is what happened.

Admiral BLOCH. I do not have all the evidence before me that the Roberts Commission had.

269. General RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department took those messages and pursued separate courses without reference to the other?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not know. But I will say this: It is very simple to sit here today, two and a half years later, with the facts no longer clear in your mind—and I have only a fair memory, not any too good—and to say what you would have done or what somebody else should have done. But I was out there at the time. I knew Admiral Kimmel very well. I had known him for years, and I saw him very frequently. I do not know of any man who had worked harder or more devotedly. God knows he spent enough time with General Short, and if they did not understand each other I don't know why.

270. General RUSSELL. The last question I asked was not directed to that point. It was merely to illustrate the fact, if it is a fact, that each was free to act on the information which he received without reference to what the other did.

[1532] 271. General FRANK. As had been done in the year previous.

272. General RUSSELL. As had been done in 1940.

Admiral BLOCH. And it was done afterwards.

273. General RUSSELL. Then that was the situation?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, I find that I know very little about this thing. I only told what I know myself, but I was really quite a small element of the whole big thing.

274. General FRANK. To get back to distant reconnaissance again, Admiral: In this Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, paragraph 18, treating of the responsibility of the Navy, it says:

The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

- (a) An inshore patrol.
- (b) An offshore patrol.

And in paragraph i it says:

Distant reconnaissance.

You have stated that you could not provide distant reconnaissance because you did not have the planes with which to do it?

Admiral BLOCH. I did not have any planes assigned to the local defense forces.

275. General FRANK. What happened immediately after December 7?

Admiral BLOCH. I believe a search or daily reconnaissance was made. They used everything they had, Army B-17's, Navy P.B.Y.'s, anything they had; and I think they even used those old B-18's by putting them in the southeast sector where they only had to go a couple of hundred miles.

276. General FRANK. Were there any additional Navy planes furnished from the mainland?

[1533] Admiral BLOCH. Oh, yes.

277. General FRANK. Do you remember about how many?

Admiral BLOCH. No; I do not. That would not come under me. I know some came out, and a lot of B-17's came out almost immediately.

278. General FRANK. Did not the Navy give you some P. B. Y.'s from the coast with which to conduct this reconnaissance immediately after December 7th?

Admiral BLOCH. Almost immediately after December 7th the principle of unity of command went into effect. I think just a few days afterwards the Navy began to send P. B. Y.'s out, and a great many of them that had been damaged on December 7th were repaired and made serviceable. The Army sent quite a number of B-17's out. I cannot speak authoritatively, because this did not come under me at that time, even though the war was on—I think Admiral Bellinger was told to run these in, and I think he did.

279. General FRANK. What I was about to bring out was the fact that there were planes made available right after December 7 which, had they been available prior to December 7, would have made it possible for reconnaissance to have taken place?

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct. But the distant reconnaissances that we made after December 7th were made jointly with Army and Navy planes. If they had had those planes prior to December 7th they could have made reconnaissance had they so desired.

280. General FRANK. But prior to December 7th there was not a defensive reconnaissance in force?

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct, sir.

281. General GRUNERT. Then, even though that joint plan was signed by you, when they came to carry it out you had no say about the distant reconnaissance?

Admiral BLOCH. That is right, sir. As a matter of fact, I did not have a staff or facilities for doing it. It took a great big staff, a lot of communications and facilities. We had those facilities under Rear Admiral Bellinger, and it would have been stupid to set up another duplicate thing.

282. General GRUNERT. I have a general question, a question of opinion. Had the staff of the Admiral of the fleet and the staff of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department sat alongside of each other, as they probably had to do under unity of command, would there have been better results, in your opinion?

Admiral BLOCH. Of course they never did sit alongside of each other. They could not get any establishment large enough to take them and have it located in a position—

283. General GRUNERT (interposing). I really meant the heads.

Admiral BLOCH. We got a directive from the War and Navy Departments to establish a joint operating center, I believe it was called, and we used some tunnels in a hill up at Aliamarru. I had a tunnel up there and had some officers up there and some communications. They have been in operation now since February, 1942. I do not think they have ever been worth ten cents. I think that the stimulus we needed was to get geared for war; and we got that on December 7th.

284. General GRUNERT. Have you anything else that you can think of which might contribute any assistance toward getting at facts, anything which you think the Board should know and consider outside of what you have given us already?

[1535] Admiral BLOCH. Well, we have discussed numbers of features relating to distant reconnaissance, joint air plans, and telegrams, and whether I knew about the capabilities of the Army and whether they knew about my capabilities. Of course I can't answer that question, but I don't know what else you want to know, General Grunert. There may be some other things, but I can't think of anything else at this time.

285. General GRUNERT. I did not know but what something stood out in your mind as something special or peculiar or something that probably you thought that an Army Board might think of to go into. I do not mean about naval operations or anything like that, because we want to get information about the facts insofar as the Army is concerned and anything that is connected therewith which will give us light on this subject. That is all.

Admiral BLOCH. Well, I think that it is pertinent to say here that all my views—and my views are rather expansive on the number of anti-aircraft guns that were required to defend a given place—have been altered greatly. One of our big battleships today probably carries more barrels of anti-aircraft guns than they had in all Hawaii on the 7th of December. That may be a slight exaggeration. I think that one of our battleships has 170 barrels. Maybe the Army and Navy together, they had more than 170 barrels together. Two battleships would probably meet the bill.

286. General GRUNERT. Admiral, it may not be so much what they had; it is what they did with what they did have.

Admiral BLOCH. I agree with you there, sir. I agree with you there.

[1536] 287. General GRUNERT. If there are no other questions—

288. General FRANK. From whom did you have to ask for these planes for your force there?

Admiral BLOCH. You mean the patrol planes?

289. General FRANK. Yes. The Navy Department?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, the Navy Department instituted what they called a 15,000-plane program. I think it was in 1940 when they got the money for the 15,000-plane program. You would probably know that better than I. And in that 15,000-plane program they had so many PBYS, and to the 14th Naval District they allocated I think 108, and to the Fleet I think they allocated 150 or something like that. At that time the Fleet only had 81, I think.

Now, the planes for the 14th Naval District, I was quite persistent in trailing them, pursuing them, and trying to get them, and everybody knew, the Commander-in-Chief knew; all the correspondence went through him, because that was a line of business that I conducted through him, and he supported me. The correspondence went to the Navy Department asking for these planes, and I was told repeatedly they would be given to me but they would not be given to me until sometime that was indefinite in the future.

290. General FRANK. That was a question of appropriation?

Admiral BLOCH. No, it was not a question of appropriation. It was a question of priorities: The war was in the Atlantic; the Pacific wasn't in the war. That is the expression of war plan. They say it in the war plan: The war is in the Atlantic; the Pacific is a more or less quasi-defensive until they get around to it.

1537] 291. General GRUNERT. Well, Admiral, we appreciate very much your giving us of your time and assistance.

Admiral BLOCH. Thank you very much. I hope I have been of some assistance, and I hope I have made myself understood.

292. General GRUNERT. I think you have.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

Thereupon, at 6:35 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of business for the day and proceeded to other business.)

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
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HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
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
PART 28

PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

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Wisconsin

COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*

GERHARD A. GESELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*

JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*

JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, *General Counsel*

SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, *Associate General Counsel*

JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*

LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

	Pages	Transcript Pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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539] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF BENJAMIN L. STILPHEN, BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

Major CLAUSEN. Sir, the Recorder will not be here for a little while, I will act as Recorder.

(The witness was sworn by the Assistant Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Major CLAUSEN. Will you state to the Board your name?

Mr. STILPHEN. Benjamin L. Stilphen.

2. Major CLAUSEN. And your address?

Mr. STILPHEN. My address is 109 Jarolemon Street, Brooklyn, New York.

[1540] 3. Major CLAUSEN. What is your occupation?

Mr. STILPHEN. I am handling industrial relations with the Sinclair Corporation.

4. Major CLAUSEN. In 1941, Mr. Stilphen, were you employed by the United States Engineering Department?

Mr. STILPHEN. The Office of the Chief of Engineers; yes, sir.

5. Major CLAUSEN. What were your duties specifically in August 1941?

Mr. STILPHEN. My duties were somewhat varied. I was generally sort of a "trouble-shooter" and expediter in handling the labor field. I was classified as a lawyer, but the law had a small part in what I did. I was a liaison labor man; that is what I was. I also did expediting and "trouble-shooting" for them.

6. Major CLAUSEN. Are you admitted to the bar?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir. I am a member of the District Court here in Washington, D. C., and of the Court of Appeals.

7. Major CLAUSEN. Were you acquainted in August 1941 with one Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir.

9. Major CLAUSEN. Were you acquainted at that time with Theodore Wyman, Jr.?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir.

10. Major CLAUSEN. Were you acquainted with a John Martin, [1541] attorney for Mr. Rohl?

Mr. STILPHEN. I met Mr. Martin.

11. Major CLAUSEN. When did you meet him?

Mr. STILPHEN. It was sometime in the summer of 1941.

12. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall exactly, with regard to August 28, 1941, when you met Mr. Martin?

Mr. STILPHEN. Well, I was sitting at my desk, and Colonel Lorence and Colonel Gesler sent a message out and asked me to come into their office; and Mr. Martin was with them.

13. Major CLAUSEN. He was in the office with Colonel Gesler?

Mr. STILPHEN. And Colonel Lorence.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Could you tell me approximately when that was in 1941?

Mr. STILPHEN. I have not the slightest idea. It was in the summer-time sometime; that is all I can remember.

15. General FRANK. Who was Colonel Lorence?

Mr. STILPHEN. Colonel Lorence was Walter E. Lorence; he was the assistant to Colonel Gesler in the Office of the Chief of Engineers. It was the finance section.

16. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Stilphen, I show you our Exhibit No. 2, which is a photostatic copy of a letter, and ask you whether you have seen the original of that before.

Mr. STILPHEN (after examining copy referred to). It sounds suspiciously like something that I might have written.

17. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recognize that as having been prepared by yourself?

Mr. STILPHEN. Frankly, I do not, but I have a general idea that I wrote it; yes, sir.

[1542] 18. Major CLAUSEN. Can you tell me whether the talk you had with John Martin was before the letter was prepared?

Mr. STILPHEN. Oh, yes.

19. Major CLAUSEN. About how long before? You said you met him in the summer of 1941.

Mr. STILPHEN. I do not know. Several days elapsed, because I had to investigate a case between the time I met Martin and the time this letter was written.

20. General FRANK. What was Martin's mission in there?

21. Major CLAUSEN. I was just going to ask that, General.

When you met Mr. Martin you say he was in the office of Colonel Gesler and Colonel Lorence. Tell us what was said by those officers to you and Mr. Martin at that time.

Mr. STILPHEN. I was called in and introduced to Mr. Martin and, in substance, they said that a Colonel Wyman, whose name I knew but whom I had never met personally, who was in charge of certain construction for the Corps of Engineers in Hawaii, had written, wired, telephoned, or communicated in some way with the Office of the Chief of Engineers stating that this man Mr. Martin represented—that his services were necessary to completion of these projects out there; that

he was one of the foremost construction engineers of the world, and they had to have him out there.

Mr. Martin was introduced as counsel for this man Rohl, and said he was back here on other business but had been asked by Mr. Rohl, after a consultation in some way or another—I don't know how—that Wyman had been asked to come down to the War Department to see the officers in charge to see if something [1543] could be done about getting Rohl's citizenship papers expedited, because at that time there was some sort of a regulation that an alien could not leave the country. So he had to have citizenship papers.

I might add that Mr. Martin, I was told, was back here on other business and stopped in to see what could be done about this thing.

22. Major CLAUSEN. Who told you that, Mr. Stilphen—Colonel Gesler or Colonel Lorence?

Mr. STILPHEN. I think it was Colonel Lorence, if I am not mistaken; I would not be too sure about it.

23. Major CLAUSEN. What were your instructions with regard to this?

Mr. STILPHEN. To take Mr. Martin out and find out from him his idea of the case, what it was all about, and then to see if I could not do something about it.

24. Major CLAUSEN. What did you do?

Mr. STILPHEN. I took Mr. Martin out to my desk and sat him down and got Rohl's full name, his address, and his background, on paper, and then I called the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. I am very hazy about this business. I will try to recollect it the best I can. If I remember correctly, I could not get hold of anybody at that time. I talked to some girl. So I told Mr. Martin that I would take care of it, but I could not get hold of anybody then.

25. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ask Martin why he did not go down to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization himself and do this?

[1544] Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir. My instructions were to do something about it.

26. Major CLAUSEN. Was anything said at this meeting as to why John Martin should not go down himself and take care of getting his client's citizenship papers expedited if he could?

27. General FRANK. Who gave you these instructions—Lorence or Gesler?

Mr. STILPHEN. It was one of them, or both. I think it was Lorence, as a matter of fact.

28. Major CLAUSEN. Did Mr. Martin tell you why it was that while the petition for naturalization was filed on January 15, 1941, here it was August 1941, and still it had not been granted?

Mr. STILPHEN. I found that out. I found out that that was the usual paper work procedure.

After I did get hold of the proper party at the Department of Justice, I was informed that his papers were in final form, but that the usual red tape—he was in a certain line of precedence. At the time he filed his application here there might be ten other people filing their applications, and fifteen might be before him. His case was completed, but it was a question of taking his papers off the top of the stack and putting them on the bottom of the stack.

29. Major CLAUSEN. But nothing other than that?

Mr. STILPHEN. That is correct; that they had completed the investigation and had nothing against him.

30. Major CLAUSEN. Who told you that?

Mr. STILPHEN. Somebody in the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. I have not the slightest recollection of who [1545] it was.

31. Major CLAUSEN. Was it the Commissioner?

Mr. STILPHEN. I talked to somebody in his office.

32. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall whether John Martin told you that there was nothing against this Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Mr. STILPHEN. First of all, we had a recommendation as to Rohl's character from Wyman.

33. Major CLAUSEN. What kind of a recommendation was it?

Mr. STILPHEN. That he was of excellent character, above reproach, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

34. Major CLAUSEN. Was that in writing?

Mr. STILPHEN. It was some sort of a communication; I do not know whether it was in writing, telegram, or telephone conversation.

35. Major CLAUSEN. Did you hear that over in the Office of the Chief of Engineers?

Mr. STILPHEN. I remember getting that in the Office of the Chief of Engineers.

36. Major CLAUSEN. From whom?

Mr. STILPHEN. The impression I have is that I got it from Colonel Lorence. Whether he had the document or whether he had a telephone call from Wyman, or what it was all about, I don't know.

37. Major CLAUSEN. If you got it from Colonel Lorence, was Colonel Gesler there?

Mr. STILPHEN. I cannot remember.

38. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have other talks before you went to the telephone to phone the Bureau? Did you have other talks with either Colonel Lorence or Colonel Gesler concerning it?

[1546] Mr. STILPHEN. Not outside of my original talk that I have already mentioned.

39. Major CLAUSEN. You must have gotten this information while you were in that office.

Mr. STILPHEN. I would say that would be a reasonable inference.

40. Major CLAUSEN. Is that the first case you ever had of getting citizenship papers for somebody?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes; it was the first case of that kind.

41. Major CLAUSEN. It was very unusual for you to ask for citizenship expedition; is that correct?

Mr. STILPHEN. I did not consider it unusual. I just thought it was another routine matter at that time. It was in August of 1941, and people were not quite as excited then as they are now.

42. Major CLAUSEN. But you had never had that kind of a routine matter presented to you, had you?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir.

43. General GRUNERT. Have you had any since?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

44. General GRUNERT. In your same position?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir. That was with the Navy Department.

5. Major CLAUSEN. Did Mr. Martin tell you that Hans Wilhelm Rohl had falsely documented some vessels and would have to pay a fee of \$25,000 before he could receive favorable consideration?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir; he did not tell me anything about that.

6. Major CLAUSEN. Did he tell you anything at all about an investigation by the F. B. I.?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir; he did not.

7. Major CLAUSEN. After you had this first talk with this unknown party down at the Bureau of Immigration, what did you next do?

Mr. STILPHEN. I waited to hear from them again. They were going to look up the case, and I subsequently heard from them, and, to the best of my recollection, I was informed that this case was all complete; it was just a matter of routine paper work.

8. Major CLAUSEN. You mean you had, then, only two telephone calls?

Mr. STILPHEN. I think I went over there in person once, if I remember correctly.

9. Major CLAUSEN. When you went over in person whom did you see?

Mr. STILPHEN. I cannot remember.

10. Major CLAUSEN. Did you go down to the Department of Justice Building?

Mr. STILPHEN. I went down to the Department of Justice Building.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Did you report back to your superiors what you had been informed?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes. By the way: Pardon me if I am interrupting you, but the reason for that letter was that I was requested to write that letter by whomever I talked to in the Department of Justice.

12. Major CLAUSEN. When you went down to the Department of Justice were you told substantially the things you have set forth in this letter? [1548]

Mr. STILPHEN. I would say so, yes. In other words, I brought out what Colonel Wyman had said it was essential to have Mr. Rohl in Hawaii for the completion of these defense projects; and I imagine went into his background, and so on.

13. Major CLAUSEN. In connection with the letter itself, you knew at this work that was to be done by Mr. Rohl was secret work?

Mr. STILPHEN. I knew it was defense work of some sort. I did not know what type it was.

14. Major CLAUSEN. I invite your attention to this sentence of the letter:

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question.

What was the basis for that, Mr. Stilphen?

Mr. STILPHEN. The statements by Wyman, and then this investigation that I found out about that had been completed over at the Department of Justice.

15. Major CLAUSEN. It says in the letter that the petition was filed January 15, 1941. This letter is dated August 28. Do you know whether or not Wyman made more than one request?

Mr. STILPHEN. I do not know that, sir.

16. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know when the first request was made by Wyman?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir.

57. Major CLAUSEN. Did you talk about this with General Robins?
[1549] Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir.

58. Major CLAUSEN. Did you talk about it with General Kingman?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir.

59. Major CLAUSEN. In connection with the sentence which I just read:

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question.

Is it your intent to say that the investigation that was made resulted in that conclusion?

Mr. STILPHEN. The investigation and the recommendations of Wyman, and this investigation that I made that I just previously mentioned, about the Department of Justice.

60. General FRANK. Did the instructions to you convey the thought that they wanted this matter gotten through in a hurry?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

61. General FRANK. Was a result of that the lack of thorough investigation of Rohl before this letter was accomplished?

Mr. STILPHEN. That is rather a difficult question to answer specifically. I would say that the Corps of Army Engineers would not have adequate facilities, in my opinion, to thoroughly investigate Rohl. It would have to take somebody else's opinion. Those opinions would be of people that knew him personally or had been associated with him, such as Wyman; and then the investigation made by the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, whose business it is to investigate these people, these aliens.

62. General FRANK. Did you realize at that time that this man [1550] was a German alien?

Mr. STILPHEN. Oh, yes; I recognized that.

63. Major CLAUSEN. Did you also realize that the letter would be presented to the Court and would have very persuasive power with the Court in granting the petition?

Mr. STILPHEN. No. My idea of using the letter, as I previously mentioned, was that I was requested by the Department of Justice, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, that they would like to have a letter requesting that these papers be expedited. That was the reason for that letter.

64. General FRANK. Were you in this position, that you were called in and told something about this as a "go-getter," and you were then operating under two controls, namely, to get something done about this, if possible, and write that letter, or, rather, first to find out the story about Rohl, and then to write the letter?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

65. General FRANK. Could you, in the zealously of haste have slighted somewhat the question of the investigation of Rohl before you wrote that letter?

Mr. STILPHEN. Generally speaking, that is a fair statement; but when I received my instructions there was no question at that time of writing a letter. The idea was to get this thing fixed up if possible, and the letter came up after I investigated the matter over at the Department of Justice, because they wanted a letter. But I of course would not be competent or qualified and would not have the necessary

facilities to investigate Rohl. I was not in a position to be able to investigate Rohl personally. I would have to rely upon [1551] other agencies and other people.

66. General FRANK. Did the fact that you in person were not going to sign the letter, but it was somebody else's onus, lead you to be careless at all about what you put into it?

Mr. STILPHEN. No. If I was writing a letter for someone else's signature it would be the same as writing it for my signature. I would never worry about the onus.

67. General GRUNERT. While we are on the subject of that particular paragraph of the letter about Rohl's loyalty, why did you consider it was necessary at all to put that in, if you were just going to write a letter to attempt to expedite the consideration of his case?

Mr. STILPHEN. I suspect you would call that a little "window-dressing," General.

68. General GRUNERT. A little persuasion or a little influence, in any way?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

69. Major CLAUSEN. So that there will not be any mistake about it, up in the upper right-hand corner are the initials "B. L. S."

Mr. STILPHEN. Those are my initials.

70. Major CLAUSEN. You have no question in your mind now that you prepared that letter, have you?

Mr. STILPHEN. I am convinced of that.

71. Major CLAUSEN. Let me invite your attention to this sentence:

The qualifications of Mr. Rohl are of vital importance to the expeditious completion of the general construction project because of his [1552] peculiar qualifications.

What peculiar qualifications were you informed that Mr. Rohl possessed?

Mr. STILPHEN. He was one of the foremost construction engineers in the world, I was told, and it was absolutely necessary that he be sent to Hawaii for the completion of these so-called defense projects.

72. Major CLAUSEN. Who told you that?

Mr. STILPHEN. I got that by somebody from Wyman. I don't know whether I got it from this communication of Colonel Lorence, but from somebody around there somewhere.

73. Major CLAUSEN. Did you get it at the time you had this preliminary meeting with Mr. Martin, Colonel Gesler, and Colonel Lorence?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes.

74. Major CLAUSEN. Is your memory refreshed at all as to when the conversation occurred with respect to the date of this letter, August 28, 1941?

Mr. STILPHEN. It might have been perhaps a week before or two weeks. I seem to be able to associate it with the fact that the letter was written—some sort of a period of time elapsed between the meeting and the writing of the letter. It might have been a period of days or a period of a week or two weeks; I just can't remember. Too many things have happened since that time.

75. Major CLAUSEN. At any rate, on the date when you had this meeting, was Martin there when you phoned the Department?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes; he sat at my desk.

76. Major CLAUSEN. Was it in this telephone conversation that [1553] you were asked to go down and see the Immigration Department?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir. I could not get hold of the proper party; he was not in, or something. I talked to a girl—I remember that—and stated that I wanted to get some information about an immigration case. I think she said that I would have to “come down here.” So nothing more was said on the telephone.

77. Major CLAUSEN. When did you go down?

Mr. STILPHEN. That day. If I remember correctly, this meeting occurred in the morning. That is when I first met Martin and was called in to Colonel Lorence’s office. I don’t think he sat any longer at my desk than perhaps five or ten minutes. I got Rohl’s full name and his address from him, and tried to develop something from him about his background, as to the kind of work he did, and what projects he had worked on. So I am sure it did not take longer than ten or fifteen minutes.

78. Major CLAUSEN. Then you went down there in the afternoon?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes.

79. Major CLAUSEN. This party that you saw in the afternoon: Do you remember his title?

Mr. STILPHEN. I don’t remember a thing.

80. Major CLAUSEN. You told General Grunert that you had other cases afterwards. Did you see the same party afterwards?

Mr. STILPHEN. I did not have other cases afterwards in Washington, D. C. I had other cases when I was with the Navy at New York.

81. Major CLAUSEN. In any event, inviting your attention again to this letter, it says:

It is therefore requested that the granting [1554] of those final citizenship papers be expedited.

Was that the topic of discussion in this conference you had with Colonel Gesler, Colonel Lorence, and Mr. Martin?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

82. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, they wanted the application granted?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, they stated it was very important to get it done.

83. Major CLAUSEN. The question of investigating to see whether it should be granted before you wrote the letter was not brought up; is that right?

Mr. STILPHEN. I would not say that exactly. If I remember correctly, I was to look up the case to see what it was all about and, if it was possible to get it done, to get it done.

84. Major CLAUSEN. After you had this first talk down at the Department of Justice, did you ever see this party again that you talked with?

Mr. STILPHEN. No; it was a telephone conversation.

85. Major CLAUSEN. I thought you said that you went down there after the telephone conversation.

Mr. STILPHEN. I did.

86. Major CLAUSEN. The next thing that happened was when you prepared this letter?

Mr. STILPHEN. That is right.

87. Major CLAUSEN. How long did you talk with this party, Mr. Stilphen?

Mr. STILPHEN. I was down there at the Department of Justice on all kinds of business in those days. I had a tax [1555] case in Alaska. They had some school tax law where they could imprison people that did not pay, and they had half of the construction force in jail. I was down there on that, and I was down on all sorts of things.

88. Major CLAUSEN. It sticks in your mind that Mr. Martin was in your office for only five minutes?

Mr. STILPHEN. I just happened to remember that?

89. Major CLAUSEN. In any event, did you have any other communications with the Immigration authorities following the telephone conversation, the visit down to see this party, the subsequent telephone conversation, and the writing of this letter?

Mr. STILPHEN. I would not say so, sir.

90. Major CLAUSEN. Did it ever come to your knowledge later on that Mr. Rohl had illegally entered the country and had paid a fine of \$25,000 for violating a law with regard to immigration matters?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir; I never heard of him since that time. I was never concerned with him, except when I read about it in the papers here, when Mr. Truman brought it up.

91. Major CLAUSEN. Were you ever asked by your superiors to do any checking up after you had written this letter?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir.

92. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

93. Colonel TOULMIN. May I ask a question?

94. General GRUNERT. Yes.

95. Colonel TOULMIN. You have stated that the Corps of Engineers had no means of investigating Mr. Rohl; is that correct?

[1556] Mr. STILPHEN. I said that in my opinion they had no means. They do not have an investigative agency themselves. I suppose if they wanted to investigate Mr. Rohl they could have gotten Army Intelligence, the F. B. I., or any other such agency. But I meant specifically the Corps of Engineers.

96. Colonel TOULMIN. In this case did they make any investigation, to your knowledge, prior to your writing this letter?

Mr. STILPHEN. What is very strong in this case, to me, at least, and assume—

97. Colonel TOULMIN. I am asking for the fact now, not for your opinion.

Mr. STILPHEN. To answer that question, I wanted to bring out that Colonel Wyman recommended this man—not only recommended him, but he was the particular one that wanted him. Colonel Wyman was the District Engineer, and he certainly had means at his disposal to know about this man. I understood he had worked with him for years and knew all about him. To me, at least—and I am sure the same would apply to Gesler and Lorence—that would be very important.

[1557] 98. Colonel TOULMAN. Well, did you see yourself the recommendation of Colonel Wyman about Rohl?

Mr. STILPHEN. Well, I cannot remember whether I did or not, sir. I heard it. I know I heard it. Whether I saw it afterwards or not, I can't remember.

99. Colonel TOULMIN. So that the total extent of investigation by the Corps of Engineers was the Wyman recommendation, so far as you know?

Mr. STILPHEN. And my inquiries at the Department of Justice.

100. Colonel TOULMIN. But I am confining it now.

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir; as far as the Corps of Engineers go, the policy, that is a correct statement.

101. Colonel TOULMIN. And the other investigations were made by the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Immigration; is that right?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

102. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, doesn't it strike you as strange that you write a letter of strong recommendation, such as this document of the 28th of August, 1941, on behalf of the Corps of Engineers certifying as to this matter, when you did not have any means of investigation except Wyman's recommendation, and you were writing the letter to the people who did have the opportunity of making investigation? Isn't that rather the reverse of what is ordinarily done?

Mr. STILPHEN. Well, other letters of recommendation had been written, I don't suppose about citizenship papers, but I was asked to write a letter requesting that this case be [1558] expedited by the agency that had cognizance of it; and, as I said before, anybody that makes a recommendation in the Corps of Engineers through the Chief of Engineers out in the field, usually his recommendation, unless it is very, very wrong, would be accepted; I don't care what the matter would be. I mean, if a man is out in the field he knows what he is talking about; unless it is way out of line obviously, and at that time I do not think anybody thought it was out of line.

103. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, you have a letter here, Mr. Stilphen, which you wrote on August 28, 1941, in which you give a very extended and positive recommendation of Mr. Rohl to the people who had made the actual investigation, and it is just puzzling, I think to us why the people who knew the least should be doing the recommending to the people who knew the most.

Mr. STILPHEN. Well, that, sir, I am afraid I can't answer; and Colonel Wyman and my superiors in the Corps of Engineers wanted that man over there, and it had to be done that way, as far as I was concerned it was going to be done that way. They had the perfect liberty to change that letter. As a matter of fact, I have written lots of letters for all the gentlemen involved, and they have no doubt changed a great many of them before they got into the final form.

104. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. Now that brings me to the next question: Was this letter, which was drafted by you originally, finally signed in this form without change from your original draft, or was it revised by anybody?

Mr. STILPHEN. I couldn't answer that. I wouldn't know.

[1559] 105. Colonel TOULMIN. You don't remember?

Mr. STILPHEN. I don't remember, no, sir.

106. Colonel TOULMIN. It was customary to have your letters re-
sed. was it not, when you submitted them for somebody else's
signature?

Mr. STILPHEN. It wasn't customary, but if they didn't like some-
ing they could change it; I had no pride of authorship.

107. Colonel TOULMIN. You don't remember it in this case, whether
ybody changed this letter?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir, I do not.

108. General FRANK. Might not your initials up there in the corner
licate that the letter was not changed?

Mr. STILPHEN. That didn't mean anything at all. That didn't
ean anything at all as far as office procedure went. In other words,
I drafted the letter originally and it went through, and say they
anted to change one sentence here or add something, or had any-
ing that should be changed, it would come back again and be typed
ain, and my initials would still go out on it.

109. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all I want.

110. General RUSSELL. So either Gesler or this other Colonel who
as out in the outer office that morning, the office into which you went,
roduced you to this man Martin as Rohl's attorney?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

111. General RUSSELL. Do you know how long Martin had been out
ere with these gentlemen?

[1560] Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir. I do not.

112. General RUSSELL. At this conference you were directed by one
both of these Colonels, whose names you have given, to follow a
rtain procedure and accomplish a certain purpose?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

113. General RUSSELL. The decision that the Corps of Engineers
ould expedite, insofar as it could, this application for citizenship
y Rohl had been made, therefore, when you were called in?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

114. General RUSSELL. Do you know how long Martin had been in
nference with these two Colonels before you went into that room?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir, I do not.

115. General RUSSELL. Was anything said between Martin and
ose two Colonels after you went into the conference room?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, I couldn't—if I remember, if I can possibly
member, I think that I was introduced to him, and he was identified,
d then the statement was made about Wyman and the construction
roject, and it was necessary to get him over there, and would I see
it, take all steps to see that it was done. Would I take Mr. Martin
tow, as it were, and get what information I needed and then go to
ork on it.

116. General RUSSELL. The instructions which were conveyed to
u by these two Colonels, one or both of these Colonels, at that con-
ference, indicated very definitely that your only job was to expedite
ose papers?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

[1561] General RUSSELL. They, in other words, had adopted
hatever had been sent in by this man Wyman or information they

had from other sources, and had decided to go along in getting Rohl these naturalization papers?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes. I was to investigate the case.

118. General RUSSELL. Well, that is what I am getting at. How much investigating were you to do?

Mr. STILPHEN. Well, I was to look up and see what the status of the case was. Obviously, if I found out by looking it up that the man was some sort of notorious citizen, I would report that back to them just as a matter of doing my job; but if there was nothing wrong, why, get him out of there.

119. General RUSSELL. Then, your activities were to be along two lines: First, an investigation was to be conducted; and, second, if that investigation was favorable to Rohl, you would press his application?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

120. General RUSSELL. Then, you did have a burden of investigating Rohl's desirability as an American citizen?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir. I wouldn't say that, sir. My part in this was to look up the status of his papers at the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, which was far from an investigation of whether Rohl would make a desirable citizen or not. The burden of proof was not upon me for the investigation or to determine his desirability. I was merely to determine the status of his citizenship papers at the Department of Justice.

121. General RUSSELL. Now, is that what we are going to stay by? Is that the only thing that you were to investigate, the [1562] status of his papers?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

122. General RUSSELL. Therefore, your evidence now is that you were not to make any investigation to determine his desirability as an American citizen?

Mr. STILPHEN. Oh, absolutely. I had no instructions as such.

123. General RUSSELL. Did you discuss this situation with General Kingman?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir.

124. General RUSSELL. You never talked to him about it?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir.

125. General RUSSELL. I may have asked you this; I am not sure. But do you recall how long you were in conference with these two Colonels and where Martin was present that morning?

Mr. STILPHEN. Oh, not more than five minutes, I would say.

126. General RUSSELL. How did it come that this problem was in Washington at all?

Mr. STILPHEN. Well, the way I get it, or I got it, was that it came—how it came about, I don't know, but Martin, I was told, was back there on business, some other business.

127. General RUSSELL. Well, let me approach it another way: Is it true or not that this application for the granting of citizenship to this man Rohl was pending in a Federal Court on the West Coast?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir, I think it was.

128. General RUSSELL. It would be in that proceeding, therefore, that all of the evidence would be, and there is where the [1563] judicial conclusions would be reached and the decision made?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

129. General RUSSELL. By the Federal Judge out there?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

130. General RUSSELL. Now, I am just ignorant on these immigration matters, but there was a file here in Washington relating to this West Coast application?

Mr. STILPHEN. Well, now, I don't know that, whether it would be a file here or whether they called or telegraphed out to the Coast. If I am not mistaken, I have a hunch but I certainly wouldn't swear to it; I just can't recollect; I think they wired out there regarding this case, or telephoned.

131. General RUSSELL. When you were over talking with these people in the Department of Justice, did they have a Rohl file there?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir. As a matter of fact, it took them several days to get the information that they wanted, if I remember correctly.

132. General RUSSELL. Now, you don't remember whether they showed you a telegram or a letter from the West Coast in which this information was set forth?

Mr. STILPHEN. They showed me nothing, sir. They showed me nothing.

133. General RUSSELL. I may be confused, but as I remember you said that you had a telephone conversation and then immediately went on—not immediately, but then on the same day you went over to the Department of Justice and talked with them?

Mr. STILPHEN. That is right.

134. General RUSSELL. And when you were over there did they [564] have a record or information that Rohl was seeking citizenship in a Court on the West Coast of the United States?

Mr. STILPHEN. I think I stated the case to them orally at the time I went over there, and told them what we were after. Then I left there, and they in turn got the information. At no time did I see any papers of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization on this man.

135. General RUSSELL. What information did the Department of Justice get from the West Coast?

Mr. STILPHEN. I suppose the status of his papers out there, along the lines that I have brought out.

136. General FRANK. Do you know?

Mr. STILPHEN. Do I know? No, sir, I don't.

137. General RUSSELL. Now, when you were in all of your conferences with this Department of Justice group here in Washington, what information did they convey to you about Rohl?

Mr. STILPHEN. Well, the nub of it, the way I recollect, was that their investigation of him had been completed.

138. General RUSSELL. Now, "their investigation." What do you mean by "their investigation"?

Mr. STILPHEN. The Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization.

139. General RUSSELL. That was their Washington office?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes. I speak of that as the office for the country; I don't speak of it just as specifically the Washington office, because I know as well as you know that they operate through field offices and that they would have to, naturally would have to, couldn't all just be down in Washington.

140. General RUSSELL. All right. Go ahead now. Give me the facts if you have them as to what they told you.

[1565] Mr. STILPHEN. Well, I don't have an awful lot of facts, sir. It was a long time ago, and I am trying to do my best to recollect this thing. There has been a lot of water over the dam since that time.

141. General RUSSELL. Well, let me ask you this question: Is it true or not that, had the Office of the Chief of Engineers not intervened in this thing, would the Washington office either of the Department of Justice or the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization have ever known anything at all about Rohl's application?

Mr. STILPHEN. Well, that is a point of procedure I wouldn't know about. That would be a procedure between the field office of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and the Washington office of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. Now, whether they clear their papers with the Washington office, I don't know.

142. General RUSSELL. You are not informed as to whether or not these people in routine procedure here in Washington, whom I have named a moment ago, normally know what is going on in District Courts throughout the United States relating to naturalization?

Mr. STILPHEN. I am not informed, sir.

143. General RUSSELL. But it is your impression now that when you contacted the Washington offices of these two Departments it was necessary for them to go to the West Coast to find out what was going on, including the desirability of Rohl to become a citizen?

Mr. STILPHEN. Well, I would go so far as to state it was [1566] necessary for them to go somewhere and get some information, because, as I recollect it, it took them several days to get the information. In other words, they couldn't give me an answer right away.

144. General RUSSELL. And they didn't give you memoranda or other writings in which such information was conveyed to them?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir.

145. General RUSSELL. Did they give it to you in the office or over the telephone?

Mr. STILPHEN. Gave it to me over the telephone.

146. General RUSSELL. Did they tell you in that conversation over the telephone that Rohl's loyalty to the United States could not be questioned?

Mr. STILPHEN. No sir, I don't think they said that.

147. General RUSSELL. What did they say about his desirability as a citizen, to become a citizen?

Mr. STILPHEN. As far as I can recollect, they said that he had filed his papers, that everything was completed about it, and that all that had to happen was that he had to take his turn to get into the District Court to take his oath to become a citizen. That was a question of routine red-tape procedure.

148. General RUSSELL. You are not acquainted with these naturalization proceedings in the Federal District Court?

Mr. STILPHEN. I am not. I have a very small knowledge of them. I am certainly no authority on them.

149. General RUSSELL. It did come to pass, as a result of the [1567] Office of the Chief of Engineers intervening, that all this machinery was set in motion in Washington: the Bureau of Immigra-

on and Naturalization and the Department of Justice, and these three offices cooperating together were responsible for influencing the Western District Court to call up Rohl's case and dispose of it rather quickly?

Mr. STILPHEN. Well, that is the conclusion you are drawing, sir. I assume it is correct.

150. General RUSSELL. Well, you are on the inside to know what the facts are. Is that conclusion correct or not?

Mr. STILPHEN. Well, I would say it is a fair statement. In other words, the way the field offices operate, if they get some instructions from Washington they usually do it. See?

151. General RUSSELL. But all of this machinery that was put into operation here in Washington, the Office of the Chief of Engineers, the Department of Justice, and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization—

Mr. STILPHEN. May I interrupt you, sir?

152. General RUSSELL. All resulted from the appearance of one Martin in the Office of the Chief of Engineers, and his selling those people down there on the desirability of pressing it along?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir. I just make one statement there. I don't know whether Martin sold them or not. I don't know anything about that, but this chain started upon the appearance of Martin. You can put it that way. As far as I am concerned it started with the appearance of Martin.

And there is one thing, just for the record. You are [1568] calling it the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. They are one and the same thing. That is, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization at that time was in the Department of Justice.

153. General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

154. Major CLAUSEN. Who was Colonel Lorence?

Mr. STILPHEN. He is colonel Walter E. Lorence, L-o-r-e-n-c-e. He is the assistant to Colonel Gesler.

155. Major CLAUSEN. You say Walter?

Mr. STILPHEN. E. Lorence, L-o-r-e-n-c-e.

156. Major CLAUSEN. What was said, Mr. Stilphen, in this talk at you had with Colonel Gesler, Colonel Lorence, and yourself and Mr. Martin concerning the contract that was entered into in December 1940?

Mr. STILPHEN. Nothing was said.

157. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you didn't get this information out of the thin air that is in the first paragraph. You got the contract number and the information that the contractor was doing very important, you say, defense construction at Honolulu.

Mr. STILPHEN. That is right.

158. Major CLAUSEN. Well, from whom did you get that?

Mr. STILPHEN. Well, on the statement that he was necessary on his work, I went to the files and got the number of the contract out.

159. Major CLAUSEN. Did you discuss that with anyone?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir.

160. Major CLAUSEN. You mean you just had a five-minute conversation with Colonel Gesler, Colonel Lorence, and Mr. [1569] Martin, and then see these instructions, and undertook all this action?

Mr. STILPHEN. Well, my instructions were that way; yes, sir.

161. Major CLAUSEN. Now let me invite your attention to this letter, Exhibit 2. Alongside your initials are some others. What are those initials, Mr. Stilphen?

Mr. STILPHEN. There was a man there that was head of the—the Corps of Engineers, the finance section was divided up into a legal section. I was assigned to the legal section, but I didn't really report to him; I reported directly to Lorence and Gesler on this labor stuff, and I was separate from the labor men on this legal section, but I did do legal work for him too, when I had some spare time, and I think these initials are of the man that was the head of that section. His name is Ralph—I can't think of his last name, but he would be known; I know that. He was head of that legal section if I am not mistaken. It looks like the last initial is "H" to me, and I think his name begins with an H, but I can't remember now.

162. Major CLAUSEN. You say, head of the legal section of the labor division?

Mr. STILPHEN. No; he was head of the legal section of the finance division of the Corps of Engineers at that time. It was Ralph somebody; I can't think of his last name.

163. Major CLAUSEN. Let me invite your attention to these initials underneath the date. Do you know whom they represent?

Mr. STILPHEN. You mean this mark here (indicating)?

164. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. STILPHEN. I can't even decipher it.

[1570] 165. Major CLAUSEN. Now, referring to these initials ending in "H", was that an officer or a civilian?

Mr. STILPHEN. It was a civilian.

166. Major CLAUSEN. Then on the second page there are three sets of initials. Can you tell me whom they represent?

Mr. STILPHEN. I think Gesler had a funny little thing; I think that is Gesler's, but now I wouldn't swear to it yet. I remember he had a funny little O. K. You see, the way when these letters went out, I will show you; I might give you an idea of the procedure:

I would draft the thing, and then there was a fellow in the section I was in; it would go to him, and he would read it and initial it if it was all right with him. Then from him it would go to the head of this legal section I just mentioned, and he would initial it, and then it would go to Lorence and then to Gesler, and then it would start going up channels to the assistants to the Generals and to the Generals. I mean it would go through nine or ten or fifteen hands.

167. Major CLAUSEN. They didn't go down that way to you, though, did they?

Mr. STILPHEN. You mean the letters?

168. Major CLAUSEN. No. I mean your instructions didn't come down that way?

Mr. STILPHEN. Oh, no.

169. Major CLAUSEN. In this case they went direct to you?

Mr. STILPHEN. That is right.

170. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever see Mr. Martin again after this occasion?

[1571] Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir.

171. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever hear from him again?

Mr. STILPHEN. If I remember correctly, I got a letter from him, thanking me.

172. Major CLAUSEN. Thanking you?

Mr. STILPHEN. Saying that the papers had been granted, and thanking the Corps of Engineers and me for the assistance, in the letter.

173. Major CLAUSEN. That was about when?

Mr. STILPHEN. Oh, golly, at least a month and a half, I guess, or two months.

174. Major CLAUSEN. Addressed to you personally, was it?

Mr. STILPHEN. Addressed to me at the United States Corps of Army Engineers, yes.

175. Major CLAUSEN. Personally?

Mr. STILPHEN. Personally.

176. Major CLAUSEN. Did you keep that?

Mr. STILPHEN. "Benjamin L. Stilphen, Office of the Chief of Engineers, War Department."

177. Major CLAUSEN. I say, you kept that, did you?

Mr. STILPHEN. I think I kept it for a while, but when I sold my house here in Washington I went with the Navy and moved down to New York. I went down there on the Normandie job. I had a lot of papers, and I don't know whether I cleaned them out or destroyed them or not.

178. Major CLAUSEN. Was your action on this letter extracurricular or was it official?

Mr. STILPHEN. My action on this letter?

179. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

[1572] Mr. STILPHEN. I would say my action was—wait a minute. I don't know what exactly you mean, "official." I signed no correspondence myself.

180. Major CLAUSEN. You say you got a letter from Mr. Martin dictated to you, and that you kept it for a while and didn't put that in the files of the Engineering?

Mr. STILPHEN. It was a personal letter.

181. Major CLAUSEN. Was your action in going down to Mr. Schofield a personal matter or was it official, in your mind?

Mr. STILPHEN. It was official.

182. Major CLAUSEN. Well, then when you got the letter from Mr. Martin did you take that and show it to anybody there?

Mr. STILPHEN. I showed it to Colonel Lorence.

183. Major CLAUSEN. I see. Anybody else? Did Colonel Lorence show it to one; do you know?

Mr. STILPHEN. I don't think so.

184. Major CLAUSEN. Colonel Gesler?

Mr. STILPHEN. I don't think so. It was, if I remember—I can remember it; it was about one sentence. It said: Mr. Rohl's papers were granted so-and-so date, and we want to thank you and your associates for your cooperation in this matter, or something on that order.

185. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

186. General GRUNERT. I have a few questions. The first one is to get me straightened out on that organization. Was the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization at that time a part of the Department of Justice?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir. It had been recently transferred [1573] from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice.

187. General GRUNERT. And the F. B. I. was also a part of the Department of Justice?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

188. General GRUNERT. Now, in your investigation when you went down to the Department of Justice did you in any way know what was in the F. B. I. files about this man Rohl?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir.

189. General GRUNERT. From your investigation could you personally vouch for Rohl's loyalty?

Mr. STILPHEN. No, sir.

190. General GRUNERT. You didn't, then, have enough information as to be able to vouch for his loyalty?

Mr. STILPHEN. I personally, no.

191. General GRUNERT. Now, who passes on it, or what is the procedure in an alien getting American citizenship? Does the Court grant it?

Mr. STILPHEN. The Court grants it. He files——

192. General GRUNERT. Where does the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization come in? Do they investigate and recommend to the Court?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

193. General GRUNERT. Now, did it occur to you that the wording of the letter you drafted could have influenced the granting of citizenship because of the fact that the Government appeared to want and need this man badly, and because the Government appeared to vouch for this man's loyalty?

Mr. STILPHEN. I would say that is the tenor of the letter.

[1574] 194. General GRUNERT. Now, do you know whether this letter itself ever got to the knowledge of the court or whether it just ended at the Bureau of Immigration and had its influence there?

Mr. STILPHEN. That I don't know, whether it got to the Court or not, sir.

195. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

196. General FRANK. You stated to General Russell that your instructions from Colonel Lorence did not obligate you to look up Rohl's loyalty. Then, why did you put this in here about his loyalty was beyond question?

Mr. STILPHEN. My instructions were to investigate the status of Rohl's case at the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. After I had determined that there was nothing against him, and on the basis of Wyman's recommendation, that was put in there, as previously mentioned, to lift the letter up, to——

197. General FRANK. Window-dress it?

Mr. STILPHEN. Window-dress it.

198. Colonel TOULMIN. Selling?

Mr. STILPHEN. Selling.

199. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, you were the legman in this?

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

200. General FRANK. And you were trying to do everything that you could to carry out the expediting instructions that you had gotten from Colonel Lorence?

Mr. STILPHEN. That is right, sir. If it had been Mae West I would have done the same thing, or anyone. The idea was, if [1575] they needed her out there—him or her or anybody out there—to help the war, the idea was to get it done. That is what I tried to do.

201. General FRANK. That is all.

202. Major CLAUSEN. What was your employment prior to the time you went to work for the Chief of Engineers?

Mr. STILPHEN. I was in the office of the Solicitor of the United States Department of Labor.

203. General GRUNERT. There appear to be no more questions. Thank you for coming.

Mr. STILPHEN. Yes, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 10 a. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

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575] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

THURSDAY, AUGUST 24, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board, at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Hansen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

**TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL P. N. L. BELLINGER, U. S. NAVY;
COMMANDER, AIR FORCE, ATLANTIC FLEET; ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE, NORFOLK, VA.**

(Admiral Bellinger was accompanied by Captain Logan C. Ramsey, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff to Commander, Fleet Air, Norfolk; Administrative Headquarters, Norfolk, Va.)

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Admiral, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Admiral BELLINGER. Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy; Commander, Air Force, Atlantic Fleet; administrative office at Norfolk, Virginia.

[1576] 2. General GRUNERT. Admiral, the Board is after facts as to what happened prior to, leading up to, and during the attack at Pearl Harbor. It is primarily interested in those things that pertained to or could have been connected with the Army. From your assignment during that time, the Board hopes you will be able to give some light on the facts, and also, possibly, leads to where we can find other facts.

Will you please state to the Board your assignment, and generally your duties thereunder, during the year 1941, giving dates as far as you can remember.

Admiral BELLINGER. On December 6, 1941, and for several months prior thereto, my duties were as follows:

Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wing, and Commander, Patrol Wing 2. Included in the larger command were the patrol squadrons and aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings 1 and 2.

Commander, Task Force 9. This comprised Patrol Wings 1 and 2, plus other units, as assigned by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for the conduct of specific operations.

Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. The responsibilities of this function included administrative authority in local matters over all fleet aircraft actually based on the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor.

Liaison with Commandant, 14th Naval District, for aviation development within the District, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands.

Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force.

In connection with the above duties, I functioned under [1577] the following seniors:

Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who, as Type Commander for patrol wings, was based at San Diego.

Commander, Scouting Force, the force command of which Patrol Wings 1 and 2 were a part.

Directly under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in my capacity as Commander, Task Force 9.

Under Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, when performing my duties as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force.

Commanders of fleet task forces 1, 2, and 3, for operation of patrol planes assigned to those forces for specific operations.

If I may, and it is the desire of this Board, I would like to continue giving further information.

3. General GRUNERT. You appear to have some sort of prepared statement, and, if it will enlighten the Board and put its feet on the ground, I think it would be a good thing if you went ahead with your statement, and then we will piece it out with such additional information as we may want. Is that all right with the Board? All right. Proceed.

Admiral BELLINGER. On December 6, 1941, and for several months prior thereto, in addition to my basic naval duties as enumerated above, I had the title of Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, under the then Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, who was Admiral Bloch, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. A change in my status was contemplated in what was then the current Navy War Plan. Under its provisions, the [1578] units of my naval command were expected to make an early move to bases in the outlying islands, Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra. My own headquarters were to be at Midway.

Reverting to my status on Oahu, the most complicated of my duties consisted of those in connection with the air defense of Pearl Harbor. About 1 March 1941, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, directed me to report to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare an air defense plan in conjunction with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. I so reported, and proceeded with the assigned task, working directly with Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. Army. Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, who, incidentally, was senior to me.

The operation plan for the Naval Base Defense Force included several subsidiary plans. The most important of these was the opera-

plan of the Naval Base Defense Air Force. In it was outlined proposed employment of all units made available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force. In so far as Naval and Marine Corps Air Units were concerned, it was an order requiring definite action when applicable.

Orders from Army sources covering the function of air units in the Naval Base Defense Air Force were the guides for these aircraft. Both Army and Navy orders on this subject were based on the estimate of the situation, dated March 31, 1941, and signed by both General Martin and myself. That estimate was based on the conditions as they existed at the time it was drafted. Changes in the Naval Air Station between that date and December 7, 1941, were not of sufficient significance to warrant a reestimate, and my information on the Army Air Force [1579] indicated an analogous condition. The estimate I believed and still believe to be sound, but the order based on that estimate, like a precept of international law, lacked sanction; and the missing sanction in this case was the absence of unity of command.

Specifically, the organization was designed to function through mutual cooperation between the Army and Navy for the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack. As such the Naval Base Defense Air Force would function only in the event of an actual emergency or when higher authority so directed. The composition of the Naval Base Defense Air Force varied from day to day with the number of aircraft made available to it by the various air commands, both Army and Navy. The determining factor in this tactical availability was the employment schedule of aircraft belonging to the various air units. Aircraft reported as available were subject to the operational control of the commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, or of the Army Pursuit Commander, in the prevailing category of readiness, whenever the Naval Base Defense Air Force was in a functioning status.

The normal procedure used for vitalizing this organization for drills was for the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, to send a dispatch reading: "Drill. Danger of air raid on Pearl Harbor exists. Drill."

This placed the search-and-attack groups in a functioning status. On receipt of this message, I in turn, as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, sent a dispatch to all air units [1580] which made planes available to that organization, except Army pursuit units, ordering them to place all available aircraft in the highest degree of readiness. At this point, during such drills, searches were immediately started by planes initially in a high degree of readiness, and their efforts were supplemented by orders to other aircraft as they were alerted ready for flight.

The term, "Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force," was actually a misnomer, due to the limited composition of that portion of the Air Forces under my operational control, which included only the aircraft for scouting to locate enemy surface units and to attack them when located. It did not include fighter aircraft, radar detection detachments, or antiaircraft guns. The term "Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force," was even more of a misnomer, as it implied authority

over operating units to a degree which did not exist. This authority was nonexistent until an emergency was apparent, or until appropriate authority placed the Naval Base Defense Air Force in a functioning status; and when so called into existence, was limited in scope, in that it consisted only of operational control over Army units based upon mutual cooperation.

In addition, my authority, limited as it was, extended only over the search-and-attack groups of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, and was non-existent so far as Army pursuit aviation and Navy fighter aviation were concerned, which were to function under the operational control of Brigadier General H. C. Davidson, U. S. Army.

To illustrate the lack of numerical strength of aircraft available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force, attention is [1581] invited to the report of a Joint Army and Navy Board, dated 31 October 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian area. Paragraph 4 (a) of this report, which was signed by Major General Martin, as Senior Army member, and myself, as senior Navy member, reads as follows:

Paragraph 4. The problem confronting the Board as pertains to Army aviation was summed up by the Army representatives as follows:

a. The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out this mission is:

(1) To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action by bombardment aviation.

(2) To detect, intercept, and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu, by pursuit aviation.

It was pointed out that under the Army 54 Group Program, 170 B-17s and two groups of 163 Pursuit planes each, would be assigned to fulfill the above missions.

Naval planes called for 84 patrol planes and 48 VSO planes, to be directly under the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to supplement or function in lieu of the 98 patrol planes of Patrol Wings 1 and 2, which might be ordered to advance bases on the outlying Islands of Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra. Further, the planes actually present on Oahu were not free until ordered to concentrate on the naval base Air Defense. Both Army and Navy were in the process of receiving replacements of obsolescent planes. Army B-18s were being replaced by the [1582] more modern B-17s, and Patrol Wings 1 and 2 PBV-1s, -2s, and -3s were being replaced by PBV-5s. The new types were subject to the usual shake-down difficulties and maintenance problems.

The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization into a functioning status would have necessitated the substantial cessation of training activities in order to concentrate on defense. With the patrol planes constantly scouting to a maximum range, and the bomber aircraft standing by for attack missions, a situation would have been soon reached wherein the Navy planes would have been greatly reduced in material readiness and their combat crews approaching an operational fatigue point, while the Army pilots would have been in need of refresher training. Hence, as pointed out in the Martin-Bellinger estimate, the problem resolved itself into one of timing with respect to the current status of our relations with Japan and the necessity

for specific information as to the expectation of an air attack within other narrow time limits.

The Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, did not have the authority to place that organization in a functioning status, except in the case of an actual emergency. The Naval Base Defense Air Force assumed a functioning status immediately after the start of the attack December 7, 1941, without orders from higher authority. Orders for planes in the air were sent and received by 0805, and a message—

Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is no drill.

was ordered broadcasted at 0758 that morning.

4. General GRUNERT. Did the Naval Base Defense Air Force have anything to do with the outlying islands, Wake, Midway, and so forth?

[1583] Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

5. General GRUNERT. That was not part of the responsibility of defense or air action of the Naval Base Defense Air Force?

Admiral BELLINGER. The Naval Base Defense Air Force was based on the joint estimate.

6. General FRANK. The joint air estimate?

Admiral BELLINGER. This joint estimate, prepared by General Martin and myself does not state, "air estimate," but it is based primarily on air, this joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu, or fleet units in the Hawaiian area.

7. General GRUNERT. The Hawaiian area did not include anything outside of the Hawaiian Islands proper, did it?

Admiral BELLINGER. No.

8. General GRUNERT. Now, the Board is interested in the terms used, when the plan is "effective," and when it is "operative." These plans became effective when they were signed, but as I understand, you say they were not to become operative until an emergency arose, and then, I believe, that they could be ordered to become operative by the Army or the Navy Department, or by local commanders, when agreed upon. Is that your understanding?

Admiral BELLINGER. The question is, who were the "local commanders"—the senior Army and senior Navy officers present?

General GRUNERT. Are you familiar with the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of approximately February 1941, to which this air operational plan was a sort of supplement or appendix? I have here what is known as the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan," which was dated as of 11 April 1941, and [1584] in that plan, paragraph 15 (c), (2), it states:

Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

Now, just who are referred to, there, as "local commanders," the Board has not yet determined. At least, I do not know who are meant. I would interpret it off-hand to mean that the "local commanders" in Hawaii would be the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, whether or

not it went down below that. But what was your understanding as to when the joint air agreement became effective and operative?

Admiral BELLINGER. In this joint estimate signed by General Martin and myself, in paragraph 5 (e), the first sentence reads as follows:

Establish a procedure whereby the condition of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the senior officers present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them.

10. General GRUNERT. I thought I understood you to say, in your statement, that this naval air plan functioned only during an emergency?

Admiral BELLINGER. Or when set into the functioning status by proper authority. Now, the question is, what is "proper authority"? My understanding of it is that the Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, could issue an order. Whether it would be complied with completely by the Army, lacking an [1585] emergency, would depend on the understanding of the Army commander, whether there was a state of emergency which required concentrating on that type of work. That question, as I say, never came up except in connection with drills, and when a drill was held it was arranged by mutual consent prior to the time of the drill, in order to make sure that the force involved, particularly with the Army, would be available to take part in the drill.

11. General GRUNERT. Then, for each such drill or maneuver, it required cooperation for that particular period, and did not extend beyond that period? Is that right?

Admiral BELLINGER. During the period of the drill, the cooperation existed; yes.

12. General GRUNERT. That was because the two senior commanders agreed upon having such a drill and maneuver?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

13. General GRUNERT. To your knowledge, did the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department agree at any time prior to December 7 to make this joint air operation agreement effective as an emergency?

Admiral BELLINGER. I remember a situation wherein the Army were having a 3-day period of drills, in which the Navy cooperated in these drills, to get both Army and Navy forces working together. This was subsequent to the plans and directives, and this estimate we have just been discussing, which were in effect.

14. General GRUNERT. That, again, does not answer the question.

[1586] Admiral BELLINGER. Excuse me—may I continue?

15. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

Admiral BELLINGER. The first day, the operations were carried out under the plans of the Naval Base Defense Air Force. That night, I received a dispatch from Army headquarters, stating that the bomber command was no longer "under my command," or "operations control"—I have forgotten the term used in the dispatch. I wondered what caused that dispatch, and what it meant. It arrived late at night. The next morning, there was an air-raid drill in connection with these operations scheduled, and in carrying out the plan for this drill the question, to me, was, was the Army Bomber Command going to function, or not?

About 5 o'clock in the morning, the Wing Commander, Colonel [redacted], called me up and asked if we were going to ask for the Army to assist the Navy. I said, "No; I don't know of any plan to that," that I was not the one to ask for the Army to assist the Navy; it would be for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, if they wanted the Navy to ask for the Army to assist the Navy. He said to me that they would like to work in this problem. Well, I said I would like very much to, and that I would keep them informed, and they could carry out their directives, as they might think, acting on the information I gave them, as they saw fit, in accordance with their directives.

In checking later to find out why this dispatch was sent, changing the plan, so to speak, I was informed that it related to the provisions for joint action, which, in my understanding, were superseded, to the extent as indicated, in the plans [1587] embodied in the defense of Pearl Harbor.

After that, I proposed a letter to General Short, for the signature of Admiral Bloch, to endeavor to straighten that situation out, and I believe it was more or less straightened out in so far as I could see from the preliminary phases of it; the idea being that if an emergency did exist and was present, then it would not require authority or sanction of General Short for the Bomber Command to function; and it was in that way and in that echelon that I am speaking about, now.

16. General GRUNERT. Did the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet ever indicate his approval of that joint air agreement as signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short?

Admiral BELLINGER. I assume he did approve it, because Admiral Bloch functioned under the Commander-in-Chief in his capacity, in the defense of Pearl Harbor.

17. General GRUNERT. Now, of course, that was an incident in the line of straightening things out so you could cooperate. What I want to start in with is to get down to the basis. This Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was based on joint action of the Army and Navy, as agreed to in Washington. Under paragraph 9 (b) thereof, it reads:

Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by exercise of unity of command in the following cases:

- 1. Where ordered by the President; or,
- 2. When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy; or,
- 3. When Commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the service that will [1588] exercise such command.

Was there at any time, up to December 7, any discussion as to the necessity for agreeing on the exercise of unity of command, under the conditions that then existed?

[1589] Admiral BELLINGER. I had mentioned it. In other words, I was not satisfied with the setup under the estimate and directives concerning the Naval Base Defense Air Force. I thought that it was necessary to have a unity of command to make such an operation a success.

18. General FRANK. You mean a unity of command before something happened?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

19. General FRANK. Rather than when it happened?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

20. General GRUNERT. Up to December 7th was that in your mind made it necessary to bring that cause things were about to happen? In other words, of possible attack? You apparently in your estimate of air raid or attack was highly possible, if not probable, such a period that it seemed to be more necessary than that to a head?

Admiral BELLINGER. I would like to point out that the estimate is based on—

21. General FRANK. Between you and Martin?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes; the joint estimate between Martin and myself.

22. General GRUNERT. But approved by the 14th day by the Admiral of the Fleet?

Admiral BELLINGER. This estimate (indicating) was directed to cooperate with the Army and was worked out by the Army.

23. General FRANK. By whom?

Admiral BELLINGER. By the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

[1590] Admiral Kimmel. I was directed to the Commandant of the Naval Base to do this, who was Admiral Kimmel. The most logical procedure was first to make an estimate, and this was the first step in the effort to bring about action, but this estimate, as you see, was based on the possibility of sudden hostile action against Oahu and fleet unit areas. It was not an estimate of Japanese war plans.

24. General FRANK. Doesn't that estimate state that an attack was the most probable action expected?

Admiral BELLINGER. "It appears that the most likely form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack," says the estimate. You asked me, Was this estimate approved by my instructions, the estimate and my directives to the Navy end of the estimate, the decisions of the Commander Naval Base Defense Force, who was in command.

25. General FRANK. That was Admiral Bloch?

Admiral BELLINGER. Admiral Bloch. I assume that General Martin sent his copies to General Short, and the General Martin and myself was that on the basis of that would get out a directive for his part of the force, and I would get out a directive for my part of the forces was done.

26. General GRUNERT. Presumably it was approved?

Admiral BELLINGER. Beg pardon?

27. General GRUNERT. The presumption is that of higher headquarters because action was taken in bringing it out?

Admiral BELLINGER. I am sure it had the approval because I was complimented on it indicated between Army and Navy.

28. General GRUNERT. I want to get this fact: But that was not to become operative until an emergency was on your neck, but I want to find out if there wasn't a period of imminence there in which those concerned should have tried to force to a conclusion to make it operative now or to have declared a state of affairs so that unity of command could have been put into effect, and you said you had that in mind but that it was not done?

Admiral BELLINGER. No. Pardon me. That could have been done any time by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, who was Commander Naval Base Defense Force, if it was approved by and agreed upon by General Short.

29. General GRUNERT. That is what I want to get at. Why didn't they get together and agree upon it?

Admiral BELLINGER. Or it could have been put in effect by General Short if proposed by him and agreed upon by Admiral Bloch.

There was one point I wish to raise, though, in that: that naval planes that were scheduled and which were made available when available to function under this Naval Base Defense Air Force were not separate and distinct from other functions for which they were assigned, which the Commander had a great deal to do with, the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.

30. General GRUNERT. But this is the thing that confuses me: the Naval Defense District and the Commanding General of the [1592] Hawaiian Department could get together and agree to do this and that, and then suddenly the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet comes and he may issue orders that are not in consonance with the agreements that General Short and Admiral Bloch had. In other words, he got out an instruction which was late—I don't know—in October, and whether or not that was in consonance with the Hawaiian defense plan and with the air operational agreement, I do not know, but where does the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet come in on these agreements between the District and the Department? Does he have to approve them? If he doesn't approve them, he has most of the means or some of the means that will be involved therein.

Admiral BELLINGER. In view of the fact that Admiral Bloch functioned under the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, for those purposes I am sure that what was done in preparation of the plan had his approval.

31. General FRANK. For what purposes? You said, "for those purposes." I am trying to get what they were.

Admiral BELLINGER. For the Pearl Harbor defense force.

32. General FRANK. I would like to ask a question here.

33. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

34. General FRANK. Will you give us a little explanation of your official relationship to Admiral Bloch and to the Commander of the Fleet?

Admiral BELLINGER. My direct relation with Admiral Bloch was by directive from the Commander-in-Chief to report to him for duty in connection with the preparation of a plan coordinated with the Army for the air defense of Pearl Harbor, and as such and in conformity with such I reported, and then as a result of [1593] that I became what was known then as Commander Naval Base Air

Force functioning under Admiral Bloch, the Commanding Officer of the 14th Naval District.

35. General FRANK. All right. Now, as that Commander-in-Chief put your responsibilities to Admiral Bloch and what we are to do? Kimmel?

Admiral BELLINGER. Admiral Kimmel had supervised the rest of the Navy, and my forces could be removed any million that he saw fit to assign them; and as of December 4th there were two squadrons of planes, one at Midway, in connection with an operation which the Commander-in-Chief Pacific had directed. Those planes were utilized in the Naval Base Defense Air Force when they were ashore.

36. General GRUNERT. When and if they were they are ashore and available, they could be used for the defense of the fleet, Admiral Kimmel, could pull out anything that was needed at any time needed?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

37. General FRANK. Who was responsible for this agreement, the next higher man? Admiral Bloch, Kimmel, or both, or you?

Admiral BELLINGER. The joint estimate signed by Kimmel was the result of the initiative taken by Admiral Bloch, who was signed by General Martin and myself. The Commander-in-Chief was responsible for the joint estimate.

38. General FRANK. We know who was the next man above Kimmel, General Martin, and it was General Short, and there is no doubt about it, but I still do not know who was the next man above General Short.

Admiral BELLINGER. Admiral Bloch was the one who was above me in connection with the Naval Base Defense Air Force.

39. General GRUNERT. But Admiral Kimmel at that time was not in Admiral Bloch's business in the defense line and by taking out some of his means?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct. The naval operations at that time required me to base at Midway, Johnston, and possibly some at Oahu.

40. General GRUNERT. Here in this case through the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet he initiated the joint estimate, and as a result of that was about this joint air operations agreement which was signed by General Short and by Admiral Bloch, but in that agreement the air forces that pertained to the Fleet, and your use of them when they were ashore, and they could be taken out at any time as far as the actual defense of Hawaii was concerned.

Admiral BELLINGER. Correct.

41. General FRANK. They could be taken out of the Naval Base Defense Air Force Commander?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, but not—

42. General FRANK. But you still would have command?

Admiral BELLINGER. As Commander Patrol Wings, Hawaiian Area.

43. General FRANK. In which event you no longer were under [1595] Admiral Bloch?

Admiral BELLINGER. No. I was under Commander-in-Chief Pacific in that capacity. That was what I tried to indicate when I answered the first question, and I think you will find that very clearly put as an answer to the question.

44. General FRANK. Now I would like to ask this question. Let us assume that somebody did say that, "Here is unity of command." With the forces that you had what would you have done about it?

Admiral BELLINGER. As unity of command in connection with the Naval Base Defense Air Force?

45. General FRANK. With the whole situation, unity of command; suppose that were on December 1st.

Admiral BELLINGER. In that case whoever had unity of command would be responsible for all phases of action which he initiated. Therefore, if he took planes away for one purpose, he is responsible. If he takes, sets the planes for one purpose at another place, he is responsible there. In other words, if he has a certain amount of forces, he would be responsible for the distribution of those forces.

46. General FRANK. I know, but what I am trying to get at is this: in view of the lack of equipment, assuming that you had had command of it as a result of the Navy having command under the principle of unity of command, what could you have done?

Admiral BELLINGER. I do not know that I could have done anything more unless—that is I.

47. General FRANK. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. The Commander who had unity of command may have done more, yes, because he would be in a position, as [1596] I say, to make distribution of forces, complete distribution, as he saw necessity therefor.

48. General FRANK. Were you familiar with the messages that arrived along the 16th of October up through the 27th of November?

Admiral BELLINGER. 16th?

49. General FRANK. October 16th, and November 24th and 27th.

Admiral BELLINGER. 16th of October?

50. General FRANK. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. No, I never saw any of those messages. I do not remember one on the 16th.

51. General FRANK. Well, there was one on the 16th.

Admiral BELLINGER. That is, I never saw these messages prior to December 7th.

52. General FRANK. Well, there was a message on the 16th, a Navy message. In effect it said, "Take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan." That was the Navy message of the 16th of October.

Admiral BELLINGER. I do not remember, sir.

53. General FRANK. You did not know anything about that?

Admiral BELLINGER. No. There was a conference in connection with the reinforcement of Wake and in connection with Midway, and the first tentative plan it was contemplated that Army pursuit planes might be put out there. Then that was not agreed upon, so

Marine planes were put out there. I attended a conference in the Commander-in-Chief's office. I have forgotten the date. It may have been on the basis of that dispatch. I do not remember ever having seen that dispatch.

54. General FRANK. On the 24th of November there was another [1597] message: Caution relative possibility of surprise attack on Guam or Philippine Islands.

Admiral BELLINGER. Never saw it. I never saw it prior to December 7. My statement with regard to not having seen these dispatches refers to prior to December 7.

55. General FRANK. Did you know that they had arrived?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not prior to December 7.

56. General FRANK. You did not.

Then there was one of the 27th of November: War warning. Guam Samoa warned re sabotage. Jap action versus Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, Borneo, expected. You did not know anything about that?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not prior to December 7.

57. General FRANK. And the Army sent out a message. Since then you have known that those messages had gone out?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

58. General FRANK. But at that time you knew nothing about it?

Admiral BELLINGER. I did not.

59. General FRANK. Did you know that there was a tense situation existing?

Admiral BELLINGER. The paper indicated quite a tense situation. As a matter of fact, the tense situation had been rising and falling, as you remember yourself, out in that area for some time. It caused me to write considerable letters trying to build up my forces and to get action. I realized thoroughly that it was a tense situation, and as I say the papers indicated a tense situation, but I had no knowledge of [1598] secret dispatches at that time prior to December 7th.

60. General FRANK. How many P. B. Y.s did you have then?

Admiral BELLINGER. We had a total of 81 P. B. Y.s in the Patrol Wings 1 and 2. And when I say "we had" that included those that were at Midway as well.

61. General FRANK. How many did you have right there in Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe?

Admiral BELLINGER. On what day?

62. General FRANK. December first to seventh.

Admiral BELLINGER. On December 5th one squadron that had been away, that is, a squadron of 12 planes that had been away for over a month or so, basing on both Midway and Wake, returned, and one squadron was at Midway on December 6th.

From December 1 to 5 we had 57 P. B. Y. planes.

63. General FRANK. On Oahu?

Admiral BELLINGER. On Oahu or in the Hawaiian area.

On December 5 to 7 we had 69, with 9 out of commission.

Excuse me. I have to check this a little bit. I have got figures to show all this, and I want to make sure that I am right on this.

64. General FRANK. Well, you have the records of the exact number of planes, haven't you?

Admiral BELLINGER. On December 7th we had at Kaneohe 36 planes, at Pearl 33 planes, and at Midway 12 planes, making a total of 81 planes.

[1599] 65. General FRANK. What I am getting around to is this: What kind of reconnaissance or patrolling did you carry out between November 27th and December 7th?

Admiral BELLINGER. There was a requirement by a directive from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, to patrol wings—not Naval Base Air Defense, but patrol wings—to search fleet operating areas in the early morning at sunrise.

66. General FRANK. Those are task force operating areas?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes. That was a daily occurrence.

[1600] 67. General FRANK. About how many planes did you send out?

Admiral BELLINGER. From three to six, depending on the amount of area covered by these assigned operating areas.

68. General FRANK. Is that the total number that went out during the day, or did they relieve each other?

Admiral BELLINGER. The search was in the early morning, and when that was accomplished, that was the search for that day on that particular job.

69. General GRUNERT. What was the purpose of the search?

Admiral BELLINGER. To guard against submarine attack, primarily, or Japanese ships in the area.

70. General GRUNERT. And that was primarily done in order to know that in that area a task force could operate with comparative security?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes; from surface or sub-surface craft.

71. General GRUNERT. It had nothing to do with searching or making reconnaissance for the defense of Oahu?

72. General FRANK. Against a surprise attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. No. Excuse me. There was patrolling being carried on from Midway.

73. General FRANK. What I would like to know is this: Was any patrolling being done as a prevention against a surprise attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. Only in the vicinity of Midway. There was a movement in connection with putting these planes that I spoke about, these Marine planes, on Midway and Wake, and in connection with the movement of the carrier task force which was charged with that job we had patrol planes on Midway and Wake that did certain security patrol which was in connection with the security of the task force at sea.

74. General FRANK. What instructions did you receive with [1601] respect to conducting patrols or reconnaissance for security purposes?

Admiral BELLINGER. The ones I spoke about, which required a search of operating areas in the early morning each day.

75. General FRANK. You had no instructions from anybody to conduct any search against a force to protect you from a surprise attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. We had had on specific occasions, when there was some apparent reason for doing so. That instance had occurred for one or two different periods during the year.

76. General FRANK. Was Naval Combat Intelligence information made available to you?

Admiral BELLINGER. That depends on the echelon or kind of intelligence.

77. General FRANK. During this period?

Admiral BELLINGER. Those dispatches were not made available to me.

78. General FRANK. Did you have any information about a Japanese task force with carriers in the Marshalls about the first of December?

Admiral BELLINGER. No; not to my knowledge.

79. General FRANK. Such information would certainly put you on your high horse to get busy, would it not?

Admiral BELLINGER. In order for me to get busy I would have to initiate some proposition to higher authority; that is, to get busy lacking some definite actual emergency.

80. General FRANK. If you had gotten that information would you not have done some recommending?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is something that I would like to say [1602] yes to. I hope I would have done so. But this is post-Pearl Harbor, and then was ante-Pearl Harbor when we were at peace. But I think I would have.

81. General FRANK. But at the time you knew nothing about it?

Admiral BELLINGER. No.

82. General GRUNERT. I would like to go back to the subject of what we call distant reconnaissance. You may call it patrol or whatnot. If you had received instructions to do some distant reconnaissance or patrolling with a view to finding out whether there was any air force that might come in to attack Hawaii, in the line of discovering the location of carriers, from whom would you have received that directive for such a reconnaissance.

Admiral BELLINGER. Either Admiral Bloch, by his status as Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, in which case I assume he would have conferred with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific prior to issuing the order, or I might have received it direct from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

83. General FRANK. All the planes that you had to perform any missions as Commander of the Naval Base Defense, Air Forces, were sent over there from the fleet, were they not?

Admiral BELLINGER. Will you repeat that, please?

84. General FRANK. You had a series of six hats that you wore. Among them was Commander of the Naval Base Defense Force, which was under Admiral Bloch; but Admiral Bloch, as the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, had no airplanes. Therefore any airplanes that were made available for work as such in the Naval Base Defense Air Force were sent over there from one of these several units?

[1603] Admiral BELLINGER. Or else the Army Bomber Command.

85. General FRANK. Therefore, as long as the commander of the fleet left the planes there, Admiral Bloch and, in turn, you—but principally Admiral Bloch because you belonged to both of them—Admiral Bloch's plans for carrying out his missions were secure;

but if the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet wanted to pull some of those planes away, that left Admiral Bloch high and dry, so far as carrying out the missions he wanted carried out was concerned. Is that correct?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct. In other words, the planes comprising the Naval Base Defense Air Force were a "movable feast". In other words, there was no stable organization set aside to form the Naval Base Defense Air Force prior to December 7th. After December 7th, and on December 7th, the main mission became Naval Base Defense Air Force, and all planes functioned on that duty, unless otherwise specifically directed by the Commander-in-Chief, who also took cognizance, and direct cognizance, of the activities of the Naval Base Defense Force.

May I inject one thing on this matter? As I said before, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, initiated the formation of this Naval Base Defense Force, including the Naval Base Defense Air Force. He did it, so I understand, in order to endeavor, with the forces available, to prepare the best plan, considering all the other factors involved in operation, and to bring about some kind of coordinated effort through mutual cooperation, utilizing what existed or might exist in case the need for it arose.

86. General FRANK. One question I would like to ask about this agreement. I asked you who was the one man in the Navy [1604] responsible for the execution of the Martin-Bellinger Agreement. We have three names, Bloch, Bellinger and Kimmel. Under which of the three shells do we find the peanut?

Admiral BELLINGER. General Short was—

87. General FRANK (interposing). I say, just in the Navy.

Admiral BELLINGER. It was not within my authority to start the Air Defense Force unless there was an emergency existing. In other words, it could not be started by me to meet a thought that I might have of danger, unless there was some definite reason to indicate it, in which case I would have had to get some sort of backing from General Martin in order to present this idea to higher authority, because it would have to be a mutual agreement to start it, by General Short and Admiral Bloch.

88. General FRANK. That is what I am getting at. We knew to whom Martin would go; there is no question about that. He would go to Short. But to whom would you go? You would go to Bloch or Kimmel?

Admiral BELLINGER. With reference to the Naval Base Defense Air Force I would go to Bloch. He was my boss.

89. General FRANK. All right. Thank you.

90. General GRUNERT. I want to exhaust two subjects before we go on with another, in so far as they are exhaustable with the present light.

Let us continue what we might call this command phase. Here we have the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan executed between the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Therein, as agreed to and apparently approved all around, it is provided, under [1605] paragraph 18, that

The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shall provide for—

and it runs from A to P and paragraph I thereof is "Distant Reconnaissance". It is agreed that the Navy shall provide distant reconnaissance.

As far as the Navy is concerned, in the signatures to that there is the signature of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. He is to provide for something, but apparently he has nothing to do that providing with, unless he can get it from his senior, who happens to be the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. If he is not given the means wherewith to do that, what was the use of having him agree to do it?

Admiral BELLINGER. It sounds a little bit worse than it actually might have been, in view of the fact that Admiral Bloch was responsible and functioned under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for that purpose. The Commander-in-Chief did have an onus in connection with that also, because Bloch was his man for that purpose.

91. General GRUNERT. This is my understanding of it. Here is the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. That is not only Hawaii; it is the Pacific. He has his headquarters at the same place as that of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Therefore, he is in command, and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District is his subordinate and under him, and he is charged with the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. They make an agreement as between the Army, which is charged with defense, and the Fourteenth Naval District, which is charged with defense, and he agrees to do some distant reconnaissance. [1606] He has no means, apparently, for this distant reconnaissance, or he did not have except such as the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet saw fit to make available to him. In the absence of sufficient aircraft to meet all the demands there necessarily was a sort of pool, and that pool was primarily for the fleet and secondarily for the District. Ordinarily, most of the time the fleet used it and it could not be made available to the District if the fleet was going to use it. So it resulted in what? It resulted in your being put in command of practically all the air forces and the activities of all the air forces, and you had four or five or six different propositions and you had three or four people to go to: You had the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet; you had the District Commander, and you also had some task force commanders, I believe.

Admiral BELLINGER. The task force commanders came into the picture when the task forces were operating.

92. General GRUNERT. So, about the only thing you could do, apparently, was to agree with the Army Air Force commander and say, "We will do what we can with what we have got; and in order to know what we have got, my part of the plan is seaward, and your part of the plan is over the land or nearby." And you agreed on what each other would do, and you agreed that when the time came the fighters of the Navy would be turned over to the Army, and what we may call the reconnaissance of the Army would be turned over to the Navy. That is, generally speaking. So each day, or periodically, you made reports to each other as to what was available?

Admiral BELLINGER. Each day.

93. General GRUNERT. And, therefore, you agreed that

When and [1607] if the time comes that we may have to put this plan into effect, that is our working scheme.

Is that generally a fair statement?

Admiral BELLINGER. Generally speaking, I would say that is correct.

94. General GRUNERT. Without any details.

Now, apparently the inherent weakness in making such plans is the question of their not becoming operative in time to meet an attack? Is that true?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct. In other words, it is not operative until made operative.

95. General FRANK. It depended on a period of strained relations?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes. There was dependence on information that indicated that it was very advisable to put it into operation; and then that required, I would say, mutual consent from Admiral Bloch and General Short in which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, would have a good deal to do about it with reference to how many planes could be used for that. For instance, he might send planes away. As I say, these two squadrons of planes that went to Midway and Wake were on the direct order of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

96. General FRANK. It could have been put into effect, that is, this unity of command, by direction from Washington in accordance with joint Army and Navy action?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

97. General GRUNERT. Washington did not direct it.

The only way you had an idea of whether or not this prepared plan would work would be by a number of drills and exercises, which I understand were had?

[1608] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

98. General GRUNERT. But there was no period of imminence of war that impressed itself upon the minds of those present to decide to get together to make this plan operative and to do it every day until something broke?

Admiral BELLINGER. Apparently not.

99. General GRUNERT. Would it then have been better, and would it have given a better chance to meet an attack on December 7, had that plan been made operative as of the 27th of November, and from that time on you had exercised daily?

Admiral BELLINGER. As a result of hindsight and the proper selection of a sector for distant reconnaissance, I would say yes. The question which has to be taken into consideration in looking back now, with out minds built around ante-December 7 days, is this, and I would like to bring this point out: We were in the process of getting new planes; in other words, replacements with new planes, and between 28 October, 1941 and 23 November, 1941, we received 54 new types of planes.

100. General FRANK. P. B. Y.-5's?

Admiral BELLINGER. P. B. Y.-5's; and those planes were experiencing the usual shake-down difficulties, and we were hampered in maintenance by almost a complete absence of spare parts. We also were not overstocked with personnel. One of our main problems, as I know it was in the Army at that time, was what we termed expansion training, with the idea of endeavoring to develop an additional and adequate number of combat air crews. So that when this was put into effect, in so far as the Navy planes were concerned, that would have to be taken into consideration.

[1609] 101. General GRUNERT. Those are what you might call handicaps under any condition?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct.

102. General GRUNERT. But if it had been decided that the emergency was such as to go all out in preparedness, then, under existing conditions, would it not have been better to have made that decision before anything happened and not have to implement a plan upon a hostile attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. There is no doubt about that, because the whole basis of the plan was to discover the enemy before it could make an attack.

103. General FRANK. I would like to ask a question there which is pertinent to that. Had unity of command been in effect and had the whole Army and Navy been in the same frame of mind that they were on the 7th of December with unity of command in effect, what difference would it have made?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is rather difficult to answer, because there are so many questions of command relations from the highest echelons, which I am not familiar with, and you would know as much about that as I do. One man who has got the responsibility and the authority to make decisions, instead of trying to influence another man to think as he thinks, is the better plan.

104. General GRUNERT. If one man had to make the decision and he could get better action, then if two men had to make decisions by cooperation, even with the same means available, do you think you could have gotten better action?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think undoubtedly unity of command would have brought better action, starting from the day unity [1610] of command was established.

105. General GRUNERT. Then if any mistake was made in not establishing unity of command, it may have been made by the Powers That Be in Washington or could have been made by joint agreement between the commanders out there. Even unity of command, under the Joint Army and Navy Agreement here in Washington that I read—

106. General FRANK. But the frame of mind, the attitude toward the situation, would have been the same in any event, would it not?

Admiral BELLINGER. That I am unable to answer, because I do not know what attitude of mind Admiral Kimmel and General Short had.

107. General FRANK. Do you think that any information was available in the hands of either of the supreme commanders that would have led to different action had either one of them been supreme?

Admiral BELLINGER. If I answered that question it would be entirely supposition on my part; and I do not think that I am competent to really answer it.

108. General FRANK. It is just a matter of logic.

Admiral BELLINGER. Logically speaking, starting back in August, 1941, I felt that to place something into existence that was then based on mutual cooperation would be much better if they had unity of command; and I still persist in that.

[1611] 109. General GRUNERT. We hear considerable about the question of cooperation and the lack of it, and so forth, versus unity of command, and what might have been done thereunder; but this

joint action of Army and Navy, as promulgated here, is part of the "bible" here among the Army and the Navy, from Washington on down, on which this Hawaiian Defense plan is predicated. It says, as I read it, in paragraph 8, B (3) :

Operation of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by the exercise of unity of command in the following cases, 1, 2, and 3.

The third one is:

When the Commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the service that shall exercise that command.

That unity of command could have been put in force any time those Commanders out there thought the situation demanded it; and apparently they did not think the situation demanded it?

Admiral BELLINGER. Maybe one did, and the other didn't! I don't know.

110. General GRUNERT. Have you any more questions on this subject of command? We can go to another subject, now.

111. General RUSSELL. Admiral, as I understand it, Bloch's function as Base Commander in connection with these islands was limited to the islands and the waters adjacent thereto. The Pacific Fleet, on the contrary, operated over a very immense area, relatively speaking; is that true?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

[1612] 112. General RUSSELL. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had all of this area away from the islands, and Bloch had this narrow area about the islands, as his immediate concern; is that true?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes; under the Commander-in-Chief.

113. General RUSSELL. Well, of course, he was in the chain of command. You were immediately concerned with and in command of all the aircraft with the Pacific Fleet, and that which may have been assigned to the Base Commander, with what exceptions?

Admiral BELLINGER. In the first place, the fleet planes that I had command of in the Naval Base Air Defense Force consisted of those that were made available to me.

114. General RUSSELL. Well, let us not jump the track, Admiral. That is the trouble we are having.

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, but you have to come down to "brass tacks" on this, because it is too confusing.

115. General RUSSELL. Let me state my question, and see if it can be answered.

Admiral BELLINGER. All right.

116. General RUSSELL. What aircraft in the Pacific Fleet or in the Fourteenth Naval District did you not have command of?

Admiral BELLINGER. The Fourteenth Naval District had under it certain air stations, and there were certain small utility-type planes attached to them, and those planes were directly and specifically under the commanding officer of the air station, and they were directly under the Commandant of the Naval District.

117. General GRUNERT. That is what you call "housekeeping"?

[1613] Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct.

Now, there was a utility wing. The utility wing was not under me.

118. General RUSSELL. What was that?

Admiral BELLINGER. That was a wing composed of various types of planes, to do service to the fleet, such as towing targets, drone control, and various other utility works for the fleet. Also, the carrier planes based ashore were not under me, except when they were made available to me, and when based ashore, and only those, of those based ashore, that were made available to me.

119. General FRANK. And the carrier planes available?

Admiral BELLINGER. Those carrier planes were attached to aircraft carriers, and while on board the carriers I had nothing to do with them. When they were on shore, those that were made available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force, with the exception of the fighter planes; certain ones of those that were available were made available to the fighter command, General Davidson, in the same method and means as the bomber and scouting planes were made available to me as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. And in addition to that there was a Marine group, which was not under my authority except as the planes were made available to me for the Naval Base Defense Air Force; likewise, the fighter planes of that outfit were made available to General Davison of the fighter command.

Does that answer your question?

120. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Now, we are dealing with four groups, Admiral; certain utility planes that were available to the installation command- [1614] ers, and utility planes available to the sea units; the carrier-based planes, when they were on the carriers; and the Marine group. Now, those were the types of planes out in that area, that only on occasions were under your command?

Admiral BELLINGER. Right.

121. General RUSSELL. And probably the utility planes were never under your command?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

122. General RUSSELL. Because they were "housekeeping"?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, they were under my command for that purpose—for this purpose only—Naval Base Defense Air Force purposes.

123. General RUSSELL. Now, let us think about that third group, there, the carrier-based planes. Those were the ones on the two carriers, the LEXINGTON and the ENTERPRISE, operating out of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

124. General RUSSELL. About how many carrier-based planes did each of those carriers have?

Admiral BELLINGER. Normally, they carried at that time, I believe their complement was 93 planes.

125. General RUSSELL. 93 each?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

126. General RUSSELL. That would give them 186?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

127. General RUSSELL. Now, let us go to the Marine group. Where were they, and what were they?

Admiral BELLINGER. The Marine planes were at the Ewa base and they functioned under the Commander of Carriers of the Pacific Fleet at that time, was his title.

[1615] 128. General RUSSELL. How many were there?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't remember how many planes they had. It was something about, as I recall, one squadron of bombers, one squadron of scouts, and about two squadrons of fighter planes, perhaps. I am not sure whether that was their full complement or not.

129. General RUSSELL. And where were they, from November 27 to December 7, 1941?

Admiral BELLINGER. Some had been moved to Wake. A fighter squadron had been moved to Wake, and I think it was a squadron of dive-bombers that was at Midway.

The remainder of the planes were at Ewa air station.

130. General RUSSELL. Was there any plane arrangement or agreement which regulated the functioning of the planes under your command, the planes with the carriers, and the Marine planes, for reconnaissance purposes?

Admiral BELLINGER. Either reconnaissance or for attack purposes?

131. General RUSSELL. Let us talk about reconnaissance.

Admiral BELLINGER. When the Air Defense Force was functioning, they automatically came under my command. Those planes were available and received orders as required, either for scouting or for bombing. In other words, standing by for attack. We did not intend using them normally for scouting, because their range was entirely too short.

132. General RUSSELL. Let us go back to realities, from November 27 to December 7. Now, there were these planes with the carriers, there were these planes under your command, and the planes of the Marine people. There was no plan in existence, [1616] then which coordinated the reconnaissance functioning of these three groups of planes out there?

Admiral BELLINGER. The plan for reconnaissance was primarily for the patrol planes to carry out reconnaissance. In other words, they were the only ones trained and capable of carrying it out, and these 54 new planes that I am speaking about as having arrived after 28 October were supposedly the best aircraft we had for reconnaissance out in Hawaii.

133. General RUSSELL. Under whose command, then, between November 27 and December 7, were all of the planes in the areas which we have discussed, capable of conducting patrol missions?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is a question you have got to elaborate on to get a practical answer. Now, speaking from practical experience, after December 7.

134. General FRANK. In the first place, they were all under the Commander of the fleet, at the top side, were they not?

Admiral BELLINGER. All fleet planes are subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, as he sees fit, and they each have different commands, but the reconnaissance planes were the PBYs and the 4-engine bombers of the Army.

135. General RUSSELL. We are not talking about the Army, now.

Admiral BELLINGER. They were used, and proved the best for reconnaissance work in practice, after December 7.

136. General RUSSELL. We are not talking about that, and I will approach it from another angle. Were there any planes out there

which you have described as "Marine planes," on reconnaissance duty, prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral BELLINGER. You mean, under me, functioning?

137. General RUSSELL. No, sir. I asked you a simple question.

[1617] Admiral BELLINGER. Well, yes; there were.

138. General RUSSELL. Were those planes on reconnaissance?

Admiral BELLINGER. They were going to Midway for that purpose.

139. General RUSSELL. They were functioning, then, on reconnaissance?

Admiral BELLINGER. They went to Midway to do jobs at Midway which would require reconnaissance as well as combat.

140. General RUSSELL. All right. Then you did have Marine planes doing reconnaissance from Midway prior to December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. I did not have, no. I just happened to know that they were there.

141. General RUSSELL. Do you know of any of the other Marine-commanded planes that were doing reconnaissance or patrol prior to December 7, 1941, except those at Midway?

Admiral BELLINGER. No. Their planes were not actually designed for reconnaissance work, unless perhaps they were operated from a carrier. They at one time used these planes for operating from carriers, and when they were so operated they did carry out reconnaissance duties from the carrier; but from land their range was not satisfactory for that sort of work.

142. General RUSSELL. So, therefore, from land bases their range was not satisfactory for that; then their operations from Midway would not have been satisfactory, because they would have been land-based, there?

Admiral BELLINGER. Early information is very desirable. Now, the question is, how early can you get it. If you get information 100 miles away, it is better than having it from 20 miles away. Therefore, they did carry out, I know, [1618] reconnaissance work within their limitations, when they were based on islands; and I don't think any commander who is in charge of an island base would hesitate to use some sort of plane, even a fighter plane, to try to get early information of an attack, or an approaching enemy.

143. General RUSSELL. What would have been the range of those planes based at Midway, that were from the Marine Corps?

Admiral BELLINGER. As a matter of fact, those planes flew from Honolulu to Midway with special tanks on them. It was stretching it pretty far, but they did it.

144. General FRANK. That is around 1100 miles?

Admiral BELLINGER. Midway to Oahu, I think, is 1200 miles, isn't it?

145. General FRANK. That is near enough.

Admiral BELLINGER. It is 1138 miles.

146. General RUSSELL. Do you know where all of these Marine planes were disposed, or where they were based, on 7 December?

Admiral BELLINGER. Those in the Hawaiian area were based at Ewa.

147. General RUSSELL. Do you know about how many there were, there?

Admiral BELLINGER. I am not positive.

148. General RUSSELL. Do you know how many were at Midway?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think it was one squadron of 18 planes. I am not positive of that, but I think so.

149. General RUSSELL. Where could we get that information, Admiral, as to where the Marine planes were?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is two years and four months ago, Isn't it? I am trying to think where you could get it, now. [1619] It is only just by luck I have certain papers.

150. General RUSSELL. All right. Now, let us think about the third group.

Admiral BELLINGER. Excuse me. Perhaps you have gotten the wrong impression, when I said that the Marine planes flew from Oahu to Midway. As I say, that was with special gasoline tanks and specially loaded, as lightly as possible, to get the maximum range possible, the normal range combat load—"normal radius of action," you might say, practically, was about 175 miles, the radius of action.

151. General RUSSELL. Then they would be available for reconnaissance from their bases, 175 miles out, and return, or 87 miles out and 87 miles back?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

152. General RUSSELL. Which one? They go out 175, and come back, or they go out 87, and come back?

Admiral BELLINGER. If you wanted them for reconnaissance work you would take off some of the load and put more gas on, and get more distance. Normally speaking, I think the plane could search a sector of a radius of 100 miles.

153. General RUSSELL. Then, as a matter of fact, it is a mere generalization to say that the Marine planes were capable of only relatively close-in reconnaissance?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes. As a matter of fact, that was an auxiliary mission.

154. General RUSSELL. Now, let us discuss the planes that were on the carriers at that time, 93 on each carrier. Those planes were available to these two carriers?

Admiral BELLINGER. Available to them.

[1620] 155. General RUSSELL. Yes. I mean, they had been issued. They had them?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

156. General FRANK. They were their complements?

Admiral BELLINGER. They were either on the carriers, out at sea, or, when the carriers get in, the planes, the air group, are based ashore.

157. General RUSSELL. Now, the LEXINGTON, that morning of December 7, was about 200 miles westerly of Oahu, isn't that true? One of them was with a task force?

Admiral BELLINGER. One of them was returning. The ENTERPRISE was returning.

158. General RUSSELL. They had with them, or should have had, these 93 planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. I am not familiar with all the details of this operation, because I did not have charge of it.

159. General RUSSELL. You do not know?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't know for a fact, no. I know from certain information what was going on, and I knew it at the time, but this is two years and some months since then.

160. General FRANK. Did you have any authority over or anything to do with the airplanes on the carriers?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not on the carriers; no.

161. General FRANK. Did you have anything to do with, or any authority over, the Marine planes.

Admiral BELLINGER. Only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force functioned, and then I had operational control over those that were made available to me. You must remember that these various commands had commanding officers. They had the [1621] job of running them.

162. General RUSSELL. The point I was attempting to illustrate, Admiral, is, that there were certain planes out there that you did not command, and that did not confuse your operation, simply because they were somewhere else, doing something under another command. Those were the utility planes, the marine planes, and the planes that were with the carriers. They did not trouble you, because you had nothing to do with them except when they were attached to your command, isn't that true?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, they didn't trouble me.

163. General RUSSELL. With respect to the planes which you had under your command, it did not confuse you a lot, whether you were operating under orders from Kimmel or whether you were operating under orders from Bloch, if you understood your orders?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, it didn't confuse me, so long as I got orders.

164. General RUSSELL. But there was no plan set up, and operative, by which you were working with the Army planes, out there, prior to December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. You say there was no plan operating?

165. General RUSSELL. Operative.

Admiral BELLINGER. A plan was made operative, at times.

166. General RUSSELL. From November 27 to December 7, was it operative?

Admiral BELLINGER. Oh, excuse me. I beg your pardon, was that question from November 27?

167. General RUSSELL. I was going to limit it, so we could not take in so much territory. From November 27 to December 7, [1622] were any of those plans operative?

Admiral BELLINGER. They were not in a functioning status.

168. General RUSSELL. Is there a great difference between "operative" and "in a functioning status," please, Admiral?

Admiral BELLINGER. There is a great misinterpretation of words in the English language, and I want to make sure that it is understood that this plan was not actually functioning at that time.

169. General RUSSELL. Well, I like your language, and we will just adopt it. That will avoid a lot of trouble.

Admiral, on the morning of December 7, 1941, how many Navy planes were available on the Island of Oahu, or in the waters immediately adjacent thereto, to have aided in repelling this Japanese attack?

170. General FRANK. That is, for reconnaissance, as well as for fighting purposes?

171. General RUSSELL. For fighting. I am going into the fighting.

Admiral BELLINGER. That is a question which is entirely under the

control of the Commander of the fighter group, U. S. Army, as they made their reports to him. They were not under me.

172. General RUSSELL. Then your answer is that you do not know how many naval aircraft were available on the Island of Oahu and the waters adjacent thereto, on the morning of December 7, 1941?

173. General FRANK. That is something to get from Davidson.

Admiral BELLINGER. In accordance with the estimate of the situation, signed by General Martin and myself, it was [1623] agreed that there would be daily reports of planes that were available to the various commands; and on the afternoon of December 6, I received a dispatch from the Marine Air Corps 21, which stated:

Availability as follows. Eighteen scout bombers, three condition four; fifteen scout bombers, condition five; applicable for December 5, 6, and 7.

I sent this dispatch to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force:

Seven fighters, five condition five; nine scouts, three condition four, six condition five.

Now, those planes were presumably marine planes that were reported to me available, and the scouts were reported because they functioned under the fighter command, the pursuit command, in the normal plan we had drawn up, with the idea that they might be able to track the planes from a hostile air raid back to the carrier, and thereby give the position of the carrier.

[1624] 174. General RUSSELL. Now, were the Marine planes all that were available there at Oahu, or were there some Navy planes in addition thereto available for fighting?

Admiral BELLINGER. The regular air groups that were out there were available.

175. General FRANK. By that you mean that they were on the carriers?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes. I am practically sure that there were no other planes of that type or of that general size except the Marine planes.

176. General RUSSELL. So there was nothing there available from the Navy aircraft for the defense of the Island that morning, at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes; those that I just spoke to you about and mentioned.

177. General RUSSELL. I though you described those as Marine planes.

Admiral BELLINGER. I think they are Marines.

178. General FRANK. Those are Navy planes.

Admiral BELLINGER. But they are Navy planes. They came in the same category.

179. General RUSSELL. All right. I will ask you if there were any other planes except—

Admiral BELLINGER. Excuse me one second. You must remember that the condition of readiness that existed and was in the state of being on the morning of December 7th was Baker 5. Now, that meant, that is for the defense air force setup.

180. General RUSSELL. Yes.

[1625] Admiral BELLINGER. Now, you understand what Baker 5 is?

181. General RUSSELL. We understood it to mean, Admiral, that condition of readiness.

Admiral BELLINGER. So when you speak of readiness, that is the readiness that they were in.

182. General RUSSELL. We are trying to count the planes out there from the Navy that were available to this defense. That was all.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

183. General RUSSELL. And those that you have given me are all.

Admiral BELLINGER. That is all I know of.

184. General RUSSELL. Yes.

185. General GRUNERT. I would like to find out what Baker 5 is. Is that four hours' readiness?

Admiral BELLINGER. Baker 5 is one-half of aircraft in four hours' readiness. Now, that was a requirement—

186. General GRUNERT. They could be used in the air?

Admiral BELLINGER. Excuse me. That was a requirement by the order by the Commander Naval Base Defense Force. It did not mean necessarily that all planes were only kept in that condition, because planes were not standing by for this [indicating] except within the category that was demanded. In other words, there was a lot of work to be done both by the Army Air Force and myself as well as all the rest of them out there, and that was being done; and if they didn't set this at a lower, a priority which would permit this work to go on, why, it would have been a question of standing by and no work being done.

[1626] 187. General GRUNERT. Then, after notice was given, in four hours you could furnish the number of planes that the General was talking about?

Admiral BELLINGER. If they still were in 5.

188. General FRANK. Such other work as was to be done, one of the things would be training?

Admiral BELLINGER. Training was one of the big jobs.

189. General RUSSELL. That was what you were discussing, Admiral, some time ago, that maintaining a constant high state of alert out there would produce a weariness of personnel and obstruct other necessary work?

Admiral BELLINGER. It was a question of whether we were to improve our conditions out there or take a status quo and never be better than that for some time and rather deteriorate, rather than to improve.

190. General GRUNERT. Of course, had you known the attack was coming December 7th, it would not have been a long period in which to be on the alert, would it?

Admiral BELLINGER. If anyone knew the attack was coming, why I assume they would have been in a functioning status.

191. General GRUNERT. Then, if you had received the intelligence that you learned of after December 7th, would that not have given you an idea of the imminence of something coming that would have been greater than attempting to perfect yourselves in training, but to do the best that you could with what you had? I do not mean as to your knowledge about the attack, but I mean as to your knowledge

as to the information that was available to create in your mind a question at least [1627] as to the imminence of an attack.

Admiral BELLINGER. In other words, you mean if I had had access to all dispatches, would I have recommended that the Naval Base Defense Air Force be put in a functioning status?

192. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. As I said before, I hope I would have.

193. General GRUNERT. All right.

Admiral BELLINGER. But that is making a statement two years and four months subsequent to December 7, as an aftermath and not as an ante bellum.

194. General GRUNERT. Admiral, will you tell us the number of planes that were available to you as of December 7th for your, we will say, functioning responsibilities?

Admiral BELLINGER. As Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force?

195. General GRUNERT. Right.

196. General FRANK. Did you contemplate using B-18s for any purpose?

Admiral BELLINGER. B-18s had a very limited range, so it certainly was not in a good position for reconnaissance. It was hoped that they could make a bombing attack if a carrier came in, in within their radius of action.

197. General FRANK. On the other hand, they had very little defensive armament?

Admiral BELLINGER. Correct. As a matter of fact, also they were used as well as various other types that were not considered suitable for distant reconnaissance but which we sent out in order to find out anything that we may be able to find out within their radius of action on December 7th.

[1628] Answering the former question by General Grunert, data contained in reports which were sent in accordance with provisions of the joint estimate for the Naval Base Defense Air Force indicate that there were 66 VP planes, 11 utility planes, and from the Army 8 B-17s, 21 B-18s and 6 A-20s. These planes were reported in various conditions ranging from condition of readiness 5 and less.

198. General GRUNERT. That means what in time?

Admiral BELLINGER. Condition 5 means ready in four hours. I would like to bring one point out, though: that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, had their conditions in what was termed Easy 5. "Easy" means E-5, and E-5 states that, "All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purpose of this plan," in Condition of Readiness 5, that is, within four hours.

199. General GRUNERT. You mean to say any reported number of planes would not be ready within four hours?

Admiral BELLINGER. The report means to me that these planes were conducting routine operations, which I assume were carrying out his normal jobs, and they were not ready for the purpose of the Naval Base Defense Air Force plan, but that they could be made ready in four hours.

200. General GRUNERT. All right. Then they are within four hours? Four hours after they got back?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

201. General GRUNERT. What I am trying to get at is how many were available.

Admiral BELLINGER. I am interpreting, because I assume that is what he meant, in other words, because that differs [1629] from the other reports. That is, material readiness Easy or E was different from the others; and, as I say, that "E" means,

All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purpose of the plan.

202. General GRUNERT. Meaning, then, that after they got through with the operation they would be made ready in four hours, after they get back? Is that the operation?

Admiral BELLINGER. My interpretation was that they were conducting exercises or else were doing something else, but they were not standing by for this plan, but that they could be made ready in four hours.

203. General GRUNERT. You were not actually able to make the plan function on December 7th, were you? Or did it function?

Admiral BELLINGER. The plan began functioning with planes that were available, insofar as scouting was concerned, immediately by radio to the planes that were in the air, and by instructions to get other planes going; and of course the planes that were not in the air were gotten going at various times, some very quickly.

204. General GRUNERT. Will you tell me how many there were in the air?

Admiral BELLINGER. And some, a great many of course, were damaged.

205. General GRUNERT. Do you know, can you tell me approximately how many were in the air on a scouting mission at the time when the attack first struck or shortly before that, and what their scouting mission was?

I will change that: Were any planes on distant reconnaissance [1630] that morning?

Admiral BELLINGER. There were no planes on distant reconnaissance in the true sense of the term "distant reconnaissance." Several planes were conducting search between 120 to 170 degrees to 45 miles from Midway. Four planes were on the surface at Midway armed each with two 500-pound bombs and on ten minutes' notice. These four planes took departure at 10:30 and covered a sector from east towards north. Four planes were in the air conducting intertype tactics with submarines.

206. General FRANK. At Midway?

Admiral BELLINGER. Off Oahu. Captain Ramsey informs me it was off Lanai.

Therefore, considering Midway and Oahu, Patrol Wings 1 and 2 had 14 planes in the air, 7 of which were on search from Midway. 58 were on the surface at Kaneohe or Pearl Harbor ready for flight within four hours or less. 9 planes were undergoing repairs, making a total of 81 planes.

207. General FRANK. How many were destroyed in the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. 38 were completely destroyed. 38 were never able to be repaired.

208. General FRANK. What about the rest of them?

Admiral BELLINGER. 57 planes were put out of commission either temporarily or completely. 38 of those were not able to be put back in commission.

209. General FRANK. You then had 24 available after the attack? You said you had 81 and you lost 57. That leaves 24.

Admiral BELLINGER. Captain Ramsey says we only had 12 at Midway.

[1631] 210. General FRANK. Well, it leaves 12 in commission at Oahu after the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. I am informed by Captain Ramsey that that is correct.

211. General GRUNERT. Now, a few questions on intelligence. I believe this question was answered. If so, why, we will just say, "answered," but I wanted to make sure that it was understood by you: Did you know of the presence of a Japanese task force in the vicinity of Jaluit between November 27th and 30th?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

212. General GRUNERT. You did not. Nor were you kept advised as to anything about that force later than that, up to December 7th?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

213. General GRUNERT. Now, what was the customary procedure insofar as what we would call air intelligence was concerned? Was that a separate intelligence from other intelligence?

Admiral BELLINGER. No.

214. General GRUNERT. It was not?

Admiral BELLINGER. No. Naval Intelligence.

215. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether the air part of the Naval Intelligence was transmitted to the Army Air Forces?

Admiral BELLINGER. I do not know. I was not informed.

216. General GRUNERT. Do you know of any efforts made by the Navy to get intelligence, including intelligence about aircraft or carriers that may have been in or about the mandated islands?

Admiral BELLINGER. The Navy is very seriously interested [1632] in intelligence, and they have an intelligence branch of the Navy whose job it is to get all intelligence they can get, and undoubtedly everyone in the Navy is interested in getting the maximum amount of intelligence they can get.

217. General GRUNERT. Your definite interest, though, was primarily, I presume, to know about the possible opposing aircraft and carriers?

Admiral BELLINGER. That was something in which I was very much interested.

218. General GRUNERT. Did you get any such information?

Admiral BELLINGER. But, as I said before, my war plans job was to base at Midway. Therefore, with my forces on the various islands including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston, I would therefore be very much interested in all information about Japanese air effort.

219. General FRANK. But you didn't have any that morning?

Admiral BELLINGER. I beg pardon.

220. General FRANK. You didn't have any on the morning of December 7th?

Admiral BELLINGER. December 7th I didn't have any information about a task force in Jaluit, you say?

221. General GRUNERT. Yes, or the Marshalls. I will put it both.

222. General FRANK. When is the first time since then that you have heard of that?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think it is today.

[1633] 223. General GRUNERT. If you were based on Midway then it would be more than that?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

224. General GRUNERT. Anxiety as to information about the mandated islands would be greater?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

225. General GRUNERT. Did you ever needle the powers that be to give you more information than you had? You apparently had not known about it. Did you ever get after them and say, "Here, in order to do my work in the future I have got to have information"?

Admiral BELLINGER. As to this information about a task force in Jaluit, I do not remember anything about it. This is my first information about that, now, that there was information about this task force in Jaluit. Certainly I am interested and was interested in every form of readiness which includes naval intelligence. As a matter of fact, we were discussing this subject with General Martin and others some time considerably prior to this, wondering if we would have intelligence on the movement of a Japanese force.

226. General GRUNERT. My understanding is that you did not get any information about the movement of Japanese forces in or about the mandated islands?

Admiral BELLINGER. I remember nothing about it at the present time, and I do not think I ever got it.

227. General GRUNERT. Did you take any positive action in attempting to get such intelligence from the Navy or from any other source? Not that intelligence, but any intelligence about the Japanese Navy?

[1634] Admiral BELLINGER. We were supposed to be kept informed, as a force commander or commander of an operating outfit, and presumably information of that kind would be distributed as it was known to have been distributed in the past. I do not remember any special effort or special demand for information that I ever made to the Navy Department. When it came to demands it was mainly demands for increasing the material readiness. But I do not know of any particular definite specific demands for naval intelligence.

228. General FRANK. You assumed that if it was available it would be given to you?

Admiral BELLINGER. I assumed that and I expected that.

229. General GRUNERT. We will go to a different subject now.

Were the submarines of the fleet or of the naval district, if any, used for reconnaissance purposes? Did they fit into your scheme of reconnaissance?

Admiral BELLINGER. The submarine force was not under me. We worked that submarine force in various ways. For instance, we had drills to work out with submarines and we had something to do with operations connected with reconnaissance duties.

230. General GRUNERT. Were they ever used in a scheme of distant reconnaissance? While you did not have quite enough planes to cover 360 degrees, there were certain areas that might be covered by subs. Was that ever done?

Admiral BELLINGER. They were not put in the scheme of things connected with that, presumably because they would be used offensively rather than on defensive missions.

231. General GRUNERT. Any intelligence they might furnish would be incidental to other duties?

[1635] Admiral BELLINGER. Submarines have been used for intelligence work in war games and in plans. Whether any submarines had been sent out for any specific intelligence work, I do not know. That was not under me.

232. General GRUNERT. They were not under the air reconnaissance?

Admiral BELLINGER. They were not working under me and were not in the picture in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor.

233. General GRUNERT. It is the Board's understanding that these task forces that went out from Pearl Harbor had no definite job in distant reconnaissance for the defense of Oahu; that they scoured the areas for security purposes and then were used by the task forces for their own purposes, and not for distant reconnaissance purposes for the defense of Oahu. Is that your understanding?

Admiral BELLINGER. I do not think that any task force was sent out as a job for the security of Oahu. Some task forces that were operating at that time, that I have spoken about, were in connection with Midway reinforcement and Wake reinforcement. When on those missions, of course they conducted search to the maximum of their capabilities; and in addition to that we had patrol planes that were there for that purpose, too. That is what the squadrons were out there for.

234. General GRUNERT. The patrol search was intended primarily to safeguard from subs, to look for subs primarily, and any air reconnaissance was incidental as far as protection for Hawaii was concerned?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not being the task force commander, I [1636] cannot say; I do not know. Submarines were there on December 7th and for many days after that. Aircraft were there on one day.

235. General GRUNERT. Let me put it this way: As Navy Defense Air Force commander, you had no assignments made for any air mission so far as the task force was concerned? In other words, they were not given any assignments in so far as your job as the Naval Base Defense Air Force commander was concerned?

Admiral BELLINGER. No. In my status as commander of Patrol Wings 1 and 2, in that capacity I furnished planes as directed, or squadrons as directed, by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to work with that task force in accordance with the plans of that particular task force commander.

236. General GRUNERT. How was the so-called cooperation between you and General Martin? Was it satisfactory to you?

Admiral BELLINGER. I should say it was very close, friendly cooperation. I have a high opinion of him and I think he is a very fine officer and gentleman.

237. General GRUNERT. Outside of his being a fine officer and gentleman, did you get out of him what you needed to carry on your work, and did he get out of you what he needed to carry on his work?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think so, because shortly after he arrived—I had arrived just shortly before he arrived, and we immediately agreed to endeavor to work out exercises together and we conducted many exercises which were entirely arranged between him and me, and then we would have a critique over at the Naval Air Station where several Army officers came over to attend. I think for a while those exercises took place once [1637] a week, and maybe later once every two weeks, and then finally when this Naval Base Defense Air Force came into being the exercises were planned more in accordance with that.

238. General GRUNERT. Then the gist of the whole thing is that you got along well together officially and socially. Aside from unity of command, do you think you got about as much as the two of you could get by cooperative action?

Admiral BELLINGER. That can never be attained, because—

239. General GRUNERT (interposing). I say, aside from that, did you get as much of cooperation as you think the two of you could have gotten short of unity of command?

Admiral BELLINGER. I do not see how we could have. Cooperation is fine, but there is always the responsibility of one man to one boss and the other man to the other boss.

240. General GRUNERT. You did not have that; but did you get as much out of it as you expected, short of that?

Admiral BELLINGER. I was thoroughly satisfied with the cooperation between General Martin and myself.

241. General GRUNERT. Did you know what action the Army took, or General Short took, as a result of a message which he received from the Chief of Staff on November 27? The Army went on what they called Alert No. 1, sabotage alert. Were you informed that the Army was on such an alert?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

242. General GRUNERT. You did not know anything about that?

Admiral BELLINGER. I cannot remember knowing anything about it. One second; excuse me. This was a long time ago. (After a pause:) I do not recall knowing about it; at least, if I knew about it, I did not know about it officially.

[1638] 243. General GRUNERT. Would it have affected your responsibility one way or the other had you known?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is, that the Air Force was on an alert?

244. General GRUNERT. The entire Hawaiian Defense Command was on Alert No. 1, which is an alert against sabotage. They went on that Alert on November 27th. My question is, did you know about it? You say you did not know about it.

Admiral BELLINGER. I did not know the reasons for it. If I knew they were on their alert, I did not know it officially.

245. General GRUNERT. Would it have made any difference whether they were on alert or not as far as your responsibility was concerned?

Admiral BELLINGER. It would depend on for what reason they went on the alert. That I knew nothing about.

246. General GRUNERT. And you knew nothing about the message received by the Army from the Chief of Staff, or the message received

by the Navy which started with the words "Consider this a war warning?"

Admiral BELLINGER. No.

247. General GRUNERT. You were not informed of that?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

248. General GRUNERT. Tell us what you know, if anything, about the Army's Interceptor Command which included its air warning service and its ability to operate December 7. What did you know about it and what was your opinion of it?

Admiral BELLINGER. It was my understanding that it was in the process of building up; that they needed more personnel, more equipment, and more experience.

[1639] 249. General GRUNERT. Did you have any confidence in its ability to operate?

Admiral BELLINGER. I had never had any definite experience that would give me that assurance.

250. General GRUNERT. Did you have any similar scheme within the Navy itself, such as was contemplated in the Interceptor Command, where one officer, the controller of the information center, controlled the operation of the device in the air or controlled antiaircraft and controlled the radar? Did you have any such thing to control your antiaircraft aboard ship? If not, how were they handled in the Navy? Here was a bunch of antiaircraft on each ship, with quite a bit of fire power, and you had radars. Were they each independent on the ship, or was there some coordinated system of handling all that intelligence and operation while they were together?

Admiral BELLINGER. You are speaking about ships at sea, I presume?

251. General GRUNERT. Yes. In handling your aircraft was it necessary for you to have any such system as the Army established as an Interceptor Command?

Admiral BELLINGER. Apparently it was not practical to do that. I have forgotten whether this was subsequent to December 7 or prior to it, but I know that efforts were made to try to see whether radar on ships in harbors, with the interference of the surrounding land, would prevent the radar from being effective.

252. General GRUNERT. Presumably the radar on ships in the harbor did not operate while in the harbor?

Admiral BELLINGER. They did not function very satisfactorily [1640] at that time. I am speaking now about approximately that time. I am not so sure whether this was before December 7 or after December 7, because the radar on ships was something that was just coming into being and every effort was made to try to get them on the carriers first.

253. General GRUNERT. After the attack occurred on Pearl Harbor of course the Interceptor Command scheme was broadened so as to weave into the antiaircraft defense those guns aboard ship while in the harbor. They supplemented the land-based antiaircraft, and then it was all woven into one whole. Up to that time, as far as you know, those had not been included in the antiaircraft scheme? Is that right?

Admiral BELLINGER. The effort to utilize the ships in the harbor with their guns was placed in effect in conjunction with the effort for the air

defense, and came into being under the Naval Base Defense Force commander.

254. General GRUNERT. Was that prior to December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

255. General GRUNERT. But it had not been woven into the Interceptor Command control?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. It was not under the Interceptor Command control; it was under the control of the operating staff of the Naval Base Defense Force. There was a requirement which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, had in effect at the time, and had for some time, with reference to the manning of gun crews continuously. There was a regular scheme laid out for their control, so far as practicable by the ships that were in the harbor, by the senior officers in certain sectors of the harbor. That was a different situation, maybe, every day. We [1641] hoped it was a scheme that would work and fit conditions that existed on any day. But the general plans and instructions for manning the guns were in effect.

256. General RUSSELL. After November 27, 1941, did you receive any part of the record which indicated to you, as Commander of the Air Force which you then commanded, that there was a tightening up in the operations in the Navy with respect to reconnaissance or being on the alert for impending attack or trouble with Japan?

Admiral BELLINGER. No.

257. General RUSSELL. There were no new instructions, therefore, that reached you on November 27 or thereafter, which you could interpret as meaning that the relations between the two powers were becoming more strained?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, not officially; only through newspapers.

258. General RUSSELL. As a result of what you saw in the newspapers did you take any different action from what you would have taken had you not read the newspapers?

Admiral BELLINGER. The question is how to interpret the newspapers. As a result of the newspapers, I took no special action. We were in a condition of trying to get ready to such an extent that I was endeavoring to indoctrinate the aircraft in my patrol wings, 1 and 2, that if they were on a flight and they got word that war was on the way, they would be ready in their training point of view, combat crew discipline and the equipment in the planes to carry out the job that might be assigned. That was the kind of training that were trying to perfect.

259. General RUSSELL. So you did not regard the newspaper information [1642] as changing your operations at all?

Admiral BELLINGER. As a matter of fact, I was laid up a few days from December 2nd to the 6th, and I saw newspapers.

260. General RUSSELL. You testified a little while ago that certain planes were operating from Midway to a distance of approximately 450 miles, and you gave the directions of those operations by language with which I am not familiar. I wonder if you could tell me this. Were you operating those planes to the north, the east, the west, or to the south?

Admiral BELLINGER. In regard to Midway, the sector covered was to the southeast from Midway. After word was received out there at Midway the four planes that were remaining and ready for flight were on a sector towards the northeast.

261. General RUSSELL. Do you have another copy of that map which is before you?

Admiral BELLINGER. No. This is an original and is the only one I have.

262. General RUSSELL. You would not want to give it to us?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

263. General FRANK. If one of those planes had met with some Zeros it would have been too bad?

Admiral BELLINGER. It would have.

264. General FRANK. If all four together met with Zeros it would have been too bad?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes; although patrol planes have "shot it out" with some Jap planes.

265. General GRUNERT. Is there anything else that occurs to you that you think might be of assistance to this Board in getting at facts or getting leads towards sources of such facts? [1643] If so, if you could add it now to your testimony we would appreciate it. Is there something that sticks in your mind that ought to be considered, outside of what we have covered in our questions and your answers?

266. General FRANK. Let me ask this question: The general activities of the Navy operating out of Pearl Harbor were in what direction from Oahu?

Admiral BELLINGER. On December 7?

267. General FRANK. No; in the period prior to December 7, in November and up to December 7.

Admiral BELLINGER. Toward the northwest and west. On the routes toward Midway and Wake there were two task forces of surface craft and aircraft that went out in connection with the reinforcement of those two islands, Midway and Wake, by Marine aircraft. These forces were operating in that area going out and coming back.

268. General GRUNERT. You do not think of anything else that you think ought to be put before the Board?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. I think it has been covered as far as I can see. I know of nothing more to bring out.

269. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for giving us of your time and assistance.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 1 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m.)

[1644]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board, at 2 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, U. S. N.; ON DUTY AT CHIEF, NAVAL OPERATIONS; WASHINGTON, D. C.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Commander, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station, please.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, U. S. Navy, on duty at the Chief, Naval Operations; Washington, D. C.

2. General GRUNERT. Commander, this Board is after the facts, both as to what happened prior to, leading up to, and during the attack at Pearl Harbor. From a study of the Roberts Commission's report we find that you were in a position, by reason of which I think you can give us some information that will help us.

First, then, will you state to the Board what your assignment was in the latter part of 1941, and then explain what the duties of that assignment were, so that we may get clearly just what your position was and how you fitted into the picture.

Commander ROCHEFORT. About June 1941, I was ordered from duty as intelligence officer of the Scouting Force to combat intelligence at Pearl Harbor. This combat-intelligence assignment was to an office which was a field unit to the home office, which was in Washington, the other field unit being in Cavite, and operating under the Sixteenth Naval District. I was attached to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and theoretically had no connections with the Commander-in-Chief [1645] or with any other organization, then.

The duties of the office were extremely technical in nature, and had nothing to do with ordinary intelligence; it was primarily radio intelligence. The method of operating was, we were given assignments by the head office in Washington as to the type of work they wished us to work on.

3. General GRUNERT. Before you go any further, let me see if I understand that. You were then the combat-intelligence officer, in matters pertaining to the Fourteenth Naval District; at least, you were attached to that district for combat-intelligence work?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

4. General GRUNERT. There existed also a fleet-intelligence officer?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

5. General GRUNERT. And a district intelligence officer?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

6. General GRUNERT. There was also an Army intelligence officer?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

7. General GRUNERT. Those were the other echelons of intelligence work going on at that time?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

8. General GRUNERT. You had nothing to do with local intelligence nor with the ordinary intelligence that the fleet needs; you had to do with special intelligence work?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

9. General GRUNERT. That was mainly in the line of radio interception?

[1646] Commander ROCHEFORT. Radio interception. I might say, General, that when I first went there it had no name whatever. It was called the "radio unit" of the district, but we changed that after I went there and called it "combat intelligence," and then enlarged it to include such things as providing situation maps for the Commander-in-Chief, and plots of all vessels in the Pacific, and so on, and so forth; and generally we consisted of an interception station, a radio-direction-finder station, and, in the crypto-analytic units in Pearl Harbor, proper.

10. General GRUNERT. If there is anything, in answering any of our questions and in explaining anything to us, that may be of future value to the enemy, we had better consider what should be on, and what should be off, the record; so keep that in mind in answering these questions.

Just what is the set-up, so that you could perform the duties that you were required to perform out there?

Commander ROCHEFORT. I don't understand your question, by "set-up," sir.

11. General GRUNERT. All right. Now, there is radio intercept?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

12. General GRUNERT. You spoke of direction finders; and now, what is the physical set-up? How do they do that. Give us an understanding of that.

Commander ROCHEFORT. We had what we termed the "intercept unit," which during 1941 was located at Heeia, at an old naval radio station.

13. General GRUNERT. That is on an island in the Hawaiian [1647] group?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. That is just beyond Waialua over on the other side.

14. General GRUNERT. That intercept station works by itself? It doesn't have to have anything farther out, does it?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. It might be understood a little more clearly, sir, if we called it a monitoring station. I believe that is what the FCC calls it—a monitoring station. In other words, we intercept any traffic that is going, either way.

15. General GRUNERT. In any direction?

Commander ROCHEFORT. In any direction; yes, sir.

16. General GRUNERT. All right. Now, I understand it. What are your "direction finders"?

Commander ROCHEFORT. The task of the direction finders was to take bearings on transmissions of vessels or units in which we were interested.

17. General GRUNERT. That requires more than one station, does it?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; that does require more than one station.

18. General GRUNERT. Did you have charge of those stations, or were those independent groups, too?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. In addition to the combat intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor, there was established in 1937 what we called the "Mid Pacific strategic direction-finder net," which were all high-frequency direction finders, and those direction finders were physically located at Dutch Harbor, Samoa, and Pearl Harbor, plus one at Guam, which for administrative [1648] purposes came under the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, but who took bearings for us, so we had four stations which were included in the Mid Pacific net.

19. General GRUNERT. Was the direction finding primarily for the fleet, or was that incidental in following up your radio-intercept, and so forth?

Commander ROCHEFORT. That was incidental to the radio intelligence job, sir. The function of that, or rather the mission of that

was to tell the Commander-in-Chief and any other interested parties where certain units of any nation, other than our own—and our own, if so directed—were.

20. General GRUNERT. That is, where they were physically located?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

21. General GRUNERT. Although you might have picked it out of the air about their being there, but you located them through the direction finder?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. That was the function of the radio direction finder.

22. General GRUNERT. To whom was this information you got through the radio intercept and direction finding transmitted?

Commander ROCHEFORT. That came into the office which was located in the administration building in Pearl Harbor, and was evaluated there with other information, and was disseminated to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet by means of a daily bulletin, which included locations of enemy vessels and estimates and evaluations regarding future operations. Also, if anything of any importance was determined that was sent by radio to a group of addresses, a standard group of addresses, which included the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, the Commandant of the [1649] Sixteenth Naval District.

23. General FRANK. That was in Manila?

Commander ROCHEFORT. That was Cavite; yes, sir; plus the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

24. General GRUNERT. Did you have any responsibility as to anything sent by direct transmission to the Army in Hawaii?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

25. General GRUNERT. If that was transmitted, it was somebody else's business?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Our relations with the Army in Pearl Harbor were more on the personal basis. We had no directives to my knowledge, to do such and such, with Colonel Fielder. He happened to be my opposite number, there. I worked through Colonel Fielder; but everything that was done was on a personal basis, and if we determined anything or heard anything, it would be delivered to Colonel Fielder, personally.

26. General GRUNERT. But it was not your responsibility to keep him informed?

Commander ROCHEFORT. I did not consider it was; no, sir.

27. General GRUNERT. Was most of this work that you were doing considered to be of a high degree of secrecy?

Commander ROCHEFORT. It was considered to be the very top, sir.

28. General GRUNERT. Therefore, you were probably limited in the dissemination?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

29. General GRUNERT. And he was not on your list for dissemination?

[1650] Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we were not permitted to deal with anybody other than the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet.

30. General GRUNERT. And the Commandant of the District? All right.

Now, on all diplomatic or consular stuff, could you "pick" or "butt into" that?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. In this allocation of work that I mentioned before, the diplomatic and consular work was done by the unit in Washington; and, to a certain extent, it was assisted by the unit in Cavite.

31. General GRUNERT. But if it were in the air, could you not pick it out?

Commander ROCHEFORT. We could have, sir, if it was in the air; but—it may sound funny, now—it was not our job, sir.

32. General FRANK. When you refer to "the unit in Washington," do you mean the naval unit in Washington?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; in so far as we were concerned, it was the naval unit. Actually it was both the Army and the Navy here, together, but in so far as we were concerned.

33. General GRUNERT. Was it against the law for you to pick that up?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

34. General GRUNERT. And trying to decode it?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; it was.

35. General GRUNERT. Now, we get down to cases. This information that you got was furnished by daily summaries to the fleet and the District?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

36. General GRUNERT. And to other people, but not directly to [1651] the Army?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

37. General GRUNERT. If you got any special information, I suppose it was furnished to the same people?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. The arrangement we made, General, was again on a personal basis, that anything pertaining to the islands, themselves, in so far as I was concerned, was the function of the district intelligence officer and of the Army; anything pertaining to outside of the islands was my job, and the arrangement I had was that if any information such as—oh, say an unauthorized radio transmitter, perhaps, on the Island of Oahu, if that came up, I would communicate that information to the district intelligence officer and to Colonel Fielder.

38. General GRUNERT. And they would handle the local matters?

Commander ROCHEFORT. They would handle the stuff in the island, proper. In other words, they were interior, and I was not at all interested in anything that went on, on the beach, or within the island. I didn't consider that part of my job.

39. General GRUNERT. But suppose you picked up something a way out to one side, you then could not be the judge as to whether it was Navy, Army, or the district?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Then I dealt only with the Commandant of the District, sir.

40. General GRUNERT. What I am trying to find out is, if it had to be transmitted to the Army, that would be transmitted on his judgment?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; either by the Commandant, the Commander-in-Chief, or by the Chief of Naval Operations, here.

[1652] 41. General GRUNERT. All right, now; I think I understand the set-up.

Along about the latter part of November, or, I believe, as testified by you before the Roberts Commission, along about the 1st of November, you started picking up some stuff which appeared to be of great interest and probably some question, and then, along about the latter part of November, you picked up some stuff that showed concentration of Japanese vessels. Now, will you give us the story to that, from the beginning to the end, until you lost it, or lost part of it, or whatnot? Give us that story, please.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Well, in any of this radio intelligence work, sir, by experience, trained men or trained officers can make a very, very good estimate of what the intentions will be of the enemy, by means of just a study of the traffic, itself; and from our experience in Hainan, the movement which had happened about nine months before, and watching the traffic during the late fall of 1941, it became apparent that the Japanese were preparing for a major operation. As time developed, and along about the 20th or 25th of November, things had progressed to the point where our views crystallized, and we accordingly prepared an estimate, which was sent to all the addresses that I mentioned previously.

42. General GRUNERT. That was in the form of a summary, was it?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; you call it a "summary." We call it a "summary."

43. General FRANK. How was that sent—by radio?

Commander ROCHEFORT. That was sent out by radio, sir. [1653] The procedure was that it was sent by radio to a single addressee which included Chief of Naval Operations, two Commanders-in-Chief and the two District Commandants involved. That summary indicated to us that the Japanese were engaged in a major operation which would start in the immediate future, and that it was composed generally of two task forces; and we gave the location and the composition and the general heading. In addition to that, there appeared to be a very strong concentration in the Marshalls; as I recall, we said at least one third of the submarines, and at least one carrier division unit—at least that. We sent that out, as I recall, about the 25th or 26th of November.

44. General GRUNERT. Would you tell me what a carrier-division unit consists of, how many carriers?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Normally, two, sir, with the Japanese. It could be three, but normally, two.

45. General GRUNERT. And the submarines, you said about a third?

Commander ROCHEFORT. About one third of the submarines. There were as I recall two squadrons, which would be probably about 15 or 20 submarines.

46. General GRUNERT. Were there any battleships in that force?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Not that we noted, sir; not that we noted.

47. General GRUNERT. All right. Go on.

Commander ROCHEFORT. That summary was sent out about the 25th or 26th of November, and the reply was received from the Asiatic unit, the so-called "Cavite unit," in which they agreed with us in pra-

tically all particulars, other than the location of the carriers in the Marshalls.

[1654] Their reaction was that they did not have sufficient evidence that would indicate there were carriers in the Marshalls. Aside from that, they agreed with us.

48. General GRUNERT. They had a similar unit to yours, in Cavite?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, the only difference being the type of work that they were working on, the type of stuff that they were working on.

49. General GRUNERT. Then, what happened, after the 25th, after that summary?

Commander ROCHEFORT. After the summary, sir, why, things got very quiet, and there was considerable action and traffic and indications in the area generally to the westward of the Empire; that is, between the Empire and Indo-China, which made it very clear that the Japanese were moving in that area. There was some traffic indicating a move down toward the Philippines.

50. General GRUNERT. Was there anything indicating that this force which you had estimated or figured out to be in about the Marshalls had left the Marshalls?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir; there was not. Aside from those two groups or forces that I have mentioned; that is, going toward the Philippines, and toward Indo-China, there was no information of any sort available from a study of radio traffic that indicated any move to the eastward from the Empire, or any move out of the Marshalls.

51. General GRUNERT. About when was it that, from all the evidence, this force in the Marshalls dropped out of existence?

Commander ROCHEFORT. About the latter part of November, [1655] I would say, sir; perhaps in the last five days of November.

52. General GRUNERT. You could not get anything on the carriers, or you could not get anything on any part of the force, or what?

Commander ROCHEFORT. They were not transmitting. That is, if they were transmitting messages, we were not hearing them.

53. General FRANK. They were on radio silence, completely?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Apparently so, sir; apparently, they were on radio silence.

54. General GRUNERT. Was that indicative to you there was something serious in the air?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; there was; but not toward the eastward.

55. General GRUNERT. Did you enquire of Cavite again to find out whether they got anything more on them?

Commander ROCHEFORT. There was a series of dispatches between Cavite and ourselves and Washington, beginning with our message, about the 25th. I don't recall any specific message though, or what it said, but we had been for months of course in constant communication; but whether any of the messages subsequent to that asked that specific question, sir, I don't recall.

56. General GRUNERT. You did not have any reaction, though, from Washington, on your summary?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. There was no reply.

57. General GRUNERT. There was no reaction, indicating that they believed in it, or disbelieved in it?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir; there was no reply from [1656] Washington, sir.

58. General FRANK. Did you get anything from Dutch Harbor or Samoa?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I didn't get anything from Dutch Harbor and Samoa, General. They only had either three or four radios, and they were merely a direction-finding unit, that was all, and they were supposed to be trained direction-finder men; but that's about all they were good for.

59. General GRUNERT. In this radio intercept stuff about the force being in the Marshalls, did you get the names of any of the vessels?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

60. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether this force that you located in the Marshalls was the force that attacked Hawaii?

Commander ROCHEFORT. We believed it was, afterwards, sir.

61. General GRUNERT. What led you to believe that? What led you to believe that they were the same vessels?

Commander ROCHEFORT. We were reasonably sure, sir, in so far as the submarines were concerned, because we had, of course, numerous submarines off Pearl Harbor, beginning on or about the 7th of December, and the logical place for them to come from was the Marshalls, particularly in view of the fact that the force commander of the submarines was in the Marshalls during November and remained there during December and probably January.

62. General GRUNERT. Was there any talk in the air by radio, later on, from Japanese sources, that gave you information as to where they had been, or what they had done?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. We knew, of course, who had come to Pearl Harbor, but where they had come from, we didn't [1657] know.

63. General GRUNERT. There was something I did not quite understand, in your testimony before the Roberts Commission. The Chairman said something to the effect,

Now, you had information on Wednesday—

I presume that is the 3rd—

that the consul here was burning his papers, did you not?

You replied,

We are the ones who gave that to Washington.

He appeared to be surprised, and said, "Oh!" And then you said:

We talked—we told them he was. They told us that London and Washington were burning papers.

Presumably that was the 3rd of December, Wednesday?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

64. General GRUNERT. Now, was that information from Washington that the consulates in London and Washington were burning papers transmitted to your district commander?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

65. General GRUNERT. And to the Chief?

Commander ROCHEFORT. It was transmitted to the District Commandant, sir, by me, personally, and it was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, by reason of the fact that he was an addressee. In other words, all of those dispatches were automatically addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, but whether or not he personally saw them, of course, I couldn't say.

66. General GRUNERT. And you do not know whether that information got to the Army, or not?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I do not. There were some of those messages, General, which indicated that, "Please show to the Department commander," or, "Please inform the Army authorities of this decision."

[1658] 67. General GRUNERT. Those were some messages that came from the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Some of those dispatches indicated that he was to confer with the Army authorities.

In connection with that diplomatic situation, sir, if I may clear up that one point, the task, as I have indicated, of the diplomatic stuff, was being done in Washington on a joint basis. I think it was Mr. Sarnoff who came out to Honolulu, September, October, or something, and we had been endeavoring to my knowledge since 1925 to get some of this traffic, unsuccessfully. Mr. Arnoff indicated we should get it.

68. General GRUNERT. Mr. Sarnoff was acting in what position?

Commander ROCHEFORT. He was head of the RCA, at the time, sir, President of the RCA. It was suggested we make some sort of effort, and, on a personal basis, with the district intelligence officer, he gave me some of the traffic which he had obtained. It was very recent traffic, and that is how we sent that one dispatch to Washington, indicating that he was burning the stuff, because of some stuff, there.

69. General GRUNERT. That has covered all the ground I wanted to cover. Have you some questions?

70. General RUSSELL. Did you know anything about the effectiveness of the radar which was in possession of the Navy at Pearl Harbor?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I did not.

71. General RUSSELL. You did not know whether they could search out anything with those radar installations?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir; I did not.

72. General RUSSELL. You state that you were not permitted [1659] to pick up or evaluate information intercepted from the consular service, is that what you said?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; that is correct.

73. General RUSSELL. You were precluded by law from doing that?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

74. General RUSSELL. Didn't you have to get some of it, before you knew whether it was consular, or not?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Well, actually, general, it had been obtained, but it was being done by people other than us. That was part, again, of the allocation of work. In other words, we had, say, five jobs to do. Washington, we will say, would handle two, and they would give us two, and they would give Cavite the fifth one, and we would work on them; and if any information was obtained from one of the other jobs, that would be passed on to us; but we were not supposed to work with that type of traffic.

75. General RUSSELL. So, as soon as it was distributed by your operators, then they lost interest?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. We didn't cover those "printers" on which it would be sent.

76. General RUSSELL. I understand.

Commander ROCHEFORT. In other words, we were only interested in one thing, in Pearl Harbor. We were interested in the Japanese Fleet. That's all we cared about.

77. General RUSSELL. You were interested only in what?

Commander ROCHEFORT. In the Japanese Fleet. That's all we were interested in.

78. General RUSSELL. Now, you say there was a summary, about [1660] the 20th of November, in which this task force in the Marshalls was discussed?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

79. General GRUNERT. You say the 20th?

Commander ROCHEFORT. The 25th, sir.

80. General RUSSELL. The 25th?

Commander ROCHEFORT. About the 25th.

81. General RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not a copy of that estimate is in existence, in Hawaii?

Commander ROCHEFORT. A copy should be available, sir, in the office of Naval Communications. That would be the normal custodian, in the Office of Naval Communications.

82. General GRUNERT. Here, in Washington?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. They should be the custodians of all that traffic.

83. General GRUNERT. Is there any record of it in Hawaii, do you know?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Yes, there would be a record there.

84. General RUSSELL. Now, about this task force with the carrier unit in it, would it be divulging anything that you should not divulge if you told us where you first picked that up?

Commander ROCHEFORT. That would be very difficult to answer, General. In estimating these things, it was more by sense than by any thing else. I used to explain it by saying that in any major operation started by the Japanese there would be three definite stages. There would be the stage of a large flurry of traffic; that is, messages, and one thing and another; and then there would be a stage of apparent confusion, in which [1661] they would send a message to General Soandso, and Admiral Soandso, and they would say, "He isn't here, send it somewhere else"; and quite a bit of confusion, which was caused apparently by the regrouping of the ships and the units. That would be the second phase. [1662] The third phase was radio silence, and when radio silence started then you knew something was up. So we could always tell by these various conditions or phases they would go through just about how far advanced they were in this thing. And I think the estimates that were made by both the units at Pearl Harbor and Cavite were accurate in everything except one respect, that is, that one task force from Pearl Harbor. Everything else was absolutely correct. The make-up of them, the composition we knew that.

85. General GRUNERT. There was one other question I wanted to ask you: In that force going down to Hainan, had any of that force ever assembled as far away as the mandated islands in order to go down to the southeast?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

86. General GRUNERT. Then did it seem strange that they should be assembling in the Marshall Islands in order to go southeast?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No. As I recall, General, we said in our summary that that force might possibly be a force that was to cover the flanks. I believe we made such a statement as that, something similar to that. It was our assumption at the time that that group of submarines there, with or without the carrier group, would be used to secure the flanks against any possible move on the part of the United States.

87. General GRUNERT. Now, at that time was your service rather new?

Commander ROCHEFORT. The service in Pearl Harbor, sir, was relatively new.

[1663] 88. General GRUNERT. What I am getting at is, did the rest of the Navy believe in what you were doing and what you could do? In other words, how much credence did they give the output of what you did, in your opinion?

Commander ROCHEFORT. The naval officers who had access to the information believed in it very strongly, sir, but those were only a fraction of one percent, possibly, of the naval officers. That is, for reasons of security we were not permitted to discuss the matter with anybody or to show them anything. So that Admiral Kimmel came over very frequently and discussed matters with us, but whether he discussed them with members of his own staff or not, referring to our work, I do not know.

89. General GRUNERT. Did you consider that force a threat against Hawaii?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Personally, no sir.

90. General GRUNERT. Although it had aircraft carriers in it that could strike at Hawaii or most any other near-by point?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. The organization that we had identified, General, is not a type of organization you would have for a striking force. In other words, it lacked two elements: it lacked either cruisers or destroyers, and it lacked a supply, that there were no indications of tankers there, no indication of any cruisers or destroyers. For that reason it did not seem that it was coming to the eastward, because they would not move carriers and submarines.

91. General GRUNERT. Of course, that was none of your business? You picked the information up and gave it to them in a summary, and it was up to them to figure it out?

[1664] Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, because we had nothing else available, sir, no other information available aside from that we gathered by radio.

92. General GRUNERT. All right. General Russell, have you finished?

93. General RUSSELL. I am a little bit intrigued about their moving out there to protect the flank, the southern movement of a major portion of the Japanese forces. What was on the flank that they should have been troubled about?

Commander ROCHEFORT. The United States Fleet, sir.

94. General RUSSELL. Where?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Pearl, sir.

95. General RUSSELL. Pearl Harbor?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

96. General RUSSELL. Where would it have been easier for them to have destroyed that fleet?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Well, if I were Admiral Yamamoto, sir, I would like to have them in the Marshalls somewhere.

97. General RUSSELL. Would it have been better to have attacked them or attempted to have destroyed them when they were in battle formation moving to the west, or when they were not steamed up and lying in the harbor at Honolulu?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Probably when they were out to the Marshalls, I think it would be easier.

98. General RUSSELL. If they had a force out there to have fought it out with these naval forces in the Marshalls?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. I think probably it would have been better from the Japanese point of view to have had us in the Marshalls.

[1665] 99. General RUSSELL. With no cruisers, no destroyers, no battleships?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No; all they would need there, sir, would be the air bases.

100. General RUSSELL. Oh, you mean move in with the land-based planes?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

101. General RUSSELL. As it developed, that was not what they were thinking about.

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir, that was not in their mind at all.

102. General RUSSELL. Wasn't it true that this report that you had in the latter part of November indicated the names of the carriers that you had contacted?

Commander ROCHEFORT. I am not sure of that, sir, but I do not believe that it did.

103. General RUSSELL. Is it true or not that the radio stations or the sending sets, if that is the accurate description of what the transmitter is, on the carriers were relatively weak and could not be detected for a long distance?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Oh, no, sir. No, sir; that is not true.

104. General RUSSELL. That is not true?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir, that is not true.

105. General RUSSELL. That when these carriers went into port they changed the type of radio set that they operated with, and you lost sight of them?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

106. General RUSSELL. So long as the carriers then were in home ports you had very little way of checking on them? [1666]

Commander ROCHEFORT. We had what we called collateral, sir. We do the same thing. Everybody does the same thing. When a ship goes into port it usually utilizes the communication facilities of that navy yard or naval base, whatever it is going to be. In other words, he may send his messages by blinker or land-line or telephone or any-

thing else. When he is at sea, of course, then he has to transmit his own.

I might say in passing that at that time, though, we got relatively few dispatches transmitted by a certain vessel as transmitted from that vessel. We got them on the second or third or fourth transmission. In other words, the carrier might send a message to Tokyo. If that carrier were close to Truk he would probably transmit it to the station at Truk, and then Truk would transmit it on up to Saipan or perhaps direct to Tokyo, and we would get it on what we called the second or third or fourth bounce; and then if there was an information addressee in it, possibly Ominato, Tokyo would put that on the air again for Ominato; and by means of that information which we call collateral you could usually determine where a vessel was or where a unit or a commander was.

107. General RUSSELL. Do you know an officer of the Navy by the name of Layton?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

108. General RUSSELL. What was his function out there at this time?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Layton, Lieutenant Commander Layton at that time, was the fleet intelligence officer for the Commander-in-Chief.

[1667] 109. General RUSSELL. Did he have an independent agency for collecting data on the Japanese fleet? By "independent" I mean different from the agency which you were operating.

Commander ROCHEFORT. I am not sure that I understand, sir. Layton received all radio intelligence pertaining to the Japanese from me, to which he added other types of intelligence that he might have received from other sources, perhaps from documents or letters or something of that nature from someone else. His radio intelligence was received from us.

110. General RUSSELL. Therefore such information as he had about the location of the different elements of the Japanese fleet during the year 1941 probably came from you?

Commander ROCHEFORT. It probably came from us, yes, sir.

111. General RUSSELL. Is it true or not that during the year 1941, or to limit that period a little further, during the six months next preceding December 7, 1941, there were a great many periods of time when you had little or no information on the Japanese Navy?

Commander ROCHEFORT. I think—

112. General RUSSELL. Let me ask you this, Commander: Have you seen the statement which was furnished by Lieutenant Commander Layton to the Roberts Commission?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

113. General RUSSELL. Have you made a study of that table that was there?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

114. General RUSSELL. I am confining this question purely to the accuracy of the table, and not to any construction that was placed on it. Do you regard the information in that table [1668] as accurate?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; the statements made there are accurate.

115. General RUSSELL. Well, did that table, or not, indicate that there were relatively long periods of time during the six months

preceding Pearl Harbor when there was little information about the Japanese fleet available to you?

Commander ROCHEFORT. The information contained in the table indicated that there were relatively long periods in which we did not have positive information of the location of some specific unit or task force, but from collateral information or other information we did not consider that we had lost those units or forces.

116. General RUSSELL. I want to ask you one thing as a matter of information before I discuss this table in one or two of its details with you. There is an entry which I could not interpret; I do not know what it means. The entry was: Cruisers second fleet less the word c-o-n-d-i-v or -u.

Commander ROCHEFORT. C-o-n-d?

117. General RUSSELL. C-o-n-d-i-v. What is that?

Commander ROCHEFORT. "Com."

118. General GRUNERT. C-o-n-d-i-v. What is it? It is a part of the fleet?

Commander ROCHEFORT. It would be a portion—it would be cruisers of the second fleet less the Nachi or Chikumi or Toni or something of that sort, sir.

119. General RUSSELL. Then there is an entry relating to that same word which describes it as "seven, very active on detached service." Nothing positive about that.

[1669] Commander ROCHEFORT. Seven, sir?

120. General RUSSELL. Seven condivs, if that is what it is.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Crudivs.

121. General RUSSELL. Crudivs?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Crudivs is probably what it should be, sir: cruiser divisions.

122. General RUSSELL. Crudiv?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Crudivs. That would be seven cruiser division. We call it crudiv seven.

123. General RUSSELL. Well, being enlightened, I want to ask you about the carrier situation as reported in this table.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

124. General RUSSELL. The report was that the carriers with the crudivs out—

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

125. General RUSSELL. That there were 134 days in the last six months when the Navy was uncertain as to the location of the Japanese carriers, that the periods when they were lost during those six months numbered twelve, and that these periods varied from nine to twenty-two days. It seems that the 22-day period was in July 1941. Now, do you have any independent recollection of those carriers being lost all of those days?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. I believe that the table is correct. The construction to be placed on those remarks I believe is incorrect. In other words, while it is true we did not have any concrete evidence of a unit or units for periods of from nine to twenty-two days, it did not mean that we were uncertain as to their whereabouts. It merely meant that we had not heard them. In other words, we still had not lost them.

[1670] 126. General RUSSELL. But you were very well satisfied that you knew something about them or knew a great deal about them during these periods when you heard nothing from them?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

127. General RUSSELL. And the table, then, reflects periods when you just didn't have anything?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, when we did not hear them. Either they had not transmitted or, if they had, it was over circuits that we did not hear.

128. General RUSSELL. Now may I develop briefly, and I will be through, the remark which you made in reply to some of General Grunert's questions about identifying the submarines in the waters near Oahu in the Hawaiian area, that you knew were based out in the Marshalls?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

129. General RUSSELL. As I recall, your logic there was that you discovered the commander of this submarine group in the Marshalls.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

130. General RUSSELL. You knew the commander of the group operating in the Hawaiian waters was there. Did your station, intercept station, operate during the attack and immediately thereafter on the morning of December 7th?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

131. General RUSSELL. Could you tell us briefly what information you picked up that would give you identity as to the vessels operating there, the craft operating in that attack?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. I would say by 1000 we had determined that the officer commanding the striking force [1671] was comcarries, Commander Carrier Divisions, what we call Commander Aircraft. We had determined the fact that he had carriers with him, cruisers, and destroyers, and with one bearing that we had obtained we determined his bearing from Pearl Harbor. The submarines did not show up until that evening and the next day, aside from the midget submarines. The regular submarines, the fleet submarines, did not show up until that night. I would say, sir, that by noon of the 7th we had fairly well identified the surface forces.

132. General RUSSELL. How many carriers do you think were in that convoy?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Four, sir.

133. General RUSSELL. Four?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes.

134. General RUSSELL. The complement of each was about how many aircraft, or do you know that?

Commander ROCHEFORT. About sixty, sir; sixty to sixty-four.

135. General RUSSELL. Then they could have had a total striking force of aircraft of some 250?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

136. General RUSSELL. And cruisers or destroyers that appeared in the task force there?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. They had enough—they had one division of cruisers, as I recall it, and approximately one squadron of destroyers.

137. General RUSSELL. What time did you begin operating the day? On the morning of the 7th what time did you begin operating?

Commander ROCHEFORT. We were on a 24-hour basis.

[1672] 138. General RUSSELL. And you picked up nothing in the night preceding the attack?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

139. General RUSSELL. So they moved in with radio silence?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. We were on a 24-hour basis the sir, seven days a week, and had been for about four or five months.

140. General RUSSELL. Of course, you had no means for detecting aircraft in the air?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

141. General RUSSELL. By radar operation?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

142. General RUSSELL. That was not part of your function?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir, that was not part of our function.

143. General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

144. General GRUNERT. General Frank?

145. General FRANK. No.

146. General GRUNERT. Colonel Toulmin?

147. Colonel TOULMIN. Nothing, sir.

148. General GRUNERT. Colonel West?

149. Colonel WEST. No.

150. General GRUNERT. Major Clausen?

151. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir.

152. General GRUNERT. That appears to be all. Thank you very much for coming.

We shall take a brief recess.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[1673] (There was a brief informal recess.)

TESTIMONY OF MRS. MARY B. KOOGAN, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of her rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mrs. Kogan, will you state to the Board your name and address, please?

Mrs. KOGAN. Mrs. Mary B. Kogan, 1340 Taylor Street, Northwest Washington.

2. Colonel WEST. Are you employed now, Mrs. Kogan?

Mrs. KOGAN. I was up until two months ago, with the Corps of Engineers here in Washington.

3. General GRUNERT. Mrs. Kogan, the Board is after facts regarding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and anything that may have led up to that or what happened at the time. Now, it has come to the knowledge of the Board that you have some information that may assist the Board in its investigation. That is why we asked you to come here.

Now, will you please state to the Board where you were just prior to and during the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mrs. KOGAN. In bed.

4. General GRUNERT. Where was the bed?

Mrs. KOGAN. We lived in Wahiawa, which is about three or four miles from Schofield Barracks. The Barracks was unable to house all of its officers due to the great impetus or influx of new officers.

5. General GRUNERT. Then you did not live on the post of Schofield itself?

Mrs. KOGAN. Not until after the attack.

[1674] 6. General GRUNERT. Now, information has come to the Board that you, in an article which appears in the Washington Star of March 23, 1942, stated in effect, "that the warning of a Hawaiian newspaper a week earlier than the attack predicted the attack"; also, "that prior to December 7th we hadn't even been told what to do in case of an air raid."

Now, is this substantially true?

Mrs. KOGAN. We had never been advised what to do in the event of an air raid.

7. General GRUNERT. You mean you had never been told, you had never been instructed, as to where to go, where to seek shelter?

Mrs. KOGAN. That is right.

8. General GRUNERT. Where to get food, how to take care of yourselves, or anything of the kind?

Mrs. KOGAN. Absolutely.

9. General GRUNERT. Now, do you know whether those on the post of Schofield itself knew or had been told?

Mrs. KOGAN. I feel confident that they did not know.

10. General GRUNERT. They did not know. How long after the attack were such instructions given to you, if ever?

Mrs. KOGAN. To my knowledge, they were never given.

11. General GRUNERT. They were never given?

Mrs. KOGAN. Immediately after the attack we drove—or I might say this: that my husband was in the Dental Corps, of course which was a part of the station hospital, and after hearing all of the commotion he went to the phone and called the hospital to learn what was happening, and the person who answered the phone at the other end said that he didn't know, [1675] but whatever was happening, real ammunition was being used.

That didn't add up, so we called a number of friends, and they didn't know what was happening. The radio was still playing lovely church music, and that didn't help, so we went out in front of the house and saw a lot of planes in the sky that were flying quite low, and they started to machine gun us, and we thought, well, that is a crazy thing for maneuvers to be doing, and we saw the rising sun insignia, dashed back into the house, and the radio became silent for a few minutes, and when it went back on again an announcer advised all military personnel to report to their various stations.

12. General GRUNERT. To report to what?

Mrs. KOGAN. Military stations. Living off of the post, that meant that we were to go to Schofield Barracks. So we dashed over there, and I went to the hospital and helped with surgical dressings while my husband assisted in other ways, and at about two o'clock we were placed—the women and children were placed in different quadrangles of Schofield, and we waited there until about ten o'clock at night not knowing what was going to happen to us and in complete blackout. We were put into busses not knowing where our destination was to be,

and we were driven over the highway past Pearl Harbor. And might add, at that time there were lots of tracer bullets flying through the sky and lots of people milling around on the highway, and it just seemed like all hell had broken loose again. The bus that I was turned off about a quarter of a mile from Pearl Harbor, and several hundred of us were put into a little schoolhouse in Kalihi Valley. We just did what we were told to do; we followed the leader, and that was the only instruction, [1676] that was momentary and impulsive, as to what to do in the event of an air raid.

13. General GRUNERT. And had you ever discussed with your husband what should be done in the event of an attack? In other words, did he know what to do if you didn't?

Mrs. KOGAN. I don't believe he did.

14. General GRUNERT. Well, let us get back to this article which appeared in the Washington Star in which apparently you had some information that a warning had been given in a Hawaiian newspaper something about predicting an attack. What was that about?

Mrs. KOGAN. Well, I think that time is approximate, and the exact reading of the headline I don't recall. However, a short time before the attack I remember that an extra paper appeared, and the headlines were very startling to us, and I was terribly frightened by them, and we dashed over to friends of ours and sort of went into a huddle, to think, and the essence of it was what I said there. Now, I can't recall the exact words of that headline.

15. General GRUNERT. All right. Who were your friends that you went into a huddle with?

Mrs. KOGAN. A Captain and Mrs. Rosen, in the Dental Corps.

16. General GRUNERT. And as a result of that huddle did the alarm spread?

Mrs. KOGAN. No.

17. General GRUNERT. Or did everybody else think that there was going to be an attack in a week?

Mrs. KOGAN. I don't know that they thought of it that seriously, but we felt that there was something in the air.

[1677] 18. General GRUNERT. You didn't know any of the higher-ups that pooh-poohed it or agreed, or anything, do you?

Mrs. KOGAN. No. Of course, an awful lot of rumors ran rampant all over the place, such as General MacArthur having sent a telegram the night before the attack advising something was in the wind, and to go on hundred percent alert. Another rumor had it that the alert that was on was called off at seven o'clock that morning and all the planes were supposedly unloaded, that is, the ammunition, and the guard was slackened up.

19. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether any of these rumors was every traced down to find out what its origin was?

Mrs. KOGAN. No, I can't say that I do. I couldn't substantiate any of them.

20. General GRUNERT. Has the Board any questions?

21. General RUSSELL. No.

22. General GRUNERT. General Frank?

23. General FRANK. No.

24. General GRUNERT. Anybody else? (No response.)

All right; thank you very much for coming down.

Mrs. KOGAN. You are welcome.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[1678] **TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER E. LORENCE, CORPS
OF ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel LORENCE. Colonel Walter E. Lorence, Corps of Engineers, Chief of the Maintenance Division, Military Supply, Office of the Chief of Engineers, stationed at Columbus, Ohio.

2. Major CLAUSEN. Colonel, what were your duties and assignment in August, 1941?

Colonel LORENCE. Assistant Chief of the Finance Section, Office of the Chief of Engineers. I believe the reorganization had not gone into effect at that time. I believe I was still under Colonel Gesler, at that time, in 1941.

3. Major CLAUSEN. About that time do you recall having met one Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel LORENCE. I do not remember.

4. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever meet Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel LORENCE. I don't know whether I have or not, because in those days we processed pretty nearly—well, the peak of our personnel action was 50,000 people a month.

5. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall having met an attorney by the name of John Martin who had an office in Los Angeles and represented this party, Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel LORENCE. No; I do not. That is, I do not definitely recall, unless I have something in the record of the business I was doing at that time.

6. Major CLAUSEN. I show you our Exhibit 2 and ask you if you recognize that as having been before you or discussed with [1679] you at one time?

Colonel LORENCE. Yes; I remember it.

7. Major CLAUSEN. Will you explain the circumstances?

Colonel LORENCE. May I read the rest of it first?

8. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Colonel LORENCE. (after reading Exhibit 2). Yes; I remember this particular communication.

9. Major CLAUSEN. Will you tell the Board how you recall that communication?

Colonel LORENCE. I don't know all the details of this particular one, but as near as I can remember—because you have to bear in mind that I was receiving pretty nearly a thousand letters a week just like that from people looking for jobs, and so forth. That was in the midst of very heavy construction. Most of them were before Pearl Harbor, not after Pearl Harbor. We were recruiting. We had recruiting offices throughout the entire country recruiting for our construction program in the United States and for overseas. We handled all recruitments for overseas; and my recollection of this is that Mr.

Rohl, if I am not mistaken, was wanted by the Hawaiian Department for work in Hawaii, and of course all assistance that we could render in the Chief's office, with reference to clearing and moving them overseas, of course we did. I believe there was a question of whether or not he was a citizen at the time.

10. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall that he was supposed to be a German alien?

Colonel LORENCE. I don't know, at that time. Of course I don't know all the details of this, any more than any of the other thousands of items we were handling at that time; but my [1680] recollection is that they were anxious to get this man to work on this project; that he had worked with the Hawaiian Constructors previously in their activities; that the Hawaiian Constructors was then getting this work overseas, and his ability as an engineer on this work was needed. My recollection is that in New York he had already put in his citizenship papers, his first, second, and so forth, and it was a matter, under present regulations, that if they had been approved or would be approved by the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, he would comply with the requirements we had at that time for shipment overseas.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Specifically, Colonel, what did you have to do with the preparation of that letter or the sending of it?

Colonel LORENCE. I would have to look at the top of it. (After examining letter referred to:) I don't know, to tell the truth, other than this, that looking at the initials on the top, I think this is Mr. Stilphen, who was then my labor relations man.

12. Major CLAUSEN. He was in your department?

Colonel LORENCE. Yes.

13. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall now a Mr. John Martin who appeared before you and requested the action that is set forth in that letter on behalf of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel LORENCE. I don't recall. I know somebody appeared before me on this case, and that I sent either Mr. Stilphen or somebody to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization in order to see whether or not the papers had been cleared or to push the clearance of them in order that he could be processed for overseas.

14. Major CLAUSEN. When this party appeared before you 'who [1681] was present at that time?

Colonel LORENCE. I have no idea. I had as many as two or three hundred interviews a day at that time.

15. Major CLAUSEN. Is this the first case of your assistance to a party desiring naturalization?

Colonel LORENCE. The only case that I know of. It was not assistance to naturalization; it was checking to see whether the papers had been cleared in the Bureau.

16. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall that after this party appeared before you, you sent somebody, you say, to check over and see the status of the affair?

Colonel LORENCE. Yes; to see whether the papers had passed through the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. As far as I know, there was no assistance.

17. Major CLAUSEN. Have you seen that letter before?

Colonel LORENCE. I have not seen this letter; no, sir.

18. Major CLAUSEN. You never saw it before?

Colonel LORENCE. I do not think so. I may have.

19. Major CLAUSEN. Are your initials on there any place?

Colonel LORENCE. Not on here; I don't believe so. However, it is quite possible that this came through me. I don't know whether it did, or not. I can see Colonel Gesler's initials underneath here, and any matters of personnel under him were my responsibility. Mr. Stilphen did part-time work for me and part-time work for Colonel Gesler, because he was a part-time man on labor relations and a part-time man on contracts. So, whether it went through me at the time or not, I don't know; but the instructions to check up with the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization as a personnel matter, to see [1682] whether or not his papers were in order so that he could be processed for overseas, were my instructions on that.

20. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall now having given those instructions?

Colonel LORENCE. Oh, yes. I always did that.

21. Major CLAUSEN. To whom did you give them, Colonel?

Colonel LORENCE. That I don't know. You see, complete processing of the papers would have two courses: One through our Procedure Section to see that all the papers were in order for appointment; and if it was for liaison work with another federal agency it could be one of many people; sometimes myself, in order to see whether there was a clearance on it. At the time we were trying to clear men and women for another agency for transfer overseas, and many of those things took place daily.

22. Major CLAUSEN. Are you sure that your only instructions were that the party should investigate the status of the papers?

Colonel LORENCE. I think that is all; I don't know.

23. Major CLAUSEN. With respect to the part of this letter, Exhibit 2, which reads as follows:

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question

do you recall what, if any, investigation was made to determine that as a fact?

Colonel LORENCE. I think it was, based on the evidence which was submitted. I would not know unless I had all the other papers, if there are any other papers. But we have regular procedure in the checking up. The procedure at that time was prior to the Pearl Harbor procedure, which set up in- [1683] vestigation through the Provost Marshal General's office. They didn't have that form. The investigation which was made was the character of investigation which was made partially by us and partially by the Civil Service Commission at that time.

24. Major CLAUSEN. Specifically in August, 1941, what was your procedure to check on the loyalty of a prospective contractor with the government?

Colonel LORENCE. A contractor or as an individual?

25. Major CLAUSEN. A prospective contractor.

Colonel LORENCE. I did not do any checking.

26. General FRANK. Let us say, an individual contractor.

Colonel LORENCE. An individual person?

27. General FRANK. A contractor is an individual person, is he not?

28. Major CLAUSEN. Specifically in August, 1941, what, if anything, was the procedure of the Engineer Corps to which you have referred in your previous testimony that you put into effect with regard to an individual contractor?

Colonel LORENCE. I didn't handle contractors; I only handled individuals that moved in on the federal pay roll as Civil Service employees or as the equivalent of Civil Service Employees, overseas. I made no investigation of contractors.

29. Major CLAUSEN. When you told the Board about the procedure for checking—

Colonel LORENCE. That is on the individual.

30. Major CLAUSEN. What was that procedure?

Colonel LORENCE. The procedure prior to the security regulations which came out after Pearl Harbor was the usual character investigation, to see whether or not a man complied [1684] with the law and also his statement and affidavit which he came in with, under the oath of office, that he was not contrary to the Hatch Act—that is, communistic activities and things like that—whether or not he was a citizen or that his papers were in sufficient order.

31. Major CLAUSEN. That was conducted with respect to what questions? When did you put that procedure into operation in your division, you, yourself?

Colonel LORENCE. That has always been in effect.

32. Major CLAUSEN. With respect to what questions? What question would come before you, Colonel, which would cause you to put that procedure into effect?

Colonel LORENCE. That procedure is checked on every individual that comes into the federal service. It is not a question of checking on his loyalty to the government, unless some adverse letter or other matter which was presented in his Civil Service form or on his oath of office, or something of that nature, brought it to our attention. We never questioned, on a security basis, anybody at that time, which was prior to Pearl Harbor, if he was a citizen or the equivalent of a citizen, his last papers having gone in, as to whether or not there was any disloyalty.

33. Major CLAUSEN. This procedure you say you followed in August, 1941—did that apply with respect to persons who wished to be employed by the Engineer Corps?

Colonel LORENCE. Yes.

34. General FRANK. Under Civil Service?

Colonel LORENCE. Yes, sir. Here is the point I want to make: Personnel who were recruited by us for overseas assign- [1685] ment on the federal payroll, which was the equivalent of Civil Service—they are not classified Civil Service people; they are federal employees, but not Civil Service.

35. Major CLAUSEN. Was that procedure followed with regard to contractors?

Colonel LORENCE. I don't know, sir; I didn't handle that.

36. Major CLAUSEN. Were your functions to deal solely with civilian employees?

Colonel LORENCE. Yes, sir.

37. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know how it was, then, that this matter came to you to be directed by you to somebody to perform the function of trying to get this man's citizenship papers through, when it related to a contractor?

Colonel LORENCE. Yes; because you see we also handled labor relations, which means—let me put it this way: In recruiting for an overseas job you cannot differentiate between contractors, employees, and federal employees. You have got to set up wage scales for both. Each one has to assist the other in pushing the papers and the procedure through, because you must remember that we were processing on an average of 10,000 people a week for overseas, not only for Hawaii, but for Panama and for the island bases.

38. Major CLAUSEN. Did you check on their citizenship?

Colonel LORENCE. We had two methods on that.

39. Major CLAUSEN. What did you do in August, 1941, on that?

Colonel LORENCE. This is the way that was handled. Our system was decentralized to the district or division office in the area where the actual recruitment was taking place. Those that were recruited in Washington were handled by my group. The [1686] general procedure was the same. For federal employees a check was always made on citizenship, because that was a necessary attribute.

40. Major CLAUSEN. Did that include also an F. B. I. investigation—to see what they had, if anything?

Colonel LORENCE. No, sir.

41. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall having had before you about August, 1941, any recommendations from one Theodore Wyman, a Colonel, or at that time a Lieutenant Colonel?

Colonel LORENCE. I think that is how the matter originated; that he was the one that asked us to get the man or to help clearance on that.

42. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall whether you had a letter or some communication orally or in writing from him?

Colonel LORENCE. I don't know whether it was oral or in writing. It may have been in writing, or oral; it may have been a teletype or a cable from Hawaii, because we got communications all three ways in those times.

43. Major CLAUSEN. You have read this Exhibit 2 over, have you not?

Colonel LORENCE. Yes.

44. Major CLAUSEN. Just what was the basis for those statements, if you know?

Colonel LORENCE. The basis for the statement, as I remember, was that the final papers, through some red tape and so forth, were being tied up in the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization.

45. Major CLAUSEN. Who told you that? Where did you get that information?

[1687] Colonel LORENCE. I don't know where the definite information came from at that time, whether it was from Colonel Wyman or some other source, but it all emanated from the Hawaiian Department.

46. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know of your own knowledge whether Colonel Wyman had any relation to that letter whatsoever?

Colonel LORENCE. I think he did, but I don't know definitely.

47. Major CLAUSEN. Your thought in that regard is in what respect?

Colonel LORENCE. I think he did, because in every district or division we had an unvariable rule. We never sent anybody to anyone just for dumping them. That was the rule. Only when they wanted certain people. The same thing applies right now. Most people are sent this way, by name, because they know their particular qualifications, either as an engineer or as an administrative man; and it was our job to try to get those people, whether they worked in another department or for a contractor, and see whether or not we could get them. This is another case of the same sort.

48. Major CLAUSEN. After you gave the instructions to whoever you gave them to, did you check up on the instructions to see if they were followed out?

Colonel LORENCE. No, sir; I don't think so, because if I did that then I would have to get myself another checker to recheck, with the number of cases we used to have on that.

49. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever get any communication from this John Martin?

Colonel LORENCE. I don't know, sir. I don't know him at all. [1688]

50. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever get a letter thanking you for your assistance in the matter?

Colonel LORENCE. I probably could have. I got thousands of letters. I don't want to be hazy on this thing, Major, but we had a tremendous business in those days. Our average, as you know, at our peak—we had 279,000 federal employees in our construction program which I supervised, and 1,300,000 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract employees, and I would not know individuals in each case.

51. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever find out that this Hans Wilhelm Rohl was a German alien?

Colonel LORENCE. No, sir; not that I know of.

52. General FRANK. As far as you were concerned, it was just another case?

Colonel LORENCE. Just another case, just like any other case, where they needed a man and needed him badly. A job had to be done, and we sent the people that they asked for.

53. General FRANK. Notwithstanding the fact that this man was a German alien, it was just another case?

Colonel LORENCE. No; I would not say that, General. I didn't know about that, General.

54. General FRANK. You just got through telling me that.

Colonel LORENCE. Not quite, sir. You mean, there is something in this letter?

55. General FRANK. You said that is the only one you remembered

Colonel LORENCE. On a naturalization case, that is the only one I can remember.

56. General FRANK. Yet you just pushed it right out as if [1689] you were handling a thousand a day; and he was a German alien?

Colonel LORENCE. General, I can remember, for instance, of thousands where we made special exceptions, where they were not citizens. I have in mind now an important case. This brings up recollection of it; a Doctor Casagrande, who is supposed to be one of the greatest soil experts in the United States, from Massachusetts Institute of

Technology. We were requested to take special action so that he could go down to Panama in order to make a report on deep foundation work on the third lock system.

57. Major CLAUSEN. It says in this letter that Hans Wilhelm Rohl has peculiar qualifications. Did you tell that to the party to whom you gave instructions?

Colonel LORENCE. No, sir.

58. Major CLAUSEN. If you gave the instructions to this party, whom you say you cannot recall, do you know where he got the information that he would have to have in order to write that letter?

Colonel LORENCE. It must have been from the correspondence that he got from the Hawaiian Department.

59. General FRANK. Or could it have been from Mr. Martin?

Colonel LORENCE. It could have been from Mr. Martin; yes, sir.

60. General FRANK. But you do not know?

Colonel LORENCE. No, sir; I don't know which it is.

61. Major CLAUSEN. You say you never got the information, so you are sure you did not give it to this party to whom you gave instructions?

Colonel LORENCE. I don't know definitely. I don't think [1690] I gave the instructions second-handed after listening to Mr. Martin. I think I turned over the matter to Mr. Stilphen in connection with the case in order to process it, because Mr. Stilphen used to be in the Labor Department before I brought him over into the Engineers. He was one of the Bacon-Davis lawyers whom I used to deal with over in that section. He was a good man. He is a cracker-jack on labor work. I handled wage rates and so forth under the Bacon-Davis Act among other things.

62. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know what, if anything, Colonel Gesler had to do with the drafting of this letter?

Colonel LORENCE. Nothing, other than that he was the boss and it passed through me or Mr. Stilphen as one of the executives along that line, looking it over to see if it was in proper order, and so forth.

63. Major CLAUSEN. At this point do you recall having had a conference with Mr. John Martin and Colonel Gesler concerning the subject matter of this letter?

Colonel LORENCE. No, sir; I do not.

64. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

65. Colonel TOULMIN. Colonel, what caused you to recognize that letter immediately when you read it, in view of the fact that you just stated that everything was routine to you and you remembered nothing?

Colonel LORENCE. There were a lot of outstanding things that came up during the period. The reason for that, more than anything else, was that after the telephone conversation to me at Columbus stating that they wanted me here, I didn't know what they wanted me for. I could think of a dozen things about [1691] Hawaii that they might want to know. I went there as Budget Officer when I handled the labor problem over there, when we were trying to get funds and they would not give them to us; and a dozen other things. When I talked to our investigator I asked him whether there was any particular phase that I should bring papers in, or something like that, and he said he did not know, but he thought it was in connection with somebody in connection with citizenship papers, or something like that. So

I cudgeled my brain to find out who that person was in connection with that. It is the same problem, as I say. We have certain things that stand out. It is very unusual for us to check in on citizenship papers, and it was even at that time, and it is very unusual for us to ask for exceptions for people who are not citizens. That is the reason I call it an unusual case.

66. Colonel TOULMIN. In view of the fact that it is so unusual and so exceptional, how do you account for the fact that you remembered so immediately about the letter and the circumstances in which it was written?

Colonel LORENCE. Because, only the facts of what the action is and what the action should be in order to process the man stand out, and not the detailed facts of the writing of the letter.

67. Colonel TOULMIN. Do you want us to understand that you have no independent recollection of this incident other than the fact that that letter was written and you remember having seen it?

Colonel LORENCE. I do not even remember whether I saw the letter.

68. Colonel TOULMIN. You do not even remember that?

[1692] Colonel LORENCE. No, Sir. I may have, because I sign a basketful 20 times a day.

69. Colonel TOULMIN. You have no recollection of it?

Colonel LORENCE. Not this particular one.

70. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know Colonel Wyman?

Colonel LORENCE. Yes. He used to be the District Engineer when I was in the General Staff School. However, I never served with him or came in contact with him, even out at Fort Leavenworth. Of course, I knew him by reputation.

71. Major CLAUSEN. Before you came here to testify did you ever hear of this letter incident in the press or on the radio?

Colonel LORENCE. Yes; I have read of the incident in the papers. Not that letter incident, but I have read the incidents in connection with the tie-up.

72. Major CLAUSEN. Between Rohl and Wyman?

Colonel LORENCE. Yes, sir.

73. Major CLAUSEN. Did that refresh your memory?

Colonel LORENCE. No, sir.

74. Major CLAUSEN. When you read those incidents did you remember then this letter incident?

Colonel LORENCE. No.

75. Major CLAUSEN. Who do you think in the Engineering Corps might be able to give us information on that?

Colonel LORENCE. I don't know, sir, unless it is Wyman himself. The reason I say that is that in practically all recruitment, which we did on field recruitment, it was either the District Engineer or the Division Engineer or the Area Engineer or one of the people who were doing the actual recruiting at the time, and our office dealt with that.

[1693] 76. Major CLAUSEN. What you did in August, 1941, was that if an opening appeared for an employee in Hawaii you would check his citizenship?

Colonel LORENCE. Yes.

77. Major CLAUSEN. You did that same thing back in December 1940, did you not?

Colonel LORENCE. Yes.

78. Major CLAUSEN. How did you do it?

Colonel LORENCE. The check on citizenship, of course, for an ordinary person, is on his Civil Service application, that he is a citizen and so forth. We don't question that. We don't do any checking on that. That was the investigating authority of the Civil Service Commission. The only kind of check we make is where a case comes in where we are told that a man is not a citizen, or that his papers are in and that he had been trying to check his papers. There may have been other cases like that, but I have no recollection. That is what I am getting at. Normally, there is no check on citizenship papers.

79. Major CLAUSEN. Except by the Civil Service Commission having done it for you?

Colonel LORENCE. That is correct. The Civil Service Commission was 9 months to a year behind schedule, and they finally had to turn it over to the War Department.

80. General GRUNERT. I have a question or two to clear the record. Did I understand you to say that you passed on about 10,000 cases a week for overseas service? That would be over a thousand a day.

Colonel LORENCE. That was during our peak.

81. General GRUNERT. This was in August, 1941. Did they have [1694] that amount of construction in the overseas bases at that time? That is over a thousand a day.

Colonel LORENCE. That is correct, sir.

82. General GRUNERT. And for ten weeks it would be 100,000?

Colonel LORENCE. General, we had a tremendous attrition rate overseas.

83. General GRUNERT. All I wanted was to make sure that that was correct—10,000 cases a week for overseas bases.

Colonel LORENCE. During the peak.

84. General GRUNERT. How long was the peak, approximately? I just want to make sure about it.

Colonel LORENCE. The peak on that, General, as I remember, lasted about three months.

85. General GRUNERT. You made a statement to the effect that you received about a thousand telegrams or radiograms or telephone messages from overseas bases a day?

Colonel LORENCE. Not from overseas bases; from all over the United States.

86. General GRUNERT. That is what I wanted to get the record clear on, because it sounded extravagant to me.

Colonel LORENCE. It was a big program, sir.

87. General GRUNERT. As long as you have cleared the record and you are sure of your statement, that is all. Thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[1695] **TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WALTER S. De LANY,
UNITED STATES NAVY**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Admiral, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Admiral DE LANY. Rear Admiral Walter S. De Lany, Assistant Chief of Staff for Readiness on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet.

2. General GRUNERT. Admiral, I believe you understand the purposes of this Board and that we are after facts or leads toward facts and because of your assignment during 1941 and your having testified before the Roberts Commission, we asked you to come in in order that we might delve for facts. Will you tell us of your assignment and, generally, the duties of that assignment in 1941?

Admiral DE LANY. At the beginning of the year 1941 I was Chief of Staff to Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force, and when the Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force became Commander-in-Chief, of the United States Fleet about 1 February, 1941, I then became assistant Chief of Staff for Operations on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet.

3. General GRUNERT. Who was that?

Admiral DE LANY. Admiral Kimmel.

4. General GRUNERT. Will you give the Board your idea of the command setup that existed in Hawaii at that time and explain just what the chain of command was?

Admiral DE LANY. So far as the Navy was concerned, the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, commanded all United States Navy forces attached to the fleet, and as I consider the [1696] setup, generally saw to it that the responsibilities of the Army and the Commandant of the Naval District were coordinated and matched the requirements of the fleet in the Pearl Harbor area.

5. General GRUNERT. Then the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was a subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet? Is that true?

Admiral DE LANY. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet did issue directives to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, but he made him a task force within the fleet organization; but that, as I saw it, pertained only to the relationships that had to exist between the Commandant of the Naval District and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

6. General GRUNERT. You speak of the Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. They are two separate things, but they both were Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

7. General GRUNERT. Are you familiar with the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan drawn up between the Hawaiian Department and the Fourteenth Naval District?

Admiral DE LANY. I cannot say that I am now, General. I think that if the paper is presented to me I can recognize it.

8. General GRUNERT. Not that it is going to make any particular difference, but I would like to see whether we know what we are talking about. (Handing a document to the witness.)

Admiral DE LANY. Yes; I have seen this paper.

9. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not Admiral Kimmel in his position approved of that joint plan or acted upon it in any way?

[1697] Admiral DE LANY. No, sir; I cannot answer that now. I cannot hook this specific paper up with any approval that I personally know of, sir.

10. General GRUNERT. In most of those plans and agreements you, as corresponding to the Operations Officer that we have on our staff, would normally pass and see such papers?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

11. General GRUNERT. Are you familiar with what they call the Joint Air Operations Plan, generally, as drawn up?

Admiral DE LANY. I think that is the one that was signed by General Short and Admiral Bloch, as I remember it, sir.

12. General GRUNERT. Yes; drawn up by the respective air commanders, Bellinger and Martin. You are familiar with that?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir. I am generally familiar with it.

[1698] 13. General GRUNERT. Were you, in your position, kept informed of the Army's defensive measures, those taken by the Army generally?

Admiral DE LANY. Generally speaking, yes.

14. General GRUNERT. Do you recall whether the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, informed Admiral Kimmel of the special measures, if any, that he proposed to take, after November 27, as a result of a message he got from the War Department?

Admiral DE LANY. I know that Admiral Kimmel and General Short discussed the general situation, and I am quite sure that Admiral Kimmel knew of the plans that General Short had placed in effect within the Hawaiian area, which, as I understood at the time, were primarily set up as a precautionary measure against sabotage.

15. General GRUNERT. Were you at this conference to which you refer?

Admiral DE LANY. I think I was; yes, sir.

16. General GRUNERT. Do you recall whether that conference was held in the morning or afternoon of the 27th?

Admiral DE LANY. No, sir; I do not recall.

17. General GRUNERT. Do you recall whether it was held before or after the receipt of the Navy message which began, "Consider this a war warning"? Was that message discussed in that conference?

Admiral DE LANY. No, sir; I can't say that, definitely. I cannot answer that question. I know that there were discussions between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, in which this matter of the precautionary measures that were to be taken [1699] within the Island on the part of the Army, and the steps that the Navy took in their own operating areas, were discussed.

18. General GRUNERT. Presumably, then, the conference must have taken place after the receipt of the message.

Admiral DE LANY. I think so; yes, sir.

19. General GRUNERT. Otherwise, they could not have discussed it.

Now, let us go back a little further. Were you on duty with Admiral Kimmel in February 1941?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

20. General GRUNERT. It appears from the Roberts Commission's report that Admiral Kimmel inspected the Pearl Harbor defenses in February, and he declared himself astounded at the then existing weaknesses; and that he pointed out the inadequacy of the antiaircraft guns,

the obsolescence of land-based aircraft, and the lack of aircraft detectors. Do you recall that inspection?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir; I think I accompanied him on that inspection.

21. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether he communicated those views on that subject to General Short, or did you communicate them to the Army for him?

Admiral DE LANY. I can't answer that, specifically; but as I recall the thing, the letter that the Commander-in-Chief wrote regarding the defenses of Pearl Harbor was either shown to General Short before it was sent, or he was furnished a copy of it.

22. General GRUNERT. Throughout the year, then, up until the latter part of November, were there any other inspections made? [1700] Do you know of any progress made toward curing what they thought was wrong?

Admiral DE LANY. I know that on at least two other occasions I accompanied Admiral Kimmel, and I believe General Short was in the party, around the Island in connection with joint headquarters. The Army were building quarters up in the cave, up there, and we were there and inspected all the installations. There was also the question of the joint air center, and as I remember it, General Short, Admiral Bellinger, and General Davidson or General Martin, I have forgotten who, were on that party. We drove down towards the area where the location was being proposed at the time.

23. General GRUNERT. Then, in your mind, you thought that progress was being made toward bettering the conditions, from what has been noted earlier in the year?

Admiral DE LANY. So far as material and personnel were being furnished, I believe that the conditions were better, as the year progressed; but it would be my observation that the amount of material that had been originally requested was not forthcoming.

24. General GRUNERT. Then you think that they were making progress with what they had, but they needed more; is that correct?

Admiral DE LANY. Definitely so; yes.

25. General GRUNERT. Now, on the subject of intelligence, did you know of the presence of a Japanese task force in the vicinity of Jaluit between November 27 and 30?

Admiral DE LANY. As I recall the intelligence, now, as I knew then, I recall that the information I had was that one [1701] carrier task force was operating in the South China Sea, and the remainder of the Japanese main fleet was in home waters.

26. General GRUNERT. That leads me to believe that you do not recall that a Japanese task force was in the Marshalls.

Admiral DE LANY. That is correct, as I recall it, now. I may have known about it; but I cannot recall.

27. General GRUNERT. My next question that I wanted to ask was whether, if you had such information, you knew whether or not it had been transmitted to General Short. Generally, do you know what sort of information of that kind was transmitted to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, or have they any policy on that?

Admiral DE LANY. I understood that there was an exchange of information between the naval intelligence center in Pearl Harbor and the Army center at Shafter, or wherever it was located, and that

in addition I feel sure that the intelligence as it came in to the Commander-in-Chief was information that normally came through the district intelligence center, and for that reason I felt that what was available in the naval intelligence center was also available to the Army intelligence, because I believe they exchanged information.

28. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not that included combat intelligence?

Admiral DE LANY. I cannot answer that. I do not know.

29. General GRUNERT. We understood from previous testimony that the combat intelligence, at least certain parts of it, was so highly secret that it was very carefully guarded and disseminated only to a few, and I wanted to find out whether or not that dissemination included the Commanding General of the [1702] Hawaiian Department, and who decided what to turn over to General Short, and what they thought was too secret even to turn over to General Short. Could you answer anything in that line?

Admiral DE LANY. No, sir. I cannot answer your question definitely, General, but it seems to me that I recall instances where General Short was in the office, there, where Admiral Kimmel had his general Pacific chart, and that I can recall the intelligence officer of the fleet, who was then Commander (I think) Leighton, being in there and pointing out on the wall chart the summary of the information that we had at the time that the General was in there.

30. General GRUNERT. And that would include combat intelligence?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir; that was the location of Japanese fleets and forces.

31. General GRUNERT. You think Admiral Leighton, I believe it is now, was present?

Admiral DE LANY. No, sir; he is a captain, right now.

32. General GRUNERT. Captain Leighton would be our best source of information on that?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir; I think so, sir.

33. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether efforts were made by the Navy to secure information of Japanese naval activities in the mandated islands?

Admiral DE LANY. No, sir.

34. General GRUNERT. Did the fleet have any particular means of getting information from the mandated islands?

Admiral DE LANY. No, sir.

[1703] 35. General GRUNERT. Upon what source did they depend for that information?

Admiral DE LANY. Our information came primarily from the main Naval Department from Washington.

36. General GRUNERT. That was the combat naval intelligence?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

37. General GRUNERT. From Washington?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

38. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether Washington sent you anything on this subject of what was in the Marshall Islands, about November 25 or 26?

Admiral DE LANY. There is a naval intelligence bulletin, dated 1 December, which I am of the impression we did not have in our files

on the 7th of December, which states the fact that there was a carrier group, I believe, in the Marshalls.

39. General GRUNERT. Do you recall where that came from, whether from the District or from Washington?

Admiral DE LANY. That was an ONI bulletin from Washington, dated 1 December; but the information that we had prior to the receipt of that bulletin, as I recall it, was based on information that came out of the Sixteenth Naval Department, and, I believe, substantiated in dispatches from Washington.

40. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not General Short, as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, was kept informed of the movement of the task forces of the fleet, in so far as it pertained to whether they were in or out of the harbor, and, while they were out of the harbor, what areas they covered that might give him protection?

Admiral DE LANY. I am sure that that information was [1704] available to Army sources in the Hawaiian area, but whether General Short had it, personally, I cannot answer that.

41. General GRUNERT. By "available," do you mean, "It's here! Come and get it!" or what?

Admiral DE LANY. No, sir; I mean that when the fleet went into an operating area we discussed our operating program with the Army opposites in our staff organization, and so far as I was concerned we always arranged drills for range-finder check, Coast Artillery training. We checked our range finders and submitted our plots against theirs. There was also an arrangement with the Army as to the fact that they knew where we were operating, so that their air forces came out and did whatever searching or bombing or anything else they wanted to do.

42. General GRUNERT. Did these task forces that were sent out from time to time, especially in the latter part of November and early in December, have any definite "distant reconnaissance" missions, as we call them, in so far as the defense of Hawaii was concerned?

Admiral DE LANY. No; not as I interpret your question.

43. General GRUNERT. The defense of Hawaii was under whom, in the Navy?

Admiral DE LANY. Well, the defense of Hawaii was under the Army; and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District coordinated naval activities with them, as I understand it.

44. General GRUNERT. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

45. General GRUNERT. In that joint plan that you recognized, there, the Fourteenth Naval District contracts to have the Navy [1705] provide, among other things, distant reconnaissance?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir; and I believe the agreement provided, too, that the Army would assist in it, as I recall the agreement.

46. General GRUNERT. That afterwards came in the joint air agreement. That is right.

Now, what I am trying to get at is the subject of distant reconnaissance—whether or not it was made; if so, how; and whether it was just made periodically; whether these task forces were woven into

a pattern in making it; or what. Could you enlighten us on that general subject?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir. I say this, that the general mission of the naval forces in the Hawaiian area had been, and, with the approval of the Navy Department, continued to be, training. So far as distant reconnaissance is concerned—and presuming that you mean by that, aircraft—

47. General GRUNERT. Primarily, yes.

Admiral DE LANY. —The number of planes, pilots, and spare parts, and so forth, that were available in the Hawaiian area, and the fact that the planes in the Hawaiian area required such wartime work on them as installing bullet-proof cells and other wartime equipment, there just were not enough planes, pilots, or time available to do the job of training and preparing the planes for wartime requirements, and conduct a distant reconnaissance.

I believe I am safe in saying that the same thing that I say about Navy planes prevailed in the aviation situation so far as the Army was concerned.

48. General GRUNERT. Then I gather from your answer to that [1706] question that there was practically no so-called "distant reconnaissance," as such.

Admiral DE LANY. That is correct, sir.

49. General GRUNERT. And that was due primarily to the lack of means?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

50. General GRUNERT. When the task forces went out, whatever patrolling or searching they did was primarily for the task of training while they were out there, to protect themselves, and was not a part of a so-called "distant reconnaissance" for the protection of Hawaii against an air attack?

Admiral DE LANY. That is correct. The plane coverage that was given to naval forces, whether they operated in close proximity to the islands or whether they operated as we did on certain problems four or five hundred miles to the northward of the island, our coverage was always designed with the idea that we were protecting the service forces against submarine attack.

51. General GRUNERT. The reason I am asking these particular questions is to see whether or not the presence of task forces in certain areas outside the Island of Hawaii gave the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department a false sense of security, thinking that he would be secure from anything coming in that direction, be it surface or air. If he had been kept informed of their presence, and of what they did out there, and of what they did not do, he might then have had a different picture.

That is just an explanation of the line of questioning, so that if there is anything wrong with that sort of reasoning [1707] you might tell me. If there is not, I will assume that it is fairly correct.

Admiral DE LANY. The task forces that operated out of the Hawaiian area as surface task forces always operated in assigned areas, which, in my opinion, were known to the Army and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I believe, too, that the Army was entirely familiar with all the plane flights that were made by both

Army and Navy planes, and that with that knowledge the Commanding General knew just what the status of surface and air forces in the Hawaiian area was, at all times.

52. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District had any air means for long-distance reconnaissance, or did that which existed pertain to the Navy, proper?

Admiral DE LANY. They were a part of the U. S. Fleet, but there is no question but what the Commandant knew exactly what the planes were doing.

53. General GRUNERT. In any use of those PBVs that were flying in and about Honolulu daily, they were probably engaged in operations pertaining to a task force going out or coming in, or whatnot?

Admiral DE LANY. Plus training; yes, sir.

54. General GRUNERT. Were submarines ever used for this distant surveillance?

Admiral DE LANY. There were submarines stationed off Midway and Wake for observation.

55. General GRUNERT. We have been told that because of the lack of means, there could not be a 360° protective distant reconnaissance, and I wondered whether or not in naval tactics, or whatnot, they often or sometimes used submarines to cover part of a ring around the place.

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir; I think that is entirely possible.

56. General GRUNERT. But you do not know whether any of that was done?

Admiral DE LANY. It was not done.

57. General GRUNERT. Now, I go into the subject of cooperation and coordination. Will you tell me what you thought of the cooperation between the Army and the Navy, as a whole, and particularly that which existed with the fleet, of which you know directly, and that which existed between the Army and the District, if you know about that.

Admiral DE LANY. I am more familiar with what existed between the fleet and the Army than I am, between the district and the Army. In so far as the fleet is concerned, I felt that from the top down through my echelon there wasn't any question about amicable understandings and coordination.

58. General GRUNERT. Was there any question about knowing sufficiently of each other's business to be able to carry out your own responsibility, when it came to cooperative action?

Admiral DE LANY. So far as I personally am concerned, no, because I was generally familiar with the strength of the Army in the Hawaiian area, what their antiaircraft defense amounted to, the number of planes, type, and so forth, that were available. I felt that the Army knew our general operating schedules, and, as I said before, there wasn't any question about amicable understandings and coordination.

[1709] 59. General GRUNERT. Who was your opposite number in the Army?

60. General FRANK. Hayes?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes; I did business with Hayes.

61. General GRUNERT. Might it have been Donegan?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir; I did business with Donegan, and I also did business with Fleming, who was closer to General Short, out there, than anybody else that I knew of in the Army set-up, sir.

62. General GRUNERT. Did you know the Army system of alerts that was in effect, say in November and the early part of December—not in effect, but which could be put into effect?

Admiral DE LANY. I cannot describe them; no, sir.

63. General GRUNERT. You knew that the one they put into effect was called "No. 1," the so-called sabotage alert?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

64. General GRUNERT. You would not know what No. 2 and No. 3 were?

Admiral DE LANY. No, sir; I cannot describe them. I do not know. I cannot recall.

65. General GRUNERT. Was there any question in the mind of the command of the fleet—not the Commander, but the command of the fleet; by that, I mean the commander and his staff—as to the adequacy of that alert for the protection of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, in view of the information or "messages" we will call them, that had been received by the Army and the Navy?

Admiral DE LANY. No, sir; not so far as I am concerned, because I felt that if the island were alerted against sabotage, that was the extent to which the defense of the island should go.

[1710] 66. General GRUNERT. Then it did not enter your mind, did it, that your fleet would have been better protected had it gone into a more protective alert such as Alert No. 2, which carried a spreading out of their planes and a readiness to get them into the air in a hurry?

Admiral DE LANY. Not on the information we had; no, sir.

67. General GRUNERT. Then the messages received from the Navy Department, particularly the one on November 27, which started out, "Consider this a war warning," together with the message from the Chief of Staff of the same date, did not alarm you or your Commander-in-Chief to the extent of thinking that war was quite imminent?

Admiral DE LANY. Well, we knew that Japan was on the move. We knew that she was headed south. We had no statement as to what the policy of Washington was towards the Japanese, and what would occur in the event that Japan committed an overt act against the United States; and, with no further information than that, the war warning meant just that.

68. General GRUNERT. Then as far as you were concerned, the Army's going on a sabotage alert was O. K. with you?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

69. General FRANK. There wasn't an understanding of any kind as to what a warning in that language meant?

Admiral DE LANY. General, we had no M-Day. I do not know what you call it in your war plans, but there had been no mobilization, there had been no mention of anything that indicated anything like that.

[1711] 70. General GRUNERT. Who had to bring about that designation?

Admiral DE LANY. Sir?

71. General GRUNERT. Who had to bring about the designation of M-day?

Admiral DE LANY. It had to come from Washington, sir.

72. General GRUNERT. Are you sure? I will refresh your memory on the Joint Act of The Army and The Navy, as set forth in Chapter II, paragraph 9b:

(Except from Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, Chapter I is as follows:)

Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by the exercise of unity of command in the following cases:

- (1) When ordered by the President; or
- (2) When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy; or
- (3) When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service that shall exercise such command.

That was not just exactly what I had, what I meant and wanted to bring out then, but I am glad I brought it out now, and I will come back to the other question.

Was the question of the desirability of unity of command ever taken up in conference or discussed with a view to possibly putting in effect under this that I have just read, in case it became necessary prior to December 7th?

Admiral DE LANY. Not that I recall, no, sir.

[1712] 73. General GRUNERT. Did you ever turn the matter over in your mind as to whether you thought unity of command was desirable prior to December 7th, and whether or not it could have accomplished more than cooperation was then accomplishing?

Admiral DE LANY. There was never any question in my mind that there should have been unity of command before the 7th of December.

74. General FRANK. When did you think that? At that time or is this back sight?

Admiral DE LANY. No, sir. I make that statement as a thought of my part within a month after the—well, by the first of March, 1941.

75. General FRANK. But it was not in your mind prior to the attack?

76. General RUSSELL. He said March 1, 1941.

77. General FRANK. Oh, March 1, '41. All right.

Admiral DE LANY. As a matter of fact, I don't recall the date, but I know that General Short and Admiral Kimmel, as I mentioned before, had visualized this thing and had actually inspected the places where the Army was putting up their command stations in the mountain out there, with the idea that the whole command set-up would move up there and there would be a unity of command.

78. General GRUNERT. That was provided for when war broke?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

79. General GRUNERT. But the unity that I was referring to was unity of command prior to any emergency, so that the preparation could be unified instead of waiting until something broke.

[1713] Admiral DE LANY. General, I think in answer to your previous question I had said there that I don't recall Admiral Kimmel or General Short discussing unity of command either before the 27th or subsequent to the 27th of November. Whether it was discussed or not, I do not know but I know that, as I said, both the Admiral and the General had visualized this because of their interest in getting a place, a post where the command could be exercised.

80. General GRUNERT. Now, going back to the former question or discussion of the M-Day, I refer now to a paragraph in this Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, paragraph 15c (2):

(Excerpt from Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Re: M-Day, is as follows:)

(2) M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of their respective plans prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

Admiral DE LANY. That is right.

81. General GRUNERT. So they could have put any or all of this thing into effect by mutual agreement?

Admiral DE LANY. That is right.

82. General GRUNERT. Between local commanders?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

83. General GRUNERT. But as far as you know it never came to such mutual agreement?

[1714] Admiral DE LANY. It never came to such a mutual agreement because—well, I think I am correct in saying that nobody out there considered that it was essential to do it.

84. General GRUNERT. Then, it all boils down to the fact that they were sort of sabotage minded but not really war minded at that particular time?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

85. General GRUNERT. Is that a broad statement of it?

Admiral DE LANY. That is a correct statement, and I think it is based entirely on factual information that we had available to us at that time.

86. General GRUNERT. Then really, before you got into a different state in which you would actually expect an attack, you expected to have more information of more critical conditions than you actually did get; is that the idea?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

87. General FRANK. You well knew, however, that the Japs were known traditionally to hit and then let that strike be the opening gun in the declaration of war?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

88. General FRANK. You feel, I take it from your comments, that in the face of the information that you had, if the situation were known in Washington to be sufficiently acute to require the announcement of M-Day, that that announcement should have come from him?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir, or we should have had more information in order to have us make preliminary deployments or anything else that we would have made prior to receipt of an M-Day dispatch.

[1715] 89. General GRUNERT. Tell me, Admiral, about what you knew about the Army's interceptor and air warning service, as to its completeness, as to your confidence in it or your lack of such confidence. Just what did you know about it?

Admiral DE LANY. I knew that there were, as I recall it, three radar sets on the island. I knew that the Army was drilling personnel on those sets. I knew that there was normal communication between radar

and headquarters that was not reliable but could be used. I personally conducted a conference between the Army and the representative of the Fourteenth Naval District at which, as I recall it, personnel from the telephone people in Hawaii were present when Commander Taylor who was entirely familiar with the intercepts system as it was installed in U. K., was out there. I saw the outline of the system as it was to be put in, I saw the list of equipment that was required, the number of persons that were required to man it; but beyond the fact that there were, as I said, I believe, three radars on the island, I don't believe that the intercept system was in effect beyond any stage except where the Army was training on the radar and could get telephone communication back to some place at headquarters.

90. General FRANK. And could pick approaching planes up?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir. The operators were being trained on their radar sets, sir. I believe the scheme out there, as I recall it, was that the men were sent out on a truck that went out on a morning patrol, and then when the truck came back from that they picked these operators up some place around 7:30 or something like that in the morning and brought them back for their breakfast, and then they went out later on in the after- [1716] noon, as I recall the thing.

91. General GRUNERT. The evidence that you gave before the Robert Commission appears to be somewhat to the effect that you were pushing the establishment of this service, that you were straining to get it into position and action. Do you know, what was that pushing and what was this straining, and what were the results? Do you recall that?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir. As I say here, before the 7th of December, as far as I know the system, the only thing that we had was the radars, and none of the appurtenances and equipment and so forth that go to make an aircraft warning or a fighter director system.

92. General GRUNERT. Did you ever visit the Information Center?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

93. General GRUNERT. Wasn't that complete?

Admiral DE LANY. Partially so, yes, sir.

94. General GRUNERT. Were not all the connections made, with not three but five radar stations?

Admiral DE LANY. Not that I know of, sir. I thought there were three.

95. General GRUNERT. These that I am speaking of are mobile stations.

Admiral DE LANY. That is right; yes, sir.

96. General GRUNERT. I note that you said there was no direct wire to your headquarters or your office.

Admiral DE LANY. That is right, sir.

97. General GRUNERT. Now, what was there about getting the direct wire to your office? Did that take materials that they [1717] had trouble getting?

Admiral DE LANY. Well, there just wasn't any available, sir, or it wasn't put in, because after the 7th of December we did rig some portable cable down there.

98. General GRUNERT. That seemed a little bit strange to me, that after the 7th of December everything started popping and getting

done, and prior to that they seemed to have trouble getting started, getting things in. That is why I wondered why you were pushing and straining to get action.

Admiral DE LANY. Well, General, I do not think there is any difference between what happened in the Army and what happened in the Navy. We couldn't get a 20-mm gun out there before the 7th of December, and after the 7th they poured in. The same way with other equipment.

99. General GRUNERT. That is true in a number of weeks afterwards, but shortly after, practically on the 7th of December and the 8th and from there on that system started working, without waiting for anything to come from the United States?

Admiral DE LANY. Not on the 8th, sir, or any time within a week afterward, sir. It was possible to get the information through, yes, sir; and had we known on the first of November that there was going to be an attack any time subsequent or close to that, we could have put the string up then, but the plans were in effect and the material was being shipped to install a permanent installation as it now exists. It would have been possible to have done anything, sir.

100. General GRUNERT. The whole thing goes back again as to just how deeply they were impressed with the imminence of war. I just have one or two more questions, and then I will turn you [1718] over to the mercies of somebody else here.

Outside of the conferences held between General Short and Admiral Kimmel, what was the nature of the conference held between their respective staffs? Were there any periodic conferences or special conferences, or just individual talks, or what?

Admiral DE LANY. I can only speak for my section of the staff and say that they were mostly individual conferences between the gunnery people, the communicators in the Operations Section, sir, and that pertained primarily to joint training exercises that were matching our operating schedule, and then also to the joint base defense drills that were held in the Pearl Harbor area.

101. General GRUNERT. When did you leave the vicinity of Pearl Harbor permanently for change of station?

Admiral DE LANY. I left there in May '42 and was down in the South Pacific and then came back in November '42, and that is the last time I have been assigned on anything in Pearl Harbor.

102. General GRUNERT. The last time you saw Pearl Harbor was November, 1942?

Admiral DE LANY. No, sir. The last time I saw Pearl Harbor was the 2nd of July, 1944. I came back through there from Saipan, sir.

103. General GRUNERT. What I want to get about the Army defenses for Pearl Harbor. Do you know whether they have improved to the extent that you Navy people now think that the Army, with the means it now has available, can give the Navy protection in Pearl Harbor?

[1719] Admiral DE LANY. I can't answer that, General. I talked with some people on the staff out there when I came through, and I got the general impression from talking to people on CINCPAC's staff that generally speaking the requirements of the Army that were asked for starting in April, 1941, have gradually accumulated out there and they do have enough stuff.

104. General GRUNERT. I gather from, I think it was, your testimony I read before the Roberts Commission that at that time you were pretty well convinced that Pearl Harbor was not a good place for the fleet to be, to be protected, to be secure. Is that right or not?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir. I make no hesitancy in saying that on the 7th of December, 1941, Pearl Harbor was not a fleet base as I would visualize a fleet base.

105. General GRUNERT. I think I shall give General Frank a chance now to piece in anything that I may have missed that may be in his mind.

106. General FRANK. Do you know the different responsibilities that the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District had?

Admiral DE LANY. By Commander-in-Chief's directive he was the base defense officer, sir, and he was also required to maintain liaison with the Army.

107. General FRANK. What I am getting at is this: In the first place he was Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

108. General FRANK. On a basis on which he was the representative of the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

109. General FRANK. That is one hat?

[1720] Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

110. General FRANK. He was a commander under the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, was he not?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir. He was commander of Task Force 4, sir.

111. General FRANK. Commander. What was that?

Admiral DE LANY. That was Base Defense Officer and as such included the outlying islands of the Hawaiian Group, but I mean Johnston, Midway, Wake, Palmyra.

112. General FRANK. That is two hats he had?

Admiral DE LANY. Well, that as a task force commander he was the Base Defense commander who was responsible for his sea frontier which included the outlying islands.

113. General FRANK. Yes. But in this other capacity, which I just mentioned, he reported direct to headquarters in Washington. Now in this capacity he reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet?

Admiral DE LANY. As a base defense officer, yes, sir.

114. General FRANK. Yes. Now, he had another responsibility with respect to the joint Army-Navy coast defense plan, did he not?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir, with the Army.

115. General FRANK. And who was his immediate superior with respect to that? Did he report with respect to that to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet or to Washington?

Admiral DE LANY. I believe by his original orders he would report to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington.

116. General GRUNERT. That seemed to be a dual one to me.

117. General FRANK. Another subject: Generally speaking, there [1721] actually was not an activity known as distant reconnaissance carried out for the express purpose of providing security of Oahu against a surprise attack?

Admiral DE LANY. Against a surprise air and surface attack, no, sir.

118. General FRANK. No. And I gathered that that was because of the state of mind that generally existed as a result of conclusions arrived at from information, messages, and the general situation; is that correct?

Admiral DE LANY. Partially, yes, sir.

119. General FRANK. Amplify it, will you?

Admiral DE LANY. And also, as I said before, that the mission of the fleet activities in the Hawaiian area was at that time primarily training, and in addition to the fact that there were neither planes, pilots, nor equipment available to conduct a continued distant reconnaissance.

120. General FRANK. Now, do you feel that the authorities in Washington were conversant with the lack of material and the lack of training necessary for adequate protection of the place?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir, I think they were fully cognizant of it, because not only had the Commanding General and the Commander-in-Chief repeatedly outlined the deficiencies of the fleet and the defenses of Pearl Harbor, but in addition to that I am quite certain that all the plans such as you refer to here had copies of them—I speak for the fleet now—had copies of them sent back to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington. They were entirely familiar with our training and operating schedule, and they knew that we were not conducting distant reconnaissance.

[1722] 121. General FRANK. Have you any reason to believe that the state of mind in Washington was different than the state of mind in Honolulu?

Admiral DE LANY. No, sir, I have no way of knowing.

122. General FRANK. Have you any opinion that you would like to express on it?

Admiral DE LANY. Well, my own opinion is that people who sit close to the throne probably hear a whole lot more than those who don't sit quite so close to the throne, and with that general opinion I believe that the people here must have heard more than we did out in Pearl Harbor.

123. General FRANK. With the knowledge, had they had knowledge that led them to believe that you were on a hot seat and needed help to take care of yourself, should that impetus have come from here, you think?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir. I believe a commander in the field is entitled to every bit of information that can be furnished him, sir.

124. General FRANK. There was a lot of help arrived right after the Pearl Harbor attack?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir; some supposed to come in that morning, I believe.

125. General FRANK. Even had it been there, the state of mind which led to the conclusions that they had wouldn't have made any difference under the circumstances, however, would it?

Admiral DE LANY. Well, I do not think that that is an entirely fair supposition, because I believe that if the Commander-in-Chief had not had his fleet depleted for months prior to the 7th of December, and had both the Army and the Navy received equipment for which they asked as equipment being required in emergency, that the opinion of the Commanding General and the Commander-in-

Chief would probably have been quite some different because I believe they would have felt that since the material that they needed was forthcoming there would have been some different point of view on the thing.

126. General FRANK. You generally remember the messages that arrived from the 16th of October, the 24th of November, and the 27th of November? I do not mean the exact wording, but generally?

Admiral DE LANY. I don't know what you refer to on the 16th of November, sir.

127. General FRANK. October.

Admiral DE LANY. 16th of—

128. General FRANK. October.

Admiral DE LANY. Oh, yes, sir; I know.

129. General FRANK. Just to refresh your memory a bit, on October 16th:

Take due precautions including preparatory deployments that will not disclose strategic intention.

Navy message of the 24th:

Caution relative probability of surprise attack on Guam or P. I.

Navy, the 27th:

War warning. Guam Samoa warned Jap action versus P. I., Thai or Korean Peninsula, Borneo.

Army message of the 27th:

Hostile action possible. Desire Japan commit first overt act. Do not alarm civil population. In case of trouble carry out Rainbow Five.

Now, what were the reactions from the amount of information that you did get? You knew that there was an acute situation?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir. Well, as I said in answer to a little differently phrased question, I felt that Japan was on the move, as I said, and from the information that we had, the information that appeared in those dispatches mentioning P. I., Guam, and so forth, that the movement was toward the south. There was no question about that. But I certainly never thought that there would be an air or a surface attack on Pearl Harbor.

130. General FRANK. What I am trying to get is the statement as to how much the contents of these messages influenced your thinking, you see.

Admiral DE LANY. Well, my line of reasoning, my line of thought was exactly as I expressed here. I thought that the movement was down in that direction. The latest information we had on the employment of the Japanese Fleet, even presuming that I had known that there was a carrier group in the Marshalls, would not have led me to believe that the Japanese carrier force was going to make an attack on Pearl Harbor. I never would have believed it. I didn't think that Japan would ever choose that as an initial act of war.

[1725] 131. General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, Admiral, after these messages that General Frank has talked to you about have been received and considered by the naval authorities, no change at all in their plans were made?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir; there were.

132. General RUSSELL. In what way?

Admiral DE LANY. We did what we thought was against a possible hostile act on the part of Japan, and that is that we increased our protection against submarine activities.

133. General RUSSELL. In what way?

Admiral DE LANY. In that the ships in the operating area were required to take their war-time dispositions, with the anti-submarine screens, maintain air patrols, and generally take war-time precautions as they would do in cruising in enemy submarine waters; outside of the fact that, as you know, carriers were sent to put planes on both Midway and Wake.

134. General RUSSELL. I have wondered about those two movements. What was the purpose of those two movements?

Admiral DE LANY. That was part of the defensive deployment.

135. General RUSSELL. Those would be land-based planes on those two islands to be used for what purpose?

Admiral DE LANY. Probably reconnaissance, but primarily defense.

136. General RUSSELL. It has been mentioned in the testimony heretofore that the situation was influenced in 1941 by the transfer of part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Ocean. Do you recall when that was done, and about how much of the Navy was affected?

[1726] Admiral DE LANY. No, sir; I cannot give the exact dates, but I know there was a carrier and battleship divisions and one or two squadrons of destroyers, plus some transports, both large and small, that we had set up in San Diego to commence amphibious training.

137. General RUSSELL. Do you know about when that occurred?

Admiral DE LANY. No; but I would say, offhand, some time around July or August.

138. General RUSSELL. Early in your testimony this afternoon you discussed with General Grunert the inspection that was made by Admiral Kimmel and you in the early part of 1941, as I recall. As a result of that inspection a letter was sent to the Navy Department, and probably a copy furnished to General Short. That is the letter which prompted the correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War touching the subject of the inadequacy of the Army defense on Oahu. Did you know that such a communication was sent?

Admiral DE LANY. I cannot answer that; I do not know.

139. General GRUNERT. The Secretary of the Navy's letter to the Secretary of War was dated January 24. The Secretary of War's reply to the Secretary of the Navy was dated February 7. The inspection that was made was not until after the Secretary of War had replied to the Secretary of the Navy; so I do not think there is any connection.

140. General RUSSELL. I think that the record will show that the letter was written from out there on the 25th, and I am trying to find out about it. Admiral Kimmel's letter is dated the 25th of January and the Secretary of the Navy's letter is dated the 24th. I am just wondering how many inspections were [1727] made. Do you know whether or not an inspection was made before the 25th of January?

Admiral DE LANY. No, sir; I cannot say that, sir; I do not know. I cannot recall the dates.

141. General RUSSELL. So far as you know, there was not an inspection out there until shortly before Admiral Kimmel wrote the letter of January 25?

Admiral DE LANY. I believe that Admiral Richardson, as the former Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, had presented prior letters about the inadequacy of the defense of Pearl Harbor.

142. General RUSSELL. In the letter of the 24th of January reference was made to the probability of a combined air and submarine attack as being the most probable form of attack by the Japanese Nation. Do you know about that?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir; and I think you will find that the Commander-in-Chief's security letters provide for furnishing the facilities of the fleet to the Army and the Base Defense Command in the event that an air attack occurred while the ships were in Pearl Harbor.

143. General RUSSELL. The interest seems to have been rather acute in the early part of 1941, January and February; that is, the interest in a surprise attack by aircraft and submarines. Is that true?

Admiral DE LANY. No, sir; that is not true, because, as I recall it, the last Base Defense air drill was held some time around—well, after the 20th of November.

144. General RUSSELL. At that time there was not such an intense interest in the form of attack out there, was there?

Admiral DE LANY. I do not know what you mean by interest [1728]

145. General RUSSELL. It was a fact that there was absolutely no protection or screen thrown out on the morning of December 7th or attempt to obtain information about the launching of an attack on Oahu?

Admiral DE LANY. That is true not only of the 7th of December but every other day before that, sir.

146. General RUSSELL. If you people were so intensely interested in the type of attack, why was it that no diligence was exercised at all to discover the force which might have launched that sort of attack?

Admiral DE LANY. Oahu is an island. There are no probable sectors of approach. Therefore, the only way that the Island can be completely protected and an enemy approaching the Island can be discovered is to maintain a 360-degree circle of coverage around the Island. There were neither planes, pilots, nor other facilities available to conduct and maintain such a continuous reconnaissance.

147. General RUSSELL. You realized the danger, but there was simply nothing that you could do about it?

Admiral DE LANY. Generally speaking; yes, sir.

148. General RUSSELL. What effect on the damage suffered at that time would the dispersion of the ships have had?

Admiral DE LANY. Within the harbor, you mean?

149. General RUSSELL. No. If the ships, instead of being berthed in the harbor, had been at sea.

Admiral DE LANY. If the battleships that were eventually salvaged and which are now fighting in the Pacific Campaign had been at sea and had received the same number of torpedo hits that they received in Pearl Harbor I believe they would be sunk.

[1729] 150. General RUSSELL. It would have been necessary for the task force to have sought these ships out wherever dispersed and attacked them at sea?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes.

151. General RUSSELL. Would it have been a considerably larger undertaking than the attack that was made?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes; very decidedly so. And I would like to add to that, that had the fleet not been in Pearl Harbor and had the attack changed from fleet ships as their objective to shore installations as their objective, I believe that the ultimate damage and subsequent results would have been very much more far-reaching.

152. General RUSSELL. In answer to one of General Grunert's questions you stated that you did not regard Pearl Harbor and Honolulu as a desirable Navy base. I attempted to follow the reasons assigned, but, if they were given, I was confused about it. What were your reasons for saying that?

Admiral DE LANY. My concept of a naval base is one to which fleet forces may go and obtain the necessary recreation for their crews and overhaul of their matériel during the time that they are in port. Facilities were not available in Pearl Harbor, because the ships were required to maintain a condition of readiness that permitted them to get underway almost immediately, and the crew was required to stand condition watches and live on board a ship that was almost completely bottled up, so far as light and ventilation was concerned. Under those circumstances I believe that the general morale and health of a crew would soon deteriorate if they had to keep that up continuously not only during the time they cruised at sea but [1730] also during the time that they were supposed to be in their bases.

153. General RUSSELL. What caused this condition of semi-alertness which prevented the crews from obtaining the necessary recreation?

Admiral DE LANY. The condition of readiness that was set after the 7th of December, as I said, required the ships to be ready to get underway.

154. General RUSSELL. We were at war then. Prior to December 7th did this condition obtain?

Admiral DE LANY. I am talking about something different, then, General. I am talking about Pearl Harbor as a base after war was declared.

155. General RUSSELL. I meant, prior to the war.

Admiral DE LANY. Prior to the war it was a very good operating base. The weather was good; there was plenty of deep water as soon as you left port.

156. General GRUNERT. What good is a base if you are not going to use it in a war? The whole thing is prepared for the purpose of war. Therefore, a place that is good for a peace base and is not good for a war base is not a good base, is it?

Admiral DE LANY. No, sir. I have said it is not a good base. I have said it is not a good base for war operations. The General asked me about peace time. I said, "Yes, it made a very good operating base during peace time," because you had no restrictions on the security of the bases.

157. General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, what happened was that the fleet was moved out there before Pearl Harbor had been completely ready to receive and to protect the fleet. [1731] Is not that true?

Admiral DE LANY. That is correct; and if you see the facilities in Pearl Harbor as pertained to November and that existed to the 7th of December, and those that existed on the 1st of July, 1944, you would appreciate exactly how correct your statement is.

158. General RUSSELL. Admiral, what is your view of the desirability of a base for a large part of our Navy where the surrounding territory is on the Island of Oahu and is inhabited largely or predominantly by people whose nation is hostile to the United States?

Admiral DE LANY. I think it is very undesirable.

159. General RUSSELL. That is all I have.

160. General FRANK. General Russell brought up the point of your dispersing the elements of the fleet that were in Pearl Harbor as a defense measure against air attack. What is your reaction to the presence of a large number of submarines with the Japanese task force? Did you or did you not know that there was a large submarine force with this attacking force?

Admiral DE LANY. I knew after the attack that they had been there and I can only say that if the air and submarine coordination in the attack on Pearl Harbor was as efficient as it was down in the Coral Sea and in the area where I operated six months afterwards, we would have had a very sad experience had we stood to the northward and run into those submarines.

161. General GRUNERT. Admiral, there appear to be no more questions, except that I would like to give you an opportunity to add anything to your testimony that you think might be of value to the Board in sizing up the situation, which is mainly [1732] from an Army viewpoint, but not all-inclusively an Army viewpoint. Is there anything that occurs to you?

Admiral DE LANY. The only thing that I would like to add to my statement, sir, is that from my personal knowledge and observation I am certain that there were no disagreements or misunderstanding between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, and that any statements that are made to the contrary are not true.

162. General GRUNERT. We thank you very much for coming here and giving us of your time and helping us.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 5:20 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

[1733]

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[1734] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR
BOARD

FRIDAY, AUGUST 25, 1944.

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

(Leon M. Golding was sworn as a reporter.)

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY, RETIRED. (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, EDWARD B. HANIFY, LIEUTENANT, JUNIOR GRADE, UNITED STATES NAVY.)

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Admiral, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Admiral KIMMEL. Husband E. Kimmel, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Retired.

2. General GRUNERT. Admiral, you probably know what this Board has been appointed for. It is to find out the facts as to what happened prior to, leading up to, and during the so-called Pearl Harbor attack. By reason of your position and [1735] assignment out there we hope that we can get some facts from you or some leads to where we can get facts. That is the main reason for asking you to come over.

I have prepared a number of questions based on the list of subjects I sent over to you. Of course, we will try to stick to those subjects as closely as possible, but when we get to questioning you we will broaden out a bit.

First, will you please state to the Board your assignment and, generally, your duties thereunder, during the year 1941, giving us dates as far as you can recall them?

Admiral KIMMEL. I took over the office of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, the 1st of February, 1941. I was relieved of that command on December 17th, 1941. During that time I was responsible for the Pacific Fleet.

3. General GRUNERT. Will you tell the Board generally what your official relationship was to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

4. General FRANK. Is there any kind of a chart in existence which shows the relationship of the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and to Admiral Bellinger?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District was a subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. The reason I hesitate a moment is that I want to get the thing straight.

5. General GRUNERT. Use your own time, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was the subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief, but the [1736] had many duties; he was authorized to perform many duties by direct correspondence with the Navy Department. He, by orders of the Navy Department, War Plans, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, was charged with and in charge of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier Defense, and the Commandant of the district, together with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, made up a Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. The Commandant of the district was charged most directly with cooperation with the Commanding General in Hawaii. He was responsible for details of Army and Navy cooperation. As my subordinate he kept me informed of what was going on, and I naturally was responsible for what he did.

6. General GRUNERT. That is what I wanted to get at next. Any plans that were made, although he made them in his capacity under the Navy Department as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, he kept you informed of; and did you approve such plans?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. He kept me informed, and I knew what he was doing.

7. General GRUNERT. You did not actually have to sign those plans, did you?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. My recollection is that I did not sign any plans, but I knew the plans and I approved the plans.

8. General GRUNERT. You were generally familiar, then, with the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes, by all means. I initiated the business of perfecting the cooperation betwixt the Army and Navy air forces in Hawaii and was very much interested in it and thoroughly approved what they did and was informed of it.

[1737] 9. General GRUNERT. Admiral, see if I am generally correct in what my understanding is of the chain of command, as we might call it, and of action thereunder. For instance, the District Commander was a subordinate of yours?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I have a document here which may tend to clarify the minds of the Board on that point. It is an attempt to simplify the various provisions of the Navy Regulations, General Order No. 142, General Order No. 143, and the orders contained in directives from the Navy Department as provisions in the war plan. I submit that for the consideration of the Board and for their future study. I think it is accurate. It at least will bring you to the place where you can find what is laid down in the documents. I hesitate to testify as to just what the document means. I think you are entitled to get that meaning yourselves from the document.

10. General FRANK. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District wore one hat—I take that as a phase of responsibility—in which for certain things connected with the Fourteenth Naval District he was responsible directly to the Chief of Naval Operations here in Washington, was he not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; matters that had to do with the administration of the district, the expenditure of funds, the expansion of the plant out there—all manner of administrative affairs; and, as a practical matter, he was under me primarily for military reasons.

11. General FRANK. That was one phase of his work. The second phase of his work was his responsibility for the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. His responsibilities were laid down [1738] in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and were the result of agreement; and, due to the lack of Army equipment in the Islands, in order to utilize everything that we had to the fullest extent, he agreed to supply the deficiencies that did exist there to the best of his ability. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was a realistic plan based on what was available and an attempt to utilize it in the best manner possible without regard to the responsibilities—not without regard—but going beyond the responsibilities as laid down in the Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935. In the Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, the responsibility for the defense of Oahu lay with the Army; even the long-range reconnaissance was a function of the Army General Headquarters, Air Force. When it came to making plans in Hawaii there was no General Headquarters, Air Force, out there, and we had to rig up a plan to utilize what we had; and at the time that the Commandant agreed to this plan he had been informed that he would eventually have 108 patrol planes assigned to him and that the Army would have something on the order of 200 flying fortresses, and if and when that condition obtained he would have been in very good case to defend Hawaii with other elements that would have been present.

Those are the primary things. However, there being no district patrol planes in existence, there being only—

12. General FRANK (interposing). That is, Naval District patrol planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. —and there being only a handful, I think, six flying fortresses suitable for distant reconnaissance and bombing, it was manifestly impossible for the Commanding General and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to dis- [1739] charge their responsibilities with this equipment, and it was planned to utilize so many of the patrol planes of the fleet as might be available at any one time, augmented by such planes as the Army could supply to do the distant reconnaissance. The number of patrol planes in the fleet was 81, all told. Of those approximately between 50 and 60 were in the Island of Oahu and suitable for service on the 7th of December. I cannot tell you the exact number, because I do not know which ones were laid up for check and various things like that, but those 81 patrol planes were fleet planes and they had to cover all the Hawaiian Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific Fleet. They could not, and the Commandant knew they could not, be made permanently available for the defense of Oahu, nor was the fleet out there to defend

Oahu; the fleet was there for different purposes. However, we recognized, thoroughly and fully recognized, the conditions as they obtained and endeavored to make the very best use of the equipment that we had available. I found General Short most cooperative in his efforts to get things done and, as you have probably heard already, our relations from the time we first met up to the present day have been most cordial. I, in my experience, have never seen any locality where the Army and Navy had closer cooperation or more wholehearted desire to make the best of what we had then we had in Hawaii during the term of my command as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

I thought I would give you that general picture.

13. General GRUNERT. Admiral, this document which you have handed me, which shows a chart of the organization as of December 7th, 1941, together with a statement—I believe that if [1740] we take time out and read this into your testimony it would be well. It may obviate the necessity of asking some of the more detailed questions, and we can get down to the point with a definite understanding. With your permission, I will read it, or your counsel may read it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no objection to its being read, and my counsel may read it or you may read it, just as you please. I want you to understand, however, that this paper was prepared and is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, an accurate, although restricted presentation of the orders and instructions that governed the actions of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.

14. General GRUNERT. This document starts out by saying [reading]:

(Document "The Pacific Fleet in the Command Organization of the Navy as of December 7, 1941", is as follows:)

1. Normal command channel.
2. A legal channel rarely used.
3. Navy Regs. 1481—The Commandant is the direct representative of the Navy Department, including its Bureaus and Offices, in all matters affecting district activity.
 - a. Art. 1484 (7)—In intercourse with government, state and foreign officials and with local authorities in matters of interest to the Navy, the Commandant shall himself, or through his subordinate, represent the Navy Department.
 - b. General Order 142—The Commandant has dual authority as Commandant of the district operating [1741] under orders of the Navy Department.
 - c. General Order 143 (7)—Commandants of districts * * * have administrative responsibility direct to the Navy Department for Naval local defense forces.
4. Navy Regs. 1480 (4)—All matters pertaining to military operations in Naval districts shall be under the Office of Naval Operations.
 - a. Navy Regs. 1485 (5)—All correspondence relative to changes in the assignment of district craft to CNO via Bureaus concerned.
5. CinC, U. S. Fleet and CinC, Pacific Fleet are identical. The relation of Cincus to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Atlantic and Asiatic Fleet is expressed in General Order No. 143, "Under the CNO the Cincus will, through type Commanders, prescribe standards and methods of training for all the sea-going forces and air-craft of the Navy. The U. S. Fleet is an administrative organization for training purposes only, and is a task organization only when two or more fleets are concentrated or operating in conjunction."
6. General Order No. 142—In his dual capacity, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District as an officer of the fleet operates under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief thereof.
 - a. With duties corresponding to those of a senior officer present afloat.

b. In command of a task group of the fleet when and as directed by its Commander-in-Chief.

The following excerpts from official publications are [1742] pertinent to the investigation:

"Navy Regs. 1482—In the administration of affairs in the districts, the Commandant * * * will transact necessary business with the officer commanding the group or unit. These groups or units will be coordinated and every effort will be made to develop complete intercommunication and cooperation among several groups and units in regard to all matters requiring joint action.

"Navy Regs. 1484 (3)—The Commandant shall cooperate with Army commanders and Commanders of Fleet Forces within the district, in the preparation of defense plans in time of peace, as well as their execution in time of war.

"Navy Regs. 1484 (5)—He shall be charged with the maintenance of an efficient information and communication service within the district in accordance with instructions issued by ONI and Offices of Naval Communications.

"Navy Regs. 1486 (1)—The mission of a Commandant of a Naval District in coast defense is to control the sea communications within the district * * * The limits of the Naval districts extend to seaward so far as to include the coastwise sea lanes.

"Navy Regs. 1486 (5)—The Commandants of Naval districts will cooperate with the Army officers commanding corps areas in the preparation of plans in time of peace, determining the more probable situations likely to arise and entering into advance agreements upon plans of joint action for each such situation.

"General Order 142—The duties of the Commandants will include the local Naval Defense Forces.

[1743] "a. The duties of a Commandant as an officer of the fleet will be guided by such instructions as the CinC of the Fleet may consider desirable.

"b. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District will report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific upon assuming command."

JOINT ACTION ARMY AND NAVY

This publication states under paragraph 19 (d) 3, "Army shall provide, operate and maintain communication and intelligence systems to include air-craft warning service, with provision for prompt exchange with the Navy."

Paragraph 19 (g)—"Navy will provide and operate:

"h. A system of off-shore scouting and patrol to give timely warning of attack."

Paragraph 21 (b) 1—"The Army Air Components will operate over the sea in directing defense of the coast."

Paragraph 31 (d)—"Category 'd' requires long range air reconnaissance plans made for use of GHQ, Air Force." Category "d" is defined as—"Coastal frontier that may be subject to major attack."

Paragraph 31 (g) 2—"In all categories the Army Commander is responsible for AA Defense within the corps area and Naval districts, to include air-craft warning service."

Paragraph 42 (d)—"Strategic freedom of action of the fleet must be assured. THE FLEET MUST HAVE NO ANXIETY IN REGARD TO THE SECURITY OF ITS BASE."

Paragraph 31 (f)—"Regardless of the presence or absence of the fleet, the GHQ, Air Force, retains responsibility for reconnaissance."

[1744] Page 49 (d)—"The Army is responsible for the defense against aerial attack on all Naval facilities ashore in a harbor area." The air-craft warning service is defined on page 150 of this publication.

THE JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN FOR THE HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.

This plan, signed by General Short and Admiral Bloch, is prepared in accordance with the basic war plan and joint action Army and Navy. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier is defined as including Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Canton and Wake Islands. The defensive sea areas are defined and Hawaii is considered as in category "d". The tasks are:

a. Joint—Hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval base. Control and protect shipping in the coastal zone.

b. Army—Hold Oahu against land, sea and air attack and against hostile sympathizers. Support Naval forces.

c. Navy—Patrol coastal zone and patrol and protect shipping therein, to support the Army forces. In this joint plan the Commanding General of the Army is to provide for:

a. Beach, land, sea, coast and anti-air craft defenses of Oahu, with particular attention to Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Schofield Barracks, Wheeler Field and Luahalei.

b. AA and gas defense, intelligence and warning service.

f. Establish an in-shore air patrol in cooperation with Navy [1745] in-shore patrol, and an aerial observation system in outlying islands. Establish an aircraft warning system for the Hawaiian Islands.

i. In conjunction with the Navy establish a system of land communication (teletype, telegraph loops, radio interceptions, etc.) to insure prompt transmission and interchange of hostile intelligence.

e. Establish a joint intelligence service.

The Commandant of the 14th Naval District shall provide for:

a. In-shore patrol.

b. Off-shore patrol.

c. Escort force.

e. Maintain harbor Control Post for joint defense of Pearl and Honolulu Harbors.

f. Install and operate underwater defense for harbors (Hydro-Acoustic Posts)

g. Plant submarine mines if necessary.

h. Sweep channels.

i. Distant reconnaissance.

l. Local communications (in conjunction with the Army).

n. Operate Naval intelligence for the collection, evaluation and dissemination of hostile information.

[1746] 15. General FRANK. I would still like to ask just a couple of questions.

16. General GRUNERT. Go ahead with your questions.

17. General FRANK. Prior to this I was asking about the jobs of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, and we determined that he had a responsibility where he reported direct to the Navy Department. Then it was brought out that he had a responsibility with respect to the joint coastal frontier defense plan. In that capacity was he responsible directly to you or to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Chief of Naval Operations sent out instructions to each District Commandant as to the form, scope, and the contents of a defense plan, and they laid down and prescribed certain parts of the plan. The Commandant, I should say, was responsible directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Naval Operations approved or disapproved his action on that. Naturally, I had a chance to get my ideas into the defense plan or any other plan that the Commandant made. However, it was his job to go ahead and do it, and unless I interfered, why, he did the whole thing.

18. General FRANK. All right. Now another thing: I notice in this paper that General Grunert just read into the record that it stated in there that the Commandant of the Naval District, being responsible for the local defense forces, was responsible to the Navy Department and that coincides with what you just said.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

19. General FRANK. Now, he had a third responsibility, which was that he had command of a task force?

[1747] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

20. General FRANK. And as commander of that task force he was responsible to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct. Now, as commander of the task force that is laid down, if you would like to have that, just what it was.

21. General FRANK. Will you state it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I can give it to you.

He was in command of Task Force 4 of the Pacific Fleet. Task Force 4 under the command of the Commandant 14th Naval District, Rear Admiral Claude G. Bloch, U. S. Navy, included that part of the 14th Naval District activities which involved the island bases, primary missions to organize, train, and develop island bases in order to insure their own defense and provide efficient services to fleet units engaged in advance operations. Now, by the provisions of my letter 2 CL-41 of 14 October 1941 the Commandant was also designated as Naval Base Defense Officer, and his duties were laid down in considerable detail in that publication. I think it would be well to present now to this Board a copy of Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 2 CL-41, revised, of October 14, 1941.

22. General FRANK. This, then, constitutes a fourth responsibility for the District Commander?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct; I should say yes, that is about right. The number I presume is correct.

23. General FRANK. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. At any rate, immediately after I took command of the Fleet I wanted to get an organization for the use of all the naval forces which happened to be in Pearl Harbor [1748] at any one time, so that they could be used in the event of any kind of an attack. In the middle of February we issued the first letter on this subject. This letter which I have just quoted was a revision of the original letter.

24. General GRUNERT. That was in October, was it?

Admiral KIMMEL. This is October 14th. This letter tied up some loose ends and tucked them in where they should be, but made no material change in the letter of the 15th of February, 1941.

25. General GRUNERT. May I ask at this point whether your instructions there were in consonance with this joint coastal frontier defense plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think there is no question about it. If there had been any conflict we would have discovered it in the course of the numerous drills which we had, and this letter was the subject of considerable thought and effort on the part of the Commandant, 14th Naval District, the forces afloat, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. He knew all about this order; and in this order—I think I can touch on some of the high spots of the order profitably—we disposed the ships of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor as they came in so as to cover all of the various sectors upon which aircraft could approach. It was the duty of the senior officer present afloat, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, to so place those ships. We had a sector commander appointed for each sector—that is, of the ships afloat; and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was placed in charge, as Naval Base Defense Officer, of coordinating the efforts of the Navy, of whatever happened to be ashore, with those of the Army in the defense of the Pearl Harbor base.

[1749] The other big point that we covered in this and in the joint agreement betwixt the Commanding General and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was a question of cooperation of the aircraft. I think you should have that presented to you. In general it provided that the bombers and long range planes should be under

the command of the Navy; the fighters should be under the command of the Army, and there were certain other provisions. I won't go into them because I see you have had it here and it is contained in the papers.

Incidentally, I came to Washington in June of 1941, and I told the Chief of Naval Operations about this agreement which we had arrived at in Pearl Harbor, and he was very much pleased with it, and I undertook to dictate from memory the terms of the agreement, in his office, and tell him about it.

26. General GRUNERT. Were not those agreements forwarded to Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, it was. He hadn't seen it apparently, and I had tried to bring him up to date on it. At any rate, I think it had already been forwarded, and later on another copy was forwarded; I know that.

Well, he was pleased with it and said that we had gone further in that respect, of getting a coordinated action of the Army and Navy air forces out there, than anywhere else, and he wanted to use it as a model to send to other places, and I think he mentioned the Caribbean as a place where at that time they hadn't been able to arrive at a definite agreement.

This order, as you will see if you take the trouble to read it, is quite comprehensive. It covers all foreseeable [1750] contingencies and prescribes in general the action to be taken by each element of the Army and Navy in the event of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

Now, this letter is quite long. There are plenty of copies of it.

27. General GRUNERT. We have a photostat copy of what you are referring to.

Admiral KIMMEL. I see. Well, then we don't need it.

28. General GRUNERT. So I do not think there is any need of putting it in the record. I think that photostatic copy is the one from the Roberts Commission.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, there is one there, if you have that.

29. General FRANK. Yes.

30. General GRUNERT. There are copies of both your February one and the revised one of October.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct. I think they are both in that testimony.

31. General GRUNERT. All right. You may complete your examination, General Frank.

32. General FRANK. I should like to go back to a statement that you made with respect to airplanes and the responsibilities of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. I think you stated, no planes in existence. I do not believe you meant that. There were types of planes in existence, but they were not in Honolulu. That is what you meant; wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't know what I said, now. I don't know what you are talking about. I can't make it out. It is not clear what you are asking, the question you are asking me.

33. General FRANK. Well, you were discussing the [1751] responsibilities of the Commandant of the Naval District with respect to conducting reconnaissance, and you stated there are no planes in existence. There were planes in existence, but they were not in Honolulu and available to him; is that what you mean?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it is a fact that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District had no planes assigned to him at this time.

34. General FRANK. Well, that is what you meant.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is a fact. I don't know what I said. I can't recall.

35. General FRANK. All I was trying to do is to straighten out the record.

Admiral KIMMEL. I see.

36. General FRANK. So that we don't come back and find that you made a misstatement.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I don't want to make a misstatement if I can help it.

37. General FRANK. You see what I am trying to do?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, certainly. Thank you.

38. General FRANK. Now, when you read this—how is that identified [indicating]?

Admiral KIMMEL. I might add that, as the Commandant 14th Naval District had no planes assigned to him, the only place that he could get planes was from the Fleet.

39. General FRANK. Or from—

Admiral KIMMEL. Or from the Army.

40. General FRANK. Or from Washington, having the Chief of Naval Operations assign him planes?

[1752] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, again I am trying to be realistic, sir.

41. General FRANK. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. He made his best efforts to obtain planes from Washington. He wrote letter after letter to obtain planes from Washington.

42. General FRANK. But he didn't get them?

Admiral KIMMEL. And he didn't get them.

43. General FRANK. Now, in this paper that General Grunert just read is the statement:

Regardless of the presence or absence of the fleet, the GHQ Air Force retains responsibility for reconnaissance.

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't make any such statement as that. That statement is made in Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935, as of December 7, 1941, and if you get a copy of Joint Action of the Army and Navy you will find it in there.

44. General FRANK. It was just read out of this paper right here [indicating].

Admiral KIMMEL. That was taken from this publication here [indicating]. Did he say what page it was? I don't recall myself.

45. General FRANK. Page 3, Paragraph 31 (f).

There would seem to be a little confusion between this statement and the provision in this agreement that was made between the Army and the Navy in which the Navy takes over responsibility for all reconnaissance.

Admiral KIMMEL. The agreements arrived at in Hawaii were an honest and energetic effort to use the forces available to [1763] the best advantage, and there weren't any general headquarters Army aircraft available in Hawaii, and we knew that there weren't going to be any.

46. General FRANK. I am just trying to straighten out the record.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I understand.

47. General FRANK. That is all I am trying to do.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I am too. That is all I am trying to do.

48. General FRANK. And this statement that you presented gave this impression that the GHQ Air Force was responsible for reconnaissance irrespective of the presence of the fleet; whereas actually, as a result of this agreement that was made between the Army and the Navy in Hawaii, the Commandant 14th Naval District, under 18 (i) was made responsible for distant reconnaissance.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; he accepted the responsibility for distant reconnaissance, because he couldn't do anything else and be sensible.

49. General FRANK. All right. I see.

50. General GRUNERT. Now we go back to a few general principles; we may call them general principles. I am now referring to the joint Hawaiian coastal frontier defense plan. It appears that that plan was made and it became effective when signed, but was not to become operative until something happened. I want to read to you a paragraph from that plan and then ask you a question. Paragraph 15 says "Forces." Subparagraph "c" says, "Overseas reinforcements." Subparagraph [1754] (2) to paragraph c is as follows:

(Excerpt from Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is as follows:)

M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this plan.

In other words, the plan was not to be executed until M-Day had been decided upon.

Then it goes on:

M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of their respective plans prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

That is the end of that paragraph.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I know that.

51. General GRUNERT. Therefore, parts of this plan could have been put into effect prior to M-Day had the local commanders so agreed. Now, in that, as to local commanders, what is your interpretation of what "local commanders" means? Does that mean to you the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the District? Or does that mean you and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, or does it mean both combinations?

Admiral KIMMEL. I feel that it does not make much difference what it means.

52. General GRUNERT. This is my question. My next question [1755] was this:

Admiral KIMMEL. I will answer. I am perfectly willing to answer that.

53. General GRUNERT. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, if they felt that they should put into effect the mobilization, they could have recommended it to me. That is, the Commandant, 14th Nava

District, would have recommended such to me; and if he had so recommended it to me, I would have referred it immediately to Washington. We were in communication with Washington. Washington knew much more about this situation than we did. They were the fountain head of the information, and if any action looking towards the execution of this plan were necessary, it appears to me that there is no question but what Washington should have taken the action.

Now, these provisions of what to do on mobilization and what mobilization meant were laid down in the basic plans, and they were laid down in the subsidiary plans which went to the execution of the basic plans; and I venture to say that, had we put into effect mobilization order in the Pacific at any time during the year that I was in command, we would have been most severely criticized by Washington for having done so without prior reference to them, and they would have quite promptly pointed out that you can get an answer in an hour and a half or two hours, and why go ahead and put into effect a plan like this when you are in direct communication?

54. General FRANK. Why? What would that have done?

[1756] Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

55. General FRANK. Why should you not have done it? What would have been the result to which Washington would have objected?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would have alarmed the population. It might have been considered by Japan an overt act. It would have tended to upset the Japanese-American relations, which we had been enjoined to maintain in status quo; and it would have required, so far as the Navy is concerned, certain movements of the fleet and certain action which should not have been taken without reference to the Department.

56. General FRANK. In Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. In Washington, yes.

57. General GRUNERT. That has answered the next question I had; but now I have one: Was there ever a discussion as to whether or not to make parts of this plan operative, and so recommend to Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. In this 2 CL-41 letter which deals with the security of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor and in the operating areas outside of Pearl Harbor also, we prescribed certain security measures to be taken, and they were placed in effect; and at the time or prior to the Japanese attack the ships at sea in the operating areas were operating with full security measures. Those in Pearl Harbor had a considerable number of them in effect, but not so much as in the operating area, because in our estimate of the situation (which, incidentally, we revised almost daily; I mean, went over almost daily, in accordance with the intelligence information which we received) we felt that if, as intimated in the dispatches of 27 November, [1757] if the Philippines were attacked or if Guam were attacked, that the principal assault would be there. We felt, too, that it was quite possible that we would have a mass submarine attack on the ships in the operating areas and off the entrance to Pearl Harbor. Against such a contingency we took complete precautions.

58. General GRUNERT. Of course, Admiral, this Board is primarily interested wherever anything touches the Army, and it is not going into the naval phases. So whatever you have to say we will be glad

to hear, but if it isn't exactly pertinent to what we are after we shall save a lot of time and tell you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I am sorry. I am very sorry.

59. General GRUNERT. So these plans as such were really plans to be prepared to do something, but nothing could really be done except by agreement prior to the time M-Day was decided upon or the time something hit. That is why my question here: Was there no time prior to December 7 where things appeared imminent to the respective Commanders over there that caused them to want to implement the plan, even if they had to apply to Washington to do it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think, if I have given the impression which your question implies, I have created a wrong impression. Well (I, speaking for myself) would have had no hesitancy in placing into effect any provision of the plan that I thought necessary to put into effect prior to any word from Washington; and had I considered it necessary to place into effect these things, I would have done so. As a matter of fact, [1758] we did actually place into effect some of the provisions of the plan, and not all of them, but I think that the significance of this paragraph and of ordering the full mobilization is different from that, and the full mobilization was something that I would not have ordered without reference to the Navy Department, but any specific provisions which are contained in these plans I would not have hesitated at all to order, and did not hesitate to order, as I considered necessary.

60. General GRUNERT. Then let me ask this question: At no time up to December 7 did you consider the conditions over there as justifying you in asking the War Department to declare M-Day in existence?

[1759] Admiral KIMMEL. No, I did not; and had I considered that I had information which the Navy Department did not have, or had I considered that the information which it supplied to me, or that the information which had been supplied to me from any source demanded that M-Day be proclaimed, I would have so recommended to the Navy Department.

61. General GRUNERT. Do you recall any particular provisions of this joint plan, that were made operative by agreement, prior to December 7, generally speaking?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think I can give you those. Of course, I am more familiar with what happened in the Fleet, with what I did with the Fleet. My main preoccupation was with the Pacific Fleet and not with the defense of Hawaii.

62. General GRUNERT. Then what you told me relates primarily to the Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

63. General GRUNERT. And not between the District and the Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, yes; correct.

64. General GRUNERT. Then whatever was done under that joint plan, unless it was brought to your attention, you could not tell us very well what was done?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think that's true; yes; yes.

65. General GRUNERT. Let me read to you, or refresh your mind about a paragraph in the joint action of the Army and Navy, chapter 2, paragraph 9 (b), which reads as follows:

Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by exercise of unity of command in the following cases:

- [1760] 1. When ordered by the President; or,
- 2. When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy; or,
- 3. When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the service which shall exercise such command.

Did that question come up as to the necessity for unity of command prior to anything that might happen in the future? If so, was it discussed and ever contemplated that the commanders over there would agree on unity of command?

Admiral KIMMEL. To the best of my recollection, General Short and I never discussed the question of unity of command. We had worked out a formula for cooperation, and we never had any disagreement which we couldn't resolve amicably and to the satisfaction of both of us. I think neither one of us raised a question of unity of command, because, as you know, it has been a touchy subject in the Army and Navy for many years; and I am certain that had either one of us recommended that unity of command be placed in effect in Hawaii prior to the Japanese attack it would not have been done. I think you gentlemen are just as well able to judge that as I am. That is merely my opinion. In any event, we did not discuss it, and made no recommendations. That, I can state.

66. General GRUNERT. The Board has had testimony to the effect that, had there been unity of command at that time, it would probably have improved matters, including plans and agreements under plans, and a possible decision to take action prior to December 7; so I just wanted to get your reaction as [1761] to that question of unity of command.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to add one thing to that. Unity of command in the field isn't going to be truly effective as long as the commanders are receiving their orders from different sources. It will help.

67. General FRANK. Had you and General Short, prior to December 7, come to an agreement to have installed a unity-of-command basis out there, from whom would that single head have received his orders in Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. The President, I presume. There is no other agency that could give the orders to both of them. I think you gentlemen can answer that just as well as I can.

68. General GRUNERT. Now, as to deficiency of means to implement the plans that existed, can you generally give the Board an idea of what deficiency in such means there was, as far as the Navy was concerned, that would prevent this plan from having the best results when anything happened? Not in detail, but just generally.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think the primary deficiency in Hawaii was in aircraft; and next to aircraft, both Army and Navy, it was in the antiaircraft guns, means for repelling air raids. My recollection is

that we had, on December 7, 1941, 12 B-17 bombers in the islands, and we had 81 patrol planes in the islands, altogether. I may be wrong in detail, but this is a general picture that I think I can give you. Of the 12 B-17s, six of them were in operating condition, six had been stripped and were inoperative.

69. General FRANK. Stripped for parts?

Admiral KIMMEL. Stripped of parts—and you know why—to send the ones to the Philippines by the ferry. Of the 81 [1762] patrol planes, 12 of them were up at Midway, 12 of them had just returned from an extensive covering operation, escorting the task force which went to Wake. We had had a great many difficulties with new planes—patrol planes, I am talking about—so I think it is fair to say that we had in the neighborhood of 50 planes, between 50 and 60 planes, over-all, Army and Navy, fit for distant reconnaissance or for an attack on a task force. That is, based on Hawaii, now.

70. General GRUNERT. What should you have had, to be reasonably prepared for such work?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was an allowance established of 108 patrol planes for the Navy, for the District, and about 180, as I remember it, for the Fleet. In other words, about 270 planes. Maybe my arithmetic is bad, there—270 or 280 planes, of the 15,000-plane program, and plans were to assign that many patrol planes.

71. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, there was a plan worked out which stated that number?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

72. General FRANK. Or, rather, it stated the number required.

Admiral KIMMEL. It stated the number required, and it was in the neighborhood of 270 planes, all told, including the 108 for the District. Also, the Army expected to get, I think it was, 200 B-17 bombers out there. Now, had those planes arrived, they would have been in fairly good shape not only to provide a searching force but to provide a striking force; which is just as important as a searching force; and it is very difficult to accomplish anything from the surface ship against an airplane attack, and that was very well recognized, and has been [1763] proved over and over again in this war. We had three aircraft carriers which could be used for this purpose, supported by the fleet, of course; other elements of the fleet. I am speaking now particularly of what did happen in an aircraft raid against Pearl Harbor. Of these three carriers, one of them was on the coast getting some repairs, and was going to ferry some planes out from San Diego; one of them was returning from Wake, having discharged some Marine fighters at Wake; and one of them was about 400 miles southeast of Midway, ferrying some planes up to Midway. They were not badly placed in case of an attack, as it worked out, provided we had had sufficient planes left on Oahu to do the job of locating the enemy.

There has been some misconception, I think, about the question of distant reconnaissance with surface vessels. I think it is generally accepted that proper reconnaissance against aircraft attack requires that the patrol planes run out to about 800 miles from Oahu, around a 360 degree arc, if you want a full coverage, and this will take about 84 planes, assuming a 15-mile visibility, for one day. Now, the periphery of that 800-mile circle is some 5,000 miles, and to put ships 30 miles apart, you can divide 30 into 5,000 and get the number of ships

that it would be necessary to place out there on that periphery. We didn't have enough ships to do any such stuff as that.

Furthermore, had they been placed on the periphery, it would not have been effective, because all the enemy had to do was to run by them at night and get inside the line; and then you would have nothing to back them up, because we didn't have any more ships. I just wanted to dispose of that as being too absurd to even think of. So we had left, as the only means of [1764] locating an enemy, planes, searching planes, and, of course, radar.

And in addition to the shortage in planes—you asked me about that—while I do not carry the figures in my head, my impression is that the Army had about one-third of the anti-aircraft guns that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, after a study, considered necessary.

73. General GRUNERT. Of course, we like to have 100 per cent of anything, but we never get to 100 per cent.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, no; that is true.

74. General GRUNERT. But that brings up this question: Was that which you had used to its capacity and to its limits, or was it not possible to use what you had for certain protection without getting a 360-degree protection?

Admiral KIMMEL. Certainly; it admits of no argument that if you send out one plane to 800 miles, you have covered something, but I have given you, up to the present, only a part of the picture. These were the forces available. That was the question that I was trying to cover.

Now, there are many other considerations. The principal one that arises at once is the question of personnel, the necessity for training personnel, from the fact that certainly the Navy was training personnel and shipping them back to the States, that we were constantly getting new personnel. That intensive training program was essential if we were not to have a fleet that was utterly impotent. I have been informed, and I believe firmly, that the Army had just as many troubles as we had, if not more. They brought pilots out there that needed training, and they were depleting their trained airmen of all ratings. [1765] and in the weeks immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, the primary effort for their Hawaiian Air Force, I think it is fair to say, was in ferrying planes to the Asiatic station, and they very greatly depleted their stuff.

75. General GRUNERT. To what extent, if you know, was General Short, as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, familiar with what you are telling us?

Admiral KIMMEL. With what?

76. General GRUNERT. To what extent was he familiar with conditions that existed in the Navy, which would affect his defense? In other words, what did he know about what you are telling us?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think he knew it all. I think he knew everything about it; and, as a matter of fact, as a part of our daily work down there, the available aircraft were reported each day to the Army, and the Army reported their available aircraft to the Navy. I mean the ones based on shore at Hawaii. That is, so far as the aircraft was concerned. I think that in our various conversations—and we had many and extended conversations on all phases of the business—we covered practically everything that I can think of.

77. General GRUNERT. Now, we take the other side of the picture.

Admiral KIMMEL. Of course, you know the difficulties, when you assume somebody knows something, and you don't mention it—and we all do that—but I don't think there was much of that, if any.

78. General GRUNERT. Taking the other side of the picture, how well were you informed as to the Army's deficiencies for [1766] a proper defense?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I was very well informed.

79. General GRUNERT. Was your staff well informed about details?

Admiral KIMMEL. Generally speaking, yes; I think they were. It is fair to say that they were well informed. As a matter of fact, I reported in a dispatch to the Navy Department, in the week before Pearl Harbor—I have got it here, somewhere or other—that there were just 6 B-17 bombers that were capable of flying, in Hawaii. I know I was familiar with that, because I reported it. I know, too, that I was quite familiar with the pursuit strength out there; and this proposal from the War and Navy Departments, supplied to General Short by the War Department and to me by the Navy Department, to relieve Marine units with Army units, both aircraft and troops, out on the islands, brought up in considerable detail what we actually did have there at the time; and, incidentally, there was a case where General Short got certain instructions, and I got certain instructions, and we didn't know exactly what they wanted us to do; but we ironed it out, and there was no disagreement betwixt us when we did iron it out.

80. General GRUNERT. I think the Board is pretty well informed of the actual conditions regarding materiel, personnel, and so forth, that existed at the time.

Admiral KIMMEL. All right, sir.

81. General GRUNERT. I would like next to develop the phase of what I call "intelligence", or information; and before we go into that, I think it would be well to take about a 5-minute recess.

(Brief recess.)

[1767] 82. General GRUNERT. Do you want to add something, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I wanted to say, in regard to the conditions that existed in Hawaii with reference to defense, that in January of 1941, early January, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson, a letter pointing out what he considered deficiencies in Army and Navy means for the defense of Oahu. The Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson, sent that in with a forwarding letter. This letter, I believe, was the basis of the letter which the Navy Department drew up and sent to the War Department, pointing out the deficiencies in Hawaii, as to defense, and the Secretary of War wrote an answering letter, to the Navy Department, in which he recognized these deficiencies and stated that the remedying of them was given top priority. All those letters I presume you have.

83. General GRUNERT. We have them. We have also had testimony on them. But the only new thing, or which appeared to be new, is what you said, is that the letter was based on Richardson's report. We did not know just what it was based on.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; it was based on Richardson's report; and I believe that Herron knew all about it and approved what Richardson was doing, and he sent in a parallel recommendation himself.

84. General GRUNERT. That brings up a point in the Roberts Commission report. You testified as to an inspection you made of the Pearl Harbor defenses in February of 1941, in which you stated that you were astounded at the then existing weaknesses, and that you pointed out the inadequacy of the antiaircraft guns, the obsolescence of land-based aircraft, and the lack of air- [1768] craft detectors. As far as that is concerned, did you communicate your views on that subject to General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think there is no question about that. If you mean in writing and formally, no. If you mean in conversations, yes; and he thoroughly agreed with me.

85. General GRUNERT. During the time from that inspection in February, 1941, up to, we will say, the latter part of November, 1941, did you know what corrective action was taken? Did you notice any improvement in what you had found before that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. Roughly, at the time I made that statement which you have referred to, the Army had no modern planes in Hawaii at all, none.

86. General GRUNERT. That was in February of 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. The antiaircraft guns were even fewer than they were on December 7, 1941. In the spring we made two trips with airplane carriers to bring pursuit planes for the Army to Hawaii. I think it was two trips; it may have been more. I knew by December 7, 1941, that they had approximately 100 effective pursuit planes in the islands. So that was an increase from zero to 100. In that same time they had as high as 27 B-17 bombers out there. I followed this very closely because I was very much interested in it; and as I have previously testified, you know we had just six effective ones on December 7th. They had a number of other planes in the Army at that time, that is, B-18's and A-20's, as I recall it. At any rate, I was informed that they were practically useless for offensive work, and they were so short that they could not get anywhere at sea, anyway.

87. General GRUNERT. Let us go into that. Did you know of [1769] the presence of a Japanese task force in the Marshall Islands, in the vicinity of Jaluit, between November 27th and 30th? If so, was this information transmitted to General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had radio intelligence, as I recall, of probably one or two Japanese carriers in the Marshalls. Along within this period—I do not remember the exact date, but it was only a few days before the attack—we also had information by which we thought we could place with reasonable accuracy all the Japanese carriers. I do not recall all the details, but I went over this daily with my intelligence officer, with my war plans officer, and with my Chief of Staff, and we made a re-estimate based on the new intelligence and took whatever action we thought was necessary. Practically every time that General Short came to my headquarters, which was on an average of two or three times a week throughout the time I was out there, I called in the intelligence officer. I had a great wall map in my office, and he gave us a little lecture on what the latest intelli-

gence was. That was done during the week of the 27th of November to 7 December, and we had a report from the Navy Department dated 1 December, 1941, which placed the Japanese carriers, the major part of them, in the home waters. I think I can read you from this report if I may.

88. General GRUNERT. Yes. We would like to hear it.

Admiral KIMMEL. This is the Fortnightly Summary of Current International Situations issued by the Office of the Chief of Naval Relations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, and dated December 1, 1941. It is signed by T. S. Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence. The portion which I am about to read is on page 9 sub-paragraph C, "The Japanese Naval Situation." [1770]

(Portion of Fortnightly Summary of Current International Situations is as follows:)

Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force not definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date, this task force, under the Command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships may also be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.

The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.

In addition to that, of course, there was a radio intercept unit to obtain combat intelligence in the 14th Naval District, [1771] directly under the command of the Commandant, 14th Naval District, and they reported to me what they obtained. There was another unit, the principal one, out in Manila, in the 16th Naval District, and a unit in the Navy Department.

89. General FRANK. In Washington.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. In Washington. These three units with their intercepts and summaries of information exchanged information, and generally the Navy Department made up a summary and sent it out, of their estimate, after having received the other two.

During this period the Navy Department directed the Commandant 16th Naval District, to prepare the summaries, and gave more weight to the 16th District than to the 14th District. We of course got all those and, generally speaking, they confirmed what was in this summary of December 1st. We had no reason to believe, from any intelligence we had, that the Japanese were going to make any air attack on Pearl Harbor, or even that any attack was going to be made on Pearl Harbor. While we had received these messages, all of our information taken together resulted in the action that we took, and there was no disagreement as to what we felt about the situation.

90. General GRUNERT. Do you believe that General Short was kept generally informed of all that you have told us?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

91. General GRUNERT. Was this stuff all highly secret?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes. This stuff was highly secret; and these secret matters about the enemy—we did not have any secrets from Short himself.

92. General GRUNERT. Did you judge what to give General Short, [1772] or did you give him practically everything?

Admiral KIMMEL. I gave him everything. I did not tell him anything about our plans for operation overseas. I gave him all the information which I thought would help him in the defense of Oahu.

93. General FRANK. How did you give him that information?

Admiral KIMMEL. Mostly by word of mouth, because that seems to me to be the safest way.

94. General FRANK. You gave it to him yourself?

Admiral KIMMEL. I gave it to him and, as I have told you, by the lectures in my office; and his staff officers consulted with mine. So far as the fleet plans of what we proposed to do were concerned, following the principle that the fewer people that know about any operations, the better off you are, he was not directly concerned and I did not tell him about those, and he did not inquire.

95. General GRUNERT. Skipping down to a question that I had in mind to ask, he probably had no definite interest in your plans as far as your responsibilities were concerned, except inasmuch as it might have affected his?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

96. General GRUNERT. When the task forces left Pearl Harbor to go out into areas to either maneuver or for any special task which would probably cover some of the area that would worry him for fear of an attack coming from that particular direction, was he informed generally about these task forces and where they were?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

97. General GRUNERT. But these task forces did not do what we [1773] call distant reconnaissance for the defense of the islands, did they?

Admiral KIMMEL. It is a fact that wherever they were and whatever they did covered the areas, and to that extent it was reconnaissance. The ENTERPRISE, under Admiral Halsey, went to Wake and was covered by aircraft all the way out, or patrol squadrons, in addition to scouting of their own, and they cut a swath across there, which was, in effect, a reconnaissance.

98. General FRANK. It was incidental to the operation of the task force, however?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

99. General GRUNERT. Primarily reconnaissance for submarines, for their own protection?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. When Admiral Halsey went to Wake we did not know what was going to happen to him. Wake was a considerable distance. Patrol planes were not a great deal of protection against submarines, and he did not bother about submarines particularly, because he had an escort of 9 destroyers around his three cruisers and aircraft carrier. He was looking for bigger game than submarines.

100. General GRUNERT. You evidently had some suspicion, if you sent a task force like that, that was well able to take care of itself. You thought they might run into something?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; we thought they might run into something. We were taking all precautions, always.

101. General GRUNERT. But you did not think that that something might come as far as Hawaii, or attempt to?

Admiral KIMMEL. Based on the messages we had and our interpretation of the messages and the information we had, we felt [1774] that they would not come to Hawaii. Otherwise we would have done something somewhat different. Wake, you know, is 2,000 miles to the westward.

102. General FRANK. You stated that your combat intelligence had told you that there was this force in the Marshalls?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is my recollection at the present time. I cannot be sure of that.

103. General FRANK. Which would put it in the vicinity of Jaluit. That force, in your estimate of the situation, was supposed to consist of some submarines and aircraft carriers. Did not that disturb you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; but we watched that very closely.

104. General FRANK. It disappeared, did it not, about December 1st?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I do not think so; not as I recall it.

105. General FRANK. I think we have some testimony before the Board that it went on radio silence and disappeared. If you were conversant with that, did not that cause you some concern?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes. But you must realize that in radio intelligence you cannot locate every ship every day. Throughout the year in which I was in command and conversant daily with the situation units would disappear for four or five or six days, and then they would come back again. That was something to be expected.

106. General FRANK. What is your explanation, to your own mind, of the reason for the presence of this Jap force at Jaluit?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought they were taking supplies of various kinds down there, planes, all manner of things, and deploying. I thought they were going to make an attack in south- [1775] east Asia and that they were looking to see that they were not going to be interfered with.

107. General FRANK. Will you state how you felt with respect to the possibility of a Japanese attack on the Hawaiian Islands at this time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, after reading all the messages and getting all the information it boiled down to an estimate by the Navy Department that the Japanese were on the move, and they included as possible points of attack the Philippines and Guam. Of course, Guam would have fallen at once.

108. General FRANK. This estimate was by the Navy Department in Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the message which came. It mentioned several places. Let me read the message to you.

109. General GRUNERT. The message of November 27th started out:

Consider this dispatch a war warning.

Admiral Kimmel (reading):

The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 only. Guam, Samoa, and Continental districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.

[1776] The first sentence is:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.

Everything else in this dispatch is a characterization of that first sentence, and it laid down in considerable detail where they expected the attack—that and succeeding messages which told of scouting on the Indo-China coast, the proposal to transfer planes and personnel to relieve troops on the Islands, and numerous other actions by the War and Navy Departments, including the stress on sabotage, guarding against sabotage in Oahu. It all led us to believe that the attack would probably be down in southeast Asia; that if they did attack the United States, it would be in the Philippines; and if such an attack were made in the Philippines it might be accompanied by some submarines in the area.

I have said that some time ago. I have tried to repeat just what I said before.

[1777] 110. General FRANK. What I was after was an explanation of how you arrived at a state of mind that led you to believe that you were at that time secure against a Jap attack in Hawaii.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I have tried to tell you.

111. General FRANK. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I might add that the decisions I made were my own. They were made after consultation with my staff and with my senior assistants, the senior commanders, those that were present; and that I have no reason to believe that General Short disagreed with any of these decisions or the conclusions.

112. General FRANK. The Army was sending planes, B-17s, into Honolulu from time to time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

113. General FRANK. What was happening to them?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you ought to get that from the Army, but I can tell you as well as I know. I am perfectly willing to do so.

114. General FRANK. They were being sent—

Admiral KIMMEL. You are talking now of the B-17s?

115. General FRANK. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. The B-17s were being transported to the Philippines, and they were going to the Philippines by way of Oahu, Midway, Wake, Port Moresby, and Manila.

116. General FRANK. Did the fact that those planes were going elsewhere and were not building up the force in Hawaii lead you to any frame of mind?

Admiral KIMMEL. The conclusion was inescapable that, if [1778] the War Department had had any real belief that Hawaii was going to be attacked, they would not have denuded them of B-17.

117. General GRUNERT. I want to go back to a little background on information which might or might not have influenced the state of mind early in 1941. Were you advised of the report of the United States Ambassador to Japan by telegram to the Secretary of the Navy on January 27, '41 (as contained in "Foreign Relations of the United States; Japan 1931-41," Vol. II, Department of State, Washington) reading as follows:

(Report of United States Ambassador to Japan (Grew) is as follows:)

"The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of Navy
(Paraphrase)

TOKYO January 27, '41—6 p. m.
(Received January 27, '41—8:38 p. m.)

A member of the Embassy was told by [name omitted] colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of "trouble" between Japan and the United States; that the attack would involve the use of all the Japanese military facilities. My colleagues said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic.

(Signed) GREW.

Did you in 1941 know anything about that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I had the substance of that sent to [1779] me. It arrived out there in, oh, I imagine somewhere in February of 1941, and it was sent by a subordinate in the Navy Department in a routine manner. There was no stress laid on it, and certainly if the Navy Department and the War Department took that seriously they didn't take the action to meet the attack that they could well have taken.

118. General GRUNERT. I think you have covered the question of cooperation quite well, unless some member of the Board wants to ask questions on the question of cooperation; but I want to bring it down to, say, two primary messages. One was this message you have just referred to which starts out, "Consider this a war warning," and the other was the Army message which apparently was sent as the same information passed to the Army as was passed to the Navy, although the two messages were worded entirely different.

Do you recall whether or not you had a conference on those messages with General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. I received the message of 27 November from the Navy Department in the afternoon in Hawaii, and I immediately sent that message: gave it to my intelligence officer and departed from the usual routine in order to get it to General Short.

119. General GRUNERT. Who was your intelligence officer?

Admiral KIMMEL. Commander Layton.

120. General GRUNERT. Layton?

Admiral KIMMEL. L-a-y-t-o-n.

And departed from the usual routine in delivering it in order to get it to him promptly. He was in the office, [1780] brought the message into the office to me. And while he was still in there General Short sent me the message which he had received from the War Department on the subject. I read it and gave him back the message. I didn't keep a copy of his message. As I recall it, I got the message from the Navy Department the next day, which repeated, as you say,

the substance of the message which had already been delivered to General Short. I knew that General Short had been directed to make his report to the War Department of the dispositions he had taken, and I knew that he had made such a report.

On succeeding days, the 28th—I don't get the dates; I have them in here somewhere (indicating papers)—we had a meeting and we discussed everything that had to do with these messages. We did discuss all phases of the situation and the steps that we should take. The discussion of the transfer of Army units to the islands involved in itself a discussion of the Japanese situation and what measures we should take, not only in Hawaii but in the islands.

121. General FRANK. You mean the Philippine Islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no. We were talking about the outlying islands when I spoke of the islands.

122. General FRANK. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I might clarify it here. The islands that I referred to were Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, Canton, and Christmas, and even down in—we were talking about Noumea and New Caledonia and Fiji and also Samoa; and how you can discuss movements of the troops to these islands without discussing the Japanese situation is beyond me. It couldn't be done, and we did discuss that and every phase of it and the [1781] warnings that we had received.

I don't know what else you asked for.

123. General GRUNERT. That covers it.

Admiral KIMMEL. What else?

124. General GRUNERT. That covers my question as to what conference you had and what was discussed.

Admiral KIMMEL. Does that cover the question?

125. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Now, in that discussion you understood, then, that the Army was going on Alert 1, for sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew the Army was on a sabotage alert, yes.

126. General GRUNERT. And under the circumstances did you consider that sufficient so that that would give you the protection that you needed while your ships were in the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, in the absence of an air raid, yes.

127. General GRUNERT. And evidently if you and General Short were satisfied with the Army and the measures taken, then there must have been a frame of mind that there would be no air raid?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, that is right.

128. General GRUNERT. So everything seems to be predicated on that frame of mind and the reasoning and the conclusions reached as to what might happen.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

129. General GRUNERT. Now, then, of course we know what did happen; but, had it been in your mind that an air raid might be possible, then that alert would not have been sufficient.

Admiral KIMMEL. In addition to what you have just stated, I knew that General Short had reported to the War Department the [1782] measures he had taken. I had every reason to believe that the War Department, who had much more information or was in a position to have more information than we had, was satisfied with what he had

done, and that went to add another reason why we thought that what we had done was all right.

130. General GRUNERT. Now, in order to make sure about this question of cooperation between the Commanders over there, I want to ask you an impertinent question.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I shall try to answer it.

131. General GRUNERT. Is it a fact that you and General Short mutually, whilst maintaining the utmost in cordial personal relationship, felt such a delicacy as to interest in one another's affairs that neither of you really got down to the details of your respective responsibilities and inquired into each other's business, so that there was a lack of true teamwork and cooperation based upon definite factual knowledge of exactly what was happening?

Admiral KIMMEL. That's a mouthful. I will answer that this way. I served for a great many years in the Navy. One of the things that I had observed was the lack of cooperation betwixt the Army and the Navy in the various theaters that I had served. I was Chief of Staff with Admiral Tom Craven when he was Commander of the battleships of the battle force, and he made every effort he could at that time to get some joint exercises on the West Coast, to get some joint exercises in the Canal Zone, and to get a joint exercise in Hawaii, and he was unsuccessful at every turn.

We went on a problem into Pearl Harbor, I think it was in '35, spring of '35, winter and early spring of '35, and we [1783] arrived off the entrance along in the middle of the night and steamed up and down in front of that harbor awaiting an entrance plan; and during the course of the night the Army turned searchlights on us. They were friendly, you see; we were entering our own port. They exposed us to the enemy.

So Admiral Craven got ahold of the Commanding General and twitted him with this business about how he had turned the searchlights on them. The Commanding General said he didn't know we were coming in, didn't know anything about it; and then he went to our Commander-in-Chief and he spoke to him about it. He said, "It is none of the Army's business when we come in."

I knew all this, and when I took command of the Fleet I decided I was going to cultivate friendly relations with General Short and to exchange information fully and freely with him.

He came to Honolulu a few days ahead of time and lived in a house out in town, and I went out in civilian clothes, and while he was still in civilian clothes, and called on him, and I told him then that I wanted to cooperate and do everything we could together. In that and succeeding conferences I took up the question of cooperation and coordination of our effort in Hawaii.

General Short responded as a man should, and our relations were always cordial, and we discussed all matters that had to do with a defense of Hawaii fully, frankly, and completely. To be sure, he did not inquire as to the organizations that I had in the ships, and I did not inquire as to the organization of his troops on shore. That was his job. He knew more about [1784] than I did, on the one hand, and I thought I knew more about the other than he did, and it was not where our paths crossed.

I feel that I was very well informed as to the condition of the defense of Hawaii as far as the Army was concerned, and I think he was very well informed as to the Navy. It was a question of details that I knew nothing about, and many details in the naval service are left to subordinates. I had to trust them, and did.

I think that constitutes an answer to your question.

Is that an answer to your question?

132. General GRUNERT. That is an answer.

Did that same cordiality of cooperation extend down through the staffs, as far as you know?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think it did. I am sure it did.

133. General GRUNERT. Was there ever any discussion or question as to the necessity of getting the staffs physically together with a view toward furthering each other's interests?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think they were physically together, and they were on the ends of telephone lines which they used freely and frequently.

134. General GRUNERT. Then, no such idea existed as, "Well, hell, that's their business. Although it affects my responsibility, that's their business. Therefore I won't inquire into it"?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I think less than in any place I have ever seen. And there was a certain courtesy which goes with all relations and must be maintained, and I think it was maintained.

[1785] You ask about that. I think it would be of interest to you to have an account of cooperation in training radar crews.

135. General GRUNERT. I was coming to it next.

Admiral KIMMEL. We had radar in four of five ships out there. It was brand-new in the Navy, but we got it a little before the Army got it on shore; and immediately we got it we told the Army about it; and they, knowing that they were going to get radar, wanted to put some men on the ships to send them to sea so that they could see radar operated and learn how to operate it, take lessons in it. For weeks there we had Army personnel on every ship that was equipped with radar, every time they left the harbor, and most of the time while they were in port too, and they learned a great deal about the only equipment of that kind that was available in the Islands.

Subsequently the Army obtained their radar, and along in August of '41 I had a letter from General Short in which he thanked me for the cooperation given him by letting his men go on the ships, and saying that he expected to have his radar in operation very shortly.

About the same time he wrote to me asking that I detail a liaison officer for radar. I replied to his letter and detailed my communication officer, Commander Curts, and told him he would be available for consultation at all times and liaison, and that was the last request I had for any liaison officer to be detailed to General Short.

Subsequently a Lieutenant Taylor—W. E. C. Taylor I think his name is—came to the Fleet, and he was a naval reserve officer and he had been in the Marines, in the British Navy, British Air Force, had quite a career. At any rate, he knew [1786] something about the operation of radar, and I think he knew more about the reception in the plane than he did about anything else. At any rate, the Army asked us to let him come over there and advise them. General Martin

requested it, as I remember, and so I sent him over on verbal orders to do anything he could to help. He worked with the Army in an advisory capacity in trying to get their information center—I think that is what they called it—working over there.

Of course I didn't follow his activities in detail, but I have since been informed that he did do considerable to assist the Army, and on 24 November he submitted a report to the responsible Army people, the Colonels in the information center, and I believe he stated that he had given a copy of his report to my operations officer. I had never seen it until just the other day. It was quite a good report. I do not know how sound the recommendations were, but he covered the situation very well, and it was his views on the situation.

I cite those things to show how we tried to work together and how we did exchange information.

Now, of course, any liaison officer required in the information center should have been supplied by the Commandant, 14th Naval District, rather than by the Commander-in-Chief. That was his function, to see that that was done, and my information, which I have no way of checking—at least I haven't checked—was that no specific request had been received for the detail of liaison officers up to December 7.

136. General GRUNERT. That was insofar as the information center of the air warning service was concerned?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

[1787] 137. General GRUNERT. But I believe that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District did have a Lieutenant Burr as a liaison officer with the operations section of the General Staff, did he not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes. I was talking merely of the aircraft warning.

138. General FRANK. A. W. S.

Admiral KIMMEL. Now, all of my remarks there should be restricted to the aircraft warning service.

139. General GRUNERT. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. And I do not know of my own knowledge what the Commandant, 14th Naval District, did, but that is what I have been informed.

140. General GRUNERT. As to this liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, with what we call the G-3, which corresponds to your Operations: was he considered both as liaison officer for you and the 14th Naval District, or just for the 14th Naval District?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would say that he was the liaison officer for the 14th Naval District primarily.

141. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. And I think that you should understand that the ordinary and most of the contacts betwixt the Army and Navy in Hawaii were headed up as between General Short and Admiral Bloch: that is, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and the Commander of the Hawaiian Department. The Commander-in-Chief was, theoretically at least, a bird of passage, and it was a fortuitous circumstance that I went ashore at all. The only reason I went ashore was that I could [1788] not house an adequate staff on board the ships, any ship without practically demobilizing it. My communication was much better when I went on shore than it was on a ship, and

I had much freer communication. Every time I cut loose on the ship it would lay it open to location by the radio direction finders.

That and various other considerations led to my going on shore. It was inevitable that while I was on shore certain of the decisions that had to be made as betwixt the Army and the Navy would necessarily have to be referred to me. At practically every conference that I conducted or that I attended with General Short, Admiral Bloch was present, and Admiral Bloch was primarily concerned with carrying out the decisions made there.

142. General GRUNERT. What prompted that question about Lieutenant Burr as liaison officer was something that came up in some former testimony to the effect that that liaison officer was supposed to transmit everything to the Navy that went on about the Army in which the Navy was interested.

[1789] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, of course, in the set-up, Admiral Bloch was responsible for keeping me informed of all his dealings with the Commander of the Hawaiian Department in which he thought I would have any interest or that it would be necessary for me to know. There were a great many things that he did with the Commander of the Hawaiian Department, that he never told me anything about, quite properly to.

143. General GRUNERT. Let us go forward with the intercepting command; and we included as one of its functions the Air Warning Service. I want to find out from you just what you know about that in the latter part of November and early in December, and what you thought of it as to its status and its ability to operate.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, at the time, I thought the aircraft warning service of the Army was probably somewhat better than it later proved to be. I knew that in the drills that we had conducted they had been quite successful in following the planes, and I recall that General Short, on one occasion, told me that he thought he could give us a coverage up to 150 miles and probably to 200 miles. This was just conversation. I didn't inquire too closely into it, because that was quite satisfactory to me; and if he could do that, that was, I thought, doing pretty well.

I knew that they were standing watches in the aircraft warning center to the limit of their personnel and equipment; and I knew that, even though I think now I had somewhat overestimated the capacity of it, I knew it was far from perfect and far from a finished product; but it was all we had, and I believed they were doing the very best they could with it.

[1790] 144. General GRUNERT. Did you know they were "standing watch," as you call it, only from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m., and that that was only for practice purposes?

Admiral KIMMEL. In detail, I didn't know just the hours that they were standing watch. The aircraft warning service was manned during most of the day. I had been informed of that.

145. General FRANK. Did you get the impression that it was manned most of the day just for training purposes, or for actual, effective operation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I thought while it was manned it was effective. Now, so far as effective operation is concerned, the aircraft warn-

ing service, I knew and everybody else knew, was in a state of infancy, and we couldn't expect too much of it.

146. General FRANK. You knew that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes. Why, of course!

147. General FRANK. You knew that it had not been formally activated to the point of where they were providing full-hour service?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I knew that on the many drills that we had had, they had manned this center, and sent out a lot of information and drill messages of various kinds.

148. General FRANK. Did you realize that, for them to have been operative, it would have been necessary for several different agencies like the Navy and the Civilian Defense and others to have had people on duty all the time at the information center?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I was talking about radar; and the information center, while it is a part of the system, it is [1791] not radar, but the information center is to use the radar information that is obtained.

149. General FRANK. That is right; but it all has to be integrated into a system, for any part of it to be successful?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it can be partially successful, even when it is only partially integrated. For instance, if a young man on the radar calls up and says he has got planes at such and such a place, that in itself is some information to him. Now, I agree thoroughly that to be fully effective it must be fully and completely manned.

150. General FRANK. Yes. You realize that it was not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; but the radar was different from the information center.

151. General FRANK. Yes, I know. We are fully conversant with that.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I know. I just want to clarify my position, that is all.

152. General FRANK. When did General Short make the statement that he could give coverage up to 150 miles?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I don't know. I couldn't give you that by line and date, to save my life.

153. General GRUNERT. Knowing what you did about radar and the information center, did you feel that, on December 7, that had let you down?

Admiral KIMMEL. Of course, I knew nothing about the receipt of any information at all in the Army radar, until the Tuesday, I think it was, following the attack; and when I found out that they had known where these planes came from and located within rather narrow limits the attacking force— [1792] yes, I felt let down, because that was the information we wanted above everything else. I have been informed that the Navy, Admiral Bellinger, and Captain Logan Ramsey, called the Army information center several times each, during this attack of December 7, and asked them if they had been able to locate the direction from which these planes had come, and to which they returned; and each time they were informed they couldn't get anything.

Then, when this information was reconstructed two days later, we felt that it was unfortunate that we had not had that information available.

154. General GRUNERT. I have one more question, then I will turn you over to one of the other members, to piece out.

It appears that one Raymond Coll, editor of a Hawaiian newspaper, was quoted by a Washington newspaper shortly after the submission of the Roberts Commission's report, on January 24, 1942, as having said, in substance:

General Short and Admiral Kimmel had made clear by their utterances before December 7 the probability and imminence of a Japanese attack at an early date.

Is there any basis of fact for that statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

155. General GRUNERT. As far as you remember?

Admiral KIMMEL. As far as I remember, no newspaperman quoted me to any such effect. In any event, I did not make any such statement. Now, the only possible basis that he could have had for such a statement was a speech which I made at the Chamber of Commerce meeting—that is, as far as I am concerned—at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, and I indicated certain measures [1793] that they could take in the islands which would improve things considerably, from our standpoint; and I forget the exact term. I think it was along the lines of "You might even have an attack, here." That was the sentiment. Other than that, I don't know of anything. And that was made in September, not in November.

156. General GRUNERT. General Russell, or General Frank?

157. General RUSSELL. I think you have explored most of it, Admiral. There are two or three details. In discussing the aircraft available to the Army and Navy, early in your testimony, I do not recall any mention which you made of the aircraft that were on the carriers. We have had testimony to the effect that the ENTERPRISE and the LEXINGTON had a complement of aircraft consisting of some 83 planes.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct. They were shy. They were short of torpedo planes, and they were short of fighter planes—every one of our carriers.

158. General RUSSELL. Let us count what we had.

Admiral KIMMEL. All right.

159. General RUSSELL. I believe we had 83 planes on each of those carriers?

Admiral KIMMEL. Something of that kind.

160. General RUSSELL. What type of planes were they?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were fighters and torpedo bombers. I think that is all—and scouts, yes—dive bombers, fighters, and torpedo bombers; that is right, isn't it?

161. General RUSSELL. To what extent were they effective as reconnaissance planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. To a very limited extent, probably a [1794] maximum of 300 miles. Halsey told me that he could send his planes out to 300 miles.

162. General GRUNERT. And have them come back?

Admiral KIMMEL. And have them come back. I said, "How far have you sent them?" He said, "I have never sent them out more than 200." That was long prior to Pearl Harbor. As to distant

reconnaissance, there was nothing in those carriers which was capable of distant reconnaissance.

163. General RUSSELL. They could have a maximum total flight, then, of from 400 to 600 miles?

Admiral KIMMEL. When they were armed and ready for action.

164. General RUSSELL. Well, were they armed and ready for action on these carriers, prior to December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; Halsey had them all armed and ready for action.

165. General RUSSELL. So this was a reconnaissance force which we did not mention earlier? This was a reconnaissance means that you did not mention earlier in the testimony?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, it wasn't a reconnaissance means. That is just what I have said.

166. General RUSSELL. They could go out 200 miles, and look, and come back?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, well, yes, sir; that is true; but I mean as bearing on the subject of distant reconnaissance in the Hawaiian Islands. They were practically useless for that.

167. General RUSSELL. What aircraft was being used by these task forces for reconnaissance, for their protection?

Admiral KIMMEL. Those. Those were the aircraft that were used for reconnaissance for their protection.

[1795] 168. General RUSSELL. Then that left some 50 aircraft based on Oahu available for reconnaissance from those bases?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes—long-range aircraft; that is right. Now, I think I should make it clear that the aircraft based on the carriers were not in fact available for reconnaissance, and to stick an aircraft carrier out into an area where you were expecting an attack of this kind as a reconnaissance force was just suicidal.

169. General RUSSELL. Let us go back to the question, then that was answered a while ago, and that seems to be departed from, now. What aircraft was used by these task forces that went on to Midway and Wake and those other islands, for the reconnaissance which was conducted by the task forces?

Admiral KIMMEL. The aircraft, as you framed the question, were those that were on the carriers; but in addition to the reconnaissance conducted by the aircraft on the carriers, we had the long-range patrol planes operating and covering the areas that they were traversing on the way out and back, and basing on Pearl Harbor, Johnston, Midway, and Wake.

170. General RUSSELL. That clears it up, for the first time.

Now, we had testimony here about some marine planes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

171. General RUSSELL. That is, as distinguished from the categories that you have already described.

Admiral KIMMEL. They were the Marine Expeditionary planes.

172. General RUSSELL. What was their reconnaissance capacity?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were about equal to the planes that go onto ships—the same thing, the same kind of planes that go onto the ship, the scout dive-bombers.

[1796] 173. General RUSSELL. In answer to a question by General Grunert, or General Frank, you stated that, once having located

the task force in the mandated islands—and I am not sure that you confined that answer to the Marshall Islands—you watched it rather closely. What means did you employ to watch it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the radio interception; that is all we had. Well, I said, "radio interception, that is all we had"—I am not now and never have been familiar with all the means available to the Navy Department in Washington.

174. General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, Admiral, if that Japanese task force was in the Marshalls, it was some 400 or 500 miles south of one of our positions—I believe, Wake Island—was it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. About 600 miles, something like that.

175. General RUSSELL. About 600 miles from Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, if you locate the task force at Jaluit, it is considerably more than 600 miles.

176. General RUSSELL. It would be 100 or 200 miles farther?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; that is right.

177. General RUSSELL. In other words, the situation was that we actually discovered carriers at Jaluit, and we had an operating base 600 or 700 miles away from there?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right; that is right.

178. General RUSSELL. And it came to pass that, if this Japanese task force left Jaluit, it traveled, by this route, or by Wake, for some 2,000 miles, and launched their air attack on Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

179. General GRUNERT. I think the upper one of those maps will you show you the location of Jaluit.

[1797] Admiral KIMMEL. Here is Wake, here is Jaluit, and there is Hawaii. This is not a scale map, but it gives you the general idea.

180. General RUSSELL. Now, while we are looking at the map, we had forces on Wake, and we had forces at Midway, and we had forces at Johnston?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

181. General RUSSELL. Let us assume, now, that the Japanese task force from which the carrier aircraft were launched reached a point 135 miles north of Oahu, and launched their attack on Pearl Harbor. Then they had to make their way through the open sea, through these outposts of ours, for a distance of approximately 2200 miles, to reach that point from which to launch their aircraft?

Admiral KIMMEL. More than that, if they were going to the northward—and that's where the Army says they found them—considerably more than that. I have no idea that they came inside of the 800-mile circle, when they were going up there, until they got ready to come in.

In other words, General, I cannot prove it, but I believe now that the carriers that took part in that attack came from Japan, they didn't come from the Marshalls, at all; and I have felt that the most probable direction of the attack, after it had taken place, was from the northward; and there are many reasons for that—many reasons for that. You have given a good many of them, already, yourself—that is, the outlying islands, and the fear of discovery if they came in from the south.

182. General RUSSELL. They had to pass through whatever screen of reconnaissance was set up by our installations?

[1798] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

183. General RUSSELL. That is, on the islands we have named; and by the barriers of the task forces that moved back and forth to these outlying islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. That is correct.

184. General RUSSELL. And you regard that as one of the principal reasons why they came from some other place?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. Now, my estimate at the time was, it was northward. I got information that they were to the south, which later I think proved to be wrong. "Bill" Halsey was in the operating area at the time—and he is good; always has been—he thought they would come from the south; but, there you are! I think, though, now, they didn't.

185. General RUSSELL. Let me ask you this: Is it true or not that there was considerable activity of hostile submarines in and around the Hawaiian Islands on the 7th of December, and two or three days thereafter?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, yes.

186. General RUSSELL. If it were brought to your attention and you were convinced that the commander of that submarine force which operated in that area was located down in the Marshalls, would that influence your thinking as to where the carriers came from?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

187. General RUSSELL. Not at all?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no. Those two forces could assemble in that area, coming from different directions, and could have arrived at specified points, or to be at the specified points at the time of the attack, and then operate from that on; and [1799] there is no particular evidence to show as to where the submarines came from. They could have come from any direction. When I say "any direction," they could have come either from Japan or from the Mandates.

188. General RUSSELL. About what was the speed of these carriers of the Japanese Navy at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I think the best of them, about 27 knots.

189. General RUSSELL. That is approximately 30 miles?

Admiral KIMMEL. A little over; adding $\frac{1}{6}$, 31 or 32 miles, or $\frac{1}{4}$.

190. General RUSSELL. Could they average that over a considerable period of time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I think so, long enough to make a 24-hour dash, or something of that kind.

191. General RUSSELL. If they came from Japan, they would have been on the open sea for about a week, would they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I estimated—and this was all part of it—if they came from Japan, they had to start at least two weeks, maybe longer, because when they made the attack, they had to be full of fuel, and they had to fuel at sea before they made the attack; and fueling at sea at that time of year and in those latitudes was a pretty difficult proposition; and I don't think that they came there and made an attack when they were empty of fuel, as they would have been after coming all the way from Japan; and therefore these fellows must have started, oh, I would say at least two weeks beforehand, considering all the things that I think they had to do.

192. General RUSSELL. If they had come out of the Marshalls, [1800] How long before that would they have had to start, to have made that attack on December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it is about 3500 miles from Japan to Oahu. From the Marshalls to Oahu approaching Oahu from the north and skirting the 800-mile circle, it would be about 3,000 miles. Those are offhand estimates. You see what I mean by skirting, do you not? They would have to keep out of the Oahu 800-mile circle.

193. General RUSSELL. Admiral, this testimony has been given on this question—and it is a matter of opinion—

Admiral KIMMEL. A good many of these things are.

194. General RUSSELL. Yes, sir; we have gotten opinions both from Army and Navy personnel.

If four Japanese carriers, each with a complement of 50 or 60 planes, or a total of from 200 to 250 planes, reached a point from which an attack on Honolulu could have been launched, say 125 to 150 miles out; having 150 to 200 aircraft available for that attack; do you believe that, with the defensive means available to the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor on that day defense could have been set up which would have been completely successful?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I think that every bit of evidence in the war indicates that, once an aircraft attack is launched, it is never stopped. I mean an attack in force, like that.

195. General FRANK. A determined attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. A determined attack; yes; and the only exceptions to that, that I know of, are the reports that came back from Saipan, where they practically annihilated the Jap force, with no damage to ourselves; but those were against moving targets; and certainly, with the defenses that we had in [1801] Hawaii at that time, we were going to be hurt somewhat if they drove in.

[1802] 196. General RUSSELL. Before we go away from the probabilities of Japanese action in early December: You did conclude that there were probabilities of attack against your forces by submarines?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; if they attacked the Philippines, if they attacked United States possessions, yes.

197. General RUSSELL. If war came you expected submarine attacks?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I expected submarines in that area.

198. General RUSSELL. Around Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

199. General RUSSELL. But you did not expect an air force attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; not at that time.

200. General RUSSELL. I want to ask you one or two questions about your letter. You did not write the letter of January 25, did you? You had not been on duty there?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it was a letter of January 11, was it not? There were two letters.

(Informal discussion off the record.)

201. General RUSSELL. I think your counsel has suggested what I wanted to know. He stated that you collaborated with Admiral Richardson in the letter which motivated the Secretary of the Navy in

writing to the Secretary of War and calling attention to the weaknesses of the defenses at the Pearl Harbor base.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not collaborate in the writing of this letter. Early in January a letter was written by Admiral Richardson, and that letter I knew about, although I did not collaborate in writing it. In the latter part of January another [1803] other letter on the same subject was written, and at the end of the letter it said, "Rear Admiral Kimmel, who is to be my relief, concurs in what I have said."

I think that was on the 25th of January.

202. General RUSSELL. As a part of the estimate of the situation, as stated in that letter, that the most probable form of attack on Oahu or the harbor would be a surprise air attack in conjunction with a submarine attack, the reference to the outstanding weaknesses of the defenses on Oahu related to this surprise air attack. Do you recall that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Which letter is that? 25 January?

203. General RUSSELL. I did not see your letters, and have not until now.

Admiral KIMMEL. You are talking now about the letter from the Secretary of the Navy?

204. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I did not agree to that. I have stated that I felt that the most probable form of attack out there was a submarine attack. I thought they might drop some mines. The mining was easily taken care of, because there was only a limited area in which they could plant mines effectively.

205. General RUSSELL. Do you have a copy of the Richardson letter here?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

206. General RUSSELL. Do you have a copy of any letter that came to the Secretary of the Navy in which the probabilities of Japanese action out there were described? What I am attempting to say, Admiral, is this: Do you know whether or not the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War set up a [1804] different probability from that contained in other letters?

Admiral KIMMEL. I could not state that from memory. At any rate, the probabilities set up in the Secretary of War's letter to the Secretary of the Navy, and of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, and of the Commander-in-Chief, are somewhat influenced by the needs of the situation, by what was needed to be remedied at the time, and trying to emphasize for all time the things that need to be done now.

207. General FRANK. A conclusion reached at any time depends upon the series of circumstances surrounding the situation at that time; is not that true?

Admiral KIMMEL. Exactly. The conclusion arrived at, in which I might concur in January, 1941, I would not want to be held to in November of 1941, under different circumstances.

208. General RUSSELL. Were not the probabilities that the Japanese would strike from the air the same in November as they were in January?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

209. General RUSSELL. What was different?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not necessarily. It all depends upon what the Japanese intentions were and what other employment they had for their aircraft at that time.

210. General RUSSELL. What evidence did you have of changes in their intentions between January 1st and November which might have made the probabilities of air attack less?

Admiral KIMMEL. We are considering now—at least I am—the probabilities of a specific time under specific circumstances. I have given you my estimate of that. To ask me what the changes were from the previous January—I do not remember exactly [1805] what the conditions were the previous January. If you mean the physical conditions of Pearl Harbor and such things as that, that is one thing.

211. General RUSSELL. Admiral, what occurs to me—and I am attempting to get at a rather big conclusion—is this: You have testified, and it has been supported by a line of evidence here, that there was not available to the Army and Navy any means for distant reconnaissance to ascertain the location of a Japanese task force.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

212. General RUSSELL. Prior to the time that it might reach a point, from which it could launch aircraft from carriers. That seems to me a conclusion that the witnesses agree upon. It has also been testified rather consistently that such a task force having reached the point from which aircraft could be launched, the attack could not be stopped. Hence the conclusion seems inevitable that there was not any way for the American force at Hawaii to prevent a very great danger to our installations there by aircraft attack from carriers on the 7th of December, 1941. Is that true?

Admiral KIMMEL. In general, I think it is.

213. General RUSSELL. If the success of such an attack was assured and the Japanese seemed to have known everything about the situation out there, why would they not have made an attack which had to be successful?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, of course, there are two or three answers to that. One is that the Japanese Air Force, I think, without question, was much more efficient than we had believed it to be. The attack was a well-planned and well executed at- [1806] tack. Another phase is that the greatest damage done there was done by aircraft torpedoes. We believed prior to the 7th of December that they could not launch an aerial torpedo in Pearl Harbor. We thought that the water was not deep enough. Our air service had not been able to do it; and we had received official information from the Navy Department which convinced us that it could not be done. We were wrong. The major part of the damage was done by such torpedoes.

So far as reconnaissance is concerned, we had plans for reconnaissance and could run reconnaissance of a sort, but in our estimate which had been submitted to Washington, and which was on file in both the War and Navy Departments, it was clearly stated that we had to know the time of the attack, within rather narrow limits, in order to have anything like an effective search, because we could not maintain a search except for a very few days. Then of course we were hoping to get more planes all the time, and we had been promised additional planes, patrol planes, and additional Army bombers, all of which were necessary for the defense of Oahu.

214. General RUSSELL. It occurs to me, Admiral, that we have gone over rather carefully all of those elements.

Admiral KIMMEL. I am talking about what we were basing our estimates on. The question of torpedoes is a very vital one, because that is where the major portion of the damage was done. If it had been a pure bombing attack I do not think it would have been anything like the same amount of damage.

215. General RUSSELL. Let me ask you this question: It occurs to me that your answer now as to the incorrectness of your estimate is based on your under-estimate of the capacity of the [1807] Japanese Air Force.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; a considerable part of it.

216. General RUSSELL. Where did you receive the information from which you made your estimate as to the capabilities of the Japanese Air Force.

Admiral KIMMEL. From all sources: The Navy Department, people who had been in Japan. It was all taken together, you might say, a resultant of many opinions.

217. General RUSSELL. Was the estimate made up by you and your staff in your official capacity, or was it sent out to you from the Navy Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. We got information from the Navy Department about it; but so far as the efficiency of the Japanese Air Force is concerned I do not think I can at present put my finger on it. I am merely speaking now of a general feeling, and I think that a good many people have testified to that feeling, that they had underestimated the ability of the Japanese Air Force, and that that was not confined to the fleet, by any means.

218. General RUSSELL. I think we are all agreed that we had a bad estimate, and we are trying to find out where it came from. That is largely the purpose of this. Before I go from that: I have asked some questions heretofore about our failure to know anything about what was going on in the Mandated Islands except by the radio intercept, which of course presupposes, to be at all effective, the existence of some elements of the Japanese forces there using radio on their part. What efforts were made, after you came into the command of the fleet out there, up to December 7th, to send people to the Mandated Islands to discover [1808] what the Japanese were doing.

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is that our orders were not to go anywhere near them.

219. General RUSSELL. From whom did those orders come?

Admiral KIMMEL. We wanted to go into the Gilberts to make some surveys down there and find out something about the Gilberts, and the answer was that we should not evince any interest in the Gilberts, because the Japs might find out that we were interested.

220. General RUSSELL. Do you know specifically where the orders came from to stay out the Mandated Islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. As far as I am concerned, they came from the Navy Department.

221. General RUSSELL. Do you have any recollection of any such orders?

Admiral KIMMEL. Any specific orders, you mean?

222. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the Navy Department restricted the Commander-in-Chief to a considerable extent. A movement such as that would have had to be approved by the Navy Department. While I cannot put my finger on it, I am convinced that no reconnaissance of the Mandates would have been permitted by the Navy Department at that time. The only time while I was out there that a reconnaissance of the Mandates was authorized was a proposal to send a B-24 over and do some photographing.

223. General RUSSELL. Could you look into that and present the information to the Board?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have nothing on it.

224. General RUSSELL. One more question, and then we will go [1809] away from the reconnaissance feature. Did you know as a result of your contacts with General Short that the maximum limit of reconnaissance of which any means available to him was capable ended at the extreme range of the radar? Do I make myself clear?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I think you mean that having turned over all planes capable of reconnaissance to the Navy, the only thing left to him was the radar. Is that right?

225. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I think that is correct.

226. General RUSSELL. So you knew, then, that when the Army's radar range of 130 miles was reached, beyond that the Army could discover nothing about Japanese movements and convey information to you, whatever the range was?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

227. General RUSSELL. So that the responsibility for watching the departure of Japanese convoys beyond that limit was the responsibility of the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew also that even if he had available all of his own planes he could not have gotten the necessary information from reconnaissance.

228. General RUSSELL. Admiral, I have had some curiosity about what was done with your radar as far as the ships in the harbor were concerned.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have been informed by experts, and knew at the time, that the radar on ships in port was virtually useless on account of the surrounding hills, and the towers and buildings in the Navy Yard, and we never made any attempt to use it, but depended entirely on the shore for radar informa- [1810] tion. Furthermore, radar properly mounted on shore, and high up, has much longer range than anything we could get, because one of the elements in the range of the radar is the height above the sea at which it is mounted.

229. General RUSSELL. Did the military people who came down to the ships while they were in the harbor to receive instructions in the operation of the radar receive instructions in the operation while the ships were there in the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. They went to sea. That is where they got their real instruction, but they played with it in port. While you can play with it in port and learn how to work it, the indications are erratic and unreliable, if you get any. I am not a radar expert, and you can run me up a tree very quickly on that.

230. General RUSSELL. Someone else will have to do that. I am not a radar expert, either.

I believe you stated that General Short on one occasion said that he could cover 150 to 200 miles?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

231. General RUSSELL. Did you interpret that as meaning that he was then giving you a coverage of that distance?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not at that time; no.

232. General FRANK. As a result of the success of the Jap attack you were prevented from employing your planes, were you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. To a considerable extent; yes.

233. General FRANK. You had some PBYS numbering about 50 that may have been used for reconnaissance had you not felt secure without using them, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Something of that kind, but we had a very [1811] difficult decision to make. We wanted to maintain our training status. Up to the last minute we had received no orders to mobilize. We had received these which were quite similar to the ones we had received previously, and we felt that we were entitled to further information, and even orders, before we changed our status. We felt that we must conserve what planes we had.

234. General FRANK. I have nothing more.

235. General GRUNERT. Has anyone any other questions? (No response). If not, I have only the following question:

Admiral, is there anything that you want to tell the Board now which may not have been said by you or not brought out by other witnesses in the hearing before the Roberts Commission, as to the Army, your relationship with the Army, or what may have influenced the Army decision?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean, any further statement that I have to make?

236. General GRUNERT. Any further statement or anything that you want to bring to the Board's attention that may assist it in getting facts or leads.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have a statement that I would like to make to the Board with regard to the information which was supplied to the two responsible commanders in Hawaii. We thoroughly considered all such information and took the action which we deemed appropriate. There was no disagreement between the Army and Navy, and none between me and my personal advisers.

Since Pearl Harbor information has come to my knowledge that vital information in the hands of the War and Navy Departments was not supplied to responsible officers in Hawaii; in [1812] particular, that the War and Navy Departments knew that Japan had set a deadline of 25 November, later extended to 29 November for the signing of an agreement, after which they would take hostile steps against the United States; that on 26 November an ultimatum was delivered to Japan by the United States. This was done notwithstanding a joint recommendation to the President by General Marshall and Admiral Stark that no ultimatum of any kind should be made to Japan. I had been advised of this recommendation and had received no qualification of that information. I had no knowledge of the delivery of the ultimatum to Japan on 26 November, 1941.

I am further certain that several days prior to 7 December, 1941, there was information in the War Department and the Navy Department that Japan would attack the United States and, very probably, that the attack would be directed against the fleet at Pearl Harbor, among other places; that there was information in the War and Navy Departments on 6 December, 1941, that the hour of attack was momentarily imminent, and that early on 7 December, 1941, the precise time of the attack was known. It was known at least three or probably four hours before the attack. All this information was denied to General Short and to me. I feel that we were entitled to it. I felt then that if such information was available to the War and Navy Department it would be sent to us. Had we not been denied this, many things would have been different. Had we been furnished this information as little as two or three hours before the attack, which was easily feasible and possible, much could have been done.

237. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions now that you have heard this additional statement? (No response.)

[1813] How about our counsel and recorders? Have you anything to suggest?

238. Major CLAUSEN. I have nothing, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I please have a transcript of my testimony when it is made up? I should like to request that.

239. General GRUNERT. I will take it up with the Department. I do not see any objection to it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Of course you will give me an opportunity to verify my testimony?

240. General GRUNERT. If you so desire. Tomorrow morning we are starting west.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is up to you, if you don't want me to verify it.

241. General GRUNERT. We are starting west tomorrow, and I do not know how soon the notes will be written up. I will talk to the Board and see whether or not there is a copy that can be sent to you to be verified.

Admiral KIMMEL. Thank you.

242. General RUSSELL. I would like to make this request, Admiral. With reference to the last statement which you made relative to information in the War and Navy Departments which was not sent out to you and General Short, under the division of the work of this Board which was made by General Grunert I have had considerable to do with investigating in the field which you have last discussed. Some of the things to which you have referred may become the subject of further investigation before the Board is through. I was wondering if we could get in touch with you after I have sufficient time to look at your statement as transcribed. It might come to pass that we would [1814] want the source of certain information referred to by you in your statement. Would you be willing to cooperate with us to the extent that we might be furnished the source of the information contained in your statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will cooperate to the best of my ability, in conformity with the restrictions which have been imposed upon me.

243. General RUSSELL. I will say, further, that my failure to develop a line of questions or to interrogate you was largely the result

of a feeling that there might be some parts of that about which you would not want to testify freely if I questioned you at this time. I hope you will consider the matter and that we may get in touch with you again.

Admiral KIMMEL. All right. Thank you, sir.

244. General GRUNERT. We thank you for giving us of your time, Admiral.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day, and proceeded to other business).

[1815]

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[1816] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

TUESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1944.

PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Friday, August 25, 1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President, Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry T. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL F. L. MARTIN, UNITED STATES
ARMY, RETIRED.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General MARTIN. Major General F. L. Martin, Retired. My present address is 401 North Bolling Green Way, West Los Angeles, California.

2. General GRUNERT. Now, General, you probably know what the Board has been appointed for. We are after facts and background and viewpoints and leads that will give us facts about the attack on Hawaii. So we hope that in view of your former assignment in Hawaii you will be able to help us.

Now, I am going to skip around and ask a number of questions [1817] about a number of things in order to piece out here and there other testimony we have had; and after the Board gets through asking questions, then if you have anything else that you wish to offer we shall be glad to hear it.

Are you familiar with the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan?

General MARTIN. Well, of course, you understand, General, it has been nearly three years ago since I have seen that.

3. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General MARTIN. I know all about it, because it was formulated at the time that I was in command of the Hawaiian Air Force, now the 7th Air Force.

4. General GRUNERT. Do you recall your Joint Air Operations Agreement?

General MARTIN. I can state as to my memory as to its provisions, that the searching was to be done by the Navy, calling upon the Army

at such time as they needed additional assistance. The coast line, that is, contingent to the Island of Oahu—reconnaissance over that area was to be conducted by the Army.

5. General GRUNERT. Now let me ask you a few questions, and then if I do not bring anything out you may add anything you want.

First, was the Army charged with the tactical command of defensive air operations over and in the vicinity of Oahu?

General MARTIN. For the defense of Oahu, yes, but if the targets were located at sea the Navy had control of the mission, would assign the mission and call on the Army for such bombardment as they felt was necessary.

[1818] 6. General GRUNERT. Now, under the Joint Air Operations Agreement, were all concerned well aware of this agreement and their respective functions under that?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

7. General GRUNERT. Was the agreement lived up to?

General MARTIN. Well, it was not on the morning of this attack on Pearl Harbor, because there was no call made upon us for any assistance whatever.

8. General GRUNERT. What tests and exercises did you have that were held under this agreement?

General MARTIN. Will you please repeat that?

9. General GRUNERT. What tests and exercises did you have under that agreement in practising for it?

General MARTIN. We had a number of exercises where targets would be sent out by a small task force, and they would tow what they call a slick sled. The slick sled would be bombed by components of the Hawaiian Air Force under the direction of the Navy. These exercises were never a great distance from our base, not to exceed probably 100 miles.

10. General GRUNERT. From the time the agreement was reached up to the time of the attack, about how many exercises had been held under that agreement?

General MARTIN. You have reference to the full compliance with the joint agreement between the Army and Navy?

11. General GRUNERT. Yes; whenever the Army and the Navy got together in any test or exercise. About how many such exercises had been held?

General MARTIN. I would not say that we ever had had a full compliance with the agreement. The only opportunity the [1819] Army Air Forces had of entering into a joint exercise with the Navy was these exercises that I have described where they would tow these slick sleds in rear of a cruiser or battleship. They would have out a task force that would have in it destroyers and the cruisers and battleships. We would make an attack upon the slick sled. They would train their gunners on board, but as to actual firing at any targets that we had, we did not have them, but we would drop practice bombs on the slick sleds.

12. General GRUNERT. Now, I understand that for tactical air fighting over the land all fighting aircraft came to the Hawaiian Air Force, whether it was Army, Navy, or Marine; and for work at sea the bombers and long-distance reconnaissance craft went to the Navy.

General MARTIN. That is correct; yes, sir.

13. General GRUNERT. Now, was that practiced? Did they ever call out all you had for practice, so as to get in the habit of doing what the Navy told them, or did any of the Navy and Marine ever come to you for practice?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. We had one particular maneuver in which the Navy and Marine fighters joined with the Hawaiian Air Force for the purpose of such an exercise.

14. General FRANK. When was that?

General MARTIN. Oh, that was about May, I think, in '41. I cannot remember the exact dates. Unfortunately, General, I have no record of the files that are in the 7th Air Force, which was formerly the Hawaiian Air Force, or the Hawaiian Department.

15. General GRUNERT. Are those files on record in Hawaii?

General MARTIN. They should be, yes, sir, and I just have to trust to memory here as to the statements I am making, which you may find not to be exactly correct, but they are correct so [1820] far as my knowledge is concerned.

16. General GRUNERT. All right. Now, did the Navy conduct distant reconnaissance regularly?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir, they did. They had task forces out, of which we had no knowledge. They were secret task forces. They were out of communication even with their home station so far as we knew.

17. General GRUNERT. You say that was distant reconnaissance?

General MARTIN. Well, by task force, the Navy—

18. General GRUNERT. You mean just because the task force covered an area you thought they were having distant reconnaissance in the defense of Hawaii?

General MARTIN. Well, they had some patrol boats that went out on what was called the early morning mission. They left at approximately 5 o'clock in the morning. But there were only two or three of those that went out on patrol duty.

19. General GRUNERT. What were they supposed to do? Do you know?

General MARTIN. They made a reconnaissance in that particular area. Of course, you know how much of a reconnaissance two or three ships can make, nothing to amount to much.

20. General GRUNERT. How about air reconnaissance?

General MARTIN. That is air reconnaissance I am talking about now.

21. General GRUNERT. You are talking about that.

General MARTIN. Now, they had task forces out at various and sundry times, no regular intervals, that went out. As to what they did, I cannot say, because I didn't know anything about it excepting they did have them go.

[1821] 22. General GRUNERT. Now, are you sure that these patrol boats that went out were not to just cover the task forces that were going out about that time?

General MARTIN. I cannot give you any accurate information as to what the Navy did when they had their task forces out.

23. General GRUNERT. Now, did we have an inshore patrol?

General MARTIN. Nothing more than the airplanes that were flying in the vicinity of Oahu that were always on the alert for enemy submarine.

24. General GRUNERT. Were they armed?

General MARTIN. No, sir, no more than they would be for the normal performance of a mission. That is, they usually went up, performed gunnery missions at the same time. So they were armed with that: they had their guns and ammunition, but not for a regular combat mission.

25. General GRUNERT. Then, any reconnoitering they did was incidental to their training; is that right?

General MARTIN. It was incident to the training of a day, and not as a well-organized reconnaissance for the area.

26. General GRUNERT. They just happened to observe what they could see in their training; is that right?

General MARTIN. Well, a little more than that, General: They were instructed to observe that area at all times.

27. General GRUNERT. They were just looking for subs; is that the idea?

General MARTIN. Looking for submarines, yes, sir. There was no other danger from any other source than submarines in the immediate vicinity of the island. That only extended just four [1822] or five miles offshore.

28. General GRUNERT. So that, as I understand, your understanding is that the task forces went out, and apparently they covered certain areas of the sea; and outside of that, as far as you know, there was no distant reconnaissance by the Navy?

General MARTIN. Excepting for the two or three patrol boats that went out each morning.

29. General GRUNERT. Did you know where they went?

General MARTIN. No, sir, I do not.

30. General GRUNERT. Did you think that in any way covered a defense against an air raid?

General MARTIN. No, sir. I complained to Admiral Bellinger about the lack of patrolling that was being done.

31. General GRUNERT. What did he say?

General MARTIN. Well, he said, "This is all that I have. This is all I can put up."

32. General GRUNERT. But you actually complained about the lack of it?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. I told him that I was not at all satisfied with the amount of patrolling that the Navy was doing in so far as covering the area was concerned.

33. General GRUNERT. Now, do you recall your air agreement with Admiral Bellinger, that is, of the 31st of March, '41, the Joint Air Operations Agreement?

General MARTIN. Very well; yes, sir.

34. General GRUNERT. Was General Short well aware of that agreement?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

35. General GRUNERT. Did he approve it?

[1823] General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

36. General GRUNERT. Now, in there there was an estimated possible enemy action, and you stated the "high probability of a surprise dawn attack." Now, that was in the mind of you airmen at the time you drew up the agreement?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

37. General GRUNERT. Now, what was done to avoid such a surprise attack that you people thought was highly probable?

General MARTIN. Well, nothing more than what I stated. The search of the area was in the hands of the Navy.

38. General GRUNERT. Now, there were Addenda 1 and 2 to that plan. Addendum 2 to the Agreement described the various states of readiness by the Interceptor commander using recently-installed equipment and controlling operations from his central board.

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

39. General GRUNERT. That was just a theory at that time, then, was it?

General MARTIN. Well, it was more than that, because it actually had been used and practiced.

40. General GRUNERT. Well, that seems to indicate the existence of the Interceptor Command with an installed air warning service and a control board as of September 20th or prior to November 17th. But did you actually try that out during that test?

General MARTIN. Well, here is what happened with reference to the establishing of this control. The location for the station was temporary. The permanent location was to be under ground, and this was being constructed, and there were perma- [1824] nent locations for these five instrument stations, and there were permanent installations to be made, but the engineers had not completed those sites. So the five reporting stations were in temporary locations, and the Department Commander would not turn those over to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Forces until he had completed the training under his Department Signal Officer. He refused to turn them over until he considered they were properly trained. So they were still training under those conditions and not been turned over to the Air Force the morning of the attack on December 7th.

41. General GRUNERT. But you had an exercise somewhere around November?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

42. General GRUNERT. 17th to 22nd?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir, about that time; I don't know.

43. General GRUNERT. Now, at that time the air warning service, such as it was, and the control board operated, did they?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

44. General GRUNERT. Then they were capable of operating?

General MARTIN. They were capable of operating. The personnel was being trained for the operation of the equipment. The temporary stations were located, the temporary control station had been located, and the equipment used primarily in the training of personnel to take over the operation of the control area.

45. General GRUNERT. Now, when was the Interceptor Command actually activated as a part of the Department setup in full control of the Interceptor Command; do you know?

[1825] General MARTIN. I couldn't give you that date, General; I don't remember.

46. General GRUNERT. It was not prior to December 7th? It must have been afterward; is that right?

General MARTIN. It was set up and the men were being trained for, I would say, possibly a month prior to the attack on December 7th. Now, that is just an estimate. The actual time should be a matter of record in the Hawaiian Department.

47. General GRUNERT. Now, let us consider just prior to the attack, from late in November. Were you in on a conference between General Short and Admiral Kimmel after General Short received the Chief of Staff's message of November 27th?

General MARTIN. Well, as to the exact date, I do not know, but I was at a conference with Admiral Kimmel and General Short at about that time. This was after General Short and Admiral Kimmel had had a conference with reference to information that they had.

48. General GRUNERT. What did they discuss at that conference?

General MARTIN. I do not know as I could tell you definitely, General, just exactly what was discussed.

49. General GRUNERT. Mollison was with you, wasn't he?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir, he was.

50. General GRUNERT. Well, do you know whether they discussed what interpretation to place on these messages received from Washington and what action they should take? Do you know whether that was discussed or not?

General MARTIN. Well, no doubt it was, but as to the subject matter under discussion at that particular time, it is very hazy in my mind. We were discussing the different possi- [1826] bilities under the instructions that had been received from the War Department by General Short and from the Navy Department by Admiral Kimmel.

51. General GRUNERT. Do you recall that the message to the Navy started out by saying, "Consider this a war warning"?

General MARTIN. No, I do not remember that statement being made.

52. General FRANK. Did you see the message?

General MARTIN. The only messages I saw were, as I remember it, two that came to General Short which he showed to me. One was something to the effect that no overt act would be committed by the Army; that is, the first overt act would not be committed by the Army. And the next, the other one, as I remember it, was something in connection with preventing undue publicity with reference to his preparations for the defense of the island becoming known to the public.

53. General GRUNERT. Were you present at the discussion or was there discussion that you know of concerning what form of alert General Short should take under these warnings?

General MARTIN. Well, as to whether this occurred at a conference or whether it was just General Short and myself talking, he did discuss with me the type of alert that he felt was appropriate.

54. General GRUNERT. You say he did or did not?

General MARTIN. He did, under the circumstances, and his estimate of the situation was that under the conditions and the information that he had his danger lay within the population of the island and that he was going to order Alert No. 1, which is concentration for protection against sabotage and internal up- [1827] rising. That seemed to be correct and in keeping with the information we had at the time.

55. General GRUNERT. Did he ask your advice on what alert to take, or did he tell you what he had taken or what he decided to take?

General MARTIN. I cannot say as to whether he asked my advice. General Short and I usually just discussed these things as man to man. He made the decision. I had an opportunity to present my viewpoint.

56. General GRUNERT. Then, you concurred in his decision?

General MARTIN. I didn't see any more danger from attack than General Short did, that is, from a surprise attack with the information we had.

57. General Grunert. Did you concur with him that it would be all right to have your planes concentrated and not dispersed?

General MARTIN. Of course, I never wanted to concentrate my planes, but we had practiced these different alerts, Alerts No. 1 and Alert No. 2, and they were concentrated under Alert No. 1 for protection against sabotage. We did not have the manpower to effectively protect them in dispersed position. That was the purpose of concentration. Under Alert No. 2 we had them dispersed in dispersal areas at the different airdromes. As to whether it was Alert No. 1 or Alert No. 2 was just a question out of the estimate of the situation. Now, as to how seriously General Short and I discussed the necessity of using Alert No. 1 or Alert No. 2, I am not capable of saying at this time, but I will say that I always had the liberty of discussing these matters with General Short.

58. General GRUNERT. You tell me you did not like to have [1828] your planes concentrated. Did you object to having them concentrated?

General MARTIN. I don't think I made any serious objection to him about it, because at the time that the alerts were decided on, as to what they constituted, I explained to him the danger of always pulling your ships in if there was any opportunity of attack from the air, and we weighed all of those things against the possibility of their being defended in a dispersed area, and on account of the large number of men that would be required they were brought into concentrated areas when alert No. 1 was in vogue.

59. General GRUNERT. You then put it on the question of shortage of personnel. Was there such a shortage of personnel?

General MARTIN. There was so far as I am concerned, General. I was charged with the defense of the airdromes with the air personnel, and I could not give it.

60. General GRUNERT. How much more personnel would it have taken if you had dispersed them instead of having them concentrated, approximately, in percentage?

General MARTIN. As a rough estimate, it would take about four times the men than we had. You see, these were around the perimeter of the field, and both Wheeler and Hickam Fields, which were two large stations, covered considerable area. We discussed the matter of having high fences around the areas. There was a high fence around part of the area at Hickam Field, but not the entire area. This was considered to be too expensive, as we were still having trouble getting funds for some of the things that we considered very essential, and to properly protect the planes in a dispersed area would take a large number [1829] of men.

61. General GRUNERT. Had there been any evidences of sabotage?

General MARTIN. No.

62. General GRUNERT. But you were all sabotage-minded; you were all afraid of it?

General MARTIN. Absolutely.

63. General GRUNERT. If they had taken Alert No. 2, wouldn't that have covered sabotage also?

General MARTIN. No. The greater danger was from the air and not from internal sabotage. The opportunity for sabotage would probably have been prevalent under either type of alert.

64. General GRUNERT. I want to find out what went on in your minds to convince you that defense against sabotage was sufficient to protect you after you had had these warnings?

General MARTIN. A large per cent of the population there was Japanese. As to how loyal those who had been there for the second generation would be, no one knew.

65. General GRUNERT. Suppose you had been on Alert No. 2, couldn't you have been just as well protected as far as they were concerned?

General MARTIN. General, there is no question if you are going to be attacked from the air that you must not have your planes concentrated. Regardless of what other threats might have been, the controlling factor is the fact that you could not have your planes concentrated at the time they were going to be attacked from the air.

66. General GRUNERT. That is what I want to get at. Here you make an estimate and you almost dope out just exactly what the Japs did, but when the time comes, and you get warning, you [1830] apparently forget your estimate and go to sabotage. I cannot understand what went on in the topside here.

General MARTIN. All I can do is to say this: All these things had been considered. They had not been overlooked. You come back to making a final decision. Which is it going to be? They are almost diametrically opposed to each other. And the decision was made by the top commander that his greatest danger lay in the sabotage and the uprising that might take place on the islands themselves. They didn't have guns. We didn't know what they had in the way of dynamite and other explosives. It was hoped they had little or none. But in making the decision he was governed largely by the information he had from the War Department as to what he might expect. There was no indication whatever on the part of anyone that he could expect an attack from the surface of the sea or the air on the Hawaiian Islands.

67. General GRUNERT. That is what he was out there for, was it not?

General MARTIN. That controlled his decision to the point where he decided there was no danger from the air, that his only danger was from the ground.

68. General GRUNERT. When Alert No. 1, the sabotage alert, was called, did you then telegraph to the various airports to tell them to carry out sabotage Alert No. 1 and concentrate their planes?

General MARTIN. We had communication with all of our air stations. We had both teletype and telephone and telegraph.

69. General GRUNERT. Now, in discussing the matter with General Short, after which he made his decision to go on Alert No. 1, and you as his air force commander well knowing there was [1831] no competent distant reconnaissance that would cover the areas, how do you then justify your agreeing with him that Alert No. 1, sabotage,

would probably be the best thing to do? You knew there was no air reconnaissance to cover you from the outside. Therefore, you had no knowledge of what might come in from the sea, and if you had taken Alert No. 2 you would have covered both your air defense and your sabotage; but still you concurred on the sabotage alert only. It does not seem to make sense, unless you have some arguments back of it. I am just trying to get facts. I am not blaming you or anyone else.

General MARTIN. Let us cover the reasons. Let us say we had not been attacked from the air and we were under Alert No. 2 and the attack had come from within. We would have had all our ships dispersed in the dispersal areas. Then the embarrassment would have been almost as great as it was before, because you are not prepared to defend them in the dispersal areas. They could have been destroyed by little hand grenades or any sort of a crudely-constructed bomb or fire, or anything of that nature by a few individuals. A few individuals could destroy each one of the areas if properly dispersed, and the whole thing would go up in smoke. We could be just as severely criticized for having them in that position as we were when the attack took place from the air instead of from the ground. So the choice is, which is the greater threat, and as the Department Commander made his decision, which I think was correct, on the information he had, and I subscribed to it, that the defense should be made from sabotage and internal uprising.

70. General GRUNERT. You subscribed to it because you thought there was more danger from sabotage if they were dispersed than [1832] if they were concentrated?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

71. General GRUNERT. And in concentrating them, you put them practically wing-to-wing, or overlapped them, where, if a fire started, you could not get them out to save your neck.

General MARTIN. Well, they are not serviced or are not armed when in that condition. That was one of the conditions of the alert.

72. General GRUNERT. Did you have any evidence as to any actual danger from sabotage, outside of your knowing that a great number of Japanese nationals was part of your population?

General MARTIN. No, sir; and as far as I know there has been none since the islands were attacked.

73. General GRUNERT. It was just that bugaboo of a possible chance?

General MARTIN. That was in the minds of all of us, that we could expect trouble from that source.

74. General GRUNERT. Did you know whether or not these sources of explosives had been checked and guarded and one thing and another? What gave you the impression that there might be individuals who would have explosives to make individual bombs for sabotage purposes? Do you know anything about that part of it?

General MARTIN. No, sir, I do not, because our G-2 activities were under the Department itself.

75. General GRUNERT. When I mentioned the message of November 27th from the Chief of Staff you seemed to recall just the things about "Let Japan commit the first overt act; don't alarm the public; don't show your intentions." You recalled those [1833]

things, but do you recall this part of the message: "If hostilities cannot be avoided, the United States desires Japan to commit the first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense?"

General MARTIN. Yes, I knew that that was in there.

76. General GRUNERT. Evidently at the time that course of action taken to guard against sabotage was not considered as jeopardizing the defense of the island?

General MARTIN. It was not so considered. General Short informed me that the War Department was thoroughly advised of the action he had taken. He had no criticism from the War Department as to the action he had taken in reference to putting the troops under Alert No. 1. We had had a maneuver just before this and, as I recall, we went directly from the maneuver into the alert and remained on there, but for what period of time I do not recall now. However, we had been on Alert No. 1 for some period of time before the attack took place.

77. General GRUNERT. After the attack, then they took the extreme alert, No. 3, didn't they?

General MARTIN. We started to make that disposition without any orders whatever, as soon as the attack took place.

78. General GRUNERT. How long was that kept up, that No. 3?

General MARTIN. I cannot tell you.

79. General GRUNERT. When did you leave?

General MARTIN. I got my orders on the 8th of January. As I recall, I left the 13th or 14th of January.

80. General GRUNERT. 1942?

General MARTIN. 1942; yes, sir.

[1834] 81. General GRUNERT. Then it was kept up at least from December 8th until January, when you left?

General MARTIN. I was relieved of duty part of that time; about December 15th, I think.

82. General GRUNERT. What I am getting at is this: If you could do it afterward and you took the chance against sabotage, you could have done it before. You had personnel enough to do it afterward, didn't you?

General MARTIN. There is a difference there. It had been actually demonstrated that we could be attacked from the air. Therefore, your greatest menace then was from such an attack.

83. General GRUNERT. Still you demonstrated to yourself when you made your estimate that you could be attacked from the air.

General MARTIN. General, when you make an estimate of a situation you consider all things that may happen. Then you come down to your decision and weigh one against the other, and finally your decision is predicated on what is more probable to happen. Your decision is going to be contradictory to some of the other points in the estimate you make.

84. General GRUNERT. Now, when you make an estimate and say this is the most probable thing that is going to happen, then why not be prepared to meet the most probable thing that is going to happen, instead of taking something way down the scale? It does not look consistent. Here you make an estimate and you seem to hit it right on the nose as to what actually did happen, and then when the time

comes you pay no attention to that. You say, "I am afraid of sabotage."

General MARTIN. You will have to consider, General, what information was being received. I do not know actually what [1835] the Navy received. I do know a part of what the Army received, because those things that it was essential I know were told to me by General Short, or he let me read the messages. From the information he had, he was not of the impression they were alarmed about an attack on the Hawaiian Islands.

85. General GRUNERT. Suppose you had no information at all, then what?

General MARTIN. That is a little bit different.

86. General GRUNERT. Then what are you out there for? You are there as an outpost, aren't you?

General MARTIN. Absolutely.

87. General GRUNERT. Then you ought to be prepared to meet anything that may happen, isn't that right?

General MARTIN. You can put it that way.

88. General GRUNERT. And you made an estimate as to what was going to happen and then along came additional information. This message did not say anything about sabotage, the message on which the decision was made, did it?

General MARTIN. You mean the estimate of the situation says nothing about sabotage?

89. General GRUNERT. No; this decision that was made on the Chief of Staff's message said nothing about sabotage.

General MARTIN. No, it did not.

90. General GRUNERT. And the decision was made, on this Chief of Staff message, to go into a sabotage alert?

General MARTIN. I cannot recall the chronological order of dates and circumstances in their exactness. All I can say to you is that that decision was based upon what was considered to be the logical thing to do at the time. Now, it happened [1836] that the estimate of the situation as to what was the most probable thing to guard against was exactly correct. It could have been the exact opposite of that and the thing the Department Commander prepared for was exactly what would have been correct. It so happened it was not.

91. General GRUNERT. If you had had no information from the War Department or from the Navy Department, what would have been the thing to do to protect yourselves?

General MARTIN. I think that requires a lot of thought before you make that decision.

92. General GRUNERT. All this requires a lot of thought. That is what we are here for.

General MARTIN. Why should I have to make that decision now?

93. General GRUNERT. You don't have to. I am not attacking you. I am trying to develop something so as to get ideas and thoughts as to what was back in your minds while you were in Hawaii in making your decision. Anything I say here, do not take as personal, because I do not mean it that way. I just want to develop the subject to see if we can find out what happened in the minds of the command out there. So we beat all around the bush and occasionally go right through it to try to get some reaction.

General MARTIN. Let us go back please. Assume that this attack had not taken place and we are making this decision without the information that they could do it. All the best minds out there, including Commander Browning, whom General Frank knows quite well—

94. General GRUNERT. Of the Navy?

[1837] General MARTIN. Of the Navy. Had pondered this question; General Street, then a Lieutenant Colonel, and various other individuals, from every conceivable viewpoint before that was written. The probability of that taking place was considered the best opportunity the Japanese had. As to its possibility, it was very, very doubtful that anything so hazardous would occur, because if it failed, it meant such a reduction in their striking power that they would be confined to their own home waters from then on. We felt as though it was just too much of a risk for them to take. These task forces were out. Very little information was coming in from the War and Navy Departments. I am sure, having no knowledge of a possibility of an attack taking place, other than it was probable that it could take place, those things affect you in making a decision. Why should I disperse my aircraft and get prepared for an air attack, when in all probabilities, under existing and present circumstances, my threat is going to come from within the population, the Japanese population of the islands? No, it is very hard for you under those circumstances, this attack having not been demonstrated that it could be accomplished, to say that it will be accomplished and my all-out effort must be to ward that off, when something is right there under your nose that is full of dynamite. I am afraid that is going to have a very marked influence on your decision. It did for us.

95. General GRUNERT. You did get some information through the Navy and from the Chief of Staff that war was impending. The message that went to the Navy started out with the word, "Consider this a war warning." Then in this message from the Chief of Staff, of the 27th, it also gave intimations of a hostile at- [1838] tack; and you people still thought that sabotage was your biggest immediate danger, is that right?

General MARTIN. General, I do not believe that you can read into those messages any specific warning that you can expect attack from the surface or the air. The possibilities for those things, of course, are always in our minds, but the average opinion was very vague as to there being an actual attack, as I recall it.

96. General GRUNERT. Did you expect the War Department to tell you what to do all the time, or just give you certain information on which to use your judgment as to what to do?

General MARTIN. We wanted information on which to exercise our judgment. The decision had to be made by the Department Commander there as to the defense of the islands.

97. General GRUNERT. Let me read you the dispatch received by the Navy, which they were instructed to transmit to the Army. This was the dispatch of November 27th from the Navy to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or a paraphrase of it: "Consider this dispatch a war warning." If you are given a war warning, what do you expect to do?

General MARTIN. Aren't you reading a Navy dispatch, General?

98. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General MARTIN. I have no knowledge of that. As to whether General Short had it, or not, I could not say.

99. General GRUNERT. That was the next thing I was going to bring up. Outside of the November 27th dispatch from the Chief of Staff, did General Short keep you informed of other messages received through the Navy or otherwise, or is that dispatch of [1839] the 27th from the Chief of Staff the only one you knew of?

General MARTIN. As to the things received through the Navy, I could not answer it, but as to anything else, he considered I should have knowledge of, he very probably gave me the information, so far as I know.

100. General GRUNERT. Then you do not know about this dispatch? I will read it to you to make sure of it.

Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46 only. Guam, Samoa, and Continental districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.

You do not recall ever having been made acquainted with that?

General MARTIN. General Short got something similar to that. I have some of that information, but not all.

101. General GRUNERT. General Short got the message of the 27th we have just been talking about and which reads as follows:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities [1840] that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as to not, repeat not, alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

That appears to be the counterpart of the other message.

General MARTIN. I do not recall the text of the message you read that the Navy received, but from some source I received the information, I believe from General Short himself, that anticipated a move might be made down through the East Indies and French Indo-China or in that direction.

102. General GRUNERT. In other words, you thought that they would hit far out first and not hit you?

General MARTIN. We had no idea they were going to make this bold attack from the sea. It was possible. And that possibility had been weighed, but we thought it was too much of a risk for them to take.

103. General GRUNERT. When you weighed that possibility in your estimate, you concluded it was highly probable, but when it came to actual conditions you concluded it was highly improbable; is [1841] that right?

General MARTIN. Circumstances cause you to change your mind.

104. General GRUNERT. Now, what was it that Washington said or did that caused you people to elect sabotage instead of an air attack as your biggest danger? It was not any particular thing that Washington did, was it?

General MARTIN. No, I would not say it was anything that Washington did that decided us on Alert No. 1. With the number of carriers we thought the Japanese had, we felt they would not risk that number of carriers that we felt they had to bring up.

105. General GRUNERT. You did not think they had the nerve to attempt such an almost suicidal attack?

General MARTIN. That is right.

106. General GRUNERT. And if you had been on Alert No. 2, would it have been successful, in your opinion, or do you think you could have caught them?

General MARTIN. No, General; we never had enough equipment to stop them. We could have prevented them from being so successful, but not to have stopped them.

107. General GRUNERT. Could you have knocked out those slow-moving torpedo-bombers?

General MARTIN. You might knock out some of them, but you are not going to get all of them, because they had too many for the forces we had.

108. General GRUNERT. Of course, it is like every other situation, you cannot tell what you would have done, but at least you would have been in the air and you could have prevented a lot of what was done?

General MARTIN. It would not have been so severe; no [1842] question about that.

109. General GRUNERT. About this reconnaissance referred to in that directive of the 27th, it said "take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary", or words to that effect. What did that mean to you?

General MARTIN. The observation and patrolling around the coastal areas, so far as the Army was concerned, were very alert. They were looking for submarines that might be in the shallower waters or taking shelter from the conformation of the islands in different parts of the areas in the islands. That did not extend out to sea to any large extent, although we were sending training missions right along to the small islands south of Oahu and others to the northwest, that is out about five or six hundred miles, for the training of navigators and of the crews for these long missions over water. All of those were always on the alert for anything that might be suspicious.

[1843] 110. General GRUNERT. What could this inshore aerial patrol do in the line of or for the defense of Hawaii?

General MARTIN. It did nothing more than to give information as to any suspicious looking objects under the water in that area or that might be on the surface.

111. General FRANK. To whom?

General MARTIN. For submarine.

112. General GRUNERT. That was patrolling for submarines, to the Navy?

General MARTIN. In that area for submarine.

113. General GRUNERT. But that was for the Navy purposes, wasn't it?

General MARTIN. That was for the Army too.

114. General GRUNERT. What were subs going to do to the Army defenses?

General MARTIN. Well, we were charged with the defense of Pearl Harbor.

115. General FRANK. To whom did you give the information if you got it?

General MARTIN. Oh, that would come directly to the Air Force headquarters and then on to the Department: go to the Department, the Department would give it to the Navy. They would communicate in that respect.

116. General GRUNERT. Did you ever find any subs?

General MARTIN. No, never found any.

117. General GRUNERT. But what could subs near to the Island do to the Army defenses of Oahu?

General MARTIN. Well, the joint agreement was that they were to have charge of the reconnaissance of that particular [1844] area within the immediate shore line of Oahu for—

118. General FRANK. Who was?

General MARTIN. The Army.

119. General FRANK. Yes.

General MARTIN. Yes, and of course that comes on down to the air forces.

120. General GRUNERT. You did it under that agreement?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

121. General GRUNERT. But as far as the actual Army defense of Oahu was concerned, what danger were subs to you?

General MARTIN. Well, there would be no gain excepting our mission was to defend the Navy Yard; that's all.

122. General GRUNERT. And they could get within distance to shell the Navy Yard, could they?

General MARTIN. No, no; it wasn't considered that they might shell the Navy Yard, but they would have been in position to lurk in there to attack ships of the Navy, carrier or capital ship, anything that they wished to consider targets.

123. General GRUNERT. Then, it was really defense for the Navy?

General MARTIN. And for such observation as they might make in putting up their periscope; that was all.

124. General GRUNERT. This message says, "Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary." Now, was any additional reconnaissance ordered, or did the Commanding General not consider any additional reconnaissance necessary?

General MARTIN. Well, the reconnaissance around the shore line was increased when they went into alert.

125. General GRUNERT. Increased?

[1845] General MARTIN. That was very definitely increased in the vicinity of the Island.

126. General GRUNERT. Sabotage alert? Increase it?

General MARTIN. We did have a very direct concern about the activities of submarines, but we didn't have any feeling that they were going to take the gamble of attacking from the surface.

127. General GRUNERT. As a matter of fact, the Army was sabotage-minded, and the Navy might be classed as submarine-minded; does that about cover it?

General MARTIN. Well, I think you are apt to give a wrong impression to others if you use that statement. You might say, from the testimony we have given here, that that is true. I would not say that we were absolutely sabotage-minded and submarine-minded.

128. General GRUNERT. But at least it was uppermost in your mind?

General MARTIN. I think it would be dangerous to convey that thought because that isn't quite true. We had considered all these other things. Now, what we actually did would indicate that what you said is true, but it also indicates that we cast aside serious consideration for these other things that actually did take place, which is not true.

129. General GRUNERT. You were not satisfied with the distant reconnaissance being made by the Navy?

General MARTIN. Oh, no; I knew it was not sufficiently complete.

130. General GRUNERT. And you complained to Admiral Bellinger, did you?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

[1846] 131. General GRUNERT. About when was that? Late in the game or early in '41 or late in '41, or several times?

General MARTIN. No. I did it on two different occasions. I did it shortly after I went over there and then specifically along in August after we had submitted a scheme for the reconnaissance and protection of the Hawaiian Islands from the air that had been worked out by my staff and had resulted from a CPX we had had in the spring of 1941 after I arrived there in November in 1940.

132. General GRUNERT. Was that orally or in writing?

General MARTIN. Sir?

133. General GRUNERT. Were those complaints oral or in writing, or what?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. You will find a copy of it in the Army Air Force headquarters and in the War Department.

134. General GRUNERT. Then, we ought to find in Hawaii, when we go there, at least two letters from you complaining against the inadequacy of the distant reconnaissance?

General MARTIN. In writing? I thought you were talking about this plan for the defense.

135. General GRUNERT. No, no. Your complaints to Admiral Bellinger.

General MARTIN. I don't know whether you will find them in writing or not. You should, but whether you do or not, I won't be able to say.

136. General GRUNERT. Rather you think probably, it was oral, do you?

General MARTIN. Sir?

137. General GRUNERT. You think probably you just talked to him about it in complaining?

[1847] General MARTIN. Well, I know I did that.

138. General GRUNERT. Which might be nothing—

General MARTIN. It is possible it was in writing too, because it was a subject of considerable moment.

139. General GRUNERT. But if there are copies of those things they would be in the Hawaiian Air Force record?

General MARTIN. Yes; if it is in writing it should be either in the—it should be in the Air Force files or——

140. General GRUNERT. Well, now, you say there was a lack of these patrols. You knew they were not covering you outside. Was that discussed when you decided to take the sabotage alert and not go to the air alert?

General MARTIN. Why, of course.

141. General GRUNERT. But you discounted that because you didn't think the Japs had the nerve or the equipment to pull anything like that; is that generally the idea?

General MARTIN. We just felt that it was too much of a gamble in the beginning for him to take.

142. General GRUNERT. Now, how about your air fields? They do not appear to have been properly protected by taking necessary measures to protect themselves.

143. General FRANK. From what point of view?

144. General GRUNERT. From the idea of protection of personnel, from having air raid shelters designated, from having places where persons could jump into a slit trench, and having machine guns set up against possible air attack. Now, those things, most of them, appear to have been done after December 7, but how much was done prior to December 7?

General MARTIN. Well, there was quite a bit had been done prior to December 7. The plans were made as to the distribution [1848] of the airplanes at the airports. The dispersal positions had been revetted and slit trenches put in at Wheeler Field. The dispersal positions had been selected at Hickam Field. The revetments had not been constructed because it was considered—now, whether I am quoting correctly or not, but it was my understanding that the Department had requested this and the War Department turned it down as being too expensive. Now, it may be——

145. General GRUNERT. What was that?

General MARTIN. The revetments for the bombers at Hickam Field. It may be that those revetments were turned down in the Department as being too expensive for the amount of funds that he had. It was one place or the other, but they had been refused after having been requested. The fields that were being constructed on the other islands had provisions for shelter for at least one guard company at each one of these stations.

146. General FRANK. What kind of shelter?

General MARTIN. They were the theater-of-operation type, excepting down at Morse Field; they were a little more permanent there, a part of that construction.

147. General GRUNERT. None of that is protection from an air attack?

General MARTIN. No, no, excepting as to concealment. The effort was made to put them in among the algarroba. Any other protection that might be available on the edge of the airport, and also they were staggered in and placed in lines and streets: more to represent a little native town than anything else.

[1849] 148. General GRUNERT. Most of them in the line of camouflage?

General MARTIN. Oh, they weren't strictly camouflage, but an effort was made to make them as inconspicuous as possible without—

149. General GRUNERT. Which, in a form, is camouflage so as to make it fit in with the scenery: that is camouflage.

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. That is, at Barking Sands the roofs were green very much like these buildings here, and they were among the algarroba, which were green all the year round.

150. General GRUNERT. How about setting up machine guns to be prepared in case an air attack came?

General MARTIN. The machine-gun pits were at various points around Hickam Field and also at Wheeler Field. Remember, General, your Alert No. 1 pulled the anti-aircraft in from these positions. The anti-aircraft had dispersal points throughout the island. And Alert No. 1 pulled them in from those positions into their home posts, so they were not in those positions the morning the attack took place.

151. General GRUNERT. That seems to be the trouble: Alert No. 1 did everything that should not have been done.

General MARTIN. Absolutely.

152. General GRUNERT. That is, in the light of what we know now.

General MARTIN. Yes, sir; that is correct. It did exactly the opposite of what the dispersal should have been to meet the attack that took place.

153. General GRUNERT. But I still do not understand how after December 7th we appear to have had plenty of personnel to do [1850] all this dispersion and take care of that in addition to sabotage, but they seemed to blame the sabotage on the drain on personnel—why you came to that conclusion.

General MARTIN. General, we had already been stung. We knew it could be done. The improbability of it was a thing of the past. The probability of its happening again was quite dangerous.

154. General GRUNERT. Now, you made several remarks here to the Roberts Commission that I just want to call your attention to.

General MARTIN. I want to make one comment with reference to something I said before the Roberts Commission which I mentioned to General McNarney afterward, and he said, Well, he didn't think it was of sufficient importance to come back before the Commission and prove it. Admiral Standley showed me a copy of the Navy order which embodied parts of the estimate of the situation here that I didn't recognize, and I told him that while these things had been discussed, so far as I knew, that I had not seen that paper. Well, I had not seen the paper, but it was an extract from the estimate of the situation which we have been discussing right here, and that is the only thing I know of that is in error with reference to the testimony I gave.

155. General GRUNERT. General Russell.

156. General RUSSELL. I have only two or three things.

General, as I understand your testimony there was no complaint of an inadequacy of ships available to the Army to conduct this close-in reconnaissance: aircraft.

General MARTIN. Now, wait a minute. I am not following [1851] what you are saying.

157. General RUSSELL. The mission of the Army in connection with the defense of Oahu was to conduct the close-in reconnaissance?

General MARTIN. There was no objection to our doing it?

158. General RUSSELL. No. Was that your mission?

General MARTIN. It was assigned according to the joint agreement.

159. General RUSSELL. All right. Now, did you have sufficient aircraft to conduct that?

General MARTIN. Oh, yes, for close reconnaissance. Goodness, you go around the island in just a few minutes.

160. General GRUNERT. Was there any definite plan for conducting this close-in reconnaissance?

General MARTIN. As to whether you will find an operation order in the operation files at the 7th Air Force that says how this will be done, I cannot say. It was being done by everyone that went out on a mission. That was a general understanding, that they were always alert for these specific things that might be an indication of the presence of the enemy, particularly under water. We thought he would be spying upon us, because they would send submarines into that area to detect the movements of the Navy, of the Fleet.

161. General RUSSELL. Then this reconnaissance was conducted as a part of some other mission?

General MARTIN. Normally, yes.

162. General RUSSELL. Do you recall ever having sent out any Army aircraft for the specific and sole purpose of conducting this close-in reconnaissance?

[1852] General MARTIN. I can't recall specifically that that was done. We had an observation squadron there, you see, that you will find in their files, I am sure, specifically assigned to some missions for them. Now, as to the making of that, I wouldn't know.

163. General RUSSELL. Yes.

General MARTIN. They were given general instructions that this was a part of their duty. It was a part of the duty of the bombers and fighters as well. They all had the same responsibility for observing the area in which they were flying.

164. General RUSSELL. General, your testimony or your evidence as given in reply to General Grunert's questions indicated a rather close relationship between you and the Department Commander, General Short.

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

165. General RUSSELL. Were your transactions with him quite frequent or infrequent?

General MARTIN. No; I would say they were quite frequent. If I had any business to transact on which it was necessary to get his decision, I would ask permission of his Chief of Staff to have an audience with him, which was always granted at as near the time I had requested as was possible for him, and he would call on me quite often to come into headquarters to discuss different matters.

166. General RUSSELL. When did you go out there?

General MARTIN. I reported for duty there the 2nd of November, 1940.

167. General RUSSELL. Was the Department in a condition of alert when you arrived?

[1853] General MARTIN. No, sir.

168. General RUSSELL. Were you informed when you arrived that the Department had been on an alert?

General MARTIN. No, sir.

169. General RUSSELL. That year?

General MARTIN. Oh, I think there had been some sort of a maneuver or something of that kind. As to being alerted, I didn't have any knowledge of that, don't remember of anything of that kind. I won't say that they were not.

170. General RUSSELL. Were you, or not, conscious of the fact that the relation between the American Government and the Japanese Government grew more tense from the time you arrived until the attack on December 7, '41?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir; that is right. That is correct. Had full knowledge of that.

171. General RUSSELL. You had full knowledge of that?

General MARTIN. Yes.

172. General RUSSELL. How did you acquire that knowledge?

General MARTIN. Well, I acquired it through the press relations and through information that the Department Commander gave me.

173. General RUSSELL. Then, the Department Commander and you were agreed that the relationship between the Japanese and American Governments was growing more tense through the year 1941?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

174. General RUSSELL. Was there anything occurring on the Island itself which would lend color to this growing tenseness between the two Governments?

[1854] General MARTIN. No, there was none, no indication of anything on the Island that would cause unnecessary suspicion, although the G-2 section of the Department was unusually alert and they were searching for information as such a large percentage of the population were of Japanese descent or native Japanese, natural Japanese, that they felt that it would be almost impossible for them to ferret out all the things that might be taking place. So there was naturally cause for great concern as to what this great mass or large percentage of population could do that would be harmful to us.

175. General RUSSELL. In the fall of 1941 or in November, to limit the period a little more, in middle and late November of 1941, what were the conclusions reached by you and the Department Commander as to the probable imminence of war with Japan?

General MARTIN. We thought it quite probable.

176. General RUSSELL. When you went on Alert No. 1 as of late November, were you and the Department Commander, insofar as you knew his thoughts, impressed that war might begin at any day or at any hour with Japan?

General MARTIN. I think that is a little bit further than we considered. The probability of war, yes. And when you say "the probability of war," it is apt to break out at any particular time. The fact that it was going to break out within the next month or two, as far as I am concerned, I will say I did not think that it would. I felt that the Japanese were anxious to accomplish or to gain and hold what they had, rather than to bring additional trouble on their shoulders.

177. General RUSSELL. Yes, sir. Well, do you know, General, whether or not the opinion which you have just expressed as to [1855] the imminence of war at that time was entertained also by the Commanding General of the Department, General Short?

General MARTIN. All I can say is, he discussed it with me, and the information he had, which indicated that the negotiations were not progressing as they had expected.

178. General RUSSELL. Yes, but you are not able—

General MARTIN. And they were getting at the critical stage.

179. General RUSSELL. I understand, then, that you are not in a position to give any too clear a picture of General Short's thought about war at that time.

I will ask you this, General: Do you think that in the estimate of the situation, upon which the order for Alert No. 1 was issued, the probability or improbability of immediate war with Japan played any part?

General MARTIN. You mean to say as to probability of immediate war taking place with Japan being given consideration at the time Alert No. 1 was decided?

180. General RUSSELL. And affecting the order.

General MARTIN. I don't think there is any doubt but what it was considered.

181. General RUSSELL. General, suppose that a conclusion had been reached by you that war with Japan was likely at any hour: would you have thought then that Alert No. 1 was sufficient?

General MARTIN. Yes, under the circumstances that I stated to General Grunert. You weigh all the information you have available to you. One counters another, and it is up to the Department Commander and his assistants to make a decision as to what he thinks is the greatest set to him. Under the circumstances and the information that was available to him at [1856] that time I felt that his decision was correct.

182. General RUSSELL. Whether war came or not?

General MARTIN. Yes.

183. General RUSSELL. General, in the discussion by General Grunert of the—

General MARTIN. I would like to add something right there, sir, in addition to the question.

184. General RUSSELL. Very well.

General MARTIN. I feel that our decision was influenced to a certain extent by the fact that the Navy was patrolling with task forces in waters of which we had no knowledge. Now, as to what areas they were covering, we did not know, but it did affect a decision as to the paramount danger coming from within rather than from without.

185. General RUSSELL. You didn't know where they were? You didn't know where they went to, did you?

General MARTIN. No.

186. General RUSSELL. Whether north, south, east, or west?

General MARTIN. No, sir; they didn't tell us.

187. General FRANK. Did you have confidence in the effectiveness of these task forces?

General MARTIN. Well, not complete, no, but—

188. General FRANK. But? But what?

General MARTIN. Well, but what, I don't know what I was intending to say. I was going to say: the task force, not knowing as to where it had gone or not knowing what information it had that would indicate that it should go certain places, I couldn't answer the question.

189. General FRANK. But you just said that the fact that the [1857] Navy had task forces out influenced your decision.

General MARTIN. Well, I am sure that it did.

190. General FRANK. Well, why did it?

General MARTIN. Well, if there was anything so large as a task force of proper size to make a successful attack against the Island on the ocean, I just had a feeling that the Navy, in the spreading of their task force to pick up information, would contact it in some way.

191. General FRANK. Therefore, you had confidence that the Navy was conducting task force operations that would furnish you a certain protection?

General MARTIN. That is right.

192. General FRANK. And because of that feeling of confidence in the Navy to do it, you felt a certain security?

General MARTIN. That is perfectly true. Now, as I stated a moment ago, we were not completely satisfied with the way this reconnaissance was being done, because there wasn't enough in the air, and your reconnaissance from the air would extend over a larger territory in the limited amount of time, and that was the thing I was complaining to Admiral Bellinger about. There wasn't sufficient air reconnaissance, but we did have a feeling that the task forces going out were going out with the specific purpose in mind of conducting reconnaissance of the waters in that vicinity. As to where they went, I didn't know.

I am sorry to interrupt, but I just wanted to bring out that point.

193. General RUSSELL. Well, you were not the one that interrupted, General.

I want to talk to you about what General Frank has injected here, this question of confidence in the Navy, not [1858] from a reconnaissance standpoint but from a defensive standpoint. You seem to have some idea, for an air force commander, General, about naval operations, of the task forces necessary to support this air attack, and so forth.

What was your feeling about the ability of the Navy based on Pearl Harbor to destroy such a task force before it could launch the planes from the carriers, assuming that the Japanese task force was discovered in time?

General MARTIN. I felt the Navy was strong enough and the task forces were strong enough to be such a threat against any concentration excepting the entire Japanese fleet, which I didn't think they would ever contemplate sending, that it would be a very decided deterrent to the Japanese ever sending a task force into that area. They were strong enough to have defeated any except a very unusually strong and well constituted task force with plenty of capital ships in it, because they had capital ships and they had cruisers, a goodly number of destroyers, submarines, and the other lighter ships essential to the protection of the capital ships and carriers. There were four carriers that were in and out at various and sundry times which could have been a part of any task force.

194. General RUSSELL. There were four carriers? Now, I didn't get the full import of that.

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. I say "in and out." Now, there were the Hornet and the Enterprise and the Yorktown and the——

195. General RUSSELL. Oh, that is out.

196. General FRANK. Lexington.

General MARTIN. Yes, Lexington.

[1858A] 197. General GRUNERT. Four of our own carriers?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

Now, as far as we knew, the Japanese—all the information we had was that the Japanese had about eight fairly good-sized carriers and probably about the same number of converted carriers, and the naval forces that were then in the Hawaiian Islands were perfectly competent of taking care of any normal task force that might be sent against them. It was a question of their finding them.

198. General RUSSELL. Now, General, this final question: Earlier in your examination you referred to the fact, when asked about means available to you to have intercepted and destroyed this air attack—

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

199. General RUSSELL. You made reference to that and stated that before you left you wanted to discuss that.

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

200. General RUSSELL. And I would like to ask you to discuss it now.

General MARTIN. Well, I would like to do two things: I would like to make just a general statement as to conditions, and then I would like, if I may, to read extracts from personal letters I have written to General Arnold on the subject, so you can see the thing was being discussed at the time. And I'll admit I didn't get any very definite answers with reference to how it was going to be corrected, but it had been under discussion for some time.

When I took over from General Frank in the Hawaiian Islands we had, you might say, no combat equipment. We had some P-26s, an old obsolete type of fighter which we then [1859] called a pursuit airplane. We had some old observation planes, some B-18 bombers which could never protect themselves in any combat at all. They could be used for reconnaissance, but you would lose them as fast as you sent them out, if they went into combat. They were always recognized as not being a combat ship.

In the spring of 1941 we received possibly 50 P-36s. They were obsolescent at the time they came over. A little later—as I remember it, about May—we received some P-40 fighters. These ships were brought in on carriers and flown off to the station after they arrived in Hawaii. About May we received 21 B-17s that were ferried over by air. 9 of these, about the 5th or 6th of September, were transferred to the Philippines by air.

The 12 remaining were ordered to proceed to the Philippines; and upon our request that they be delayed that we could continue the training of combat crews for that type of ship, as the two bombardment groups at Hickam Field would be equipped with that type of airplane, they would go on the tail of some 60-odd airplanes that were being transferred from the mainland to the Philippines. At the time this attack took place the preparation of these 12 B-17s for transfer to the Philippines had progressed to the point where 6 of them were on the ground with fuel tanks being replaced, in which we found some deterioration; engines being replaced so that they would have the requisite amount of lack of time on the engines that they would be sure to be in a position to function properly in transit. The types of ships which could have been used in combat, which is the P-40, B-17, and 10 A-20s, were always possibly 50 percent out of commission due to spare parts. In the beginning of our production program [1860] all monies, as possible, were placed into the

producing of additional engines, and the spare parts requirements were neglected at the time. Therefore, the new airplanes coming out were deficient to meet the requirements of spare parts.

We had sent cablegrams and letters on the subject of spare parts through proper channels to our supply agencies, and they were not in a position to help us. I knew that, but I did want them to be sure to realize how important it was to improve the spare-part situation as rapidly as possible. If we had an accident in one of our ships, we used what they call cannibalism to rob it of certain spare parts to repair other ships.

Now, that was directly forbidden by regulations, but the situation was such that I knew that I would be always justified in taking such action. They were never destroyed in any way but what the parts if received could be put back in and the ship put back into commission again. But even the taking of a part from any part of the airplane or engine was forbidden as far as our regulations at the time were concerned.

Now, as to information we may have that you may find in the files, I am sure you will find plenty of it explaining this situation, the exact time when these airplanes were received, and the efforts we were making to train combat crews. The type of airplane we had was entirely different from the type we were receiving. Therefore the training program had to be rather extensive for the fighters. We were receiving men just out of the schools, who had not had advanced training at the time: that is, a limited advance training but not on any of the modern equipment. So they were put through a [1861] demonstration of their ability to handle the old, obsolescent P-26, then through the P-36 and on to the P-40, and considerable progress was being made in training these men to take over the P-40 equipment.

201. General FRANK. How about the bombers?

General MARTIN. The bombers, as soon as we got B-17s, in I think it was some time in May, we had a few of our pilots that had flown the B-17s. They started training others, and as I remember there were one or two officers remained with the first flight of bombers that came over, and helped train other additional crews. So they had to train the pilots to operate the ship, the co-pilots and all other members of the crew. We had no knowledge of repairing its engines or any of its equipment. We had schools because the schools on the mainland—the technical I am talking about, now—had not progressed to the point where they could meet the requirements. In other words, they had consumed some of their own fat, so to speak, to meet the enlargement of the technical school facility. We were getting but a few technically trained men.

I inherited from my predecessor certain schools which were in being, and others were established afterwards to give radio, engine mechanics, airplane mechanics; and different types of training and repair by the artisans in the handling of this new equipment was given at Wheeler and Hickam Fields. There were possibly 400 men in these schools, as I remember.

My contention, the only dissension of note that I ever had with General Short, was with respect to the Air Corps performing its specific functions and taking care of its own, and the ground forces fur-

nishing protection for the airdrome. The regulations at the time specified that the air force are [1862] responsible for the defense of the airdrome, but on account of my intensive training program and the fact that I expected this new equipment to come, the Hawaiian Air Force having just been set up in November of 1940, there was a tremendous amount of loose ends to be picked up, and I complained very bitterly to General Short to have the men relieved that he insisted be trained as infantry for the defenses of the airdromes and for other duty; and his idea was that, when this attack was pressed home to a point that the air forces had been liquidated, then the ground troops would be used as infantry. That part of it was perfectly sound and all right, but my contention was that until I was prepared to meet my primary mission I could not spare the men to be trained for this secondary mission.

Now, I would like to read you some extracts from letters.

202. General RUSSELL. Before you get away from training, General, in order to make the record more or less logical: What effect on this training program would your having gone into Alert 2 or 3 have had?

General MARTIN. So far as training for the defense of the airdromes is concerned?

203. General RUSSELL. This general training that you are talking about.

General MARTIN. As soon as you went into one of those alerts then it was assumed by the Department that these men had taken their positions for the final protection of the Island, and parts of them were to report to the military police, and parts of them, a certain number of troops were in defense of the airdromes on the Island. Therefore they would be taken completely away from their essential positions—those that had [1863] been trained for other positions—with the air force units. After they had been trained as infantry for this defense and the alert had been called, they had by that time qualified for a classification in the air corps or the ground forces, ground crews for these ships.

[1864] 204. General FRANK. It is not quite clear to me. Let me ask a question.

General MARTIN. Perhaps it was not made clear.

205. General FRANK. On Alert No. 1 you could continue your Air Corps training, is that right?

General MARTIN. Now so far as these troops that were performing the duty of infantry was concerned —

206. General FRANK. Did you perform infantry duty on all three alerts?

General MARTIN. Yes, for those troops that had been trained as infantry.

207. General FRANK. In all three alerts?

General MARTIN. Yes.

208. General FRANK. Was there any advantage to conducting Air Corps training in any one of the three alerts?

General MARTIN. Well, as to the training in the alert —

209. General FRANK. No, Air Corps training.

General MARTIN. Yes.

210. General FRANK. Technical training. Was there any advantage to conducting Air Corps training in any one of the three alerts?

General MARTIN. By Air Corps training you mean technical training?

211. General FRANK. Yes.

General MARTIN. Pertaining to the Air Forces?

212. General FRANK. Yes.

General MARTIN. There most certainly was, because we were hard pressed to get the men properly trained to meet our requirements in the new organization.

213. General FRANK. Could you do more technical training for the [1865] Air Force in No. 3 Alert, No. 2 Alert, or No. 1 Alert, or was there no difference?

General MARTIN. Of course there was a difference. There would be more under Alert No. 1.

214. General FRANK. More technical training?

General MARTIN. Yes. Under Alert No. 2 your ships are dispersed and your crews are with the ships.

215. General GRUNERT. Under Alert No. 1 your ships were concentrated. Did you take them out of parking then, to train, or what?

General MARTIN. The point you have in mind and what I am answering may be different. There is one thing, as to technical training in the schools we had on the ground. If you are talking about the opportunity for training in the crews assigned to the ships, then it is different.

216. General FRANK. No, I am talking about the schools.

General MARTIN. Your Alert No. 1 gave them great opportunity for technical training on the ground.

217. General RUSSELL. What happened with respect to training crews under Alert No. 1?

General MARTIN. You have no planes at all.

218. General RUSSELL. They are all placed together?

General MARTIN. Yes. You could not train crews under those conditions.

219. General RUSSELL. After December 7th what happened to your training effort?

General MARTIN. I should say it started about 8 o'clock on December 7th. The men were moving the ships out of the dispersed areas so far as they could. In fact, considerable of [1866] them were caught in getting them to dispersed areas.

220. General RUSSELL. Let us go to December 8th. What sort of training did you carry on on December 8th and thereafter?

General MARTIN. There was very little training there, or you could not call it training. We went to our established stations.

221. General RUSSELL. That was Alert No. 3?

General MARTIN. Combat stations.

222. General RUSSELL. That was Alert No. 3?

General MARTIN. Yes. While it was training, I would not call it training.

223. General RUSSELL. General, I want you to be sure or be accurate on the answer that you made a moment ago about under Alert No. 1. Under Alert No. 1 you assembled all your planes on the aprons and runways close in?

General MARTIN. That was to protect them against trouble.

224. General RUSSELL. All day long they were kept there?

General MARTIN. They were kept there, excepting those required for missions and other assignments, which were withdrawn and put back into this concentration upon returning.

225. General RUSSELL. Were any of those missions training missions for which you took those planes out?

General MARTIN. In a sense, yes. It was flexible to a certain extent when permitted by the Department command. A strict interpretation of the alert would mean you put them there and have them there, but for training they were withdrawn and taken out and continued to be used and put back in their concentrated positions at night, or whenever they came back. They were training at night as well as day time.

[1867] 226. General RUSSELL. I am going to leave the development of your fighting strength, if there is any development, to General Frank; he knows more about it than I do; but I do want to ask you one other question. What help could the Hawaiian Department considered as a whole, Army, Navy and all, have expected in the way of fighters from the Navy?

General MARTIN. It would have helped to take from the Navy, under our control, such fighters as were flown off the carriers that were within the harbor. That is all.

227. General RUSSELL. Do you know that strength as of December 7th?

General MARTIN. Let me add: And such Marine Corps fighters as were based on Hawaii.

228. General RUSSELL. Do you know what that effective strength was as of December 7th, 1941?

General MARTIN. There were no carriers in the harbor, for one thing. I think there were about 25 ships belonging to the Marines out at Ewa Air Base. As to what the Navy may have had on Ford Island, I cannot say. I think you will find those figures of the ships that were actually on the Island at that time in the Operations file of the 7th Air Force, because there was a record being made of the fighting effectiveness of the Hawaiian Air Force from the standpoint of its real defense.

229. General RUSSELL. When these carriers were in the harbor, the aircraft which normally accompanied them to sea were taken off the carriers, were they not?

General MARTIN. When they came in?

230. General RUSSELL. Yes.

General MARTIN. They always wanted them to go ashore to [1868] some air field for training. As to whether they were always flown from the carriers to a shore-based station, I cannot say, but it was my understanding they were, because there was great discussion between the Army and the Navy as to the number of air fields that should be made available to the Navy.

231. General RUSSELL. We had some testimony during this hearing about the probable Jap strength in carriers and aircraft. Do you have any independent opinion as to their strength, both in carriers and aircraft, involved in the attack on December 7th?

General MARTIN. I think I said at the time that we felt we could expect them to have approximately 8 specially designed carriers, and possibly the same number of converted carriers.

232. General RUSSELL. I am talking about those in the task force which made the attack on Pearl Harbor. How many do you think were there?

General MARTIN. I did not think any such number would ever be in any such task force to leave the Japanese Islands. I would not expect them to have all of their carriers in the task force.

233. General GRUNERT. How many Japanese planes attacked Hawaii, do you know?

General MARTIN. No one knows.

234. General GRUNERT. Your estimate?

General MARTIN. I would estimate from a hundred to two hundred. It is my opinion they were in the neighborhood of 150. It is further my opinion that a great number of those that made the attack never did return to their carriers. I may be wrong about it, but I believe that is true.

[1869] 235. General RUSSELL. General, you stated that you had some letters that you wanted to discuss. Would you discuss those now?

General MARTIN. I wish to read extracts of personal letters that I have written to General Arnold. I wrote letters to General Arnold from time to time to keep him apprised of what was going on in the Hawaiian Air Force. I will take them up chronologically.

He had written me a letter on October 16th, 1940, which I received after I reported for duty in the Hawaiian Department. The extract from that letter that I wish to read is as follows:

From the most accurate information available to date, provided further releases of equipment are not made unexpectedly, it is quite probable that new equipment will be available for assignment to Hawaii not later than the first of July, 1941.

From a letter that I had written to him shortly after my arrival in the Hawaiian Department on the 17th of December, 1940, I wish to read the following extract:

In my opinion we have in the past and are still practicing a very faulty policy with reference to providing our foreign possessions with modern equipment. The importance of these stations from the standpoint of national defense dictate that they receive first consideration in the assignment of modern equipment and the full quota of personnel for its operation. We have been satisfied in the past to supply our units in foreign possessions with obsolescent equipment until organizations in the States had been equipped with modern types. This to me is very faulty [1870] and could, in these times of uncertainty, be very detrimental to our scheme of national defense. Our foreign possessions are outposts of great importance and should by all means receive first consideration as to quantity and quality of equipment.

In reference to that, from his reply of the 3rd of February, 1941, I quote the following:

You are correct in that it is of great importance to provide our foreign departments with modern equipment. I am sure that you can appreciate the many conflicts which arise with respect to the assignment of aircraft, based upon tactical needs as determined by the War Plans Division. At this writing, your heavy bombardment groups setup for B-17 airplanes; the 18th Pursuit Group for P-40's, and the 15th Fighter Group for P-38s. It appears that we may be able to send to Hawaii a few of these B-17s around August of this year. Likewise, we expect to send a small number of P-40s late this spring. Indications are that the P-38s are not going to be available until the spring of 1942. We are right in the midst of completing the plans on the assignment of aircraft, pursuant to the 54 group program. As soon as more definite data has been worked out, I will

advise you as to when your unit should be equipped, in accordance with the plans now in progress.

In a letter which I wrote to him on the 25th of July, 1941 I have the following extract that I wish to read:

As a result of an Air Force CPX which I held last winter, a study has been prepared, under the direction of Colonel Farthing assisted by Major Morgan and Captain [1871] Coddington of the 5th Bombardment Group, which gives a clear presentation as to how these islands can be given a positive defense by the operation of long-range bombardment. It also dictates the number of this type of airplane required. This study is going forward within the next few days and I am sending a copy of this study, which is submitted through the Department Commander, directly to you. To me it is the most important study which has ever been prepared for the solution of the problem of the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and should receive most serious consideration. This is particularly important in view of the fact that by a memorandum addressed to the Commanding General, U. S. Air Forces, dated July 17th, 1941, a study was requested to be made of the air situation in Hawaii to include but one heavy bombardment group for this Department. Any other increases to be limited to pursuit and light and medium bombardment and observation types, holding any additional heavy bombardment in readiness on the mainland. Due to the unusual circumstances associated with the proper solution of air defense of these islands, it would be impossible to attain efficient operation from organization reinforcing the Hawaiian Air Force after hostilities begin. The solution of our problem requires special training in the search of water areas and the bombing of precision targets represented by aircraft carriers and other surface vessels. Fortunately the preparation of landing fields on the other islands of this group are underway as a result of the approval of projects which have been submitted some time ago.

[1872] I would like to enlarge on that particular statement that has just been made in that paragraph.

A CPX was conducted, I think it was in January 1941 or early February, with three officers of the Hawaiian Air Force who were capable of operating our estimate of the Japanese air strength in an attack upon the Islands. I myself conducted the defense with the obsolete and obsolescent equipment that was then available to us, using B-18s for bombardment missions because that was all we had. The radius of action of these B-18s with any appreciable bomb load was approximately 300 miles.

This CPX brought out that the enemy could bring his carriers within easy range of the islands before darkness fell, running in at night, and could launch an attack with comparative ease against the islands and get back to safety beyond the range of the existing bombardment type of airplane before we could make an attack against them.

236. General FRANK. That is the B-18?

General MARTIN. The B-18. As a result of this information and knowing that we had been allocated the B-17 type, a study was made as to the total number required for proper reconnaissance and to provide a striking force of that type of airplane. This study was started by Colonel Farthing, as he had full knowledge of the information we had gained from our CPX. His study was in a comparatively crude state and the details of his final form were worked out by my G-3 Section on consultation with myself.

This resolved into an estimate of a requirement for 72 long-range bombardment airplanes on reconnaissance each day flying at an interval of five degrees. In going out, after [1873] passing approximately 600 miles distance from their base, they would not be able to see between the two courses of adjacent ships. Therefore,

when they went to the limit of their radius, which was estimated to be a thousand miles, they would turn to the left, and in doing so, in coming back, they would cover the area in between that was beyond their field of vision on the outward journey.

An additional 72 ships were required for the next day's reconnaissance mission, with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force. Those 36 would be augmented, if pilots were found, from the reconnaissance planes which had been on mission the previous day. This brought the total of heavy bombardment to 180.

This plan was completed and forwarded to the Department Commander in Hawaii about the middle of August, sometime before the end of August.

237. General FRANK. That made a total equipment of how many B-17s?

General MARTIN. 180. There were 72 for each day's reconnaissance, 72 resting on the ground after having completed one day's reconnaissance—all the daylight hours that were available to us they would be out, so they needed rest—and 36 that were a permanent striking force.

238. General GRUNERT. And that presumed that the Army Air Force would do all of its distance reconnaissance?

General MARTIN. I might explain that this was submitted, due to the fact that I had a feeling that the Navy was not properly equipped to conduct a reconnaissance that would be completely satisfactory to me; and on the assumption that if [1874] trouble arose the Navy might be quite distant from Oahu, and we were charged with the responsibility of defending that base so they could always return to it. It was on the assumption that the Navy would be absent from Pearl Harbor while we were charged with its defense.

239. General GRUNERT. And that the District would not have enough to do that distant reconnaissance?

General MARTIN. That is right.

240. General GRUNERT. Outside of the fleet?

General MARTIN. That is correct.

Another quotation from my letter to General Arnold dated the 25th of July, 1941, reads as follows:

Another problem which is causing very grave concern is the fact that there is in existence such a limited quantity of spare parts for the modern combat airplane, which grounds for long periods of time ships which are sorely needed for combat training. I know how this came about and I know you are aware of this condition and I am sure you are as fully aware as I am of the effects of this condition upon our efforts to make all possible progress in providing combat teams as rapidly as possible.

We are making progress in achieving our goal but it is very irritating that it cannot be more rapid.

Here is a little more accurate information on the date of forwarding that secret plan for the reconnaissance and protection of the Hawaiian defense by air. This is a letter from me to General Arnold on the 15th of August, 1941:

There has been mailed under separate cover a secret study which was being made at the time the memorandum from the [1875] Secretary of the General Staff was received requesting that "a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii."

This study was originally made by Colonel Farthing as commanding officer of the 5th Bombardment Group (Heavy) assisted by Major Rose and Captain

Coddington. It has been prepared as a staff study and carefully checked as to its contents with certain additions being made by the G-3 Section of the Hawaiian Air Force. It represents to me the complete possibility of the Hawaiian Islands being defended from attack by carrier-based aircraft. It is not making a statement which cannot be fully realized upon to say that "The defense of the Hawaiian Islands can be accomplished with the 180 heavy bombardment airplanes which are set up for the mission by this study." That being true, then, by occupying outlying fields on this island group and with the requisite number of airplanes and of the combat crews as called for by this study, the defense of the Hawaiian Islands has been accomplished and need cause the War Department nor the Army Air Force further concern.

On the 25th of September, 1941, I wrote General Arnold as follows:

Your letter of August 12th, giving information on the augmentation of the Army Air Force and the six charts showing the successive build-up to the 84 Group Program was most valuable information for us. It is strange how quickly you become adjusted to figures in large denominations as to the numbers of aircraft and personnel which but two years ago would have had a staggering effect as to the possibility of accomplishment. We now accept the plans [1876] for the future with the confidence of achievement without a thought of failure.

Since the departure of our nine B-17s we have but 12 of this type left in the Hawaiian Air Force. We have competent crews which can be sent to the mainland at any time to ferry additional B-17s as soon as they can be made available to us. For our preparations for the future and for the carrying out of our defense mission in the Hawaiian Islands, it is extremely important that we get as many of these ships as can be allocated to us as soon as possible.

Further along in this same letter I wrote as follows:

The following progress is being made on the establishment of outlying fields on the other islands. At Barking Sands, on Kauai, one runway is under construction; mobilization housing for two squadrons and one National Guard company for the defense of the airdrome has been completed; one bombing target for day and night bombing has been completed. One bombing target for day and night bombing is partially completed; protected gasoline storage is under construction. At Morse Field, on Hawaii, two squadron barracks and mobilization housing for one National Guard company, with utility buildings, have been completed; protected storage for gasoline and runway are under construction. At Hilo mobilization housing has been provided for one National Guard company for the defense of the airdrome and work is progressing nicely on one runway construction and mobilization housing for one squadron will be started in the near future. At Homestead Field, on [1877] Molokai, the CAA has presented money which has been placed at the disposal of the District Engineer who has started work on the extension of runways, and mobilization housing for one company of National Guard for the defense of the airdrome has been completed. On Lanai work has started on the construction of the runways, and mobilization housing is yet to be completed for one squadron. Bellows Field has been designated a permanent station at which barracks, mess hall and utility buildings, for the strength of 1200 men are nearing completion—the construction of runways is underway.

At the end of that same letter I again call attention to the fact that "Our great need for progress at the present time is for our allotment of new equipment.

The underground excavation for the Interceptor Command is nearing completion and we expect to have this in operation within 30 days.

General FRANK. What is the date of that letter?

General MARTIN. The 25th of September, 1941.

Five mobile RDF stations have been established on Oahu but the permanent stations on this and the other islands will not be available to us until March 1942.

From a letter from General Arnold dated the 7th of October, 1941, I wish to read the following extract. In preparation for this, I will say that I had given him a report on the nine B-17s transferred by air

to the Philippines, in which I had called his attention to the limited experience of the great mass of personnel and particularly the excellent work which had been done by Sergeant Griffin as the principal navigator. I stated [1878] that his work was of an outstanding nature and should be so recognized. In his reply he said:

The status of Sergeant Griffin's application for commission is being determined. As you have been informed, your need for equipment has been taken up. So far as the shortage of B-17s is concerned, I know how you must feel when you have set up an efficient heavy bombardment organization only to lose part of it because of the greater need elsewhere. I hope that conditions soon will permit the allocation of new ships to the Hawaiian Air Force.

[1879] I wish to read the following letter from General Arnold dated the 25th of September, 1941:

There has just been brought to my attention the Hawaiian Department Tentative Standing Operating Procedure publication July 14, 1941. I note under Section 2 that the Hawaiian Air Force is charged with being prepared to release a provisional battalion totaling 500 men to assist the auxiliary police force. It is further observed that the Hawaiian Air Force is charged with defending Schofield Barracks against ground and sabotage attacks.

The combat units, together with the auxiliary and service units set up for the Hawaiian Department, have been designed primarily to insure the full effectiveness of air force operations during that critical time indicated under the Hawaiian Department Alert No. 1. It would appear, however, that we have overestimated the requirements for the Hawaiian Air Force. Obviously, it would be impossible for the Hawaiian Air Force to carry out the mission above noted, in addition to its Air Force combat mission, unless there were a surplus of Air Corps and related troops.

As we are so short of trained officers and personnel in the Air Force, it is most undesirable to employ such personnel for other than Air Corps duties, except under most unusual circumstances.

It would seem that the proper step to be taken [1880] would be a request made on the War Department to increase the Hawaiian Department by the number of personnel required to assist the auxiliary police force and to defend Schofield Barracks. Our action would then be to reduce the numbers of Air Corps and auxiliary personnel by that number.

However, before any official steps are taken, I would appreciate your unofficial and informal comment.

Sincerely,

H. H. ARNOLD,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of the Army Air Forces.

This letter is from me to General Arnold dated 3 November 1941:

In reply to your request for unofficial and informal comment upon the use of Air Corps troops as ordered by "Hawaiian Department Tentative Standing Operating Procedure," dated July 14, 1941, the following information is submitted.

During the department maneuvers, which lasted from the 12th to the 24th of May of this year, the Department Commander, General Short, became very much interested in the proper employment of all military personnel in a last stand defense of Oahu. At that time he mentioned the fact that the Air Force had approximately 4,000 enlisted men at Hickam Field and nearly 3,000 at Wheeler Field; he saw no reason why these men should not receive some training as Infantry so that after the Air Force was destroyed [1881] they could assist the ground forces in the defense of the island. I told him it was not possible to give such training at this time as the Air Force's first mission, that of training combat crews, was in a most unsatisfactory state. In order to obtain these combat crews the men must be processed through our technical schools and in addition thereto gain experience in the actual performance of these duties under proper supervision.

As no further comment was made at the time, I thought the matter was a closed issue. Without further warning a letter was received from the Hawaiian Department, dated 5 June 1941 on the subject of training Air Corps personnel for ground defense missions. This letter directed that—

"a. At Hickam Field: The training of two battalions of 500 men each to perform the following missions:

"1. One battalion to provide ground close-in defense for Hickam Field.

"2. One battalion to be prepared to take over initially under the direction of the Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department, the anti-sabotage mission within Police District No. 1, City and County of Honolulu, now assigned to the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, under the provisions of Field Order No. 1, OHF 38.

"b. At Wheeler Field: The training of one [1882] battalion of 500 men to perform the following missions:

"1. Provide ground close-in defense of Wheeler Field.

"2. Be prepared to take over initially under the direction of the Headquarters Commandant, Hawaiian Division, the protection of the Schofield Area, now assigned to the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, under the provisions of Field Order No. 1, OD 40.

The training of these 1500 men was conducted under the supervision of Infantry instructors, after three o'clock in the afternoon, four afternoons per week. The men who were placed in these battalions were the most recent arrivals in the islands, plus a certain number of noncommissioned officers required in the organization. The officers for these battalions were reserve officers regularly assigned to these two stations but from other arms of the service. As the Air Corps training for the enlisted men in these battalions progressed they received assignments with the Air Corps commensurate with their ability and training. The Infantry drill in the afternoon, which usually lasted from 3:00 p. m. to 4:30 p. m. interfered a great deal with the performance of their normal duties and when an alert was called these men were required to take their defense positions which took them away from their Air Corps assignments. This left the organizations to which these men belonged extremely short of the necessary personnel for carrying [1883] on the functions required of the Air Corps organizations. In other words, there was imposed upon these men the performance of a duty assigned to them for the last defense of this island when the Air Force was still carrying on this primary mission in the defense of the island. As soon as sufficient reliable data could be collected as to the inroad this was making on Air Force activities, a letter dated August 25, 1941 was prepared on this subject and taken to the Department Commander, General Short, in person showing that it was inconsistent with the Air Force mission to require its men to train as Infantry and take their Infantry positions when an alert was called, leaving vacant their proper assignment with the Air Force. The only relief from the performance of these duties General Short would give at the time was that those assigned to such duties and properly trained for the performance of these duties need not receive more training than was necessary to insure that they would be properly prepared to assume these duties when called upon.

A new "Standing Operating Procedure" is being prepared but has not yet been published. A copy of this procedure which was submitted to this headquarters for comment made no mention of the assignment of Air Corps troops for Infantry missions, other than Air Corps troops will be trained for the close-in defense of Army airdromes on the Island of Oahu. I have delayed answering your letter awaiting the publication of this "Standing Operating Procedure", [1884] that I might be sure that the provisions of the existing "Standing Operating Procedure" had been changed as indicated above.

It is my belief that the letter which I mentioned above, pointing out the unnecessary handicaps placed upon the Air Force in training as Infantry at a time when they were unable to conduct sufficient training to meet their primary mission as Air Force troops, has received consideration. In this letter I asked the Department Commander to rescind his instructions requiring Air Corps troops to train as Infantry at least until such time as we had developed sufficient combat and maintenance crews to meet the Manning Tables for the number of airplanes allotted to the Hawaiian Air Force. I am attaching hereto a copy of the letter on the subject of diversion from Air Force training dated August 25, 1941.

It is my firm belief that no attempt would be made by an enemy force to make a hostile landing on these islands until the Hawaiian Air Force has been destroyed or reduced in effectiveness to the point where they could offer little if any resistance. When the present allotment of airplanes has been received and these airplanes are properly manned by competent combat crews, there is no enemy in these waters strong enough to destroy the Hawaiian Air Force or effect a landing on these shores.

I can well understand how one charged with the defense of these islands, assuming that the Hawaiian [1885] Air Force had been destroyed, would wish to utilize to the fullest extent the military manpower available to him in carrying out his mission of the defense of Oahu. For Air Corps troops to be effective under such circumstances they should be properly trained for the parts they are required to play in such defensive action but I just do not wish my Air Force troops to receive training for this "last ditch fight" until they have been properly trained for their primary mission with the Air Force.

General Short is a very reasonable man of keen perception. It is now my belief that he sees more clearly the training problems confronting the Air Force and realizes its enormous proportions. I do expect that the training of Air Force troops as Infantry will not be permitted to seriously interfere with their proper training for their normal mission.

I feel very strongly that a War Department policy should be established or orders issued which will prescribe that troops from the ground forces have the responsibility of the defense of airdromes and performance of interior guard duty. If the interior guard duty is to be performed by Air Force troops, then a special table of organization should be issued for a Military Police Company to be established at each post for the performance of interior guard duty. Due to the importance and value of property on Air Corps stations, troops performing interior guard duty should be especially well trained for this service. These [1886] services can never be efficiently performed except by those who are regularly and permanently assigned to such duty. The duties to be performed by troops for the close-in defense of an airdrome are quite similar and require the same training as that given to all ground troops for a similar mission. As to the number of men required, it makes no difference whatever whether the defense of airdromes and interior guard duty are performed by Air Force troops or troops from other arms. In either case troops performing these duties must have this as their sole responsibility and assignment.

I am happy to say that this problem of training Air Force troops with Infantry, which has caused me such deep concern, seems now on its way to a satisfactory solution. Having given me this opportunity to unofficially and informally bring this matter to your attention I shall, if in the future this burden becomes unbearable, bring it to your personal attention.

I am forwarding under separate cover a study which has been made of our personnel requirements to meet the allocation of airplanes for the Hawaiian Air Force. As you will observe tables of organization for the respective units have been adhered to as far as possible. Our experience indicates the number of men in these organizations barely meet the demands on this personnel for our operations.

Expressing to you my high esteem, I beg to remain,
Most sincerely,

F. M. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army.

[1887] I would like to read an extract from a letter to General Arnold on the 17th of November, 1941:

With the transfer of the nine B-17s and accompanying spare parts we have practically exhausted all spares for B-17s at Hickam therefore it is important that future flights have distributed among the planes in each flight such spare parts as experience has dictated may be required for these ships while in transit. Tail wheels and inverters are two items for which there has been the greatest demand.

That had reference to the 19th bombardment group, heavy, which passed through Honolulu en route to the Philippine Islands.

241. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions as far as those letters read? I have a few if no one else has.

When you in one of your earlier letters referred to units in the United States being equipped prior to those in overseas departments, was there any reply to that as to whether or not that was true that they were equipping units in the United States before they were giving overseas departments their proper equipment?

General MARTIN. I know that was true before I left the mainland.
242. General GRUNERT. But there was no reply to that effect verifying it?

General MARTIN. Nothing more than General Arnold acknowledged the importance of the outpost position of Hawaii.

243. General GRUNERT. Did he in any reply to you on that subject make any reference to the requirements for aircraft that was going across seas to other nations?

[1888] General MARTIN. Would you please state the first part of that question? I didn't get it.

244. General GRUNERT. In his reply to you did he at any time explain to you that possibly there were demands on him for aircraft to be sent to other united nations or allied nations?

General MARTIN. Oh, he just inferred that.

245. General GRUNERT. Just inferred it?

General MARTIN. If you remember, in one of his statements he inferred that; he didn't say that.

246. General GRUNERT. Now, you referred to the search of water areas by that force of 180 bombers, I believe you asked for. Then, what was really under the joint Army-Navy action arrived at in Washington in which the Air Force was to do such searching; is that right?

General MARTIN. Now, I don't get all what you have said. I will answer it in this way: this plan was conceived by the Air Force, prepared—

247. General FRANK. Where?

General MARTIN. —immediately, shortly after the CPX in the winter of '41.

248. General FRANK. Conceived by the Air Force in Hawaii?

General MARTIN. Yes, Air Force—oh, I see. By the Hawaiian Air Force?

249. General FRANK. Yes.

General MARTIN. The study was made. It was followed by a staff study. The study was originally made by Colonel Farthing and his assistants, and it was followed by a staff-study of my own G-3 section of the Hawaiian Air Force. The plan was drawn up and submitted to General Short and approved [1889] by him. Then it was submitted through General Short to the War Department, excepting this one copy that had been sent directly to General Arnold.

250. General GRUNERT. Then, as far as you were concerned, it was based on your own studies and own plan?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir; no, not—our own study and the experience we had, dictating what was necessary to accomplish the mission.

251. General FRANK. As a result of these exercises?

General MARTIN. As a result of command post exercises, yes.

252. General GRUNERT. Now, you referred to the construction of air fields. In that construction work were there any appreciable delays and, if so, to what did you attribute the delays?

General MARTIN. Well, it was a perfectly natural delay that you had to experience from bringing materials; first, getting it approved; sometimes that was difficult. I didn't have so much trouble with General Short, but I had a terrible time with General Herron to convince him of the necessity for outlying airdromes. General Short came there receptive as to the need for outlying airdromes. Then

the estimate had to be made as to the cost, approved, and sent to the War Department, approved by them, and the monies made available. Then and only till then could materials start to move from the mainland to Hawaii for the purpose of construction, such as were needed from the mainland.

253. General FRANK. With respect to the construction of these airdromes, when did you begin to get money for Air Force construction for airdromes and other projects?

[1890] General MARTIN. I cannot say specifically.

254. General FRANK. Well, money was scarce up to a certain point?

General MARTIN. Yes, up to a certain time.

255. General FRANK. And then?

General MARTIN. Well, it wasn't free until after the attack, or approximately the time of the attack, was it ever free to the Department. The things that General Short had been requiring for further defense of the Islands had been given to him very niggardly until the attack took place, and then he had more.

256. General FRANK. Well, did you actually have any money for the construction of airdromes prior to December 7th?

General MARTIN. Yes, on the outlying stations, the runways, and the temporary housing. Now, as to how much of that was taken from the Department Commander's funds, I could not say. As to whether he gave the funds prior to the funds being received for the project that was submitted to the War Department, I do not know.

257. General FRANK. Did you feel that there was any delay in any of your construction, including the aircraft warning service, that was attributable to the contractors?

General MARTIN. No, I did not. I had no contact with the contractors, but I did have contact with Colonel Wyman, who was the Division Engineer of that Engineering—District Engineer. He was not a District Engineer.

258. General FRANK. Yes, he was.

General MARTIN. The district was here. Division Engineer. He is most cooperative and operated very rapidly within his [1891] limitations. Now, he was limited in getting equipment and getting materials.

259. General FRANK. How?

General MARTIN. Due to the fact that it had to come from the mainland.

260. General FRANK. Well, how did that hold it up?

General MARTIN. First he had to convince them as to its need.

261. General FRANK. Had to convince whom?

General MARTIN. The War Department.

262. General FRANK. Well, if you had the appropriation, the need was—

General MARTIN. Oh, after the appropriation had been granted, then as to how he dealt with the contractors, I do not know. Whether the Government purchased the supplies and shipped them or whether the contractors purchased them and shipped them, I do not know, but I surmise that the contractors made the purchase of the supplies and shipped them as a part of the contract.

263. General FRANK. But so far as you were concerned, did you have any complaint to make as to the manner in which Wyman functioned?

General MARTIN. No, I did not.

264. General FRANK. Or the manner in which the contractors functioned?

General MARTIN. No, I did not. I complained with reference to the time that was required to get these permanent stations for the RDF installation; but as I remember, those stations were being constructed under the supervision of [1892] Colonel Wyman rather than Colonel Lyman, who was the Division Engineer. Now, as to who actually had charge of the construction, I will not be positive, but it is my impression at the present time that Colonel Lyman—at least, he was pushing it at the time, trying to unravel the knots that were preventing progress.

265. General FRANK. Did you ever have any difficulty with Colonel Wyman?

General MARTIN. I thought that he was the most aggressive and active engineering officer I ever came in contact with.

266. General FRANK. Did you ever come in contact with a man by the name of Rohl, R-o-h-l, the civilian contractor?

General MARTIN. No, I did not; not to my knowledge. If I met him it was just casually.

267. General FRANK. I see. That is all I have along that line.

268. General GRUNERT. This S. O. P. of November 5th, did that cure the thing of which you complained, requiring Air Corps personnel to do guarding duty for sabotage purposes, or were the provisions of that still in there that required you to turn out Air Corps troops for such purposes?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. I was just disappointed. I thought that the thing had been so definitely presented to General Short that there wasn't any question about his making provision for it in his orders; but after the attack took place and these men were still on guard at these stations I asked that they be relieved, that they could take charge of the salvaging of equipment and getting as much of our equipment back into the air as possible; and he said definitely no, and [1893] they were still on that duty until General Emmons arrived about the middle of December. They were relieved before sundown that night, though.

269. General GRUNERT. Did the Commanding General of the Department approve your plan for air defense, your 20th of August, 1941, air defense plan that you sent in to your chief?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

270. General GRUNERT. He approved that?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. You have reference to the use of the 180 heavy bombardment planes?

271. General GRUNERT. Yes, that is right.

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

272. General GRUNERT. Now except having plans for the use of what you thought was the ultimate in protection, did you have plans for the use of what you had?

General MARTIN. Oh, the plans for the use of what we had? Well, we could not do much planning with what we had, General. You just do the best you can, depending upon the situation that confronted you at the time, knowing full well that you could never fully meet it

until additional equipment and trained personnel were available to you.

273. General GRUNERT. Well, we all like to have everything we think is necessary, but our job requires us to make the best use of what we have. Did you have plans to make the best use of what you had?

General MARTIN. Well, they were not in concrete form, because I cannot see any reason for writing up a plan to guide everyone as to the use of the equipment today when it is going to be different tomorrow. We do have a plan for the equipment [1894] that is promised and which we expect will be available to us in the future; but the thing that I think is important is this, General: that that equipment was never stable; it was always in a state of flux, and you can never lay down that you are going to use so many planes and so many tomorrow because in all probability that particular number is not going to be available to you. So it is from a day-to-day proposition of utilizing, in keeping with the situation, to the best of your judgment, that equipment which is available to you. So you can have no fixed plan for any such operation.

274. General GRUNERT. Not to the detail that you describe; I agree with you there; but you must have plans for the use of what you do have. They must be flexible, and when you get more you can do more; but up to the time you get more you have to use what you have.

General MARTIN. Absolutely.

Now, as to plans, I think you have to use that word advisedly. It is just to make the maximum use of what is available to you on this particular day when it is needed. Now, that is in the minds of everyone there that has anything to do with the operation.

275. General GRUNERT. But if they have no plan by which to use it, how can they use it intelligently or effectively? There is a difference between a complete detailed plan and a plan to operate.

General MARTIN. You have a plan, the master plan that you are going to operate on, but as far as I know there are no troops that go into battle that lay down a hard and fast plan and say, "This is the one we are going to follow," and, if they [1895] only happen to have a small percentage of what they expected to have, still follow this strict plan, because your plans have to conform to what you have available to you.

276. General GRUNERT. But they are plans, aren't they?

General MARTIN. But not from the standpoint of writing them down and putting them away in the secret archives to be referred to when they are needed. They are plans to meet the situation of the moment.

277. General GRUNERT. Well, with what you had available, did all that stuff that you had available know what to do on December 7th?

General MARTIN. They not only did that, but they did it to the maximum of their ability. I was extremely proud of the behavior of all those men because practically without orders they immediately rushed to the positions, grabbed the ships, got them out of the concentration, got them into the dispersion area, and took such steps as were indicated by the conditions existing at the time. Both officers and enlisted men. I am extremely proud of their conduct under those circumstances, which were most unusual and trying. They left noth-

ing to be desired so far as being competent to carry out that which was their assigned or intended mission under the circumstances.

278. General GRUNERT. That finishes my questions so far as that letter was concerned. He was yours before we left and got on this. Go ahead.

279. General RUSSELL. After December 7th did men and matériel for employment by your forces begin to arrive much more rapidly than before December 7th?

General MARTIN. Nothing arrived prior to that excepting [1896] the 21 that I spoke about that were being sent on to the Philippines.

280. General RUSSELL. Well, did any arrive?

General MARTIN. On the morning of December 7th we had nothing but our 12 B-17s coming from the mainland. Those ships arrived during the time the attack was taking place. We warned them in the open, because that is the only way we could warn them, to remain in the air as long as possible; that we had no airdromes at other islands that would accommodate them as yet. They were only partially completed. Four of the eight were lost from the attack of the Japanese. Eight were made available to the Air Force afterwards. Some were damaged in landing. One landed at a golf course. One landed at Bellows Field with the prevailing wind, on a very short runway. The new runway was not yet completed there and it was badly crashed.

281. General RUSSELL. What happened beginning December 8th and thereafter up until you left out there? Did you get a lot of ships or none, or what?

General MARTIN. Oh, I wouldn't say a lot, but they were beginning to come in. As to the exact dates of the arrival of airplanes to supplement the meager force we had there, you can get that from the record.

282. General RUSSELL. Yes.

General MARTIN. I cannot give you the exact dates.

283. General RUSSELL. Well, I will quit there on that, then.

What about troops? Did they send you more troops out there after December 7th?

General MARTIN. They didn't while I was there.

284. General RUSSELL. All right. Was this statement which [1897] you have read from the letters a while ago, General, given to the Roberts Commission?

General MARTIN. No, sir.

285. General RUSSELL. It was not. That is all I have.

General MARTIN. I don't remember that I read any of these to the Roberts Commission.

286. General FRANK. How many B-17s did you have available?

General MARTIN. On the morning of this attack?

287. General FRANK. Yes.

General MARTIN. Six.

288. General FRANK. You had six.

General MARTIN. And three of those were damaged in the attack, so it left just three.

289. General FRANK. All right. If you had to have a plan to operate six B-17s when you needed 180, where would you have sent those six?

General MARTIN. Well, that is rather—not a difficult question to answer. You send them where you think they will do the most good, but you don't expect to get them back.

290. General FRANK. Well, where would you have sent six airplanes?

General MARTIN. I would have tried to get the carrier if I could; but inasmuch as I couldn't find the location of the carrier and I would have estimated they would have been lost anyway in the attempt to get the carrier, I don't think they could have done a particle of good without protection or without great numbers.

291. General FRANK. If six airplanes had barged into this Jap force that was making the attack, what would have happened?

[1898] General MARTIN. They would all have been lost, in my estimation. I don't see how any of them could have come back. And it is probable that they would have been lost before they did very much damage. At least, they would have not stopped the attack.

292. General FRANK. Will you give me a little analysis by comparing the probability of a Japanese air attack against the probability of a sabotage attack?

In the first place, I would like to ask you this question: In race track parlance what in your opinion were the odds for and against a Japanese air raid succeeding?

[1899] General MARTIN. Succeeding?

293. General FRANK. Yes.

General MARTIN. Well, they were very, very large. I do not think it is possible to be very accurate about it, but if I were betting I would have said that it was at least 50 to 1, probably greater.

294. General FRANK. What?

General MARTIN. Of their not succeeding; not being made.

295. General FRANK. In other words, you considered it what kind of a venture?

General MARTIN. Considered that with the improbable attack from carrier-based aviation that far from Japan, would be at an odd of about 50 to 1. Therefore the greater menace to the defenses of the islands was right in our own midst among the Japanese people which, as I remember, in about 400,000 are approximately 165,000 of Japanese descent. Of that number there are possibly 25,000 that are foreigners.

296. General FRANK. In other words, you thought that a Japanese raid such as happened was a very daring, unusual risk?

General MARTIN. It was a terrific gamble. Everything was based on its success; everything to be lost with its failure.

297. General FRANK. All right. Now will you give me an analysis by comparing the probability of the air attack versus the probability of the sabotage attack?

General MARTIN. Well, I think, from the information we had and the terrific gamble that would be entailed in risking a sufficiently large task force of the Japanese Navy with its carriers into those waters which they knew were frequented by our own Navy, that would indicate that it would be practically a suicide mission to attempt anything of the kind. But within our own population we had a very explosive mixture that could [1900] come to the surface, have a complete understanding and organization as to what they would do, without our being able to know anything about it. There are great areas in the islands that are mountainous and rugged and practically inaccessible, in which the average person never goes. Those are wonderful opportunities for caches of explosives, incendiary equipment, everything of that nature, and it seemed impossible for anyone to be

completely informed, to be assured that there would be no attack from within. That seemed to be the most dangerous source of damage in the defenses of the Hawaiian Department.

298. General FRANK. In other words, the sabotage effort was there present, and the Jap air attack you considered a 50-to-1 gamble?

General MARTIN. I wouldn't say that the sabotage effort was present. I would say the probability of sabotage was extremely great. It could be on you at a moment's notice. The attack from the air, on account of the extreme gamble that was involved, could be highly successful or be a complete failure, and we did not believe that they were going to gamble to that extent in the beginning.

299. General FRANK. I see. Now, do you know any place where the Japanese have been as considerate of Americans as the United States was considerate of Japanese in Hawaii?

General MARTIN. Never.

300. General FRANK. What do you think would have been the plight of 160,000 Americans in Japan under similar circumstances?

General MARTIN. Oh, it is quite definite they would be in concentration, they would be carefully investigated and certain ones would be destroyed. Others would eke out an existence as [1901] captives in a foreign country. On the other hand, there were only about 800 of the Japanese that were immediately taken into control by the military authorities after the attack took place, and this was increased somewhat, later. As to how many, I do not know.

301. General FRANK. Now, had you been alerted so that your fighters could have taken the air, to what extent do you estimate 80 fighters could have interfered with the attack?

General MARTIN. Well, they could have done considerable damage. They could not have prevented it. It would have been impossible to have prevented it, but they could have reduced its effectiveness quite materially.

302. General FRANK. How many Jap planes actually were shot down over Oahu?

General MARTIN. I do not know. The Air Forces shot down about 10. The antiaircraft shot down others. As I remember, it was possibly 29 or 30. There is a record of that.

303. General FRANK. Yes, I know.

General MARTIN. I do not remember exactly. I think it was about 29 or 30. But in my opinion, seeing a large number of those ships leaving the area with gasoline streaming out behind them, they never made the carriers, and that was true in many cases that I saw where there would be a white plume of gas—why it didn't catch fire I never knew—leaving the tanks of the airplanes that were making for the sea.

304. General FRANK. Well, had the No. 2 or 3 Alert been active and if they got, we will say, 25 Jap planes on the sabotage alert, with the antiaircraft and 80 fighters operating, the chances are that a No. 2 or 3 Alert would have made it most expensive for the Japs.

General MARTIN. There isn't any question about that. You see, we lost about approximately 50 per cent of our total [1902] strength in this attack. 50 per cent was already on the ground out

of commission. After we dispersed them we lost very few ships in the dispersed areas.

305. General FRANK. You entered into this agreement with Admiral Bellinger, and when you entered into this agreement you knew that you didn't have any airplanes to give him to make it effective?

General MARTIN. That is true.

306. General FRANK. And you also knew that he didn't have very many air planes to make it effective?

General MARTIN. That is true. Simply gazing into the future.

307. General FRANK. Therefore it was pretty much of a paper defense that you had?

General MARTIN. At that time it was, and known to us to be in that status.

308. General FRANK. Now, did you ever have any knowledge of a Japanese task force with carriers in it in the vicinity of the Marshalls on the 1st of December?

General MARTIN. Oh, no. No, sir.

309. General FRANK. What would have been your reaction to that information?

General MARTIN. Well, I think I would have been a little more concerned about the possibilities of their getting nearer, if that had been true, if I had known that had been true.

310. General FRANK. You doubted the audacity of the Japs to risk carriers, when they had only eight large carriers, in an attack on Hawaii?

General MARTIN. In the beginning. In the beginning of the [1903] fight I thought that would be too much of a gamble for them to take on the assumption that they would meet with success.

311. General FRANK. With that as a background, what would have been your reaction had you been told that there was a division of carriers in the Marshalls on December 1st?

General MARTIN. Oh, you would have to assume then that they may be going to take that one big chance; at least it is a threat that you hadn't considered, that they would concentrate a large force so far from their home base. Then you would have to consider it as a threat and give it consideration in your estimate of the situation.

312. General FRANK. Did you have any information along that line?

General MARTIN. No, sir, I did not. This is the first I have ever heard of it.

313. General GRUNERT. What was your opinion of the Japanese air force as such, compared to your own?

General MARTIN. I thought they were very good, the older members, and their equipment was not the most modern but would be very effective. The number of airplanes that could be carried on their carriers was very much less than that which we could carry on our own large carriers. Therefore it would require more carriers. The number of carriers would indicate a smaller force than would be carried by the same number of our own aircraft carriers.

314. General GRUNERT. Did you ever have any discussion as to the necessity for unity of command in place of action by cooperation?

General MARTIN. Well, General, as to that being discussed [1904] between the different officers in Hawaii, I do not remember

having such a discussion; but to my way of thinking that is one of the prime essentials for the success of the military force of any country, particularly this one, to have a central control. It was discussed at the War College, and we were allowed to discuss it very freely there, and did, and we believed that that is one of the prime essentials.

315. General GRUNERT. But inasmuch as you were only on Alert 1, sabotage, the question of unity of command didn't show up, whether cooperation proved a handicap or unity of command would have helped things, because they never came to conclusions?

General MARTIN. I think unity of command would have been a direct help in the solution of the problems in the Hawaiian Islands, and I believe—

316. General GRUNERT. You didn't make use of what you had, so where would unity of command have come in to help out?

General MARTIN. What was that last question?

317. General GRUNERT. I say, they didn't use what they had, the Army or the Navy, in the attack, because the attack surprised them, or they were not ready for it or they didn't anticipate it; hence you don't know whether unity of command would have helped the situation then or not, do you?

General MARTIN. I can't tell you too much about that because it would be between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, quite frequently. I seldom attended those; and the cooperation between the two, as to whether it was a 100 percent or not, I am not in a position to say, but I have always felt that cooperation was one of the weakest possible props for successful operation requiring united effort.

[1905] 318. General GRUNERT. Now, if you had had unity of command, wherein would your Joint Air Agreement have been changed?

General MARTIN. It would have been changed in that all the information available to the Army and Navy would come to the central headquarters.

319. General GRUNERT. Then you realized the lack of information for the dissemination of that information, or what?

General MARTIN. You mean, would it be received, not only received but disseminated from the central headquarters, which would have made for strength and unity of effort.

320. General GRUNERT. What I am getting at is, your reply led me to believe you felt there was weakness in getting information and disseminating it. Is that right?

General MARTIN. Well, it probably is no weaker there, General, than it would be elsewhere where cooperation is depended upon for unity of action.

321. General GRUNERT. You don't know of any information that you ought to have that you didn't have?

General MARTIN. I don't know of any specific instance where there was lack of cooperation.

322. General GRUNERT. Then, you don't know whether the Navy failed to transmit something to you that you should have used? You don't know that as a fact, do you?

General MARTIN. Well, this thing General Frank has just mentioned, that either the Navy or the Department Commander has that,

I think it would have been of value to me in helping me form an opinion as to the advice I should give my Commanding General.

323. General GRUNERT. Well, now, General Short kept you pretty [1906] well informed generally, did he?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir; I thought he did.

324. General GRUNERT. How did it work on the other end of the game? Did you keep your commanders well informed?

General MARTIN. I tried to.

325. General GRUNERT. Rudolph doesn't seem to have known anything about any of these warning messages.

General MARTIN. Rudolph?

326. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General MARTIN. Well, he only knew certain phases of it because they were absolutely secret, and the more people that know a secret the less opportunity there is to keep it from being spread about. Now, he knew that certain conditions were imposed upon operators of an air force. He may, and I am sure he did—I don't know that he had knowledge of the wording of the message, any of those messages.

327. General GRUNERT. Did Davidson know?

General MARTIN. My Chief of Staff had knowledge of it.

328. General GRUNERT. Did Davidson know?

General MARTIN. That I could not say, General. I wouldn't say. I couldn't say, to give you factual information.

329. General GRUNERT. But then you didn't know about the Navy message that started out, "This is a war warning"?

General MARTIN. Not the naval message, but a similar message.

330. General GRUNERT. And you didn't know about the task force that may or may not have been out in the Mandates? So you apparently were not fully informed, anyway?

General MARTIN. Well, I will say this: In any organization if you want unity of effort and the proper evaluation and [1907] dissemination of information, you must have central control of that unit.

331. General GRUNERT. Did we have unity within the Army as to spreading of information?

General MARTIN. Well, I can't answer to what others do. I don't know whether they do or not. I think I have suffered from lack of information on many instances.

332. General FRANK. You are highly in favor of unity of command. Let's—

General MARTIN. Oh, now I am speaking of task forces or—well, it is a unit sent out to do a certain thing.

333. General FRANK. Well, I am talking about the situation in Honolulu on December 7th.

General MARTIN. Well, I am answering General Grunert here as to dissemination, receipt and dissemination of information. Had one person been responsible for the defense of Oahu, the information should have come to him and should have been evaluated and distributed by him. Now, you had a dual situation there. There was a commander of the Pacific Fleet present. The local defense commander had nothing to do with the operation of that fleet.

334. General FRANK. What defense commander, Army or Navy?

General MARTIN. The Army defense commander.

335. General FRANK. That is right.

General MARTIN. He had nothing to do with the orders received or issued to that fleet. Information coming to that CINCUS might not have been properly distributed as to its value to the defense commander of the Hawaiian Department.

336. General FRANK. Did you then believe that there should have [1908] been unity of command between the Army and the Navy in Honolulu?

General MARTIN. You are going to cover too much territory there. You can't possibly have unity of command when there is one organization headquarters operating a fleet that is 3,000 miles from that base, and another charged with the defense of particular islands themselves.

337. General FRANK. They have it now.

General MARTIN. Well, I don't agree to it.

338. General GRUNERT. They have it now.

339. General FRANK. They have it now.

General MARTIN. We had to put something above those fellows.

340. General GRUNERT. And, as a matter of fact, as soon as war broke they had it right on that day, didn't they, December 7th and 8th?

General MARTIN. As soon as General Emmons arrived they had it. General Emmons and Admiral Nimitz were given those instructions.

341. General GRUNERT. Yes.

342. General FRANK. Now, the question for which I have been trying to prepare you is this: Assuming that there had been unity of command prior to December 7th, what organization in the War Department or the Navy Department, or both, would have handled it?

General MARTIN. There is no head to it at all. There is no what you may call national defense headquarters which should control, in my opinion—this is simply my opinion—the military operations of the Army, Navy, and Air, which I feel should be separate and distinct from each other, but controlled by this [1909] central planning body: a national defense organization, call it.

343. General FRANK. At that time the President of the United States was the only one.

General MARTIN. That is right. He was the only could be acting.

344. General FRANK. And we now have the joint Chiefs of Staff.

General MARTIN. Yes, which is a—

345. General FRANK. All right.

346. General GRUNERT. You don't blame the attack on Pearl Harbor on the lack of such an organization, do you?

General MARTIN. Oh, no. No, not at all. I did not think that the organization was weak to that extent.

347. General RUSSELL. General Frank asked you some questions a moment ago, General, about what could have been accomplished by 80 fighters on December 7th. I want to ask you: Did you have 80 fighters available on December 7th before the Japanese came in and destroyed a great part of your force?

[1910] General MARTIN. Now, let me see. We had approximately 100 P-40s.

348. General RUSSELL. And they are fighters?

General MARTIN. Yes, they are fighters. We had approximately 50 P-36s.

349. General RUSSELL. And they are fighters?

General MARTIN. They are fighters. At least half of those were always on the ground, on account of lacking spare parts, so I reduced it to 75. Out of the 75 there is always probably ten or fifteen per cent that would be out of commission from day to day. They would be in today and out tomorrow. So it is something less than 75 that would be the maximum that could have been put in the air on that day.

350. General RUSSELL. Do you mean to say when you have 150 planes you have less than 75 you can fight with?

General MARTIN. That is what I am telling you was true of the Hawaiian Air Force.

351. General GRUNERT. Due to the peculiar circumstances at that time?

General MARTIN. I don't want to be misunderstood. If I had 150 planes I would try to keep 150 planes in the air, but you can't do it, nor can anyone else. But I was subjected to an additional castigation with that force by having approximately 50 per cent at all times on the ground, simply because I could not get the requisite spare parts from the mainland.

352. General FRANK. That was a special situation that existed at that time, which at this time does not exist?

General MARTIN. You can expect to have 10 to 15 per cent of your ships on the ground.

[1911] 353. General GRUNERT. That is normal?

General MARTIN. That is normal.

354. General GRUNERT. Then you could have turned out approximately between 50 and 55 fighters to meet the attack?

General MARTIN. Yes.

355. General FRANK. And did the mobile AWS trail back the returning attackers to their carriers? I am speaking of your radar.

General MARTIN. Oh, no. You could not do that. There was so much confusion in the air. You look at those plots afterwards, and there was just a mass of lines. Of course, the people that saw those could get an indication of a trend, but the operators at the time, regardless of how skilled they might have been, could not have gotten any particular trend from the tracks on the bands. There were too many of them.

356. General FRANK. Did you feel there was Japanese radio activity interfering with your radar?

General MARTIN. We knew it. They started in as soon as the attack began. And these stations which had not been in operation at all were extremely active as soon as the attack began. You were getting spurious messages that parachutes were dropping on certain parts of the island, that there were carriers off shore in every direction except those where we feel now they were. Messages of that nature were coming in over our frequencies at all times. If you asked for landing instructions or anything of that kind, it would be garbled for days afterwards. It was in the neighborhood of ten days or two weeks before those instruments were located and confiscated.

357. General FRANK. You did have sabotage then, didn't you?

[1912] General MARTIN. Sabotage?

358. General FRANK. That kind of sabotage.

General MARTIN. By jamming the air frequencies; yes. It was very much in evidence and there was no indication of it prior to that. We had two monitoring stations in existence there, under whose control I do not know; I think they were F. B. I. They had no indication of these stations being in existence, because they had not been operated. But as soon as this attack took place and got under way, the air was full of Japanese conversation and our own language to the point where it was very difficult to carry on operations using the radio for that purpose.

359. General GRUNERT. When they located these stations, did they get the personnel that operated them?

General MARTIN. They had the personnel that had operated them.

360. General GRUNERT. I mean, did they capture the personnel with the stations when they located these interfering stations?

General MARTIN. Oh, yes. But they were not always fixed stations. They were mobile stations. In fact, the last one we had had been located out in the direction of Ewa, which had been a Marine Base, but when we got there there was nothing but a thicket, nothing out there at all, no possibility of a station.

361. General GRUNERT. But they captured the personnel with them?

General MARTIN. Yes.

362. General GRUNERT. General, have you anything else you would like to present to the Board which may give us leads or be of evidence as to facts about the Pearl Harbor attack that you can think of now?

[1913] General MARTIN. As far as I can think of the different factors at the present time, I know of nothing but what has been touched upon or covered in the testimony that has been given.

363. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? There being no more, thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 12:30 p. m. a recess was taken until 2 p. m.)

[1914]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board at 1:55 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL JACK W. HOWARD, QUARTERMASTER CORPS.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel HOWARD. Jack W. Howard, Colonel, Quartermaster Corps, O7991, Permanent Boards, 9th Service Command, S. C. U. 1939, Presidio of San Francisco.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, this Board is after facts about what happened prior to and leading up to and during the attack on Pearl Harbor, and because of your assignment there during that time we thought we could probably get some facts from you.

What was your assignment in Hawaii during the latter part of 1941, and give us the dates.

Colonel HOWARD. I was the Supply Officer of the Hawaiian Quartermasters Depot, stationed at Fort Armstrong in 1941 up until after Pearl Harbor.

3. General GRUNERT. The Adjutant General just had you listed there as commanding officer of that supply depot?

Colonel HOWARD. I took over the command of the depot in June of 1942.

4. General GRUNERT. And who then was in command of the Supply Depot during the attack and just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Colonel HOWARD. Roland Walsh. I think he is now a Brigadier General of the Quartermaster Corps in command of the [1915] Philadelphia Depot. I took over the duties at the time of Pearl Harbor, on the day of Pearl Harbor, the duties of the executive officer. I was the next senior second in command.

5. General GRUNERT. You testified before the Roberts Commission, did you?

Colonel HOWARD. I did, sir.

6. General GRUNERT. What in gist was your testimony there? Why did they call you?

Colonel HOWARD. Well, I think that General Walsh could probably give you more information as to why I went before the Commission than I could. In fact, he called me in and told me this Roberts Commission was sitting at Shafter and that he wanted me to go up as a representative of the Depot to see and meet the Commission.

7. General GRUNERT. What did the Board ask you when you were before it?

Colonel HOWARD. They asked me in effect what I was doing and what I did do on the day of Pearl Harbor.

8. General GRUNERT. And I will ask you the same question: What did you do?

Colonel HOWARD. I got to the Depot as soon as—or I would judge around 8:30. I was living at that time out of Fort Armstrong, out in Kahala, and I got to the Depot I would judge about 8:30, and from that time on I was very busy, not only supplying troops but answering and giving all the information I could over the phone.

9. General GRUNERT. What protection was there for the Depot or the surrounding grounds there as far as you were concerned in that post, the defense measures taken?

[1916] Colonel HOWARD. Well, of course, there was a small coast artillery setup there on Fort Armstrong. I think they were 3-inch guns.

10. General GRUNERT. Antiaircraft?

Colonel HOWARD. No, sir. The antiaircraft guns were right across the entrance to Pearl Harbor.

11. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Colonel HOWARD. I mean the entrance to Honolulu Harbor, on Sand Island.

12. General GRUNERT. What protective measures were taken to protect the personnel against air raids and bombing?

13. General FRANK. Any slit trenches?

Colonel HOWARD. Sir?

14. General FRANK. Did you have any slit trenches?

Colonel HOWARD. I was trying to think, General, whether we built those before or after Pearl Harbor. I am of the opinion that they were not built until the day of Pearl Harbor.

15. General GRUNERT. Did you have any air raid shelters where all women and children and the personnel could run to to get out of bombing range?

Colonel HOWARD. No, sir, not at the day of Pearl Harbor, time of Pearl Harbor; no sir.

16. General GRUNERT. Were there any standing orders as to procedure in case of an air attack? In other words, did you know what to do, and the men and officers under you, in case of an air attack?

Colonel HOWARD. Well, I don't know how to answer that question. No. I would say no; my duty was as a supply officer, and my men of course were—my employees were mostly civilians, and I would have been operating on the supply standpoint of view entirely. Now, the post of Fort Armstrong was under the command of Roland Walsh, and he in turn had an adjutant operating [1917] ing up there who had command of the troop, and they did have some kind of a standard, an S. O. P. in which they were to operate under an attack, but I had nothing to do with that.

17. General GRUNERT. Your men were in warehouses and one thing another?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, sir; warehouses and clerks.

18. General GRUNERT. Did they have any instructions what to do?

Colonel HOWARD. Nothing except for fire.

19. General GRUNERT. Evidently you didn't have much to offer to the Roberts Commission, and have you anything now that you would like to offer that you think would be of assistance to the Board in getting at the facts?

Colonel HOWARD. I have nothing, sir. As a matter of fact, I have less information of that than several officers that were around the Depot at that time.

20. General GRUNERT. Any questions?

21. General FRANK. Wasn't there a casemate or something that was a bomb-proof in which they could take shelter?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, but that at the time, General, was operated by some coast artillery men from Fort De Russy, and they were quartered in there.

22. General FRANK. Did the women and children actually take refuge in there?

Colonel HOWARD. No, sir. All the women and children that day were moved right off of the post and moved on up into the Nuuanu and Moana canyons.

23. General FRANK. All right.

24. General GRUNERT. That will be all, Colonel. Thank you.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[1918] **TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WILLIAM J. MCCARTHY, 260TH COAST ARTILLERY GROUP, FORT BLISS, TEXAS**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel McCARTHY. William J. McCarthy, Colonel, 260th Coast Artillery Group, Fort Bliss, Texas.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is after facts and leads toward facts; and because of your assignment in Hawaii in the latter part of 1941 and also because you testified before the Roberts Commission we asked that you be sent here to this Board to testify to give us such facts as you may know of your own information, and then I have one particular fact that I wanted to inquire into that I didn't understand in your testimony before the Roberts Commission.

Now, tell me first: What was your assignment in Hawaii, and give me the dates.

Colonel McCARTHY. I arrived in Hawaii on October 6th, 1939, and was assigned to Fort Kamehameha.

Does that call for my complete assignments all the time while I was there?

3. General GRUNERT. Carry it right on through.

Colonel McCARTHY. At that time I was a Captain. I was assigned to the 41st Coast Artillery, railway. I remained with the railway artillery until July 1, 1940, when I was assigned as battalion commander of the railway battalion. I remained there in various capacities as battalion commander and artillery engineer of the harbor defense up until July 1, 1941, when I was assigned as battalion commander of the 55th Coast Artillery, which is a 155 tractor-drawn battalion, and I remained in command of that battalion until I left Hawaii. Among [1919] other assignments I was the Group Commander of the so-called Ewa Group, which was a sector of the defense on the west shore of Hawaii that the 155 regiment covered.

4. General GRUNERT. Where were you during the attack?

Colonel McCARTHY. In Fort Kamehameha, sir, right in the fort.

5. General GRUNERT. And you had a coast artillery assignment with the heavy weapons?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir, with tractor.

6. General GRUNERT. Didn't you have any antiaircraft?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir. The only antiaircraft that we had with us were .30-caliber machine guns which were assigned for our own immediate defense, but that was not anti-aircraft.

7. General GRUNERT. In the report of the Roberts Commission it says that you testified that from November 22, '41, until December 2nd or 3rd, Alert 2 had been in effect. You stated the post commander did this. Now, the post was Kamehameha, was it?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir.

8. General GRUNERT. And what Alert 2 was in effect up to December 2nd or 3rd, and why was it then called off?

Colonel McCARTHY. If I am not—that may be a mistake. I think I said the 27th.

9. General FRANK. 27th of what?

Colonel McCARTHY. Of November, and not—

10. General FRANK. Well, that is immaterial.

Colonel McCARTHY. It is immaterial. The 27th. Colonel Walker, who commanded Fort Kamehameha, had instituted a series [1920] of practice alerts. We would black-out the post at certain times, and we would go in the field; sometimes we would never leave the post; to determine how proficient the units were in getting ready to go

into the field. You see, besides the 55th Coast Artillery there was a battalion of railway coast artillery and the 15th, which was the harbor defense regiment, they having command of the fixed guns: The 16s and 12s, that were about Fort Kamehameha. There is Fort Weaver and Fort Barrett.

It so happened that during one of these practice alerts that Colonel Walker had called the thing suddenly went off about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and battalion commanders were ordered to report to Colonel Walker's office at once. In fact—

[1921] 11. General GRUNERT. What date was this?

Colonel McCARTHY. I am not mistaken, it was about the 27th of November.

12. General FRANK. One of these guns went off?

Colonel McCARTHY. No. I say this practice alert went on in the post. The thing suddenly stopped in the middle of it and the battalion officer suddenly ordered us to report to Colonel Walker's headquarters. When we got there we were told to forget it, everything is over. "I just received a call from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department that we are now going on an antisabotage alert, and we will guard our own installations in Fort Kamehameha and we will send a sufficient guard to protect the various stations from being damaged by people wandering around."

13. General GRUNERT. Then from that time on, which you estimate to be November 27th, you were on a Department Alert No. 1 or sabotage?

Colonel McCARTHY. Or sabotage; yes, sir.

14. General GRUNERT. What was this No. 2 alert that you were practicing?

Colonel McCARTHY. The No. 2 Alert, as we understood it, was one where we were ready to go into the field, but not actually going out into the field. No. 3 would take us right out into the field. Under No. 2 we were all supposed to go, and that was what we were working on.

15. General GRUNERT. That was just a post practice alert?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes.

16. General GRUNERT. It was not a Department No. 2 Alert?

Colonel McCARTHY. It was not called by the Department, [1922] not that one that we were working on.

17. General GRUNERT. Did your command have anything to do against an alert called against an air attack?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

18. General GRUNERT. You would have no function during an air attack alert?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir; I would have none.

19. General GRUNERT. Then that explains why you were on Alert No. 2 and it was called off about November 27th, and you went on a Department alert?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes.

20. General GRUNERT. But the No. 2 Alert that you were on was a post practice alert which got you ready to take the field, but you did not go into the field?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir.

21. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything about the protective and defensive measures for the post that were in effect prior to the attack? For instance, what were the measures for the defense of the post itself, what were the protective measures for the care of personnel, the protection of personnel and so forth?

Colonel McCARTHY. Under the SOP that we operated under from headquarters of the 7th Coast Artillery Brigade.

22. General GRUNERT. Who had that brigade?

Colonel McCARTHY. At that particular moment General Burgin was in command, but he had relieved General Gardiner. In the event of a No. 3 Alert all organizations had separate sectors, I myself having the so-called inner sector. That consisted of all of the defenses of 155s and some searchlights from a point just north of Barbers Point.

[1923] 23. General GRUNERT. We will stop right there. I think you mistake what I am after. I want to find out what measures there were to protect the post proper in the line of machine guns to fire upon airplanes, slit trenches to jump into, air raid shelters, and so forth.

Colonel McCARTHY. There were no air raid shelters as such. The only air raid shelter that was figured on being used was at Battery Hasbrouck, which was a 12-inch battery, and that was a regroup CP, all underground. Perhaps I better go back a little further. Let me interpolate here that on the 17th of June, 1940, we were suddenly alerted very quickly, and everybody moved out into the field. That is the only time that I know of where we actually took the live ammunition for the guns. I at the moment had the railway battalions on the north shore. I had one railway battalion and one 155 battalion, which was manned by the 11th Field Artillery, and we took live H. E. ammunition and powder out into the field with us.

At that time the Commanding Officer, Colonel Walker, advised that all officers and enlisted men who had families to make some provision to evacuate the post to Fort Kamehameha in the event of an attack.

24. General GRUNERT. Advised the individuals to make arrangements?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes. The advice took this form: To collect a certain amount of food that you could carry, a certain amount of clothes that the family could carry, and the idea at that moment was to move back into the hills behind the Pali in the event of a landing. I personally had not figured on an air raid attack. I was thinking of a landing by troops.

[1924] 25. General GRUNERT. Was there ever an S. O. P. issued that told everybody what to do in the case of an air attack or a landing?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

26. General GRUNERT. Were there measures taken after the attack, protective measures?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes.

27. General GRUNERT. What happened then?

Colonel McCARTHY. After the attack all the women and children on the post were put into Battery Hasbrouck, and they remained there for three days and nights. Some of the women and children were evacuated into civilian homes in Honolulu, but they came back after a couple of days and returned to their quarters on the post.

28. General RUSSELL. After this alert of June 17, 1940, what was the subsequent history? How long did you stay out?

Colonel McCARTHY. We stayed out, if my memory does not fail me, until almost the 4th of August.

29. General GRUNERT. And then did the entire unit move back to the post?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir, when the alert was declared off everybody came back to the post.

30. General GRUNERT. You were out on it for about six weeks?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir.

31. General GRUNERT. What effect on your training and morale did this six-week period of training have?

Colonel McCARTHY. It did not hurt; it helped, as a matter of fact.

32. General GRUNERT. You liked it?

[1925] Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir.

33. General GRUNERT. Then there was no interference with your training or your morale?

Colonel McCARTHY. No. We carried out gunnery instructions under drill just the same as we would have had we been back at the post. In addition, we had to stand two alerts, day and night.

34. General RUSSELL. What excitement among the populace prevailed or obtained as a result of this June 17th alert?

Colonel McCARTHY. Well, General, I could not answer that. I do not know. You see, I was at Fort Kam and we went right out to the north shore, where I was stationed at the time, and came back to Kam.

35. General RUSSELL. And your testimony is to the effect that in moving in and out you did not come in contact with any of the civilian population?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir. Of course, we saw a certain amount on the road, but the only contact I had with any civilians whatsoever, in view of this procedure, was with the plantation people, securing rights of way or permission to go on their ground.

36. General RUSSELL. If there had been a great deal of excitement among the civilian population on the island, including those of Japanese descent and Japanese who had not been naturalized, such a state would naturally have reached your ears, wouldn't it?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, it would. On the Waialua Plantation a great portion of their employees were Japanese. They didn't bother us any, so far as I know. We were right there encamped on their property.

[1926] 37. General FRANK. What did you have command of on the north shore?

Colonel McCARTHY. A railway battalion. They called it the North Group, General, but it consisted of one railway battery.

38. General FRANK. You said the 11th Field Artillery manned it.

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes.

39. General FRANK. The 11th Field Artillery belonged to Burgin at Schofield, didn't it?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes. Two batteries of the 11th Field Artillery manned 155s which belonged to the Coast Artillery and they were under my control as group commander.

40. General FRANK. The Coast Artillery down at Kamahameha commanded some of the 11th Field Artillery that belonged under Burgin at Schofield?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, that is right. Those batteries were assigned to man the 155s, which were presumably harbor defense guns on the north shore. I don't know why, except that they were.

41. General GRUNERT. Colonel, have you anything that you know of that you might offer to the Board in the line of testimony that would throw light on any facts that pertain to the attack?

Colonel McCARTHY. General, the only thing I could tell you is what happened where I was.

42. General GRUNERT. What was that, briefly?

Colonel McCARTHY. At about a quarter of 8 in the morning of December 7th, I heard airplanes passing over Kamehameha and I heard this firing, machine gun firing. At the moment I thought [1927] it was the Navy practicing. I had seen them flying around a good deal.

43. General FRANK. On Sunday?

Colonel McCARTHY. This was on Sunday morning, sir.

44. General FRANK. Had the Navy been flying on Sunday and shooting?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, but we had this alert and I didn't know what was happening. I thought they were practicing. We had blank ammunition for machine guns for ground shooting, but I had never heard of them being in an airplane. I was curious and ran out to see, and just at that time I heard the swish of an explosion. I didn't know what that was. I ran out of my quarters and a Japanese plane was flying overhead with machine guns going. I immediately tried to raise headquarters. The phones were all dead. I got my car and chased the battery out, told them to go out and man their war positions, take over their battle stations.

It so happened that A Battery was in position right at Fort Kamehameha. C Battery guns were in position at Fort Weaver, but the personnel was at camp. B Battery's guns and personnel were at camp. B Battery's position was at Barbers Point.

When I got to the battery area I found B Battery in the middle of a dog fight with some planes right over their heads. They were firing .30 caliber machine guns at them. So far as I know, they shot down two planes. When I got to headquarters Battery they had knocked down one plane, and a plane had caromed off a tree and the pilot was lying on the ground. It was one of those single-seater affairs and was a total wreck. The pilot was dead.

[1928] About the second wave was just starting to come over at that time. I started to move out into Hickam Field. I saw Hickam Field was burning. I didn't know what was causing it, but I could see it burning. But after the battalion was on the road getting ready to move, I reported into headquarters for instructions. Colonel Ryan, who was in the group at headquarters, advised me he had received a report that there were 25 transports 4,000 yards off Kaena Point and for me to get into position as quickly as I could, because I was the biggest thing north of Pearl Harbor at the moment, with 155s, to be ready to repel what he naturally assumed would be a landing in force. Those transports never materialized. Where he got his information, I do not know, except that he gave me that.

I went out in the field and remained in the field until I was relieved on April 12th or 13th and came back to the United States.

45. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

**TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WILLIAM DONEGAN, G-3, FOURTH ARMY,
FORT SAM HOUSTON, TEXAS.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel DONEGAN. William N. Donegan, Colonel, General Staff Corps, O1174, G-3, Fourth Army.

2. Colonel WEST. Where are your headquarters?

Colonel DONEGAN. Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

3. General GRUNERT. Colonel, this Board is attempting to get facts or leads to facts pertaining to the background of the period leading up to and also concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor. [1929] Because of your assignment in the Hawaiian Department in the latter part of 1941 we hope that we can get some such facts from you. I have prepared a number of questions based primarily upon your position at that time, which was what?

Colonel DONEGAN. G-3.

4. General GRUNERT. G-3 of what?

Colonel DONEGAN. G-3 of the Hawaiian Department.

5. General GRUNERT. I will ask you these questions and if you cannot give us the answers, just say so. If you can, naturally we expect the answers, but I understood from an interview with you that I would probably be expecting too much from you. Are you familiar with the provisions of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan?

Colonel DONEGAN. Could I take about 1 minute, General, just to give my background, and then I think I can be in step?

6. General GRUNERT. Go right ahead.

Colonel DONEGAN. I was in the G-3 Section, Hawaiian Department from September, 1940, until Pearl Harbor. From September 1940 until November 1941 I was Assistant G-3, with a typical G-3 Section on a desk. I was appointed G-3 in November. During most of my time in the G-3 Section, now Brigadier General, then Major Hobart Hewitt was the so-called specialist on the G-3 Section, on Army and Navy agreements and also working with the Air Force. Colonel William Lawton, then Major Lawton, came in and understudied Hewitt for a period of six months, and then he took over Hewitt's task and was the specialist on the Hawaiian Defense Plan, Joint Army and Navy Agreement, and aircraft warning. On these questions he was my adviser at G-3, and I sat in at all principal meetings with the [1930] Navy and Air Force.

7. General GRUNERT. The Board expects to hear Major, now I believe Colonel, Lawton later on. In the meantime I will see what information you can give me on these questions.

8. General FRANK. From what branch does Colonel Lawton come?
Colonel DONEGAN. Both Hewitt and Lawton are Coast Artillery.

9. General GRUNERT. And you are what?

Colonel DONEGAN. Infantry.

10. General GRUNERT. Under that plan was not the Army charged with the tactical command of the defensive air operation over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu?

Colonel DONEGAN. That was my understanding.

11. General GRUNERT. They were providing the antiaircraft defense of Oahu, with particular attention to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the naval forces therein?

Colonel DONEGAN. Honolulu and Pearl Harbor; yes, sir.

12. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not the Commanding General kept himself informed as to the naval forces present in Pearl Harbor?

Colonel DONEGAN. I cannot answer that, General. There is another point I would like to bring out, based on the Roberts Commission report. We also had in the G-3 Section, now Colonel, then Major, Dingeman, who was the liaison officer between the G-3 Section, Hawaiian Department, and the 14th Naval District. I don't believe he appeared before the Roberts Commission and he is still on duty in Hawaii.

13. General GRUNERT. What is his name?

[1931] Colonel DONEGAN. Dingeman, Ray E. Dingeman. He was in the G-3 Section.

14. General GRUNERT. And he is still in the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir. They also have an Air Corps officer in the G-3 Section who has not been injected into the picture. That is Wilfred Paul. He was there I believe three months before December 7th and at least three months after December 7th. He was one of the advisers on the Air equipment. I don't believe he appeared before the Roberts Commission.

15. General GRUNERT. What do you suppose he would know that we cannot find out otherwise?

Colonel DONEGAN. He worked up several of the joint Army and Navy exercises in which the Air participated.

16. General GRUNERT. He was particularly concerned in working up exercises that General Martin wanted and that were to receive the approval of the Department?

Colonel DONEGAN. I would say the other way. He was working for General Short and he coordinated our Air Corps and Interceptor Command and Navy in these joint exercises. He was working more or less as general air adviser in the General Staff Section.

17. General GRUNERT. He would not know anything that General Martin would not know?

Colonel DONEGAN. He should not, no.

18. General GRUNERT. General Martin would probably know all that Paul knows?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

19. General GRUNERT. Our time is limited and we cannot branch out too much, unless they are leads for facts that we cannot get otherwise. [1932]

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

20. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department knew what elements of the fleet were in or out of the harbor?

Colonel DONEGAN. I do not know.

21. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether such information was ever requested from the Navy through G-3?

Colonel DONEGAN. Not through G-3. I do not recall, no, sir.

22. General GRUNERT. Would the knowledge whether the fleet was in or out of the harbor make any difference in taking defense measures or applying them or implementing them?

Colonel DONEGAN. I don't believe it would have at that time. The Navy was constantly in and out. I can recall that distinctly, because at one time they alternated a program so the Navy could be out over the week-end and come back during the week.

23. General GRUNERT. Did you consider that you had a greater responsibility when the fleet was in than when it was out?

Colonel DONEGAN. Frankly, I did not think so, as G-3.

24. General GRUNERT. I understand you had in your office a naval Lieutenant by the name of Burr.

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes.

25. General GRUNERT. Who was the naval liaison officer for the 14th Naval District.

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes.

26. General GRUNERT. Was he capable?

Colonel DONEGAN. Well, he was selected by the Navy. He [1933] was there. He was not of much value to us.

27. General GRUNERT. Did he keep you informed of what the Navy was doing?

Colonel DONEGAN. My recollection of Burr is that when we wanted information we told him what we wanted and he went out and got it for us. But he gave us very little, as I recall, on his own initiative.

28. General GRUNERT. Did you give him whatever the Navy wanted?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir. There was no question about that. Anything we had in our Section was available to him.

29. General GRUNERT. Did he often ask for it or did he have to ask for it or did you, whenever you had anything new, tell him about it or ask him whether the Navy was interested? I am trying to get at what actual liaison there was there in getting information from one to the other.

Colonel DONEGAN. It was there for him. I don't believe he asked for much. I think at that time Major Lawton was in daily contact with his corresponding number in the 14th Naval District.

30. General GRUNERT. His corresponding number would be what?

Colonel DONEGAN. There was a series. One time Hewitt and I would frequently be contacting a Captain Goode, who was the 14th Naval District, like the Chief of Staff. Then a Captain Munson. Our liaison was back and forth. I had many trips over there and would go with either Lawton or Hewitt. I have also gone to now Admiral, then Captain, McMorris, on board the cruiser *Indianapolis*. I had been over there frequently to arrange these missions. He had a Scouting Force at that time. [1934] Then I know several times a G-3 representative went out to Admiral Halsey's carrier, to

Commander Miles Browning, when the carrier would come in from a "raid", testing out.

31. General GRUNERT. Then you did not depend on this naval Lieutenant, Burr, for your contacts?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir.

32. General GRUNERT. In G-3?

Colonel DONEGAN. He was an Intelligence man.

33. General GRUNERT. Intelligence or intelligent?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, Intelligence, Naval Intelligence. He was not like a line, tactical or combat officer. He was a Navy Intelligence reserve officer. We used him very little.

34. General GRUNERT. Would he know anything about the Interceptor Command?

Colonel DONEGAN. Very little.

35. General GRUNERT. And the war warning service?

Colonel DONEGAN. We did not deal with him for anything like that. We discussed the aircraft warning service and dealt with a man in the 14th Naval District who was an expert.

36. General FRANK. He was a sort of a technical liaison man?

Colonel DONEGAN. That is right.

37. General FRANK. Rather than an efficient operating liaison man?

Colonel DONEGAN. He did not have the background. Dingeman, our man, did have the background, particularly on this harbor control post. He spent full time over at the Navy. He came in our office at 8 o'clock in the morning to check up on what we had and then went immediately over to Pearl Harbor, and came back at about 11:30 to have luncheon with us, and would go back to Pearl Harbor at 1 o'clock and spend the rest of the day there. He spent full time at Pearl Harbor.

38. General GRUNERT. That was Dingeman?

[1935] Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

39. General GRUNERT. Now I am going to read you some extracts here from the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and ask you a few questions about it.

Paragraph 4 of Section 1 of that plan designates G-3 as the planning representative for the Army, in paragraph 15c (2); Section 3 states in part:

Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

Paragraph 21, Section 6, states in part:

This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or disapproval in part or in whole by either the War or Navy Departments.

Now, do you know whether or not the War and Navy Departments approved that plan?

Colonel DONEGAN. I do not know. Was that not dated some time in April?

40. General GRUNERT. Right.

Colonel DONEGAN. 1941.

41. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether they disapproved all or part of the plan?

Colonel DONEGAN. I do not.

42. General GRUNERT. Did the War and Navy Departments ever order any part of the plan put into effect prior to M-Day?

Colonel DONEGAN. Not to my knowledge.

43. General GRUNERT. Did the local commanders ever mutually agree to put into effect any part of the plan?

Colonel DONEGAN. I do not recall. If I could talk to General Frank off the record? That comes under something about [1936] plans being put into effect. As to G-3, I do not know.

44. General GRUNERT. My next question is, if so, would that sort of thing be put on record and be of record in the Hawaiian Department, do you know?

Colonel DONEGAN. I would not say so; to my knowledge, no.

45. General GRUNERT. What is M-Day?

Colonel DONEGAN. Mobilization Day.

46. General GRUNERT. What does that mean?

Colonel DONEGAN. That is the day that the Department commanders would be notified by Washington.

47. General GRUNERT. Could the Department commanders initiate M-Day?

Colonel DONEGAN. My understanding was that Washington was going to do it.

48. General GRUNERT. I think the plan provided that M-Day could be put into effect for reasons of the imminence of war of anything like that, by local agreement between the two commanders. Of course, it would have been reported to Washington or probably a request made on Washington to put M-Day into effect.

49. General FRANK. What is M-Day?

Colonel DONEGAN. According to that plan, the War Department was going to stage an M-Day in preparation for war, prior to which we would get a maximum war strength garrison. I may add here that just a week before Pearl Harbor, after a very comprehensive and complete study, we submitted a report which was mailed not later or not earlier than the 1st of December to Washington, stating our requirements for an initial war garrison. It was in the mail on December 7th, I am sure. In that our G-3 Section worked out what we considered the essentials of what the War Department called an initial war garrison, and I believe they gave us the figures.

[1937] 50. General FRANK. What is the necessity for declaring an M-Day?

Colonel DONEGAN. In this way, I would say, they would build up the garrison to war strength. That is the only reason I know of. They certainly did not have a sufficient garrison there.

51. General FRANK. Suppose the Commander of the Hawaiian Department had declared an M-Day; what would have happened?

Colonel DONEGAN. I believe my reaction to that would be, if it was necessary for the local commanders to declare an M-Day and they believed the situation was serious enough for that, we would have gone on to a so-called Alert No. 3, instead of the sabotage alert, or No. 1, which we were on at that time. I do not believe that they thought the conditions warranted calling an M-Day. I never thought of M-Day that way before, but the emergency did not exist at that time.

52. General FRANK. What I am trying to find out is what happens in a place like Honolulu, when M-Day is declared by anybody? What is the sequence of events?

Colonel DONEGAN. I don't know. It should be in that plan. They refer to M-Day in that.

53. General GRUNERT. I will read it for the benefit of the record. It is paragraph 15 C (2) of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

M-Day is the first day of mobilization and is the time origin for the execution of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of their respective plan prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day, as ordered by the War and Navy Departments, or as mutually agreed upon by [1938] local commanders.

M-Day therefore appears to be when you take steps just as if you expect war in the near future, and in taking those steps mobilization consists of the various steps to be taken, as to the civil population, as to recruitment for the Army, reception of Army personnel, operation of martial law and various other steps that you would take only in case you think war is in the immediate offing. Is that your understanding?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes. As G-3 I didn't think war was in the immediate offing, from my knowledge of the situation at that time.

54. General GRUNERT. What was your position in January, 1941? Assistant G-3?

Colonel DONEGAN. Assistant G-3 and the section I had, I believe, was that I was in charge of ground troops. I remember particularly tables of organization and so forth.

55. General GRUNERT. While in G-3 there did you know of a letter written by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of War's reply to the Navy, a copy of which was sent to the Hawaiian Department, that pertained to the defenses, called attention to certain weaknesses, and especially called attention to the need for preparation to meet air attacks? Do you remember that letter at that time?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir, I don't believe I do.

56. General GRUNERT. General Short acknowledged receipt of a copy of that letter of February 19, 1941. Do you know what was done between February and December in the line of increasing the defense against air attack, generally speaking?

Colonel DONEGAN. Well, from a training viewpoint I know [1939] we had considerable training. We had exercises with the Navy at least once a month, sometimes twice a month. I think we had it with the Hawaiian Air Force. We had CPX. I recall an Air Force communications officer running CPXs.

57. General GRUNERT. Do you know that they were building an air warning service?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

58. General GRUNERT. Was that considered progress toward air defense?

Colonel DONEGAN. I would consider it such.

59. General GRUNERT. What other things were done?

Colonel DONEGAN. I believe during the year 1941 they built that Information Center at Fort Shafter.

60. General GRUNERT. Who in G-3 would know more about this line of questions?

Colonel DONEGAN. Lawton.

61. General GRUNERT. Lawton?

Colonel DONEGAN. He was a specialist in G-3.

62. General GRUNERT. Then our best source, outside of General Short, would be whom?

Colonel DONEGAN. The Chief of Staff, General Davidson, who had the Interceptor Command; Colonel Paul, Department Signal Officer, and Lawton, who was the General Staff man.

63. General GRUNERT. Can you, of your own knowledge, give us any information that they cannot?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir, and it would not be as accurate.

64. General GRUNERT. Then I will see if I can find something else that you may be able to give us better information about than they may. What was your conception or understanding of the [1940] generally increasing tautness of the international situation as between the United States and Japan during the latter part of the year 1941? What did you know about it and where did you get your impressions, and what were your impressions?

Colonel DONEGAN. Is this personal, official or a combination?

65. General GRUNERT. Combination. Tell me what you know.

Colonel DONEGAN. I think we all felt that there was a tenseness there. We were working every night during the month of November. I think Lawton, Dingeman and I worked every night till 10 or 11 o'clock.

66. General GRUNERT. What did you work at?

Colonel DONEGAN. At that time we were planning to take over from the Navy the occupation and defenses—well, we were going to send task forces to Canton, maybe Christmas. We were going to take over Palmyra.

67. General GRUNERT. Let us stick to Hawaii.

Colonel DONEGAN. This was all under the Joint Hawaiian Department. The tempo had increased, because, as I say, we figured out an initial war garrison if the War Department knew our requirements. It stepped up the garrison to around 60,000. I knew we were flying some ships out to the Far East. We were building an air field down in the South Pacific under the Department's control. We had a time date. I think the time date the War Department sent was March, 1942, for Christmas and Canton. I don't know whether it is both, but it sticks in my mind as March. General Short fixed it, by a directive for January. He stepped it up about two months.

68. General GRUNERT. Let us get back to your state of mind of [1941] the relationship between Japan and the United States. You say you realized, on account of all this, that the situation was growing more and more tense. What did that indicate to you? Did it alarm you in any way as to the defenses of Hawaii or the possibility of an attack on Hawaii?

Colonel DONEGAN. That, sir, would come from G-2. I have no such information.

69. General GRUNERT. But there was a General Staff. You were all one family and one set of brains. G-2 is not supposed to know everything. What did G-3 know? What did you know?

Colonel DONEGAN. I didn't know a thing as to an attack coming when it came.

70. General GRUNERT. Did you know what information was being received, what alarm or what warning as to the danger of that attack? Did it come home to you that it might come or was in the offing or away in the distance, or what?

Colonel DONEGAN. Frankly, I did not visualize an attack was coming. I did not expect it.

71. General GRUNERT. Were you acquainted with or did you have knowledge of the Navy message that was received and transmitted to the Army which started out "Consider this a war warning."?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir, I never saw it.

72. General GRUNERT. You never saw it, but did you ever hear of it?

Colonel DONEGAN. I was called up to the Department Commander's office, I believe, when that message of November 27th was received, when we had a staff conference, or the Chief of Staff had it, and I later went into General Short's office—

73. General GRUNERT. That message is the one known as the Chief of Staff message of November 27th?

Colonel DONEGAN. It might be. That is the last one I [1942] recall before Pearl Harbor.

74. General GRUNERT. That was an Army message, was it?

Colonel DONEGAN. That was an Army message.

75. General GRUNERT. That is the Chief of Staff message of November 27th?

Colonel DONEGAN. That is the one where they mentioned the Rainbow plan?

76. General GRUNERT. Yes. Tell us what happened then?

Colonel DONEGAN. We stepped up the tempo of this antisabotage.

77. General GRUNERT. What do you know about that message?

Colonel DONEGAN. That is a long time ago, General.

78. General GRUNERT. Were you called into conference as to its meanings?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir. We discussed it, and later I went into General Short, with one or more others of the G-3 Section, and we discussed it.

79. General GRUNERT. I think it would be well if I read that message and refreshed your memory here, because I want to ask you a few more questions about it. This is the message of November 27th, 1941, from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

(War Department message of November 27, 1941, was read as follows:)

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile [1943] Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as to not, repeat not, alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

That refreshes your mind?

[1944] Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. Now, where did you get in on that discussion of that message?

Colonel DONEGAN. The Chief of Staff called a conference, up in his office. I will go back. I was out in the field, and I returned from the field. The conference had started, and the Chief of Staff was reading that message. Prior to that time, I believe that Major Horner, in the G-3 section—he is now Colonel Horner, G-2, of the Ninth Corps—had gone over the Rainbow plan with General Short, and I further believe that after the Chief of Staff's conference we restudied that telegram in the G-3 section. That is the best I can recall it.

80. General GRUNERT. Now, where did you come in on it? What advice did you give about it?

Colonel DONEGAN. As far as the Chief of Staff, the decision had been made, as I say, when I returned from the field, and I believe this directive had been issued about this sabotage or Alert 1.

81. General GRUNERT. Then the decision had been made?

Colonel DONEGAN. It had been made.

82. General GRUNERT. You were not called upon to recommend what was to be done under that, before the decision was made?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir. I was not present at the headquarters. I was, I say, in the field, and when I returned, the conference was in session, and I think the Staff study had been made on it.

83. General GRUNERT. Do you know who represented G-3 in the discussion before the decision was made?

Colonel DONEGAN. I am sure that then Major Horner did.

84. General GRUNERT. Would it have been natural for them to call on G-3 Operations for recommendations as to action to be taken under such a warning, or did the Commanding General make the [1945] decision with his Chief of Staff, or what?

Colonel DONEGAN. Of course, that was the first time we had ever received such a warning, and there was no precedent for the staff procedure in the headquarters.

85. General GRUNERT. But there had been other decisions made that pertained to operations before that, undoubtedly?

Colonel DONEGAN. In other decisions pertaining to G-3, invariably it was called up.

86. General GRUNERT. But in this, you had no say, personally?

Colonel DONEGAN. I was not available, at the time.

87. General GRUNERT. Or, the discussion afterwards, after the decision was made? Then you reread this thing?

Colonel DONEGAN. I think that G-3 went into a conference among ourselves, and we put in effect the directive of the Chief of Staff, and we made no other recommendation.

88. General GRUNERT. In your discussion was any question raised as to whether or not an antisabotage alert was sufficient to cover what was required and what was intimated in that radiogram?

Colonel DONEGAN. I do not believe there was, in the G-3 section.

89. General GRUNERT. In your own mind, did you ever give it a thought as to whether or not the "Old Man" was going far enough?

Colonel DONEGAN. I will be frank, with you, General, I didn't. I was fooled as much as anybody else—if we were fooled. That is my honest opinion.

90. General GRUNERT. Do you think that the antisabotage alert covered the requirements of the situation?

Colonel DONEGAN. I would rather not state, in that there was a decision of the Department Commander. That was his decision, and I would rather not comment on it.

91. General GRUNERT. Were you free to state your opinion and to hammer it home as long as no decision had been made?

Colonel DONEGAN. I feel that at headquarters I was always [1946] free to say anything I wanted to say.

92. General GRUNERT. Then you feel that, the decision having been made, from that time on your thoughts were not to be expressed, but the decision was to be carried out?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir; I did not feel that way. The decision was made, and if I had taken exception to it, which I had done several times in the past, I would have gone up and recommended a modification. In this case I didn't. I don't believe anybody in the G-3 section recommended I do it.

93. General GRUNERT. Since the Chief of Staff had been G-3, was there any inclination on his part to make decisions for G-3 without consulting G-3?

Colonel DONEGAN. I don't think you can say that he was G-3. If he had been G-3, it was only for about a month. Colonel "Phil" Hayes was the G-3. He was relieved by Colonel Throckmorton; and Colonel Phillips was not G-3, to my knowledge, over six weeks. He was just waiting to step in to take over the Chief of Staff's job. He never was a G-3.

94. General GRUNERT. How was that staff team, over there? Was it a cohesive team, or were there some disagreements among them, any jealousies, or backbiting, or disappointments, or what?

Colonel DONEGAN. I don't think there were any disappointments, if you are referring to the appointment of the Chief of Staff—not to my knowledge.

95. General GRUNERT. Did the staff, or did you, consider Phillips competent to be a Chief of Staff of the Department?

Colonel DONEGAN. I would rather not answer. We have been warned on this thing. I would rather not discuss this thing. I think that is perfectly all right, isn't it?

96. General GRUNERT. We will not require you to discuss it. You spoke of Captain McMorris, of the Navy?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

97. General GRUNERT. What was his position in the fleet, do [1947] you know?

Colonel DONEGAN. He was the Chief of Staff of the Scouting Force, and I remember I went over there with Hobart Hewitt, and visited him aboard the flagship, and also I think, with Lawton, and we did a lot of our training with him.

98. General GRUNERT. Did he ever express himself to you as to what he thought about this Japanese situation and the dangers of it, or anything of that kind?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir. I think we worked quite closely with him, because I saw considerable of him when he was Admiral Nimitz' Operations Officer for Pearl Harbor; and he never expressed himself to me.

99. General GRUNERT. What did you have to do with getting up the SOP of November 5?

Colonel DONEGAN. I had a chance to go over it and delete anything I didn't like, I think, and that SOP, I signed it. I read it before I came to this Board. It is dated November 5, and I think I was appointed Chief of Staff about November 7, and I couldn't have been Chief of Staff 24 hours when I signed that thing; but I helped work on it in the section, as an Assistant G-3.

100. General GRUNERT. And you became Chief of Staff of the Department?

Colonel DONEGAN. Not more than a month before Pearl Harbor. I mean, the G-3.

101. General GRUNERT. Oh; I did not understand that you had been Chief of Staff.

Colonel DONEGAN. Oh, no. I was G-3, appointed G-3 of the Hawaiian Department in November 1941.

102. General GRUNERT. But then, you had been in the G-3 section?

Colonel DONEGAN. The G-3 section. I worked on that SOP.

103. General GRUNERT. Then you were the next senior in the G-3 section, were you?

[1948] Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir; I was.

104. General GRUNERT. By the way, how did the staff section work together? Did they work in isolated groups, or in "compartments," you might call them?

Colonel DONEGAN. No. It was customary in that headquarters to have a staff conference every Saturday morning at 8 o'clock. The Chief of every General and Special Staff section, or the senior or president of the section was present, and it was conducted by the Chief of Staff, and at that conference it was supposed that each General Staff would bring out the principal activity of the week; and G-2 was called in for an orientation, to bring out numbers of things going on. That was customary.

105. General GRUNERT. Let us ask you a little bit about those orientations. When was the last staff meeting held before December 7?

Colonel DONEGAN. I would say, on the morning before. It must have been.

106. General GRUNERT. That was on a Saturday, and your meetings usually took place on Saturday?

Colonel DONEGAN. Every Saturday morning at 8 o'clock. I don't know whether it was held on Saturday, December 6, or not; if not, it was an exception, because they were held every Saturday morning at 8 o'clock.

107. General GRUNERT. All right. If it was held December 6, and the Saturday before that, did G-2 come up with anything alarming about the situation?

Colonel DONEGAN. It did not.

108. General GRUNERT. Did not? Then you concluded there was nothing, inasmuch as you heard nothing said, and G-2 told you nothing at these conferences? Or do you suppose G-2 did not put out, there, but kept a lot to himself, or between him and his Commanding General, which?

Colonel DONEGAN. I don't think the G-2 visualized what was [1949] impending.

109. General FRANK. Did G-2 ever have any information that was very "hot?"

Colonel DONEGAN. I never got any of it, as G-3. I don't think there was much "hot." I know he didn't pass it out.

110. General GRUNERT. Now, were these conferences "hot," or were they just—"Oh, well! we have to get together once a week and tell them something!"

Colonel DONEGAN. Well, you say about being "compartments." That certainly took us out of the "compartment," and let us know what the other fellow was doing, if we had anything. It was kind of instructive to all the staff. I would tell them, from G-3, what the problems were, what we were doing, and each section would do the same thing.

111. General GRUNERT. But, in the last two conferences, on the last two Saturdays before Pearl Harbor, there was no particular discussion about what might come; or was there any particular discussion about sabotage?

Colonel DONEGAN. I cannot recall.

112. General GRUNERT. That was a "hot" subject then, was it not?

Colonel DONEGAN. A "hot" subject in G-3. In our section, every officer went out to make visits, for sabotage, went around to see that the guards were on these water plants and power plants, and down by the docks, and the oil fuels, down there; and we thought sabotage was the real thing, and practically every officer in the section was out daily checking on activities.

113. General GRUNERT. In your section, or in the General Staff meeting, either one, did the question ever come up as to, "Well, the Navy is doing its job of distant reconnaissance, to ward off an attack, or to let us know if there is anything coming"? Did that subject ever come up?

Colonel DONEGAN. I can't say whether it did or not.

114. General GRUNERT. It apparently did not impress itself on [1950] you, if it did come up, because, otherwise, you might remember it.

Colonel DONEGAN. To my knowledge, I think reconnaissance was effective. I personally thought so.

115. General GRUNERT. You thought distant reconnaissance was effective?

Colonel DONEGAN. I thought so.

116. General GRUNERT. What made you think that distant reconnaissance was effective—your confidence in the Navy; or did you know anything in particular about it?

Colonel DONEGAN. Well, I thought I knew something about it. I tried to keep abreast of it, and my reaction is, I thought it was effective, that they were doing as much as could be expected.

117. General GRUNERT. Would the Navy liaison officer attend these General Staff meetings?

Colonel DONEGAN. Only the Chiefs of sections attended.

118. General GRUNERT. The naval liaison officer was not in on it?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir.

119. General GRUNERT. So, even if he had had any information on it, he was not there to give it to you?

Colonel DONEGAN. Well, he would have told me. It was my liaison officer, and I could have told them at the staff section.

120. General GRUNERT. What did Dingeman ever tell you about the Navy reconnaissance; anything?

Colonel DONEGAN. Not to my knowledge.

121. General GRUNERT. Did you ever make any definite inquiries as to what the Navy was doing in the line of distant reconnaissance?

Colonel DONEGAN. I think we would go direct. I would go over with Lawton, direct, over to the Navy, and ask those questions.

122. General GRUNERT. All right. Did you go directly?

Colonel DONEGAN. We visited frequently.

[1951] 123. General GRUNERT. Did you ask about the distant reconnaissance?

Colonel DONEGAN. I don't recall whether we did or not.

124. General GRUNERT. But you were interested in it, weren't you?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir. That was going on three years, which is a long time. I don't know whether we discussed that, or not.

125. General GRUNERT. Then you thought they had distant reconnaissance, but you really didn't know. You don't remember anything about it?

Colonel DONEGAN. I believe at this time that they were having effective distant reconnaissance. If they didn't, I didn't know it.

126. General GRUNERT. Was that in the line of 360° patrolling?

Colonel DONEGAN. Well, I would say west of Hawaii.

127. General GRUNERT. West of Hawaii?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes; west.

128. General GRUNERT. Were you depending on the task forces that went out, or on the planes that were sent out or ordered, or did you just have general confidence that they were doing what you thought they ought to do?

Colonel DONEGAN. Frankly, I feel that is more G-2 than G-3. You are asking me this, G-3, and I should think that would be a G-2 thing for the Hawaiian Department.

129. General GRUNERT. Well, the G-3 is operations, and in case anything happens, you have to control the fighting of the defense, do you not?

Colonel DONEGAN. I understand that, but I get my information from G-2. He goes out and gets it?

130. General GRUNERT. Well, did you ask G-2 about it?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir. He had no information, other than I think he gave me everything he had; so far as I know he [1952] did.

131. General GRUNERT. How was Fielder considered, as to G-2?

Colonel DONEGAN. I would rather not discuss personalities.

132. General GRUNERT. Well, discuss officialities, then. Officially, was he considered O. K.?

Colonel DONEGAN. As far as I know, he was O. K. I would say he was as good a G-2 as I was a G-3. I would just as soon let that go in the record.

133. General FRANK. That's fair enough.

134. General GRUNERT. Yes; that's fair enough.

What brought about this system of Alerts 1, 2, and 3? When you first went over there, they only had one kind of alert, didn't they, and that was an all-out alert?

Colonel DONEGAN. That is right.

135. General GRUNERT. Then why 1, 2, or 3? That must have been in your minds, or somebody started it.

Colonel DONEGAN. That was discussed a great deal, and I think the idea was that in the past when they had an alert they moved everything out, and this way they could continue their training and develop as necessary.

136. General GRUNERT. You mean, then, it was a step from the less serious to the more serious, to the all-out?

Colonel DONEGAN. To the all-out.

137. General GRUNERT. All right.

Now, let us get down to this training. Just what training would be handicapped in Alert No. 2, which was a combination of defense against aircraft and antisabotage? Just how did that interfere seriously with training, and whose training?

Colonel DONEGAN. Well, I think it spread a considerable number of men all over the island, every vital installation, the [1953] ground forces, and it was principally ground forces. You asked me about the antiaircraft. I will say it did not affect antiaircraft.

138. General GRUNERT. That was part of the air defense, was it not? not?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes.

139. General GRUNERT. How did it affect the air training?

Colonel DONEGAN. I don't believe it did affect the air.

140. General GRUNERT. It did affect the ground troops, but they had the least to do, and would not have been put out in No. 2, would they?

Colonel DONEGAN. Fifty percent, in No. 2; and I think SOP, as I recall it—you have it, I think—50% went out on Alert No. 2; as I recall, one battalion, or one something, motorized.

141. General GRUNERT. But that was primarily for antisabotage?

142. General FRANK. No. 2.

143. General GRUNERT. No. 2 includes, against air and anti-sabotage?

Colonel DONEGAN. And sabotage.

144. General GRUNERT. But what brought the infantry out, the "ground troops," as we call them? The bringing out of the infantry in full force was No. 3?

Colonel DONEGAN. 100% in the field.

146. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Colonel DONEGAN. Everything.

146. General GRUNERT. Everything for the fact that they had certain guarding duties against sabotage under No. 2, and so forth, they were not much concerned with No. 2?

Colonel DONEGAN. Well, you take 50%. All right, now, they [1954] are considerably concerned. Fifty percent were altered under No. 2.

147. General GRUNERT. Do you know the reason back of calling Alert No. 1 "antisabotage" instead of Alert No. 2, which would have been against air, and antisabotage?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir.

148. General GRUNERT. You do not know the reason, whether the reason was all training, part training, or what?

Colonel DONEGAN. I don't; no, sir. I think they thought No. 1 would do the job, otherwise they would have called No. 2.

149. General GRUNERT. Would do what job?

Colonel DONEGAN. Whatever job it was, from the information received from Washington.

150. General GRUNERT. The job that was intimated, appeared to be in the Navy message, which was transmitted to the Army—"this is a war warning"?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes.

151. General GRUNERT. Now, would antisabotage take care of a war in the offing?

Colonel DONEGAN. I don't recall seeing it, as I stated.

152. General GRUNERT. Then you referred to the job that the Chief of Staff's message which I read to you called for?

Colonel DONEGAN. November 27.

153. General GRUNERT. We will go back to that message. In that message the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he might deem necessary. Was any additional reconnaissance made, do you know, or did he not consider any additional reconnaissance necessary?

Colonel DONEGAN. I don't remember. If it was ordered, it [1955] is certainly a matter of record somewhere. I don't recall.

154. General GRUNERT. Would such matters have been sent out through you in directives to do such, or not? I am not heckling you; I am just after information.

Colonel DONEGAN. I think this has been handled direct by the Chief of Staff. It all came so fast, and I say, there was no precedent, this was the first time it was done; so you see normally you can't say whether it would be handled through G-3 or not, because there was no staff precedent or procedure for it.

155. General GRUNERT. Is there anything now in the line of alerts or the influences or conclusions respecting this information that you had, that you could tell the Board, that might give us further light on this thing, as to the state of mind or the reasons or causes, or anything in that line?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir. I tell you, it all happened so fast, November 27 to December 7, that we were, I will say, on Alert 1. Then, I couldn't get the reactions of other officers, after December 7. It was just a question of our being in the tunnel, we dug in, and it wasn't discussed, even, in fact, in my own section; we didn't have the time.

156. General GRUNERT. The Hawaiian command was created and put out there as an outpost, and it was their business to be prepared for anything; and, if they were properly warned, if you had notice, why then of course it was the business of the command, your business as G-3, to make whatever plans the "Old Man" called for?

Colonel DONEGAN. It was.

157. General GRUNERT. And up to that time you considered the plans had been made and pretty well implemented, is that right?

[1956] Colonel DONEGAN. From the information that I knew, I think the Department Commander took the steps that were adequate.

158. General GRUNERT. From what you know of the training and stated training and efficiency of the command, had it been Alert 2, what would have been the results of this attack that did come? Have you ever tried to visualize it that way? Could you have stopped it?

Colonel DONEGAN. I have tried to visualize it from all angles. I don't know whether it could be stopped or not.

159. General GRUNERT. Could you minimize the danger, or the amount of damage that was done?

Colonel DONEGAN. Well, I don't have to answer it, but I will say I don't believe—it would have been negligible, is my opinion.

160. General GRUNERT. If you do not answer some of these things, it leads me to believe that you have something for which you are afraid you might be hauled up.

Colonel DONEGAN. Oh, no, sir! Not a thing to worry me, about that!

161. General GRUNERT. I think I will turn you over to one of the other Members of the Board, here, until I think of something else. General Russell?

162. General RUSSELL. You were out there when General Short came out, were you, Colonel?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

163. General RUSSELL. You had been out there some time before that?

Colonel DONEGAN. I arrived in the Department in August 1940.

164. General RUSSELL. How many new officers did General Short bring out there with him?

Colonel DONEGAN. Very few. From the top down, he brought [1957] Phillips, he brought Truman. I don't know of anybody else I can recall right now.

165. General RUSSELL. Phillips became Chief of Staff, and Truman was an aide?

Colonel DONEGAN. That is right.

166. General RUSSELL. All the other people who were functioning out there on General Short's staff as of December 7 he found when he got out there, if that be true?

Colonel DONEGAN. I would say, as my memory recalls it, I know of no one else that he brought out.

167. General RUSSELL. It was not a cleaning out of the staff when Short came out there and a moving in of a new staff?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir.

168. General RUSSELL. How did you happen to be sent out there? Was it because it was your turn to go out there?

Colonel DONEGAN. I went out in the foreign service. I was assigned to the Twenty-first Infantry at Schofield, and I was a Major of Infantry, in the G-3 section, on DS. I had a nervous breakdown and I was placed in the hospital. They let me out, and I asked to go out on DS. I went out there as assistant.

169. General RUSSELL. What I am trying to get at, Colonel, is this: Who sent people out to the Hawaiian Department? Was it the War Department, or the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel DONEGAN. The War Department, always.

170. General RUSSELL. Did they require the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to take such people as he had and as the War Department sent him, and do what he could with them?

Colonel DONEGAN. That is right. He selected his staff [1958] usually from the personnel available in the Hawaiian Department.

171. General RUSSELL. These people who were on the staff, there, Fielder, and you, and Throckmorton—and who was this man who was G-4?

Colonel DONEGAN. Marsden.

172. General RUSSELL. All those people were already on the staff when Short got there, were they not?

Colonel DONEGAN. Let me get this, now. When Short arrived, "Empty" Potts was G-1. That is Adam E. Potts. Marsden was G-2, Throckmorton was G-3, and Carl Bankfield, I told you, was G-4. Carl Bankfield went back to the mainland, expiration of service, and Marsden was put into G-4. "Empty" Potts dropped out of or was called off of G-1 and went off with a Coast Artillery outfit.

173. General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, this staff out there was just a sort of normal staff in the Army as it had operated at that time; they were gradually leaving, and gradually coming in?

Colonel DONEGAN. That is right.

174. General RUSSELL. General Short had the same problem that anybody else would have had, to make the best he could out of what he had, is that right?

Colonel DONEGAN. Oh, yes; it is the Commander's prerogative to select his staff.

175. General RUSSELL. He had to select them from within the Department?

Colonel DONEGAN. I believe he inherited some that were sent out by War Department selection. I think Hobart Hewitt, in the G-3 section, assistant G-3, was sent out by the War Department, the selection of the War Department General Staff. Then there was a transition, when the War Department no longer selected them, and the local commander selected detail on General Staff.

176. General RUSSELL. From where?

Colonel DONEGAN. From personnel available within the Department. [1959]

177. General RUSSELL. From within the Hawaiian Department?

Do you think these people who were selected to be on General Short's staff were selected and sent to him, because they were specially allotted as General Staff officers?

Colonel DONEGAN. Which people are you talking about, General?

178. General RUSSELL. You and Marsden and Phillips—all of you people. How did you happen to get an assignment on this staff?

Colonel DONEGAN. It was selected as an assistant G-3 by Throckmorton, on his recommendation, and was then G-3, and I was placed on General Staff on the recommendation of Colonel Hayes, when Hayes was Chief of Staff.

179. General RUSSELL. Some questions were asked you about your not being called upon to express an opinion on this November 27 message. I did not get your testimony any too clearly, but as I recall, you said that if you had disagreed with the Commander's decision, and had you thought that antisabotage was not sufficient, you would have felt perfectly free to go in and discuss it?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

180. General RUSSELL. With the Chief of Staff, or the Commanding General, or with whom?

Colonel DONEGAN. My channel would have been to go to the Chief of Staff.

181. General RUSSELL. Were they arbitrary, up there?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir.

182. General RUSSELL. They permitted you to discuss matters with them?

[1960] Colonel DONEGAN. I always felt free to go in.

183. General RUSSELL. I got the impression from your testimony, Colonel, that in these night jobs that were being carried on, and the work being done in G-3, your thinking was in the terms of Japan and Wake? It was directed toward Japan and Wake?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, that was based on War Department directives. The War Department told us to make studies of task forces necessary to take over certain islands, and I think Palmyra was one which was then occupied by the Navy, and we figured out a "TO," a table of organization, naturally involving Coast Artillery, Infantry, and Antiaircraft, and we worked those out with the Navy representative, who was Colonel of Marines, and submitted those to Washington.

184. General RUSSELL. But this work that you G-3 people were under pressure to do did not relate to Oahu and the defenses there, but related to islands which lay between you and, generally, the Philippines; is that right?

Colonel DONEGAN. That was just an additional job. Our defense of Oahu was the primary mission we had, there was no question about it, you can't get away from it. This was just additional work, prior to December 7. I was trying to give you a background of what we were doing, and that was one of the major works going on in the section during the month of November, the latter part of November.

185. General RUSSELL. Did General Short step up the defensive preparations after he got there?

Colonel DONEGAN. Considerably.

186. General RUSSELL. Pardon?

Colonel DONEGAN. A great deal.

[1961] 187. General RUSSELL. He was defense-conscious, you feel?

Colonel DONEGAN. Very much so. In fact, I think a great deal was done, there, on the defense, on bunkers, pill bunkers for the Air Corps, pill boxes, beach defense, being constantly carried on.

188. General RUSSELL. Reference was made to Hawaii as an outpost, it being the area nearest the mainland, which had been fortified and occupied by us; but were there not many other installations between us and Japan and Wake and Midway and the Philippine Islands and Guam, whatever was done on Guam?

Colonel DONEGAN. That is correct.

189. General RUSSELL. That is all.

Colonel DONEGAN. What has that got to do with it?

190. General RUSSELL. How?

Colonel DONEGAN. May I ask a question? What has that got to do with it?

191. General RUSSELL. I don't know what anything has to do with it!

192. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions, General Frank?

193. General FRANK. Had you ever discussed the possibility of an air attack or an air raid on Oahu?

Colonel DONEGAN. Discussed it many, many times, every time we had a joint Army and Navy exercise, when they came in on Navy carriers, and so forth.

194. General FRANK. What was your thought about the possibility of a raid on Oahu by a Jap carrier force?

Colonel DONEGAN. Well, I believed it was possible; I didn't think it was probable. I discussed that with staff officers Street and Hagenberg, and they discussed it many times.

[1962] 195. General FRANK. Had you ever gone into it in a very detailed manner?

Colonel DONEGAN. I had gone into it with your man Farthing, in connection with patrolling. He had a patrolling plan, there, and I had gone into it and studied it with him—the number of planes necessary to patrol, and the 360° patrol. All those things were discussed.

196. General FRANK. Speaking in race-track parlance, what did you consider the possibility of a Jap air raid?

Colonel DONEGAN. Frankly, I didn't expect one or anticipate one. I didn't think they would attempt it; but I had not made up my mind that way.

197. General FRANK. What were the chances, did you think?

Colonel DONEGAN. I hadn't even thought it out in chances.

198. General FRANK. If you did not think they would do it, why wouldn't they do it? Let us approach it from the other side. Let us approach it from the Japanese side. That is what I am trying to get at.

Colonel DONEGAN. Well, you could ask every officer in the Hawaiian Department, over there, the same question, and it's "second guessing" now, three years later. I think, to ask them, "Why don't you think they attempted it?" I don't believe anybody over there, whether it was the Department Staff or the Air Force Staff or Antiaircraft, thought it. That is what we were there, for, but nobody expected it.

199. General FRANK. If you thought the Japs would not attempt it, why, from the Jap point of view, wouldn't they attempt it?

Colonel DONEGAN. I don't know why—I will say the same thing—I don't know why I should answer these questions.

[1963] 200. General FRANK. I am trying to get it as a point of view, and we are building up a point of view and a background on this thing. That is the reason I would like to get it. You are a professional soldier, you have been in the Army over a period of time.

Colonel DONEGAN. That is correct.

201. General FRANK. And you must have some sort of professional opinion. From that point of view, then, I would like to have a professional opinion from you on that subject, if you have one.

Colonel DONEGAN. Well, I can say that with contemporaries there, I discussed it many, many times, and we had our defenses set for it, and we studied and supervised the training in connection with the anti-air defense, antiaircraft, and I personally did not anticipate a raid on Hawaii.

202. General FRANK. Well, I have asked you two or three times. Why. Was it because it was hazardous, it was a risky thing to do, they

were hazarding too much to attempt it, or what was behind your reason for thinking they would not attempt it?

Colonel DONEGAN. My reason would be that I thought that their interest lay more in Asia than that they would care to jeopardize the chances, or their limited fleet, in coming to Hawaii. That would be my reaction.

203. General FRANK. How much of a risk were the Japs taking in pulling a raid on Honolulu?

Colonel DONEGAN. The answer is, "Zero," right now, based on December 7; but I should think it would be a great risk.

204. General FRANK. All right. Well, that was the reason? That is one of the reasons that you thought they would not attempt it, was because you thought it was too great a risk?

[1964] 205. General FRANK. Had everything not clicked for them, it might have resulted in a disaster? Had both the Navy and the Army been sufficiently alerted to have gone after them, it might have resulted in a disaster?

Colonel DONEGAN. Well, it could have been a 100% failure, there is no question about it—just as bad a failure as it was a success, if things were 100% the other way.

206. General FRANK. Now, did you read the Martin-Bellinger estimate of the situation?

Colonel DONEGAN. When was it published?

207. General FRANK. I refer to the air estimate of the situation that they got out in the spring of 1941.

Colonel DONEGAN. The spring of 1941?

208. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel DONEGAN. I don't recall it.

209. General FRANK. They made an air estimate on the situation.

Colonel DONEGAN. Who is Bellinger—the Admiral?

210. General FRANK. The Admiral in command of Patrol Wing 2.

Colonel DONEGAN. PAT-2? I have sat in conference with him in connection with the use of air.

211. General FRANK. Do you remember this air estimate of the situation that was submitted?

Colonel DONEGAN. No doubt I have read it, if he wrote it.

212. General FRANK. To get back to this air attack again, did you ever make any comparison between the probability of damage from an air raid and the probability of damage from sabotage?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, I didn't.

213. General FRANK. Or as to which was more probable?

Colonel DONEGAN. Let me say this, General. I think, now, [1965] that, after three years, to come here and ask a lot of questions about what we did or what we didn't do three years ago, I think it's rather unfair, whether I am a professional soldier of 27 years' service, or not. Since Pearl Harbor, like many others, we have been trying to win this war, working about 12 to 14 hours a day, and to come in here "cold" and ask me what I thought in December 1941, I think it is unfair for the Board to do it.

214. General FRANK. I asked you if you had ever made that comparison.

Colonel DONEGAN. I never compared the damage that an air-raid would do, and the damage by sabotage. I feel certain I don't recall going through any such mental operations.

215. General GRUNERT. The witness may think that he is under some compulsion to answer these questions. If you don't know the answer, say so.

Colonel DONEGAN. I would like to give you the answer, if I can.

216. General GRUNERT. If you haven't thought it over, say, "I don't remember"; but to the questions asked, give him an answer, or say, "I don't want to answer anything." You are not under compulsion to try to think back three years ago and actually remember details.

Colonel DONEGAN. I would like to make my stand clear. I would like to assist the Board as much as possible.

217. General GRUNERT. That is all we want.

Colonel DONEGAN. But I would like to have the questions within bounds.

218. General GRUNERT. If they are out of bounds, you need not answer them, if you cannot answer them, as far as you know.

Colonel DONEGAN. All right.

[1966] 219. General GRUNERT. But we have to get facts, and we have to dig. We have to do a lot of digging, and this is one of the methods of digging, to see, to get the state of mind, and everything; and so we are going to continue to dig.

Go ahead.

220. General FRANK. No, I have no more.

221. General GRUNERT. Are there any suggestions by the Recorder, the Assistant Recorder, or the Executive Officer?

222. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir.

223. General GRUNERT. That appears to be all. Thank you for coming up.

(The witness was excused with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day, took up the consideration of other business.)

[1967]

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[1968] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 30, 1944

PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Houlmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL JOHN S. PRATT (RETIRED)

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel PRATT. Colonel John S. Pratt. I am retired. I live in San Francisco, 2230 Washington Street.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is after facts. It wants facts and background and viewpoints in order to get leads as to where it can develop facts; that is, both prior to and during the Pearl Harbor attack. Because of your assignment during 1941, particularly, we thought you might give us some facts or lead us to where we might get facts.

[1969] Will you tell the Board what your experience has been in the line of assignments in Hawaii, and give approximate dates.

Colonel PRATT. I arrived in Hawaii the latter part of June 1937, and left Hawaii April 22, 1942. I was on the Department Staff as Officer in Charge of Civilian Component Affairs, which included the National Guard, the organized Reserve, and the R. O. T. C. My office was in the business section of the city, and not at Fort Shafter.

3. General GRUNERT. Then you had experience in and about Honolulu for nearly five years?

Colonel PRATT. That is true.

4. General GRUNERT. That included the time leading up to the attack of December 7, and during the attack, and after the attack, for several months?

Colonel PRATT. Yes, sir.

5. General GRUNERT. Now, in your position as Officer in Charge of Civilian Affairs, you evidently had an opportunity to know considerable about the civil population, is that right?

Colonel PRATT. I think I probably did have an opportunity to know more than the average civilian out there.

6. General FRANK. You had an opportunity to know more than the average officer, too, did you not?

Colonel PRATT. Probably; yes.

7. General GRUNERT. I will skip around considerably here, but the background of what I am getting after is that your position probably gave you an opportunity to observe, and from that, you may throw some light on the situation; and the Board is after such light.

Now, suppose you go back into 1940. I understand that at [1970] that time there was an alert pulled, in 1940. Will you tell us about that alert, just in general terms.

Colonel PRATT. I believe I understand the particular alert you mean. It happened as I recall approximately four or five months before the arrival of General Short. We were in a conference at Fort Shafter, at which General Herron was presiding, and an orderly came in and handed a message to the Chief of Staff, Colonel Hayes. He in turn handed it to General Herron, but excused himself and said that he would be back after awhile. Later, he returned. The meeting was finished, and I had occasion to go to the Chief of Staff's office upon a matter.

While there, I couldn't help but hear him dictating an order, which in effect was to place the entire command on the alert and at battle stations, with full supply of ammunition; and I asked Hayes what it was all about. I said, "I couldn't help but hear what you were saying." He said that the Navy had lost contact with the high-seas Japanese fleet, and that General Herron was turning the command out.

8. General GRUNERT. At that time was there just one alert, or were there two or three or four types of alert?

Colonel PRATT. To my knowledge, at least, there was Field Order No. 1. Now, what other alerts there may have been, I don't know of them.

9. General GRUNERT. What, generally, did that Field Order No. 1 prescribe as to being prepared for action?

[1971] Colonel PRATT. Well, Field Order No. 1 sent all units to their battle stations and their battle jobs, with the necessary supplies, ammunition, and so forth.

10. General GRUNERT. Later, was that field order superseded by other instructions that required a different gradation of alerts?

Colonel PRATT. I believe it was. I was not acquainted with those gradations of alerts, though I knew they were in effect. I had never seen them.

11. General GRUNERT. But for this 1940 affair, there was just one getting out and getting ready, is that right?

Colonel PRATT. So far as I know.

12. General FRANK. That was a full-out effort?

Colonel PRATT. Yes. Just a moment, please. May I correct that, a little?

13. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Colonel PRATT. They would turn us out on alerts, generally at night, to see how fast the office forces could get to their places of business and ready for business; and that was done quite frequently.

14. General GRUNERT. When you turned out for this alert in 1940,

and you took your battle position, you were ready for business, you had all the ammunition and everything you needed, is that right?

Colonel PRATT. Yes, sir.

15. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not that alarmed the public, at the time?

Colonel PRATT. I could see no visible effect on the public, because we had had practice alerts before, and I think they were fairly well used to them at that time.

16. General GRUNERT. Did going on such an alert disclose your intent, except that you were ready to defend yourselves?

Colonel PRATT. Not to my knowledge.

[1972] 17. General GRUNERT. At the time of that alert, what was your assignment, and how did you participate in that alert?

Colonel PRATT. I was then Officer in Charge of Civilian Component Affairs, and it was my duty to report to my office with my entire force, and stay there, on a 24-hour basis.

18. General GRUNERT. What opportunity did you have to size up whether or not the public was alarmed by the troops going on the alert?

Colonel PRATT. None other than the newspapers. In other words, the public did not seem to be unduly interested in the thing, any more than they had been in the past.

19. General GRUNERT. Under how many Commanding Generals did you serve during this period of nearly five years?

Colonel PRATT. General Drum, General Moses, General Herron, General Short, and General Emmons.

20. General GRUNERT. And under how many Chiefs of Staff?

Colonel PRATT. To the best of my recollection, the original Chief of Staff when I arrived was Colonel Osborne. I am not sure of that. No, I am wrong about that. There was another man ahead of him, I think. Osborne was G-3 when I arrived, but I can't remember the Chief of Staff's name in 1937; then Osborne, and then Colonel Hayes, who was G-3 prior to his assignment as Chief of Staff. Then, when General Short came out there, Colonel Phillips became the Chief of Staff; and he was there when I left.

21. General GRUNERT. In your assigned duties, with whom was most of your business done, at headquarters?

Colonel PRATT. With the Commanding General, with the Chief of Staff, with G-3, G-2, and the Department Surgeon, I would say.

22. General GRUNERT. Was most of it done with the Chief of Staff?

[1973] Colonel PRATT. I would say most of it; yes.

23. General GRUNERT. What was your connection with G-2? What line of work did you have to do?

Colonel PRATT. Well, if I had any information that I thought might be of value to G-2, I would tell them about it.

24. General GRUNERT. Were there many such occasions?

Colonel PRATT. Not many.

25. General GRUNERT. How did you size up the Japanese element of the population—as particularly dangerous, or can you give us an idea on that?

Colonel PRATT. My attitude towards it, from all I could learn and hear and see, was that the great majority of the Japanese population would be loyal, except when the time came when Oahu was just about

to capitulate; then I felt that they would turn on us, the great majority would. I had reason to believe that an espionage organization existed among them, or a military, you might say, espionage organization, and that was confirmed later when I was a member of a Military Commission that tried one Otto Kuhn, a German spy, who had been operating out there and elsewhere for a number of years; and he was found guilty and sentenced to death.

26. General GRUNERT. During the trial of this German, did it indicate where this espionage system headed up?

Colonel PRATT. It appeared from the evidence, as I recall it, as FBI presented it, that he was in close contact with the Japanese consulate there in Honolulu.

27. General GRUNERT. Then you think there were a number of Japanese agents in and about Honolulu?

Colonel PRATT. That is my opinion; yes, sir.

[1974] 28. General GRUNERT. Was there any evidence of this training against the United States during or shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, that you intimated, there, that the Japanese elements might turn against the United States?

Colonel PRATT. None that I personally know of, except on the night subsequent to the attack, I listened in on a local police radio net, and there were certain indications then, and I fully, myself, personally, expected an attack at dawn in force on the beaches.

29. General FRANK. On the 8th, you mean?

Colonel PRATT. Yes. I thought an attack might come in on the 8th, the morning of the 8th; and in listening in on this network and hearing the return messages from the "prowl cars," the police patrol cars. Different colored lights would blink, and then be turned out, and rockets would go up; and I believe, if I recall correctly, several cases, of roman candles; and that occurred, as I recall, all along the district from Hawaii to Kahala; that is, from the northwest coast to the east coast.

30. General GRUNERT. That gave the impression it might be the signal for a general attack the next morning?

Colonel PRATT. Well, they were signalling something, and I couldn't imagine what it would be, other than the enemy units at sea, possibly submarines.

31. General GRUNERT. Did you anticipate any organized movement from within, in connection with the possible attack?

Colonel PRATT. I thought it possible that they might engineer such a thing if and when an attack came in.

32. General GRUNERT. Did you inform anyone on the staff as to what your observations were? In other words, was your knowledge [1975] made the knowledge of the General Staff?

Colonel PRATT. Well, I think G-2 was tuned in on the same radio I was. I think he got all of that.

33. General GRUNERT. What staff conferences were held while you were there in 1941, or late in 1941? Did you participate in any staff conferences?

Colonel PRATT. I participated in one, which might be of interest to this Board. I was ordered to attend a conference, at once, at headquarters. I was a little late in getting a car, so I was late, and arrived

late at the conference. In the meantime, the Staff had assembled and I am told that the order or the radio message received from the Chief of Staff in Washington to General Short was read to the assembled staff, though I am not sure of that; and I was handed the copy, in the clear, of that message, and read it at the time; and some instructions were given to certain members of the staff that were more intimately connected with the alert plan than I was.

34. General GRUNERT. Let me refresh your memory, or let me ask you whether this message that I read is the one that you refer to. This is a message from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, 27 November 1941:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat not, be avoided, United States desires Japan commit first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that [1976] might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5, as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to the minimum essential officers.

Is that the message to which you have reference?

Colonel PRATT. To the best of my recollection, that is, sir.

35. General GRUNERT. Now, will you tell us anything more about that conference—what was discussed, and what impression it created on those conferring, or what impression it created on you, as one of the conferees?

Colonel PRATT. Well, it was a very serious message, to me, and I thought the possibilities of danger quite grave.

36. General GRUNERT. Had the decision been made as to what action to take upon it, at that time, do you know?

Colonel PRATT. That, I do not know.

37. General GRUNERT. What action was taken on it, to your knowledge?

Colonel PRATT. Not to my knowledge. I do not know.

38. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not the Commanding General ordered an alert, and what that alert covered?

Colonel PRATT. This is hearsay information. I was told that Alert No. 1 was in effect. As I say, I don't know what it was.

39. General GRUNERT. Then what was the conference about?

[1977] Colonel PRATT. The reception of this message, and doubtless the Chief of Staff wanted to give some instructions to certain members of the Staff. That was what I gathered, at least.

40. General GRUNERT. Did you know that the command was alerted against sabotage?

Colonel PRATT. I did not personally notice it, except I believe, as I recall that, I did see some soldiers posted at certain bridges and communications systems.

41. General GRUNERT. As to the purport of this message, did it occur to you, or did you turn it over in your mind, whether or not the action taken was sufficient under those instructions and warnings?

Colonel PRATT. Well, it occurred to me, in the light of what General Herron had previously done, that Field Order No. 1 might have been put into effect.

42. General GRUNERT. And Field Order No. 1 provided for an all-out alert?

Colonel PRATT. Yes.

43. General GRUNERT. Then I gather from the tenor of your testimony that the occasion called for an all-out alert, in your opinion; is that right?

Colonel PRATT. Well, that was my opinion; yes, sir.

44. General GRUNERT. You spoke of General Herron's taking an all-out alert. Does that lead me to believe that there was a difference in the way Herron and Short looked at the thing?

Colonel PRATT. Apparently.

45. General GRUNERT. How about the two Chiefs of Staff, Hayes and Phillips; were they different?

[1978] Colonel PRATT. They were different personalities; yes, sir.

46. General GRUNERT. Which did you consider the stronger personality?

Colonel PRATT. Colonel Hayes.

47. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything about the cooperation between the Army and Navy, and its effectiveness?

Colonel PRATT. Only by hearsay.

48. General GRUNERT. From the impression you gathered, were they getting along, were they cooperating, or was there a lack of such cooperation?

Colonel PRATT. I would say that, from what I heard, the cooperation between the Army and Navy was not what it might have been.

49. General GRUNERT. Was that more evident early in your service over there, or late in your service?

Colonel PRATT. It was evident all the way through, with one exception. There was an Admiral, and I can't remember his name, who was in a subordinate position at Pearl Harbor, who went out of his way to cooperate. His name commenced with an F, as I recall.

50. General FRANK. Was it Fitch?

Colonel PRATT. No.

51. General GRUNERT. Who was the Admiral of the fleet, just prior to Kimmel, do you remember?

Colonel PRATT. Admiral Richardson, I believe.

52. Major CLAUSEN. There was an Admiral Furlong, may I ask?

Colonel PRATT. No, it was not Furlong. It was as I recall something like Friedlander or Fridenthal. I don't remember the admiral's name.

[1979] 53. General GRUNERT. So Admiral Richardson was in command of the fleet prior to Kimmel?

Colonel PRATT. Yes, sir.

54. General GRUNERT. During Richardson's regime and during Kimmel's regime, do you know anything about their policy of keeping ships in or out of the Harbor?

Colonel PRATT. Personally, I had never seen what their policy was, except it was noticeable in passing Pearl Harbor on occasions that you would see more ships in there, of different types, during Admiral

Kimmel's regime than you would when Admiral Richardson had the fleet; and that was particularly true of capital ships.

55. General GRUNERT. Have you some questions, General Frank?

56. General FRANK. No. Do you have some questions, Major Clausen?

57. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. May I put the question?

58. General GRUNERT. Yes.

59. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, you mentioned some investigation concerning a German citizen. I wondered if you had met or were acquainted with Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel PRATT. I was not.

60. Major CLAUSEN. Did you hear any derogatory comments concerning this Hans Wilhelm Rohl in connection with espionage?

Colonel PRATT. Not at that time; no.

61. Major CLAUSEN. Did you, later?

Colonel PRATT. Only as I learned it from the newspapers and other reports.

62. Major CLAUSEN. And when was that, sir?

Colonel PRATT. That was after I got back.

63. Major CLAUSEN. And, with respect to Colonel Theodore Wyman, [1980] Junior, did you know him?

Colonel PRATT. Very casually. He was on the staff when I was out there.

64. Major CLAUSEN. Did you hear rumors as to his inefficiency?

Colonel PRATT. No, I did not. At the time, he was considered to be quite efficient in getting things done, but he gained the antipathy of a number of persons, both in the military service and civil life, by what they termed his "rather high-handed methods," but I never heard any criticism of his efficiency in getting things done.

65. Major CLAUSEN. Did you hear any remarks concerning the relationship which existed in Hawaii between Colonel Wyman and Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel PRATT. Not until after I got back to the mainland.

66. Major CLAUSEN. In connection with this German that was tried and sentenced to death, did you hear the name of Werner Plack?

Colonel PRATT. I did not. That is my recollection. I do not remember hearing such a name.

67. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions, General Russell?

68. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Colonel, as Officer in Charge of Civilian Component Affairs, you were not about Department headquarters a lot, you were in the field where the various units were, is that true?

Colonel PRATT. My office was in the business district of Honolulu, and the only time I visited headquarters was when I had occasion to do so on official business.

69. General RUSSELL. Of what did these civilian components consist? That is to enable me to know the sphere of your [1981] activities and the people whom you contacted.

Colonel PRATT. They consisted of an Adjutant General and staff of the National Guard, two regiments of infantry. We administered at one time about 1700, as I recall, organized Reserve Officers, some of them from the mainland, and all the R. O. T. C. units there in Hawaii.

70. General RUSSELL. Were there numbers of Japanese people in these units which you have described, or people of Japanese origin?

Colonel PRATT. In the National Guard there were a few American citizens of Japanese extraction, in the enlisted branch. To my knowledge there were I think no American citizens of Japanese extraction in the commissioned ranks. There may have been one or two. But I think that the Adjutant General of the Territory, Colonel Smoot, made an honest and a good endeavor to get rid of as many American citizens of Japanese extraction as possible, and I think he did a pretty good job of it.

71. General RUSSELL. Then it came to pass, Colonel, that the people who were on the ground, who knew the Jap and the American citizen of Jap origin, had so little faith in his loyalty that they were almost entirely excluded from civilian military organizations out there?

[1982] Colonel PRATT. Well, we had some Japanese officers, of Japanese extraction, in the reserves, Organized Reserves. Some of them are doing very well in Italy today.

72. General GRUNERT. How about R. O. T. C.?

Colonel PRATT. No; they were Organized Reserves people.

73. General GRUNERT. But your R. O. T. C. units; were they practically all of Japanese extraction?

Colonel PRATT. The University of Hawaii and the McKinley High School R. O. T. C., roughly, were about, I would say, 90 percent of Japanese extraction.

74. General RUSSELL. Well, now let us approach it a little more directly. Were you in frequent or infrequent contacts with Japanese and Americans of Japanese origin?

Colonel PRATT. Well, I knew quite a number of—I knew a few Japanese, officers of Japanese extraction that I had contact with in the Organized Reserves, but I had very little contact with people of Japanese extraction in the R. O. T. C.

75. General RUSSELL. Colonel, was it a fact, or not, that you were more intimately associated with civilians and had much more frequent contact with civilians than the average soldier out there, professional soldier, because of your assignment?

Colonel PRATT. I would say so; yes, sir.

76. General RUSSELL. And by virtue of this contact with civilians who in turn were in contact with the Japanese elements on the Island, you seem to have developed a suspicion of the Japanese elements or a feeling toward them which probably is somewhat different from what we have found elsewhere. Could that be accounted for by virtue of your contact with our own people, our civilian people out there, who in turn were in [1983] touch with these Japs?

Colonel PRATT. As to the question of the loyalty of the Japanese in Hawaii, it depends utterly on whom you contact. If you contact, for instance, the managers of sugar plantations or if you contact the economic leaders of the Territory, you would get one attitude which is very favorable toward the Japanese; but if you contact the lunas of the plantations and the men who became more intimate in actual contact with the people, you get an entirely different estimate.

77. General FRANK. A luna is a supervisor or overseer?

Colonel PRATT. Overseer of work.

78. General RUSSELL. Now, you contacted both of these groups, I assume from your testimony, the huger ups, the upper brackets, and the overseer brackets?

Colonel PRATT. In some cases, in some few cases, but I have heard the opinions of certain people also who have contacted these people.

79. General RUSSELL. Now, either because of unloading coal over here or because I didn't hear your evidence very clearly, I did not get the full import of your testimony relating to the radio broadcast that you listened to that night prior to the attack or——

Colonel PRATT. No; it was after the attack.

80. General RUSSELL. Oh, after the attack?

Colonel PRATT. Yes.

81. General RUSSELL. As I recall, General Frank asked if it was on the 8th, and you replied, "Yes," and I became somewhat confused.

Colonel PRATT. Well, it was the night of the 7th-8th.

[1984] 82. General RUSSELL. Yes. It was after the attack on the morning?

Colonel PRATT. That is correct.

83. General RUSSELL. Now, on the evening prior to the attack or any time prior thereto, was there evidence of the possibility of a Jap attack out there, from the sources that you described which gave you information on the 8th?

Colonel PRATT. No, sir.

84. General RUSSELL. There was nothing to indicate an attack on the morning of the 7th?

Colonel PRATT. Not to my knowledge.

85. General RUSSELL. And there were no signals of any sort that were sent up on that night that indicated anything out of the ordinary?

Colonel PRATT. Not to my knowledge.

86. General RUSSELL. Had anything developed on the Islands proper, Colonel, within the two or three months prior to the Japanese attack which indicated growing tension or the possibility of trouble between the Japanese Empire and the American Government?

Colonel PRATT. Nothing to my knowledge, other than what one read generally on the question of relations between the United States and Japan, and we all had the feeling that the situation was becoming tenser and tenser due to that influence alone, but as to local indications I would say no.

87. General RUSSELL. General Grunert in discussing your reaction to the sabotage alert of General Short, on about the 27th of November, elicited from you an opinion that you thought an all-out alert should have been ordered.

[1985] Colonel PRATT. In the light of the message that we received from the Chief of Staff in Washington and the action that General Herron took almost a year before, I was led to believe that it warranted an all-out effort.

88. General RUSSELL. Do you think the fact that General Herron went on an all-out alert a year before played any considerable part in the formulation of that idea?

Colonel PRATT. I think so.

89. General RUSSELL. Do you know upon what order from the War Department the alert of General Herron was directed?

Colonel PRATT. I do not.

90. General RUSSELL. You do not know, then, that the message to Herron on June 17, '40, directed him or ordered him onto an alert to repel an air attack from overseas?

Colonel PRATT. I did not know it.

91. General RUSSELL. Colonel, your impression was that the cooperation between the Army and Navy during your entire stay on Oahu left considerable to be desired?

Colonel PRATT. That was my impression; yes, sir.

92. General RUSSELL. Did you obtain that or did you form that impression from information obtained from official sources or just discussions among officers in a social or private way?

Colonel PRATT. Discussions among officers.

93. General RUSSELL. At social affairs and other places?

Colonel PRATT. Well, yes.

94. General RUSSELL. It was based on the talk which went on between and among Army officers as to these relations?

Colonel PRATT. As far as my knowledge is concerned, yes.

95. General RUSSELL. In your prior testimony, Colonel, you [1986] stated that you were impressed that more ships were in Pearl Harbor after Admiral Kimmel took command? In other words, he had more ships in Pearl Harbor than Richardson ordinarily had in there?

Colonel PRATT. It seemed to me so; yes, sir.

96. General RUSSELL. Could you make any comparison between the number of ships in the harbor customarily during the week and the number in there on week ends, Saturdays and Sunday?

Colonel PRATT. I couldn't, no, sir.

97. General RUSSELL. You noticed no difference?

Colonel PRATT. As far as I am concerned, I didn't.

98. General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

99. General GRUNERT. Did General Short ever make use of the R. O. T. C. units in the defense of Hawaii?

Colonel PRATT. Yes, he did.

100. General GRUNERT. Prior to December 7th or afterward?

Colonel PRATT. Subsequent to it.

101. General GRUNERT. Subsequent to it?

Colonel PRATT. Subsequent to December 7th, I would say a day or two, the Territorial Adjutant General came into my office and informed me that the Commanding General and the Governor of the Territory had held a conference in which it was agreed that certain units of the R. O. T. C. should be turned out for guard duty in the city; and if I recall correctly I believe it was either then or later limited to those of 18 years of age and older, though I am not sure of that. Well, it seemed to me to be rather important, because of the high percentage of Americans of Japanese extraction, that I didn't take the word of the Territorial Adjutant General for this. [1987] He requested me to order the units out, but I got General Short in person on the telephone at the command post and told him what the Adjutant General had told me; and he said Yes, there had been a

conference in which it had been agreed that these units would be turned out for guard duty. I called his attention to the fact that there was a high percentage of citizens of Japanese extraction in some of these units, and he said he thought they might prove to be perfectly loyal and thought we should go ahead and direct the PMS&Ts to take ahold and get them out, which I did.

102. General GRUNERT. In this impression you received through conversation that the cooperation between the Army and Navy was not what it might be—was not as it might be desired, we will put it—was there any lack of that cooperation manifested? In what form did it show itself? Can you give us any light on that?

Colonel PRATT. Well, to the best of my recollection—this is three years ago now—there was a request made upon the Navy to do certain things for the Army.

103. General FRANK. Such as?

Colonel PRATT. Well, furnishing boats of certain descriptions, and sometimes participating in certain maneuvers that the Army wanted to engage in there. As I say, as far as I could see there was one Admiral there who went out of his way to cooperate, but he was in a subordinate position and I can't remember his name.

104. General RUSSELL. Any other questions suggested to the Recorder?

Colonel WEST. That German that was tried and sentenced [1988] to death: Do you recall whether that sentence was ever executed, or what was the outcome of that case?

Colonel PRATT. I didn't know it until I met Mr., or Major now, Angus Taylor here in San Francisco quite recently, and he informed me that the sentence had been commuted to a life term and that it was being carried out now, if I recall correctly, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

105. General GRUNERT. Colonel, can you think of anything now that may assist the Board in getting at facts or leads that might assist the Board in getting witnesses who might have knowledge from which we might adduce some facts?

Colonel PRATT. No, sir.

106. General GRUNERT. Do you know of any witnesses now in Hawaii that can help us get the true story?

Colonel PRATT. Well, there was a gentleman named Mr. Harold Kay, K-a-y, who I believe now is military aide to the present Governor of the Territory, who on the morning of the attack observed the attack from his home at an altitude of 900 feet, which overlooked the whole south seaward coast of Oahu, through binoculars and made notes of what he saw at the time; and I think he might be of some aid to the Board in finding out or corroborating testimony as to what actually did happen so far as he saw it there.

107. General GRUNERT. And you do not think of anything else, that you could of your own knowledge assist the Board with any more evidence?

Colonel PRATT. No, sir.

108. General GRUNERT. There appear to be no more questions. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[1989] **TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM R. WHITE, U. S. ARMY; MIRA LOMA QUARTERMASTER DEPOT, MIRA LOMA, CALIFORNIA.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General WHITE. William R. White, Brigadier General, U. S. Army, Quartermaster Corps, stationed at Mira Loma Quartermaster Depot, Mira Loma, California.

2. General GRUNERT. General, the Board is after facts as to background as to events leading up to what happened at Pearl Harbor during the attack of December 7, '41. Because of your long service in the Hawaiian Department and because you were present prior to and during the attack, we called you hoping that we can get some facts or leads toward facts. There is nothing particular except that you were over there a long time and undoubtedly accumulated a lot of information about the situation.

And so, tell us first what your assignment was, how long you were over there, when you came back, and what your assignments were while over there.

General WHITE. I arrived in Honolulu the end of February 1940. My first station was Schofield Barracks, as Quartermaster at that station. In March of 1941 I was ordered to Fort Shafter as the Department Quartermaster, which position I held until February 13, 1944, when I returned to the mainland. Immediately following the attack on December 7th I was appointed Director of Food Control for the entire Territory, which duty was in addition to my work as Department [1990] Quartermaster.

3. General GRUNERT. Now, the Board is primarily interested as to what happened prior to the attack and during the attack. Can you, first, give us your impression of that cosmopolitan population of Honolulu, especially regarding the Japanese population, both foreign-born and American citizens?

General WHITE. My impression, especially of the Japanese was that what we term the alien was probably a better behaved and more on his guard as to his behavior than the American-born. It was quite apparent that the American-born soon adopted the Western customs, and in their recreation and usual habits they more or less approached the habits of our own people: I mean by that, in their manner of dress, in their consumption of food, their love of entertainment, and their et cetera.

4. General GRUNERT. Give us some sidelights on the question of loyalty.

5. General FRANK. What was your last word?

General WHITE. Et cetera. Now, that is not a good word. We might stop at that last there, but I am just trying to cover it.

May I have that question again?

6. General GRUNERT. Give us your impression of the loyalty of the Japanese American-born American citizens.

General WHITE. I doubt the loyalty of the American-born Japanese citizens just the same as I do the alien-born. In my opinion

their being American citizens is simply a matter of circumstance, of having been born under the American flag, and I have never seen why they should be particularly loyal to this [1991] country, especially in a place as far off as Honolulu where they are not in contact with our people as much as the Japanese on the mainland would be.

7. General GRUNERT. If there was any disloyalty, we will call it, what form did that take, and what were your chances to observe and form an opinion on this class of people?

General WHITE. You couldn't put your fingers on any particular thing that would stand out as a disloyal act. It was their attitude of superiority, their pushing a white person around, you might say, in the stores that are run by the orientals practically entirely over there. It was quite common for the white person to go in to buy something and find very little for sale in the front part of the store, and a lack of interest in making the sale to the white person, while on the other hand in the rear of the store would probably be a good assortment of merchandise and probably Japanese back there getting the pick of whatever was available. It was this type of attitude, you might say, and the fact that it was difficult to believe that there would be any great loyalty to this country, that caused me to form the opinion that I wouldn't trust any of them.

8. General GRUNERT. To your knowledge were there any acts of sabotage committed while you were over there?

General WHITE. To the best of my knowledge and belief there were no acts of sabotage committed before or during the attack.

9. General GRUNERT. In your capacity as Department Quartermaster did you have anything to do with the shipping plying between the United States and Hawaii?

[1992] General WHITE. Before the attack, of course, we were interested in getting Quartermaster supplies. We used to requisition 60 days in advance on San Francisco's Depot, and no difficulty was experienced in getting Quartermaster supplies. As a matter of fact, on December 7, 1941, I had abundance of food and all other types of Quartermaster supplies available to the Army.

[1993] 10. General GRUNERT. Did you have anything to do with the requisitioning or arranging for shipping of construction supplies?

General WHITE. I did not.

11. General GRUNERT. Do you know approximately what time it took for ordinary quartermaster supplies, from date of requisition to date of receipt?

General WHITE. We used to figure 45 days as a turn-around; that is, a ship to leave Honolulu, get to the port, San Francisco, pick up our supplies, and get back to Honolulu. As I stated before, we were required to submit requisitions 60 days in advance of our actual needs. There was no difficulty in transportation problems previous to December 7, 1941.

12. General GRUNERT. Then you did not experience any particular delays on account of shipping, as far as anything you were concerned with?

General WHITE. I did not.

13. General GRUNERT. What knowledge have you of the tenseness of the Japanese-American situation toward the latter part of 1941?

General WHITE. I saw no evidence of any tenseness on the part of any Japanese, previous to the attack of December 7, 1941.

14. General GRUNERT. Were the newspapers full of stories about what was happening?

General WHITE. Just ordinary accounts. I recall distinctly when Kurusu came through, he was met by our G-2, and the paper carried an account of this interview; and such communications as you might expect in view of the war situation that was going on at the time; but there was nothing that would create [1994] a tenseness, that I recall, being published.

15. General GRUNERT. How about the headlines in the morning paper, say, of November 30, which predicts a war within a week? Did that make any impression on the people over there?

General WHITE. I must truthfully say I don't recall that headline.

16. General GRUNERT. Were you kept informed of any so-called "warning messages" received by the Navy, transmitted to the Army, or received by the Army directly, from approximately November 24 up to the attack?

General WHITE. Some time just before Thanksgiving, I am not sure of the exact date, I was ordered to report to headquarters at 3:45 one afternoon, and upon arrival, I found the chiefs of all the services had gathered, and we were taken into General Short's private office, and the door was closed, and General Short stated that he had a very serious message to read, from General Marshall. He then proceeded to read a "radio" that was worded approximately like this:

All negotiations have been broken off. Take all measures for defense. Be prepared for any emergency, but do nothing to alarm the populace,
Signed "Marshall."

He stated to us that this was secret; that he was ordering Alert No. 1 into effect immediately; that this would not be discussed except insofar as to put Alert No. 1 into effect.

That is the only warning order that was made known to me.

17. General GRUNERT. Will you listen to this message and see if this is the one to which you refer. This is a message from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 27 November 1941:

[1995] Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibility the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, United States desires Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to the minimum essential officers.

General WHITE. That is the first time I have ever heard that complete message.

18. General GRUNERT. But was that the message to which you referred?

General WHITE. That was not.

19. General GRUNERT. That was not?

General WHITE. I might say that the message that I refer to was much shorter, and that the only thing that I recognize in that message that was in the one that I spoke of, was the one statement, "Do nothing to alarm the populace." My message started off, as I said, that "All negotiations have broken off." It was very much shorter than that message.

[1996] 20. General GRUNERT. Did you actually see the message?

General WHITE. I did not. General Short read the message to us.

21. General GRUNERT. It could have been paraphrased, and it could have been just extracts of the message, or was the whole message read, word for word, do you remember?

General WHITE. It could have been extracted. It was apparent at the time that General Short was reading word for word, but I did not see it.

22. General GRUNERT. But at that time, had he made a decision to take Alert No. 1?

General WHITE. He had.

23. General GRUNERT. And what did you understand Alert No. 1 to mean?

General WHITE. Alert No. 1 was to protect all installations against sabotage.

24. General GRUNERT. Did you turn over in your mind whether or not you considered that alert sufficient under the warning then received?

General WHITE. I don't understand.

25. General GRUNERT. Did you think to yourself, "Well, is that sufficient protection under this warning?" or anything of that kind? Or didn't you think about it?

General WHITE. I did think about it, and I thought seriously about it; and I immediately called my people, the chiefs of my installations, and gave them this information on the Alert No. 1, and before midnight that night every installation was guarded, and the Alert No. 1 was in full effect; and at that time, I honestly believed that sabotage was the thing that we [1997] had to look for.

26. General GRUNERT. All right. Now, as far as your installations are concerned, if they had taken Alert 2 or 3, what difference would it have made as to your installations, as to the protective measures taken?

General WHITE. Alert 2 provided for an internal uprising, and had Alert 2 been put in, then it would have been necessary to have placed more guards around the installations to protect them against an attack from the inside. If Alert 3 had been called, which called for an all-out attack of the Japanese against the islands, then guarding my installations would have presented no more problem than Alert 2. It would have required all troops to have taken the field, in field positions, for a defense of the island against a Japanese attack from the outside.

27. General GRUNERT. What troops did you have that would have had to go out?

General WHITE. Well, we had actually no troops of my own, except that at Fort Armstrong, for instance, we had our own war plan, and we had a battalion of our own troops that had been drilled. We had our own machine guns, and we had our positions for them to go, in case Alert No. 3 or 2 was put into effect.

28. General GRUNERT. Did you ever hear of a warning that was sent through the Navy, which started out to this effect—

Consider this a war warning?

General WHITE. I did not.

29. General GRUNERT. Then, so far as you were concerned, you considered an alert against sabotage as of sufficient protection under the instructions received, is that right?

[1998] General WHITE. Under the instructions as I knew them.

30. General GRUNERT. I gather from your testimony as to what you understood of the situation prior to the attack, that you were not alarmed about an attack coming, is that right?

General WHITE. That is correct. I would like to add right here that the reason I make that statement is that, in my War College class of '32, we had 10 or 12 very bright naval officers, and I distinctly remember, and have carried it in my mind ever since, that the theory which they spoke openly at all times was that in any war between this country and the Japanese, we would have to take that war to Japan, that Japan would never risk a naval engagement further than a thousand miles from her shore; and throughout the whole year, as I say, the consensus of those men was to the effect that we would take the war to Japan in case of a war.

31. General GRUNERT. Then you never visualized the ability of the Japanese to bring the war over as far as Hawaii, initially, at least?

General WHITE. I must say I did not.

32. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions, General Frank?

33. General FRANK. Yes.

From your analysis of the feeling that you had against the Japs, I infer that it was a general state of uncertainty and suspicion.

General WHITE. That is correct.

34. General FRANK. But the background for this so far as any factual proof of it is concerned, is very nebulous, isn't it?

General WHITE. That is correct. I might say that altogether I have been in the Hawaiian Islands, to my knowledge, six of the ten past years, and have noticed among the Japanese [1999] this shrewdness, this grinning of theirs, indications all the way along that, "Well, if I could knife you in the back, I would be delighted to do it, if I was sure I wouldn't be punished." It is that attitude.

35. General FRANK. That is an impression that you got?

General WHITE. That is correct.

36. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, their characteristics are very different from the characteristics of an American?

General WHITE. Yes.

37. General FRANK. Their cultural background and practices are completely different from the American, is that right?

General WHITE. That is right.

38. General FRANK. What about their ethics?

General WHITE. I am not prepared to answer that.

39. General FRANK. How do they compare with the ethics of Americans?

General WHITE. I would say they didn't have any to speak of.

40. General FRANK. All right. Now, let us analyze their patriotism a little.

General WHITE. I think their patriotism is purely a veneer. You were speaking of patriotism toward our country?

41. General FRANK. I am talking just about patriotism. If you are going to discuss it, discuss it under (a) and (b)—(a), their patriotism for Japan, and (b) their patriotism for the United States.

General WHITE. All right. Then we will discuss it under (a), their patriotism to Japan. That was manifested on all occasions where any celebration such as the emperor's birthday [2000] or any holiday that would be in Japan. They would fly their flags for all kinds of ceremonies, and it was quite evident that their loyalty to Japan was just as one might expect.

42. General FRANK. Were you conversant with the Japanese law in their homeland relative to the status of a Jap born of Japanese parents in the United States or in Hawaii?

General WHITE. It is my understanding that the Japanese never gave up that particular person as a citizen of Japan, notwithstanding the fact that he was an American citizen under our law. In other words, there was a dual citizenship, so far as the Japanese were concerned.

43. General FRANK. Now, for him to become a full-out citizen of the United States and cease to be claimed as a citizen of Japan, do you remember what was necessary?

General WHITE. As I remember, he had to go to court and sign away his allegiance to the emperor and all connections with his country. I am not in a position to discuss all the details, but I know that something like that had to be done.

44. General FRANK. And he had to do that even though he were a native-born Jap?

General WHITE. Yes.

45. General FRANK. With respect to this impression that you got from the naval officers at the War College in 1932 about the "1,000 miles," did it ever occur to you that there has been technical and industrial progress in the meantime which greatly increased the range of aircraft and service craft to an extent such that that 1,000 miles might have been considerably altered?

General WHITE. Yes, sir; and on the other hand, in late years, of course, we taught that you don't put battleships and [2001] naval craft up against land-based aircraft, and that in thinking this thing over, what thought we gave to it over there was that an armada or a task force sufficient to attack the Hawaiian Islands would be of such size that it certainly would be reported long before it approached the islands, especially as the Navy were carrying on their observations daily, on the lookout for just such an event.

46. General FRANK. Did you ever analyze the possibilities of a raid such as that which occurred?

General WHITE. No.

47. General FRANK. Did you ever believe that such a thing would happen?

General WHITE. Definitely, I didn't believe it could happen.

48. General FRANK. How risky an undertaking do you consider it was?

General WHITE. I think if that had happened at any time other than Sunday morning it might have been quite disastrous for the

Japanese, and while that doesn't answer your question, I think your question must be answered that it was quite risky, in my opinion.

[2002] 49. General FRANK. Do you think it was a very daring unusual venture?

General WHITE. Not necessarily so, under the circumstances. War had not been declared. It was an aerial attack with, as we have been told, two carriers; and for a nation——

50. General FRANK. How many carriers?

General WHITE. I understand there were two, may have been more; but for a nation at war to undertake such a mission, it was quite risky.

51 General FRANK. I would like to ask one more question: What do you think would have been the attitude of Japan toward the same number of Americans in Japan as there were Japanese in Hawaii?

General WHITE. What do you mean by "attitude"; I mean in that case?

52. General FRANK. Do you think they would have been interned, or what would have happened to them?

General WHITE. I am quite sure they would have been interned.

53. General GRUNERT. Prior to the declaration of war?

General WHITE. Oh, no. No, I didn't understand that was prior to the declaration of war. I might state that I was in Japan on one occasion, in uniform, and at every train that I got off there would be an official at my side asking me my name, my business, where I was going, how long I expected to remain. Now, whether that happened to all other officers in uniform, I don't know, but it was quite apparent from that that they were watching very closely American officers who were in Japan.

[2003] General FRANK. Did you ever see a similar scrutiny of Japanese in the United States?

General WHITE. I did not. I have not.

55. General GRUNERT. Did you ever see any Japanese officers in the United States in uniform?

General WHITE. No, although I have seen them in the Hawaiian Department, which is a territory of the United States.

56. General RUSSELL. Was this flag-flying on national holidays carried on by native-born Japs as well as by those who were born in the Empire?

General WHITE. It is my impression that it was.

57. General RUSSELL. Your impression is that there was a sharp line of demarcation out there between the Japanese and all other groups?

General WHITE. In their patriotism? I mean, their attitude toward their native country?

58. General RUSSELL. Well, in their living together, going together, worshipping the Emperor, and those things, they were a sort of unity in the Hawaiian Department?

General WHITE. That is correct.

59. General RUSSELL. They didn't amalgamate with other races at all?

General WHITE. Let me state it this way: In '35-'37 when I was over there it was unusual to see a Japanese with anyone else but a Japanese. When I returned in 1940 it was not unusual to see a Japanese fraternizing with the American soldiers, going to the picture shows, going to parties and dances with them, and I know of two cases

where Chinese have married Japanese women. That happened on my second tour. During my first tour [2004] I saw none of that and I think but very little of that existed at that time.

60. General RUSSELL. So far as you know, those two cases that you have referred to are the only two cases of intermarriage of Japanese with other nationalities?

General WHITE. So far as I know of the Chinese intermarrying with the Japanese, but I think there have been some American soldiers that have married some of the Japanese.

61. General RUSSELL. Did they dominate the commercial life of Honolulu and other towns out there?

General WHITE. The Japanese and Chinese practically control all of the small business.

62. General RUSSELL. The larger businesses were American?

General WHITE. The larger businesses were the Americans.

63. General RUSSELL. Did you buy goods from many Japanese in connection with your duties as Quartermaster?

General WHITE. Yes.

64. General RUSSELL. You had an opportunity, then, to deal with the Japanese and get his outlook on life?

General WHITE. Yes; and I might say, in business it was no different from any American concern.

65. General RUSSELL. There was nothing out there just prior to the attack that convinced you that war was imminent, including this message that General Grunert read to you in whole or in part?

General WHITE. No, I would not say that. That message indicated that the relations were right at the breaking point, and I didn't question—I never have questioned—the fact that some day Japan and the United States would fight a war, but [2005] there was nothing in my mind that indicated that such an attack as happened would happen.

66. General RUSSELL. General, you discussed or you made a statement that other than on Sunday morning you do not think that attack would have had any chance at all?

General WHITE. No, not exactly in those words. I stated this: that if the attack had come any other morning but Sunday it would have found our men more prepared. Sunday morning a great many men were off duty that normally during a week day would be at their post and would be on duty, but I think that attack would have had considerably less chance and might have been quite serious for Japan had it happened on a morning other than Sunday.

67. General RUSSELL. And your sole reason for that conclusion is that we would have had more men on duty any other morning?

General WHITE. I think so.

68. General RUSSELL. That is all I have.

69. General GRUNERT. From part of your testimony I was led to believe that you believe that the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance practically regularly.

General WHITE. That is my understanding.

70. General GRUNERT. Now, do you have any definite knowledge as to whether they did or not?

General WHITE. Other than that I was told and that the Navy sent their ships out a certain number of miles, and then from there their

planes took off and it is my understanding that it was at least 600 miles out: in other words, that the ships went out a certain distance, and then the planes went out farther than that, and that they covered approximately 600 miles out.

[2006] 71. General GRUNERT. You did not know, then, what these task forces went out for, whether reconnaissance or whether it was maneuvers of their own, or whether they were covering the perimeter around the islands or not, did you?

General WHITE. Now, you must remember that my job was the Department Quartermaster, the Supply Officer, and I was not in on a lot of the conferences, and all, where the tactical—

72. General GRUNERT. Then, it appeared to be just your impression without any definite knowledge on the subject.

General WHITE. Other than having been told in more or less words to that effect, that there was such a mission.

73. General FRANK. By whom?

General WHITE. Well, I can't recall right now any particular person, but it was generally understood.

74. General FRANK. It was just general conversation, however?

General WHITE. That is correct.

75. General FRANK. And impression?

General WHITE. Yes.

76. General GRUNERT. What gave you the impression, then, that the Navy was doing the job of taking care of the outside?

General WHITE. We understood that that was their mission.

77. General GRUNERT. Now, then, from your military education and from what you know of the past tactics and strategy of the Japanese and the Germans, is it not true that the Japanese usually attempted to get in the first blow, which was practically a blow with a declaration of war at the time the blow was given?

General WHITE. I know that happened in the Russia War, Russia-Japanese War; but at the same time there was part of the Russian Fleet very close to the Japanese Islands at the time of that naval engagement.

78. General GRUNERT. And is it not true that the Japanese followed the German tactics and had been instructed by Germans [2007] in their military education?

General WHITE. It is my understanding that that is a fact and that their general staff is taken right from the German General Staff, as they call it, or more or less copied from them.

79. General GRUNERT. And also that the Germans usually sought surprise, and particularly on Sunday morning?

General WHITE. That is correct. I think we were all influenced by the great distance between Japan and the Hawaiian Islands as to such a surprise move on the part of Japan.

80. General GRUNERT. Just one more question: Have you anything that you think might be of assistance to the Board in getting at facts, that you can add to your testimony or give the Board any leads as to where they might get at such facts, that has not been brought out during your testimony?

General WHITE. No. I would simply like to add one statement: that I knew a great many people in the Hawaiian Islands; I talked to a great many officers, Army officers, Navy officers; and I have my

doubts that any officer in the Army or Navy at that time over there had any idea that such an attack as happened on December 7th, 1941, was possible. Now, that is my opinion and my impression gained from spending quite a time over there and discussing at various times what might happen.

81. General GRUNERT. Anything further? (No response.)

Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2008] **TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GEORGE S. WELCH, AIR CORPS,
ORLANDO, FLORIDA.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Major, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Major WELCH. My name is George S. Welch, Major, Air Corps, O398557. I am stationed with the A. A. F. Board, Orlando, Florida. I am now on terminal leave from that organization.

2. General GRUNERT. Major, the Board is after facts as to what happened before and during the attack on Pearl Harbor. Because you were a witness before the Roberts Commission we called on you to appear before this Board, to see what you could give to us. I have but one point as far as your testimony is concerned that I want to look into, but if there is anything else which you can give to the Board which will assist it we shall be glad to get it.

Now, will you tell us what your assignment was, and when, during 1941 in Hawaii?

Major WELCH. You mean, sir, before the war started, up to the war?

3. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Major WELCH. I was a Second Lieutenant, sir, assigned to the 47th Pursuit Squadron, stationed at Wheeler Field in February, 1941, and I arrived in the Islands and was stationed there still at the time that the war started. My squadron was on temporary duty at an auxiliary field, Haleiwa, actually when the war started, the day it started.

4. General FRANK. What were you doing down there?

Major WELCH. Our squadron was out there, sir, for gunnery camp.

[2009] 5. General FRANK. That is how you happened to have ammunition?

Major WELCH. Well, we had some ammunition. We had .30 caliber.

6. General FRANK. What kind of planes did you have?

Major WELCH. As nearly as I can remember, sir, we had four or six P-40Bs, about a dozen P-36As, two A-20s, and a B-12 and about five P-26s.

7. General GRUNERT. The one particular question I have here: You testified that the guards at M-a-l-a-i-w-a Field had no instructions as to what to do if the enemy planes came over. Now, what field was that? I haven't heard this name mentioned before.

Major WELCH. Haleiwa, sir. H-a-l.

8. General GRUNERT. That is H-a-l?

Major WELCH. Yes, sir.

9. General GRUNERT. Now, what was the guarding system at that field and what were the instructions in the event of an attack, if any? Do you know?

Major WELCH. Sir, as far as I can remember there were no instructions to cover any possibility of aerial attack. The only possibility of attack that was covered was either sabotage or an enemy landing.

10. General GRUNERT. What was this field? Just a gunnery range?

Major WELCH. No, sir. Haleiwa Field was a very short, sandy field originally used as an emergency landing field, and probably about six months before the war started they had [2010] chopped down a few trees and were allowing fighter squadrons to operate out of there as an emergency field to practice shortfield landings; and a month before the war started, the 15th Group, of which the 47th Squadron is a part, was sending each squadron out there for two weeks in rotation to operate off of the field in simulated combat conditions.

11. General GRUNERT. Who was the commanding officer of that field at that time?

Major WELCH. Well, the commanding officer, sir, was the commanding officer of the squadron that happened to be there.

12. General GRUNERT. Then the commanding officer was changed?

Major WELCH. Yes, sir.

13. General GRUNERT. Was there no permanent post complement there?

Major WELCH. Yes, sir. There was a Lieutenant Currie who was Post Quartermaster PX. Really, sir, there was nothing there, no installations. We brought our own tents and everything with us.

14. General GRUNERT. That is, it was just a question of guarding your own planes, was it?

Major WELCH. Yes, sir; just our own personal equipment.

15. General GRUNERT. What happened to that field when the attack took place?

Major WELCH. The Japs passed right over it, apparently didn't notice its existence or didn't know that we were using it; and about the second raid I think one or two planes made a pass at the field, shot up a couple of P-36s.

16. General GRUNERT. So there was little damage done there?

Major WELCH. There was no damage done, sir, except to a few [2011] airplanes.

17. General GRUNERT. And then, as a matter of fact, the lack of such a guard and instructions what to do in case of an attack didn't have much effect as far as the actual attack was concerned, did it?

Major WELCH. No, sir. By the time the Japs did make one pass at the field, the men had machine guns out, .30 caliber ground guns, and they shot back at this man, this Jap.

18. General GRUNERT. Well, now, about how many planes all told were on that field at the time of the attack?

Major WELCH. The original attack?

19. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Major WELCH. Everything we had. I imagine it was—I just gave you an approximate idea of what we had. I suppose it was about 16, 18.

20. General GRUNERT. About 16. Were they bunched, all put together, or were they spread or dispersed, or what?

Major WELCH. No, sir. They were lined up in a perfect line right down one side of the field.

21. General GRUNERT. Is that what is always done in peacetime, or is that a special measure against sabotage, or what?

Major WELCH. At Wheeler Field, sir, we had revetments, and the airplanes had been called back from the revetments because of sabotage. At Haleiwa we had no revetments, and we just parked them there just to look nice, and also to keep them bunched so we could guard them easier.

22. General GRUNERT. Then, the concentration of planes was really normal procedure?

Major WELCH. Yes, sir.

[2012] General GRUNERT. Routine procedure.

Major WELCH. Except, sir, that they had started thinking about dispersal at Wheeler Field and had built revetments which were unoccupied.

24. General FRANK. You took off in a plane and conducted a little attack, didn't you?

Major WELCH. Yes, sir.

25. General FRANK. What did you take off in?

Major WELCH. A P-40B.

26. General FRANK. P-40B.

Major WELCH. That is the second or third model.

27. General FRANK. What happened? Did you shoot any down?

Major WELCH. Yes, sir.

28. General FRANK. How many?

Major WELCH. I claimed four definitely, sir.

29. General FRANK. All right. Did anybody else take off from up there?

Major WELCH. Yes, sir. Lieutenant Taylor took off with me as my wing man, at first.

30. General FRANK. All right.

Major WELCH. About half an hour or an hour later three or four other pilots took off from Haleiwa.

31. General FRANK. How many did they get?

Major WELCH. Between the planes that took off from Schofield and the ones that they finally got off from Wheeler Field, I think we shot down 12 planes definitely.

32. General FRANK. All right. Taking that as a background and assuming that you had been on a different kind of an alert at Wheeler, so that they could have taken off in a matter of a [2013] few minutes with 60 or 75 planes, and considering the state of gunnery training of the fighters at Wheeler, what do you think they could have done to that Jap attack?

Major WELCH. Providing, sir, that the pilots were ready to go, as you said, and had ammunition in their planes, we could have shot every one of them down except the fighters before they got to the Island.

33. General FRANK. You think?

Major WELCH. I know, sir; I mean from what I have seen with the same type of equipment they used against us there and down in the Pacific. We have fought the same thing. Their dive bombers wouldn't

have gotten through. They might have strafed a bit with their fighters, but there wouldn't have been any bombs in there or torpedoes.

34. General FRANK. This boy has a very outstanding reputation as an accurate shot.

35. General GRUNERT. Then naturally that is why he assumes if all the rest of them were of his caliber they would have gotten quite a number.

36. General FRANK. I simply mention that in passing.

Major WELCH. No, sir. I have seen—in New Guinea at one time I had a squadron of average pilots and trainee pilots that knocked down the same type of Jap ship, and not a one got through.

37. General GRUNERT. How about the torpedo bombers? They are pretty slow, aren't they?

Major WELCH. Yes, sir.

38. General GRUNERT. Are they easier to get at than the others as far as shooting is concerned?

[2014] Major WELCH. Yes, sir; the Japanese dive bomber and torpedo bomber are sitting ducks.

39. General FRANK. That is all I wanted to bring out.

40. General RUSSELL. Sitting ducks for the type of aircraft that you had out on Oahu on December 7, '41?

Major WELCH. For our 75 P-40s; not for our other equipment.

41. General RUSSELL. How many of those 75 P-40s did you have out on Oahu available for action that morning?

Major WELCH. Well, sir, they were all available. Of course, they didn't have guns in them.

42. General RUSSELL. Well, I know. If they had had the guns and ammunition, how many P-40s were out there ready to go into action; do you know?

43. General FRANK. He wouldn't know.

Major WELCH. I believe at least 75 or 100, sir. You could find that.

44. General RUSSELL. You are on terminal leave from what?

Major WELCH. I am on terminal leave from the air forces boards. I have been donated to North American by the Air Corps to be an engineering test pilot.

45. General GRUNERT. Any other questions? (No response.) There appear to be none. Thank you very much, Major, for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m.)

[2015]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board reconvened at 2 p. m., and continued the hearing of witnesses, as follows:)

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL W. A. CAPRON; ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT OGDEN ARSENAL, OGDEN, UTAH

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, would you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel CAPRON. Capron, W. A.; Colonel, Ordnance Department. My station is Ogden Arsenal, Ogden, Utah.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, this Board is after facts, and leads that may get other facts; and because of your assignment and position during 1941 we asked you to come here to testify, with the hope that we might get something that would help us. What was your position and assignment in the Hawaiian Department in 1941, and give us the dates.

Colonel CAPRON. From August 1938 until December 30, 1941, I had the dual function of Department Ordnance Officer of the Hawaiian Department, and as Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Ordnance Depot.

3. General GRUNERT. Then, because of that assignment, you had an accurate knowledge of ordnance equipment, did you?

Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir.

4. General GRUNERT. Generally speaking, was the Department well equipped in ordnance items, or was it deficient in some material items?

Colonel CAPRON. When, sir, may I ask?

5. General GRUNERT. At the time of the attack.

Colonel CAPRON. It is very difficult to answer that [2016] question with any degree of accuracy, on account of the time period that has elapsed.

6. General GRUNERT. Give us your general impressions as to the equipment of the department in the ordnance line, as you remember it.

Colonel CAPRON. As I remember, sir, the seacoast, in both armament and ammunition, was in excellent condition. The mobile ground weapons, I think we lacked 105 howitzers; we had some but not the full complement; and 90-mm. antiaircraft, of which we had none. That was a new weapon, sir, at that period.

7. General GRUNERT. How about ammunition for antiaircraft weapons?

Colonel CAPRON. Our ammunition for the weapons which we had, the 3-inch M-1, was good ammunition. We had been using the powder-train fuse. Before the blitz, however, the new fuse centers which handled the mechanical fuse arrived and we had changed over a large portion of the ammunition into mechanical-fuse items.

8. General GRUNERT. Give us a few facts about the storage of ammunition. What was the status of that at that time?

Colonel CAPRON. Ammunition storage for what we had was excellent—no, I will say superior. The total reserve was underground in tunnels, the Department reserve.

9. General GRUNERT. Did you lose any ammunition on account of the attack?

Colonel CAPRON. Absolutely none of the reserve. One bomb hit in the floor of the Aliamanu crater, which is drilled from the inside, but it had no effect.

10. General GRUNERT. Now, what can you tell us about the shipment of supplies from the mainland to the islands, as far as you recall? Were there any unusual delays, or was the transportation about what you expected?

Colonel CAPRON. There are two answers, there, sir, before and after the 7th of December, 1941. Before, it was usual and normal. It was not so much a question of transportation; it was, as I remember, the items were not on hand on the mainland or that the Philippines, hav-

ing a higher priority than we had, a large number of items were going over there which we would have liked to have had, but they just didn't have them.

11. General GRUNERT. Do you recall when the Philippines had a higher priority than you did on ordnance materials?

Colonel CAPRON. No, sir.

12. General GRUNERT. But that was your own understanding and impression?

Colonel CAPRON. That was my impression.

13. General GRUNERT. You don't know, then, when suddenly toward the latter part of 1941 they might have had a higher priority, but before that, they did not have as high a priority?

Colonel CAPRON. I believe, General, all of that is a matter of record on the status report, the ordnance status report for the Hawaiian Department. I wouldn't venture a definite answer; but it was my impression that they were getting things that we would love to have had.

14. General GRUNERT. That was your impression?

Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir.

15. General GRUNERT. But you have no evidence to that effect?

Colonel CAPRON. No, sir. It is a matter of record, after the 7th—if I may finish that first question, sir—transportation [2018] poured in there. We couldn't have had better service.

16. General GRUNERT. You mean, then, after the attack on December 7, things started pouring in?

Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir.

17. General GRUNERT. They came at a more rapid rate than they did prior to that time?

Colonel CAPRON. They poured in so fast, sir, we could hardly unload it.

18. General GRUNERT. Now, as to any deficiencies in ordnance material that may have existed, did that in any way affect the taking of appropriate defensive measures with what you had?

Colonel CAPRON. No, sir.

19. General GRUNERT. You told us that you were the Department Ordnance Officer. As such, did you attend conferences of the Department staff?

Colonel CAPRON. All of the conferences.

20. General GRUNERT. Do you recall attending a conference any time about November 27 or thereafter, before the attack—any particular conference?

Colonel CAPRON. There were so many urgent conferences called along in that period that I couldn't pin it down, sir.

21. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not General Short ordered the alert which they call the "sabotage alert," about that time?

Colonel CAPRON. We had had alerts, sir, beginning in April, one after the other. They became more frequent and of longer duration, with more confinement of troops to their arms, as December approached.

22. General GRUNERT. Do you recall whether you were at a [2019] conference wherein the Commanding General or the Chief of Staff referred to a message then received from the Chief of Staff concerning the Japanese-American situation, in which they were given directives to do so and so, and cautioned not to do so and so?

Colonel CAPRON. I remember something about the American-Japanese relations coming up in an urgent conference that had been called. The "radio" was read and discussed, but I am hazy on any indicated action by the War Department.

23. General GRUNERT. What was your state of mind as to the imminence of a war with Japan toward the latter part of 1941?

Colonel CAPRON. I felt that it was reasonable to suppose that we would have war; that if we had, it would not come as soon as it actually did, and that if it should, we would have plenty of advance notice.

24. General GRUNERT. From whom did you expect such notice?

Colonel CAPRON. From the War Department, sir, who presumably would get the idea from the State Department. We had always counted on a period between the announcement of war and the actual meeting of the enemy. In fact, we had programs which postponed construction, to hold it for this—I have forgotten what we called the period.

25. General FRANK. Was it a "period of strained relations"?

Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir; that was it, a "period of strained relations."

26. General GRUNERT. Did this message that was read to you at this conference indicate to you, as you considered it, a period of strained relations?

Colonel CAPRON. Now, which conference, was that, sir?

[2020] 27. General GRUNERT. That is the one you just mentioned.

Colonel CAPRON. The one in November?

28. General GRUNERT. Approximately November 27. Did you have other conferences in which messages were read or referred to?

Colonel CAPRON. Yes, quite a number of them, sir.

29. General GRUNERT. Messages from the United States?

Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir.

30. General GRUNERT. From the Chief of Staff?

Colonel CAPRON. In my remembrance; yes, sir.

31. General GRUNERT. Does any one of these conferences stand out in your mind as being of great importance, of more importance than other conferences you had?

Colonel CAPRON. We had one alert in November. The only way I can fix it, General, is that it was so intense and so sustained that after things eased up, I assembled my ordnance battalion and gave them a talk, made a speech to them, in which I had obtained a verbal commendation from General Short to them. If that is the principal one, I presume it might have indicated strained relations.

32. General GRUNERT. I will ask the recorder to read to you the Chief of Staff's message to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 27 November 1941, to see whether or not that will bring back to your memory whether a particular conference was held on that message.

Colonel WEST (reading):

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanesque future action unpredictable but hostile [2021] action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy

should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit discussion of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

33. General GRUNERT. Do you recall whether there was a conference on that message?

Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir. May I ask what the date of that was?

34. Colonel WEST. November 27, 1941.

Colonel CAPRON. I remember the wording, sir, now—"Let Japan commit the first overt act," and that we couldn't do anything that would alarm the population on the island.

35. General GRUNERT. Those two things seem to stand out in your mind. If they stand out in your mind, why do not these other things stand out in your mind, such as:

This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

Then, another thing is, in the message, the part which says:

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

[2022] Why do certain things stand out in your mind, there, as compared to other things in that message? Were they emphasized, or was it because they went on a sabotage alert, or what? Have you any recollection of why those two things that you mentioned stood out more than any others?

Colonel CAPRON. No, I have not, sir.

36. General GRUNERT. If any other measures were adopted, how in your opinion would they alarm the populace, or disclose the intent? Have you thought on that?

Colonel CAPRON. I don't quite understand, General, what you mean.

37. General GRUNERT. Now, you picked out two parts of the message, "don't alarm the public," and the "overt act." Now, if other measures had been taken, besides antisabotage measures, how in your opinion would the public have become alarmed? Have you thought of it in that line?

Colonel CAPRON. I had not; no, sir.

38. General GRUNERT. Did anything in particular come up at this conference as to discussion of the various parts of this message, or were any reasons expressed why they went into an antisabotage alert instead of an all-out alert?

Colonel CAPRON. I can't remember any particular conversation or any words in connection with that particular message.

39. General GRUNERT. Now, you stated in your testimony something to the effect that there was a period which you afterwards identified as "a period of strained relations," in which certain construction should go forward.

Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir.

40. General GRUNERT. That intimates that up to that time [2023] certain construction was not to be prosecuted. What sort of construction was that? Do you recall what was delayed until strained relations came into being?

Colonel CAPRON. There is a large number of those items, sir. I can't remember one, any detail on it, but that is a matter of record, and I am sure it is on file in the records of the Hawaiian Department.

41. General GRUNERT. There are a lot of things to be done, later, when you declare M-Day, which is presumably declared when strained relations reach such a point that war is practically imminent, but you think there were some actual construction projects that would go forward in that period?

Colonel CAPRON. Absolutely, sir; and as I recall, they were engineer's construction. They didn't have any funds to do this, that, or the other. One of the things I cheated and I used Ordnance money to do, a job which the engineers didn't have any funds on, rather than put the thing off until we happened to have a fight.

42. General GRUNERT. Then it was your understanding that when this period of strained relations came across, there would be funds available and additional authorizations and some additional construction would take place?

Colonel CAPRON. I always considered that as being—we all sort of looked forward to that as "Christmas Day," when all of these things that we had been after would suddenly come forth.

43. General GRUNERT. They started to come forth after the attack, didn't they?

Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir; they did.

44. General GRUNERT. That was along toward Christmas, wasn't it?

[2024] Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir. I did not mean to be facetious.

45. General GRUNERT. Now, there is one other item I would like to get some facts or some opinions on. As Department Ordnance Officer, among other things you were particularly interested in antiaircraft and antiaircraft ammunition?

Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir.

46. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether antiaircraft was kept in position, where its ammunition was, for various types of alert?

Colonel CAPRON. Not off-hand. We had three types of alert. I think we were in a No. 1 on the 7th. We went in, Saturday, I think. I do know, before the morning of the attack, that the antiaircraft regiments—there were three regular-service and one very good National Guard regiment out in the field in position. We had the proper ammunition at all of the fixed AA positions, right at the guns, and in most cases it was out in the field with the mobile AA's.

47. General GRUNERT. Of course, it was your business to furnish ammunition, but it was not your business to put it at the guns, was it?

Colonel CAPRON. No, sir. However, it was up to me, General, to have ordnance machinists, ordnance troopers out with these units to look after them, the mechanisms of the weapons, and so on, and also to look after the treatment of the ammunition; and I had those ordnance soldiers who were out there at these places.

48. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether any of the antiaircraft positions for defense against air attack were in and about the populated parts of the City of Honolulu?

Colonel CAPRON. Well, the only one I know of, sir, was [2025] the fixed weapons up in Fort Ruger. We had, I think, four guns up there near a hospital. We had never proved or fired them for fear

of the noise. It might frighten people; but those are the only weapons that I remember of, off-hand as being right in Honolulu.

49. General GRUNERT. Do you know where the mobile antiaircraft weapons were to be mobilized in the defense?

Colonel CAPRON. No, sir. That was a variable situation, General.

50. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not the actual placing of what we call "live ammunition" near positions would have alarmed the population?

Colonel CAPRON. Well, I doubt it very much. I don't believe it made any difference. We were always having maneuvers, sir. There was ammunition being hauled all over the island. There were truck trains, and so on. We were shipping it on the ONL Railway, and we had a long series of maneuvers up, I think, around October, where the Navy actually flew some planes over to assimilate an attack; so there was so much commotion, so much going on from the Army standpoint, that I doubt if the mere placing of live ammunition, there couldn't have been any particular reaction.

[2026] 51. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions, General Russell?

52. General RUSSELL. What was the state of supply of antiaircraft ammunition on December 7, Colonel?

Colonel CAPRON. I indicated, sir, as I remember, that it was in satisfactory condition; yes, sir.

53. General RUSSELL. How many calibers did you have? How many types of ammunition?

Colonel CAPRON. Three 37s and—I may be wrong on the 37s. I am not sure of the 37s. We had 3-inch Cal. 50, Cal. 30. We had no 40s, of course, nor 20s nor anything of that sort.

54. General RUSSELL. You had your full equipment of antiaircraft weapons except those 90 millimeters?

Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir; we didn't have any 90s. That was a very new weapon then, sir.

55. General RUSSELL. But everything else, you had a full complement of weapons?

Colonel CAPRON. I am a little hazy on the 37s. We had some of those, but I doubt if we had many.

56. General RUSSELL. I guess that is all.

57. General FRANK. How did you stand on bombs and ammunition?

Colonel CAPRON. The bombs were fine, as I remember, General, but as to the ammunition I am hazy.

58. General FRANK. All right.

Colonel CAPRON. Cal. 50 later became a low point: we gave so much to the Navy that we starved the Army.

59. General GRUNERT. Now, Colonel, we have had many witnesses and we shall have many more, so the Board does not want simply to pile up evidence just to have a fat record, but we would like to find out whether there is anything that stands out in [2027] your mind that might assist us, and for us to judge whether or not we have already covered it.

Now, is there any one thing that stands out in your mind, or two or three, that you ought to tell the Board about that might have some bearing on this problem?

Colonel CAPRON. I have two things, sir. I have a lasting impression that when I heard these Jap ships come over I thought, Well,

the gang arrived from the mainland a little ahead of time. They had been ferrying in, and we were looking for some. The reason I knew that: when I heard the shooting, our airplanes had been coming over there, sir, and they had their armament unmounted. It was boxed up somewhere in the shops, and we had sent—or it hadn't come over at all. I had wired, or we had all urged that hereafter when ships came over they have the guns not only along with them but also mounted for doing business. Well, when we heard all these airplanes and all the shooting, we thought, Well, at last it percolated and they are arriving here as they should have.

60. General GRUNERT. Did they arrive shooting?

Colonel CAPRON. It was the Japs, sir. That was the outstanding impression which I had.

Another one was this; it may be irrelevant here: Shortly after the blitz a representative of the White House, a young civilian, came over to the Islands to discuss presumably the subject of handling scrap metal. We had a staff meeting in the headquarters office at Shafter. Well, after this meeting was over and, oh, about two weeks later a nasty report came down from the War Department saying that they had gotten a report from this young civilian, sir, that the ordnance [2028] antiaircraft ammunition had been so foul during the blitz that they had sprayed Honolulu and killed quite a few people.

I want to bring out the fact that on the afternoon of the 7th, because there had been people killed in the city and something, presumably Japanese bombs, had gone through houses—they had functioned; they had hit out in the street; they had killed people—I organized a bomb squad of three, of civilian ammunition technicians. They went around and checked up every incident. We found what these things were. They were not Japanese; they were not Army ammunition. I would like to bring that out too—

61. General GRUNERT. What were they?

Colonel CAPRON. I made a secret report on that, sir, to General Short in writing on the 9th or the 10th of December, and am I at liberty to say?

62. General GRUNERT. This is all secret and you are at liberty to state anything that you think may assist the Board in getting at the facts, sir.

Colonel CAPRON. They were antiaircraft ammunition of another service, sir, whose time fuses had failed to function in the air. This particular type of ammunition had a base fuse with a tracer which would function on impact, and it was those items which led to the belief that the Japanese had bombed the city.

63. General GRUNERT. Then, if the Board should consider it desirable or necessary to examine this report of yours, do you know where it is now located?

Colonel CAPRON. It should be, sir, in the safe of the Hawaiian Department. In fact, I sent—which was wrong—I sent [2029] the original up—it was a secret paper. The original went up to the forward echelon. It was locked in the safe and retained in the files of the Department Ordnance Office. Subsequently some question came up on that thing, and the original had disappeared, and I made a copy of my copy and sent it up to the then Chief of Staff, Colonel—

64. General GRUNERT. Of what?

Colonel CAPRON. Sir?

65. General GRUNERT. Of what? Chief of Staff of what? The Hawaiian Department?

Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir. Colonel Phillips.

66. General GRUNERT. Then, the reason or one of the reasons that you bring out now is to show——

Colonel CAPRON. To show that our ammunition, sir, was good.

67. General GRUNERT. Your ammunition was good?

Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir.

68. General GRUNERT. And somebody else's ammunition was not so good?

Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir; the other fellow.

69. General GRUNERT. And this ammunition was thrown in the air and didn't explode, and when it came down on the ground some of it did explode and some didn't?

Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir.

70. General GRUNERT. When you said that the ammunition pertained to another service, you meant other than the Army?

Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir.

71. General GRUNERT. All right. Has anyone any other questions? [2030]

Colonel WEST. No.

72. General GRUNERT. Then, that appears to be about all that you can think of that you think might be of value to the Board?

Colonel CAPRON. May I say one more thing, sir? I had heard there was a rumor the Army-Navy relations before the blitz had been not healthful. As far as the Ordnance was concerned, sir, I personally, and my Ordnance agency, had fine relations with the Navy. We were almost hand in glove, and I have frequently gone over to the Chief of Staff over there of the District and gotten anything I wanted; and the Navy Ordnance and the Army Ordnance, who had a lot in common, were fine.

73. General GRUNERT. All right. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. WARREN T. HANNUM, RETIRED; SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General HANNUM. Warren T. Hannum, Brigadier General, Retired. I was retired February 1st. On February 4th by appointment of Governor Warren I was made Director of Natural Resources of the State of California, and hold that office at the present time.

2. Colonel WEST. Where is your office, sir?

General HANNUM. My residence address is Apartment 21, 1201 Greenwich Street, San Francisco. Office address is [2031] Department of Natural Resources, State Office Building No. 1, Sacramento.

3. General GRUNERT. Your retirement date was in 1944, was it, or 1943?

General HANNUM. It became effective February 1, 1944.

4. General GRUNERT. You mentioned the date but not the year.

General HANNUM. Yes.

5. General GRUNERT. In our attempts to get at facts and to accomplish the mission charged to the Board, the field is so broad that we divided some of these phases up between the Board members, and General Frank has this particular line of special investigation, so I shall ask him to lead in questioning you, and the other members of the Board will piece out where they think they ought to get more information.

General HANNUM. Yes, sir.

6. General GRUNERT. General Frank.

7. General FRANK. Will you state, please, what position you held in 1941?

General HANNUM. I was Division Engineer of the South Pacific Division, under the Chief of Engineers, which included all river and harbor, flood-control, and military construction work in the Pacific Coast States of California, Nevada, Arizona, part of Utah, and also the Hawaiian Islands. There was a district under my supervision in Hawaii, Honolulu, a district in Sacramento, a district in San Francisco, and one in Los Angeles.

8. General FRANK. You held the same position in 1942?

General HANNUM. Yes, but in that year the South Pacific and North Pacific and Mountain Divisions were abolished and [2032] combined into one division known as the Pacific Division, which included practically everything west of the Rocky Mountains except Hawaii, which had by that time been transferred to the control of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

9. General FRANK. Was Colonel Wyman in charge of one of your districts?

General HANNUM. He was the District Engineer in Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.

10. General FRANK. Had you been Division Engineer when he was previously in Los Angeles?

General HANNUM. Yes.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, are you familiar with the negotiations for the contract which was W-414-Eng-602, dated 20 December 1940, with the Hawaiian Constructors, for defense projects in Hawaii?

General HANNUM. Yes. I do not know the contract by the number. I know it by the name, under Hawaiian Constructors.

12. Major CLAUSEN. You initiated the contract, didn't you, sir, by a letter to Colonel Wyman when he was stationed in Hawaii?

General HANNUM. No. As District Engineer he was responsible for the initiation.

13. Major CLAUSEN. Well, did you write him, sir, this letter, a copy of which is attached to the I. G. file, report by Colonel Hunt, letter dated November 6, 1940, which I show you?

General HANNUM. That is not my signature, but it is probable that I signed it, yes, sir.

[2033] 14. Major CLAUSEN. But do you recall having sent a similar letter to him, if you cannot say that that is it?

General HANNUM. That is in conformity with my recollection of the circumstances, yes.

15. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. I would like to introduce this letter in evidence and read it into evidence, so that the Board may understand it. We then do not have to make photostats.

This is a letter dated November 6, 1940, on the letterhead of the Office of the Division Engineer, 351 California Street, San Francisco, California. It is to:

(Letter of November 6, 1940, Colonel Hannum to Lt. Col. Wyman, is as follows:)

Lt. Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., C. E.,
U. S. Engineer Office,
Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR WYMAN: I inclose herewith a letter received from Colonel Gesler, Office, Chief of Engineers, in reference to negotiated contracts on the basis of fixed price and also cost-plus-fixed-fee. The form for cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts is inclosed.

If you negotiate on the basis of a fixed price, it appears, since you will not have the plans and specifications ready until December 20, that you could not negotiate before that time. After arriving at an agreement, it would take some time to execute it and then an additional month or two before equipment could be placed in Honolulu on the job. On the other hand, if you use a cost-plus-fixed-fee form, negotiations [2034] could be conducted without waiting for the detailed plans. Since the contractors interested are mainly on the mainland, it seems to me it would be well for you to come to the mainland to conduct the negotiations with specified parties on specified dates. We will sit in with you on these negotiations.

Since the Navy contractors over there are on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis, it occurred to me that a contractor working for you on a fixed price basis would be at a disadvantage since the Navy work is much larger in amount than you would have.

However, I prefer that you examine various methods in the light of existing conditions in Hawaii and come to your own conclusions as to methods and procedure.

Sincerely yours.

WARREN T. HANNUM,
*Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.*

Now, following that letter, sir, did Colonel Wyman come to the mainland and confer with you?

General HANNUM. Yes; he came to the mainland and conferred with me.

1. Major CLAUSEN. And would you state fully the particulars concerning what then happened, sir?

General HANNUM. He went to Los Angeles to confer with possible contractors at Los Angeles. Later I advised him, in view of the fact that neither I nor my office had had any [2035] experience in cost-plus-fixed-fee work, and the contract would have to be approved in Washington, I advised him to proceed to Washington, to the Chief of Engineers Office, and conduct the negotiations there in order to expedite the completion of the contract and get the work started.

2. Major CLAUSEN. Well, now, between the dates that Colonel Wyman arrived and you had this preliminary talk with him, and your instructions that he proceed to Washington, you are aware, are you, that he went to Los Angeles and there discussed this contract with Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General HANNUM. I do not know that he conducted it with Hans Wilhelm Rohl. I understood, or my impression is, that he conducted it with Callahan Construction Company, Mr. Paul Grafe, and my understanding is that Mr. Paul Grafe went to Washington and was in consultation in Washington.

3. Major CLAUSEN. Well, do I understand from what you say, sir, that when Colonel Wyman reported to you as to his trip to Los Angeles he did not tell you that he had seen Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General HANNUM. I do not recall that he had said anything to that effect.

4. Major CLAUSEN. But you do recall that he did say he had seen Paul Grafe?

General HANNUM. Yes. I am sure about that because later on Paul Grafe went with me to Honolulu in May of '41 to look over the work over there, and all my contacts regarding that contract were with Paul Grafe of the Callahan Construction Company.

5. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall if Colonel Wyman had [2036] discussed this contract with anyone beside Paul Grafe as a possible contractor between the—

General HANNUM. I think he did. I think that Mr. Guy Atkinson of the Guy Atkinson Construction Company was in contact with him in Los Angeles, as I recall.

6. Major CLAUSEN. And so far as your memory now serves you, you do not know whether he discussed it with Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General HANNUM. No, I don't know.

7. Major CLAUSEN. Well, did you know at that time, sir, Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General HANNUM. I had heard of him. I did not know him.

8. Major CLAUSEN. Did you know at that time that he was an alien, a German alien?

General HANNUM. No; that didn't come up until later.

9. Major CLAUSEN. Specifically, General Hannum, whose responsibility in the Corps of Engineers would it be to see that the Government did not make a contract of a secret nature such as this with a German alien?

General HANNUM. I don't know that—Rohl had made—contracts had been made by the Engineer Department with Rohl several years before that in the construction of the breakwater in Los Angeles harbor.

10. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Reporter, would you read the question please?

General HANNUM. And—

11. Major CLAUSEN. Pardon me. I thought you had finished.

General HANNUM. I am bringing out the point that no one knew; it wasn't known that he was not a citizen. He had been in this country for quite a number of years, he was a reputable contractor in Los Angeles, and if there was any idea that he was an alien, and I don't know; if he was an alien at that time, the rules and regulations and laws forbade the employment of aliens.

[2037] 12. Major CLAUSEN. Well, my question was this: Who in the Corps of Engineers had the responsibility to ascertain?

General HANNUM. Initially the District Engineer. Above that, the Division Engineer and the Chief of Engineers office.

13. Major CLAUSEN. So in this case the responsibility primarily or initially would rest upon Colonel Wyman; is that correct, sir?

General HANNUM. That would be my correct interpretation of the rules, yes.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Now, as I understand it, Colonel Wyman came to the mainland and he conferred with you in San Francisco here?

General HANNUM. Yes.

15. Major CLAUSEN. And then you gave him certain instructions, he went to Los Angeles, and then did he come back here and report to you?

General HANNUM. I don't recall whether he came back to San Francisco and went from San Francisco or whether he went to Los Angeles—or went to Washington direct from Los Angeles. I can't recall that.

16. Major CLAUSEN. In any event, he then went to Washington?

General HANNUM. Yes.

17. Major CLAUSEN. And were any further conferences had with you, sir, concerning this contract before Colonel Wyman returned to Hawaii?

General HANNUM. No. No, because that contract was left in Washington for final execution in Washington, and it was some months later before it was finally executed, as I recall.

18. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, I show you a letter dated 14 February [2038] 1942, from Colonel A. K. B. Lyman, Department Engineer in Hawaii, to Major General Reybold, and I am going to introduce this in evidence and I would like to read it. Perhaps I should read it, sir, and then the witness will hear what I am going to say. It is certified as a true copy by Colonel Brown of the Corps of Engineers.

19. Major CLAUSEN. This letter is dated 14 February 1942, on the letterhead of the Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the Department Engineer, Fort Shafter, T. H., too:

(Letter of February 14, 1942, Colonel Lyman to Major General Reybold, is as follows:)

Major General EUGENE REYBOLD,
Chief of Engineers, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL REYBOLD: We have had an unfortunate and unpleasant situation develop here in the Hawaiian Department. The District Engineer has executed some of his work in a most efficient manner, however, due to an unfortunate personality he has antagonized a great many of the local people as well as some of the new employees and officers who have recently been assigned to his office. Since this atmosphere of antagonism exists whenever any condition arises such as slowness in making payments to dealers or to employees, even if this condition is beyond the control of the District Engineer, the people wrathfully rise up in arms against him.

Prior to December 7 I did not have very many official dealings with the District Engineer and I know little about the efficiency of his administrative and [2039] engineering organization, but since December 7, when it was believed that it would be more economical and in the interest of efficiency to continue using his office as the procurement and dispersing agency for the Department Engineer's office, I have had many dealings with him. Some of the work which they were called upon to perform for me has been carried on in a highly satisfactory manner but there are many other items of work, which for some reason or other there was a slowness in getting results. This, I am told by various Post and Station Commanders, obtains generally and as a result many of their assistants carry resentment towards the office of the District Engineer. I shall have to state that there was rather a very abrupt change made when the ZCQM was taken over by the District office and some of the difficulties were undoubtedly created by lack of a suitable transition period.

Even though this area has been officially declared a Theatre of Operations, the District continues to function independently or under the Division Engineer on certain work over which I have no control, and as a result there is a lack of cohesion in our operations, and the whole engineer program is suffering with a consequent loss of prestige by the Engineers in both civilian and military circles. However, this could be overcome by certain corrective measures in the District Engineer's organization and methods, and many of these are now being under-

taken. It is extremely questionable whether a change in sentiment or method of operation by [2040] the District Engineer at this time could better the situation in the future due to the intense antagonism that now exists among civilians and worse among military personnel towards the District Engineer. It may be that the present District Engineer has outlived his usefulness in this Department.

The Department Commander discussed this situation with me two days ago and suggested that I warn you that he may conclude that a change is necessary. I know that General Emmons thinks very highly of the present District Engineer in some of the work that he has performed; however, the General feels that possibly an insurmountable condition has developed which is a handicap to efficient operation and he may decide to recommend a change. Before doing this, however, he has directed me to confer with the District Engineer and suggest changes in both his organization and his method of operation in an attempt to improve the existing unsatisfactory service.

Very truly yours,

A. K. B. LYMAN,
*Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Department Engineer.*

Sir, do you recall having seen that or a copy of it?

General HANNUM. No, I don't recall having seen that letter at all. This is the first I have heard of it.

[2041] But it confirms in a way what Colonel Lyman told me when I went out there in May 1942. I went out there in 1942 on the request of the Department Commander. That was after Colonel Lyman had taken over as Department Engineer, taking over the work of district engineer, and the district was abolished, and was no longer under the division engineer.

20. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, with respect to this portion of the letter where it says—

There were many other items of work, on which, for some reason or other, there was a slowness in getting results.

What did Colonel Lyman tell you about that?

General HANNUM. He didn't tell me anything about that, specifically. What he mentioned was that he said to me when I was over there that Wyman's administration had not been efficient or effective.

21. Major CLAUSEN. And this was May that you were there, or October, 1942, did you say?

General HANNUM. I know it was in May that I went over there. No, I guess it was probably in October. I was over there in October 1941; it may have been that Lyman mentioned something to me about that time. There were differences between Wyman and Lyman at that time when I was over there in October 1941.

22. Major CLAUSEN. This trip that you made in October 1941 was a sort of inspection trip, was it not, sir?

General HANNUM. It was. I made one in May 1941—I think it was May 1941—and also in October 1941.

23. Major CLAUSEN. When you were informed by Colonel Lyman of this mess that existed with respect to your district engineer, what did you do about it?

General HANNUM. I made inspections with Colonel Wyman, [2042] and also sent over later administrative assistants to assist him in getting his office reorganized.

24. Major CLAUSEN. When were they sent over, sir? It was after Pearl Harbor, wasn't it?

General HANNUM. I think it probably was; yes, sir. I do not want to say that I agreed with everything that Colonel Lyman said in that letter. I would like to have that understood, because that's his opinion. While Colonel Wyman had a personality which was irritating when he was under pressure in conferences with others, because he was abrupt at times, he was a very efficient engineer officer and a driver, and got things accomplished.

25. Major CLAUSEN. I am going to ask you if you ever received this letter, or a copy of it. It is dated 27 February 1942, from Colonel Lyman to General Reibold, and I will read it:

DEAR GENERAL REIBOLD: I wrote you on 14 February 1942 in regard to the unsatisfactory situation in the District Engineer office here. Since that time I have personally investigated conditions and find that they are unsatisfactory, particularly in the administrative branches. The administration of his office and his handling of the air field construction program are not altogether pleasing to the Department Commander and the general unpleasant feeling toward him makes it desirable to effect his replacement.

With an organization as large as the present one of the District Engineer, decentralization of authority is essential. Colonel Wyman appears unwilling to grant authority to subordinates and attempts to carry too much [2043] of the load himself. As a result some phases of the work suffer from lack of sufficient attention. In addition three of the officers whom he has selected for important line island projects have had unfavorable reports submitted against them evidencing lack of judgment on the part of the District Engineer in the selection of key personnel.

When I wrote before, the Department Commander had not definitely decided that a change in District Engineers was necessary. He realizes that Colonel Wyman has done an excellent job in many respects and does not want to take official action that would tarnish the record of the officer. General Emmons feels that perhaps Colonel Wyman has been in this semitropical climate too long or that the pace at which the District Engineer has been driving himself has clouded his judgment. On several occasions Colonel Wyman has received important verbal instructions and failed to carry them out, either through forgetfulness or failure to understand. A reconsideration of the entire situation by the Department Commander has resulted in asking me to informally request the replacement of Colonel Wyman as District Engineer.

I sincerely hope that you will see fit to ease Colonel Wyman out of the Hawaiian Department in such a manner as to reflect no discredit on him and replace him with someone who can visualize the high degree of cooperation which is necessary between the various commanders, civilians, and the District Engineer's office in order that the Engineer Service may function to the fullest extent. I, personally, do not believe there is any solution to the [2044] problem short of the relief of the present District Engineer.

In the event that you see fit to make a change I strongly recommend that two experienced administrative assistants, thoroughly familiar with Departmental procedure, be either transferred here or sent on temporary duty to reorganize the administrative branch of the District office to permit it to carry the tremendous mass of detail expeditiously and effectively. The present administrative heads have not had sufficient experience to manage the large organization that is now required to perform the administrative detail. Errors in the preparation of pay rolls and vouchers and delay in making payments have resulted in some hardship and unpleasant feeling among local labor, contractors, except possibly the one large company handling the bulk of his work, and supply firms.

Sincerely,

(s) A. K. B. LYMAN,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Department Engineer.

You recall having seen a copy of that, sir?

General HANNUM. No, sir; I have never seen it.

26. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall having been informed of that letter?

General HANNUM. No.

27. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall having discussed some of the things mentioned in this letter, with Colonel Lyman?

General HANNUM. May I see it?

28. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

[2045] General HANNUM. Regarding the statement—

that the pace at which the District Engineer has been driving himself has clouded his judgment.

I do not know that he had clouded his judgment, but I know that he was driving himself very hard, even before Pearl Harbor.

29. Major CLAUSEN. In Los Angeles?

General HANNUM. And particularly so, after Pearl Harbor. No, he was district engineer in Honolulu at the time of Pearl Harbor.

30. Major CLAUSEN. I say, sir, was he driving himself hard in Los Angeles, when he was assigned there?

General HANNUM. He was district engineer. Yes. He was in charge of the Los Angeles District at a time when they had a great deal of flood-control work in Los Angeles, and at one time he had over 20,000 men under his employ, and a great many of them, WPA men. He had them organized and doing the work by force account, and he did a very splendid job.

31. Major CLAUSEN. Wasn't that Captain, then, now Colonel Fleming, that had that, with General Connolly?

General HANNUM. No, that was WPA work.

32. Major CLAUSEN. In any event, sir, do you care to comment upon the statement in there that Colonel Wyman would not carry out instructions?

General HANNUM. I had not heard of that. I received no information at any time that he was not carrying out instructions, unless it be instructions which Coloney Lyman had given to him as Department Engineer.

33. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, do you know Colonel Row, who was Department IG in the Hawaiian Department?

[2046] General HANNUM. No, I do not recall him.

34. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall that he made a derogatory report concerning Colonel Wyman?

General HANNUM. No. no; I do not know that. I don't recall that, now, if he did.

35. Major CLAUSEN. That is, he made several, but one in particular was dated the same date as the first letter from Colonel Lyman to General Reybold, February 14, 1942, which indicated that certain unsatisfactory conditions existed, and among these there were seven specific conditions that were unsatisfactory, which existed, and among them was:

(e) That the district engineer's office as a whole has not been organized in such a manner as to operate with efficiency.

General HANNUM. The first time I have heard of that accusation! The first time I have heard of such report by the Inspector General of the Hawaiian Department. It did not come, as I recall, to my office.

36. Major CLAUSEN. I am referring to a report of the FBI investigation, and I am reading from that. On page 58, here, it states:

It was discovered during the course of inspections of District Engineer activities prior to 7 December that his administrative set-up was improperly coordinated and was so mentioned in these reports of inspection. The District Engi-

neer in his replies has stated that steps had been initiated to correct the irregularities and deficiencies reported. It is now evident that many of these irregularities and deficiencies still existed on [2047] 7 December 1941, and have been aggravated by the increased volume of his activities incident to the outbreak of war and the taking over of the functions of the Zone Construction Quartermaster on 16 December 1941.

Colonel Wyman's methods of administration have been such as to antagonize many persons, military and civil, both within and without his organizations. His actions have also been ridiculed and criticized in the community. I believe that this condition is to the great detriment of the Army as a whole and the Engineer Corps in particular.

Did you ever discuss those allegations with any member of the IG in Hawaii?

General HANNUM. No.

37. Major CLAUSEN. When you made your inspections, prior to 7 December 1941, did you discuss the District Engineer's functions and office with any member of the IG in Hawaii?

General HANNUM. No.

38. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall, sir, an investigation by another IG, Colonel Hunt?

General HANNUM. Yes, because Colonel Hunt stopped by my office to consult with me on his return from that inspection. That was in 1943, I believe it was.

39. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, you testified at that time before Colonel Hunt?

General HANNUM. Yes, sir.

40. Major CLAUSEN. You had been informed by Colonel Lyman of these conditions. I believe you recommended Colonel Wyman for the DSM, is that correct?

[2048] General HANNUM. I recommended Colonel Wyman for a DSM, yes.

41. Major CLAUSEN. Was that your own idea, sir?

General HANNUM. It wasn't only by own idea. I discussed it with others. In fact, I discussed it with General Emmons when I was out there in May 1942, and General Emmons admitted that he had done a magnificent job, but he said that no one, up to that time, had been recommended, or had been given a DSM, except General Somervell, and he didn't want to, he didn't feel that it would be a propitious time to submit a recommendation for a DSM; and I think Wyman deserved a DSM at that time for what he had done; and I can say something about that, if you would like to know.

42. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

General HANNUM. In October 1941, I was in Hawaii on one of my inspection trips out there. Wyman and I had gone out to all the other islands on a trip, and when we arrived back, on Sunday morning, we received word that General Short desired to see us that afternoon, Sunday afternoon; and when we reported to General Short, we were informed that he had received a very secret order from Washington to construct an air ferry route from Honolulu to the Philippines by way of Australia, and that all the facilities of the district and division engineer were placed at his disposal. We discussed the matter with General Short that afternoon, the possible locations for the air fields en route to Australia, and the next day I believe it was, there was a conference which I attended with General Short, and Wyman was present at the same time, and the Commandant of Pearl

Harbor, at which arrangements were made for assistance by the [2049] Navy, particularly with the reconnaissance planes, to start parties out. Within 48 hours thereafter, as I recall, Colonel Wyman had reconnaissance parties out, starting out to various places, such as Canton and Christmas, those two islands particularly, and plans were being made for him to start the work at once, using, as I recall, the Hawaiian Constructors' forces.

I remained with him about two days and came back to San Francisco by plane, commercial liner, and after getting things started in San Francisco, a place to procure supplies, and get them over to him, and other things which he needed, I went to Washington; and while in Washington I reported to General Arnold, to describe to him what we were doing, and General Arnold was much interested in it because he had apparently initiated the order to construct the air ferry route.

He asked me. He stated that, naturally, to get to the Philippines by way of Guam and Wake, he would pass through these Japanese possessions, and would have difficulty conducting any air ferry route along that line, and therefore he wanted one by way of Australia, to avoid the Japanese possessions. He asked me when we would have it completed, and I said it would not be completed for some months, but that we would have it available for use with one strip available at each of the four places in three months—by the 15th of January, 1942—and he said to me, "Well, you don't think they can do that, do you?" I said, "Do you know Wyman?" He said he knew him fairly well. "Well," I said, "he hasn't failed me yet, when he was given a mission like that to do." It was completed, ready for use, on December 28, nearly three weeks ahead of time. And [2050] when it was reported to Colonel Fleming, he told me that in a conference with Admiral Nimitz, after Pearl Harbor, at Pearl Harbor, he was present at a conference at which this air ferry route came up, and when Admiral Nimitz learned that it had been constructed, or had been ready for use in less than three months, he said it was one of the miracles of the war.

43. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, sir, was one of the reasons why you recommended a cost-plus contract, such as was afterwards signed, the secret nature of the work?

General HANNUM. No, no; it was mainly after discussing it. I was opposed to cost-plus contracts. In the South Pacific Division I didn't make any, I didn't allow any cost-plus contracts to be made, and at the time this came up over there, I didn't want to make them; but after discussing it with Wyman and knowing the situation with regard to the Navy, how the Navy were making nothing but cost-plus contracts over there, I couldn't see any method of accomplishing the work other than by a cost-plus contract.

Since we didn't make any cost-plus contracts in the South Pacific Division, and even at the time that this problem came up, the features of the cost-plus contract were not familiarly known outside of Washington, and they were not particularly well known even in Washington at that time, in the Army.

44. Major CLAUSEN. You recall having written a letter dated 5 June 1944, to the Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs?

General HANNUM. Yes, I did.

45. Major CLAUSEN. Do you have a copy of that, sir?

General HANNUM. I think I retained a copy; yes.

[2051] 46. Major CLAUSEN. Would you make that available to the Board, please, or a copy of your copy?

General HANNUM. I would be very glad to, if I can find it. Have you a copy, there?

47. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir; that is the reason I am asking you for the copy, sir. I have not seen the original, and my notes state that you informed the Chairman that you authorized Colonel Wyman to negotiate the basic contract as a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, because of the urgency of initiating the work, the secret nature of the work, and the indefiniteness. Does that refresh your memory as to whether one of the reasons was the secret nature of the work?

General HANNUM. Well, there were some features of the work that were secret, yes.

48. Major CLAUSEN. Why, General, would a cost-plus contract be more desirable from the secret nature aspects of the work?

General HANNUM. If you made a fixed contract, you would have to write out your plans and specifications, and, normally, advertise; if you didn't advertise, you would have to call in a number of contractors and negotiate with them, showing them the plans and specifications.

49. Major CLAUSEN. And was that discussed, then, with Colonel Wyman, when he had to come over to the mainland from Hawaii?

General HANNUM. Well, he knew in a general way what he was negotiating for, the work at that time, but he also realized, we all realized that the amount of work would undoubtedly be increased over what was contemplated initially, and it was increased. There was CAA work involved I think at Canton Island—yes.

[2052] 50. Major CLAUSEN. I refer specifically, General, to one of the reasons assigned, the "secret nature of the work," as to whether the secret nature of the work and the desirability therefore of having a cost-plus contract for that reason in part, were discussed with Colonel Wyman?

General HANNUM. It was possible to keep any nature of work secret. It was more possible to keep it secret under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract than it would be under a firm contract, due to procedure.

51. Major CLAUSEN. Did you discuss that with Colonel Wyman, is my question.

General HANNUM. No, I don't know that I did discuss that with Colonel Wyman. Colonel Wyman, of course, knew what he had to do; he knew that certain features were secret, and particularly as I recall, the AWS work was involved at that time, the aircraft warning service work.

52. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, had you met Hans Wilhelm Rohl on any occasion up to December 1940?

General HANNUM. No; I did not meet him until just before he went over to Hawaii.

53. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever receive any information, General Hannum, as to the relations which existed in Los Angeles between your district engineer, there, Colonel Wyman, and Hans Wilhelm Rohl, which were apart from business?

General HANNUM. No. I have heard some rumors. I heard some rumors.

54. Major CLAUSEN. What were they, sir?

General HANNUM. What was published in the newspapers—that he had some drinks with Rohl. Rohl, I think, was a heavy [2053] drinker. Wyman was not a heavy drinker, and he took a social drink with many people, on occasion. I never knew Wyman, if you are leading up to that point of Wyman's sobriety, I would say that I have never known Wyman in my experience to be drunk.

55. Major CLAUSEN. With regard to the other relations that are alleged to have existed between Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl during the Los Angeles tour of duty by Colonel Wyman, such as accepting expensive entertainment from Rohl, and then giving Rohl's company important contracts. Did you ever hear of that during the time that Wyman was stationed at Los Angeles?

General HANNUM. No, no; I don't think Rohl ever had a contract under Wyman, after—Wyman was district engineer at Los Angeles when I came out here as division engineer, and it was a contract for the breakwater which Rohl had, which had been made before I arrived, and I think the contract was completed before I arrived out here.

56. Major CLAUSEN. When did you arrive out here, General?

General HANNUM. In January 1938.

[2054] 57. Major CLAUSEN. In any event, I understand, then, that you know nothing of these alleged conditions that existed at Los Angeles?

General HANNUM. I have no first-hand information of any discreditable or dishonorable action of Wyman with Mr. Rohl.

58. Major CLAUSEN. And when was it, General, that you heard these rumors that you stated you heard concerning the drinking?

General HANNUM. It was only after it came out in the newspapers, the relation between Rohl and Wyman, when it was publicized.

59. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever hear of this party, Werner Plack?

General HANNUM. Beg pardon?

60. Major CLAUSEN. Werner Plack, P-l-a-c-k.

General HANNUM. No.

61. Major CLAUSEN. Have you read this House Committee on Military Affairs report (indicating)?

General HANNUM. No.

62. Major CLAUSEN. Are you acquainted with the fact that shortly after this December 20, 1940, contract was executed it developed that the contract had been made with the Rohl-Connolly Company, of which Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl was a German alien?

General HANNUM. The contract was made with The Hawaiian Constructors, and The Hawaiian Constructors was a partnership as—well, of course the records will show what it was. As I recall, it was the Callahan Construction Company represented by Mr. Paul Grafe, Rohl, and Shirley, are the names, as I recall. The contract was dated December 20, 1940. It was later than that before Rohl took out his final papers, citizenship papers.

[2055] 63. Major CLAUSEN. Well, my question is this: When did you know that Rohl would have to take out his papers?

General HANNUM. Not until Wyman requested—we got a telegram I think in the Division office from Wyman to the Chief of Engineers, asking that the matter of Rohl's citizenship papers be expedited.

64. Major CLAUSEN. And with reference to December 20, 1940, the date of the contract, when did you receive that wire?

General HANNUM. That was later, some months later, several months; in the next year, I would say, 1942, because it was 1942 when I was over there in May of 1942. Mr. Paul Grafe went over by plane with me. We went together with Wyman to look over the work on Oahu that was under construction, and that evening Wyman told Mr. Paul Grafe very forcibly that he would have to remain in Hawaii to supervise that work; that his superintendent of construction wasn't accomplishing what should be accomplished, and he insisted that Mr. Grafe or some member of the firm remain in Hawaii to supervise the work; that his superintendent of construction was not satisfactory.

65. Major CLAUSEN. When was it that Colonel Wyman sent the wire requesting that Rohl's application be expedited?

General HANNUM. It was after that date, I think, because it was after that that Mr. Paul Grafe probably suggested Rohl's coming over because Paul Grafe didn't want to remain over there.

66. Major CLAUSEN. Now, sir, you mentioned that that occurred in 1942. Aren't you mistaken as to the time when that occurred?

General HANNUM. Yes, I am mistaken. I should have said May '41.

67. Major CLAUSEN. Well, now, do you recall, General, that [2056] prior to that, in specifically January of 1941, Colonel Wyman wrote to Mr. Rohl to come to Hawaii?

General HANNUM. January '41?

68. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. I will show you a copy of the letter.

General HANNUM. I don't know about that. When did Rohl go?

69. Major CLAUSEN. He went later.

I show you a letter, sir, which is an exhibit in this I. G. report of Colonel Hunt, dated January 22, 1941, which reads as follows; this is to Mr. Rohl from Colonel Wyman:

(Letter of January 22, 1941, Colonel Wyman to Mr. Rohl is as follows:)

Mr. H. W. ROHL, ROHL-CONNOLLY COMPANY,
4351 Alhambra Avenue, Los Angeles, California.

DEAR SIR: Reference is made to Secret Contract No. W-414-eng-602 with The Hawaiian Constructors for work in the Hawaiian Islands.

As you are actively interested in this venture, I desire you to proceed to Honolulu at your earliest convenience to consult with the District Engineer relative to ways and means to accomplish the purpose of the contract. You will be allowed transportation either by clipper or steamboat, both ways, and travel allowance not to exceed \$6.00 per day while enroute in accordance with existing laws and regulations.

You will make application to either the District [2057] Engineer at Los Angeles or the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, San Francisco, for transportation.

Do you recall having a copy of that about that time?

General HANNUM. No. Now, I don't know whether that is on file in the Division office, or not. I don't believe it is.

(There was a brief, informal recess.)

70. Major CLAUSEN. I was asking you, General, concerning the letter that Colonel Wyman sent to Mr. Rohl in January, 1941. I believe you testified that you did not recall having seen a copy of that.

General HANNUM. No; that my present recollection is that this is the first time I have seen that or known about it.

71. Major CLAUSEN. I see. All right.

With regard to the request from Colonel Wyman for expediting the application for citizenship, do you know whether the wire was supplemented by letters or phone calls from Colonel Wyman directed to that same point?

General HANNUM. I don't recall at the present time whether there are any wires or not. That would be a matter of record, I think, in the Division Engineer's office.

72. Major CLAUSEN. Did you take any action in that respect?

General HANNUM. No.

73. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall, sir, having seen a letter from General Kingman to Mr. Schofield at the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, dated August 28th, 1941, a copy of which is set forth on page 5 of this House Committee Report [indicating]?

General HANNUM. I don't recall having seen that letter, but I do recall now that General Kingman did—I did hear that he [2058] had taken steps to assist in expediting the matter.

74. Major CLAUSEN. When did you first hear that, General?

General HANNUM. It was during the time that, I would say, just before Rohl—it must have been probably early in '42, just before—or '41, just before Rohl went over there.

75. Major CLAUSEN. When was the first time that you learned that Rohl was a German alien?

General HANNUM. Not until the whole matter came up, as is indicated in those papers which you have presented.

76. General FRANK. Which was about when?

General HANNUM. I would say in the spring of '41. I don't know that it came up before that. I could tell better if I could fix definitely when Rohl went to Honolulu.

77. Major CLAUSEN. We are informed that he went there around about September 15th of 1941.

General HANNUM. Yes. Well, it was in the spring or summer, in '41, spring or summer, then, before—and I didn't know that he was an alien until the question came up of his going to Honolulu and we finding out that he had not taken out citizenship papers, final citizenship papers, although he had been in this country for quite a number of years and had been in the contracting business for quite a number of years.

78. Major CLAUSEN. Now, with regard to the delays in the construction program, some of these delays mentioned by Colonel Lyman, what knowledge did you have, sir, that the contracts and job orders were not being completed on time with respect to the air raid warning system?

General HANNUM. The air raid warning system was delayed not only in Hawaii but in this country due to the lack of receipt [2059] of instructions from Washington.

79. Major CLAUSEN. Instructions as to what, sir?

General HANNUM. As to just where they were to be placed and the type of installation. We received word about aircraft warning service, I guess it was in '40. We got instructions suspending action later, and it was nearly a year from the time we received the first word about it before we got final word to go ahead and we got final definite instructions. All that, I think, can be verified, if you wish, by getting copies of records from the Division office.

80. Major CLAUSEN. You mean in Hawaii?

General HANNUM. No. The Division office in San Francisco.

81. Major CLAUSEN. Have you seen those records yourself?

General HANNUM. Well, the instructions came through the office at various times about the aircraft warning service, and they all were filed in the office there, in the Division office undoubtedly as well as in the District office.

82. Major CLAUSEN. Well, they would be forwarded to Honolulu.

83. General FRANK. Do you remember what office in Washington was responsible for the delay?

General HANNUM. I don't know. I think perhaps the delay was justified because at that time they didn't know just what form the installation should take nor the locations where they should be placed. For example, they thought initially that a station high up would be the best place for a station, that was unobstructed, and later they found that a plane running, skimming along low, would not be contacted. So in many places where we put stations, where stations were planned high up, they were either moved down or alternate stations placed lower down.

[2060] 84. General FRANK. Well, was it the Signal Corps that was—

General HANNUM. The Signal Corps were responsible for the design and the installation, and the Engineers were the construction agency. The Engineers were not responsible for the initiation of it.

85. General FRANK. The Signal Corps were responsible for the design and for the selection of the sites?

General HANNUM. Yes. We did not select the sites.

86. General FRANK. All right.

87. Major CLAUSEN. Now, isn't it correct, though, General, that as early as 1939 studies had been made by a board of officers of which then Captain Fleming was a member, and sites determined for fixed A. W. S. stations?

General HANNUM. That is probably true.

88. Major CLAUSEN. And isn't it also true—

General HANNUM. I don't know. I say it is probably true. I don't recall.

89. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

90. General FRANK. In Honolulu, you mean?

General HANNUM. Yes.

91. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon, sir.

General HANNUM. In Honolulu?

92. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

General HANNUM. Yes. Captain Fleming was at that time, I believe, Assistant to the Department Engineer.

93. Major CLAUSEN. And in this study by the Board at that time there were certain fixed stations which were later carried over to this contract?

General HANNUM. With perhaps modifications, I would say.

[2061] 94. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Well, in any event, no A. W. S. stations of a permanent type were constructed prior to December 7, were they, sir, 1941?

General HANNUM. I don't know, but I recall very definitely that that work in Hawaii was suspended by instructions from Washington.

95. General FRANK. All of it?

General HANNUM. Yes, on account of the lack of indefiniteness of just what features were to be carried out.

96. General FRANK. Lack of definiteness or indefiniteness?

General HANNUM. Lack of definiteness, or it was not definitely settled at that time. There were some changes, modifications, which apparently in Washington they discovered would have to be made, from the experience which had been gained presumably abroad. I don't know. I never understood why the work was delayed or suspended.

97. General FRANK. In any event, you think it was technical?

General HANNUM. Technical, yes.

98. Major CLAUSEN. And you attribute the delays to the suspension of the work?

General HANNUM. Yes.

99. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Well, now, you say these instructions came from Washington to the Division Engineer at San Francisco?

General HANNUM. Yes.

100. Major CLAUSEN. And you were the Division Engineer?

General HANNUM. I was the Division Engineer. They were transmitted through me to Honolulu, in so far as Honolulu was affected.

[2062] 101. Major CLAUSEN. I see. And when were those instructions received here, sir?

General HANNUM. Well, I don't know. I would have to look up the records to find out.

102. Major CLAUSEN. Will you do that, sir?

General HANNUM. Well, of course, my station at Sacramento, I think you could get that by telephoning to the Division office. Colonel Corey is the executive office in the Division office down town.

103. Major CLAUSEN. I perhaps could not describe it, sir, with the particularity that you could, if you jogged your memory on that.

General HANNUM. Yes.

104. Major CLAUSEN. I think the Board would appreciate it, since we are working against time, if you could do that.

General HANNUM. Very good. I will try to have that assembled. I will have to come down next week some time, then. How long will the Board be in town here?

105. Major CLAUSEN. We shall be in town for a week. And in the event the records could be searched by somebody down there at your request, if the Board has already left we could perhaps review them in Hawaii.

General HANNUM. Very good.

106. Major CLAUSEN. Or on our return.

General HANNUM. Yes.

107. General GRUNERT. May I ask a question there: You have reference now to fixed stations as such, as distinguished from mobile stations?

General HANNUM. Oh, yes.

108. General GRUNERT. For air warning?

[2063] General HANNUM. Yes. We completed the filter here. We were able to complete the filter stations and the control stations in San Francisco and Los Angeles about a week before Pearl Harbor happened. A week or two weeks, something like that.

109. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, what knowledge do you have concerning delays in the construction of underground gasoline storage tanks?

General HANNUM. That was delayed due to lack or difficulty of getting the Navy—I think that was the combined storage you are speaking of, for the Army and Navy; is that right?

110. Major CLAUSEN. All we know is that there were contracts for underground gasoline storage.

General HANNUM. Yes.

111. Major CLAUSEN. Including facilities at Bellows Field.

General HANNUM. Yes. That was at Bellows Field?

112. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

General HANNUM. Or was it up near Wheeler Field?

113. Major CLAUSEN. Bellows Field is one in particular.

General HANNUM. I do not recall that one. I recall the one up near Wheeler Field.

114. Major CLAUSEN. Well, in any event—

General HANNUM. That was up near Wheeler Field. As I recall, that was the combined underground gasoline storage, combined for Army and Navy, and there were technical difficulties involved in the plans for that, and also difficulties involved in getting coordination between the Army and Navy requirements, particularly as to the unloading point in Pearl Harbor for pumping the gas up to the storage tanks.

115. Major CLAUSEN. Now, with regard to these delays, did you [2064] inform higher authority of the fact that there were these delays occurring?

General HANNUM. The delays were due to action coming from Washington.

116. Major CLAUSEN. Well, I state: Did you inform the Chief of Engineers of those delays?

General HANNUM. The Chief Engineers knew of them because he was the one, or they were issued from his office. The instructions were issued from his office.

117. Major CLAUSEN. I understood you to say that they were issued from the Signal Corps, concerning the A. W. S.

General HANNUM. Whatever came from the Signal Corps came through the Chief of Engineers Office to us out here. The Chief Engineers was in contact with the Signal Corps in Washington and received the plans and other details from the Signal Office presumably in Washington, and then transmitted them to the field.

118. Major CLAUSEN. I see.

Now, General, what did you do about speeding up the work over there on these things? Did you complain to people of these delays that were occurring in the A. W. S.?

General HANNUM. What delays are you speaking about?

119. Major CLAUSEN. Well, I am just referring to the A. W. S., the air raid warning system.

General HANNUM. There was nothing to be done. We got instructions to suspend and await further instructions.

120. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have any instructions to Colonel Wyman at any time that this was a matter of prime importance, that these defense installations be constructed as speedily as [2065] possible?

General HANNUM. Certainly.

121. Major CLAUSEN. Did you tell him that?

General HANNUM. Certainly, and he realized that, too. Everybody realized it.

122. Major CLAUSEN. I mean did you specifically tell him that?

General HANNUM. Well, I don't know that I did specifically tell him that. There was plenty of correspondence which might, relating to the matter, probably still in the files.

123. Major CLAUSEN. Now, during 1941 when the construction was going on up to December 7th, did you—or rather, let me ask the question this way: What were your functions with regard to the carrying out of the contract that we have referred to?

General HANNUM. Supervision only.

124. Major CLAUSEN. Of whom and of what?

General HANNUM. Supervision of the work that was being carried on in the district.

125. Major CLAUSEN. How did the Hawaiian Department Commander, Commanding General, get into that picture?

General HANNUM. He didn't fit into it until after the work was turned over to him in the spring of 1942. Wait a minute. Well, he did fit into it in this way: For instance, when that air ferry route to Australia was constructed we were directed to have the Division Engineer and the District Engineer to report to General Short, the Department Commander, and we did so. In addition to that, when I was out there, I think it was in May of '41, I directed Colonel Wyman to put the installations in in accordance with General Short's wishes.

For example, we had money for Wheeler Field and for certain [2066] installations at Hickam Field, and General Short did not wish to put those installations in there and crowd and congest those places, and he wanted to open up Bellows Field, and authority was given to open up Bellows Field; and construction that was intended—barracks and things like that which were intended for Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, were put in at Bellows Field and the work was pushed hard, including the preparation of a flight strip, although the flight strip had not been approved as a project in Washington, and that flight strip was not completed on December 7th because it couldn't be completed with the money and time available, mainly the money available.

126. Major CLAUSEN. Well, did you ever get any request from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to speed up this work?

General HANNUM. No. When I saw General Short he seemed to be very well satisfied. I went around with him in May of 1941 and also in October of 1941 when I was out there.

127. General FRANK. Did you have any functions at this end of procuring, getting priorities on, or expediting delivery of supplies or equipment?

General HANNUM. Yes; we were the procurement agency here in the division office for all the supplies and personnel for the district engineer, and particularly after Pearl Harbor and even before Pearl Harbor we had great difficulty in getting transportation to get them out there.

128. General FRANK. Did you have any difficulty in getting equipment because of the scarcity?

General HANNUM. It took time, but we were able to get them.

129. General FRANK. Priorities?

[2067] General HANNUM. The critical items under the priority system didn't go into effect, I believe, until some time after Pearl Harbor, but we got numerous pieces of equipment.

130. General FRANK. Scarcity of material and lack of shipping; was that it?

General HANNUM. No; it was lack of shipping space. Both the Army Transport Service, and particularly the Army Transport Service at that time, and the Navy, however, helped us out on getting over a good deal of supplies and personnel.

131. General FRANK. There was no scarcity of shipping?

General HANNUM. Scarcity of shipping? There was scarcity of shipping, yes. There was no scarcity of materials. I thought you referred to materials.

132. General FRANK. I know, but I am trying to find out what could have delayed construction, if there was a scarcity of shipping.

General HANNUM. What delayed construction was mainly a scarcity of qualified labor. If there is any delay in construction, construction could have gone ahead a good deal faster if we could have gotten qualified labor over there promptly, and qualified supervision. That office, the work in the District office increased perhaps ten-fold in December of 1942, and they didn't have the personnel there to handle it, the qualified personnel either in the field or in the office, and it was very difficult to secure qualified personnel at that time.

133. General GRUNERT. Whose business was it to get that qualified personnel? The contractor?

General HANNUM. No. The contractor, yes, for his own work, and the Division office helped him on that. For the office work [2068] in the District office, initially the District office itself, which in so far as local sources were concerned, in so far as sources here were concerned, we did endeavor to secure the personnel which was requested, and even after Colonel Lyman took over that office, even for some months after that it still was not operating efficiently administratively.

134. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, with reference to the letters that I read to you from Colonel Lyman to General Reybold, do you recall that Colonel Wyman was relieved shortly after that second letter was written?

General HANNUM. He was relieved, as I recall, by an order which placed the work directly under the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. the same as it had been placed under the Commanding General in Alaska.

135. Major CLAUSEN. Did you get a copy of a letter from General Reybold answering the letter of 27 February, 1942, this letter from General Reybold to Colonel Lyman dated March 16th, 1942, stating that the re-assignment of Colonel Wyman was going to be effected?

General HANNUM. No.

136. Major CLAUSEN. Well, in any event, did you have anything to do with his relief yourself?

General HANNUM. No.

137. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with his assignment to the Canol Project?

General HANNUM. No, sir.

138. Major CLAUSEN. Or up there to Alaska?

General HANNUM. No.

139. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know whether on this Canol Project [2069] he was reprimanded under the 104th Article of War for failing to observe safety precautions, resulting in part in the Dawson Creek explosion?

General HANNUM. No. That Canol Project was not under my direction.

140. Major CLAUSEN. I see.

Sir, with regard to this letter from General Kingman to Mr. Schofield dated August 28th, 1941, what did you have to do with that letter yourself?

General HANNUM. With this letter?

141. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

General HANNUM. By General Kingman to Schofield?

142. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

General HANNUM. I don't know that I had anything to do with it unless I sent a letter to Kingman about the case. I don't recall that, though.

143. Major CLAUSEN. Well, would you make inquiry in that respect also at the Division Engineer's office here?

I have no further questions.

[2070] 144. General FRANK. Did you state that you knew nothing about the association of Wyman and Rohl in Los Angeles?

General HANNUM. No; I did not know of any relationship between Wyman and Rohl. I knew that Rohl was a contractor, but I had no knowledge of any particular social relations or other relations, other than official, that Wyman may have had with Rohl.

145. General FRANK. When Wyman had the supervision of this contract in which Rohl was involved, in Los Angeles, was he then under your jurisdiction?

General HANNUM. No, General Kingman was then Division Engineer, here. I relieved General Kingman, here, in January 1938, and that contract, as I recall, for the breakwater had been made the year or two before that.

146. General FRANK. The contract had been made, but Wyman was operating down there, in 1938 and 1939, while you were the division engineer here?

General HANNUM. Wyman went out there in 1935, I believe.

147. General FRANK. Out where.

General HANNUM. To Los Angeles. He was assigned as district engineer in 1935 or 1936, along about that time.

148. General FRANK. And when did he go to Honolulu?

General HANNUM. He went out there in 1939 or 1940, as I recall.

149. General FRANK. Therefore, he was in Los Angeles for over a year under your jurisdiction while you were division engineer here?

General HANNUM. Yes, yes; that is correct.

150. General FRANK. And you knew nothing of his associations?

[2071] General HANNUM. No, no. I don't know that he had any association with Rohl during the period that he was district engineer, after my arrival. It never came to my attention. We had no contracts with Rohl in the Los Angeles district, at that time.

151. General FRANK. When did they have the breakwater contract down there?

General HANNUM. That breakwater was finished, as I recall, in December 1938.

152. General FRANK. What kind of system or arrangement did you have as division engineer to check on your district engineers?

General HANNUM. Well, when the engineering papers came in, these plans and specifications were reviewed in the engineering division in my office, and comments submitted to me, and I passed on them, and the contracts at that time had to be approved in Washington. Copies of the contract came to my office. We had copies of the contract, plans and specifications, and I went out and inspected the work with the district engineer, to inspect the progress, and also see whether the work was being carried out, and discussed with him as to whether it was being carried out in accordance with the plans and specifications.

153. General FRANK. Did he know when you were coming, generally?

General HANNUM. Generally speaking, I think he did; yes. I customarily let him know when I was coming, to make sure that they would be there when I arrived.

154. General FRANK. Did you have any organization under which [2072] you had an administrative inspector go into a district to find out how the work was being done?

General HANNUM. Yes; that is required by the Engineer Department regulations. Administrative auditors and inspectors go out, as I recall now it was at least twice a year—at least once a year, and perhaps twice a year.

155. General FRANK. But they are more in the nature of auditors, and their work is not in the nature of making inspections along the line that the War Department inspectors generally make, is that correct?

General HANNUM. It is an audit of the accounts, and the records of the district office, yes—an administrative inspection of all the administrative records of the office.

156. General FRANK. You did not have any arrangement in your system of finding out what the personal operations of your district engineers were, did you?

General HANNUM. I don't know what you mean by "personal operations."

157. General FRANK. I mean socially.

General HANNUM. Personal contacts?

158. General FRANK. Yes.

General HANNUM. No, no; only what would be observed by the division engineer going out and contacting the district engineer and knowing the persons with whom he happened to be associating.

159. General FRANK. If he knew you were coming, and he had good sense, he would not disclose anything that was not proper, do you think?

General HANNUM. So far as I observed at any time there was no suspicion of any guilt on the part of Wyman in his social [2073] contacts.

160. General FRANK. That is, so far as you know; but I am still talking about some sort of set-up in your machinery to find that out. Did you have any sort of arrangement to find that out?

General HANNUM. You would set up such an arrangement as that only if you were suspicious of somebody, wouldn't you? A brother officer, you wouldn't suspect that he was carrying on some improper relations with someone.

161. General FRANK. The War Department has a whole Inspector General's system set up that makes just that kind of inspection arrangement; and the engineers had none of it in their districts and divisions, evidently.

General HANNUM. Nothing—no, no regular set program of anything like that; no.

162. General FRANK. A condition of injudicious, improper association between a district engineer and a contractor could have existed then without your knowing anything about it?

General HANNUM. Oh, you mean in a monetary or a pecuniary way?

163. General FRANK. I mean this: Do you think that it is proper for a district engineer to accept entertainment continuously, to be on parties continuously, to be over a period of time intoxicated with a contractor with whom the district engineer is doing business?

General HANNUM. No, no.

164. General FRANK. That is what I am talking about.

General HANNUM. Yes, yes; but I don't know that that has been established, in the case between Wyman and Rohl, [2074] though.

165. General FRANK. You have heard no reports to that effect?

General HANNUM. I have heard in recent months some allegations to that effect.

166. General FRANK. This happened when he was operating under your jurisdiction.

General HANNUM. Where and when, if I may ask? Well, I don't know that that is important, sir.

167. General FRANK. I am trying to find out if the organization in the Engineer Corps was based on an absolute trust of the next subordinate, with almost no check on him.

General HANNUM. There are numerous checks, to see that the work is being carried out as planned and as specified, in accordance with the regulations.

168. General FRANK. What was your measure of efficiency and achievement?

General HANNUM. The character of the work, and the progress of the work.

169. General FRANK. Specifically, who finds that out, or who did find that out when you were division engineer?

General HANNUM. Well, I found it out, myself, by the reports that came in. The reports of operations that came in, under the various contracts, and also by personal inspections, and when the work became so heavy that there were so many projects, one man couldn't cover it, I had additional assistants to go out and check the progress of the work.

170. General FRANK. Did you ever check on Wyman's sobriety?

General HANNUM. I have been with him on a number of occasions, and have taken a social drink with him. My custom [2075] is

to take one or two, and stop, because I never like to lose control of myself mentally. Wyman would take more than that; but I have never seen him, as I say, lose control of himself, or be drunk.

171. General FRANK. Are you conversant with the congressional investigation of the Rohl-Wyman association?

General HANNUM. No.

172. General FRANK. Are you conversant with the California State investigation that involved Rohl and Wyman?

General HANNUM. No, only what I saw by way of extracts of what was published in the newspapers.

173. General FRANK. I suggest you read them.

Now, in answer to the question that I asked about a type of association between district engineer and contractor, you did not answer that question, if it were proper for a district engineer to continuously do those things.

General HANNUM. I think I answered no to your question, General. I think I answered no to that general question that you gave.

174. General FRANK. That it was not?

General HANNUM. It was not a proper thing, as you say, to accept entertainment from him, and gratuitous gifts.

175. General FRANK. No, I didn't say anything about gratuitous gifts, but continuous entertainment, and to establish an intimate personal association.

General HANNUM. Well, I don't think that an engineer officer or any contract officer should be denied the privilege of social contact with a contractor just because he happens to be a contractor. That's a personal, social relationship outside [2076] of business; provided he doesn't let that interfere with his business, official status.

176. Major CLAUSEN. When you discussed with Colonel Hunt, his report, if you did, do you know that that report of Colonel Hunt shows, wholly aside from the other aspect, that the intimate social relationship which existed between Rohl and Wyman impaired Wyman's efficiency as an officer?

General HANNUM. I don't. I haven't seen Colonel Hunt's report. He did not show that to me.

177. Major CLAUSEN. You wouldn't condone, for example, would you, sir, the entertainment of an Army officer by a contractor, with booze and liquor and women and wild soirees in a hotel?

General HANNUM. Well, I wouldn't condone that on the part of an officer with a contractor, nor anyone else that he might associate with.

178. Major CLAUSEN. When you made your answer to General Frank, you did not mean that that is the type of entertainment he should accept?

General HANNUM. No.

179. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, that is wrong, isn't it, sir?

General HANNUM. That is not proper conduct; no.

180. General FRANK. And when that continues over a period of several months or years, as in Los Angeles, it seems peculiar that it should continue without the next higher authority in some measure knowing something about it, over that length of time, through some kind of reporting or inspection system.

General HANNUM. Well, all I can say is that in all my visits, there, neither he nor anyone in the office, nor anyone [2077] else with whom I met down there ever mentioned it to me; and I met quite a few people in Los Angeles, at various times.

181. General FRANK. Did you ever get any report on him through General Connolly, who was operating down there in that vicinity?

General HANNUM. As to his conduct? No.

182. General FRANK. Do you ever inquire as to the standing of your district engineers in the community?

General HANNUM. Yes, yes; that is quite evident, in many places and cases.

183. General FRANK. Did you ever inquire as to his standing in Los Angeles, through other than the contractors, of course?

General HANNUM. Well, I don't know that I specifically made a point of inquiring as to his conduct, but by talking to contractors and others who were associated with the district engineers, personalities or rumors would naturally come up, if there were any. I saw Connolly down there several times, and Connolly's remark about Wyman's work was that he found difficulty in coordinating his work with Wyman, on account of Wyman's insistence on getting specific qualified personnel instead of taking run-of-the-mine, that is to say, the WPA personnel.

184. General FRANK. The congressional investigation and the California State investigation have indicated a continuous situation of close personal association, with constantly recurring, rather wild parties, over a period of time.

General HANNUM. Well, I don't see how that could have been true, while Wyman was in Los Angeles and I was division engineer, because he showed no sign of the effects of it, whatever, on my visits.

185. General FRANK. Nevertheless, we have these investigations [2078] and reports by governmental agencies; and you cannot ignore a congressional investigation, nor a State investigation.

Now, what I am coming to is, this situation existed, and the next higher commander, who was responsible for keeping Wyman in line, was yourself.

General HANNUM. Well, as I say, I don't know who gave the testimony, nor the character of the testimony that was given; and was there anything to indicate that there was any connivance with the contractor in a pecuniary way?

186. General FRANK. I suggest you read the official reports that exist. What I was after was trying to determine what kind of system existed in your office, to check on the behavior of your subordinates, and evidently other than your own visits?

General HANNUM. Yes, other than my own visit, or reports; persons who might be sent from my office down there to visit, and what they might have observed; and there were others who went down there, under my orders, administrative officers and engineer personnel; and no such reports of conduct like that ever came to me.

187. General FRANK. In other words, the man was out there on his own, and if the reports of such operations came to you, they were incidental rather than through predetermined methods?

General HANNUM. Yes; they were incidental to a visit for other purposes, and not the check on a man's personal conduct.

188. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, do you know Mr. Martin, the attorney for Mr. Rohl, of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

General HANNUM. No; I do not know him.

189. Major CLAUSEN. You said that you discussed Wyman's conduct with Mr. Connolly?

[2079] General HANNUM. No.

190. Major CLAUSEN. You meant General Connolly?

General HANNUM. General Connolly. I did not discuss his conduct. I discussed the relationship between General Connolly, when he was in charge of WPA in Los Angeles, and Wyman, who was district engineer. Wyman was securing WPA personnel from General Connolly, to carry on his work.

191. Major CLAUSEN. I understand.

General HANNUM. His work, which was flood-control work, was being carried on to relieve unemployment.

192. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever discuss Colonel Wyman with Mr. Rohl at this time, when Colonel Wyman was stationed down at Los Angeles?

General HANNUM. No.

193. Major CLAUSEN. Or with any member of Rohl-Connolly Company?

General HANNUM. No; and as I say, I don't think I saw Mr. Rohl but once, in my office.

194. General FRANK. After this kind of association that we have just mentioned, do you think it was good judgment on the part of Wyman to ask for Rohl to be sent over, to become intimately associated with him again in Honolulu?

General HANNUM. No; if he had that relationship, and he knew of it, I think he was foolish to ask for him to come over there to continue it; but the reason that Rohl was taken into the partnership was because he had floating plant, and he was the only one that had floating plant available, which was needed over there in carrying on the work over there in Hawaii. Floating plant was very difficult to get at that time.

195. Major CLAUSEN. Aren't you mistaken as to that, sir? [2080] Wasn't the floating plant desirable with respect to the Canol project?

General HANNUM. No. We needed floating plant over there. We had very great difficulty in getting suitable floating plant to do the work on those outlying islands where there was no water, no fresh water, no food, everything had to be imported, had difficulty in getting ships to take it out to the islands.

196. Major CLAUSEN. When was it, sir, that Mr. Rohl was in your office?

General HANNUM. As I recall, just before he finally went over to Honolulu. He came in to see if we could assist him in getting transportation over, and he saw me at that time, and I didn't like his appearance at the time.

197. Major CLAUSEN. What was wrong with it?

General HANNUM. Well, he didn't appear to be absolutely sober.

198. Major CLAUSEN. And what did you do about it?

General HANNUM. I assumed that he had been out to the Club, or somewhere, and had just come in to see me, and that it was just a temporary matter.

199. Major CLAUSEN. What did you do about it, sir?

General HANNUM. I did nothing further about it.

200. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

201. General FRANK. Were you at all conversant with the deal under which the yacht VEGA, belonging to Mr. Rohl, was taken to Honolulu?

General HANNUM. The yacht VEGA was taken to Honolulu on request of Colonel Wyman that it be sent over. He had great difficulty in getting any kind of transportation to carry things [2081] between the islands out there, and it was doubtful, in our opinion, whether the VEGA would be suitable; but some work was done on it to try to make it suitable, and it was sent over.

202. General FRANK. Do you know anything about the cargo, between California and Honolulu?

General HANNUM. No, I do not know about the cargo.

203. General FRANK. Do you know whether the VEGA ever was used or not?

General HANNUM. No, I don't know whether it was used after it got over there, or not, or to what extent it was used. I think perhaps the records in the office might show that.

204. General FRANK. While Colonel Wyman was under your jurisdiction, you know of no incident in which his conduct was not above reproach?

General HANNUM. His wife divorced him, and after being divorced he was remarried—if that is to his discredit, why that's about the only thing that I can think of, at the present time.

205. General FRANK. You knew nothing whatever about his general conduct?

General HANNUM. You are going back to his relations now with Rohl, again?

206. General FRANK. Yes.

General HANNUM. No, no; I think I have said.

207. General FRANK. And you knew nothing about his capacity for consuming liquor?

General HANNUM. No.

208. General FRANK. Do you know whether he was put on a pledge by Colonel Lyman?

[2082] General HANNUM. I did not know that. I do not know what authority Colonel Lyman would have to put him on a pledge.

209. General FRANK. When Colonel Lyman first went to Honolulu, Colonel Wyman was then up in the engineer regiment at Schofield; he had not yet been designated as district engineer.

General HANNUM. I think that, as I recall it, General, Wyman was ordered from Los Angeles to Honolulu as district engineer.

210. General FRANK. I think if you will look up the records, for your own information, now, down in the division engineer's office, you will find that Wyman was sent from the Engineer Regiment to Honolulu as district engineer.

General HANNUM. Oh, I recall, now; I believe you are right, General. I think he was temporarily on. Yes, that is right; he was sent over to deal with troops originally. Major Burnell was the district engineer at that time, and then Burnell was relieved and Wyman was put in his place. You are right. I recall that, now.

211. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall, when you testified before Colonel Hunt, with regard to Colonel Wyman, you said :

On one occasion, not necessarily in serious conversation, I know that he indicated that he could hold his liquor, indicating that he had a capacity to consume a considerable amount, without it very seriously affecting him.

General HANNUM. I recall it.

212. Major CLAUSEN. When did you have that discussion with Colonel Wyman?

General HANNUM. With Colonel Wyman? I don't recall the exact incident, whether it was on this side, or over in Honolulu.

[2083] 213. General GRUNERT. Will you give me a little line-up on just the relationship between the division engineer and his district engineers? Are your district engineers under you for administration, for disciplinary action, for control and supervision? Does all that apply as with troops? They were actually under your command, but are there certain limits, or what?

General HANNUM. No, the division engineer has supervisory control over the operations personnel in the district.

214. General GRUNERT. Suppose the district engineer does commit himself as to conduct, is it your business to take action against him?

General HANNUM. I would take action against him, yes, or warn him, and consult with him, and advise him.

[2084] 215. General GRUNERT. In other words, he is under your command for his conduct?

General HANNUM. Yes, I think I could say so.

216. General GRUNERT. For instance, did Wyman have to get your O. K. to give Rohl a contract?

General HANNUM. No. That was an arrangement that was made between—Wyman was carrying out the contract. He had, of course, authority to contact the contractors as contractors directly and direct them. He did not have to come to me for authority to secure Rohl's services over there.

217. General GRUNERT. Because they were the contracting firm with which the District Engineer was doing business; therefore he could get them over there on his own without your O. K.?

General HANNUM. Yes. He would issue the necessary instructions to his contractors initially without consulting me.

218. General GRUNERT. Did you ever get any report about Wyman's conduct from any source, as to his lack of sobriety or his conduct otherwise?

General HANNUM. You mean, in Los Angeles or Honolulu?

219. General GRUNERT. Anywhere while he was under your command.

General HANNUM. No, I don't believe so, General. I do not recall hearing any adverse criticism of his conduct except his personality and ability to irritate people. There was brought up one morning the question of his administration and the differences between Wyman and Lyman. When December 7th came the troops on Hawaii needed a lot of supplies and other things, which they did not have, and in taking their positions, their combat positions, they secured materials from the various merchants around the island, and in many cases they did not give [2085] receipts for the materials which they obtained. Then later Wyman, according to his report to me, tried to

have the Department Engineer issue instructions or have them issued by Department Headquarters that in securing these materials the commanding officer, or even a non-commissioned officer, whoever got the materials, should give a receipt to the merchant from whom he received them, merchant or other person. That apparently was not done, according to what I understood.

After things quieted down, the bills were received and turned over to the District Engineer for payment. Wyman had very great difficulty in getting anyone to certify that the materials had been received. He had no authority to make payments of equipment money unless he could get a proper certificate of the receipt of those things. That led to a confusion and a difference between Wyman and Lyman at the time. It also irritated a great many merchants and others who were delayed in receiving payment until there was an opportunity to find out whether the materials had actually been delivered by that merchant to someone in the military service.

220. General GRUNERT. Then in answer to my question do I understand that you never received any complaint about Wyman that would cause you to take disciplinary action?

General HANNUM. No, sir, I did not receive any such complaint.

221. General GRUNERT. And during the time he was under your jurisdiction, you know nothing about his conduct that would require any such action?

General HANNUM. No.

222. General GRUNERT. Do you know of any delays in construction [2086] that are properly chargeable to the District Engineer through inefficiency or neglect?

General HANNUM. No, sir. My experience with Wyman was that he was a driver and he pushed things and pushed them hard, and in doing so he did irritate some of his subordinates and other persons.

223. General GRUNERT. You know that of your own personal knowledge?

General HANNUM. Yes, sir, he was a hard taskmaster.

224. General GRUNERT. Do you know of your own knowledge whether or not any action of the contractors in Hawaii resulted in delay of construction there?

General HANNUM. No, except unless it be inefficient labor. Of course, they had very great difficulty in getting efficient labor and they did not accomplish what might have been accomplished in normal times in this country, on account of the lack of qualified labor.

225. General GRUNERT. Then I might ask you this question: Do you know whether any such delays were intentional on the part of any contractor?

General HANNUM. I would say that they would not have been intentional. I think that they were trying to execute the contract as rapidly as possible and to the best of their ability.

226. General GRUNERT. With your knowledge of construction, as an engineer officer experienced in construction, had someone else been in Wyman's place under the conditions that existed, do you think they could have done a better job, as good a job, or a job with less success or progress?

General HANNUM. I do not believe they could have accomplished more in the way of construction work. I do believe that they could have established better relationships with the public and within their own organization. [2087]

227. General GRUNERT. Any more questions?

228. General RUSSELL. There has been considerable testimony about a man named Lyman. Lyman died out there, didn't he?

General HANNUM. Yes, sir. He went out there. He was on duty as district engineer in Boston along about 1936 or 1937. He was advised by the doctors to retire. He did not want to retire. He thought that by going and taking duty with a regiment out at Honolulu he would not work under such heavy pressure and he would get along all right and when he completed his assignment to the engineer regiment out there, after two years he would retire and live out in Honolulu or in the Hawaiian Islands.

229. General RUSSELL. He was a native Hawaiian?

General HANNUM. Yes. The family was from the Island of Hawaii.

230. General RUSSELL. You state this man Wyman was rather difficult to get along with and irritated people considerably. What about Lyman?

General HANNUM. Lyman had a different personality, a pleasing personality. He made friends easily.

231. General RUSSELL. And he did not irritate people?

General HANNUM. No, I don't think he did.

232. General RUSSELL. If any friction existed between Wyman and Lyman, it would be your judgment that Wyman would be responsible for the friction?

General HANNUM. Not necessarily so. There were differences of opinion. Lyman was a positive character, too, and when he made up his mind he was just as positive as Wyman was, and because they were not, either one, under the other, there would naturally be friction there on that particular matter. [2088]

233. General RUSSELL. That is all.

234. General GRUNERT. Knowing what you did, if you had to do it over again would you choose Wyman to get that sort of a job done, or would you trust it to somebody else?

General HANNUM. Under the present conditions and what has developed, I would not want to use Wyman again in the same place, under the same conditions.

235. General GRUNERT. General, It may happen that as our investigation proceeds we may want to ask you a few more questions when we come back through here. Do you expect to be here off and on for the next month or so?

General HANNUM. I will be in the States somewhere.

236. General GRUNERT. But not necessarily here in San Francisco?

General HANNUM. No, but I can be obtained through San Francisco here.

237. General GRUNERT. There may be a few points which the Board wants to clear up, of which they may think you have knowledge, and, therefore, although we are through with you now we may want ask you a few more questions if points come up to be cleared up.

General HANNUM. Yes, sir. I can leave my office and phone number in Sacramento.

238. General GRUNERT. From what questions that have been asked and the testimony that has been given, do you know of anything that has not been brought out which might be of assistance to the Board, that you would like to introduce as evidence?

[2089] General HANNUM. This relates particularly to Wyman's relations with Rohl and Wyman's performance of duty as District Engineer in Honolulu preceding and following Pearl Harbor?

239. General GRUNERT. Yes, as limited to anything that had to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor, either background or leading up to it, or personalities concerned with, not any ancient history or things that happened afterwards, unless they have some bearing upon what happened then.

General HANNUM. And Wyman's conduct included?

240. General GRUNERT. And Wyman's conduct included.

General HANNUM. Well, I can tell you something which I heard circumstantially that took place on December 7th in Honolulu, regarding Wyman's conduct there, but I think that you can get that first-hand possibly better from the personnel in the Honolulu office who were there with regard to that matter.

On December 7th, which was a Sunday, I was coming back from Washington and was on the train this side of Chicago, when the radio recorded Pearl Harbor was being bombed. When I arrived here in San Francisco Colonel Matheson, who was my assistant, reported to me that Wyman had called up by radio phone from Honolulu on early Sunday afternoon, tried to get me, could not get me and finally got Colonel Matheson at his house in Burlingame. Colonel Wyman reported to Colonel Matheson "We are being bombed." Colonel Matheson asked him whether he could do anything. He said nope, he couldn't do anything; he just wanted to report they were being bombed. That was all the conversation.

When I went to Honolulu later, which I think was in May of 1942, I learned or it was reported to me that Wyman on the [2090] evening of December 7th, Sunday evening, when the troops were being disposed for defense of the island, happened to be along the waterfront at Honolulu and saw that the little ship harbor there to the east of the main harbor, where a lot of little boats were collected and into which there was an opening from the sea, with a shallow depth of water of 6 or 8 feet over the reef, that that area was not covered, not protected. He proceeded to take measures to get civilians and secured arms from the Ordnance Depot nearby, and had them armed, and within a few hours had taken defense measures and had the place covered, with rifle fire, of course; he had no other means.

I will be very glad, if there is anything more that occurs to me, to report it to you, any circumstances which I think might be of use to you in your investigation in connection with, as I understand, Wyman's conduct as District Engineer in Honolulu, and the conduct of his work.

241. General GRUNERT. Yes, as to his conduct, his work, delay in construction, generally about the construction work in Hawaii prior to December 7th.

General HANNUM. Very good, sir.

242. General GRUNERT. That may have a bearing upon delays that may have influenced the defenses against the attack of December 7th.

General HANNUM. Yes, sir.

243. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon at 5 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses and proceeded to other business.)

[2091]

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[2092] **PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD**

THURSDAY, AUGUST 31, 1944.

PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

**TESTIMONY OF COLONEL LATHE B. ROW, 03601; TEMPORARILY
ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL, WESTERN DEFENSE COM-
MAND; PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is after facts concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor, incident to that attack, or connected therewith. It is charged with investigation of certain things that happened in and about Honolulu, connected with Colonel Wyman, and for that purpose you have been called to give the Board some information. General Frank has charge of this particular part of the investigation, and he will lead [2093] in questioning, and the Board will fill out where it sees fit. General Frank.

2. General FRANK. Will you state any assignment which you had with respect to an investigation that you made concerning the activities of Colonel Wyman.

Colonel ROW. I was assigned as Inspector General, Hawaiian Department, some time in May 1941, and continued on that assignment until March 1943. One of the assignments given to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department which I found when taking over the office was inspections of cost-plus-fixed-fee contract operations within the Department. At that time nothing had been done relative to the inspections, and during the summer and fall of 1941 this work was started.

The inspections were turned over to the Inspector General, Hawaiian Department.

3. General FRANK. That was yourself?

Colonel ROW. That was myself. These inspections and investigations were in the main made by subordinates in a section which was

organized as a Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee section. A very small part of the work of inspections and investigations were made by me personally, although under my supervision.

4. General FRANK. Were you thoroughly familiar with the results and the details?

Colonel Row. I supervised the reports, and interested myself in the progress of them.

5. General FRANK. All right.

6. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, did you have occasion to make a report concerning Hawaiian Constructors, Colonel Wyman, et al., about February 1942?

[2094] Colonel Row. I did.

7. Major CLAUSEN. And would you let me have that, please? The record shows the witness handed me a document consisting of three pages, with a fourth page containing a little note, on the top. By the way, in whose handwriting is this, Colonel, "recommending relief of," on this little note?

Colonel Row. That was mine, personally.

8. Major CLAUSEN. I am going to read this report into the record, if I may, so that the Board may hear. It is dated 14 February 1942, on the stationery of the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Office of the Department Inspector General.

Memorandum: To the Chief of Staff.

1. The preliminary portion of the investigation now being made by Lieutenant Colonel Emil W. Leard, I. G. D., of this office regarding the operations of the U. S. District Engineer indicates that the following conditions exist:

a. That the District Engineer has antagonized the business firms of Honolulu and private individuals of the community by his failure to properly meet obligations, peremptory actions, and lack of tact on the part of himself and certain members of his staff.

b. That due to the District Engineer's failure to coordinate the procuring, auditing, and disbursing sections of his organization payments to dealers for merchandise delivered and services rendered are in some cases long overdue. Some firms are threatening to refuse further sales unless outstanding obligations are paid in full and kept current. Many smaller businesses now are faced with financial difficulties due to their inability [2095] to collect amounts due them from the District Engineer. It has been ascertained that of the larger firms approximately \$500,000.00 is due Lewers & Cooke and approximately \$60,000.00 is due Mr. Murphy, the owner of Murphy Motors and Aloha Motors. There are indications that similar large amounts are due other firms.

c. That the District Engineer's delay in paying wages, sometimes for periods of several weeks, is adversely affecting the prosecution of defense projects and the morale of employees engaged on these projects.

d. That the failure on the part of the District Engineer to properly and systematically take over the activities of the Zone Constructing Quartermaster on 16 December has resulted in disruption of administrative functions to a marked degree.

e. That the District Engineer's office as a whole has not been organized in such a manner as to operate with efficiency.

f. That there is evidence that the District Engineer has harassed the former employees of the Zone Constructing Quartermaster and has subjected them to mental persecution to such an extent that many of the key men have refused to work in his office.

g. There is evidence to indicate that the employees of the former Zone Constructing Quartermaster who have been transferred to the office of the District Engineer are discontented and dissatisfied over conditions existing therein.

2. Mr. Murphy, the owner of the Murphy Motors and [2096] Aloha Motors, stated to Lieutenant Colonel Leard yesterday (13 February 1942) that he has been unable to collect past due obligations for trucks and automobiles

purchased by the District Engineer. He further stated that he is going to the mainland by clipper within three days and that he contemplates bringing these matters to the attention of Delegate King and such other authorities in Washington as may be necessary to secure remedial action unless he can be assured his unpaid bills will be settled promptly. He also stated that he contemplates refusing to make delivery on orders now on hand for more motor transportation. Mr. Murphy is extremely bitter over the manner in which he and other automobile dealers have been treated by the District Engineer.

3. In addition to the matters mentioned above, past inspections and recent numerous incidents requiring investigation have disclosed that the administration and operation of the District Engineer activities since 7 December 1941 have been exemplified by extravagance and waste and general maladministration. It was discovered during the course of inspections of District Engineer activities prior to 7 December that his administrative set-up was improperly coordinated and was so mentioned in these reports of inspection. The District Engineer, in his replies, has stated that steps had been initiated to correct the irregularities and deficiencies reported. It is now evident that many of these irregularities and deficiencies still existed on 7 December 1941 and have been aggravated by the increased volume of his activities [2097] incident to the outbreak of war and the taking over of the functions of the Zone Construction Quartermaster on 16 December 1941. Colonel Wyman's methods of administration have been such as to antagonize many persons, military and civil, both within and without his organization. His actions have also been ridiculed and criticized in the community. I believe that this condition is to the great detriment of the Army as a whole and the Engineer Corps in particular.

4. In my opinion Colonel Wyman does not possess the necessary executive and administrative ability or the leadership to cope with the present situation existing in this Department. In addition to the matters set forth in paragraph 1 above, inefficiency of his office has further been demonstrated by:

- a. His methods of purchase, assignment and use of motor vehicles.
- b. His waste of money in the renting, remodeling and furnishing of offices for himself and his staff.
- c. The building of elaborate and expensive (\$21,652.46) air-raid shelters at the Punahou School for the use of himself and the executives of the contractor. These shelters have sufficient capacity to protect only a small percentage of the number of employees on the Punahou Campus.
- d. Directing his contractor to take over and operate the Pleasanton Hotel at an estimated loss of \$2,500.00 per month when a mess is operated and at the rates and room assignments fixed by the District Engineer. [2098] The principal beneficiaries of the use of this hotel to date have been Colonel Wyman and wife, and his staff and their dependents. This hotel was taken over on 16 January 1942 and a mess was established on 26 January 1942.
- e. Failing to utilize to best advantage the services of Lieutenant Colonel Harold, former Zone Constructing Quartermaster, and his highly trained assistants.
- f. His failure to stabilize assignments of personnel to positions of responsibility, and his failure to delegate authority to his administrative assistants to act for him.
- g. His failure to establish a system of accountability to insure the proper accounting for the receipt and issuance of construction material.
- h. His failure to issue directives in necessary detail and to organize his staff to insure compliance with directives issued by him.
- i. His disregard for and violation of orders of the Military Governor concerning the curfew law.

5. Although several of the investigations relative to matters mentioned in paragraph 4 have not been completed, the evidence already obtained substantiates the statements made above and indicate that Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., C. E., does not possess the necessary executive and administrative ability to properly conduct the affairs of his office. The fact that Mr. Murphy contemplates such drastic action and the fact that business firms threaten to refuse delivery on future orders submitted by the District Engineer indicate the seriousness of the situation [2099] and the need for immediate remedial action.

6. I strongly believe that unless a change in the administration of the office of the District Engineer is accomplished within a short time, most serious repercussions will result.

7. CONCLUSION:

That it is to the best interests of the United States and of the Hawaiian Department that Colonel Wyman be relieved at once as District Engineer.

8. RECOMMENDATION :

That Colonel Wyman be relieved as District Engineer at once.

(s) **LATHE B. ROW,**
Colonel, I. G. D.,
Department Inspector General.

I will read the note which is attached to the face of the document :

Informal Memorandum by Dept Inspector General to Dept Commander recommending relief of Col. Wyman as District Engineer.

The words, "recommending relief of" are inserted over the words, which formerly took their place, as follows :

which resulted in relief of

in other words, the pencil notation.

In view of the seriousness of these allegations and the conduct which had gone on for some time, will you tell the Board how it was necessary for you to expose these conditions, rather than the immediate Commander of Colonel Wyman, the Division Engineer?

[2100] Colonel Row. The operations of the District Engineer had increased so rapidly, and in our opinion the organization set-up was so deficient to take care of it, that it seemed to be impossible to get any corrective action taken. These matters were brought to the attention of Colonel Wyman at various times in the form of reports both written and verbal.

9. General GRUNERT. What did the Department have to do with Wyman? He was a district engineer under a division engineer—how did the Department inject itself into it?

Colonel Row. These inspections were directed by the Secretary of War in a letter of February 1941.

10. Major CLAUSEN. Now, sir, you have stated to me, and I will ask the question of you now, about prior inspections; that is, prior to the one of February 14, 1942. You have stated to me the fact that copies are not available in your office, here.

Colonel Row. That is right.

11. Major CLAUSEN. But that they are available in Honolulu?

Colonel Row. They should be available.

12. Major CLAUSEN. And I have informed you, have I not, that I was not able to locate the copies in Washington, at that time?

Colonel Row. Yes, that is so; a great many. You may have found some, there, but not all of them.

13. Major CLAUSEN. I am sure that, although I requested, I was unable to find any that preceded 7 December 1941, concerning the conduct that is referred to in your report of February 14, 1942; and I was informed that they would be available either through you, or in Honolulu; so I have asked you for them, and you now tell me that they are not available to you here, but that we will get them in Honolulu?

[2101] Colonel Row. I might explain these inspections, the form of the inspections. They were considered of the continuing type, which allows inspections to be made over several months or an entire year, and then a final report made at the end of the year, and for that reason these reports did not in all cases reach Washington.

14. General GRUNERT. Then as I understand it, the War Department, as a routine matter, charged the local commander with having his Inspector General investigate or keep track of certain things in the District Engineer's administration.

Colonel Row. That is correct.

15. General GRUNERT. And this was just one of the inspections carried on for that purpose?

Colonel Row. Yes, sir.

16. General GRUNERT. And did that, in a way, take some of the responsibility off the division engineer's shoulders as to administration of the districts?

Colonel Row. In no manner did it relieve the district commander of his responsibilities.

17. General GRUNERT. The division engineer's responsibility?

Colonel Row. Yes, sir; the division engineer's responsibility.

18. General FRANK. Were copies of these inspections sent to the division engineer?

Colonel Row. Oh, yes, sir; in all cases, the reports were sent—not to the division, to the district engineer; but not to the division engineer.

19. General FRANK. Do you know the organizational set-up in the Corps of Engineers?

[2102] Colonel Row. In general; yes, sir.

20. General FRANK. You know that the district in Honolulu was under the division engineer here in San Francisco?

Colonel Row. That is correct; yes.

21. General FRANK. He, in turn, was responsible back to the Chief of Engineers, in Washington?

Colonel Row. Yes.

22. General FRANK. Now, do you know what machinery the division engineer here in San Francisco had for checking up on the district engineer in Honolulu?

Colonel Row. I don't, at the moment; no.

23. General FRANK. While making those inspections, did you run onto any activity on the part of the division engineer to check or inspect his district engineer in Honolulu?

Colonel Row. I don't recall at this time.

24. General FRANK. Do you know of any systematic arrangement that he had for inspecting his district engineer?

Colonel Row. I do not; no.

25. General FRANK. Do you know the circumstances which prompted the War Department to have that district engineer's office inspected by the inspector of the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel Row. All of those activities were to be inspected by an Inspector General; that was the general plan. In the continental United States, all of these inspections were conducted from the office of the Inspector General in Washington, but due to the remoteness of the activities in the Pacific, these duties were charged to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

26. General FRANK. You say that the copies of the inspections [2103] were not furnished to the division engineer?

Colonel Row. No, sir; it is to the district engineer.

27. General FRANK. Yet the district engineer was operating under the supervision of the division engineer, and if there were some discrepancies that you had determined in your inspection report, the man to require the correction was the next higher commander to the district engineer, who was the division engineer; that is correct?

Colonel Row. That is correct, yes.

28. General FRANK. And yet you didn't give it to the division engineer, you gave it to the district engineer?

Colonel ROW. That is true. Of course, these inspections were of a local nature.

29. General FRANK. Well, but you found things wrong; you reported them to the district engineer, and then you found they were not corrected, and there was no superior of his to whom they were referred?

Colonel ROW. These reports went through the office of the Department Commander.

30. General GRUNERT. In other words, you were responsible to your Department Commander for them, and any distribution he made was up to him; is that the idea?

Colonel ROW. Well, I think it would be the duty of the Inspector General to properly advise the Department Commander on those matters.

31. General GRUNERT. But you did not think it necessary to send it to the division engineer?

Colonel ROW. It had not been done before.

32. General GRUNERT. I think it should have been done, but [2104] it wasn't done, that is all.

33. General FRANK. I was following through with a line of questions which ultimately would indicate that the organization and administration both were rather loose.

Colonel ROW. In practically every case, Colonel Wyman replied that corrective action would be taken.

34. General FRANK. But there was nobody in Honolulu who could require him to take that corrective action. The man who would require him to take the corrective action was the division engineer here in San Francisco; that is correct, is it not?

Colonel ROW. That is true.

35. General FRANK. I am not getting after you, at all; I am just trying to uncover the strength or the weaknesses of the system.

36. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, along that line, do you know why it was that, coincident with your report of February 14, 1942, which is addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department, a letter from Colonel Lyman, dated that same day, was sent to the Chief of Engineers, requesting the reassignment of Colonel Wyman?

Colonel ROW. I think that letter was the result of the memorandum which you have read.

37. Major CLAUSEN. The point that I inquired about is, why did not that letter go to the division engineer, who was the immediate superior of Colonel Wyman, if you know? Is there any reason that you know of?

Colonel ROW. I know of no reason.

38. Major CLAUSEN. You are familiar, sir, with the investigation by Colonel Hunt?

[2105] Colonel ROW. All I know is that he made an investigation.

39. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, I assume that your report of February 14, 1942, speaks for itself. I am going to read, some very brief extracts from the report of Colonel Hunt. On page 9 of his report, he states:

The charge relating to Colonel Wyman's questionable association with Mr. Rohl while in Hawaii, his alleged drunkenness, and occupation of rooms adjoining

those of Mr. Rohl, is not wholly sustained by the known facts and the testimony adduced, although elements of that association strongly suggest a relationship entirely inconsistent with the relative positions of the two men. If, as implied by news articles on the Tenney Committee hearings, and by various individuals, Colonel Wyman was aware that Mr. Rohl was not a United States citizen when he signed contract W-414-eng-802, these allegations take on a more sinister aspect.

Do you recall, of your own knowledge, having investigated any of those allegations, sir?

Colonel Row. As I recall, the fact that Mr. Rohl was not a citizen or had not been a citizen until a short time before December 7, 1941, came to light in an investigation that was conducted as to misuse of gasoline by the engineers, and during the course of that investigation it was discovered that he had not been an American citizen until a short time previously.

40. Major CLAUSEN. Now, in connection with that investigation of Mr. Rohl, did you hand me three pages, which I now show you, representing some notes on that investigation?

Colonel Row. I did.

41. Major CLAUSEN. And what are those notes, sir?

[2106] Colonel Row. An extract from these notes, is:

During the course of the above referred to investigation—

42. General FRANK. Just what is that?

43. Major CLAUSEN. I just asked you what those pages were. You describe them to me.

Colonel Row. I don't recall what these notes are, but apparently they are notes made by one of my assistants for my information.

44. Major CLAUSEN. I think it is advisable, sir, to read these notes, marked "Confidential."

In other words, your statement is that these apparently are notes made by one of your subordinates, of the investigation that you have already testified to?

Colonel Row. For information of the Department Inspector General.

[2107] 45. General FRANK. For information of the Department Inspector General, who was yourself?

Colonel Row. Yes.

46. Major CLAUSEN. Paragraph 1 says:

(Confidential report to Colonel Row is as follows:)

In connection with an investigation directed by the Department Commander regarding alleged illegal issues of gasoline to military personnel and employees of the District Engineer and Hawaiian Constructors, the testimony of several witnesses indicated that Mr. H. W. Rohl, present head of the Hawaiian Constructors, had authorized the issuance of USED plates—

That is United States Engineering Department?

Colonel Row. That is right.

Major CLAUSEN (reading):

plates to privately owned vehicles of several of his employees for the purpose of official identification and to enable them to obtain gasoline from the government operated gasoline station on Beretania Street. The testimony further indicated that Mr. Rohl authorized his transportation superintendent, Mr. Box, to issue gasoline without charge to other employees of the Hawaiian Constructors who were operating privately owned vehicles for business use.

2. During the course of the above referred to investigation, correspondence came to the attention of the investigating officer which indicated that [2108]

1100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. Rohl was born in Germany and was, on 15 August 1941, still not a citizen of the United States.

(Exhibit "A")

May I interpose here this question: Do you know where that Exhibit A will be found?

Colonel Row. It should be in the Inspector General's Office in Hawaiian Department.

47. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know what significance the date of 15 August 1941 has?

Colonel Row. I have no knowledge of that.

48. Major CLAUSEN. I shall continue reading. Paragraph 3:

The testimony of Mr. Rohl was deemed essential in the investigation regarding the gasoline, and it appeared desirable to obtain from Mr. Rohl information as to his status in regard to his citizenship.

4. Repeated attempts were made by the investigating officer to obtain an interview with Mr. Rohl. On the first occasion an appointment was made with Mr. Rohl by telephone to meet him in his office at 10:00 AM the following morning, April 4th. At the appointed time the investigating officer was told that Mr. Rohl was not in. Mr. Cades, the attorney for the Hawaiian Constructors appeared and stated that Mr. Rohl desired him to be present when testimony was taken. Mr. Cades was advised that this would not be permitted. After waiting approximately one-half hour for Mr. Rohl, the investigating officer was told by Mr. Middleton, administrator for the Hawaiian Constructors, that Mr. Rohl would not be [2109] able to appear as he had an appointment with General Tinker and Colonel Lyman. Two days later, April 6th, the investigating officer contacted Mr. Rohl personally and informed him that the testimony would have to be taken sometime during that day. Mr. Rohl stated that he was just leaving for an appointment with General Tinker and General Emmons, but that he would come to the Office of the Department Inspector General later in the day, or possibly that evening. At 9:30 PM, April 7th, Mr. Middleton called this office and put Mr. Rohl on the phone. Mr. Rohl then agreed to meet the investigating officer at 9:00 AM the following day, April 8th. The inspector visited Mr. Rohl's office promptly on time and waited until 10:15 AM for Mr. Rohl to appear. He then asked Mr. Rohl's secretary if she could locate him. She telephoned the Pleasanton Hotel and then stated that Mr. Rohl was not there and was probably out with General Lyman. In passing the Pleasanton Hotel after leaving Mr. Rohl's office the investigating officer observed Mr. Rohl's car parked in the hotel grounds, whereupon he stopped and asked the hotel clerk the whereabouts of Mr. Rohl. He was informed that Mr. Rohl was asleep in his room and was not to be disturbed, and further, that he had informed Mr. Rohl's secretary of that fact when she had called a few minutes earlier. The clerk was asked to call Mr. Rohl's room by telephone. Mr. Rohl did not answer. Mr. Kina, the manager of the hotel, was then asked to awaken him and advise him that a representative of the [2110] Department Inspector General was there to see him. Mr. Kina went to Mr. Rohl's room and then reported that Mr. Rohl would not be in his office until after 1:00 PM, and that he thoroughly disliked being disturbed. No further direct attempt was made to contact Mr. Rohl, as it was believed useless to waste further time in view of his evasive actions. The following morning the Office of the Military Governor was contacted and requested to take necessary action to compel Mr. Rohl to report to the Department Inspector General at a designated time for the purpose of taking his testimony. The following morning the Office of the Military Governor informed this office that Mr. Rohl had left for the mainland several days before, apparently on the afternoon of the day that he was found asleep in the hotel.

5. Neither Mr. Rohl nor any of his representatives informed the Inspector at any time that he intended to leave the Territory, but on the contrary apparently tried to conceal the fact.

6. The matter of irregularities in gasoline distribution is not believed to be sufficiently serious to warrant Mr. Rohl's evasiveness. I am of the opinion that something else, perhaps his citizenship status or other matters, may account for his actions in persistently avoiding being questioned.

7. This matter has been held in abeyance, as this office was informed that Mr. Rohl would return in about two weeks. As he has not yet returned and [2111] no definite information can be obtained as to whether he will return,

It is recommended that the Federal Bureau of Investigation be requested to make a thorough inquiry into his citizenship status from the time he first became connected with the organization known as the Hawaiian Constructors (Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contractors) up to the present date, with a view of criminal prosecution against all responsible persons if the facts so warrant.

That is the end of that.

Do you recall whether Mr. Rohl was finally interviewed?

Colonel Row. Mr. Condon of the F. B. I., who is now on duty in San Francisco, was on duty in Honolulu at that time. Yesterday, in order to refresh my memory as to what was done, Mr. Condon stated that authority was obtained from the Department Commander to ask for the assistance of the F. B. I. in this matter and that the F. B. I. conducted investigations relative to this matter.

49. General GRUNERT. What were the dates of those notes?

Colonel Row. I don't recall it.

50. General GRUNERT. They refer to April. April what year? I am in the air as to the date that these notes were made and handed in. Was it April '41, April '42, or what?

51. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember, sir?

Colonel Row. It would have to be in April '42.

52. General GRUNERT. And at that time there was question about Mr. Rohl's citizenship?

Colonel Row. It would be from—that would be so.

[2112] 53. General GRUNERT. And wasn't it well known that he became a citizen in '41?

54. General FRANK. September.

55. General GRUNERT. September of '41.

Colonel Row. I believe that is correct, according to the reports.

56. General GRUNERT. Then, I wonder why he evades being interrogated on account of citizenship when he became a citizen, as the Board understands, in September of '41. That is why I wondered what that "April" there referred to, whether April of '42 or April of '41. I just wanted to bring that out in the record because it leaves an impression that that was prior to the time that he actually became a citizen.

Colonel Row. No; he became a citizen——

57. General FRANK. I gather from this that he was over there in August of '41 before he got his citizenship papers; is that correct?

Colonel Row. I can't recall when he went over there. I am not familiar with that.

58. General GRUNERT. When was this investigation about gasoline? When was that conducted? In '42 or '41? Do you recall that?

Colonel Row. Do you have that?

59. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Colonel Row. That would be sometime in 1942.

60. General GRUNERT. Well, then evidently the April date, the month of April referred to therein, must be '42?

Colonel Row. Yes, sir. I am sure.

61. General GRUNERT. Therefore, that still confuses me more, [2113] why they should be thinking that he was evading being investigated because of citizenship.

But carry on. I just wanted to put that in the record.

62. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Sir, I am going to read from page 10 of Colonel Hunt's report, as follows:

(Excerpt from page 10 of Colonel Hunt's report is as follows:)

It is difficult, therefore, to escape the conclusion that Colonel Wyman knew of Mr. Rohl's noncitizenship when the contract was entered into, or at latest shortly after writing the unanswered letter summoning him to Hawaii. In such circumstances any close relationship between Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl thereafter would have involved the former in dealings with a man of doubtful loyalty to the United States.

Well, my question was much similar to the one put by General Grunert: whether you of your own knowledge know the basis for this conclusion by Colonel Hunt.

Colonel Row. No, I am not familiar with that.

63. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, did you follow up on that aspect, or was that later on followed up by the F. B. I.?

Colonel Row. It was followed up by the F. B. I. It was handled as a civilian matter.

64. Major CLAUSEN. Until Colonel Hunt came out to Hawaii; is that so?

Colonel Row. I think that is right.

65. Major CLAUSEN. Now, from page 11 of Colonel Hunt's report: [2114] (Excerpt from page 11 of Colonel Hunt's report is as follows:)

Various witnesses testified to having seen Colonel Wyman with Mr. Rohl at various semi-public functions,—

This is referring to Hawaii.

—when both men indulged freely in intoxicating beverages. So far as could be ascertained, most of these instances were prior to the attack of 7 December. No witness was found who could testify to drunkenness on Colonel Wyman's part. His own testimony and that of other witnesses in this respect indicates that Colonel Wyman maintained a totally unnecessary, and in the circumstances, an undesirable social familiarity with the active head of an organization whose prime business it was to profit from work under his supervision. If there is reasonable doubt that this relationship was with a man whose non-citizenship at the commencement of the contract was known to him, there is no doubt whatever that it was with a man who at the time of this relationship in Hawaii, had been proven to Colonel Wyman to have concealed the fact of his alien status. The least that can be said of that relationship is that it displayed a callousness on Colonel Wyman's part, not only toward the character of his associate, but toward the possible consequences of its public display.

Do you recall any facts being brought to your knowledge concerning these incidents that are referred to on this page 11?

[2115] Colonel Row. I don't; don't recall.

66. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall whether any reports in the Hawaiian Department were given to the Department Commander on those aspects?

Colonel Row. No; so far as I know, no reports were rendered nor any investigations made in connection with that phase of the matter.

67. Major CLAUSEN. Now, on page 31 Colonel Hunt says:

(Excerpts from Colonel Hunt's report are as follows:)

The flattery of Colonel Wyman personally and professionally, which was bestowed upon him by his wealthy associate, Mr. Rohl, evoked in Colonel Wyman so complete a confidence in the former as to lead him to an unwise acceptance of Mr. Rohl's judgment and advice during their subsequent association in Hawaii. He thereby relinquished to some extent that independence of judgment required of an officer in charge of the Government's interests, as indicated in his too

ready acceptance of Mr. Rohl's recommendations relating to equipment purchases and appraisals.

Then on this page there is this statement concerning one item:

Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government's best interest when in purchasing Rohl-Connolly equipment at a cost of \$166,423.17 against the appraised value of \$131,411.03—

And also this statement:

Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government's best interests in the purchase of equipment from the [2116] Hawaiian Contracting Company at a cost of \$156,000, in that he based that payment upon a prejudiced appraisal—

Sir, do you recall having received information concerning the matters which Colonel Hunt has disclosed on this page 31 in these prior investigations?

Colonel Row. I recall that we did make investigations relative to the purchase of equipment, but the details I don't recall.

68. Major CLAUSEN. Now, Colonel Hunt infers, by reason of the discovery of these particular instances of acts of Colonel Wyman not in the best interests of the Government, that there were others. Do you recall other instances?

Colonel Row. I don't at this time, but the records in the office of the Department of Inspector General should show them.

69. General FRANK. Who is the Inspector General there now; do you know?

Colonel Row. Colonel Milard Pierson is the Inspector under General Richardson. I don't recall the Inspector of the Service Command, the Base Command.

70. Major CLAUSEN. Colonel Hunt on page 391 states as follows, in questioning a certain witness:

Now, I want to talk about the Hawaiian Constructors. Most observers seem to agree that their work was not efficiently performed.

Did you get reports to that effect, sir?

Colonel Row. We did receive reports to that effect, and we reported on them.

[2117] 71. Major CLAUSEN. And what did you do with reports as to the inefficiencies of the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel Row. These reports were rendered to the District Engineer, and efforts were made to correct the deficiencies when found.

72. Major CLAUSEN. Did he say so, you mean?

Colonel Row. He reported that he was taking steps to correct deficiencies.

73. Major CLAUSEN. And these reports to that effect were rendered over what period of time, sir?

Colonel Row. It is my estimation that these reports started in the early fall of 1941.

74. General FRANK. What really happened here was that the chain of command and control did not uncover this unsatisfactory operation, but that an agency outside the chain of command of the Engineer Corps, namely the Department Commander, uncovered it and asked for the relief of this man who was not doing satisfactory work; and that, therefore, the system of the Engineer Corps in administering Wyman's work was not sufficient to uncover this condition and this situation?

Colonel Row. That is correct.

75. Major CLAUSEN. Now, sir, do you recall a Robert Hoffman who was an area superintendent of the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel Row. I met him one morning.

76. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall an incident which occurred in the office of General Farthing when Mr. Hoffman had complaints as to delays and inefficiencies of the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel Row. I do.

[2118] 77. Major CLAUSEN. Will you state to the Board what you recall concerning that incident?

Colonel Row. As I recall, at some date about April or May 1942, Brigadier General—Is it Farthing?

78. Major CLAUSEN. Farthing.

Colonel Row. Brigadier General Farthing, Air Corps, telephoned to me and stated that there was a party in his office who desired to make a complaint. General Farthing asked me if I would come to his office and receive this complaint. I did go to Hickam Field and there met a Mr. Hoffman. I have forgotten his name.

79. Major CLAUSEN. Robert Hoffman.

Colonel Row. Robert Hoffman. Mr. Hoffman gave me a sworn statement of a number of pages in length. As I recall, his complaints referred to operations at Bellows Field and included inefficiency of the engineer operations and of the USED: United States Engineer Department. As I recall, the complaints included conflicts of authority, dual control, waste, and so forth. These complaints criticized Colonel Wyman and other personnel.

Do you want me to go right ahead with the story?

80. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, I think so.

Colonel Row. Before leaving Mr. Hoffman, General Farthing told me that he had just given Mr. Hoffman a letter of commendation due to the fact that Mr. Hoffman had been closely associated with Colonel Farthing at Bellows Field.

81. General FRANK. And had done good work?

Colonel Row. And apparently had done good work, in the estimation of General Farthing.

[2119] 82. General GRUNERT. What work?

Colonel Row. Engineering work.

83. General GRUNERT. What kind of work?

84. Major CLAUSEN. Area superintendent.

Colonel Row. As area superintendent at Bellows Field.

85. General GRUNERT. Was he working for Farthing or for Wyman? Hoffman.

Colonel Row. For Wyman. But General Farthing was in command of Bellows Field, as I recall.

86. General RUSSELL. Was Hoffman a soldier?

87. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir. He was employed by Hawaiian Constructors.

88. General RUSSELL. Well, that is different.

89. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

90. General FRANK. Nobody said he was a soldier.

91. General RUSSELL. He could not work for the Engineers if he was working for the contractor.

92. Major CLAUSEN. Well, the Engineers on many occasions issued orders directing the employees.

By the way, the statement to which I invited your attention yesterday, which is already an exhibit before this Board as being a statement given in writing, with exhibits, by Mr. Hoffman to General Farthing: do you recall whether you saw that statement on the occasion when you went to the office of General Farthing?

Colonel Row. No, sir, I did not, as I recall.

93. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

Colonel Row. I don't recall of ever seeing that statement.

94. General GRUNERT. Before we leave this subject of Hoffman, [2120] where is that sworn statement he made that you saw? Is it available to the Board?

Colonel Row. This report was typed.

95. General FRANK. What report?

Colonel Row. That Mr. Hoffman gave to me in the form of a sworn statement. I transmitted it to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, by memorandum recommending—

96. General GRUNERT. Then you think it should be on file in the records of the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel Row. It should be, sir.

97. Major CLAUSEN. At this point I would like to show the witness again the sworn statement or the statement that was furnished by Mr. Hoffman.

98. General GRUNERT. You have it, then, have you?

99. Major CLAUSEN. I have one, sir, and I would rather assume that this that I have is the statement, although he informed me yesterday that he didn't think it was. I would like to get it. It will just take me a moment.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

100. Major CLAUSEN. I show you, Colonel, Exhibit No. 8-B in evidence before this Board. I will ask you to take a look again and see if that is the statement with the supporting documents that you received—rather, a copy of the statement you received from Mr. Robert Hoffman.

101. Colonel TOULMIN. Give the date now.

102. Major CLAUSEN. That was in '42.

Colonel Row. I examined this document day before yesterday, and I wouldn't say definitely that this document was never in the office of the Department Inspector General, but I don't believe it was. I don't recognize any feature of it except [2121] as to some of the content, which was similar in nature to the sworn statement that was given to me by Mr. Hoffman sometime in the spring of 1942.

103. Major CLAUSEN. On page 16 of this Exhibit 8-B there is a signature of Robert Hoffman and the date April 29, 1942. There are attached to this statement of Robert Hoffman various documents which are dated in 1941.

104. General FRANK. What months?

[2122] 105. Major CLAUSEN. There are July, September, November, December, August and so forth, and they refer to delays and inefficiencies.

I first want to ask the question as to whether you had any conversations with General Farthing after this occasion that Mr. Hoffman was in the office?

Colonel Row. I may have, but I do not recall them.

106. Major CLAUSEN. And with regard to the months of 1942, do you know when that was that you had this conversation with Mr. Hoffman and General Farthing?

Colonel Row. It seems to me it was either in March or April of 1942.

107. Major CLAUSEN. And did the statement that Mr. Hoffman make to you refer to items of delays and inefficiencies that occurred in 1941?

Colonel Row. That is my impression at this time.

108. Major CLAUSEN. And did they refer to items of delays and inefficiencies prior to 7 December, 1941?

Colonel Row. It is my impression that that is so.

109. General RUSSELL. What is the date of that statement?

110. Major CLAUSEN. This is dated April, 1942.

Now, for the record and in order that one thing may tie to another, I am going to read from an F. B. I. report that was furnished to this Board by G-2, which is dated October 29, 1942, on page 49, as follows:

(Excerpt from F. B. I. report, October 29, 1942, page 49, was read as follows:)

Confidential informant T-1 related that his division conducted the investigation which precipitated the transfer [2123] of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. as District Engineer of the Hawaiian Islands. In connection with that investigation, one Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Hawaiian Constructors, voluntarily furnished information to Confidential Informant T-1 which indicated many inefficiencies in connection with construction work performed by the Hawaiian Constructors and described in detail instances where major work performed by them had cost the government at least 50 per cent more than it should have cost under the circumstances. According to Informant T-1, Hoffman is considered a capable engineer of wide experience and training whose opinions would undoubtedly carry a considerable amount of weight.

This report is by the party you mentioned from the F. B. I., John Condon. Do you recall having a conversation with Mr. Condon concerning this incident?

Colonel Row. I do not recall any such conversation with him.

111. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall if some other member of your division did?

Colonel Row. It might have been some other member of my division.

112. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

113. General FRANK. Will you state if, as a result of your investigations of this situation, whether or not in your own mind you concluded, as to the efficiency or inefficiency of the contractors' work, as to whether or not there was waste and so forth?

Colonel Row. I was definitely of the opinion that there [2124] was a great deal of waste and unnecessary expenditure of time and funds.

114. General FRANK. That was based on what?

Colonel Row. Our inspections and investigations made by our office.

115. General FRANK. A series of them?

Colonel Row. A series.

116. General FRANK. But those reports were submitted to the District Engineer and not to the Division Engineer?

Colonel Row. That is correct, as I recall it.

117. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not copies were sent to Washington?

Colonel Row. I believe that some of them, in certain instances, were sent on. I believe the records in the office of the Inspector General will show that.

118. General FRANK. Otherwise the report just passed back and forth between the Department Commander and Wyman, and the Department Commander had no authority in 1941 to put the screws on Wyman direct?

Colonel Row. No, sir. No cooperation between the Commander and the District Engineer.

119. General RUSSELL. Colonel, I want to see if I can tie the evidence, or some of it, up with a few questions. You became the Department Inspector about when?

Colonel Row. May of 1941.

120. General RUSSELL. How soon after you became the Department Inspector was it before you were directed to investigate any phase or phases of the construction which was being done in the Hawaiian Islands?

[2125] Colonel Row. The order for inspections had been received in the Department some time in February or March, as I recall, of 1941, but no inspections had been made until after my arrival.

121. General RUSSELL. Do you recall when this Colonel Emil W. Leard made the inspection, the report of which has been read into the record by Major Clausen?

Colonel Row. I should think some time between January and March, the early part of March, 1942. As I recall, the report was a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, which was made about the 14th of February.

122. General RUSSELL. Is your testimony now that from the time that you took over as Department Inspector, no investigation into that construction work was made until the year 1942?

Colonel Row. Inspections were made more or less continuously from early fall, at least, in 1941, somewhere in the early fall of 1941.

123. General RUSSELL. Then this division in your office that was set up to investigate the type of contract under which the work was done was actually set up in the fall of 1941?

Colonel Row. Yes, sir.

124. General RUSSELL. We have to this time no records of any inspections up until the Leard inspections, is that true?

125. Major CLAUSEN. I have none, sir, except from the witness. The witness says they were made, but I have not seen the inspections.

126. General RUSSELL. Colonel, did you believe, based upon the inspections made after you became the Department Inspector and [2126] down to the completion of the work, that you are in any position to give an opinion as to the efficiency of the work that was being done by the contractors prior to December 7th, 1941?

Colonel Row. Our opinion was that due to the great expansion of work, engineer work, in Hawaii, the organization of the office of the District Engineer was not properly reorganized to handle the great amount of work that came there. While the engineers were having all of these difficulties, the Zone Construction Quartermaster operating in Hawaii on construction work was properly organized and was having little or very little difficulty. Our inspections included inspections of the Construction Quartermaster, and I would say the results of those inspections were excellent.

127. General FRANK. Who was the Zone Construction Quartermaster?

Colonel Row. Lieutenant Colonel Clinton Harrold, Quartermaster Corps.

128. General RUSSELL. How did the work being done under the supervision of the Zone Construction Quartermaster and that being done under the supervision of the District Engineer compare as to extensiveness? Or in size or complexity?

Colonel Row. I believe that the work of the District Engineer was greater in volume and more extensive.

129. General RUSSELL. And more complex?

Colonel Row. And possibly more complex.

130. General RUSSELL. Colonel, in your opinion were the waste, inefficiency and other inadequacies inherent in the construction in 1941 attributable solely to the expansion of the work and the failure of the District Engineer's office to keep his administrative work apace with this expansion?

[2127] Colonel Row. Yes, sir.

131. General RUSSELL. Then you do not believe that his personal conduct, including drinking, if any, his association with and contacts with Hans Wilhelm Rohl, had anything to do with this ineffectiveness of the work, the inefficiency or the waste?

Colonel Row. I am unable to answer you on that, because I was not familiar with the personal conduct of Colonel Wyman.

132. General RUSSELL. Laying aside familiarity with the personal conduct of Wyman and the conduct of Rohl which might have to come to your attention by virtue of facts, did rumors of such conduct reach your ears, either as Inspector or as an officer resident in Hawaii?

Colonel Row. As I recall this familiarity between Mr. Rohl and other officials with Colonel Wyman came about largely as a result of our inspection of the Pleasanton Hotel matter. That, as I recall, was the first time that it came to my attention that they were very closely associated.

133. General RUSSELL. Can you tell the approximate date of the inspection of the Hotel matter?

Colonel Row. It would be some time in 1942.

134. General RUSSELL. Did that inspection then discover facts relating to improper relations between Rohl and Wyman in the year 1941?

Colonel Row. No, sir, I do not think so.

135. General GRUNERT. I have some questions.

I am not quite clear as to the character of inspections that were required from your office as to construction matters. Did those inspections actually include any inspection of engineer work in the field, or was it limited to paper work and [2128] administration and management within the office?

Colonel Row. It was largely administrative inspections. We did not at any time go into the technical engineer matters.

136. General GRUNERT. Would such inspections as were made disclose the causes for any delays in the matter of completion of engineer projects?

Colonel Row. Yes, I believe it would be within the province of the inspection.

137. General GRUNERT. Did any such inspection show the reason for any particular delays in the completion of such projects?

Colonel Row. No, sir.

138. General GRUNERT. Then you will not be able to tell me whether or not such delays as were discovered were intentional on the part of the military or the contractors?

Colonel Row. No, sir.

139. General GRUNERT. The waste and extravagance and such delays as were incident to the faulty administration, as you might call it, do you know whether or not they were limited to what happened prior to December 7th, or continued after December 7th, or increased after December 7th, compared with prior thereto?

Colonel Row. I think the waste naturally increased after Pearl Harbor, when the urgency for rapid construction was more apparent.

140. General GRUNERT. Then is there anything through those inspections to indicate to you that there were intentional delays caused prior to the Pearl Harbor attack which might have been of advantage to the attackers?

Colonel Row. No, sir, that was never brought into it. [2129] Intentional delays were never brought to our attention at any time.

141. General FRANK. Do you think the delay and waste was greater than what might be expected in such a large expansion and under the stress of accomplishing work for war purposes?

Colonel Row. Yes, sir. We felt that correct organization of the District Engineer's setup would have eliminated a great deal of this waste, which was largely a deficiency in organization, as we saw it.

142. Major CLAUSEN. Do you have a copy of the letter from the Secretary of War asking the Hawaiian Department or the Inspector General to conduct these investigations?

Colonel Row. I do not have, but it should be on file in the office of the Department or the Inspector General.

143. Major CLAUSEN. And you say the date is February, 1941?

Colonel Row. About that time, February or March, probably March.

144. Major CLAUSEN. And you were Department Inspector when?

Colonel Row. From May 1941.

145. Major CLAUSEN. When you assumed that position did you see and read that letter?

Colonel Row. Oh, yes.

146. General GRUNERT. Colonel, is there anything else that you can think of to add which might throw light on the entire field of our investigation, anything that has not been brought up, that you think you might add?

Colonel Row. No, sir.

147. General GRUNERT. All right. Thank you, very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2130] **TESTIMONY OF MAJOR HOWARD F. COOPER, AIR CORPS;
1466 ARMY AIR FORCES BASE UNIT, ATC.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Major COOPER. Howard F. Cooper; Major, Air Corps; 1466 Army Air Forces Base Unit, ATC; APO 938, care of Postmaster, Minneapolis, Minn.

2. General GRUNERT. Major, the Board is after facts, and is trying to get a lead to facts, to find out what happened prior to and during the attack on Pearl Harbor. Your name having appeared as a witness before the Roberts Commission, we asked that you be sent to us so that we could find out what facts you know, and how you can help us out.

Now, tell us, first, what was your assignment, at the time the attack took place, December 7, 1941?

Major COOPER. At the time of the attack, I was a First Lieutenant, Command Headquarters, and Headquarters Squadron, Seventeenth Service Group.

3. General GRUNERT. And where was that organization stationed at that time?

Major COOPER. It was stationed at Hickam Field.

4. General GRUNERT. What can you tell us, briefly, about the attack, itself, from what you personally know about it?

Major COOPER. On the morning of December 7, 1941, at about 5 to 7, I heard loud explosions, which got me out of bed, immediately, and I raised the shade and looked over Pearl Harbor and saw huge billows of smoke arising. In a few minutes [2131] after that, loud explosions came from the hangar line, and I immediately ran to the bathroom and looked out over the hangar line and saw planes bombing the hangars.

I got into my clothes with my pistol and gas-mask and helmet and ran down to the squadron; got the First Sergeant to disperse all of the members of the organization, armed with rifles, and walked out onto the parade grounds, where there were two 50-calibers set up. They were not in operating condition. I stayed with one gun until it was in operation, and I walked down to the other gun and ordered the fellows to fire, and they said that one part was missing, for which they were waiting, and they assured me that the part was on its way, any efforts to get it faster would be to no avail since there were two fellows dispatched to get this particular part; and at this time, a third formation of bombers came over and dropped bombs on the barracks. The fellows at the gun were all killed.

5. General GRUNERT. Was it part of your duties to man those guns during a defense against an air attack?

Major COOPER. No, sir.

6. General GRUNERT. You just took charge of them, did you?

Major COOPER. Yes, sir.

7. General GRUNERT. How did you know they were down there?

Major COOPER. I walked out onto the parade ground and saw them.

8. General GRUNERT. And you say there were some machine guns in position, but they were not ready to fire because of missing parts?

Major COOPER. Yes, sir.

9. General GRUNERT. And were these machine guns part of the [2132] defensive set-up of Hickam Field?

Major COOPER. No, sir.

10. General GRUNERT. What were they doing out there, do you know?

Major COOPER. As a result of the attack, attack methods were devised to protect the field, on the spot.

11. General GRUNERT. You mean they were suddenly pulled out there?

Major COOPER. Yes, sir; from the ordnance.

12. General GRUNERT. It had not been arranged beforehand?

Major COOPER. They were pulled out from the ordnance.

13. General FRANK. After the first attack?

Major COOPER. Yes, sir; after the first attack.

14. General FRANK. They had not been out there all night?

Major COOPER. No, sir.

15. General GRUNERT. I understood you to say it was about 5 to 7. Was it 5 to 7, or was it 5 to 8?

Major COOPER. Oh, that was 5 to 7. No, that was 5 to 8.

16. General GRUNERT. You are sure it was 5 to 8, not 5 minutes to 7? because I thought you said 5 to 7.

Major COOPER. Yes, sir; I am positive it was 5 to 8 because when I did finally return to my quarters, my electric clock had stopped at 8 o'clock, and it was about five minutes before that, that the attack started.

17. General GRUNERT. In your testimony before the Roberts Commission you stated, at the time of the attack, you were on Alert No. 3 for about two weeks. What were the forms of alert, and what was No. 3?

[2133] Major COOPER. I am not positive as to the number of the alert. We had three forms of the alert, there. One was, alert against external invasion; and the other was, alert against internal sabotage; and the third was a combination of the two, which was the very serious alert.

18. General GRUNERT. Which one were you on?

Major COOPER. We were on the second, the alert against sabotage.

19. General GRUNERT. Then, though you named it "No. 3," it might have been some other number, but it was the alert against sabotage?

Major COOPER. Yes, sir; it was the alert against sabotage.

20. General GRUNERT. Because No. 3 happens to be the all-out alert.

Major COOPER. We were not on that; no, sir.

21. General GRUNERT. I wanted to clear up that point in the testimony before the Roberts Commission, because it says "Alert No. 3," and Alert No. 3 is an all-out alert; and you were alerted for sabotage?

Major COOPER. Yes, sir.

22. General GRUNERT. That happens to be No. 1.

Major COOPER. No. 2, sir, I believe.

23. General GRUNERT. In your remembrance, it was No. 2, but it was the sabotage alert?

Major COOPER. Yes, sir.

24. General GRUNERT. That was the only thing I had to bring out. Have you any questions?

Thank you very much for coming in.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 10:40 a. m., the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the morning, took up the consideration of other business.)

[2134]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The Board reconvened at 2 p. m., and continued with the hearing of witnesses, as follows:

**TESTIMONY OF THOMAS E. TILLMAN, 1230 SHAFTER STREET,
SAN MATEO, CALIFORNIA.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Tillman, will you please state to the Board your name and address.

Mr. TILLMAN. Thomas E. Tillman, 1230 Shafter street, San Mateo.

2. Colonel WEST. San Mateo, California?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Tillman, the Board is after facts concerning certain things that happened in Hawaii prior to the Pearl Harbor attack and during the attack. We have also been charged with making an investigation of certain things that happened in Hawaii, in which Colonel Wyman was concerned. I believe you have information on that phase, and I will ask General Frank and the Assistant Recorder, Major Clausen, to develop whatever you may know.

4. General FRANK. Where were you employed, in 1941?

Mr. TILLMAN. U. S. Engineers, at Honolulu.

5. General FRANK. What was your position?

Mr. TILLMAN. I was in the estimating section.

6. General FRANK. In what office?

Mr. TILLMAN. In the Operations Office, U. S. Engineers.

7. General FRANK. Is that the district engineer?

Mr. TILLMAN. That's right.

8. General FRANK. Who was your immediate superior?

[2135] Mr. TILLMAN. It was first a civilian, that I can't remember his name. It was later Colonel B. L. Robinson.

9. General FRANK. Colonel Robinson was Colonel Wyman's assistant, is that right?

Mr. TILLMAN. Colonel Robinson was Operations Officer for the district engineer.

10. General FRANK. What were your duties?

Mr. TILLMAN. Estimating the cost of various phases of work that the contractor was going to do for the U. S. Engineers.

11. Major CLAUSEN. You recall that, after Colonel Wyman was relieved from the position as district engineer in Hawaii, you did some work on the air-raid warning system stations?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir.

12. Major CLAUSEN. And you explained to me, today, the reason for that. What was the reason? Why were you called in to do that, sir?

Mr. TILLMAN. I think the principal reason was that they didn't seem to get them completed, and the progress wasn't satisfactory. and they called me in as more of a trouble-shooter, to see if something couldn't be done to speed up the completion of it.

13. Major CLAUSEN. And who gave you directions to do that?

Mr. TILLMAN. Lieutenant Colonel Weimer.

14. Major CLAUSEN. When were those instructions given you?

Mr. TILLMAN. I would say either the very latter part of April, or the first of June—right in that.

15. General FRANK. What year?

Mr. TILLMAN. 1942.

16. Major CLAUSEN. Now, you also stated to me, when I asked you, today, as to the reasons why the work had been lagging, [2136] several reasons. Would you tell the Board what you told me.

Mr. TILLMAN. You want me to explain it in about the same words that I explained it to you?

17. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. This is informal. You told me something about the work lagging, and you said the reasons were such and such and such. Just start in as you did with me and explain to the Board.

Mr. TILLMAN. Well, the stations were located in various areas around the island of Oahu. That is the one I am speaking of; and the Island of Oahu was divided up into areas. Each area had an area engineer and a superintendent for the contractors. It so happened that I believe every AWS station was situated at a considerable distance from the office or headquarters of the superintendent and area engineer. It was my observation, while I was area engineer, and other times, too, that the superintendent was not paying a great deal of attention to the construction of the AWS stations. By the way, you understand that the AWS stations were a tunnel drilled in the various places, and usually it was on a hill or a "mountain" as you might call it, there. After the tunnel was completed, certain other phases of work had to be done, there, and when those were completed, then the signal corps made their installations. They would not move any equipment there until they were completed, painted, and the civilian crew ready to move out.

18. General FRANK. You are talking about the permanent installations?

Mr. TILLMAN. That is correct.

19. General FRANK. Do you remember where they were?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, I do.

20. General FRANK. Will you state where they were?

Mr. TILLMAN. Koko Head, Opana, Ulupau, Kaena Point, Pumanahu, Mt. Kaala, and Fort Shafter.

[2137] 21. General FRANK. Was there a tunnel to be constructed at each one of these places?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, the installations were in a tunnel, and the specifications called for a 48-foot minimum coverage over it.

22. General FRANK. You are giving the name "tunnel" to what they called a "bomb-proof," aren't you?

Mr. TILLMAN. Well, yes.

23. General FRANK. All right.

Mr. TILLMAN. It was a tunnel, by the way.

24. Major CLAUSEN. Now, Mr. Tillman, you said that the superintendent didn't pay much attention to these AWS constructions. The superintendents to which you refer were superintendents of whom?

Mr. TILLMAN. For the contractor.

25. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, the Hawaiian Constructors' superintendent?

Mr. TILLMAN. That is right.

26. Major CLAUSEN. And what is the basis for your statement in that respect?

Mr. TILLMAN. The areas in which the superintendent had control of the work were all large areas. He not only had the AWS stations, but in most instances he had a multitude of other work in progress. And I just think that he had too much work to do.

27. Major CLAUSEN. How long had this lagging of this work continued, to your knowledge?

Mr. TILLMAN. At the time of the attack—

28. Major CLAUSEN. You mean December 7, 1941?

Mr. TILLMAN. December 7—the runways were given, if I [2138] remember right, a No. 1 priority. I believe the AWS stations were given No. 2 priority.

29. Major CLAUSEN. Given by whom?

Mr. TILLMAN. The district engineer. The work involved in building the AWS stations at the beginning of course was all tunnel work or excavation. This excavation or tunnel, whichever one you want to call it, was as I say in every instance at the top or near the top of a mountain. Some of those—in fact every one of them with one exception, was inaccessible to anything but foot traffic and mules. Couldn't get a truck or any kind of equipment near them. It was a tremendous job of digging this so-called "tunnel," it was slow work, very slow.

Does that answer it?

30. Major CLAUSEN. Well, I just would like to have you tell the Board and tell me what was the basis for your conclusion that the work was lagging; and I suppose you have told, as much as you can.

Mr. TILLMAN. At the time I took over the so-called "trouble-shooting" of the stations, there was quite a complaint from the signal corps that we were not making any progress. Colonel Weimer sent me out.

31. Major CLAUSEN. That is not "Wyman"?

Mr. TILLMAN. No, that is not "Wyman."

32. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Proceed, please.

Mr. TILLMAN. He sent me out to Fort Shafter to interview a Major and a Colonel in charge of the Signal Corps, I can't recall their names, to find out just what they wanted and required. I went out there and interviewed them, and they just put me right on the spot to get them completed to where they could make their [2139] installations.

33. Major CLAUSEN. Now, Mr. Tillman, in connection with your activities, did you as an estimator have some dealings with the Hawaiian Contracting Company, one of the joint adventurers in the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. TILLMAN. Not while I was in the estimating section; no.

34. Major CLAUSEN. Did you receive instructions from Colonel Robinson to appraise certain equipment belonging to the Hawaiian Contracting Company?

Mr. TILLMAN. I did, Major, but that was after I was placed in charge of the Plant Control section.

35. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Let me have the date, please, on that.

Mr. TILLMAN. That date was December 9, 1941.

36. Major CLAUSEN. And your position at that time was what, Mr. Tillman?

Mr. TILLMAN. Head of the Plant Control section.

37. Major CLAUSEN. Tell the Board exactly what you did.

Mr. TILLMAN. I rounded up equipment, rented it, bought it.

38. Major CLAUSEN. No, I mean you received some instructions from Colonel Robinson?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes.

39. Major CLAUSEN. Concerning equipment of the Hawaiian Contracting Company? What instructions were they?

Mr. TILLMAN. I received a typewritten list of equipment owned by the Hawaiian Contracting Company.

40. Major CLAUSEN. From whom?

Mr. TILLMAN. From Colonel B. L. Robinson, priced out, [2140] itemized and priced, with a request that I go out and make an appraisal of it with a view to buying it. I went out to the Hawaiian Contracting Company's yard, took an equipment expert with me, started to make the appraisal, and was called to the telephone by the superintendent of the yard, and Mr. H. P. Benson, former president of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, and on the board of directors for the Hawaiian Constructors, was on the phone, and asked me what I was doing out there. I told him I was making an appraisal of the equipment. He said, "That equipment has already been appraised, and I am very much concerned with what you are doing, and I wish you would get out of there." I did. I went back and picked up my man and went back to the office, reported to Colonel Wyman that so far as I could see the equipment was nothing but junk and we wouldn't be interested in any of it.

41. Major CLAUSEN. You say you reported to whom?

Mr. TILLMAN. I mean to Colonel Robinson.

42. Major CLAUSEN. Did you later receive additional instructions from Colonel Robinson concerning the same equipment?

Mr. TILLMAN. I did. I was ordered to go back there and make an appraisal, and not let anybody stop me.

43. Major CLAUSEN. That was how soon after the first time?

Mr. TILLMAN. I would say that was approximately two weeks later.

44. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Then what did you do?

Mr. TILLMAN. I then took this one appraiser, and also another one, with me, and went out and made an appraisal of it, turned in a report, it was practically junk and we had no use for it, and would be unable to use it. The equipment was out- [2141] dated and not equipment suitable for our needs at all.

45. Major CLAUSEN. You say you turned in a written report to that effect?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir.

46. Major CLAUSEN. To whom did you give your report?

Mr. TILLMAN. Colonel Robinson.

47. Major CLAUSEN. Have you a copy?

Mr. TILLMAN. No, I haven't.

48. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know where we can obtain a copy, other than in Hawaii?

Mr. TILLMAN. No, I don't.

49. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know, then, what happened, after you had turned in this adverse report, with respect to Colonel Wyman?

Mr. TILLMAN. I was told, and I don't remember who told me, and I think it's a fact that Colonel Wyman, the week prior to his being relieved over there, ordered that that same equipment be purchased and the deal completed before he left office.

50. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

At this point, I invite the attention of the Board to page 31 of the written report. It is a confidential report.

What is your present position?

Mr. TILLMAN. Engineer.

51. Major CLAUSEN. By whom are you employed?

Mr. TILLMAN. Donald R. Warren Company.

52. General FRANK. Who was Mr. Benson?

Mr. TILLMAN. Mr. Benson was on the executive board of the Hawaiian Constructors, and formerly was president of the Hawaiian Contracting Company.

53. General FRANK. Well, who was he to give you instructions, [2142] when you were working for the district engineer?

Mr. TILLMAN. Except that I was on his property, he had no authority.

54. General FRANK. Was this equipment later purchased by the Government?

Mr. TILLMAN. It was my understanding that it was.

55. General FRANK. Who was the co-adventurer? Who was the contractor who had charge of building the aircraft warning service stations?

Mr. TILLMAN. The contractor was the Hawaiian Constructors.

56. General FRANK. I know, but when those projects came up, were they handled by the Hawaiian Constructors, as a whole, or were they assigned to different contractors?

Mr. TILLMAN. No, sir; they were handled by the Hawaiian Constructors.

57. General FRANK. As a whole?

Mr. TILLMAN. As a whole.

58. General FRANK. In other words, the Rohl-Connolly Company did not handle one series of projects, and the Woolley Company another?

Mr. TILLMAN. No, sir.

59. General FRANK. And the Callahan Company, another group? They all handled them as a single, definite group?

Mr. TILLMAN. That is right, in so far as I knew. I didn't know anything about the Rohl-Connolly Company, Mr. Woolley, a Ralph Woolley, was also in the same capacity with Mr. Benson, in the Hawaiian Constructors.

60. General FRANK. Do you remember how much was paid for this Hawaiian Constructors' equipment?

[2143] Mr. TILLMAN. The price as it was listed to me was \$170,000.

61. General FRANK. How much was it worth, as a result of your evaluation?

Mr. TILLMAN. You mean in so far as the engineers were concerned?

62. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. TILLMAN. Worth nothing.

63. General FRANK. Had it been used by the Hawaiian Contracting Company on government projects?

Mr. TILLMAN. No, sir. You understand this equipment was some of it 30, 35, and even 40 years old. It had laid in their yard until it was overgrown with weeds, rusty, and—well, in other words, equipment that had been discarded many years before.

64. General FRANK. Do you know why the engineers wanted to buy it?

Mr. TILLMAN. No, sir.

65. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not it was ever used?

Mr. TILLMAN. By the engineers?

66. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. TILLMAN. No; I don't.

67. General FRANK. Or by the contractors?

Mr. TILLMAN. No; I don't. I know some of it could not be used.

68. General FRANK. Who comprised the rest of the firm with Benson, in the Hawaiian Contracting Company?

Mr. TILLMAN. Mr. Ralph Woolley, Paul Graef—G-r-a-e-f—

69. General FRANK. No, I am talking about the Hawaiian [2144] Contracting Company.

Mr. TILLMAN. Oh, I don't know. I do know who was supposedly the money in back of it, and that was—I can't recall it right now. It is a very well known one.

70. Major CLAUSEN. Dillingham?

Mr. TILLMAN. Dillingham—right. He was supposed to own the company, and Benson was the front for it.

71. General FRANK. The Hawaiian Contracting Company was a Hawaiian firm, it was not a California firm?

Mr. TILLMAN. That is right.

72. General RUSSELL. The Hawaiian Constructors were referred to as a "joint group" or "joint adventurers," who took on all of this work out there; is that true?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir.

73. General RUSSELL. Then Hawaiian Contractors was a local corporation?

Mr. TILLMAN. That is right.

74. General RUSSELL. And was Hawaiian Contractors a member of this group which was going to do all that work?

Mr. TILLMAN. No. Shortly after the raid, the conditions there were such that no local contractor—or, I won't say "no", but hardly any of the local contractors could get any equipment or material to work with. They were left you might say stranded, and it was my understanding that they took in Ralph Woolley and Mr. Benson just as sort of co-partners in the Hawaiian Constructors.

75. General RUSSELL. As additional parties?

Mr. TILLMAN. I don't mean that they took in the firm. I mean that they just took in these two men.

[2145] 76. General RUSSELL. Let us go back to the Hawaiian Constructors; the people with the money in that outfit were the Dillinghams?

Mr. TILLMAN. That was my understanding.

77. General RUSSELL. The Dillinghams are quite big operators out there?

Mr. TILLMAN. They are.

78. General RUSSELL. They own a great deal of real-estate?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir.

79. General RUSSELL. They are charged with being rather powerful in that area?

Mr. TILLMAN. They are.

80. General RUSSELL. They are powerful? They could go directly to Washington and have some influence?

Mr. TILLMAN. I don't know about that.

81. General RUSSELL. Have you ever heard of a Colonel Hunt?

Mr. TILLMAN. No, sir.

82. General RUSSELL. Did he approach you at any time and secure from you a statement as to your relation with the work that was carried on out there in the Hawaiian Department?

Mr. TILLMAN. I don't recall, if he ever did.

83. General RUSSELL. Have you been called as a witness before anyone, or any body of people, prior to today, for the purpose of giving the testimony which you are giving to this Board?

Mr. TILLMAN. The day before I left Hawaii, I was called in by the FBI in Honolulu and asked almost these same questions.

84. General RUSSELL. And what date was that, Mr. Tillman?

Mr. TILLMAN. That would be August 5, 1942.

85. General RUSSELL. With the exception of the statement that you made to the FBI, are there any others?

[2146] Mr. TILLMAN. Well, they also called, when I was on a secret station for the engineers up at Petaluma, and interviewed me again.

86. General FRANK. The FBI?

Mr. TILLMAN. The FBI.

87. General RUSSELL. Other than to the FBI, you have testified to nobody, or to any Board?

Mr. TILLMAN. No.

88. General RUSSELL. Benson represented Hawaiian Contractors, and he told you, when he ordered you off the property, that this equipment had been previously appraised?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir.

89. General RUSSELL. Do you know now what the basis of that statement by Benson was?

Mr. TILLMAN. I think so.

[2147] 90. General RUSSELL. Would you tell us, please.

Mr. TILLMAN. I found out later that one of Mr. Benson's employees and a machinery equipment representative and one other man—I can't recall who he was—had made an appraisal of the equipment.

91. General RUSSELL. Do you know of your own knowledge what the appraisal value on this machinery was, as fixed by those three people?

Mr. TILLMAN. That was where the \$170,000 came from. That was their appraisal.

92. General RUSSELL. Do you know of any appraisal of this machinery which may have been in the neighborhood of \$130,000?

Mr. TILLMAN. No, sir, I don't.

93. General RUSSELL. You state that you submitted with your appraisal report a list of this equipment?

Mr. TILLMAN. No. I was given a list by Colonel Robinson.

94. General RUSSELL. Did you turn that list back in to Colonel Robinson?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir.

95. General RUSSELL. Did you make any effort upon your second visit to the place where this equipment was located to fix a value on the items of the equipment?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes.

96. General RUSSELL. I believe your testimony was to the effect that the Engineers didn't want it at any price, that it would be of no value to them.

Mr. TILLMAN. I don't believe I made the statement that the Engineers didn't want it. It was my recommendation that we do not purchase it, that we would have no—could not use it.

[2148] 97. General RUSSELL. Do you recall what the aggregate appraisal value that you placed upon it was?

Mr. TILLMAN. No, I don't.

98. General RUSSELL. But you did place a value of some sort?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes.

99. General RUSSELL. Now, one more question about the air warning service: As a result of your efforts was the work on these air warning service stations accelerated?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir.

100. General RUSSELL. Would you please tell the Board what steps you took to accelerate that work?

101. General FRANK. May I ask one question: What date was this that you were put on the acceleration of this work?

Mr. TILLMAN. Probably the last of April or right around the first of June.

102. General FRANK. Of what year?

Mr. TILLMAN. 1942.

103. General FRANK. Yes.

104. General RUSSELL. That answer was made a little while ago and seems a bit queer to me: last of April or the first of June. Why was May left out? Do you remember those two—

Mr. TILLMAN. Wait a minute. I should have said May. Pardon me.

105. General RUSSELL. Now, to go back to my question: the steps that you took to accelerate the work on these air warning stations.

Mr. TILLMAN. Well, I don't know whether I could just tell you exactly the steps I took.

106. General GRUNERT. What did you do that wasn't done before?

[2149] Mr. TILLMAN. As a matter of fact, the station that I was ordered to complete first, when I arrived there there was nobody working on it, and I went right down to the area engineer who was in charge of that area and wanted to know why there were no men working there, and he said, Well, they had no equipment, nothing to work with. I went back up there then and made a survey to see just what they had to have, and got in touch with the foreman who had been in

charge of it, and got a list of equipment from him, or material that he had to have, and I went out and rounded up this equipment.

107. General RUSSELL. Well, that is exactly what we are thinking about. On that station nothing was being done, and you got equipment and people and started to work?

Mr. TILLMAN. That is right.

108. General RUSSELL. Now, do you have any recollection as to what happened at other stations?

Mr. TILLMAN. The other stations, they were working, but they were not making suitable progress. The tunnels were all completed; that is, the tunnel crew were finished with their work and out of there. It was more or less concrete and carpenter work and electrical work, plenty of electrical work, after the tunnel crew got out of there. They were very short of electrical supplies to complete these stations. In other words, I think I told the Major some of the items that they didn't have and that were practically nonobtainable: for instance, 5000-watt KVA—5000-volt hotheads, varnish cambric tape, 6-inch pipe cover, 60-amp. double-throw switches, in which I went into a shop where I knew the man in charge, and had him make these switches. We had certain stations completed [2150] up to the point where nothing was left to do but a 60-amp. double-throw switch; that was all we had to do to complete them. Well, I went into the shop and had them made and took them out there and handed them to the electrician. I did the same thing with pipe cover. I did the same thing with various other items. I just scouted around until I found them, and took them out there and handed them right to the men. Each station had a hundred-foot steel tower to be erected. They sent inexperienced steel men up there, or men, to erect these towers. They couldn't make any progress with them at all. At one station I had three different crews before I got a tower erected.

109. General RUSSELL. What did you say was wrong? Why couldn't they complete them?

Mr. TILLMAN. The towers?

110. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. TILLMAN. They didn't know anything about steel erection.

111. General RUSSELL. Lack of skill in that work?

Mr. TILLMAN. That is right.

112. General RUSSELL. Well, there were various things that you did?

Mr. TILLMAN. Oh, yes.

113. General RUSSELL. Procurement of the necessary personnel and procurement of materiel, things of that kind?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir.

114. General RUSSELL. I think that is all I have to ask.

115. General GRUNERT. Along this same line: Do you know anything about the status of completion of those air warning service installations as of December 7, '41?

[2151] Mr. TILLMAN. I really don't.

116. General GRUNERT. Do you know what caused any delays prior to December 7, '41, on them?

Mr. TILLMAN. I would say the same reasons that I cited before.

117. General GRUNERT. I believe you told us that there was a question of an area engineer or supervisor, whatever he is, having a number of engineering projects to process at the same time, and that the air

warning service stuff was, say, Priority 2. Do you know of any reason why they shouldn't work on both projects simultaneously? Was it a question of lack of material, lack of personnel, or what?

Mr. TILLMAN. They were working on both projects simultaneously. They were working on all projects simultaneously but preference was given to runways immediately following the raid. They were given first preference.

118. General GRUNERT. Immediately following December 7?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir.

119. General GRUNERT. But prior thereto do you know whether they were given preference?

Mr. TILLMAN. I don't believe we had a priority system set up prior to that.

120. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, prior to that they didn't have any money to build the runways, did they?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, I think so.

121. General GRUNERT. Do you know of your own knowledge whether or not any of these delays were intentional on the part of anyone?

Mr. TILLMAN. I have no way of knowing, no, sir. I don't—
[2152] I can't believe that they were.

122. General GRUNERT. Would there be anyone then in the Hawaiian Constructors that would have the power to delay if he had such an intent?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir.

123. General GRUNERT. Who?

Mr. TILLMAN. I would say that Paul Grafe and Mr. Rohl, either one, could have delayed the progress or completion of work of any kind.

124. General GRUNERT. In that case would that delay have been with or without the knowledge of the District Engineer?

Mr. TILLMAN. I think it could have been without his knowledge.

125. General FRANK. Do you know or believe that either one of them did delay any work?

Mr. TILLMAN. No, I don't know. If you want an opinion I would be glad to express an opinion.

126. General FRANK. Let us have the opinion.

Mr. TILLMAN. It is my opinion that both Mr. Grafe and Mr. Rohl did everything they could to complete any work that they were interested in there. Now, the reason that I say that is that while I was head of the plant control section I sat in with Mr. Rohl at his meetings with his field superintendents at night, and I heard him express his attitude in no uncertain terms too many times to think that, unless he was a lot smoother than I give him credit for, that there was any intent other than to push that work.

127. General RUSSELL. Who were these people to whom Rohl was talking on these occasions?

[2153] Mr. TILLMAN. Those were the superintendents of the various areas that I have mentioned before.

128. General RUSSELL. All native Americans? Who were they?

Mr. TILLMAN. I think so. I think so.

129. General RUSSELL. How many would be in those meetings?

Mr. TILLMAN. Oh, anywhere from eight to twelve or fourteen.

130. General GRUNERT. Now let me see if I have this straight. The Hawaiian Contractors—

General FRANK. No.

131. General GRUNERT. Was it a local firm?

Mr. TILLMAN. The Hawaiian Contracting Company.

132. General GRUNERT. The Hawaiian Contracting Company. And the Hawaiian Constructors was the over-all firm that had the contract to start with, consisting of various other firms?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir.

133. General GRUNERT. Now, as to this equipment that you spoke about that you were sent out to appraise, to whom did that equipment belong?

Mr. TILLMAN. The Hawaiian Contracting Company.

134. General GRUNERT. And not to the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. TILLMAN. No, sir.

135. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Mr. TILLMAN. It was the Hawaiian Constructors who were supposedly to make the purchase.

136. General GRUNERT. From the Hawaiian Contracting Company?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir.

137. General FRANK. But the Government was going to pay for it?

[2154] Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir. You understand the purchase arrangement between the contractors and the Government?

138. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. TILLMAN. They made the purchase. We paid them a monthly rental of one-twelfth of the cost of the equipment for a year's time in which it became the property of the Government.

139. General GRUNERT. Then, whose primary interest, whose financial interest was it, to get the Hawaiian Constructors to buy this equipment which the Government would eventually pay for?

Mr. TILLMAN. You mean who would benefit by it?

140. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Mr. TILLMAN. The Hawaiian Contracting Company.

141. General GRUNERT. Would the Hawaiian Constructors benefit by it?

Mr. TILLMAN. I do not think so.

142. General GRUNERT. I do not think of anything else. Does anyone think of any other questions?

143. General RUSSELL. I think we have developed a point there that may best be clarified a little.

144. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

145. General RUSSELL. Now, at the time that you were making this appraisal of this equipment of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, they had become one of the associates in the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. TILLMAN. I do not think so.

146. General RUSSELL. Wasn't it after Pearl Harbor that you were making this appraisal?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir.

[2155] 147. General RUSSELL. Well, didn't you testify a little while ago that they came in and they began, or they allowed them to work on the common project after December 7th?

Mr. TILLMAN. No. No, I didn't say that.

148. General RUSSELL. Well, I was just mistaken about it, then.

Mr. TILLMAN. No. They had no more work shortly after the raid.

149. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. TILLMAN. They did have an organization and they had this equipment. Mr. Benson, who was president of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, joined the Hawaiian Constructors as one of the members of the executive board; that is, in an individual capacity. The company did not join the Hawaiian Constructors.

150. General RUSSELL. They did not take their organization and their modern equipment and go in and start to work, then, on this?

Mr. TILLMAN. No, sir.

151. General RUSSELL. All right. But Benson as an individual went over and gave his services?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir.

152. General RUSSELL. Well, that clears that up. I am through.

153. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, you have mentioned several things that called into play your judgment on engineering matters. Would you, for the record, tell the Board your engineering schooling background?

Mr. TILLMAN. Well, I have been in the construction end of the engineering for 31 years. Prior, at that time, it had been about 28 years. I took a constructional engineering [2156] course from the I. C. S. School.

154. Major CLAUSEN. Worked on major projects?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir.

155. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

156. General GRUNERT. Then, you were certain that you knew equipment and what its value was, as to its present shape, and what it could be used for in the future? You were a good judge of that, were you?

Mr. TILLMAN. I think so.

157. General GRUNERT. Whom did you have to assist you in this? You spoke of the equipment man, did you?

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, sir.

158. General GRUNERT. What was he?

Mr. TILLMAN. We were buying considerable equipment from the Allis-Chalmers people. They sent two equipment experts over to the Islands to assist us in any way possible that they could be of assistance to us. The Allis-Chalmers were paying all of the expenses; it cost us nothing. When they reported over there they were ordered to report and make my office their headquarters. I took them along—they weren't working under my direction, you understand. I took them along as so-called experts.

159. General GRUNERT. And did you testify that that identical equipment that you went to appraise and did appraise was actually sold to the Hawaiian Constructors afterward?

Mr. TILLMAN. No, I can't state that it was definitely sold. I think I stated that it was reported to me that it was sold.

160. General GRUNERT. That could not have been confused, then, [2157] with any other batch of equipment that was afterward purchased?

Mr. TILLMAN. I do not think so.

161. General GRUNERT. Anything else?

162. Major CLAUSEN. I would like to know if these two men who went with you, Mr. Tillman, to appraise this equipment concurred in your judgment.

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes, they did.

163. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

164. General RUSSELL. What were their names?

Mr. TILLMAN. I don't remember their names any more. I think I could get their names. I think I have some papers at home that might give me their names, but right now I don't remember.

165. Major CLAUSEN. Will you ascertain and let me know?

Mr. TILLMAN. I could, yes.

166. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

(No response.) If not, I thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2158] **TESTIMONY OF THOMAS ERNEST CONNOLLY, 2400 FULTON STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Connolly, will you please state to the Board your name and address? Full name and address.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thomas Ernest Connolly. I live at 2400 Fulton Street, San Francisco.

2. General GRUNERT. Mr. Connolly, the Board has a broad field to cover. In addition to looking into the attack on Pearl Harbor it has been assigned the task to look into certain phases of that attack in which one Colonel Wyman, a District Engineer at Honolulu, was concerned. It is that phase particularly, I believe, in which the testimony from you may help us, and in this broad field that particular special part of it was assigned to General Frank, and to be assisted by Major Clausen, so I shall ask them to start the questioning.

3. General FRANK. Mr. Connolly, will you state your position as a contractor during 1940 and '41? Do you remember?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I had work of my own; I had work of or I was associated in work with other contractors. I was the president of the Rohl-Connolly Company, president of T. E. Connolly, Incorporated, and I was sponsoring a joint venture by the W. E. Callahan Construction Company.

4. General FRANK. Where?

Mr. CONNOLLY. The Rohl-Connolly Company and the Gunther-Shirley Company at Caddoa, Colorado.

5. General FRANK. For whom was this work being done at Caddoa, Colorado?

Mr. CONNOLLY. The Army Engineers.

[2159] 6. General FRANK. You stated you were president of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, I think that is right. I was not president. I was vice president and I was president.

7. General FRANK. When?

Mr. CONNOLLY. The latter half of 1940, from '40 on through to the present time.

8. General FRANK. What is Mr. Rohl's position?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Now he is in the position of sitting on the board while we distribute the assets of the Rohl-Connolly Company.

9. General FRANK. Well, what was his position in 1941?

Mr. CONNOLLY. He was a member of the board and vice president of the company.

10. General FRANK. Was he ever president of the company?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

11. General FRANK. When?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, we took turns about on that. He was president of that company in early '40, '39 probably. I was probably president in '38.

12. General FRANK. What determined who was president and who was vice president?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Just a matter of turnabout, nothing of any consequence. It was really a partnership. It was incorporated.

13. General FRANK. I see.

14. Major CLAUSEN. When did you first meet Mr. Rohl, Mr. Connolly?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Oh, some twenty-odd years ago, I presume.

[2160] 15. Major CLAUSEN. When did you first meet Colonel Wyman?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I first met Colonel Wyman when he was District Engineer in the Los Angeles area, I would say about '34. 1934.

16. Major CLAUSEN. In any event, Mr. Connolly, in the early part of 1940 the Rohl-Connolly Company was a corporation doing business, of which Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl was the president; is that correct?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right.

17. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Now let's go down to December 1940. Isn't it true that you didn't just take turnabout for no particular reason, but that in December 1940 you specifically telephoned from Washington to Mr. Rohl and advised him that he be not president?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is correct.

18. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. And because he was a German alien?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That's right.

19. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Now, in connection with the Rohl-Connolly Company, before this change in status occurred of your assuming the presidency in December 1940, what was the stock ownership?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I owned 50 percent of it, 25 percent of it was owned by Mrs. Rohl, 25 percent by Mr. Rohl.

20. Major CLAUSEN. And the same stock ownership continued, did it, Mr. Connolly, throughout 1940 and throughout 1941?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

21. Major CLAUSEN. So that when you had this turnabout because Mr. Rohl was a German alien, there was no turnabout or cancellation of any stock ownership, was there?

[2161] Mr. CONNOLLY. No, sir.

22. Major CLAUSEN. And he continued as a director, did he?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, sir.

23. Major CLAUSEN. When did you first know about a contract, Mr. Connolly, which later became Contract W-414-Eng-602, which is the one that was later in effect with respect to the Hawaiian defense projects?

Mr. CONNOLLY. When did I first learn about that contract?

24. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I was advised from here by telephone to Denver that the contract was to be let in the Hawaiian Islands, but I didn't know whether it was that or not. That was the specific contract I learned about the week prior to Christmas, in Washington, D. C.

25. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. But now when you say you were advised concerning defense projects, as a matter of fact it was Mr. Rohl who telephoned you; isn't that so?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right.

26. Major CONNOLLY. And he telephoned you from Los Angeles?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No.

27. Major CLAUSEN. From San Francisco?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

28. Major CLAUSEN. And he was then here in the office of the Engineers, wasn't he?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I don't know. He was in San Francisco.

29. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. He had talked with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

30. Major CLAUSEN. With whom else in the Army had he talked?

[2162] Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, that I don't know. I was in Colorado.

31. Major CLAUSEN. And this was December 16, a Monday, was it?

32. General FRANK. What year?

33. Major CLAUSEN. 1940.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, that is about right. Presumably that is correct.

34. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon, sir.

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is probably correct.

35. Major CLAUSEN. Now, at that time you were in Denver, Colorado; is that right?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right.

36. Major CLAUSEN. Specifically, what did Mr. Rohl say to you? Just try and tell the Board exactly what he said at that time in this telephone conversation, or the substance.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, he said, "Colonel Wyman is here and has some work to offer in the Islands, and he is looking over some contractors to go out to do it." And I asked Rohl what the nature of the work was, and he said that Wyman would tell me, for me to meet Wyman at Cheyenne on his plane and go on to Washington with him; and I couldn't meet him at Cheyenne because I couldn't get on the plane, but I could take a plane from Denver to Chicago and there connect with Wyman's plane, and which I did, and we flew down to Washington together, and I asked Wyman what was the nature of this thing and what was the amount of it, and he told me.

37. Major CLAUSEN. As I understand, then, you met Colonel Wyman in Chicago; is that correct?

Mr. CONNOLLY. At the airport in Chicago.

[2163] 38. Major CLAUSEN. And you then continued in company with him from Chicago down to Washington, D. C.?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, sir.

39. Major CLAUSEN. And didn't you all go to the Carlton Hotel?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, sir.

40. Major CLAUSEN. And stay there?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, sir.

41. Major CLAUSEN. And you were in his company then for how many days?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, three or four days; maybe a day or two one way or the other; four days, five days.

42. Major CLAUSEN. And this contract the number of which I have previously given you, was that signed, sir, on December 20, 1940?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I left at that time. Grafe signed it on the 20th.

43. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. When had you left? What was the date?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I left the day before that.

44. Major CLAUSEN. So that you left on the 19th?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I think so.

45. Major CLAUSEN. Now, did you have discussions with Colonel Wyman there concerning the nature of the work and the kind of work that you would do and the kind of work that these other co-adventurers would do?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No. He had one man to do the work. Grafe was to do the work.

46. Major CLAUSEN. I mean the kind of work that your firm, [2164] the Rohl-Connolly Company, was to do in connection with the contract.

Mr. CONNOLLY. No. The work was to be handled by Mr. Grafe.

47. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon.

Mr. CONNOLLY. The work was to be handled by one man for the joint—for the co-adventurers.

48. Major CLAUSEN. I don't mean the representation, Mr. Connolly, of the joint venturers by Mr. Grafe. I mean you sat down with somebody there, surely, and discussed the nature of the work that was to be done by these joint ventures, your firm and the Gunther-Shirley Company?

Mr. CONNOLLY. The over-all job, yes.

49. Major CLAUSEN. Callahan Construction Company?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right.

50. Major CLAUSEN. And you went into that deeply and fully, did you not, to find out what you would do?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, not so deeply and not so fully, because, for the very simple reason that it wasn't formulated deeply nor fully. It was very, very sketchy.

51. Major CLAUSEN. Well, the contract itself sets forth that there were to be hangars and runways and defense projects?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, sir.

52. Major CLAUSEN. Air raid warning systems?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, sir.

53. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon, sir.

Mr. CONNOLLY. The contract doesn't state that.

54. Major CLAUSEN. Will the Board permit me to go and get the contract, sir? I will be right back.

[2165] It is one of the exhibits out there. I couldn't find it.

55. Colonel WEST. I will find it.

56. Major CLAUSEN. I see. It is one of the exhibits to the—

57. Colonel WEST. Which one is it?

58. Major CLAUSEN. The contract of December 20, 1940.

59. General GRUNERT. Suppose you let somebody else do the looking up, and we can go on.

60. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. I will proceed along.

61. Colonel WEST. I will go out and see if we can find it.

Mr. CONNOLLY. You are speaking now of the contract that I saw in Washington?

62. Major CLAUSEN. I am speaking of the contract that is dated December 20, sir, 1940. It sets forth the general—

Mr. CONNOLLY. Not all those multitudinous supplements?

63. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir. I am speaking of the basic contract.

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right.

64. Major CLAUSEN. The one that was signed and executed in Washington.

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right.

65. Major CLAUSEN. And it states general terms, various subdivisions and types of work to be done.

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right.

66. Major CLAUSEN. And the air raid warning system.

Mr. CONNOLLY. There are five subdivisions stated in that contract.

67. Major CLAUSEN. Well, I mean it did, then, set forth the general character of the work?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right. There was no runway in it [2166] and there are no hangars in it.

68. Major CLAUSEN. Well, whatever is set forth in the contract—let me put the question this way—you discussed in Washington, did you not, sir?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

69. Major CLAUSEN. All right. You also had telephone conversations between yourself in Washington and Mr. Rohl in Los Angeles; isn't that true?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

70. Major CLAUSEN. Concerning the work of the contract?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Not the work. Concerning the financing of the contract.

71. Major CLAUSEN. The only financing that was to be done concerning the contract was concerning the work to be done under the contract; isn't that so?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, that is correct, if that is what it means.

72. Major CLAUSEN. Well, I mean you talked over with Mr. Rohl, your theoretic partner in this corporation, the financing of this particular work; isn't that right?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Sure.

73. Major CLAUSEN. All right. And isn't it true that in addition to being in the company of Colonel Wyman there, you also met John Martin?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Accidentally, yes.

74. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you met him, sir, did you not?

Mr. CONNOLLY. In the lobby of the hotel.

75. Major CLAUSEN. Now, in point of time from when you arrived in Washington, when did you meet John Martin?

[2167] Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I met John Martin—when I got to the Carlton Hotel there was a note there from John Martin saying

he wanted to see me, but whether I met him that day or the next day I don't know, but I met him just immediately thereafter.

76. General FRANK. Just a minute. This is on the trip to Washington around the 20th of December in 1940 that all this occurred?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, sir.

77. General FRANK. This was at that same time that John Martin was there present when you met him?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I met him in the hotel, yes, sir, in the lobby of the hotel.

78. General FRANK. Who is Mr. Martin?

Mr. CONNOLLY. He is a Los Angeles attorney.

79. General FRANK. For whom?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Oh, for various people. For Rohl-Connolly.

80. Major CLAUSEN. Now, when you met Mr. Martin he told you that he was there for the purpose of assisting in acquiring citizenship for Mr. Rohl, didn't he?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I don't think he did.

81. Major CLAUSEN. Let me refer to your statement given to the House Military Affairs Committee, as follows:

I met John Martin, Mr. Rohl's attorney, who told me he was in Washington in the interests of acquiring citizenship or furthering citizenship applications for Mr. H. W. Rohl. When I thought that there was a likelihood that we would acquire the contract I further thought that I should have Mr. Rohl resign as an officer of the Rohl- [2168] Connolly Co. and substitute myself and I so phoned him and it was so done, and he was neither officer nor a director of the Rohl-Connolly Co. until after he obtained his naturalization papers.

Did you make that statement?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

82. Major CLAUSEN. To Mr. Weiner?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

83. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I think I did, yes.

84. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Well, now, as a matter of fact, then, Mr. Connolly, Mr. Martin did tell you just exactly what you said here; isn't that correct?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, but not in the way that you put it.

85. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you put it to me, then, in the correct way.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I asked John Martin what he was doing there—out in the lobby in front of a lot of people,—what he was doing there. He said he was there on business. The next time I see John Martin he advises me that Rohl is not a citizen and I had not ought to sign a contract, that is, I had not ought to sign any contract to take Rohl out of the country. So I knew then that Rohl was not a citizen for the first time, but I didn't think it made any difference, so I signed the contract.

86. General FRANK. How long had you been associated with Mr. Rohl up to this time?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Since 1932.

87. General FRANK. Eight years, about?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

[2169] 88. General FRANK. And this was the first time that you knew that he wasn't a citizen?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

89. Major CLAUSEN. And so you then phoned Mr. Rohl and told him that he should resign?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Probably I did.

90. Major CLAUSEN. Well, is there any doubt about it, Mr. Connolly? You said in this statement here to the House Military Affairs Committee—

Mr. CONNOLLY. He resigned. He resigned; I became president. That's right.

91. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, but I say it says here that when you thought "that there was a likelihood that we would acquire the contract I further thought that I should have Mr. Rohl resign as an officer of the Rohl-Connolly Co. and substitute myself and I so phoned him and it was so done."

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right.

92. Major CLAUSEN. That is correct, is it?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

93. Major CLAUSEN. You telephoned him for that purpose?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

94. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Well, now, when did you learn this in point of time of being in Washington? On this first day that you met Mr. Martin?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, I don't think it was the first day. I think it was later on. I think it was a good—after we had been there for two or three days. We were up to the point of signing the contract. I didn't learn that the minute I got in Washington, the minute I saw John Martin.

[2170] 95. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Now, whom did you tell that to? You told Mr. Rohl the situation about his not being in the corporation because of the fact that he was an alien. Now, then, what did you say about that to Colonel Wyman?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Nothing.

96. Major CLAUSEN. What did you say about that to Paul Grafe?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I told Grafe that Rohl was not a citizen.

97. Major CLAUSEN. Why did you tell it to Grafe and not to Wyman?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Because I don't know whether—whether Rohl—whether Grafe and I would agree to sign the contract knowing that Rohl is not a citizen, or not.

98. Major CLAUSEN. Whom else did you tell in Washington at that time?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No one that I recall.

99. Major CLAUSEN. Now, here is a photostatic copy, Mr. Connolly, of articles of agreement dated December 20, 1940. I wish you would look that over and tell me if that is the basic contract to which you have reference?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, I think it is, with the exception of these first four leaves which are seemingly an indication of supplements, job orders, dates of transmittal. Of course those were not in existence at that time. And it further states in this contract we were to do five things, First, ammunition storage magazines; second, warning stations; third, railway trackage; fourth, fixed fortification structures; and fifth, in addition to the then existing radio station that was supplemented by an estimate of yardage to be excavated, which amounted

[2171] to 380,000 yards, backfill of 150,000 cubic yards, concrete of 36,000 yards, reinforcing steel of 6,000,000, some few culverts and some pavement.

100. Major CLAUSEN. Now, in your telephone talks with Mr. Rohl from Washington—I am referring to December 1940—what did you say in talking to Mr. Rohl concerning the air raid warning stations?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Not a word.

101. Major CLAUSEN. What did you say after that time to Mr. Rohl regarding those air raid warning stations?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Nothing.

102. Major CLAUSEN. Now let me refer to your testimony or statement given to the House Military Affairs Committee, as follows:

Question: Subsequent to receiving the contract for the Hawaiian Islands, did Mr. Rohl discuss with you the nature of the contract, and so forth?

Answer: No. There was no detailed discussion of this contract at all. Personally, I never saw a written description of it or a blueprint on any part of it. Rohl and I discussed the necessary financial arrangements, advancement of moneys, because after all we were financing this. We were building certain airfields. We knew what that meant, just simply movement of materials and stabilization of a base without a blueprint at all. When you are told to run a 7,500 runway we knew what it takes.

Question: But it would be most usual for him to discuss with you the nature and type of contract that you received for the Hawaiian Islands?

Answer: Yes. I don't doubt but what we mentioned [2172] building an airport there. I don't think that we ever got into some of these installations out there. I don't think Rohl and I ever discussed anything of that nature. We talked of those warning stations because I was curious as to what they were. That's all that I know that we ever got into any detail about.

Mr. CONNOLLY. That's not our telephone conversation.

103. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon, sir?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is long after Rohl was out of the islands.

104. Major CLAUSEN. That was after he was out of the islands?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Sure.

105. Major CLAUSEN. Well, with regard to the contract, do you mean? You mean—

Mr. CONNOLLY. I would like to know what an air warning station was. I didn't know what it was. He was out there, and they built them.

106. Major CLAUSEN. All right. You mean you talked with Mr. Rohl concerning these items only after you were out to the islands?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Why, yes. We were not building any airfields here [indicating papers].

107. Major CLAUSEN. Well, how many telephone calls, Mr. Connolly, did you put in to Mr. Rohl from Washington or did he put in to you and have with you?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don't know.

108. Major CLAUSEN. Well, give us an approximation.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Two or three.

109. Major CLAUSEN. And what did you say in these two or three [2173] conversations?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I said we have to finance this job. It would be about so much. You have got so much of a fee.

110. Major CLAUSEN. And what else?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That I ought to take over this company or else stay out of it.

111. Major CLAUSEN. What else did you say, Mr. Connolly?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don't know what I said, but what I am saying now is what I think I said. There was no occasion for us to discuss this, the matter of movement of yards. That doesn't mean anything to a contractor. He knows how to move dirt.

112. Major CLAUSEN. Well, does the fact that you didn't know what an air raid warning station was and the fact that you were curious as to what they were—I mean does the contractor know what an air raid warning station is?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I didn't.

113. Major CLAUSEN. Well, then are you sure, now, Mr. Connolly that you didn't discuss it with your partner?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Of course not.

114. Major CLAUSEN. As to building something that you didn't know what it was?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

115. Major CLAUSEN. I see.

116. General FRANK. You mean to say you were taking on a contract for building something when you didn't know what it consisted of?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, General. In this contract it sets out you are putting in, doing so many cubic yards of excavation, placing so many cubic yards of concrete and so many thousands [2174] of pounds of steel and so much bituminous pavement. Well, that's all right, but putting an air warning station on, I wanted to know what an air warning station was, after this attack, what were the things, and how did they work, and why.

117. Major CLAUSEN. After the attack?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Sure.

118. General FRANK. This contract was let long before the attack.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I know it, but there was never a print or a description or anything. There's the whole business: There is nothing in this contract to tell you what it is.

119. Major CLAUSEN. You mean you were to get a fee of fifty thousand for doing something and you didn't know what you were going to do?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No. I mean we were going to get it for moving this much dirt and placing this much concrete, and part of it I presume was going to be an air warning station. It said so much roads and this, that, and the other. The contractor never installed the equipment, you know, in these things; it was never his job to do it.

120. Major CLAUSEN. Now, isn't it true, Mr. Connolly, that even in 1940 Paul Grafe had gone to the Hawaiian Islands with some men and had surveyed the situation and come back and reported to you that the work was to be thus and thus and thus?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, that's not correct. Mr. Grafe sent two men to the islands way early in the summer.

121. Major CLAUSEN. Of 1940?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Of 1940. And they come back and reported [2175] to him, but they did not report to me.

122. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you were there with Mr. Grafe in Washington. Didn't he discuss that with you?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No.

123. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I never saw a report that those men ever made. That was never discussed.

124. Major CLAUSEN. Didn't Mr. Grafe talk to you about the fact that he had gone to the islands or had sent two men to the islands in 1940 and surveyed the situation from the standpoint of this defense project?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, he sent two men to the islands, but whether it was that same party or not, I had no means of knowing.

125. Major CLAUSEN. Is your testimony that Mr. Grafe did not discuss it with you in Washington, the fact that he had sent two men to the islands to survey the field for these defense projects?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, Grafe never gave me any report on what these men did for him in the islands.

126. Major CLAUSEN. Did you discuss this with him in Washington? is my question.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don't think I did.

127. General FRANK. You are financially interested in this firm, aren't you?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, sir.

128. Major CLAUSEN. Well, now, when you found out in Washington from Mr. Martin that your partner was a—by the way, you knew that was a secret contract, didn't you, Mr. Connolly?

[2176] Mr. CONNOLLY. When we were talking about it, I didn't.

129. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon?

Mr. CONNOLLY. When it was first shown me it was, yes. I didn't know it when I went to Washington, though.

130. Major CLAUSEN. Well, when you saw the contract you knew it was a secret contract, didn't you?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right.

131. Major CLAUSEN. Now, before you were shown the contract or after, when was it that you knew that Mr. Rohl was an alien?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Before. Before I saw the contract.

132. Major CLAUSEN. All right. And when you saw the contract was it in the form that you see it there (indicating) with the exception of those pages that you say refer to supplements?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, it was on white paper, stamped with the SECRET stamp upside down and downside up, as I recall, along all four margins of the front page, as I recall.

133. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you were taken considerable aback, weren't you, by the information that Mr. Rohl was an alien, German alien?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

134. Major CLAUSEN. I mean that was a big shock to you, wasn't it?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, I was a little surprised.

135. Major CLAUSEN. All right. You had gone on the plane with Colonel Wyman from Denver, or rather, from Chicago to Washington, you had been there with Colonel Wyman, and what did you say about this big shock, if anything, to Colonel Wyman?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Nothing.

[2177] 136. Major CLAUSEN. What did you say about it to—by the way, did you go over to the office of the Chief of Engineers?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, sir.

137. Major CLAUSEN. And whom did you meet over there?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, the man that did most of this work there I think was then Major Newman.

138. Major CLAUSEN. What did you say about this alien status of Mr. Rohl to Major Newman, if anything?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Nothing.

139. Major CLAUSEN. What is that?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Nothing.

[2178] 140. Major CLAUSEN. Whom else did you see in the office of the Chief of Engineers?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I remember meeting General Robins.

141. Major CLAUSEN. What did you say to him about it?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Nothing. Two or three other gentlemen, I think. I don't recall who they were.

142. Major CLAUSEN. When you came back to California, you say you think you left on the 19th of December, is that correct?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I do not know. I have got a diary that will give you the dates, if they are important, but I left and got home prior to Christmas. I left before that was signed.

143. Major CLAUSEN. Do you have a diary that indicates the number of telephone calls you had with Mr. Rohl when you were in Washington?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, but I will have a diary that indicates when I talked to him.

144. Major CLAUSEN. When you came back, though, from Washington, this deal had been made, had it not?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

145. Major CLAUSEN. And in order to make that deal you certainly talked over the contract with Mr. Martin, did you not?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Never.

146. Major CLAUSEN. What is that?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No.

147. Major CLAUSEN. You did not talk it over with Mr. Martin, who was the attorney for your firm?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Martin wasn't there as an attorney for Rohl-Connolly.

148. Major CLAUSEN. In what capacity was Mr. Martin there?

[2179] Mr. CONNOLLY. That, I can't tell you that.

149. Major CLAUSEN. Is it your sworn testimony now to this Board that Mr. Martin had nothing to do with the drafting of that contract?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, sir.

150. Major CLAUSEN. And is it your sworn testimony that he had nothing to do with any of the papers—just for example, the joint-venture agreement that would naturally precede the contract?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don't think any joint-venture papers did precede this contract.

151. Major CLAUSEN. Well, what is the fact as you state it to the Board, now? What is the fact as to whether Mr. Martin drew any legal papers, or dictated any legal papers, or did anything at all, whatsoever, legally, with regard to that contract?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Nothing.

152. Major CLAUSEN. In point of truth, now, when you came back from Washington to California you sat down and talked to Mr. Rohl, did you not, concerning the contract?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I told Rohl that that contract wasn't to come into our office down there, nor any papers concerning that contract to come in there; and there was no further discussion on that contract; nor was there, ever; nor was there any plans, papers, nor the contract to be in that Rohl-Connolly office while he was still an alien.

153. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Connolly, let me show you this contract, signed, in which Rohl-Connolly Company joins with the Hawaiian Constructors, of Honolulu, and I see it is described as consisting of the W. E. Callahan Company, Gunther & Shirley Co., and Rohl-[2180] Connolly Company. Now, the Callahan Company, the Gunther & Shirley Co., and the Rohl-Connolly Company were joint adventurers, were they not?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

154. Major CLAUSEN. Well, who drew up the papers for that, for the Rohl-Connolly part?

Mr. CONNOLLY. There were no papers drawn prior to the signing and execution of this contract. The Rohl-Connolly Company, the Callahan Company, and the Gunther & Shirley Company were building a joint venture in Colorado, and we were going in on the same percentages as existed on that job, and we had no legal papers drawn up prior to this contract, for this contract, at all.

155. Major CLAUSEN. You are speaking of the Cadoa project?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, sir.

156. Major CLAUSEN. So far as this contract is concerned, is it your statement that you were just to continue on in the same relative percentages?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is correct.

157. Major CLAUSEN. When you say that no papers came into the Rohl-Connolly Company, isn't it true now that papers had to be signed and given to the engineers, which showed that Mr. Paul Grafe, here, had authority to sign on behalf of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Certainly not! Unlimited power of attorney to go to the islands and execute it and carry on this job.

158. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, and who drew that up for the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That, I don't know; but the Rohl-Connolly [2181] Company did not have it drawn up. I probably executed it to Grafe, had it drawn up, here, probably John Martin—might be some other attorney; I don't know.

159. Major CLAUSEN. And that was done before this contract was signed?

Mr. CONNOLLY. It was not.

160. Major CLAUSEN. So far as this contract is concerned, Mr. Connolly, is it your testimony, here, to the Board, that you did not discuss it, or anything connected with the deal, with Mr. Rohl, at all, until he became a citizen?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No; I talked to Rohl, as I stated here a while back, about this contract, any arrangement necessary to carry it on.

161. Major CLAUSEN. All right. When did you talk to him?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I talked to him from Washington before we obtained the contract.

162. Major CLAUSEN. And on how many occasions?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Oh, I don't know—two or three. I was only there three or four days.

163. Major CLAUSEN. And then, when you came back to California?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I told him he was to have nothing to do with that contract, until his status changed.

164. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, when was it that you told him that, Mr. Connolly?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, when I next saw him.

165. Major CLAUSEN. When was it after you got back?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That, I can't tell you. I don't know. It was shortly after I got back, certainly.

166. Major CLAUSEN. It would be in the neighborhood of December?

[2182] Mr. CONNOLLY. In January, I would say, off-hand.

167. Major CLAUSEN. It would be December or January '41, is that correct?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I think so.

168. Major CLAUSEN. All right. From that time down to the time that Mr. Rohl became a citizen, do you want to say to the Board, or, rather, do you testify that you did not discuss the work or the contract with Mr. Rohl?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Rohl and I never discussed that work, I never saw a plan myself, and I never had a copy of the contract, and there was no scrap of paper with anything pertaining to that contract ever in the Rohl-Connolly Company office in Los Angeles, that I ever knew about; and I think I would have known; and that contract I discussed with Grafe and told him to set it operating. He had an unlimited power of attorney, to go ahead and do it.

169. Major CLAUSEN. Concerning Colonel Wyman, do you recall when he came to Los Angeles as district engineer?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, sir.

170. Major CLAUSEN. You called on him, did you not, Mr. Connolly, very soon after he arrived, in the company of Mr. Rohl?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don't think so. The first time I saw Colonel Wyman, as I recall it, was when we were putting in bids on the section of breakwater along the Los Angeles-Long Beach breakwater. That wasn't a call on Colonel Wyman, that was a call on the division engineer. It had been changed within the week.

171. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever call on Colonel Wyman when he was Captain Wyman or Major Wyman, and accompany him to any [2183] parties?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don't think I was ever in a party with Wyman.

172. Major CLAUSEN. Were you ever on a yacht trip with Colonel, then Captain or Major, Wyman?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, sir.

173. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever give him a drink?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, sir.

174. Major CLAUSEN. How many times?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I have had him in my home in this town, and gave him some drinks. How many times? I don't know.

175. Major CLAUSEN. When did you have him in your own home in San Francisco?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I had him in my own home in San Francisco after he returned here from Washington.

176. Major CLAUSEN. You mean, as he got back from Washington, from this December 1940 trip, is that right?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right.

177. Major CLAUSEN. How did he come to go to your home?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I invited him. He came out to my home for dinner, the only guest, my wife and me; ate dinner with me and the members of my family. We had dinner, and he left at 10 o'clock.

178. Major CLAUSEN. On this occasion did you tell him this information that had taken you aback in Washington?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No.

179. Major CLAUSEN. Concerning Rohl's alien status?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I have never told that to Wyman, yet.

180. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever have Colonel Wyman, or [2184] Captain or Major Wyman to your home on other occasions?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is the only time.

181. Major CLAUSEN. I think I have nothing further.

182. General RUSSELL. What percentage did Rohl-Connolly operate on in this joint-adventure agreement?

Mr. CONNOLLY. To start out, 30%.

183. General RUSSELL. Was that the percentage that you went into the 1940 contract on, Mr. Connolly?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, sir.

184. General RUSSELL. Now, you state that you talked to Mr. Rohl, back in San Francisco, about financing that work. Was all that because it was necessary to put new money into the project, other than that that was available to the Colorado operation?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No. I got this impression: It was my impression that that contract offshore in that amount was not wholly desirable, and Wyman wanted new equipment on that job. Well, new equipment takes new money. The group of us probably had \$5,000,000 worth of equivalent equipment with some age on it. Wyman, to do this job, had to put new plant on it. That takes money, and we put in a lot of money and bought the equipment to put on this job.

185. General RUSSELL. Where did this new money come from, Mr. Connolly?

Mr. CONNOLLY. We put it in, in our proportions, from our relative companies, from our companies.

186. General RUSSELL. Do you know how much money Mr. Rohl as an individual had to put in, in order to enable the group to buy new equipment incident to starting the work?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Rohl-Connolly's 40% of the necessary capital [2185] was furnished by Rohl-Connolly Company.

187. General RUSSELL. The Corporation, Rohl-Connolly Company, had the necessary money?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

188. General RUSSELL. Then why did you have to talk to him about the financing, if you were representing the corporation, and the corporation had the money?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, if two contractors associated together for years, and you are going to do something, you just as a matter of course discuss those things.

189. General RUSSELL. In the course of arriving at a joint judgment by you and Rohl?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, taking a new step, you tell your partner what you are going to do.

190. General RUSSELL. But the Rohl-Connolly Company had money, already, plenty of money?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, sir.

191. General RUSSELL. That is all.

192. General GRUNERT. Who was the "spark plug" in getting the work done in Hawaii for the Hawaiian Constructors? Was there any one man?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Grafe was supposed to be.

193. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not that work in Hawaii started to lag, and that that was the reason they got Rohl to go out there, to put more punch into it, or what?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, Rohl was more aggressive than Grafe, and Wyman wanted Rohl to go out there.

194. General GRUNERT. In your past contacts, working together and in combinations, who was the more aggressive man, Rohl [2186] or Grafe?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, Rohl would be the most aggressive, but Rohl had never had overseas or offshore experience, and Grafe had built the Madden Dam in Panama, and he had those four or five men with him who had been key men down there, and we figured we had a "natural."

195. General GRUNERT. Is that why you co-adventurers chose Grafe to represent you and get this contract started?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right. I thought it was a good nucleus.

196. General GRUNERT. But if Rohl had been a citizen, would Rohl have been the man to go out there and put things through, or not?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, General, I am not sure on that, because the key men that Rohl-Connolly had were with me at Cadoa, and they would have to rob that job, to go offshore. That would be a matter of discussion, but I thought Grafe with his group was good.

197. General GRUNERT. Were Rohl and Wyman pretty thick socially?

Mr. CONNOLLY. They were always good friends; yes.

198. General GRUNERT. Good drinking companions?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Good!

199. General GRUNERT. Both about the same type, hard-fisted, go-getters, punchers? Did they naturally click, that way?

Mr. CONNOLLY. General, they are both that way. They are both tough, and they get it done, and they drive everybody that is about them.

200. General GRUNERT. And you think that was a sort of natural [2187] affinity?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, they could fight about the way to do a thing, and get it done. One was somewhat like the other. As long as it got done, that's all that counted. To somebody else, less tender-skinned, that wouldn't suit so well.

201. General GRUNERT. In the contracting business and other businesses, is it natural to do a certain amount of entertaining in connection with obtaining contracts? Do the parties often fraternize and drink together, or are they afraid that one will influence the other?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, they always do that, General.

202. General GRUNERT. They always do that? So you didn't think it unnatural that Rohl should entertain Wyman, and that Wyman should accept that entertainment from Rohl?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thought it was a natural thing to do.

203. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not there is any gain on one side or the other through that association?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don't think there is any.

204. General GRUNERT. Financial gain, or otherwise?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am certain there is no financial gain.

205. General GRUNERT. Did you establish a residence in, or go to Honolulu, while the work was being done over there?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I did not.

206. General GRUNERT. You never went over?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, sir.

207. General GRUNERT. Then you know nothing about the process or the progress of the work over there?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Oh, yes; I know a lot about the progress of the work.

[2188] 208. General GRUNERT. Personally, as a matter of personal knowledge?

Mr. CONNOLLY. From personal inspection, I know nothing.

209. General GRUNERT. You didn't go over there?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, sir.

210. General GRUNERT. Then I think the information I am after I cannot get.

211. Major CLAUSEN. That is right, sir. I thought as much.

212. General GRUNERT. All right.

213. Major CLAUSEN. I had a few more questions. Sir, when you discovered that Mr. Rohl was a German alien, you were so taken aback that at first you didn't wish to sign the contract, isn't that correct?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No; that wasn't it. I was so taken aback that I kept my mouth shut.

214. Major CLAUSEN. And you thought it over and decided that you might not be a proper party to sign, isn't that true?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thought it over, and then I asked Grafe what he thought of it. He didn't see that it made any difference, and neither did I; so we signed it.

215. Major CLAUSEN. And you debated the advisability of signing the contract?

Mr. CONNOLLY. With Graef, yes.

216. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

Mr. CONNOLLY. "What would be the influence of Rohl, an alien, on this contract?" Well, we decided that if Paul runs it, if Grafe runs it and handles it all, it don't mean anything.

217. Major CLAUSEN. Then you say it did not mean a thing?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I wouldn't think so.

[2189] Major CLAUSEN. All right. When did you then phone Mr. Rohl and tell him to resign? Was it after this decision that you made following your talk with Mr. Grafe?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don't know. I did make a phone call; whether it was before or after, I don't know.

219. Major CLAUSEN. And specifically, what did you tell Mr. Rohl?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Four years ago, I can't tell you, but I told him to keep out of it, that I would handle it—about that many words, elaborated.

220. Major CLAUSEN. What did you say about being president?

Mr. CONNOLLY. "I will be president"—just like that, I would say.

221. Major CLAUSEN. And was the change then from Mr. Rohl, as president, to you, as president, effected after that?

Mr. CONNOLLY. After that?

222. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, after your talk from Washington to Mr. Rohl in Los Angeles, in which you told him that you would be president instead of his being president. Was that then accomplished, that change in officers?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, we were changed. The minute book will tell you better than I could tell you; but we changed the officers, there, in December.

223. Major CLAUSEN. And was it after this telephone call that you had with Mr. Rohl concerning the change, and concerning his alien status?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I presume it was.

224. Major CLAUSEN. Is there any doubt in your mind?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, except you must know something I don't, [2190] the way you are questioning me.

225. Major CLAUSEN. Is there any doubt in your mind?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, you have created one.

226. Major CLAUSEN. Let me ask you, then, have I created a doubt in your mind as to whether you told anything to Colonel Wyman about this undecisiveness on your part as to whether you should sign the contract?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Not a bit.

227. Major CLAUSEN. You are sure of that?

Mr. CONNOLLY. You bet I am!

228. Major CLAUSEN. Now, what did Mr. Rohl say to you when you told him this, about the fact that since he was an alien, he should not be president? What did he say?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Practically nothing.

229. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

230. General GRUNERT. I just want to develop this a little bit more. What does the president of the company do?

Mr. CONNOLLY. He obligates the company.

231. General GRUNERT. Were you president in name only, and did Rohl continue to run the company as usual?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Not as usual. When that company was formed, I ran it and financed it, not Rohl.

232. General GRUNERT. This was not just a subterfuge in order to get the contract that you couldn't have gotten or shouldn't have gotten because Rohl was an alien?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, no; there was no subterfuge.

233. General FRANK. Who was in this group in Washington discussing this contract?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Just Wyman, Grafe, and myself.

[2191] 234. General FRANK. Where did you stop?

Mr. CONNOLLY. We stayed at the Carlton Hotel.

235. General FRANK. All three of you?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, sir.

236. General FRANK. And did you get rooms together?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No. I had wired on to the Carlton for rooms, and when I got there with Wyman there were no rooms. We didn't have any place to go, and Grafe had a reservation, and we took Grafe's room. He had a bedroom and a sitting room, and Wyman and I took that, until Grafe showed up, and then Wyman got another room. I stayed with Grafe until I left.

237. General FRANK. Who was responsible for getting this group of contractors interested in this Hawaiian venture?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Why, Wyman.

238. General FRANK. Wyman was the man who proposed that these three contracting firms take on this job in Honolulu?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, my understanding is that Wyman came to the continent to interest contractors, and he interviewed several, that Grafe wanted this thing himself, but Wyman wouldn't give it to him alone, but he would give it to the group that was functioning in Colorado.

239. General FRANK. And with that in mind, you and Grafe and Wyman went on to Washington to consummate this contract?

Mr. CONNOLLY. We went on to Washington to negotiate it and determine whether or not we would get it. We didn't have it when we went to Washington.

240. General FRANK. Now, how soon after getting to Washington did you find out that Rohl was a German alien?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Why, I think within the next couple or three [2192] days.

241. General FRANK. That had a very direct bearing on the participation of the Rohl-Connolly Company in the contract, did it not?

Mr. CONNOLLY. What do you mean, "it had a very direct bearing"?

242. General FRANK. Well, if Mr. Rohl stayed in there as a German alien, he legally had no right to accept a defense contract?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I don't know.

243. General FRANK. That was just plain law, was it not, at that time? So it was not a question of judgment, it was a question of legal responsibility?

Mr. CONNOLLY. You mean Rohl legally could not participate in the contract?

244. General FRANK. Not unless he was a citizen; and that, in accordance with the law. That is exactly what I mean. Therefore, the status of the Rohl-Connolly Company in this venture depended upon Rohl's status, did it not?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I don't know. I am a layman, not an attorney.

245. General FRANK. You were doing business as the president of the company?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That's right.

246. General FRANK. And you certainly had better know something about the law that restricted your operations.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I didn't know there was any law that restricted that, General.

247. General FRANK. Didn't this man Martin tell you that?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, if I discussed it with him, he probably would have.

248. General FRANK. What I am getting around to is this: When [2193] you learned that Rohl was a German citizen, you started to "scratch gravel" to eliminate his being an officer in the company, did you not?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, that wasn't what prompted me to do that.

249. General FRANK. What was it?

Mr. CONNOLLY. What prompted me was the fact that that thing was secret.

250. General FRANK. Did you get any advice whatever from a lawyer on this question?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, I never developed it with them.

251. General FRANK. With Rohl's status in the company as a German alien being as disturbing as it was, and with Wyman asking that group to come into Honolulu, you want me to believe that you never mentioned it to Wyman?

Mr. CONNOLLY. General, that is the truth; I never mentioned it to Wyman.

252. General FRANK. That is what you want? That is what you want?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, it isn't a matter of wanting. That is a fact. I never mentioned Rohl's status to Wyman.

253. General FRANK. Why shouldn't you have mentioned it to him?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I didn't.

254. General FRANK. Why shouldn't you?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No reason at all, except I am the son of an immigrant, myself, who had his papers, of course. I guess, so were most of us; but Rohl seemed to think that not being a citizen was a terrible thing. I guess it is, after that many years; and I seemed to feel that I was rather a chump, not [2194] knowing more about my immediate associate than I did, after all those years, and I probably thought I didn't like to express it around, about what a damned fool I was. I had more or less pride, I guess, on my part; but that's it.

255. General FRANK. All right.

256. Major CLAUSEN. So, when you learned of this alien status in Washington, you not only learned that he was a German alien, but that he had been an alien since 1913, didn't you?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No. Well, he had always been an alien.

257. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Well, you knew though that he had come to the country in 1913?

Mr. CONNOLLY. All his life.

258. Major CLAUSEN. You knew that he had come to this country in 1913, didn't you, Mr. Connolly?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, now, I don't think I knew when he came to this country.

259. Major CLAUSEN. Maybe you don't recall your answer. What the General asked you was, "why didn't you tell Wyman?" And you said, "Well, it was such a terrible thing to have been an alien all those years."

Mr. CONNOLLY. I had known him 20 years.

260. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. That was 20 years he was an alien.

261. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you knew then that he had not only been an alien, but you he had been an alien for at least 20 years, because you had known him for 20 years, didn't you?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes—plus the rest of his life.

262. Major CLAUSEN. And you did not discuss that with him?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No.

[2195] 263. Major CLAUSEN. Did Rohl tell you it was a terrible thing to be an alien for those 20 years?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No.

264. Major CLAUSEN. Do you make the assertion to the Board here, as a statement of fact, that you did not discuss the law as to Rohl's participation in this contract with Mr. Martin, in Washington, in December 1940?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Of course, I didn't. If I did and he had expressed to me what you gentlemen as attorneys now express to me, I would have never executed it.

265. Major CLAUSEN. And that is as true as everything else that you have said, isn't it?

Mr. CONNOLLY. And it's all the truth.

266. Major CLAUSEN. Now, as a matter of fact, you shared a room with Colonel Wyman, did you, in this Carlton Hotel?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.

267. Major CLAUSEN. You not only went to Washington, but, in response to a question by General Frank, you said you slept in the same room with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. CONNOLLY. That's right.

268. Major CLAUSEN. While you were there?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No—till Wyman got a room, when Grafe came in.

269. Major CLAUSEN. And where was Mr. Martin at this time? He was in the same hotel, wasn't he?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I do not think so. I never saw him in any room in that hotel.

270. Major CLAUSEN. Where was he when you saw him in Washington?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I saw him in the lobby, but I never knew [2196] that he had a room in that hotel. I don't think he did.

271. Major CLAUSEN. Did you just have a casual conversation with Mr. Martin in the lobby? Is that all that you saw of Mr. Martin on that occasion?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No; I saw Martin in the lobby, and of course, I saw him upstairs, too, but I never went into any legal discussions with Martin about this contract.

272. Major CLAUSEN. Did you see Mr. Martin there on more than one day, or was it just the one day?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I say I saw him more than once.

273. Major CLAUSEN. Several days, on several occasions?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I saw him two or three times, there. That's reasonable.

274. Major CLAUSEN. Did Mr. Martin go to dinner with you?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don't think so, ever; no.

275. Major CLAUSEN. Did you see Mr. Martin when you were with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, I think I did.

276. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have any discussion concerning Mr. Martin with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don't think so.

277. Major CLAUSEN. Well, as a matter of fact, didn't Colonel Wyman say to you, "Why do you have your lawyer here?" and get "peevish" at the fact that you did have him there?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I didn't have him there. He was there. I didn't have him there.

278. Major CLAUSEN. Well, didn't he say that to you? That is my question. Didn't he remonstrate at the fact that there was a lawyer on the scene representing Rohl-Connolly Company, he thought?

[2197] Mr. CONNOLLY. There was no lawyer on the scene representing the Rohl-Connolly Company.

279. Major CLAUSEN. My question, sir, is this: Did not Colonel Wyman say to you, "Why do you have Mr. Martin here, your lawyer?" or words to that effect?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don't think so.

280. Major CLAUSEN. Well, are you sure?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Reasonably sure.

281. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don't think I discussed Martin with Wyman.

282. Major CLAUSEN. Did Mr. Martin sit around with you when you were discussing the contract?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Certainly not!

283. Major CLAUSEN. Did he go to dinner with the group of you?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Not that I recall.

284. Major CLAUSEN. In these discussions that you had with Mr. Paul Grafe, Colonel Wyman sat in on those, did he?

Mr. CONNOLLY. No.

285. Major CLAUSEN. Just you and Mr. Grafe?

Mr. CONNOLLY. When I remarked about Rohl, yes.

286. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon, sir?

Mr. CONNOLLY. If you mean it was the contract business that Wyman was discussing with me, why, of course, he was there; but if you mean my discussion with Grafe, as far as Rohl was concerned, Wyman wasn't there.

287. Major CLAUSEN. You are sure of that, now?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I know it.

288. Major CLAUSEN. In these discussions that you had with Mr. Grafe concerning the contract—that is, the details of this [2198] contract—was Wyman present?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Why, they were read to us, in the Chief's office.

289. Major CLAUSEN. By whom?

Mr. CONNOLLY. By Wyman and Newman, whoever was around there. There was no contract in anyone's possession around the Carlton Hotel. These papers were in the Chief's office, to stay there. There was no contract in our hands to discuss, ever.

290. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Grafe was present with you and Colonel Wyman, then, in the Chief's office, is that correct?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Sure.

291. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, Colonel Wyman was there, also?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Sure.

292. Major CLAUSEN. Now, who paid for Colonel Wyman's room at this hotel?

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don't know, but I suppose he paid for his own. I know Grafe paid for his room, when I took it over. He had the reservations. Wyman and I slept there one night before Grafe showed up. When I left, I left Grafe with the bill; so he paid the bill, for the first night, for the night I stayed there.

293. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

294. General GRUNERT. Is there anything else, Mr. Connolly, that you might tell the Board, that might assist us in getting at facts, that you have in mind?

Mr. CONNOLLY. General, anything that I could tell you, that would help you, I would be glad to, if you would just indicate what else you think I might do.

295. General GRUNERT. I just wondered, possibly there had been something we haven't brought up, that you might have in mind, [2199] and could tell us.

296. General FRANK. Have you anything, Colonel Toulmin?

297. Colonel TOULMIN. Nothing, now.

298. General GRUNERT. Apparently there is nothing else.

Thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2200] **TESTIMONY OF WALTER WILTON HORNE, 9425 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Horne, will you please state to the Board your full name and address?

Mr. HORNE. Walter Wilton Horne, 9425 Wilshire Boulevard, Beverly Hills.

2. General GRUNERT. Mr. Horne, what the Board needs is help to get at facts that will lead to other facts.

Mr. HORNE. Yes, sir.

3. General GRUNERT. So I am going to ask General Frank and his adviser there to get at some facts that they think you may be able to help us on.

4. General FRANK. Go ahead.

5. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Horne, what is your present business?

Mr. HORNE. I am a realty operator, an insurance broker, have had a great deal of yachting experience in days gone by.

6. Major CLAUSEN. And in your experience previously did you meet a Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Mr. HORNE. I did, sir.

7. Major CLAUSEN. And did you ever have occasion to discuss with him his preference for things Germanic?

Mr. HORNE. I did, sir.

8. Major CLAUSEN. Well, just briefly narrate to the Board some of those discussions that you had with him, and when they took place.

Mr. HORNE. I had the good fortune to own a German-built yacht, the ARMGAARD, built in Germany for the German Prince [2201] Lippe, a 65-ton vessel, racing yacht 106 feet long, one of the outstanding racing yachts of Germany, brought to America, and

we raced it in two races to Honolulu. It was an outstanding, very fast ship, built of German manganese-nickel steel; and Hans Wilhelm Rohl, known to us in the yachting circle as Bill Rohl, was always very interested in that boat, several times tried to buy it, even helped in connection with Honolulu races by supplying masts and gear that came off of his smaller Swedish boat, the PANDORA.

The PANDORA and the ARMGAARD, then renamed yacht CONTENDER, were anchored next door to each other, as neighbors in the Long Beach harbor; and I, as Commodore of the Long Beach Pacific Coast Yacht Club, went down to Spain in 1928 to bring back the trophies from King Alfonso and to take over to Spain the American trophies for the trans-Atlantic Ocean race. I did not consult Rohl as to my going, and when I returned he asked particularly why I went on a British ship, the Cunard Line, why I hadn't consulted him; that I had made a mistake, that he could have helped me, and go on the Hamburg-American Line. He made the direct, positive statement that his uncle, whom he was very close to and who was his financial backer, was the managing director of the Hamburg-American Line and the North German Lloyd Steamship Company, a most influential, high German financially and politically, and that he could have gotten me the very finest of accommodations aboard this trans-Atlantic passage, and he criticized me for going twelfth hour with any accommodations I could get.

9. Major CLAUSEN. Now, with regard to Germany and things German, did you have talks with him in which he boasted of [2202] things German?

Mr. HORNE. Yes.

10. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, before you answer that question, when was it that you had this talk with him about his uncle being—

Mr. HORNE. On my return in the fall of 1928.

11. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

Mr. HORNE. I went down to Spain on July 4, 1928.

12. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Did you have other talks with him about the subject of preferences for Germany?

Mr. HORNE. I kept my yacht in commission through the winter and took numbers of yachtsmen who owned other yachts that were out of commission, and he went on some of these trips, local trips, where we were practicing navigation, racing crews, and he was always bragging about the yacht CONTENDER being the finest and fastest yacht because she was German-built, and there was no one could build as fine a manganese steel yacht as the Germans could, and his whole boastful braggadocio attitude was entirely German, and things German were by far the best and by far the finest built; and he was very free in those days, in 1926 to 1938, in claiming his relationship with the managing director of the North German Lloyd Line.

13. Major CLAUSEN. Did he ever say anything about the fact that he was a German citizen himself, not a United States citizen?

Mr. HORNE. I think he kept that pretty well covered up. We didn't really know at that time that he was a German citizen, until he bought the large American yacht VEGA, and that was in [2203] his wife's name, and it was registered in New York, and he bought it for \$48,000. That is the ship that he chartered to the Army Engineers for \$75,000, reported in the newspapers at one-dollar charter, how-

ever; and we knew, checking into the thing afterwards, that it was because of his alien birth, and he had the yacht registered in his wife's name, his wife Floy Rohl. She received the charter money.

The PANDORA, the first yacht he owned, which was moored next to me, was under 75 feet in length and therefore could be registered in the name of an alien German, and the PANDORA was really his yacht, registered as his yacht.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Now, did you ever have a talk with Mr. Rohl concerning an acquaintance by him with visiting Germans of high rank, in business and diplomatic service of the German Republic?

Mr. HORNE. On my return from this yacht race to Spain bringing back the King Alfonso trophy I had occasion or was called upon as commodore of the yacht club to entertain and did see considerable of Count Von Luckner, who was an outstanding German, known as the sea raider, the skipper of the SEA ADDER that came out of the North Sea at Christmas night and escaped the blockade, in the first war.

He wanted to see this fine German racing yacht because he had sailed on the yacht in Travaminda. He had sailed the same yacht in Kiel and Travaminda, and he wanted to go with me to Honolulu as a navigator on this very fine German yacht.

I did not invite Hans Wilhelm Rohl to these receptions and entertainments of both Count Von Luckner and his Norwegian princess wife, and Rohl became incensed over the fact that I [2204] did not do so, and his friendship or acquaintanceship as a next door neighbor was chilled because of the fact that I had ignored him and had not invited him to these receptions to Count Von Luckner.

I understood that he had made Von Luckner's acquaintance and had entertained him when he came here, but the outstanding Von Luckner reception, a dinner party aboard his own ship, which was his own birthday party, which was very much of a German—the whole characteristic of the whole thing from beer drinking up and down—Hans Wilhelm Rohl was not invited to that party. Rather strange that he wasn't, but he was not invited.

There is no question but that Rohl was a true Nazi German: his braggadocio, his drinking, his excessive excesses in every way, bull-headedness and domination, overrunning everybody's rights in connection with yachting entertainments. On the return from the Honolulu race he made himself very, very obnoxious because of his foreign, German attitude and excessive drinking.

In 1926 when I first met him I was associated politically with three gentlemen who were my partners in the insurance business, and had been the campaign manager that had succeeded in arranging the large bond issues for the Long Beach breakwater, and Rohl came to us wanting to become a preferred, intimate, friendly contractor, to buy a lot of insurance from us and bid and secure the breakwater contracts that he later did actually build in Long Beach, and he offered us all of his insurance, and it was a left-handed way of bribery, and we were very suspicious of his methods and his foreign influencing of contracts, and we withdrew from the thing and have had nothing whatsoever to do with him.

He did not buy or have anything to do with our office [2205] because three of my partners were councilmen and were really sitting

as a board letting the breakwater contracts; and I went to the office of the Pacific Indemnity Company to try to get the back records of Ted Woods, the executive vice president, in reference to his investigation of Rohl's financial position; and the whole status of his presentation of his qualification for bonds financial, heavy—heavy financial bonds—was not only his own personal resources, which he admitted he brought from Germany some years previous, but that he had a strong financial backing and could command any amount of money or resources if his contracts got involved in trouble, because of the financial backing of his uncle, the managing director of the Hamburg-American Line, who was supposed to be a very wealthy German.

15. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

Mr. HORNE. He tried to buy a German yacht and was unable to do so, finally bought a large American yacht. We as yachtsmen were rather impressed with the publicity, that he had taken that large ocean-going yacht and chartered it to the Government at the beginning of the war for a dollar. It was publicized in the Los Angeles Times, and we found out later that he had actually chartered it to the Engineering Department of the Army Engineers for \$75,000 and that the only work and service that that yacht ever performed in the war effort was the hauling of a cargo of liquor from San Pedro harbor to Major Wyman in Honolulu and that the boat never had been put into any useful service in the war effort as a patrol ship, but delivered its cargo of liquor to Honolulu and just was left there.

16. General FRANK. How did you find that out?

[2206] Mr. HORNE. Well, Commodore Byron McCandless of the United States Navy, San Diego, the pioneer Navy man in charge of San Diego for the last twenty years, of the Destroyer Fleet, was encouraging me and I was offering my services gratis to try to build up a fleet of American-owned yachts for the offshore patrol, because the Navy were all lax—

17. General FRANK. Just to get back, there is just a single point I am after.

Mr. HORNE. Yes.

18. General FRANK. And that is about this,—

Mr. HORNE. Well, we were trying to charter all these boats to the Government for a dollar a year, and we were using that as a criterion, and we found out much to our embarrassment that it wasn't true, that it wasn't chartered for a dollar a year; it was \$75,000.

19. General FRANK. Where did you get the information on the \$75,000 that you are stating positively here under oath that he got for it?

Mr. HORNE. Well, that, where I got it? We checked the charter parties. Donald Douglas, a personal friend of mine, a yachtsman, and vice president of the Douglas Aircraft Company, was interested in putting his yacht in; Keith Spaulding, the owner of the schooner yacht GOOD WILL, a five or six hundred thousand dollar yacht; we made an investigation at the custom house in San Pedro about that charter party. We wanted to make the same charter party, and we found out it was chartered in New York and not here, and out of the checking up of the thing we found out it was really chartered for \$150,000, but the Government had finally come down and paid \$75,000 as a [2207] modification.

20. General FRANK. Where did you get your figures?

Mr. HORNE. Well, it was in connection with this custom-house investigation, that we wanted to make the same charters to the Government for a dollar a year, and Keith Spaulding and a number of other large yacht owners had agreed that they would turn their yachts over.

21. General FRANK. Did you ever see a document that showed that he got \$75,000?

Mr. HORNE. No. It was in New York. It was not in this custom house here. And I think as a result of our trying to find what the charter party was, to make duplicates of it, we learned—but I don't know whether we learned from the custom house or where we learned—that it developed that it wasn't a dollar-a-year charter. The American boys went on and chartered their boats to the Navy for a dollar a year, turned them over.

22. General FRANK. I have nothing further.

Mr. HORNE. But I don't know where we got that information. It was someone of the group that owned these yachts, that turned them over to the Government and——

23. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, you are not so sure that that \$75,000 is a true statement of the fact, are you?

Mr. HORNE. Well, to my best knowledge and belief, that the yachtsmen made this investigation and they chartered their boats for a dollar a year and later found out that Rohl had chartered his for a dollar a year plus \$75,000. Now, just where that information came from, I am sorry, sir, I can't tell you, but it came out in our efforts to supply this offshore patrol of these large ocean-going yachts.

[2208] 24. General FRANK. So far as you are concerned, then, it is hearsay?

Mr. HORNE. I think so, because we didn't have the records in San Pedro harbor. They were in New York, not here.

25. General GRUNERT. It may not be true, but you believe it to be true; is that the idea?

Mr. HORNE. I really honestly believe it to be true. The yachtsmen were very much incensed about it, that they had turned over more powerful Diesel schooners for this offshore patrol on a dollar-a-year basis really inspired by the fact that Bill Rohl had done the thing, and we found out afterward that he had sandbagged the Department for \$75,000.

26. General FRANK. When your group gave their yachts to the Government for a dollar a year, the Government, however, reconditioned them when they were returned, so that they were as good as when they were originally loaned to the Government, did they not?

Mr. HORNE. Well, Walter P. Murphy turned over a 260-foot 3-mast schooner, and he turned it over to the Government just as is: Do with it as you please; and the Government I believe are still using it. Now, they will have to have it reconditioned, I believe.

27. General FRANK. That is one conditioned. What about the rest of them? Did the Government recondition them?

Mr. HORNE. They have altered them. They took out all of the fine cabins and put for or five times as many—two or three times as many men aboard. I think that the yachtsmen understood that the equipment would be put back the way it was.

28. General GRUNERT. Could you have been mistaken as to the [2209] question of its being chartered for \$75,000; or putting it back in the condition that they received it cost \$75,000?

Mr. HORNE. I understood it was charter hire, \$75,000 against my friends' putting in their yachts at one dollar.

29. General GRUNERT. All right.

Mr. HORNE. The matter of conditioning I don't think was a part of the charter at all.

30. General GRUNERT. Have you succeeded in what you are after in getting or giving a document?

Mr. HORNE. I believe that we could get from the New York Custom House a copy of that charter if you would like to have it.

31. General FRANK. It is immaterial to us.

32. General GRUNERT. Yes, I think we ought to have evidence on that, and as far as this Board is concerned in its investigation, we limit ourselves to phases which pertain to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. HORNE. I see.

33. General GRUNERT. So whatever evidence there is, if our adviser on this advises us to get that evidence we can do so.

Mr. HORNE. Well, I think Mr. Earl Thatcher in Honolulu, who was a yachtsman and who had lots to do with our yacht racing down there, when you arrive in Honolulu, can verify and witness as a qualified witness. He is a member of or in charge of the War Information Bureau in Honolulu, and I believe that that information can be verified, that that yacht made a cargo haul of liquor to Honolulu and was never used otherwise.

34. General GRUNERT. Yes. We have evidence on that also.

Is there anything else you wish to bring out by this witness?

[2210] 35. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir.

36. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions?

37. General RUSSELL. Yes.

This man Rohl about whom you have testified: prior to the time that he went into work on that breakwater project down there was he a man of considerable resources?

Mr. HORNE. Well, I would say that he was a relatively small contractor. His financial resources can be determined accurately by financial statements in the files of the Pacific Indemnity Company, but the source of that money came from Germany, from his uncle, the managing director of the Hamburg-American Line.

38. General RUSSELL. Did he make a lot of money out of his operations with the breakwater contract? Did he become rich in that operation?

Mr. HORNE. Well, that would be hearsay. I understood that that was where he became a big, strong financial contractor, from the beginning of the harbor breakwater. I was the chairman of the campaign committee that raised that money, and I believe definitely that it can be shown in the records that that was his financial start as a big major contractor.

39. General RUSSELL. Now, it is true that you went over to this other indemnity company when he was seeking a bond for his breakwater work, and there made an investigation as to his financial condition?

Mr. HORNE. Yes, I did, jointly with Mr. Ted Woods, the executive vice president of that insurance company, and the more we got into it and the more there seemed to be a whole [2211] influence of his buying—buying influence to get that contract, the further we pulled away from it. But the Pacific Indemnity Company, of course, is entirely neutral; they could supply a bond if they wanted to.

40. General RUSSELL. Well, what did you learn about him? That he was not so strong financially when he went into the breakwater contract?

Mr. HORNE. That is it. It was very questionable as to whether the Pacific Indemnity Company would write his bond.

41. General RUSSELL. All right; so much for that.

Now, then, I believe in your earlier evidence you stated that when this ship of his went out to Honolulu, the one that we have had some evidence about—

Mr. HORNE. Yes, the VEGA.

42. General RUSSELL. That it took a cargo of liquor for Colonel Wyman; was that your statement?

Mr. HORNE. Yes, the statement that we understood that was what was—that was the only work that that boat ever did.

43. General RUSSELL. Now, who made that statement that this was Wyman's liquor?

Mr. HORNE. Well, there is a witness coming tomorrow named Bruce Pine, Los Angeles, Beverly Hills, and I believe that I learned that information from him; and I was in on the Congressional investigation of an attorney from the House Naval Affairs Committee, or I believe it was Naval Affairs Committee, previously, and prepared these affidavits which I will be glad to leave with you, which are signed affidavits; and they questioned me very carefully as to these two yachts, the PANDORA that was registered in Rohl's name and the VEGA that [2212] was not registered in Rohl's name. I was beyond the age limit, fifty, to get into the Navy, and I volunteered my services to help build up this offshore patrol of these large ocean-going yachts, and that is how I got into this thing and got into the custom house to try to get a copy of the charter party, because these people in a patriotic way had said, "Well, we will do the same thing and get us a copy of the charter party." And I went down to San Pedro, found that Rohl's boat was not registered in his name at all. It was registered in his wife's name, and the custom house said that she was the American and he was not; he was a foreign, an alien citizen, and the boat couldn't be registered in his name, but he was the one that used the boat exclusively. He was the skipper and owner of the boat as far as the world knew, and he went in and out of port with it.

44. General GRUNERT. We have that evidence of the House Military Affairs Committee. We have that available to us.

Mr. HORNE. Yes, sir. Well, that is how it came out.

45. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Mr. HORNE. Our efforts were very sincere, in a patriotic effort to supply all these yachts to the Navy for a dollar a year, and my friends like Donald Douglas and Keith Spaulding rather laughed at me because I had urged them to put their boats in there at a dollar a year,

and they found out that Rohl had been paid \$75,000 a year; not that they wanted \$75,000: were perfectly contented to offer their ships. Walter P. Murphy's finest yacht on the Pacific Coast was given for a dollar a year, and it is in service today and has done wonderful yeoman work.

46. Major CLAUSEN. We must get the affidavit, sir, and that is all.

[2213] Mr. HORNE. I would appreciate this one privilege. May I ask the privilege of reading this last page of this affidavit?

47. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

Mr. HORNE. I am so delighted that you gentlemen are taking the bull by the horns, and a long time ago when this thing [indicating] was written up it was in hopes that just what you gentlemen are doing would come about:

That affiant is informed and believes that said vessel sailing with the said cargo of intoxicating liquor from the harbor of San Pedro was never used for any purpose of national defense or as set forth in the charter thereof.

That affiant believes that the method of registration of said vessel VEGA and the chartering thereof, and the wrongful use of said charter, was and is a fraud upon the United States Government.

That affiant is informed and believes that the said Rohl was at Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, prior to December 7, 1941, and had complete detailed information of all of the offensive and defensive installations of the War Department, and that he knew on said date of the location of American Naval vessels, American planes, fortifications and other vital installations, and that the aforesaid knowledge of the said Rohl at that particular place at that particular time, was too serious to be a mere coincidence, which in affiant's opinion should be thoroughly investigated by officials of the Government high enough not to be biased, prejudiced, or influenced in any manner whatsoever.

[2214] Namely, Rohl's manner of influencing with money and bribery.

Affiant further states that in his opinion, the Government investigators should go deeper than the records disclose upon the surface, so that there may be apprehended all alien spies working under cover against the best American interests, and in league with agents of Germany or Japan, and that all persons so apprehended should lose their citizenship, and all of their worldly goods and ill-gotten gains available should be confiscated, and that they should be deported to the countries from which they originally came.

And that it should not be forgotten that the fathers and mothers who mourn their dead soldiers and sailors who lost their lives in this war, and who have received Awards of Merit and Distinguished Service Medals, would want to return these Awards to the United States Government so long as the said Major Wyman is allowed to retain any merits or the Distinguished Service Medal granted him, and that he should be subjected to an impartial Court Martial, and treated as found guilty, according to his just deserts and the best American tradition.

48. General GRUNERT. Now, is that evidence sworn to, and so forth?

49. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

50. General GRUNERT. All right; take it.

We thank you very much for coming up, Mr. Horne.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 4:45 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

[2215]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[2216] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY
PEARL HARBOR BOARD

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1944.

PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF MRS. GERTRUDE CAMPBELL BRUNNER, 1210 SOUTH
EUCLID, SAN GABRIEL, CALIFORNIA

(The witness was sworn by the Assistant Recorder.)

1. Major CLAUSEN. Would you state to the Board your name and address?

Mrs. BRUNNER. Gertrude Campbell Brunner, 1210 South Euclid, San Gabriel, California.

2. Major CLAUSEN. Mrs. Brunner, there is a procedure that we have followed with all witnesses, which consists of warning them of their rights.

Mrs. BRUNNER. Yes.

[2217] Major CLAUSEN. In this respect: that you don't have to say anything or testify to anything which might implicate you in any crime; that if you do say anything here it may later be used against you. You understand that, do you?

Mrs. BRUNNER. Yes.

4. Major CLAUSEN. You formerly were an employee of the United States Engineer Department?

Mrs. BRUNNER. Yes, sir.

5. Major CLAUSEN. And that employment commenced in the year 1935, did it?

Mrs. BRUNNER. Yes, it did.

6. Major CLAUSEN. And you were then assigned to Los Angeles?

Mrs. BRUNNER. That is right.

7. Major CLAUSEN. And at that time your duties consisted of running an addressograph machine?

Mrs. BRUNNER. I started as secretary to Major Zajieck, Z-a-j-i-e-c-k. He was a Naval—an Army reserve officer. And then I later went into the addressograph department.

8. Major CLAUSEN. This was in Los Angeles?

Mrs. BRUNNER. In Los Angeles.

9. Major CLAUSEN. While you were stationed there were you ever the personal representative of Colonel Wyman?

Mrs. BRUNNER. Never.

10. Major CLAUSEN. Were you ever his secretary?

Mrs. BRUNNER. No, sir.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Were you ever the stenographer assigned to him?

Mrs. BRUNNER. No, sir.

12. Major CLAUSEN. And Colonel Wyman later went to Hawaii, did he not?

[2218] Mrs. BRUNNER. That is right.

13. Major CLAUSEN. About five years later?

Mrs. BRUNNER. That is right.

14. Major CLAUSEN. And that was about 1940, '39?

Mrs. BRUNNER. Somewhere around there, yes.

15. Major CLAUSEN. And did you then go to Hawaii at about that time?

Mrs. BRUNNER. No. I think he was over there quite a while before I went over.

16. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you finally did, though, go to Hawaii; is that correct?

Mrs. BRUNNER. That is right.

17. Major CLAUSEN. Still as an employee of the United States Engineer Department?

Mrs. BRUNNER. Yes.

18. Major CLAUSEN. Colonel Wyman was relieved from Hawaii about March 1942, returned to the mainland, and was later assigned to the Canol project. Did you return to the mainland in the early part of 1942?

Mrs. BRUNNER. Yes, I did. I resigned. I came back under doctor's orders.

19. Major CLAUSEN. And did you then go to the Alaskan territory, Canadian territory, on this Canol project?

Mrs. BRUNNER. Well, it was three months after I returned to the States.

20. Major CLAUSEN. And in going to Alaska or Canada did you fly there with a Ferman K. Pickering, P-i-c-k-e-r-i-n-g?

Mrs. BRUNNER. He and his wife were on the plane, yes.

21. Major CLAUSEN. Mrs. Brunner, this morning I showed you [2219] what purports to be a statement of fact contained on pages 19 and 20 of this report of the House Military Affairs Committee dated June 14, 1940. I am going to read this portion to you:

Gertrude Campbell, who called herself the colonel's personal representative, told me that she had been with the Engineers in Los Angeles; from Los Angeles she had gone to Hawaii, where she worked directly under Colonel Wyman and had gone to Canada from Hawaii. I flew from Edmonton to White Horse in the same plane with Miss Campbell. After staying in White Horse for 2 days, we proceeded to Skagway, Alaska, by train, also accompanied by Miss Campbell, who was the colonel's personal representative on the Canol project No. 2, at Skagway, Alaska. Miss Campbell told me, in the presence of my wife and others, that on the morning of December 7, 1941, in the Hawaiian Islands, Colonel Wyman, who was then district engineer, came to the office after the Japanese attack, in a drunken condition and in civilian clothes, and changed to his

uniform in full view of the girls in the office. Colonel Wyman meantime shouted directions to those in the office and passed out guns to anyone who seemed to be able to operate firearms.

Let me ask you first, Miss Campbell, if you made that statement to which reference is made on this page 20, at that time and place.

Mrs. BRUNNER. I don't remember anything about that at all.

[2220] 22. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall, though, Miss Campbell, rumors to the effect that on the morning of December 7 Colonel Wyman came to the office in a drunken condition?

Mrs. BRUNNER. I have heard that in Honolulu and I have heard it since I have come back to the States, but I couldn't testify to that because I didn't see Colonel Wyman on the day of the 7th until in the afternoon.

23. Major CLAUSEN. I have no other questions.

24. General RUSSELL. You had better identify her, as she is testifying as Mrs. Brunner.

Mrs. BRUNNER. I was Mrs. Campbell. Mrs. Campbell, not Miss.

25. Major CLAUSEN. You were Mrs. Gertrude Campbell?

Mrs. BRUNNER. That is right.

26. General RUSSELL. And what did you say of the time, now?

Major CLAUSEN. That is on this occasion that is referred to by Ferman K. Pickering. You were Mrs. Campbell at that time?

Mrs. BRUNNER. That is right.

27. General GRUNERT. When you saw Colonel Wyman that afternoon what was his condition as to sobriety?

Mrs. BRUNNER. Well, I was not close enough to him to tell one way or another.

28. General GRUNERT. That is all.

29. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

Mrs. BRUNNER. He asked us all to report out there, and we were all assigned jobs to do. I was making sandwiches and was running small errands at Kewalo Basin, and I didn't get close enough to any of the officers except Captain McCrone, [2221] who was my superior. But I would like to say that I have never worked directly under Colonel Wyman. I have always worked under an officer. Colonel Wyman has never been my superior officer except over the officer that I was reporting to.

30. General GRUNERT. Is there anything that you would like to tell the Board that occurs to you that might be of assistance to the Board?

Mrs. BRUNNER. Well, I don't know whether it would have any bearing on this case or not, but the party that made this statement here had caused us quite a bit of trouble in Alaska. He and his wife—he was married on his way to Edmonton, and they sent them up to Alaska on the job that I was on. We finally had to send them out. He and his wife got in a fight and they broke her jaw, and they couldn't fix it in Skagway. They sent them out, and they were going to sue the Government and they were going to do a lot of things. I don't believe they have done anything since they went back, but Bechtel, Price & Callahan had a terrible time with them. I think that maybe his background, if somebody would look into it, might shed a little light on the subject.

31. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2222]

TESTIMONY OF HANS WILLIAM ROHL

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Rohl, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. ROHL. Hans William—not Wilhelm—Rohl; Rancho Dos Vintós, Camarillo, California.

2. Colonel WEST. And your occupation?

Mr. ROHL. Farmer.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Rohl, this Board is after facts about what happened prior to and during the Pearl Harbor attack, and in the course of this investigation there are phases there that pertain to Colonel Wyman and his connection with construction in Hawaii. Now, this field is so broad that we have divided the field up amongst the Board in making this special investigation, although the Board will act on all phases. So General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen here, will develop this particular field for us. General Frank.

4. General FRANK. Go ahead.

5. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Rohl, the first question I will ask you: On the night of December 7, 1941, did Colonel Wyman stay at your home?

Mr. ROHL. On the night of December 7th?

6. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROHL. No, sir.

7. General FRANK. December 6?

8. Major CLAUSEN. Or December 6?

Mr. ROHL. No, sir. Colonel Wyman never stayed at my home overnight.

[2223] 9. Major CLAUSEN. You mean at no time ever?

Mr. ROHL. At no time ever.

10. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, you came to this country from Germany on October 23, 1913; is that correct?

Mr. ROHL. Correct.

11. Major CLAUSEN. And you were born in Germany?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

12. Major CLAUSEN. Lubeck?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

13. Major CLAUSEN. And you were an alien until September 1941, sir?

Mr. ROHL. Correct.

14. Major CLAUSEN. You filed a preliminary application for citizenship papers on March 10, 1941; is that correct?

Mr. ROHL. I believe it is.

15. Major CLAUSEN. Now, in that application you stated that you were married on August 26, 1925; is that correct?

Mr. ROHL. That is right.

16. Major CLAUSEN. That you had four children born in 1916, 1918, '21, '23; is that correct?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

17. Major CLAUSEN. Now, after you filed this application do you recall that you had a request to appear and give some preliminary testimony or preliminary examination, sir?

Mr. ROHL. Here in—I mean in Los Angeles?

18. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

19. Major CLAUSEN. And do you recall at that time that you testified that your marriage to your present wife was your [2224] second marriage?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

20. Major CLAUSEN. That was not true, was it?

Mr. ROHL. No. I corrected it.

21. Major CLAUSEN. I say —

Mr. ROHL. At the time.

22. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon.

Mr. ROHL. I corrected it at the time.

23. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you corrected it not at that time but at a later time; isn't that true?

Mr. ROHL. Probably it would have been a couple of days.

24. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, after you testified to that, you left the place and then went back later on and made your correction?

Just answer yes or no. Is that correct, sir?

Mr. ROHL. Now, I want to get your question straight.

25. Major CLAUSEN. My question is this, Mr. Rohl: On this preliminary application after you filed your papers for citizenship you appeared and testified that your present marriage was your second marriage; you recall that?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

26. Major CLAUSEN. And I say that was not true, was it?

Mr. ROHL. No. I was under the —

27. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

Mr. ROHL. I was under the belief that I had a common-law marriage.

28. Major CLAUSEN. Well, later on, then, you called at the office and you admitted that your testimony in that respect was not true; isn't that correct?

[2225] Mr. ROHL. Yes. I found out that there was no common-law marriage in the State of California.

29. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. But at this preliminary examination you not only said that your present marriage was your second marriage, but you also testified that your first wife had obtained a decree of divorce from you in Sacramento in 1924; isn't that true? That is what you told them?

Mr. ROHL. No. I am not sure about that, because I did sign a settlement agreement with her and filed it with the Petitioner of Immigration or whatever it was.

30. Major CLAUSEN. Now, between the years 1931-1932 you made about ten trips to Mexico, didn't you, Mr. Rohl?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

31. Major CLAUSEN. In connection with construction work down in Mexico?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

32. Major CLAUSEN. And on any of these trips did you ever state that you were a German alien, to any immigration officers?

Mr. ROHL. No. I was not asked.

33. Major CLAUSEN. On a certain trip of the VEGA from Jacksonville, Florida, to Honolulu, back to Los Angeles, at which time there was also a stop at Balboa in the Canal Zone, do you remember anything about the ship's manifest?

Mr. ROHL. No.

34. Major CLAUSEN. Listing you as H. Wilhelm—rather, H. William Rohl, born September 29, 1886, at Iola, Kansas?

Mr. ROHL. No.

35. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with the fact that the manifest indicated that you were born in this [2226] country?

Mr. ROHL. No.

36. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall that your income tax returns for 1938 and 1939 declared that you were a United States citizen?

Mr. ROHL. I know it now. I didn't know it at the time I signed it, for the simple reason that I don't make out my own income tax. I have a competent auditor who does it.

37. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall, Mr. Rohl, that in an investigation in 1934 you were asked the question by the Internal Revenue, "Are you a citizen of the United States?" and that you answered, "Yes, I am. I was naturalized in 1921"?

Mr. ROHL. No.

38. General FRANK. You didn't say it, or don't you remember?

Mr. ROHL. I don't remember it.

39. Major CLAUSEN. Do you deny that you made that statement to the Internal Revenue agent?

Mr. ROHL. I don't know. I don't see how I could.

40. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Rohl, do you recall that in connection with your naturalization application that was acted upon in 1941, a letter written by Brigadier General John J. Kingman which stated, among other things, that your services were of vital importance in Hawaii? Do you recall such a letter?

Mr. ROHL. I have never seen the letter. I have heard there was a letter.

41. Major CLAUSEN. You sent your lawyer to Washington, did you not, sir, for the purpose of getting your naturalization application treated differently than anybody else's?

Mr. ROHL. I don't believe that.

[2227] 42. Major CLAUSEN. Well, did you send a lawyer to Washington?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

43. Major CLAUSEN. In connection with it?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

44. Major CLAUSEN. Who, Mr. Rohl?

Mr. ROHL. John M. Martin.

45. Major CLAUSEN. In addition to Mr. Martin you also employed other lawyers in connection with that application, didn't you?

Mr. ROHL. No.

46. Major CLAUSEN. Well, do you recall a Mr. Cannon?

Mr. ROHL. I believe Mr. Martin employed Mr. Cannon. I did not.

47. Major CLAUSEN. Well, Mr. Martin was your lawyer who employed Mr. Cannon to act in your behalf?

Mr. ROHL. Mr. Martin—

48. Major CLAUSEN. Is that correct?

Mr. ROHL. Mr. Martin is my lawyer. He at times employs associate counsel.

49. Major CLAUSEN. But the fact is, Mr. Rohl, that in addition to Mr. Martin there was a lawyer by the name of Cannon who also assisted you in getting your application acted upon; isn't that correct?

Mr. ROHL. I don't believe that anybody assisted me to have the application acted upon except perhaps the War Department.

50. Major CLAUSEN. Well, do you remember that you went to Court, Mr. Rohl, to get your citizen application heard?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

51. Major CLAUSEN. By Judge O'Connor?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

[2228] 52. Major CLAUSEN. And they were present in Court at that time as lawyers for you?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

53. Major CLAUSEN. And who were those lawyers for you present at that time?

Mr. ROHL. There was Mr. Cannon and Frank Martin.

54. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, you had two on that occasion in Court for you; isn't that correct?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

55. Major CLAUSEN. And it was September 15, 1941; is that right?

Mr. ROHL. That is right.

56. Major CLAUSEN. Now, do you remember that before that you had not only had John Martin go to Washington, but you had had other lawyers go to Washington in connection with your naturalization application?

Mr. ROHL. I had other lawyers go to Washington?

57. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROHL. No.

58. Major CLAUSEN. Did Mr. Cannon go to Washington for you?

Mr. ROHL. I don't think he did.

59. Major CLAUSEN. This Mr. Cannon was David Cannon, wasn't he, Mr. Rohl?

Mr. ROHL. I believe so.

60. Major CLAUSEN. The firm of lawyers in Los Angeles; isn't that correct?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

61. Major CLAUSEN. Acquainted with Mr. Francis Biddle; isn't that right?

[2229] Mr. ROHL. I don't know.

62. Major CLAUSEN. Acquainted with Mr. J. Edgar Hoover?

Mr. ROHL. I don't know.

63. Major CLAUSEN. In any event, do you know anything about a letter by this Mr. Cannon, David H. Cannon, 650 South Spring Street, Los Angeles, California, to the Secretary of Commerce, dated August 29, 1941, which states in part as follows: (Paragraph 5)

Theodore Wyman, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers, War Department, in charge of all the above-mentioned defense work in Hawaii, has requested Mr. Rohl and the War Department to have Mr. Rohl give his personal service in connection with the emergency defense work in Hawaii, and as early as January 1941 and at numerous times since that date Colonel Wyman has tendered Mr. Rohl transportation via clipper or boat to the Islands and has

stated to Mr. Rohl over interocean telephone that he will personally obtain special permission, because of Mr. Rohl's alien status, to allow Mr. Rohl to work on this secret contract.

Do you recall having seen that letter?

Mr. ROHL. No.

64. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon.

Mr. ROHL. No.

65. Major CLAUSEN. Well, now, isn't this true, Mr. Rohl: that this lawyer that you had, Martin, was not the one who effected a settlement between you and the Government for falsely documenting your vessels, but that Mr. Cannon, this [2230] David Cannon, was the man who did that?

Mr. ROHL. I don't know. You will have to ask Mr. Martin that question.

66. Major CLAUSEN. I see. You don't know anything about that?

Mr. ROHL. No.

[2231] 67. Major CLAUSEN. Did you pay the \$25,000, or did Mr. Martin pay it?

Mr. ROHL. Well, Rohl-Connolly Company paid it.

68. Major CLAUSEN. The Rohl-Connolly Company paid the \$25,000?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir; that's right.

69. Major CLAUSEN. You knew about it?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

70. Major CLAUSEN. And you knew about that at the time?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

71. Major CLAUSEN. Did you O. K. it at the time?

Mr. ROHL. I O. K.'d it.

72. Major CLAUSEN. And you know nothing about Mr. Cannon's having anything to do with it?

Mr. ROHL. I O. K.'d it on the advice of Mr. Martin.

73. Major CLAUSEN. I say, you know nothing about Mr. Cannon's having anything to do with it?

Mr. ROHL. No. I don't even know that Mr. Cannon was in Washington.

74. Major CLAUSEN. You don't know anything about this letter?

Mr. ROHL. No.

75. Major CLAUSEN. Let me refer again to this letter, the statement which was made to the Secretary of Commerce by Mr. Cannon, on your behalf. This was for the attempt to avoid forfeiture of the vessels that had been falsely documented, where he says, here:

As early as January 1941 and at numerous times since that date, Colonel Wyman has tendered Mr. Rohl transportation by clipper or boat to the Islands.

Was that a fact?

[2232] Mr. ROHL. You want me to confirm the letter, or do you want me to—

76. Major CLAUSEN. I am asking whether it is a fact that as early as January 1941, and at numerous times—

Mr. ROHL. Major, may I be excused for a minute? I am asking you, you are quoting out of a letter?

77. Major CLAUSEN. That's right.

Mr. ROHL. Now, what am I to answer? The letter?

78. Major CLAUSEN. The truth.

Mr. ROHL. The truth. I had a letter from Colonel Wyman to proceed to the Hawaiian Islands.

79. Major CLAUSEN. This was January 1941?

Mr. ROHL. That, I don't know, You probably have the letter.

80. Major CLAUSEN. If I show it to you, here, will your memory be refreshed? I am showing the witness exhibit I to the Colonel Hunt report, which is a letter from Colonel Wyman to Mr. Rohl, dated January 22, 1941.

Mr. ROHL. Yes, I received that letter.

81. Major CLAUSEN. What did you tell Colonel Wyman about your going over there? This letter asks that you go over right away, that you have got a secret contract. It has been read to the Board. What did you tell Colonel Wyman? He wrote you the letter. You are the man with the secret contract.

Mr. ROHL. I didn't tell him anything. I didn't go.

82. Major CLAUSEN. You just did nothing? I say, did you just do nothing?

Mr. ROHL. No, I applied for my citizenship.

83. Major CLAUSEN. Well, what did you tell Colonel Wyman, is [2233] the question. I say, sir, what did you do with regard to an answer and a response to that letter?

Mr. ROHL. I don't believe I told him anything. I don't believe I answered the letter. I know I didn't answer the letter.

84. Major CLAUSEN. You know you did not answer it?

Mr. ROHL. That's right.

85. Major CLAUSEN. Let me ask this question: When was the first time after January 22, 1941, that you said anything to Colonel Wyman about the subject of his request contained in this letter? Did you understand the question?

Mr. ROHL. I understand the question. I don't know.

86. Major CLAUSEN. What would be your most—

Mr. ROHL. You want the truth, don't you? I am telling you the truth.

87. Major CLAUSEN. Well, was it within a year, or ten years, or two months, or two days, or a week? Could you block it in, at some approximate period?

Mr. ROHL. As a matter of fact, I don't believe I told Colonel Wyman. I believe I told Paul Grafe.

88. Major CLAUSEN. When did you tell anything to Paul Grafe about this letter after January 22, 1941?

Mr. ROHL. Probably on his first trip to the mainland after that.

89. Major CLAUSEN. Which was when?

Mr. ROHL. I don't know.

90. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, you had telephone calls with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. ROHL. That's right.

[2234] 91. Major CLAUSEN. In January 1941?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

92. Major CLAUSEN. At which time, Colonel Wyman was in Hawaii, and you were in Los Angeles?

Mr. ROHL. Los Angeles.

93. Major CLAUSEN. Isn't that correct?

Mr. ROHL. That's correct.

94. Major CLAUSEN. How many?

Mr. ROHL. That, I don't know.

95. Major CLAUSEN. You had telephone calls in February 1941, didn't you, similar calls, between yourself and Colonel Wyman?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

96. Major CLAUSEN. And in March 1941?

Mr. ROHL. Yes. I am just talking, because I read the same book that you have, where the telephone calls are listed.

97. Major CLAUSEN. What books did I read, Mr. Rohl?

Mr. ROHL. All the House Military Affairs Committee, 60-page book.

98. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, you know that the House Military Affairs Committee actually collected positive proof of the stubs of telephone calls exchanged between yourself and Colonel Wyman?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, I admit.

99. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. In other words, those statements in that report are correct, aren't they?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

100. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Now, referring again to this letter, January 22, 1941, it says here—Colonel Wyman is saying to you:

I desire you to proceed to Honolulu at your earliest convenience to consult with the District Engineer relative to ways and means to accomplish the purpose of the contract.

Do you want the Board to understand that you just did not [2235] answer this letter?

Mr. ROHL. No, I didn't answer the letter.

101. Major CLAUSEN. Let me refer again to the letter of Mr. Cannon:

As early as January 1941, and at numerous times since that date, Colonel Wyman has tendered Mr. Rohl transportation by clipper or boat to the Island, and has stated to Mr. Rohl over Interocean Telephone that he will personally obtain special permission because of Mr. Rohl's alien status to allow Mr. Rohl to work on this secret contract.

Is or is not that a true statement of your lawyer, Mr. Cannon?

Mr. ROHL. I know I never talked to Colonel Wyman over the telephone about my alien status.

102. General FRANK. He has not answered this question. Answer the question.

Mr. ROHL. General, may I have that question, again?

Colonel WEST. Read the previous question from the record.

(Question read.)

103. Major CLAUSEN. The General would like you to answer the question.

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir. Well, it is a long time, but I have never discussed, to the best of my memory, my alien status with Colonel Wyman over the telephone.

104. General FRANK. That was not the question.

Mr. ROHL. Oh, I beg your pardon.

105. General FRANK. Let us get this question answered.

106. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Now, you understand that what I have read is an affirmative representation by a lawyer to the Secretary of Commerce for the [2236] settling of falsely documented vessels which would be forfeited un-

der the law, which representations are made on your behalf. I would just like to read to you from the third to the end paragraph of the letter:

For the reasons above stated, the petitioner, Mr. Rohl, and I have thought it advisable for me to come to Washington in an endeavor to expedite the closing of this matter. I have already been here 8 days and am quite willing to remain as much longer as may be necessary to obtain official action from your Department and as good business judgment would dictate. In the conference held yesterday it was suggested to me that a decision by your Department might not be forthcoming for several weeks, and for that reason it might not be advisable for me to continue my stay here.

Now, with that in mind, could you answer the General's question? What about this representation here that Colonel Wyman stated to you over Interocean Telephone that he would personally obtain special permission because of your alien status?

Now, just let me put the question. Did you ever discuss that subject on the Interocean Telephone with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. ROHL. I don't believe I have.

107. Major CLAUSEN. What about the statement beginning with—

As early as January 1941 and at numerous times since that date, Colonel Wyman has tendered Mr. Rohl Transportation by clipper or boat.

Did you ever get a similar letter to this one of January 22, 1941, tendering you such transportation?

Mr. ROHL. No.

108. Major CLAUSEN. Is it your statement then that you never [2237] discussed that with Colonel Wyman on the Interocean Telephone, or in any other way?

Mr. ROHL. In my talk to Colonel Wyman, he probably—I am sure he asked me when I was coming over.

109. Major CLAUSEN. I see. And what did you tell him, Mr. Rohl, honestly?

Mr. ROHL. Well, I told him honestly. I told him the truth, that I was still—

110. Major CLAUSEN. Getting your papers?

Mr. ROHL. No.

111. Major CLAUSEN. That you couldn't come?

Mr. ROHL. That I was still trying to get Caddoa dam.

112. Major CLAUSEN. Get what, sir?

Mr. ROHL. Caddoa dam.

113. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. ROHL. United States Army project, in such shape that I could leave. We were building a dam in Colorado at the same time.

114. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall having a conversation in December 1940 with Mr. Connolly on the telephone when he was in Washington and you were in Los Angeles?

Mr. ROHL. I had a conversation with Mr. Connolly when he was in Washington. I don't know what date that was. I mean, in that, I will take your date for granted, because you probably know that that is the date.

115. Major CLAUSEN. He told you at that time, didn't he, Mr. Rohl, that he had ascertained from Mr. Martin that you were a German alien?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

[2238] 116. Major CLAUSEN. And that by reason of that fact, you should resign as president, and that he should be appointed president. Do you recall that?

Mr. ROHL. No, because I resigned previous to that.

117. Major CLAUSEN. Is it your testimony, then, that you had no such conversation with Mr. Connolly?

Mr. ROHL. Oh, Mr. Connolly probably brought it up.

118. Major CLAUSEN. Yes; and do you recall then that you actually were told by Mr. Connolly from Washington that you should have nothing to do with this secret contract because it was a restricted matter?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

119. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Well, when you talked with Colonel Wyman, and he wanted you to come to Hawaii, didn't you tell him that you shouldn't have anything to do with this contract, for the reason that you were a German alien?

Mr. ROHL. I don't believe I did. I know I told Paul Grafe, because Paul Grafe was told by John Martin, in Washington, the same time when John Martin told Mr. Connolly.

120. Major CLAUSEN. Well, is it this, then—is this the reason—that Paul Grafe or Mr. Connolly told you that the whole thing had been explained to Colonel Wyman in Washington, and therefore you didn't have to tell him, later on, that the only reason that was holding you up was the Caddoa, is that the fact?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

121. Major CLAUSEN. That is the fact? Who told you that? Who told you that—Mr. Grafe, or Mr. Connolly?

Mr. ROHL. That—

122. Major CLAUSEN. The whole thing had been explained to [2239] Colonel Wyman in Washington.

Mr. ROHL. Nobody told me that. I took it for granted.

123. Major CLAUSEN. You took that for granted?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

124. Major CLAUSEN. Why? Upon what did you base that assumption?

Mr. ROHL. May I tell in a few words, of my own words, about that time?

125. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, I have no objection.

126. General FRANK. Just while we are on this subject, I would like to ask some questions about these telephone conversations that you had with Colonel Wyman, he in Honolulu, and you in Los Angeles. Do you mean to say that never, in any of those telephone conversations, did you ever bring up the question with him about your alien status?

Mr. ROHL. I don't believe I did, General. I took it for granted that he was told that, in Washington.

127. Major CLAUSEN. What did you base that on?

Mr. ROHL. Well, that's what I would like to explain.

John Martin was back in Washington on other matters, not on my business, or Rohl-Connolly business, Hawaiian Constructors' business. He was back on some other business.

128. General FRANK. Having to do with your firm?

Mr. ROHL. No, sir—with other contractors; no one involved in Hawaiian Constructors, and by accident he met Paul Grafe and Tom

Connolly and told them not to sign the contract, until he talked to them further; so John Martin called me, in Los Angeles, from Washington, and told me the nature of the contract, and I gave him permission—not permission, but told him to tell [2240] Mr. Grafe and Mr. Connolly my alien status; which he did.

129. General FRANK. Who was responsible, in trying to get the group of contractors interested in this Hawaiian project? Was it, or was it not, Colonel Wyman?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

130. General FRANK. It was Colonel Wyman?

Mr. ROHL. He was interested in getting a group of contractors.

131. General FRANK. Including the Rohl-Connolly Company, the Callahan Company, and the Gunther & Shirley Company?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

132. General FRANK. Now, Colonel Wyman, Mr. Connolly, and Mr. Grafe were in Washington together, in a group, discussing this contract, were they not?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

133. General FRANK. And a hitch that came up in consummating the contract was your alien status, is that correct?

Mr. ROHL. General, by that do you mean—now, I have no knowledge of my own whether Mr.—

134. General FRANK. Well, I will put it in different words. Maybe the word “consummating” bothers you. You and they felt that you could not participate in the contract because it was a defense project and you were an alien?

Mr. ROHL. That's right.

135. General FRANK. That is correct, isn't it?

Mr. ROHL. That's correct.

136. General FRANK. Therefore, there was some question, considerable question, as to whether or not the Rohl-Connolly Company could participate in this project?

Mr. ROHL. No, General.

137. General FRANK. There was, until you got out of it?

Mr. ROHL. There was no question about Rohl-Connolly Co.

[2241] 138. General FRANK. To whom were these letters being written, and with whom was this conversation by Wyman, in the United States? It was with you, wasn't it?

Mr. ROHL. General, you mean the letter from the Hawaiian Islands?

139. General FRANK. Yes. The letter was to you?

Mr. ROHL. Direct.

140. General FRANK. Rohl, by name?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

141. General FRANK. And the telephone conversations by Wyman were with you, Rohl, by name?

Mr. ROHL. That's right.

142. General FRANK. You were the person that he was interested in getting over there; is that not correct?

Mr. ROHL. That is correct.

143. General FRANK. Yes. You were the person that he wanted on the job, as stated in the letter that was written to expedite your naturalization, that is correct, isn't it?

Mr. ROHL. That is correct.

144. General FRANK. Therefore, you were the man who was concerned, and whose alien status threw a monkey-wrench into the smooth operation of getting this contract through, in Washington, because, unless you pulled out, the Rohl-Connolly Company could not participate in the project; that is correct, isn't it?

Mr. ROHL. General, by that do you mean, unless I pulled out——

145. General FRANK. As an official.

Mr. ROHL. As an active manager?

[2242] 146. General FRANK. Yes. That was correct, wasn't it?

Mr. ROHL. That is correct.

147. General FRANK. Therefore, there was some complication because of your personal status as an alien, wasn't there?

Mr. ROHL. No, General.

148. General FRANK. Well, you just said so.

Mr. ROHL. Well, I never had any intention of going to the Hawaiian Islands and managing that contract.

149. General FRANK. Nevertheless, Colonel Wyman in his conversation and in his letters was rather insistent on having you there, was he not?

Mr. ROHL. That's right.

150. General FRANK. Now, since your alien status was the one thing that interfered with this thing, since your alien status was the one point that had to be cleared up in Washington, since your alien status was the one thing that blocked your going to Honolulu, and since Wyman, on the other side, was so insistent on having you come there, do you mean to say that Wyman was never told about it?

Mr. ROHL. Oh, Wyman was told about it.

151. General FRANK. About your alien status?

Mr. ROHL. Alien status; because, how could Colonel Wyman write that letter? I believe he originated the letter to General Hannum, and I believe the letter went from——

152. General FRANK. I am talking now about a time back in December, 1940.

Mr. ROHL. General, you are talking about December? I don't know.

153. General FRANK. All right.

154. Major CLAUSEN. I would like to refresh your memory, Mr. [2243] Rohl, by reading some testimony which you gave before the Tenney Committee in hearings held in February 1943, particularly an answer at page 3807:

Q. When you first obtained the contracts for the construction of military installation (construction); did you tell Major Wyman that you were an alien?

A. I did, on the Hawaiian Constructors.

Q. But you didn't, on any other projects?

A. We don't have it. There are no restrictions. I mean, on a government contract you are not questioned as to whether you are a citizen or not, but on this particular contract, contract 602, being a secret contract, of course, I told him. I had to tell him.

You remember giving that testimony?

Mr. ROHL. No.

155. Major CLAUSEN. What is that, sir?

Mr. ROHL. No.

156. Major CLAUSEN. Well, what is the fact?

Mr. ROHL. I don't know whether that transcript is right.

157. Major CLAUSEN. You do not know whether it is right?

Mr. ROHL. No; and I will never—I won't take anything for granted in that transcript, because it was a frame-up.

158. Major CLAUSEN. All right, now.

Mr. ROHL. And I will have to stand on that.

159. Major CLAUSEN. Regardless of that?

160. General FRANK. Watch your step.

Mr. ROHL. No, no.

161. Major CLAUSEN. What is that?

Mr. ROHL. I am talking about the Tenney Committee.

162. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Now, just tell this Board [2244] here—just this Board, the fact as to whether it is not correct that you did tell Colonel Wyman that you were an alien?

Mr. ROHL. Major, I have testified several times that I did not.

163. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Well, now, just tell me, what is the fact as you now say it to be.

Mr. ROHL. May the reporter read back?

164. Major CLAUSEN. No, you may answer the question if you wish.

Mr. ROHL. No, it is in there.

165. Major CLAUSEN. It is in there.

166. General FRANK. Answer the question. It is a question of the truth. It is either so, or it isn't.

167. Major CLAUSEN. Let me refresh your memory further. I will come back to the question. You recall, in December 1940, that there were discussions between yourself and Colonel Wyman, regarding this contract, before Colonel Wyman went to Washington?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

168. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

169. Major CLAUSEN. There is no question about that in your mind, is there?

Mr. ROHL. No, but—

170. Major CLAUSEN. When did you first know that you were going to have these discussions with him?

Mr. ROHL. I was requested by, I believe, Colonel Kelton, or Colonel Kelton's office, to meet Colonel Wyman in Colonel Kelton's office, who at that time was the district engineer in Los Angeles.

171. Major CLAUSEN. You mean Colonel Kelton was in the District [2245] Engineer's office, in Los Angeles?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

172. Major CLAUSEN. When did you get that instruction or request?

Mr. ROHL. I would say two or three days before Colonel Wyman arrived here.

173. Major CLAUSEN. When was that?

Mr. ROHL. That has to be in December 1940.

174. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Now, isn't it true, also, that in December 1940, you registered under the Alien Registration Act?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

175. Major CLAUSEN. You know why you had to do it, don't you?

Mr. ROHL. Because I was an alien.

176. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Who told you to register under the act, or did you just read it in the paper and go down and do it, yourself?

Mr. ROHL. I read it in a paper.

177. Major CLAUSEN. Then did you go down and do it?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

178. Major CLAUSEN. What is that, sir?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

179. Major CLAUSEN. In point of time, before or after, was it, that you had these talks with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. ROHL. That, I don't know, Major. You probably have the dates, there, in your own possession.

180. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you knew, when you had the talk with Colonel Wyman, in December, 1940—

Mr. ROHL. That I was an alien.

181. Major CLAUSEN. —that you were an alien?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

182. Major CLAUSEN. And that you couldn't do any work on this [2246] contract, yourself?

Mr. ROHL. No; I didn't know that.

183. Major CLAUSEN. Well, let me read you some more from this Tenney manuscript. I beg your pardon?

Mr. ROHL. Go ahead.

184. Major CLAUSEN. I read from this Tenney transcript, page 3808:

Q. Are you familiar with the provisions of the law regarding such contracts?

A. Secret contracts?

Q. Well, secret, confidential, or restricted contracts.

A. Yes.

Q. I will read the law to you and see whether or not this is your understanding of it.

"No aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate in the contract trials, unless the written consent of the head of the Government Department concerned has first been obtained.

"Any alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts by wilful misrepresentation of his alien status, or who makes such wilful misrepresentation while seeking such employment, shall be penalized by a fine of \$10,000 or five years in the Federal Penitentiary.

"For the purpose of this section the term 'person' shall be construed to include an individual, part- [2247] nership, association, corporation, or other business enterprise."

Q. Is that your understanding of the law?

A. Absolutely. Now, as a matter of fact, before we took this contract, the War Department was told.

Did you give that testimony?

Mr. ROHL. At—I was under that impression—

185. Major CLAUSEN. I say, did you give that testimony, sir?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

186. Major CLAUSEN. What is that, sir?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

187. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Now, how was the War Department told, before you took the contract?

Mr. ROHL. That, I don't know. As I have said before, that was my impression. Now, whether Mr. Grafe or Mr. Connolly or Mr. Martin told Colonel Wyman, or anyone in the Engineer Department, that, I don't know. I simply took that for granted.

188. Major CLAUSEN. In these talks that you had with Colonel Wyman, at Los Angeles, what did you say to him about this situation?

Mr. ROHL. In my talks with Colonel Wyman? First, they were only generalities. I didn't know what the contract was about.

189. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Will you continue, now, and tell the Board what you told Colonel Wyman, in December 1940, before this contract was signed?

Mr. ROHL. Colonel Wyman arrived in Los Angeles, and interviewed several contractors.

190. General FRANK. When?

[2248] Mr. ROHL. In December, 1940. He was talking in generalities. He wasn't even saying it was a secret or a restricted or a confidential contract. He did mention that there was a third contract over there for a little over a million dollars. That was all the money that had been appropriated, at that time, and he believed the contract would probably run four or five millions of dollars; and he asked us if we would be interested; and that's about all.

191. Major CLAUSEN. Before you had that talk with him, you had already changed your position as president, with Mr. Connolly—that occurred on December 16, 1940—for the reason that you were an alien, isn't that true?

Mr. ROHL. I beg your pardon, Major, when did I register? I mean, you can help me, here. You can tell me, probably.

192. Major CLAUSEN. I do not have the date. I have the date when, as I understand it, you changed your positions with Mr. Connolly, for the reason you were an alien, which was December 16, 1940.

Mr. ROHL. I mean, I haven't got that at the end of my—the records are there. I can furnish you the records.

193. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know that at the time that you went out as president, and Mr. Connolly went in, the reason for it was because you were an alien? You knew that then, did you not?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

194. Major CLAUSEN. All right. That having occurred before you saw Colonel Wyman, for that reason, I say, what did you say to Colonel Wyman about that, having in mind the testimony that you gave to the Tenney Committee?

[2249] Mr. ROHL. I didn't say anything to Colonel Wyman about that.

195. Major CLAUSEN. Colonel Wyman expected you to come to Hawaii, as is indicated by his letter of January 22, 1941. Did you represent to him that you would or would not go to Hawaii, when you saw him, in December 1940?

Mr. ROHL. In December, I told him that I would not come to Hawaii.

196. Major CLAUSEN. Where did you say that to him?

Mr. ROHL. Either in Los Angeles or in San Francisco.

197. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Now, what were all the reasons—name them all—that you gave Colonel Wyman, as to why you would not go to Hawaii?

Mr. ROHL. Major, or General, the reason, there was a small contract. The Callahan Construction Company had recently completed the Crado dam, Los Angeles County Flood Control; had an organization, and Paul Grafe was going over, and did go over with the Callahan organization to perform that contract.

198. Major CLAUSEN. Did go over where?

Mr. ROHL. To the Hawaiian Islands.

199. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. ROHL. I had no intention of ever going over there.

200. Major CLAUSEN. I say, what did you say to Colonel Wyman, in December 1940, as your reasons for stating to him that you would not go to Hawaii?

Mr. ROHL. The job didn't warrant it.

201. Major CLAUSEN. You told him that, did you?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

[2250] 202. Major CLAUSEN. And what did he say?

Mr. ROHL. "All right."

203. Major CLAUSEN. And this was December 1940?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

204. Major CLAUSEN. And what else did you say on that subject to him?

Mr. ROHL. That's all.

205. Major CLAUSEN. Now, how many talks did you have with Colonel Wyman in December 1940? You remembered very specifically having gone to a conference.

Mr. ROHL. At Colonel Kelton's office.

206. Major CLAUSEN. At Colonel Kelton's office. All right. Now did you have talks with him elsewhere?

Mr. ROHL. I did see Colonel Wyman here in San Francisco, but prior to his departure for Washington.

207. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, that is exactly what I had in mind. Now, between what dates did you have these talks with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. ROHL. I wish I could tell you the exact dates, but here, Major, haven't you, between the time—let's put it this way: you can supply the dates. Between the time that Colonel Wyman arrived in Los Angeles, I believe he came from Honolulu to San Francisco, division office, and from the division office to Los Angeles, to interview contractors. Now, between the date that he arrived in Los Angeles and the date that he left for Washington—you are talking about the talks that I might have had.

208. Major CLAUSEN. Those are the dates?

Mr. ROHL. Well, yes.

[2251] 209. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, before he went to Washington?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

210. Major CLAUSEN. You are sure of that, as the time that you had these talks in Los Angeles and in San Francisco?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

211. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Now, what was said in San Francisco concerning this subject?

Mr. ROHL. The same thing. As a matter of fact, Colonel Wyman wasn't sure; I didn't know who was going to be the contractor when Colonel Wyman left here, because I believed that was out of Colonel Wyman's hands, anyway. Colonel Wyman, after all, doesn't award contracts without being specifically authorized.

212. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall how it came that you were in San Francisco with Colonel Wyman, before he went to Washington?

Mr. ROHL. No.

213. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon?

Mr. ROHL. No, sir.

214. Major CLAUSEN. Well, did you come up here together, do you remember?

Mr. ROHL. I don't think so.

215. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have talks at any other place than San Francisco or Washington, on this subject, before Colonel Wyman went to Washington?

Mr. ROHL. No, because I stayed in San Francisco, and Colonel Wyman went to Washington.

216. Major CLAUSEN. Well, I mean, was it just yourself and [2252] Colonel Wyman that had the talks?

Mr. ROHL. It probably was.

217. Major CLAUSEN. And was that in the division engineer's office?

Mr. ROHL. No.

218. Major CLAUSEN. What is that?

Mr. ROHL. No.

219. Major CLAUSEN. Well, where did you have these talks?

Mr. ROHL. I probably talked to him at the hotel.

220. Major CLAUSEN. That was at what hotel?

Mr. ROHL. Palace Hotel.

221. Major CLAUSEN. What is that, sir?

Mr. ROHL. Palace.

222. Major CLAUSEN. Did you see Colonel Wyman after he got back from Washington, before he went to the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. ROHL. I don't believe I did. I am pretty sure I didn't. I know Colonel Wyman was waiting for transportation in San Francisco.

223. Major CLAUSEN. Were you here at that time?

Mr. ROHL. No.

224. General FRANK. How did you know that?

Mr. ROHL. Because Mr. Connolly, my partner, if I remember right, took him out to Christmas dinner, or right around Christmas time, to his home.

225. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know Werner Plack?

Mr. ROHL. No.

226. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever meet him?

Mr. ROHL. No.

227. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever see him, in your life?

[2253] Mr. ROHL. No.

228. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever hear of him, in Los Angeles?

Mr. ROHL. No, only from Bruce Pine's testimony. I read that.

229. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, you read this testimony, then, of the Tenney Committee, over, before you came here today?

Mr. ROHL. No.

230. Major CLAUSEN. Well, where did you see the testimony of Mr. Pine?

Mr. ROHL. After I had them, printed.

231. Major CLAUSEN. You mean to say after the Tenney Committee transcript was printed?

Mr. ROHL. That's right.

232. Major CLAUSEN. You saw the Tenney Committee transcript, then?

Mr. ROHL. Oh, yes.

233. Major CLAUSEN. It included your testimony?

Mr. ROHL. And everybody else's.

234. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. ROHL. I haven't see it since. I mean, I haven't had time for it.

235. Major CLAUSEN. Now, when did you first meet Colonel Wyman?

Mr. ROHL. May I refer to your actual record?

236. Major CLAUSEN. It was about 1935, wasn't it?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, but I can tell you the exact circumstance.

237. Major CLAUSEN. The exact circumstances?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

238. Major CLAUSEN. Well, it was in 1935, when he first became [2254] the district engineer at Los Angeles, wasn't it?

Mr. ROHL. All right, he became district engineer at Los Angeles.

239. Major CLAUSEN. When he was a Captain, isn't that so?

Mr. ROHL. I don't know whether he was captain or major.

240. Major CLAUSEN. You called on him, did you not, with Mr. Connolly?

Mr. ROHL. We put in a bid.

241. Major CLAUSEN. What's that?

Mr. ROHL. Colonel Wyman's, or Captain Wyman, whatever it was at that time, his predecessor, Major Stickney, advertised for bids on an extension of the Los Angeles-Long Beach breakwater.

242. Major CLAUSEN. I say, you called on Colonel Wyman after he arrived there?

Mr. ROHL. May I continue? I will stop.

243. Major CLAUSEN. Well, if you have got a statement to make, yes; make your statement. I am waiting.

Mr. ROHL. The bids were postponed. Opening of the bids was postponed for two or three days, or for several days, so Mr. Connolly and I called on the District Engineer, and were told that Major Stickney was not there, that Captain Wyman was in.

244. Major CLAUSEN. Have you completed your statement?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

245. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

Since the time that you first saw Colonel Wyman, and since the time that he was relieved as district engineer in Los Angeles, you had Colonel Wyman on your yachts, did you not, as a guest of yours?

[2255] Mr. ROHL. Yes.

246. Major CLAUSEN. You entertained him on those yachts?

Mr. ROHL. I wouldn't say that.

247. Major CLAUSEN. Well, he was on the yachts, and you gave him liquor and food?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

248. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, you are rather familiar with this House committee report—perhaps we can shorten this. You have seen that statement of the various kinds of entertainment. Are they correct?

Mr. ROHL. No.

249. Major CLAUSEN. All right, now. Why?

Mr. ROHL. Major, if you would only let me explain in my own words, and put that in the record, that will be the true story, and all of the true story.

250. Major CLAUSEN. Proceed.

Mr. ROHL. So we are not wasting so much time, that way.

251. Major CLAUSEN. Proceed.

Mr. ROHL. I have had Colonel Wyman and his officers, meaning the officers of the district, and their wives, on a trip to Catalina and back, lasting one—or, say, leaving Saturday afternoon and returning Sunday—trip No. 1. I had Colonel Wyman on the yacht RAMONA, on a trip over to inspect the Catalina Rock Quarries which Rohl-Connolly were operating—that's No. 2.

252. General FRANK. How long was that trip? Overnight?

Mr. ROHL. Overnight. On the first trip, the officers and their wives stayed ashore. They were in the Catalina Islands. In other words, Colonel Wyman did not stay on the [2256] yacht.

253. Major CLAUSEN. Have you completed your statement?

Mr. ROHL. No; I had one more trip. I took Colonel Wyman and Mrs. Wyman on the VEGA, on a trip to Catalina and back. Excuse me, General, these are two different boats. I was talking about one. Now, I am talking about the other. I had Colonel Wyman on the VEGA, one trip leaving again on the Saturday, and returning on Sunday, to Catalina. That is all.

254. Major CLAUSEN. Well, now in addition to that, you had him out to your home, and you had him up to the Biltmore Hotel, didn't you, and entertained him?

Mr. ROHL. I have had him out to my home for dinner.

255. Major CLAUSEN. You have also had him to the Biltmore Hotel, haven't you, sir?

Mr. ROHL. I have also had him at the Biltmore Hotel; not, however—not, in both—in all cases, that Colonel Wyman has never been my guest, except the three yacht trips, overnight, either in my home, or in the Biltmore.

256. Major CLAUSEN. During the time you had him to the Biltmore Hotel, you had an apartment there, didn't you, sir?

Mr. ROHL. I had an apartment there, at times.

257. Major CLAUSEN. And you also had a home right there in Los Angeles, too, at the same time, didn't you, sir?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

258. Major CLAUSEN. What is that, sir?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

259. Major CLAUSEN. Now, I will just summarize this, to shorten the thing. In August 1935, Colonel Wyman awarded the first contract to Rohl-Connolly Company, in the amount of [2257] \$850,000, and the contract was completed, July 1936.

August 6, 1936, he awarded the second contract to the Rohl-Connolly Company the Long Beach-Los Angeles breakwater job, amounting to \$2,145,000, which contract was approved by Colonel John C. Kingman, district engineer, on August 31, 1936.

Mr. ROHL. District engineer? Not district engineer.

260. General FRANK. "Division engineer," isn't it?

261. Major CLAUSEN. It says "district." "Division," it should be. All right.

Another contract was awarded to the Rohl-Connolly Company or Rohl for the furnishing of derrick stone, at \$15,770, for emergency relief.

Those contracts actually were awarded your firm, were they, Mr. Rohl?

Mr. ROHL. Oh, yes! May I explain that, just to get it in the record? We built the first, or did Mr. Connolly explain that to you, yesterday? If he did, it isn't necessary.

262. General FRANK. Built what?

Mr. ROHL. The first section of the breakwater, under Colonel or General Peterson. I would like to get this in the record. It will clear up a lot of things.

263. General FRANK. Go ahead.

Mr. ROHL. At that time we were on competitive bids. We were \$600,000 below the next bidder, and our bid was \$1,520,000, and the engineer's estimate was \$1,500,000, but we were still \$600,000 below the next bidder, in competitive bids. Mr. Connolly and I, or Rohl-Connolly, built barges, tugs, derrick barges, opened rock quarries to do that one contract.

[2258] Thereafter, we had every extension off the Los Angeles-Long Beach breakwater—Newport, Winnemac, Redondo Beach, Seal Beach—as a matter of fact, all water-borne rock in that area, due to the fact that Rohl-Connolly Company was the only firm properly equipped to do that type of work and could do it cheaper and better for the government than anyone else.

264. Major CLAUSEN. Have you finished?

Mr. ROHL. That's the truth. I mean, I thought I would explain that. There can't be any favors in awarding a low-bidder contract.

265. General FRANK. There has been a good deal of conversation about whether or not you told Colonel Wyman about your alien status, and finally, in answer to a question from me, you admitted that you told him about your alien status.

Mr. ROHL. In—today?

266. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. ROHL. General, I might have been confused.

267. General FRANK. Now, the question I want to ask is, what is the reason for dodging the point that he was told?

Mr. ROHL. There isn't any, General, that I can see.

268. General FRANK. Well, that is what I do not understand.

Mr. ROHL. There was no reason at all for dodging that point. I mean, it was a fact. I didn't keep it a secret.

269. Major CLAUSEN. In line with what the General said, you said that you got this Tenney transcript after the hearings, and that you read it, and you read this portion of it?

Mr. ROHL. Major, may I please say, again—

270. General FRANK. Just a minute, now.

Mr. ROHL. That the Tenny transcript, I don't know [2259] whether everything in there is the truth, or not.

271. General FRANK. But you ought to remember that, it is sworn testimony, and since it is sworn testimony—

Mr. ROHL. General—

272. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. ROHL. General, I didn't mean to interrupt you. I don't know whether that sworn testimony has been transcribed right. Those things can happen.

273. Major CLAUSEN. Well, when you got the transcript and read it over, did you ever write to the Tenney Committee and say it was wrong?

Mr. ROHL. I put it in the waste basket, because that's all it was worth.

274. General FRANK. Then it must stand, however, because it is sworn testimony.

Mr. ROHL. But please—please, General.

275. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. ROHL. Let me see that.

276. General FRANK. Now, just a minute. I am not talking about this.

Mr. ROHL. No, no. May I turn you to a front page, there, please? I mean, after all, we are talking about something serious, here.

277. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. ROHL (reading):

Gentlemen (of the press) the committee has ruled for this hearing the public will be excluded but the press may remain. We are asking the press to be very careful in reporting anything of a military nature or that might have any bearing on military objectives or installations or anything of that nature which might be developed in the course of the examination of witnesses. We believe [2260] we must be exceedingly careful in reference to that. I believe with that admonition you gentlemen of the press will act accordingly. In other words, we do not want to reveal any military secrets, if any should be developed in the examination.

Then a Mr. Combs comes along and tells the press, because they are excused. I was asked to step outside the room, when Mr. Combs tells the press what to print. That would be in your record. Mr. Combs is the chief investigator for Tenney.

278. General FRANK. That is very true, but I am not talking about that testimony.

Mr. ROHL. I know you are not, General, but at the same time—

279. General FRANK. I still would like to ask you, what is the point in trying to dodge the admission that Wyman was told about your alien status?

Mr. ROHL. There isn't any point, General.

280. General FRANK. That is what I cannot understand.

Mr. ROHL. Neither can I; but, General—

281. General FRANK. Because you already have told me, in prior testimony, this morning, that Wyman was told, and in this testimony you testified that Wyman was told. What point was there in not telling him?

Mr. ROHL. There wasn't any point in not telling him. There wasn't. I took it for granted. I made it a point to have Martin explain it to Mr. Grafe and Mr. Connolly, and I took it for granted that they immediately explained it to Colonel Wyman.

282. General FRANK. Yes; and then, in this testimony this morning, you stated that you told it to Wyman.

[2261] Mr. ROHL. No. If I made that statement, I want to retract it.

283. General FRANK. Now, I come right back to my point—what was the idea of not telling him?

Mr. ROHL. There wasn't any.

284. General FRANK. Then why didn't you tell him?

Mr. ROHL. I will have to come right back again, I was under the impression that he was told in Washington.

285. General FRANK. No, that was the main point and difficulty of your getting into this contract, when Wyman was trying to induce you to come into it. Now, at some time, either now or then, this testimony is in error that you have been giving.

Mr. ROHL. Let's try and get it right.

286. General FRANK. Either now or then, the testimony is in error that you were giving. Then you testified that you told him; that is, in the Tenney Committee. Here, a little while ago, you told me that you told him. Now you come back and tell me that you didn't tell him. At the moment, we have two to one against you.

Mr. ROHL. No, no, General. What dates are we talking about?

287. General FRANK. We are talking about some time right after December 1940.

Mr. ROHL. Some time right after December 1940?

288. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. ROHL. Well, I believe I said that—now, wait a minute. I will have to tell it in my own words.

289. General FRANK. Now, just a minute. Never mind the words—never mind the records.

[2262] Mr. ROHL. All right.

290. General FRANK. Let's have the truth.

Mr. ROHL. That's right.

291. General FRANK. Yes. That is what I am after; and there is just one truth about this thing.

Mr. ROHL. That's correct.

292. General FRANK. Yes. Now, let's have it.

Mr. ROHL. I don't believe I told Colonel Wyman, personally.

293. General FRANK. This testimony is under oath, just as that was under oath, and just as the prior testimony this morning was under oath.

Mr. ROHL. I know, General. If I said that, I am going to retract it right now. Can I do that?

294. General FRANK. It is too late to retract the Tenney testimony.

Mr. ROHL. That is right.

295. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. ROHL. If that is—if the transcript is right.

296. General FRANK. Yes. And judicial notice is taken of that, now. I still do not understand why Wyman should not have been told.

Mr. ROHL. Neither do I.

297. General FRANK. And do you mean to tell me you had all these conversations with Wyman over the telephone between Los Angeles and Hawaii, when he was so insistent about your coming out there, all the way from January 1, 1941, and you never told him about your alien status?

Mr. ROHL. Now, wait a minute, General. I told Mr. Grafe.

[2263] 298. General FRANK. I am talking about Wyman. Let's stick to that.

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

299. General FRANK. And you never told Colonel Wyman?

Mr. ROHL. In December 1940? I don't—

300. General FRANK. I didn't say December.

Mr. ROHL. Oh, I beg your pardon.

301. General FRANK. I said shortly after December, in January or February 1941.

Mr. ROHL. I don't believe I did.

302. General FRANK. When did you go to Honolulu?

Mr. ROHL. In September. I left, September 25, 1941.

303. General FRANK. Why did you put it off so long?

Mr. ROHL. To get my citizen papers.

304. General FRANK. When did you get them?

Mr. ROHL. September 15.

305. General FRANK. Why did you go to Honolulu?

Mr. ROHL. Because I was requested to go.

306. General FRANK. By whom?

Mr. ROHL. By Colonel Wyman.

307. General FRANK. Since you were not interested in the contract, why did you go?

Mr. ROHL. Colonel Wyman wanted more speed.

308. General FRANK. But you stated at a prior stage in your testimony that Rohl-Connolly Company was not interested in it.

Mr. ROHL. Right, General. I am talking now about December 1940.

[2264] 309. General FRANK. I am talking about September.

Mr. ROHL. '41.

310. General FRANK. 1941. Since you were not interested in the contract prior to this time, why were you interested in it in September 1941?

Mr. ROHL. I was ordered to go over there.

311. General FRANK. You were what?

Mr. ROHL. I was ordered to go over there.

312. General FRANK. Who can order you as a civilian? Tell me that.

Mr. ROHL. The contracting officer. He can't order you; he can request you.

313. General FRANK. That is just what he did ever since December 1940.

Mr. ROHL. I wouldn't say that.

314. General FRANK. And you didn't want to go.

Mr. ROHL. No, General; not since December, I mean.

315. General FRANK. Let me see the letter.

Major CLAUSEN. January 1941.

316. General FRANK. All right. Ever since January 1941, then.

Mr. ROHL. All right. Now let us take it for granted, whether it's right or wrong or—

317. General FRANK. Let's make it right.

Mr. ROHL. Let's make it right, is right. Colonel Wyman was dissatisfied with the progress.

318. General FRANK. Under whose supervision?

Mr. ROHL. Under Paul Grafe's supervision.

319. General FRANK. Yes?

Mr. ROHL. He was dissatisfied.

[2265] 320. General FRANK. Yes?

Mr. ROHL. He wanted me over there. I refused to go.

321. General FRANK. When?

Mr. ROHL. I didn't—in this letter. I went——

322. General FRANK. When? In what month did you refuse to go?

Mr. ROHL. I refused to go until I had my citizenship papers.

323. General FRANK. I know, but you said, "this letter."

Mr. ROHL. Well, the letter of January.

324. General FRANK. Yes; you refused to go?

Mr. ROHL. I didn't refuse to go. I mean I didn't—I didn't tell them in so many words.

325. General FRANK. Well, go ahead.

Mr. ROHL. But I did go to the Immigration Department and told them that I had—that I was requested to go over there and I didn't want to go, and they told me it was the right thing to do.

326. General FRANK. Who told you that?

Mr. ROHL. Immigration Department in Los Angeles.

327. General FRANK. What did you do when you got there?

Mr. ROHL. What did I do? I made a trip around the Island of Oahu with Colonel Wyman and with Grafe and I of course stayed there for about fourteen days and came back, got personnel and equipment to expedite the work, and this time I was ordered to—by General Hannum. I intended to fly back. I was waiting for a plane. I was ordered by General Hanum to get aboard the Lurline on November the 28th.

328. General FRANK. You chartered the VEGA or the Government chartered the VEGA from you, didn't they?

[2266] Mr. ROHL. Yes.

329. General FRANK. What was the cargo of the VEGA between Los Angeles and Honolulu?

Mr. ROHL. She had no cargo.

330. General FRANK. She had no liquor aboard?

Mr. ROHL. Oh, yes.

331. General FRANK. Well, that's cargo.

Mr. ROHL. No, sir.

332. General FRANK. What is it, if it is not cargo?

Mr. ROHL. Supplies.

333. General FRANK. For whom?

Mr. ROHL. For the owner.

334. General FRANK. Who was the owner?

Mr. ROHL. Mrs. Rohl was.

335. General FRANK. Did she go to Honolulu?

Mr. ROHL. No.

336. General FRANK. What good did liquor in Honolulu do Mrs. Rohl in Los Angeles?

Mr. ROHL. General, when I told them to outfit the VEGA for six months' trip, at that time there wasn't much you could talk over the radiophone, and they outfitted the VEGA for six months' trip.

337. General FRANK. With liquor?

Mr. ROHL. No. With everything. They didn't even know what kind of a trip—the crew didn't know what kind of a trip it was.

338. General FRANK. Who paid for the liquor that went on the VEGA?

Mr. ROHL. I did.

[2267] 339. General FRANK. How much was on there?

Mr. ROHL. I don't know. I suppose—I think somebody testified that there was 16 or 17 cases or something on there.

340. General FRANK. Who used the liquor when it got to Honolulu?

Mr. ROHL. I took it off.

341. General FRANK. And you used it?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

342. General FRANK. Did the Government ever pay for it?

Mr. ROHL. No.

343. General FRANK. What reimbursement from the Government did you get for the use of the VEGA?

Mr. ROHL. One dollar, less—less about five or six thousand dollars that they didn't pay.

344. General FRANK. When you took the liquor off the VEGA in Honolulu where did you put it?

Mr. ROHL. I locked it up in the Pleasanton Hotel, in the locker.

345. General FRANK. You and Colonel Wyman had rooms at the Pleasanton Hotel, didn't you?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

346. General FRANK. Did Colonel Wyman participate in the consumption of the liquor?

Mr. ROHL. Not much, if any.

If I say anything—General, will it help, I mean, to get at the facts if I make a statement about the VEGA?

347. General FRANK. No. Just a minute now.

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

348. General FRANK. Were you conversant with the installation [2268] of the aircraft warning service bases?

Mr. ROHL. In?

349. General FRANK. In Honolulu. In Oahu.

Mr. ROHL. At what time?

350. General FRANK. When you went over there.

Mr. ROHL. In September?

351. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. ROHL. No.

352. General FRANK. You didn't know about them?

Mr. ROHL. Never seen one.

353. General FRANK. Have you anything to ask him?

354. Major CLAUSEN. Oh, yes, sir.

Sir, when you got to Honolulu you inspected various defense installations that you had previously discussed with Colonel Wyman; is that correct?

Mr. ROHL. No, I had not previously—I want to correct that. No, I had not previously discussed them with Colonel Wyman.

355. Major CLAUSEN. Well, Mr. Rohl, here on page 34 are just, it looks like, about fifteen or twenty telephone calls between yourself and Colonel Wyman.

Mr. ROHL. May I, please—may I have them and the dates, and then I can probably answer you better.

356. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, surely.

Mr. ROHL. I mean let's make it as short and correct as we can.

(A document was handed to the witness.)

Mr. ROHL. Of course, the calls before October the 1st—

357. Major CLAUSEN. What year?

[2269] Mr. ROHL. —1941, were social calls.

358. Major CLAUSEN. Well, those before October 1st were socials?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

359. Major CLAUSEN. There is one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight: eight calls, interocean telephone calls, between Los Angeles and Hawaii, you say were social calls?

Mr. ROHL. In a year?

360. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon.

Mr. ROHL. In one year?

361. Major CLAUSEN. Social? What kind of social? About defense installations?

Mr. ROHL. No.

362. Major CLAUSEN. What kind of social calls were they? What did you say to him in these calls?

Mr. ROHL. Asked him how he was feeling; how he was getting along.

363. General FRANK. Who paid for those calls?

Mr. ROHL. I did.

364. Major CLAUSEN. Did you charge those to the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. ROHL. No; I was not charging anything to the Hawaiian Constructors.

365. Major CLAUSEN. Well, did the Hawaiian Constructors charge the Government for them?

Mr. ROHL. Of course not. How could they? I didn't even charge the Hawaiian Constructors?

366. Major CLAUSEN. Well, now you want this Board to understand your testimony to be that in these telephone calls the only things you discussed were those matters you just now mentioned, and that is your positive testimony?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

[2270] 367. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

Mr. ROHL. How could I, because I didn't know anything else?

368. Major CLAUSEN. Do you want to take a recess?

General GRUNERT. Yes; if you are not near to the point of completion, we shall take a recess for about ten minutes.

(There was a brief informal recess.)

370. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Rohl, in view of the fact that you got this letter from Colonel Wyman in January 1941 and didn't answer it—didn't answer it by phone or letter—what did Colonel Wyman do about not getting an answer? Just nothing?

Mr. ROHL. I believe I told you that I told Paul Grafe shortly after that.

371. Major CLAUSEN. I see.

372. General FRANK. That is not answering the question.

Mr. ROHL. What did Colonel Wyman do?

373. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Was Colonel Wyman the kind of a man that would issue an order to you, "Proceed to Honolulu at your earliest convenience," and was he the kind of a man that, if you didn't go, he would just wait until you came, sometime maybe in October?

Mr. ROHL. No, he was not that kind of a man at all.

374. Major CLAUSEN. What is that?

Mr. ROHL. He was not that kind of a man at all.

375. Major CLAUSEN. Well, that is why I ask, what did he do when you didn't go, Mr. Rohl?

Mr. ROHL. I told him it took me some time to clean up my business.

376. Major CLAUSEN. You told him that?

[2271] Mr. ROHL. Yes.

377. Major CLAUSEN. On the phone?

Mr. ROHL. I believe I did.

378. Major CLAUSEN. How soon after you get the letter did you tell him that?

Mr. ROHL. That I don't know.

379. Major CLAUSEN. What is that?

Mr. ROHL. I don't know.

380. Major CLAUSEN. Well, and then what did you tell Paul Grafe?

Mr. ROHL. I told Paul Grafe that, to explain my status to Colonel Wyman, that I couldn't go.

381. Major CLAUSEN. Because you were an alien?

Mr. ROHL. That is right.

382. Major CLAUSEN. And when did you tell him that, bearing in mind that here you had an order, as you now concede, from a man who demanded action?

I say, when?

Mr. ROHL. You mean when and to whom?

383. Major CLAUSEN. I say, bearing in mind this order that you got from Colonel Wyman to go over there, his desire expressed that you go there at once, and he being the type of man that you say he was, and you having not the ability to comply with the order because of your alien status, does that refresh your memory as to how soon after you got the letter that you told Grafe to give him the information?

Mr. ROHL. No, but you—I believe you have Grafe here today.

384. Major CLAUSEN. You know that, do you?

[2272] Mr. ROHL. No; I don't know that. I mean he is waiting for your call, and he should have his travel dates between Honolulu and the mainland.

385. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, you showed familiarity with this House Committee—

386. General FRANK. He still does not answer your question.

387. Major CLAUSEN. I know that, sir.

Have you anything further to say on that subject?

Mr. ROHL. General, I can't give you specific date because I haven't got it. I could get it for you.

388. General FRANK. He didn't ask you for a date.

When you ask a question, get an answer to the question you ask; don't let him dodge it.

389. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Answer the question.

390. General FRANK. Well, repeat the question.

391. Major CLAUSEN. Bearing in mind the kind of a man that Colonel Wyman was, the fact that he had expressed a desire that you go to Honolulu at your earliest convenience to consult with him to accomplish the purpose of the contract, and you say that you told Grafe the status of your alienage which prohibited you—

Mr. ROHL. Well, Grafe already knew it.

392. Major CLAUSEN. What is that, sir?

Mr. ROHL. Grafe knew it.

393. General FRANK. What did Wyman do?

Mr. ROHL. What did Wyman do?

394. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. ROHL. Wyman didn't do anything.

[2273] 395. General FRANK. He was the kind——

Mr. ROHL. I mentioned to you—what did I tell Wyman?

396. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. ROHL. It's there a few minutes ago (indicating). I told Wyman that it took me—it took me several months to clean up my business on the mainland so I could devote all of my time to the work on the Islands, which is the truth. In other words, you can't—I made no preparations. I was—never intended—I never intended—it was never contemplated that I would take charge of the work in the Islands, and you can't——

397. General FRANK. Wyman never came back at you and asked you anything more about it?

Mr. ROHL. Well, he wrote another letter, not to me. He wrote a letter to General Hannum, I have heard since.

398. General FRANK. Go ahead.

399. Major CLAUSEN. In which he said what?

Mr. ROHL. To expedite my citizenship.

400. Major CLAUSEN. Precisely. And so when he wrote the letter to expedite your citizenship,——

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

401. Major CLAUSEN. —to get you to go to Honolulu, do you want the Board to believe that you said nothing to him about the citizenship?

Mr. ROHL. Major, I told you now that Paul Grafe told Wyman—if he hadn't told him before, which I don't know—but by this letter and the second letter that Colonel Wyman wrote to General Hannum, we know that Colonel Wyman at that time knew from Paul Grafe that I was an alien.

402. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

[2274] 403. General FRANK. Why didn't you come right out and tell Wyman before this that you were an alien? Were you ashamed of it?

Mr. ROHL. Somewhat.

404. General FRANK. You were ashamed of being a German?

Mr. ROHL. No.

405. General FRANK. Well, what were you ashamed of?

Mr. ROHL. I was ashamed of my negligence, living here that long without becoming a citizen.

406. General FRANK. How much communication did you have with people in Germany in the meantime?

Mr. ROHL. None.

407. Major CLAUSEN. Haven't you a relative that is in the Hamburg-American Line?

Mr. ROHL. No.

408. General FRANK. You mean to say that you had no communication between Germany in 1916?

Mr. ROHL. Oh, yes. I had three sisters in Germany, or have; I don't know which.

409. General FRANK. Go ahead.

410. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, let us get down to the contract and the work that was to be performed under it.

411. General FRANK. Let me ask him one question on this contract: What were the delays and the things delayed that you were to remedy by going over there?

Mr. ROHL. I don't know.

412. Major CLAUSEN. Something had happened, hadn't it? Paul Grafe you said was fighting with somebody else, and things were in a turmoil?

[2275] 413. General FRANK. Let me finish this.

414. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROHL. No, I didn't say that Paul Grafe was fighting with someone.

415. General FRANK. Well, now, just a minute. Just answer my questions now.

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

416. General FRANK. You stated that you went over there to speed up the work?

Mr. ROHL. Right.

417. General FRANK. That Wyman was not satisfied with the tempo at which it was being conducted?

Mr. ROHL. That is right.

418. General FRANK. All right. Now, what were the delays and the things delayed that you were supposed to remedy?

Mr. ROHL. Change organization. Wyman was not satisfied with our project manager.

419. General FRANK. Who was he?

Mr. ROHL. Ashlock, A-s-h-l-o-c-k, I believe.

420. General FRANK. And what else did you do then?

Mr. ROHL. What did I do?

421. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. ROHL. When I arrived over there?

422. General FRANK. I would like to know—

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.

423. General FRANK. —what were the delays and the things delayed.

Mr. ROHL. There weren't any delays or things delayed.

424. General FRANK. Well, then why was it necessary for you [2276] to go over there to speed up the work?

Mr. ROHL. General, Wyman wanted it done faster than we were doing it.

425. General FRANK. Well, then there was something delayed that was not satisfactory to Wyman?

Mr. ROHL. Well, there wasn't anything satisfactory to Colonel Wyman at that time. He just wanted it done fast.

426. General FRANK. Well, what did he want done faster?

Mr. ROHL. Runways.

427. General FRANK. What date was this that he wanted the runways done faster?

Mr. ROHL. I arrived on September the 25th, I believe, or the 26th, of 1941.

428. General FRANK. Yes. What runways were they building at that time?

Mr. ROHL. They were building Bellows.

429. General FRANK. September 20, 1941?

Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir, because Bellows was ready for landing on December the 7th, and a B-17 did land.

430. General FRANK. They didn't have much money for fixing up Bellows on September 20th?

Mr. ROHL. No, but Hawaiian Constructors furnished the money.

431. General FRANK. Out of their own pocket?

Mr. ROHL. That is right.

432. General FRANK. What else was done? What else that was delayed did you take steps to expedite?

Mr. ROHL. What I did, I came back here and shipped over a lot of equipment, including equipment for the alternate ferry [2277] command.

433. General FRANK. Alternate what?

Mr. ROHL. Alternate ferry command.

434. General FRANK. Alternate ferry command.

Mr. ROHL. Now, some of that equipment for Christmas and Canton Island left here in November, I believe November 18th, on the Ludington, was in preparation or process of unloading at Christmas on the morning of December the 7th and returned to Los Angeles. The only way to speed up work at that time was to ship in more equipment, General, and that is what I did.

435. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, Mr. Rohl, before you went to Hawaii you shipped over this equipment for this alternate ferry route?

Mr. ROHL. No, sir.

436. General FRANK. Before he went to Hawaii the second time, he did this.

Mr. ROHL. After I returned—

437. Major CLAUSEN. Well, before—

Mr. ROHL. No. This we must get straight: after I returned from Hawaii I purchased and took some of Rohl-Connolly Company equipment and shipped over to Hawaii, and personnel.

438. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you remember that after the basic contract was signed in December 1940, that there had been supplements to that from time to time, don't you?

Mr. ROHL. I knew that when I arrived in Honolulu.

439. Major CLAUSEN. You mean that none of those supplements came into your office?

Mr. ROHL. Nothing ever came into my office.

440. Major CLAUSEN. Until you got to Honolulu?

[2278] Mr. ROHL. I haven't seen the contract yet.

441. Major CLAUSEN. Well, did you know that the contract had been changed in various ways between December to the time that you got in Honolulu?

Mr. ROHL. The contract had been changed?

442. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, increased in scope, work.

Mr. ROHL. Oh, supplements?

443. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. ROHL. You mean supplements were issued to the contract?

444. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. ROHL. Yes, I found that out after I got over there.

445. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you mean that you didn't know about that before you got over there?

Mr. ROHL. No.

446. Major CLAUSEN. You didn't know that the fee had been increased many times, and the amount of the cost of the work had been increased?

Mr. ROHL. No.

447. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon?

Mr. ROHL. No.

448. Major CLAUSEN. Well, about this alternate air route, when you got over there you were then informed and for the first time you had unfolded to yourself the scope of the work that your firm was doing there?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

449. Major CLAUSEN. What is that?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

450. Major CLAUSEN. It could have been \$500,000,000 or \$500; you didn't know that? What is that?

[2279] Mr. ROHL. No.

451. Major CLAUSEN. What about the statement in this House Military Affairs Committee report about delays in the construction of these defense projects, as to the accuracy? Page 39, there are various itemizations of dates when the work was to be started and dates when they were to be completed. Do you know?

Mr. ROHL. Major, I have no information on that, but Mr. Grafe was over there at that time.

452. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. ROHL. And I am sure that he can give you the proper answers.

453. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, but you told General Frank about going over there to speed up things.

Mr. ROHL. That is right.

454. Major CLAUSEN. Well, when you got over there in September 1941 did you inquire into why these job orders had not proceeded with the speed that they were supposed to, to be completed in time?

Mr. ROHL. It was lack of material, lack of men. Equipment was arriving slow, beyond our control.

455. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you found out that there were delays, didn't you, Mr. Rohl, when you arrived?

Mr. ROHL. Oh, yes.

456. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, a statement has been made here about your background. Where were you during the First World War?

Mr. ROHL. I was in California.

457. Major CLAUSEN. What is that?

[2280] Mr. ROHL. In California.

458. Major CLAUSEN. Remember, you were working up in the Bear River, south bank of the Bear River, at the time?

Mr. ROHL. That's a long time ago.

459. Major CLAUSEN. What is that?

Mr. ROHL. South bank of the Bear River?

460. Major CLAUSEN. Near Sacramento.

Mr. ROHL. I was working near Sacramento on flood-control work.
461. Major CLAUSEN. 1917, thereabouts?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

462. Major CLAUSEN. Is it true about that time that you went to Mexico?

Mr. ROHL. No.

463. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon.

Mr. ROHL. No.

464. Major CLAUSEN. Well, did you in 1917, 1918, or 1919 go to Mexico?

Mr. ROHL. No.

465. Major CLAUSEN. Now, when you got to Honolulu you made a survey of these various defense projects, didn't you, with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. ROHL. And Mr. Grafe.

466. Major CLAUSEN. And then, as I understand it, you returned to the mainland?

Mr. ROHL. That is right.

467. Major CLAUSEN. And then you went back again?

Mr. ROHL. That is right.

468. Major CLAUSEN. And this time you stayed how long?

[2281] Mr. ROHL. I stayed until—I stayed from the forepart of December when I arrived until the latter part of April.

469. Major CLAUSEN. 1942?

Mr. ROHL. 1942, when Colonel Lyman—not Wyman—Colonel Lyman, at that time Colonel Lyman, allowed me ten days on the mainland.

470. Major CLAUSEN. Can you give us specific dates, Mr. Rohl?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

471. Major CLAUSEN. Let me see. You can refer to a paper. Just go ahead.

Mr. ROHL. I haven't it with me.

472. Major CLAUSEN. What is that?

Mr. ROHL. I haven't got it with me.

473. Major CLAUSEN. Well, tell the General dates that you were in Honolulu.

474. General FRANK. About?

Mr. ROHL. I have it down in the office—I have it down in the hotel. I can send it up here this afternoon when I get through, if you wish.

475. Major CLAUSEN. Can you give approximate dates now?

Mr. ROHL. I can give you approximate dates. These are to the best of my knowledge, but I have them in writing: I left Los Angeles on a clipper on or about September the 25th. September the 25th. I returned to Los Angeles about October the 10th to employ personnel and purchase equipment and—

476. General RUSSELL. That is all right. When did you go back?

Mr. ROHL. I went back—this time I was ordered by General Hannum to take the steamer Lurline on November the 28th. Then I stayed until—

[2282] 477. General RUSSELL. April?

Mr. ROHL. April.

478. General RUSSELL. That is all right. That is what I want. Mr. Rohl. I came back for ten days.

479. General FRANK. In April?

Mr. ROHL. In—promising Colonel Lyman that I would not stay over ten days. I couldn't get priorities to fly back. In the meantime Colonel Mollison was in the South Pacific, so I took a convoy, and about an hour after I was aboard the convoy my priority came in to fly back.

480. Major CLAUSEN. Now, after you—what is that? Did you finish?

481. General RUSSELL. That is all I want to know.

Mr. ROHL. Well, you want subsequent?

482. General RUSSELL. I don't. The others might.

483. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. So far as I am concerned, I just want to ask him one question here, or two.

Let me ask you this, Mr. Rohl: When you finally came back from Hawaii the last time permanently, so far as the Hawaiian Constructors were concerned, you continued then your relations with Colonel Wyman by a meeting with him, and then you went up to Edmonton, Canada, on the Canol project, didn't you?

Mr. ROHL. No.

484. Major CLAUSEN. You mean you never went to Canada on that project?

Mr. ROHL. On the Canol project, no, sir.

485. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you sent your equipment up there, didn't you?

Mr. ROHL. No, sir.

[2283] 486 Major CLAUSEN. You mean no equipment of the Rohl-Connolly Company went up there?

Mr. ROHL. On the Canol project, no, sir, never.

487. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have any interest at all in any contracts being performed in Canada?

Mr. ROHL. Foley Brothers and Rohl-Connolly had the military road called the Haynes Cutoff, from Haynes to Champaigne.

488. Major CLAUSEN. Well, in connection with that you had talks with Colonel Wyman, did you not, about your participation in that?

Mr. ROHL. No. Colonel Wyman called Mr. Connolly from Edmonton on the telephone and asked him or both of us to come up to Edmonton along with numerous other contractors.

489. Major CLAUSEN. Well, did you go to Edmonton?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

490. Major CLAUSEN. All right. That is all I have.

491. General FRANK. I haven't anything.

492. General RUSSELL. How long have you known Bruce Pine?

Mr. ROHL. Not at all.

493. General RUSSELL. Have you ever had any relations with him of any sort?

Mr. ROHL. No, sir.

494. General RUSSELL. Either directly or indirectly?

Mr. ROHL. Since his story in there I checked up, and as near as I can find out I was—attended one party with about 75 or between 75 and 100 people, where I might have met Bruce Pine.

495. General RUSSELL. But there have never been any relations [2284] Between you and Bruce Pine which would lead to any feeling on your part toward him or any feeling on his part toward you?

Mr. ROHL. General, I didn't know the man when he was sitting at the table in that Tenney hearing.

496. General RUSSELL. That is all that I have.

497. General FRANK. I haven't anything.

498. General RUSSELL. Did you know Mr. Walter Horne of Los Angeles, an insurance and real estate man of that city?

Mr. ROHL. Of Long Beach, yes.

499. General RUSSELL. How long have you known Mr. Horne? A number of years?

Mr. ROHL. Now wait a minute. May I explain? Mr. Horne had a boat and used to sail, and I met him on sailing trips or races, but I haven't seen—in about 1928, '29, or thereabouts; I don't believe I have seen Mr. Horne for ten or twelve years.

500. General RUSSELL. Did you ever have any business dealings with him, Mr. Rohl?

Mr. ROHL. No.

501. General RUSSELL. You have had no social contacts with him since 1928-1929?

Mr. ROHL. No, sir.

502. General RUSSELL. At any time during your acquaintanceship with Mr. Horne, and whatever relationship may have existed, did anything develop which might cause Mr. Horne to have any enmity toward you or any feeling against you that you know of?

Mr. ROHL. No; I don't see why.

503. General RUSSELL. Do you have any feeling toward him in any way?

Mr. ROHL. No.

[2285] 504. General RUSSELL. Your feeling toward him is perfectly cordial, so far as any exists?

Mr. ROHL. Oh, yes.

505. General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

506. General GRUNERT. Any more questions?

507. Major CLAUSEN. Just a general question here: Did your firm or yourself ever do any work in Japan or any Japanese-controlled territory?

Mr. ROHL. No, sir.

508. Major CLAUSEN. Where were you at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack?

Mr. ROHL. At the Pearl Harbor attack I was at home.

509. Major CLAUSEN. In?

Mr. ROHL. On Diamond Head Road. We had a—Mrs. Rohl and I were at home.

510. General FRANK. I didn't get that.

Mr. ROHL. Mrs. Rohl and I were at home.

Now, General, I believe I said so; I might say a question was asked here, Where was Colonel Wyman the night of December the 6th, whether he was at my house. I read in there [indicating] that he was at my house drunk. It's false. Colonel Wyman, Colonel Claterbos, and Colonel Robinson and their wives came over Friday after dinner to our house, Friday, December the 5th, stayed for about two hours. The reason was that Colonel Claterbos had arrived in Honolulu on a mission to the Red Sea, I believe, and I didn't see Colonel Wyman from Friday evening on till Sunday morning when the alarm went out for Hawaiian Constructors to report at Kewalo Basin.

Now, Colonel Claterbos was procurement officer in Honolulu after that time.

[2286] 511. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

512. General GRUNERT. Colonel Toulmin?

513. Colonel TOULMIN. No, sir; none.

514. General GRUNERT. Mr. Rohl, have you anything more to tell the Board, anything that you think of that might be of assistance to the Board in getting at facts, that you want to tell the Board of your own volition? Because this is the opportunity to do it.

Mr. ROHL. General, I would say this: the facts are not very hard to get. Facts are facts. I mean you can't ever change the facts. Stories are stories, and I believe that you will get more facts from your own officers than you will from a lot of gossipers.

515. General GRUNERT. That is not much assistance to the Board because I think the Board understands that of their own accord. Now, have you anything that you can add in the line of testimony, as facts that you think would be of value to the Board?

Mr. ROHL. I can say this: that during Colonel Wyman's regime the work was done.

516. General GRUNERT. The work was what?

Mr. ROHL. Was done, performed. And it slowed down after that due to the fact that as soon as Colonel Wyman was transferred Colonel Lyman, who unfortunately died, called me in and outlined his program to me and asked me if I would cooperate with him and slowly by stages transfer the Hawaiian Constructors personnel; and his intention was, as much as possible, to form a construction regiment, and the Army absorbing the Hawaiian Constructors personnel in easy stages, which we did during [2287] Colonel Lyman's lifetime.

517. General GRUNERT. There appears to be nothing else. We appreciate your coming in.

Mr. ROHL. Thank you, General.

518. General GRUNERT. We shall go to other business until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 11:30 a. m., the Board recessed until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[2288]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

TESTIMONY OF PAUL GRAFE, 21 CHESTER PLACE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Grafe, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. GRAFE. Paul Grafe, 21 Chester Place, Los Angeles.

2. Colonel WEST. And what is your occupation, Mr. Grafe?

Mr. GRAFE. Contractor.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Grafe, General Frank assisted by Major Clausen will develop this particular phase for which we asked you to come as a witness.

4. General FRANK. Mr. Grafe, you are a contractor in your own name or associated with someone?

Mr. GRAFE. No. I am president of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company.

5. General FRANK. How long have you held that position?

Mr. GRAFE. Two years.

6. General FRANK. Two years?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes.

7. General FRANK. What position did you have in December of 1940?

Mr. GRAFE. I was vice president of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company.

8. General FRANK. Who was president?

Mr. GRAFE. W. E. Callahan.

9. General FRANK. Do you remember a project in which the [2289] Callahan Company, Gunther & Shirley, and Rohl & Connolly were engaged, in Colorado, about that time?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

10. General FRANK. What was that?

Mr. GRAFE. John Martin dam.

11. General FRANK. John Martin dam. The three firms were associated as co-adventurers in that project, were they?

Mr. GRAFE. That is correct.

12. General FRANK. Do you remember the contract for defense work in the Hawaiian Islands that was considered in December of 1940?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

13. General FRANK. You remember that?

Mr. GRAFE. I do.

14. General FRANK. What was your first contact with that?

Mr. GRAFE. In November 1940 Colonel Wyman called me or I called him about that work that I understood was coming up in Hawaii; and if he called me I said I was interested, and if I called him I told him I was interested in the work, and he said that there was some work coming up, and I sent two representatives over there to look at—to look over the work.

15. General FRANK. Who were they?

Mr. GRAFE. DeWitt Clinton Wolfe and S. E. McCullough.

16. General FRANK. In what capacity did you do that?

Mr. GRAFE. As vice president of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company.

17. General FRANK. You were interested in it from the point of view of the Callahan Construction Company alone?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

[2290] 18. General Frank. Or—

Mr. GRAFE. Alone.

19. General FRANK. You were not concerned with these other two firms with which you were associated in Colorado at that time?

Mr. GRAFE. No.

20. General FRANK. You were interested in it solely as a Callahan project?

Mr. GRAFE. That is correct.

21. General FRANK. When the thing began to crystallize, when did you hear from Colonel Wyman to the effect that he was interested in having you participate in it?

Mr. GRAFE. Well, as a guess, I think in November 1940.

22. General FRANK. Do you remember when he came from Honolulu to San Francisco?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

23. General FRANK. On the journey in which he was trying to get that contract approved in Washington?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

24. General FRANK. How were you notified at that time?

Mr. GRAFE. By wire or telephone; I am not sure which.

25. General FRANK. Where were you?

Mr. GRAFE. In Los Angeles.

26. General FRANK. Did they request you to do something?

Mr. GRAFE. To meet Colonel Wyman in San Francisco.

27. General FRANK. In what capacity?

Mr. GRAFE. As vice president of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company.

28. General FRANK. At that time were the other two firms [2291] concerned in this?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

29. General FRANK. They were not?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

30. General FRANK. What happened when you met Colonel Wyman in San Francisco?

Mr. GRAFE. We went to—I think we met in Colonel Hannum's office, the Division Engineer's office.

31. General FRANK. And then what developed?

Mr. GRAFE. Colonel Wyman stated that I had had some representatives over on the job, they hadn't yet returned, and that he had this work to do and he wanted us to do it, the W. E. Callahan Company, and he said that we were willing to do it.

32. General FRANK. He told that to?

Mr. GRAFE. To Colonel Hannum.

33. General FRANK. Yes?

Mr. GRAFE. Colonel Hannum asked me if that was true, and I said it was. Then Colonel Hannum asked him if he had talked to any other contractors. Colonel Wyman said he had not. Colonel Hannum told him that in accordance with the regulations for and incident to the wording of a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract he must talk to at least three other contractors. He quoted the regulations, and he said it would be necessary—

34. General FRANK. Who quoted those?

Mr. GRAFE. Colonel Hannum.

35. General FRANK. Yes?

Mr. GRAFE. He said it would be necessary for him to talk to other contractors; and then they, the two of them, discussed [2292] other contractors that might possibly be interested, and I was excused. I don't know what else was said.

36. General FRANK. Were you advised of any conclusions that they reached?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes.

37. General FRANK. What?

Mr. GRAFE. They were going to—Colonel Wyman was to go to Los Angeles to meet some contractors down there and discuss this project with them.

38. General FRANK. Do you remember what contractors?

Mr. GRAFE. No, I don't. I was told today what they were, but that's all I heard.

39. General FRANK. You didn't know then?

Mr. GRAFE. I didn't know then, no.

40. General FRANK. When did you leave San Francisco to go to Washington?

Mr. GRAFE. Well, in a short—in a few days. I first went to Los Angeles and stayed there, as I remember it, a day or two, maybe three or four, and then I was to go to Washington to meet Colonel Wyman.

41. General FRANK. You didn't go to Washington with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. GRAFE. No.

42. General FRANK. You met him where?

Mr. GRAFE. In Washington, at the Carlton Hotel.

43. General FRANK. When did the other two firms that originally constituted the Hawaiian Constructors come into the picture?

Mr. GRAFE. In the conference at Washington.

44. General FRANK. In the conference at Washington. You [2293] didn't know who those other two firms were until you arrived in Washington?

Mr. GRAFE. Well, I knew they were being considered.

45. General FRANK. Who was being considered?

Mr. GRAFE. I thought that the W. E. Callahan—that the Atkinson was being considered, Gunther & Shirley was being considered, and Rohl-Connolly was being considered. Of course, Gunther & Shirley are people that we worked with all the time; I more or less took that for granted.

46. General FRANK. What about Rohl and Connolly?

Mr. GRAFE. Well, I knew that they were being considered, but we hadn't—I hadn't agreed to take them in. Or Atkinson; I thought he was being considered too. I talked to Mr. Callahan about the matter as to whether or not we should take in any more associates or not. It was his opinion, and in which I concurred, that it might be a good idea. Although the contract was not so very much at the time, it looked like it might grow larger, and then in discussing the contract with me Colonel Wyman had insisted that we purchase new equipment, which meant—on rough estimate—it meant between five and six hundred thousand dollars worth of equipment, so he thought we were sticking our neck out a little in buying that much equipment for such a small amount of work.

47. General FRANK. Did you have equipment belonging to the Callahan firm to start work on the contract originally?

Mr. GRAFE. Oh, yes.

48. General FRANK. Now,—

Mr. GRAFE. We didn't—I want to be sure that I understand your question. You mean did we own equipment that could have [2294] been used on that?

49. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. GRAFE. Yes.

50. General FRANK. That is what I meant. Now, did you have arrangements for a meeting in Washington before you left Los Angeles?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes.

51. General FRANK. With whom?

Mr. GRAFE. With Colonel Wyman.

52. General FRANK. And who else?

Mr. GRAFE. I didn't know of anybody else.

53. General FRANK. Did you communicate with anybody else prior to leaving Los Angeles that you would meet in Washington?

Mr. GRAFE. I don't think so.

54. General FRANK. Where did you stay in Washington?

Mr. GRAFE. At the Carlton Hotel.

55. General FRANK. You made reservations, or did you get a room after you got there?

Mr. GRAFE. No; I made reservations.

56. General FRANK. Did you occupy the room for the full time of the reservation?

Mr. GRAFE. I think so.

57. General FRANK. Did you stay there alone?

Mr. GRAFE. No.

58. General FRANK. With whom did you stay?

Mr. GRAFE. When I arrived Colonel Wyman and Tom Connolly were in the room, and then when I arrived Colonel Wyman got another room and Tom Connolly stayed with me.

59. General FRANK. Now, when did you learn about the details [2295] of the contract?

Mr. GRAFE. You mean as to what the work consisted of?

60. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. GRAFE. At this conference, in part, and some about it in San Francisco.

61. General FRANK. And the two men that you sent to Honolulu, they learned something about it, didn't they?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, but their information was rather sketchy.

62. General FRANK. All right. After you got to Washington where was the conference held at which you learned about the details of the contract?

Mr. GRAFE. By that you mean the terms of the—I saw the contract the first time in the Chief's office.

63. General FRANK. I beg pardon.

Mr. GRAFE. In the Chief's office.

64. General FRANK. What Chief?

Mr. GRAFE. Chief of Engineers.

65. General FRANK. The contract already had been drawn up?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes.

66. General FRANK. The first time you saw it?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes.

67. General FRANK. Were the names of the firms on it that were going to be the co-adventurers?

Mr. GRAFE. No.

68. General FRANK. Well, how did the co-adventurers get associated?

Mr. GRAFE. Well, Colonel Wyman stated that he wanted Rohl and Connolly in it, and Gunther & Shirley, together with us.

[2296] 69. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. GRAFE. And I agreed.

70. General FRANK. Where was this stated?

Mr. GRAFE. I don't remember. You mean at what exact place?

71. General FRANK. Well, was it in this conference in the office of the Chief of Engineers?

Mr. GRAFE. I am not sure about that.

72. General FRANK. Well, you must have some memory of where you first learned about your associates.

Mr. GRAFE. Well, of course, General Frank, I knew that there was something about associates when I saw Tom Connolly in that room.

73. General FRANK. Yes?

Mr. GRAFE. Now, just when it was first broached, I don't know.

74. General FRANK. Well, just give me from your memory how this thing developed. That is what I am trying to work out of you.

Mr. GRAFE. Well, as I said before when I saw Tom Connolly in that room why I knew that he must have been up there interested in that contract.

75. General FRANK. Who represented Gunther & Shirley?

Mr. GRAFE. I did.

76. General FRANK. Well, how did you come to represent them if you didn't know they were going to be in it?

Mr. GRAFE. Well, I tried to explain that in doing this, after going to San Francisco, after meeting in San Francisco, Mr. Shirley and I had agreed that it would be all right for him [2297] to participate with us, and I talked to Mr. Callahan on the phone about it too.

77. General FRANK. Well, I asked you a minute ago when you first knew about who your associates were going to be, and you told me that the first that you knew anything about it was in the Chief's office in Washington, and now you tell me you went into Washington as a representative of the Gunther-Shirley Company.

Mr. GRAFE. Well, of course we—I look upon the Gunther-Shirley Company as our partners and part of our outfit at times, and that picture just gradually grew.

78. General FRANK. Well, then, when I asked you about this, why didn't you tell me that you assumed that the Gunther-Shirley Company were going to be associated with you?

Mr. GRAFE. I intended to do that earlier in this questioning. I thought I did that when I told you that we were very closely associated.

79. General GRUNERT. May I ask a question there?

80. General FRANK. Yes.

81. General GRUNERT. If you had talked to Callahan prior to going to Washington on this, then why the surprise seeing him in the hotel?

Mr. GRAFE. Well, I wasn't surprised.

82. General GRUNERT. Well, I thought you told us you were surprised.

Mr. GRAFE. No. I knew that he was interested. It was my thought that we would either—that we would be asked to take in Atkinson or Rohl and Connolly.

83. General GRUNERT. I mean Connolly, not Callahan. Who was [2298] associated with Rohl here?

84. Major CLAUSEN. Connolly, sir.

85. General GRUNERT. Didn't you tell me you were surprised to see Connolly in the hotel in Washington?

Mr. GRAFE. No, I didn't mean to say that I was exactly surprised. I knew that he was interested in that contract when I did see him there. I don't believe that I knew he was——

86. General RUSSELL. He didn't express surprise. He expressed information when he saw Connolly present, that he knew he was there about the contract.

Mr. GRAFE. Sir?

87. General RUSSELL. You said when you saw Connolly you knew he was there about the contract.

88. General FRANK. Now, how was the decision made as to who were going to be the co-adventurers?

Mr. GRAFE. Colonel Wyman told me who they were going to be and asked me if that was O. K., and I said yes.

89. General FRANK. How many days were you in Washington before this contract was signed?

Mr. GRAFE. I can't answer that exactly.

90. General FRANK. About how many days?

Mr. GRAFE. I would say——

91. General FRANK. Two days, a week, or what?

Mr. GRAFE. Oh, no. A week.

92. General FRANK. About a week?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes.

93. General FRANK. You went there; did you have a power of attorney from the Gunther-Shirley Company?

Mr. GRAFE. No.

[2299] 94. General FRANK. Who signed the contract as binding the Gunther & Shirley Company?

Mr. GRAFE. I did.

95. General FRANK. What authority did you have to sign it?

Mr. GRAFE. Authority from a telephone conversation.

96. General FRANK. Is that legally binding, telephone conversation?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

97. General FRANK. Well, what legal authority did you have to sign it?

Mr. GRAFE. I didn't have any except that Major Newman—I told Major Newman that I would have these powers of attorneys in before this contract was approved or signed by the Government. He said that would be satisfactory.

98. General FRANK. Now, Mr. Connolly was there, and Mr. Connolly signed it for the Connolly-Rohl Company; is that correct?

Mr. GRAFE. No.

99. General FRANK. It is not correct?

Mr. GRAFE. No.

100. General FRANK. Well, who signed it for the Connolly-Rohl Company?

Mr. GRAFE. I did.

101. General FRANK. Well, how did you get authority to do that?

Mr. GRAFE. Verbal.

102. General FRANK. On the same basis as that on which you signed it for the Gunther-Shirley Company; is that correct?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, verbal authority.

103. General FRANK. Now, this was on or about the 20th of [2300] December, 1940, wasn't it?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

104. General FRANK. And you were the representative for this group of co-adventurers including Rohl and Connolly, Gunther & Shirely, and the Callahan Company?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

105. General FRANK. Was there any question about the participation of any one of those firms?

Mr. GRAFE. In what way exactly?

106. General FRANK. In any way.

Mr. GRAFE. I don't think so.

107. General FRANK. It was perfectly clear and in the open, straightforward, that all three of them could participate just as they were in the organization that existed at that time?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

108. General FRANK. No change was made?

Mr. GRAFE. I don't know of any. I don't know what changes were made.

109. General FRANK. Who was president of the Callahan Company? Mr. Callahan at that time?

Mr. GRAFE. That is right.

110. General FRANK. Who was president of the Gunther-Shirley Company?

Mr. GRAFE. Mr. Shirley.

111. General FRANK. Who was president of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. GRAFE. I don't know.

112. General FRANK. Well, who gave you authority to act?

Mr. GRAFE. Tom Connolly.

[2301] 113. General FRANK. How did you know he had authority?

Mr. GRAFE. Well, I assumed that he had it. I didn't have any written evidence that he had it.

114. General FRANK. This was a million-dollar contract?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

115. General FRANK. And had promise of running into several million?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

116. General FRANK. And those firms handled authority and responsibility on that nebulous an authority?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir. That's our habit.

117. General FRANK. What's that?

Mr. GRAFE. That's our habit.

118. General FRANK. Did any question ever come up about the participation of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

119. General FRANK. No question ever came up about it?

Mr. GRAFE. From whom? No, sir.

120. General FRANK. No. That was a defense contract?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

121. General FRANK. Were you conversant with the existence of a law at that time that any firm participating in a defense contract had to have citizens as its officials?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

122. General FRANK. You didn't know that?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

123. General FRANK. You had better take him.

124. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, when you were in Washington on this occasion you talked with Major Newman?

[2302] Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

125. Major CLAUSEN. And did you also discuss the contract with Colonel Gesler?

Mr. GRAFE. Very little with Colonel Gesler.

126. Major CLAUSEN. You talked about the contract with General Robins?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

127. Major CLAUSEN. You talked about the contract with General Schley?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir. Very little with those three gentlemen.

128. Major CLAUSEN. You talked about the contract with John Martin?

Mr. GRAFE. No.

129. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon, sir.

Mr. GRAFE. No.

130. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you met John Martin there, didn't you?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes. In Washington?

131. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

132. Major CLAUSEN. Well, all my questions were directed to Washington.

When you saw John Martin where was he?

Mr. GRAFE. He came up to my room.

133. Major CLAUSEN. In the Carlton Hotel?

Mr. GRAFE. Right.

134. Major CLAUSEN. And you had a discussion with him at that time?

[2303] Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

135. Major CLAUSEN. And what did you talk about?

Mr. GRAFE. About a bid that we had placed for the set of locks at Gatun.

136. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, sometime on this occasion of your visit to Washington you talked with John Martin concerning the alien status of Hans Wilhelm Rohl; correct?

Mr. GRAFE. That is possible.

137. Major CLAUSEN. I didn't ask you whether it was possible. I said, is that correct, sir?

Mr. GRAFE. That is possible.

138. Major CLAUSEN. You mean it is possible it is correct?

Mr. GRAFE. Answering your question, I said it was possible.

139. Major CLAUSEN. You don't wish to go further than that?

Mr. GRAFE. Further about what? I don't understand. You get me confused.

140. Major CLAUSEN. Would you read the question to the witness to which he said "possible"?

The Reporter [reading]:

Question. As a matter of fact, sometime on this occasion of your visit to Washington you talked with John Martin concerning the alien status of Hans Wilhelm Rohl; correct?

Mr. GRAFE. I don't know. I am not sure.

141. Major CLAUSEN. You knew who Mr. John Martin was at the time, didn't you?

Mr. GRAFE. Sure. He was our attorney.

[2304] 142. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. He at that time in Washington on this occasion—whether it was on the day that you first met him or later on—he was informed about the contract and as a matter of fact suggested the terms of the syndicate agreement or the agreement which would represent an understanding of your various interests; isn't that true?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes.

143. Major CLAUSEN. Well, now, by the way, you made an affidavit, Mr. Grafe, to a representative of the House Military Affairs Committee; do you recall that?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir. To which representative?

144. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon, sir.

Mr. GRAFE. What representative?

145. Major CLAUSEN. Well, I have one here. Did you make more than one?

Mr. GRAFE. I don't think so.

146. Major CLAUSEN. Well, then it is whatever representative you made it to.

Mr. GRAFE. Made it to—

147. Major CLAUSEN. I show you a document consisting of seven pages, and I will ask you to read that and see if that is it.

Mr. GRAFE. You want me to read it all?

148. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir. I just want you to look it over from one page to the other page, to see if that is the affidavit that you made on that occasion.

Mr. GRAFE. I don't believe it is.

149. Major CLAUSEN. Do you have a copy of the one that you made?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, I do.

[2305] 150. Major CLAUSEN. Where is that copy?

Mr. GRAFE. Down at the hotel. I say that because I thought I signed this affidavit.

151. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Will you do this for the Board? Will you send the Board out a copy of the copy that you have in your hotel?

Mr. GRAFE. I surely will.

152. Major CLAUSEN. All right, sir.

153. Colonel TOULMIN. Major, may I suggest that this gentleman doesn't have anything except his original copy. He would have to go home in order to send you a copy. Why can't he bring it out here and let the reporter copy it, and then we will be sure to have it right away before you get away?

154. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, he may do that when we finish a few more questions.

In any event, on occasion John Martin discussed with you the citizenship status of Hans Wilhelm Rohl; isn't that true?

Mr. GRAFE. My mind is confused as to just when Bill Rohl's citizenship status was discussed. Now, John Martin tells me that it was when we were in Washington, and possibly that is true. I didn't attach very much importance to that matter, or I wasn't startled until I learned of this law that you are talking about, which was sometime in April, and then I became keenly alive as to the situation then.

155. General FRANK. You didn't know about the law until April?

Mr. GRAFE. No.

156. Major CLAUSEN. Now, Mr. Grafe, you just swore that when you learned that Hans Wilhelm Rohl was an alien you did not attach [2306] much importance to it. I ask if you gave this testimony to Colonel Hunt of the Inspector General's Department, page 560:

Question. I take it that you were somewhat surprised yourself to learn that Mr. Rohl was not a citizen.

Answer. I was very much surprised. Boy, that was a bombshell.

Did you give that testimony?

Mr. GRAFE. I don't remember whether that is the exact wording or not.

157. General FRANK. Well, that is official, so there is no question about that.

158. Major CLAUSEN. You testified before Colonel Hunt: you remember that, Mr. Grafe?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

159. Major CLAUSEN. All right. What did you say to Colonel Wyman in Washington on the subject of the citizenship of Mr. Rohl?

Mr. GRAFE. Nothing.

160. Major CLAUSEN. Whenever you learned, whenever it was, that Mr. Rohl was an alien, it was a bombshell, wasn't it?

Mr. GRAFE. Well, I am not sure, Major Clausen, whether the fact that I learned that he was not a citizen was a bombshell or whether I learned of that law, that it was a bombshell. You must remember that is several years ago.

161. Major CLAUSEN. When you saw John Martin in Washington you discussed with him various things, and you would go to dinner with him?

Mr. GRAFE. No.

[2307] 162. Major CLAUSEN. Were you in his company for several days there?

Mr. GRAFE. No.

163. Major CLAUSEN. How long had you known Colonel Wyman?

Mr. GRAFE. Since '36 or '37.

164. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, you paid for the hotel bill of Colonel Wyman, didn't you, when he occupied rooms at the Carlton Hotel in December 1940?

Mr. GRAFE. No. No; the company paid for the bill. He gave me the money. He left in a big rush and gave me money for the hotel bill, and I had all the bills sent to the company for the company to pay.

165. Major CLAUSEN. To whom did you talk about this case before you came here today?

Mr. GRAFE. I talked to Mr. Shirley.

166. Major CLAUSEN. Whom else?

Mr. GRAFE. Mr. Connolly.

167. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Connolly. Whom else?

Mr. GRAFE. Mr. Rohl.

168. Major CLAUSEN. Whom else?

Mr. GRAFE. Mr. Middleton.

169. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Mr. Martin?

Mr. GRAFE. Mr. Martin.

170. Major CLAUSEN. That is all?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes.

171. Major CLAUSEN. The time to which you just referred as having talked to these people—that was on the occasion of your responding to the order to appear before this Board, wasn't it?

[2308] Mr. GRAFE. Sir?

172. Major CLAUSEN. I say, the talks that you had with these various people were since you got the order to appear before this Board?

Mr. GRAFE. That is a difficult question to ask—or to answer. I don't understand it.

173. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Put it this way: When did you talk to these people about the case the most recent times?

Mr. GRAFE. Today at lunch.

174. Major CLAUSEN. Today at lunch. In other words, you talked to Mr. Connolly after he had testified here; is that correct?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

175. Major CLAUSEN. He told you he had been here and testified, did he?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

176. Major CLAUSEN. Did he tell you what he had said?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

177. Major CLAUSEN. He told you that?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes.

178. Major CLAUSEN. And what did he say that he had said?

Mr. GRAFE. I don't remember all he said.

179. Major CLAUSEN. You can't recall that?

Mr. GRAFE. No.

180. General FRANK. And you learned this at lunchtime?

181. Major CLAUSEN. Today, sir.

By the way, you talked with Mr. Rohl at lunch too? Was he there at lunch with you?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes.

[2309] 182. Major CLAUSEN. He told you he had been here and testified?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

183. Major CLAUSEN. And he talked over with you what he had testified here this morning?

Mr. GRAFE. Some of the things.

184. Major CLAUSEN. Some of the things?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

185. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall, Mr. Grafe, that Colonel Wyman at Washington in December 1940, when he learned that Mr. Martin was there, became, to use your words, "sore"?

Mr. GRAFE. That is true.

186. General FRANK. You seem to remember two and a half years better than you do two hours, Mr. Grafe.

Mr. GRAFE. No, if I had been asked to answer something that happened two and a half hours ago that I couldn't answer,

187. Major CLAUSEN. When, as I understood your testimony, you learned that a contract for some defense projects was to be let in Hawaii—and this was sometime around September 1940; is that correct?

Mr. GRAFE. It is just—Major, let me explain that I explained to Colonel Wyman that Mr. Martin was not there in any capacity in connection with this contract.

188. Major CLAUSEN. That is your conclusion?

Mr. GRAFE. Well, as far as I knew he was there to—representing—asking me whether or not we wanted to protest the award of a contract.

189. Major CLAUSEN. Well, he was also there helping Rohl get citizenship papers, wasn't he?

Mr. GRAFE. That I don't know.

[2310] 190. General FRANK. You don't know that?

Mr. GRAFE. I don't know whether—that he was doing that.

191. General FRANK. Mr. Grafe, about what was the profit you and your associates made on this Hawaiian contract?

Mr. GRAFE. About eight hundred—between eight and nine hundred thousand dollars.

192. General FRANK. Now, when you made this contract Mr. Rohl was a German alien and an official of the Rohl-Connolly Company; that is correct, isn't it?

Mr. GRAFE. It is correct that he was an alien. I don't know that he was an official of the Rohl-Connolly Company. I have been told that there were some changes made then, and just when they were made I don't know.

193. General FRANK. Well, did you take into consideration that this contract might be illegal?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

194. General FRANK. Have you thought about it since?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

195. General FRANK. And have you thought that in such an event the Government, even now, could recover from you and your associates?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir. You say have I thought of that?

196. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

197. Major CLAUSEN. I would like to invite the attention of the Board to the fact that this witness indicated by his testimony that Mr. Connolly and Mr. Rohl have violated the injunction of secrecy with respect to their testimony before the Board. The Recorder warned the two witnesses that they [2311] were not to disclose what went on here, and by this witness it appears that these two men have done so.

Mr. Grafe, you first learned of the contract September 1940, and then, as I understand, you sent two men to Hawaii to review the prospective work?

Mr. GRAFE. That is true.

198. Major CLAUSEN. Now, when they were over there Colonel Wyman showed them around, did he not?

Mr. GRAFE. I don't know about that. He probably took them to some places, and his representatives took them others. I am not sure about that.

199. Major CLAUSEN. And then when he came to the mainland, when Colonel Wyman came to the mainland in December 1940, you met Colonel Wyman in General Hannum's office here in San Francisco; is that correct?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

200. Major CLAUSEN. And then did you go to Los Angeles with Colonel Wyman, or was he from Los Angeles?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

201. Major CLAUSEN. You said something about Colonel Kelton. Did you meet with Colonel Wyman in Colonel Kelton's office?

Mr. GRAFE. I didn't say anything about Colonel Kelton.

202. Major CLAUSEN. When was the next time you saw Colonel Wyman after the San Francisco visit?

Mr. GRAFE. In Washington.

203. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Now, between that time did you see Mr. Rohl and discuss with him the prospective participation of his firm in this contract?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

204. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon.

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

[2312] 205. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Grafe, you did discuss with Colonel Wyman from time to time the citizenship status of Mr. Rohl, did you not?

Mr. GRAFE. I discussed it with him the first time in April 1941.

206. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, you were so interested in the citizenship status that you made a trip to the mainland from Hawaii for the purpose of accelerating the granting of citizenship to Mr. Rohl, isn't that true?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

207. Major CLAUSEN. I am going to read you from a letter which was written to the Secretary of Commerce by an attorney, David A. Cannon. First, let me ask you, do you know Mr. Cannon?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

208. Major CLAUSEN. This is a representation that he made:

Mr. Paul Grafe, Managing Director for the Hawaiian Constructors, recently flew to and is now in the United States, with the knowledge and consent of Colonel Wyman, in an endeavor to clear the way for Rohl's going to the Hawaiian Islands on this work.

Is that a correct statement?

Mr. GRAFE. No.

209. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever, in the Hawaiian Islands, discuss this subject, at all, about accelerating the citizenship of Mr. Rohl, with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

210. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, you signed a letter, yourself, did you not, to Mr. Rohl, on August 15, 1941?

DEAR BILL: After considerable discussion with Ted, it was agreed [2313] that this matter would be handled as follows: I would write the attached letter, and Wyman would write one of a similar nature, which he read to me, to the Chief of Engineers, through the regular channels, attaching a copy of my letter. His letter is going out on the clipper today.

Kind personal regards,
Sincerely,

PAUL GRAFE.

Do you remember writing that?

Mr. GRAFE. I don't remember writing it, but it is possible that I did.

211. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon, sir?

Mr. GRAFE. It is possible that I did.

212. Major CLAUSEN. Would you care to look at it again, to see it with your eyes? [Major Clausen hands the letter to the witness.]

Mr. GRAFE. I don't remember writing it, but it is possible that I did write it. There is nothing there to—

213. Major CLAUSEN. You mean that is not the original letter?

Mr. GRAFE. That's right.

214. Major CLAUSEN. Well, that is a Federal Bureau of Investigation report.

Mr. GRAFE. Well, I am not denying that I wrote the letter.

215. Major CLAUSEN. Well, all right. Now, concerning the subject matter of the letter, just tell the Board what discussion you had had with "Ted," because you say here—

After considerable discussion with Ted.

I assume you referred, there, to Colonel Wyman, isn't that true? [2314]

Mr. GRAFE. That is true.

216. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Tell the Board what "considerable discussion" it was you had with "Ted."

Mr. GRAFE. Colonel Wyman wanted Mr. Rohl to come over to Hawaii and help with this work; so did I; and we knew that he couldn't come over, as he was an alien. We understood that he was applying for citizenship papers and that there was no action being taken on it; so we wanted to request the office of the Chief of Engineers to see that prompt action would be taken on his application for citizenship.

217. Major CLAUSEN. When did you have the first of those discussions with Colonel Wyman in Hawaii, Mr. Grafe?

Mr. GRAFE. I would say, in August.

218. Major CLAUSEN. Didn't you say here today that you had the first discussion with him somewhere around April?

Mr. GRAFE. That was about his citizenship status, but there was no discussion about helping him get his application acted upon.

219. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Tell the Board what discussion you had with Colonel Wyman, in April, concerning Mr. Rohl's citizenship status.

Mr. GRAFE. I told Colonel Wyman that he was an alien, and he seemed surprised to know about it. And then he said, as I remember it, he said, "I think there is an order out, or a circular letter out, about that, from the Chief of Engineers' office, as to the status of an alien on work of this character." It was a form letter; and in a day or two he sent me a copy of that letter, and I sent it on to Frank Martin and asked him [2315] what that law meant as to our status on the contract.

220. Major CLAUSEN. The circular letter to which you refer was one which stated that the employment of aliens on defense projects was forbidden by law, isn't that correct?

Mr. GRAFE. I don't remember what the law said. I can get that, copy of that, if you want me to put it in my testimony.

221. Major CLAUSEN. I wish you would send that to the Board, also. Now, Mr. Grafe, I refer again to this letter from Mr. Cannon to the Secretary of Commerce, dated August 29, 1941, and to the portion which I read a few moments ago. Did you ever fly to the United States and do anything in connection with getting the citizenship of Mr. Rohl accelerated or expedited or granted, or in any way acted upon?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

222. Major CLAUSEN. So, so far as your testimony is concerned, this representation that was made by Mr. Cannon is false, is that correct?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

223. General FRANK. It is? It is false?

224. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; he said, "Yes, sir."

225. General FRANK. This official testimony is false?

226. Major CLAUSEN. That is what he says, sir. He says the representation in the letter, of Mr. Cannon, to the Secretary of Commerce, is a false representation.

Mr. GRAFE. It—well, now, I don't—Let me answer your question in a different way. I do not care to answer that, whether that is true or false. I do not understand your question, exactly. What I say is that I never did anything [2316] except talk to Colonel Wyman and write him a letter about Bill's alien status. That is the only thing I ever did in connection therewith.

227. General FRANK. Mr. Grafe, where were you born?

Mr. GRAFE. In Indiana, Clay City.

228. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Grafe, you finally ascertained, did you not, in connection with all the citizenship business, in Hawaii—I mean, you learned in Hawaii that the reason that this citizenship was being held up was for certain acts of Mr. Rohl, and included among them was the fact that he had falsely documented certain vessels, which would result in a forfeiture of these vessels to the Government?

Mr. GRAFE. No, I didn't know about that.

229. Major CLAUSEN. Well, this letter from Mr. Cannon is a letter which is in effect a petition of the Rohl-Connolly Company for remission or mitigation with respect to asking to pay a fine for these violations of the law; and following the letter, the petition was granted. I tell you that, to show you the seriousness of the falseness of the statement of Mr. Cannon, if it is false.

I will read you again what he says concerning you. By the way, I will say this, that this remission and the payment of the fine preceded the actual citizenship granting; as a condition, in my opinion. Now, paragraph 6:

Mr. Paul Grafe, Managing Director for the Hawaiian Constructors, recently flew to and is now in the United States with the knowledge and consent of Colonel Wyman, in an endeavor to clear the way for Rohl's going to the Hawaiian Islands on this work, and is now at the Caddoa Dam, in Colorado, to assist in making arrangements for [2317] someone to take over the Caddoa project, if Rohl's naturalization affairs are so adjusted to permit Mr. Rohl to proceed with the work in Hawaii. Mr. Grafe must return to the Islands at the very earliest possible date.

Now, taking it piece by piece, did you "recently fly to the United States," with respect to the date of this August 29, 1941 letter?

Mr. GRAFE. Did I fly? That is possible.

230. Major CLAUSEN. Were you in the United States in August, 1941? On August 29, 1941, were you in the United States?

Mr. GRAFE. I would have to consult my records. I spent most of the time that year in Honolulu.

231. Major CLAUSEN. It says:

with the knowledge and consent of Colonel Wyman, in an endeavor to clear the way for Rohl's going to the Hawaiian Islands on this work.

Did you fly here for that purpose?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

232. Major CLAUSEN. Were you at the Caddoa Dam, in Colorado, in August—August 29, 1941?

Mr. GRAFE. I was there in July and August. It seems to me that it was in July—July or August.

233. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, do you know anything about a letter written by General Kingman to the Department of Immigration and Naturalization, requesting the granting of Mr. Rohl's application for citizenship?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

234. Major CLAUSEN. Now, I show you, Mr. Grafe, what appears to be a copy of a letter dated August 15, 1941, from you to [2318] Colonel Wyman, District Engineer, which accompanies this letter that I have already referred to, that you wrote to Mr. Rohl. This is page 15 of the FBI report. I will ask you to look that over and see if you wrote that letter. I say, do you recall having written that letter, sir?

Mr. GRAFE. I assume that I—I know I wrote a letter like that, and I would assume that that is an exact copy of it.

235. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

I have no further questions.

236. General FRANK. I have no further questions.

237. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions, General Russell?

238. General RUSSELL. Yes; two or three.

Mr. Grafe, how long have you been connected with the Callahan Company?

Mr. GRAFE. 22 years.

239. General RUSSELL. You are a member of the Callahan family, are you not, by marriage?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

240. General RUSSELL. You are now the President of the company?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

241. General RUSSELL. Now, Mr. Grafe, I want to know something about that operation out there. Who hired all those people that did the work on Oahu? Where did you get your laborers?

Mr. GRAFE. We had an employment office in Los Angeles and San Francisco.

242. General RUSSELL. Were any Rohl-Connolly supervisors out there with you, in the beginning?

Mr. GRAFE. None.

243. General RUSSELL. What organization did you take out there [2319] with you, as your supervisory organization?

Mr. GRAFE. Well, we took the general superintendent, the administrator, several key foremen, warehousemen.

244. General RUSSELL. From what company or companies?

Mr. GRAFE. From ours, and Gunther & Shirley's.

245. General RUSSELL. Did you have any of the Rohl-Connolly organization out there, until August 1941?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

246. General RUSSELL. When did any of the Rohl-Connolly organization appear out there, to do some of the work, first?

Mr. GRAFE. Key employees, you are talking about? I think the first man—the first men were the ones who went over, that started over on the Ludington.

247. General RUSSELL. About when was that?

Mr. GRAFE. That must have been about in November 1941, because it was turned back, after the attack.

248. General RUSSELL. Is it your testimony that only Callahan's and Gunther & Shirley's supervisory personnel were in the islands prior to November 1941?

Mr. GRAFE. Yes, sir.

249. General RUSSELL. Did Rohl-Connolly Company come into this picture, as one of the adventurers, at your instance, or at the instance of Colonel Wyman?

Mr. GRAFE. Colonel Wyman's instance.

250. General RUSSELL. How many times had Callahan Co. been associated with Rohl-Connolly, before this work out in Oahu?

Mr. GRAFE. Once.

251. General RUSSELL. Where was that?

Mr. GRAFE. John Martin Dam.

[2320] 252. General RUSSELL. Was it essential to have Rohl-Connolly Company in the operation, so that it might be financed?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir; it wasn't essential or necessary. We thought that we should have someone, another partner, in there, to help carry the risk that might be incurred in the purchase of this equipment on such a small contract.

253. General RUSSELL. Did Tom Connolly go to Washington at your instance, or at Wyman's instance?

Mr. GRAFE. Well, not at my instance. I assume, at Wyman's instance.

254. General RUSSELL. You have been questioned about a letter written by a man named Cannon. You testified you did not know that man?

Mr. GRAFE. Did not know him; that is correct.

255. General RUSSELL. Did you ever see that letter?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

256. General RUSSELL. Had you ever heard of that letter prior to your being questioned about it by Major Clausen?

Mr. GRAFE. No, sir.

257. General RUSSELL. That is all I want to ask.

258. General FRANK. Who sent John Martin to Washington to expedite Rohl's citizenship papers?

Mr. GRAFE. I don't know.

259. General FRANK. Anything else?

260. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir.

261. General GRUNERT. That appears to be all.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2321] **TESTIMONY OF JOHN M. MARTIN, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW;
LOS ANGELES, CAL.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you state to the Board your name and address, please, Mr. Martin.

Mr. MARTIN. John M. Martin; 714 West Olympic Boulevard, Los Angeles, is my office. My residence is Pasadena.

2. Colonel WEST. And what is your occupation?

Mr. MARTIN. Attorney-at-law.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Martin, this field we are covering is so broad that we are dividing it up for special investigation, and in this particular part of it, General Frank will lead, assisted by Major Clausen; so I will ask General Frank to go ahead.

4. General FRANK. Mr. Martin, were you ever employed by Mr. Rohl to represent him as his attorney?

Mr. MARTIN. Yes; I have represented Mr. Rohl, oh, off and on, I would say for approximately seventeen years.

5. General FRANK. Do you represent him, or have you represented him, individually, or as the counselor for the firm of Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. MARTIN. Both, whenever called upon to do so; also represent Mrs. Rohl, and the H. W. Rohl Company, and Mr. Connolly, and the Rohl-Connolly Company; and the Rohl-Connolly Partnership, before the Rohl-Connolly Company was incorporated, some twelve years ago.

6. General FRANK. Is the Rohl-Connolly Company still a going concern, or is it being liquidated?

[2322] Mr. MARTIN. Well, my brother, Frank Martin, has handled that matter directly for the Rohl-Connolly Company, and it is my recollection that T. E. Connolly Company, Inc., which is a corporation owned by Fr. T. E. Connolly, acquired the stock in the Rohl-Connolly Company, and that was owned by Mr. and Mrs. Rohl. That was some—oh, eight, ten months ago—maybe a year ago.

7. General FRANK. In December 1940, you were in Washington?

Mr. MARTIN. Yes.

8. General FRANK. At about the time that the Hawaiian contract was being negotiated?

Mr. MARTIN. Is there any objection to my referring to a memorandum?

9. General FRANK. No.

Mr. MARTIN. I was in Washington, it was, I believe the greater part of the time from October 18, 1940, until Christmas 1940. I was specifically there on December 17 and December 18, which I believe are two days when the negotiations were going on.

10. General FRANK. Have you talked to anybody who has appeared before this Board as a witness?

Mr. MARTIN. Yes.

11. General FRANK. Have you discussed the testimony that they gave, with them?

Mr. MARTIN. Only in substance, principally with Mr. Connolly, who last night asked me three questions. He said, "When did you

go to Washington, D. C., in 1940? How long were you there? and what did you do while there?" And in response to that, I called my office to get from my work sheets or time [2323] sheets some identification as to where I was, during the periods mentioned; and I have such a memo, made by me in conference over the telephone; which is complete from October 18, 1940, until Christmas 1940; so that as to that period I can say definitely where I was on any dates.

12. General FRANK. We are interested in your being in Washington, right around the 15th to the 20th of December.

Mr. MARTIN. Yes.

13. General FRANK. On that trip, what were you there for?

Mr. MARTIN. I was called, from Washington, D. C., by the McNeil-Zoss Company, in connection with the negotiations for the San Diego Housing project contract with the Department of Public Works. I had just returned to my residence, to attend my wife's father's funeral, and received that call, on November 28, 1940, asking that I meet with Mr. McNeil and Mr. Zoss, on December 2; so I left—

14. General FRANK. Let us confine the activities that you had there to those associated with the Rohl-Connolly Company, or with Mr. Rohl.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, I really had none during that period, with one exception. I had conferences along in December with Mr. Grafe and Mr. Seabury, of the Callahan Corporation, in connection with the Callahan Construction Company's bid on the Canal locks; and I had a conference on December 17 with Mr. Grafe, in Washington, in connection with the brief I was writing for the comptroller general on that protest; and at that time—

15. General FRANK. Now, just a minute. We have some testimony from commissioned officers of the United States Army [2324] about a conference you had with them in Washington, relative to obtaining citizenship for Mr. Rohl; and that is the activity about which we would like to learn from you.

Mr. MARTIN. I don't have those dates here, but they were along the latter part of August 1941. The conferences were with General Robins, primarily, the Chief of Engineers, or, by the way, General King was then Chief; but conferences primarily with General Robins and with Colonel Lorence.

16. General FRANK. L-o-r-e-n-c-e?

Mr. MARTIN. I believe so, in General Robins' office, and with Mr. Stilphen, who, as I recall, was a civilian attorney in General Robins' office.

17. General FRANK. Will you tell us just what happened on that occasion.

Mr. MARTIN. Yes. I had with me a photostatic copy of an order or directive or letter from Colonel Wyman, requesting that Mr. Rohl come to the islands.

18. General FRANK. Who gave you that? Did Colonel Wyman send that to you?

Mr. MARTIN. I don't know, but I believe that during the summer of 1941, Mr. Rohl asked me if, when I returned to Washington, D. C., in connection with other pending cases, if I would explain to Colonel Wyman why he, Mr. Rohl, had not reported at the islands in obedience to that instruction; and it is my recollection that at that time, Miss Dickey, of his office, had made and gave me a photostatic copy.

19. General FRANK. Miss Dickey, in whose office?

Mr. MARTIN. In the Rohl-Connolly Company office. She is secretary of the company. She gave me a photostatic copy of [2325] this letter from Colonel Wyman, dated along in January 1941, and I presented that letter, or the photostat, to General Robins, in his office. the latter part of August 1941.

20. General FRANK. That is right.

Mr. MARTIN. And I explained to him that Mr. Rohl couldn't go, because he was not a citizen. General Robins suggested to me that he, as head of the department, could waive that requirement. I told him that I had discussed with Mr. Rohl that possibility and that Mr. Rohl felt that he would be subject to criticism if he went there on a waiver. I told General Robins that Mr. Rohl's petition for citizenship was pending in the federal court for Los Angeles, had been for some six months, and that I felt that the only way that Mr. Rohl could properly go was after that petition for citizenship had been heard by the federal court on its merits.

I believe at that time General Robins called in Colonel Lorence and Mr. Stilphen. I am not sure as to General Kingman being called at that conference, but the upshot of the conference was that General Kingman addressed a letter to Mr. Schofield, the head of the Department of Immigration and Naturalization. I believe Mr. Stilphen delivered that letter to Mr. Schofield by hand.

21. General FRANK. Who prepared this letter?

Mr. MARTIN. I do not know. It wasn't prepared in my presence.

22. General FRANK. Did you assist in the preparation of it?

Mr. MARTIN. No, sir; I did not.

23. General FRANK. Did you offer any suggestion with respect to any phraseology in it?

Mr. MARTIN. No, I did not. I never saw it. My only [2326] knowledge of the letter was, I believe, General Robins reading me from a copy of the letter. I never saw the original nor had any part in it.

24. General FRANK. And at whose direction did you take steps to expedite this citizenship petition? Did Mr. Rohl send you there for that purpose?

Mr. MARTIN. No. Mr. Rohl had asked that while I was in Washington I explain it to General Robins, why he was not reporting to the islands in obedience to that order. I had conferences pending with the Acting Secretary of Commerce, in Washington, and with the Solicitor, General Trimble, and with Commander Fields, in connection with proceedings that were being contemplated with reference to the registration of the Rohl-Connolly Corporation's marine equipment, and at that time the Secretary of Commerce in his report was perfectly willing to mitigate the penalty, to a monetary consideration, under the statute, but insisted upon the vessels being registered; and as I recall, the regulations at that time required that 85% of the stock be owned by American citizens.

Mr. Rohl, who was then an alien, owned 25% of the stock, so that the vessels either had to be reregistered or sold or transferred, or the entire stock ownership be held to the extent of 85% by American citizens. Therefore, looking to a settlement of those proceedings, the War Department and the Department of Commerce both cooperated

to the extent of asking or rather advising the head of the Immigration Department that it would expedite a clearance of the matter, if the Rohl petition for citizenship could be put on the calendar and heard on its merits; and pursuant to those conferences, which [2327] were held direct between General Robins' office and either the Acting Secretary of Commerce or somebody in his office, Mr. Schofield wired Los Angeles to ascertain the status of the Rohl case, and I in turn received word back from General Robins' office that Mr. Schofield had arranged for the case to be set for trial on September 15, 1941; and I so advised my office and Mr. Rohl.

25. General FRANK. Did you get a letter? You are conversant with this letter that General Kingman signed?

Mr. MARTIN. That is the letter, a carbon copy of which, as I recall, General Robins read me, I would say early in September.

26. General FRANK. The date of the letter is August 28?

Mr. MARTIN. That is right.

27. General FRANK. Now, did you get a similar letter from the Department of Commerce?

Mr. MARTIN. No. I talked with the Department of Commerce, and was told by Solicitor General Trimble and the Acting Secretary of Commerce, and by Commander Field, that the matter having been adjusted to their entire satisfaction and the mitigated penalty having been paid, that they would so advise Mr. Schofield, that so far as they were concerned there was no reason why the hearing of the Rohl case should be delayed.

28. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not Mr. Schofield was so advised by them?

Mr. MARTIN. Commander Field personally stated to me in his office at Washington that he had so advised Mr. Schofield.

29. General FRANK. How?

Mr. MARTIN. I don't recall for the moment; but I wrote a letter to my office at Los Angeles, and a copy of it to Mr. [2328] Rohl, at Caddoa, in which I outlined those conversations, and that letter would give accurate information, as I dictated it at that time.

30. General FRANK. You do not remember whether they did it by letter, verbally, by telegram, or how they did it?

Mr. MARTIN. It was done verbally, I believe.

31. General FRANK. Now, when you went to Washington, did you receive any instructions from Mr. Rohl to start activity on expediting his citizenship?

Mr. MARTIN. No. When I went to Washington—now we are talking about 1941, when I was there in August?

32. General FRANK. I am talking about events during this very time.

Mr. MARTIN. No.

33. General FRANK. Did you ever get a communication or any advice in any form from Mr. Rohl to expedite his citizenship papers, about this time?

Mr. MARTIN. No.

34. General FRANK. Namely, in August 1941.

Mr. MARTIN. Not to my recollection. I was told by Mr. Rohl when he gave me the copy of Colonel Wyman's request, that he wanted me to explain to General Robins that until that was heard on its merits,

that he couldn't report. Mr. Rohl was anxious of course to have his petition heard, and it was being delayed by the federal court, by numerous departments in Los Angeles who were investigating the registration of these vessels.

35. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Martin, you are a California lawyer, admitted to practice, for how long?

[2329] Mr. MARTIN. Well, I have been admitted to practice here since 1924.

36. Major CLAUSEN. With your offices in Los Angeles?

Mr. MARTIN. Yes.

37. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall a conversation that you had with Mr. Grafe, in Washington, regarding the citizenship status of Mr. Rohl?

Mr. MARTIN. Yes.

38. Major CLAUSEN. Where did that conversation take place?

Mr. MARTIN. In the Carlton Hotel.

39. Major CLAUSEN. Who was present?

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. T. E. Connolly.

40. Major CLAUSEN. And when did that occur?

Mr. MARTIN. On December 18, 1940.

41. Major CLAUSEN. What was said by yourself and these parties?

Mr. MARTIN. To make the conversation complete, I would have to go back one day, if you permit me to go to December 17.

42. Major CLAUSEN. Surely.

Mr. MARTIN. I met Mr. Grafe in connection with this Canal Zone job, and learned from him at that time that he was negotiating for a U. S. E. D. contract in the islands, where he expected to carry on with the same group that were then constructing Caddoa dam. I had been attorney for Callahan Company, I would say, for eight or nine years, and for the Gunther & Shirley Corporation, about the same length of time, both of whom were proposed to be parties to this Pacific island contract; and I knew that Mr. Rohl was not a citizen. I felt that while I was not called upon to give advice, that I should advise Mr. Grafe and Mr. Connolly that Mr. Rohl was not a citizen. It [2330] seemed to me that for him to go outside the continental United States might cause trouble, and I asked Mr. Connolly and Mr. Grafe if they would refrain from concluding any negotiations or signing any contract till I obtained permission to give them certain factual information.

The following day, I called from Washington, D. C., and talked to Mr. Rohl, and asked his permission to tell Mr. Connolly and Mr. Grafe that he was not a citizen. He gave me that permission; and it is my recollection that after he had given me that permission, I put Mr. Connolly on the extension, so that Rohl could tell him direct that he wanted the two of us to go tell Mr. Grafe that fact. It is my recollection that call was from my associate's office, Mr. Hermann J. Galloway, of the firm of King & King, Washington, D. C., and that Mr. Galloway was present at that conference. Mr. Connolly and I then left Mr. Galloway's office and went over to the Carlton Hotel, which is two or three blocks from the office of King & King, and I told Mr. Grafe, in Mr. Connolly's presence, that I had just talked with Mr. Rohl, and that I then had the permission which I was seeking to tell him that Rohl was not a citizen. That was in the Carlton Hotel. I can't tell you, other than it was in Mr. Grafe's room.

43. Major CLAUSEN. You were aware, were you, Mr. Martin, of the espionage act at that time, which forbade employment of aliens on defense projects?

Mr. MARTIN. In a general way; yes.

44. Major CLAUSEN. And you explained that to these men as being one of the reasons why you felt that the work should not be undertaken with Mr. Rohl in the position of an alien and as [2331] president, unless some revelation of that were made?

Mr. MARTIN. Well, I only discussed this feature with them. I said, "Are you planning to use Mr. Rohl in any connection, for any purpose in connection with this contract?" and they stated, "None, whatever," that Mr. Grafe would take charge of the work, and that Mr. Rohl would have nothing to do with the work. However, I was not there to advise with them, nor did I advise with them, in connection with their negotiations for this contract, nor did I have any information as to what the contract was, other than that it was for work in the islands of the Pacific.

45. Major CLAUSEN. I asked you, Mr. Martin, whether, on the occasion of these talks which you had with Mr. Grafe on that subject, you explained to him the reason why it was necessary that no alien be employed on a defense project in the islands.

Mr. MARTIN. No, I didn't, because I had no information it was a defense project.

46. Major CLAUSEN. Well, isn't it a fact, though, Mr. Martin, now, right here in the Board, you telephoned Los Angeles and dictated the joint-venture agreement?

Mr. MARTIN. I telephoned from Mr. Grafe's room and talked to my brother, and dictated to him, or rather, gave him the instructions over the phone for the preparation of the power of attorney and a joint-venture agreement. I did not dictate it in the sense that I formulated the terms. I simply told him to prepare a joint-venture agreement, the same as the one then in existence between the same parties on Cad-doa dam, with the same participation.

47. Major CLAUSEN. In simple English, you told your Los [2332] Angeles office to prepare a joint-venture agreement respecting the contract that was being negotiated in Washington at that time?

Mr. MARTIN. I don't know whether I talked to my brother, or whether Mr. Grafe talked to him on the phone; but in any event, such instructions were given to my brother, Mr. Frank Martin, to prepare a joint-venture agreement. As to whether I personally covered it in full, I don't know.

48. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall having been interviewed by the House Military Affairs Committee, on February 19, 1944?

Mr. MARTIN. Yes.

49. Major CLAUSEN. Present at that time were Mr. Hermann J. Galloway, yourself, H. Ralph Burton, and Joseph G. Colgan?

Mr. MARTIN. Yes.

50. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall having made this statement to the question:

Mr. BURTON. You state that there were a number of supplements dated December 20, 1940?

Mr. MARTIN. Yes. I served as attorney for Hawaiian Constructors from the very inception of the contract until the completion of the work about a year ago.

By that I mean I personally dictated from Washington to my Los Angeles office the joint-venture agreement.

Did you make that statement?

Mr. MARTIN. Well, in substance that. I gave the instructions for its preparation. That statement you are reading from of course is not a complete statement, that is the stenographer's high lights of a conference that I had with Mr. Burton.

[2333] 51. Major CLAUSEN. Now, from whom did you receive the information necessary for the instruction that you conveyed to Los Angeles with respect to the preparation of this joint-venture agreement?

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Grafe, at that time, and in his room; it was very brief, to give to me that he wanted a similar agreement to the Caddoa agreement. I didn't have time to prepare it, and instructed my brother to prepare it.

52. Major CLAUSEN. You were not the attorney for Mr. Grafe, were you?

Mr. MARTIN. Well, I was, from time to time, when employed; that is all; and I am, for any of these clients.

53. Major CLAUSEN. No, I mean on this occasion.

Mr. MARTIN. I wasn't there representing the Callahan Corporation in this Hawaiian contract, but I was there in conference with Mr. Grafe as attorney for the Callahan Corporation and the Gunther & Shirley Corporation, on the Canal Zone bid.

54. Major CLAUSEN. I am referring specifically, Mr. Martin, to the Hawaiian project.

Mr. MARTIN. No, I never became attorney for that, until after the contract was executed. I never saw the contract nor read it for many months after it was executed.

55. Major CLAUSEN. Well, isn't it a fact, Mr. Martin, that you got information concerning this project from Mr. Grafe, Mr. Connolly, and Colonel Wyman?

Mr. MARTIN. No; that is not a fact. I never discussed it with Colonel Wyman. I never discussed it with Mr. Connolly. The only information I had was the information that Mr. Grafe gave me, that they wanted to form a joint-venture agreement, [2334] because they were then negotiating for work on the islands in the Pacific Ocean.

56. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, at the time you put in this phone call to Mr. Rohl concerning this matter that you have just testified about, who was president at that time, of Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. MARTIN. I believe T. E. Connolly was.

57. Major CLAUSEN. A change had been effected prior to this conversation; it had been effected on December 16, had it not, at which time Mr. Rohl stepped down as president, and Mr. Connolly stepped in?

Mr. MARTIN. Well, I have no personal, direct information on that subject, but it is my recollection that I saw at one time a resignation which Mr. Rohl signed as director, dated December 12, 1940. As to when it was accepted or acted upon, I don't know.

58. Major CLAUSEN. Well, isn't it true that you prepared the necessary papers to accomplish that change?

Mr. MARTIN. No.

59. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon?

Mr. MARTIN. No.

60. Major CLAUSEN. Who did that?

Mr. MARTIN. I assume it was done by my brother, but I am not so positive.

61. Major CLAUSEN. Who was your brother, Mr. Martin?

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Frank L. Martin, Junior, who is associated with me in the practice of law at Los Angeles. That is merely an assumption.

62. Major CLAUSEN. Is he a Los Angeles lawyer, too?

[2335] Mr. MARTIN. Yes.

63. Major CLAUSEN. Now, you also telephoned this brother of yours on this day that you telephoned Mr. Rohl, and you told your brother what you had told Mr. Grafe concerning the fact that Mr. Rohl was an alien, and for him to make a note of it, didn't you?

Mr. MARTIN. Well, in sequence, I talked with Mr. Rohl, first. I then talked with Mr. Connolly and Mr. Grafe at the hotel. I then called, from Mr. Grafe's room at the hotel, to tell my brother that I had informed Mr. Grafe and Mr. Connolly that Mr. Rohl was not a citizen, and that they desired him to prepare a joint-venture agreement on this work.

64. Major CLAUSEN. Now, you answered some questions to General Frank, here, concerning the letter from General Kingman to Mr. Schofield.

I was inviting your attention, Mr. Martin, to this letter from General Kingman to Mr. Schofield, August 28, 1941, a copy of which is set forth on page 5 of this House Military Affairs Committee report. You had been trying to get Mr. Rohl naturalized for quite some time, hadn't you?

Mr. MARTIN. No.

65. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon?

Mr. MARTIN. No.

66. Major CLAUSEN. Isn't it true that as early as 1929 you wrote a letter to Mr. Edward F. Colladay, a lawyer in Washington, and asked that he help get Mr. Rohl naturalized?

Mr. MARTIN. Well, not exactly that. I wrote a letter asking if he knew of any program by which the fact of Mr. Rohl being married to an American citizen would obviate the [2336] necessity of him starting all over again. In substance, he wrote me back that he would have to start all over again. I so advised Mr. Rohl, and he did not care to do it, and nothing was done from 1929 until his petition was later filed, I believe, in March 1941.

67. Major CLAUSEN. Now, in addition to Mr. Colladay, and in addition to your brother, you had another lawyer in this attempt to get Mr. Rohl naturalized, or to pave the way—Mr. Cannon; isn't that true?

Mr. MARTIN. No, not in the exact words you stated.

68. General FRANK. Let him state it.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Cannon was an attorney friend of my brother in the same building. I was absent from my office. My brother was ill, and Mr. Cannon did aid in the preparation of those papers, and, I believe, appeared as the attorney for Mr. Rohl, on his petition for citizenship.

69. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall having seen a letter that Mr. Cannon wrote to the Secretary of Commerce concerning the remission of the penalties for the false documenting of vessels?

Mr. MARTIN. I don't recall it at this moment. I do know that those negotiations were personally handled by me direct with the Department, in Washington, D. C., in the absence of Mr. Cannon. Mr. Cannon had gone there for the purpose of submitting certain data, prior to the time that I was in Washington, and took the matter up direct with the Department of Commerce, but he was not in Washington at the time that I had the negotiations and settled this matter with the Department of Commerce.

[2337]. 70. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you mean he was not in Washington, in August 1941, is that your statement?

Mr. MARTIN. No; I think he was there in August 1941. I can't be positive as to dates, but he was there shortly before the time when I went to Washington and negotiated a settlement with the Department of Commerce.

71. Major CLAUSEN. And that had to be gotten out of the way before Mr. Rohl could be naturalized, isn't that true?

Mr. MARTIN. Only in this way: The Department at Los Angeles had declined to place Mr. Rohl's petition on the calendar for hearing in federal court until they could make a report one way or the other on the documentation of these vessels. As it then stood it would be an adverse report, and after the hearing and determination by the Department of Commerce, it became a favorable report. In other words, they directly notified the Department that they did not longer desire the petition to be delayed on account of any contemplated steps by the Department of Commerce.

72. Major CLAUSEN. Well, in point of truth, the Los Angeles office had recommended on July 10—rather, had recommended, that the Attorney General "issue a warrant for the arrest of this alien, Hans Wilhelm Rohl, male, native and citizen of Germany, who last entered the United States at Honolulu, T. H., ex-yacht VEGA on January 21, 1938," stating:

He is unlawfully in the United States, in that—

He is in the United States in violation of the Immigration Act * * *.

This is by the inspector in charge of the Los Angeles local office, Judson F. Shaw. You knew that, didn't you, Mr. [2338] Martin?

Mr. MARTIN. I had no personal knowledge on that. I was advised by one of my associates in Washington, D. C., Mr. Hermann J. Galloway, that he learned from conference with the deportation officer in Washington, or the head of the Department, that such a recommendation had been made by the Los Angeles office, and that a decision had been rendered by the head of the Department overruling the recommendation, holding it was not a proper case. I only know that from information given me by Mr. Galloway.

73. Major CLAUSEN. Well, that recommendation that he not be deported and not be arrested was based upon the fact that the statute of limitations had run, now, wasn't it?

Mr. MARTIN. I have no information.

74. Major CLAUSEN. So that was, sir, a gratuitous ruling?

Mr. MARTIN. I had no first-hand information on that, at all.

75. Major CLAUSEN. Now, I was going to invite your attention, Mr. Martin, to a letter that Mr. Cannon addressed to the Secretary of Commerce and that it contained on pages 8-11 of this FBI report. I am going to ask you to read that, if you will, and tell me if you have seen that before. It is a copy of a letter.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, I have at this time no recollection of having seen this letter, or of conveying—I am sure I had no part in its preparation, but I probably have seen a copy of it in the files of my office.

76. Major CLAUSEN. Now, who is this Cannon, this lawyer?

Mr. MARTIN. At that time he was an attorney having his [2339] office in the same building, the Bank of America building, at 7th and Spring, Los Angeles, an acquaintance of my brother's, rather than mine. My brother was ill and so arranged with Mr. Cannon to help out on a number of different matters.

77. Major CLAUSEN. Now, these questions I am going to ask you are in the line of certain evidence that has been shown to the Board. Is Mr. Cannon a reputable lawyer?

Mr. MARTIN. Very, to my knowledge.

78. Major CLAUSEN. And do you think that he would put statements in the letter to which your attention was invited, which were inaccurate?

Mr. MARTIN. Not knowingly; positively!

79. Major CLAUSEN. Well, from where did he get the information for the preparation of that letter?

Mr. MARTIN. Well, I wasn't in Los Angeles. I would assume that he got this information by direct interview with—

80. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Rohl, eh?

Mr. MARTIN. With people who had first-hand knowledge of the facts.

[2340] 81. Major CLAUSEN. Well, for example, the statements in there concerning Mr. Rohl; do you suppose you could get the information concerning them from Mr. Rohl? Do you know anything about that, Mr. Martin?

Mr. MARTIN. I don't know personally. I had no part in the preparation of this letter, as I recall.

82. Major CLAUSEN. Well, let me ask you this question: I invite your attention to a portion of this letter:

As early as January 1941 and at numerous times since that date Colonel Wyman has tendered Mr. Rohl transportation via clipper or boat to the Islands and has stated to Mr. Rohl over interocean telephone that he will personally obtain special permission, because of Mr. Rohl's alien status, to allow Mr. Rohl to work on this secret contract.

Did you ever have a discussion concerning that matter with Mr. Rohl?

Mr. MARTIN. I had a discussion with Mr. Rohl as to whether Colonel Wyman, as the authorized representative of the head of the department, could probably waive that citizenship requirement. I told him that I thought that probably he could, but that he might be criticized for going onto a job, by men who were working there who were citizens.

83. Major CLAUSEN. Well, in other words, Mr. Rohl told you that Colonel Wyman had stated to him these things over the interocean telephone?

Mr. MARTIN. No, he never made any statement of that kind to me. [2341] 84. Major CLAUSEN. Now, this letter referring to these things—just let me ask the question this way: Did you ever have any discussions concerning this subject matter with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. MARTIN. No.

85. General FRANK. Did you know Colonel Wyman?

Mr. MARTIN. I had met him on the occasion of the general opening of bids, as District Engineer in Los Angeles.

86. Major CLAUSEN. You met him also in Washington in December 1940, didn't you?

Mr. MARTIN. Well, I—yes. Well, he asked me if I knew him. I knew him from that fact. I met him and passed the time of day with him for perhaps two minutes in Washington, D. C.

87. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. MARTIN. At no time did I have any conference with him or discuss business in Washington, D. C.

88. Major CLAUSEN. Two minutes in Washington?

Mr. MARTIN. Not to exceed that; just greeting in the hotel.

89. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, Mr. Martin, were you registered at the Carlton Hotel during that time?

Mr. MARTIN. A number of these entries show when I was registered [indicating]. I don't believe that I was, but I cannot state positively from the memorandum before me. It is my recollection that I had a room engaged at the Roger Smith Hotel in Washington, D. C., by the month at that time. Usually I do note where I stay, at what hotel, and in a number of instances I did, and I think I quit making that notation on [2342] my worksheet because I engaged a room at the Roger Smith by the month.

90. Major CLAUSEN. Well, all right. Now, it says here in this letter of Mr. Cannon that Mr. Paul Grafe flew to the United States, was now in the United States with the knowledge and consent of Colonel Wyman and in an endeavor to clear the way for Mr. Rohl's going to the Hawaiian Islands. Do you know anything about that?

Mr. MARTIN. No. That's the first I ever heard that statement, and for that reason I would now say that I never saw the letter to which you are referring, if it contains such a statement.

91. Major CLAUSEN. At the time, Mr. Martin, that you had this conversation in Washington concerning the letter from General Kingman, did you tell anybody in the War Department, any military men, the information you had received concerning this attempted recommendation toward a deportation of your client?

Mr. MARTIN. I don't believe that I ever had any first-hand information or ever discussed that matter with anyone outside of Mr. Galloway.

92. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, you were in possession of information that a recommendation had been made by the Los Angeles inspector in charge that your client be deported, arrested for illegal entry. You didn't tell that to anybody there when you went and spoke to them about having this letter sent, referring to the letter on page 5?

Mr. MARTIN. I don't believe I spoke to them about having that letter sent. I don't believe that letter was [2343] written at my suggestion or instance at all. I don't believe I had any knowledge

of that letter being sent until after it had been delivered by Mr. Stilphen and I was read a copy by General Robins. Now, I never discussed with anyone the deportation of Mr. Rohl, nor did I discuss the fact that the head of the department had overruled that and rendered a contrary decision.

93. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you say you didn't discuss it. That is the testimony. You were shown a copy of it, were you not, by Mr. Stilphen?

Mr. MARTIN. I believe by General Robins.

94. Major CLAUSEN. That was when?

Mr. MARTIN. Let's see. The date of that letter is?

95. Major CLAUSEN. August 28, 1941.

Mr. MARTIN. I would say about six days later, about September 4, 1941.

96. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

Mr. MARTIN. I could give you that exact date if you—

97. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Have you it there?

Mr. MARTIN. I don't have it here because I don't have that period here, but I am quite positive that it was in the month of September and not in the month of August 1941.

98. Colonel TOULMIN. Do you want to make a note to get it?

Mr. MARTIN. You want to know what date I first learned of the letter of August 28th?

99. Major CLAUSEN. I want to know the date that you say you saw a copy of this letter. Who showed it to you? You say General Robins did?

Mr. MARTIN. What date did I see letter of August 28th? [2344] Well, that can stand as September 4, 1941, unless I find differently.

100. General FRANK. However, you know that arrangements were being made by the Corps of Engineers to take steps to expedite action on his citizenship?

Mr. MARTIN. Oh, yes, and by the Department of Commerce also.

101. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. MARTIN. That is to expedite the setting of the case on the calendar at Los Angeles.

102. General FRANK. Yes. And you knew all this, at the same time having this other information in the back of your head?

Mr. MARTIN. What other information do you refer to now?

103. General FRANK. State it.

Mr. MARTIN. You mean as to the recommendation?

104. Major CLAUSEN. The recommendation of the Los Angeles inspector in charge that your client, Hans Wilhelm Rohl, German alien, was unlawfully in the United States, not in the possession of an unexpired immigration visa.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, the source of information, as I understand it, was Mr. Schofield's office, the man with whom General Kingman was conferring, and the man with whom Commander Fields and the Secretary of Commerce were conferring. While it is only second-hand information with me from Mr. Galloway, it is my understanding that Mr. Galloway obtained information from the head of the department with whom Commander Fields and General Robins were conferring.

105. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, but the General asked you the question that you had this information in back of your head. [2345] You knew it when you went there to Washington and had these talks in August 1941; isn't that correct?

Mr. MARTIN. I knew from Mr. Galloway's report to me that he had learned that the department had received such a recommendation and that the department had overruled it, holding that it was not a proper case.

106. Major CLAUSEN. Now, did you know that on March 1, 1941, the district director of the Los Angeles district, William A. Carmichael, made a recommendation that information had been received "which indicates that Mr. Rohl has been falsely representing himself as an American citizen for a number of years, and a thorough investigation will be necessary prior to the final hearing in order that appropriate recommendation may be made to the Court"?

Mr. MARTIN. No, I had no such knowledge as that.

107. Major CLAUSEN. Well, now, you were an attorney, as you stated, for all these different companies; Mr. Rohl. He, Mr. Rohl, became the directing head of the Hawaiian Constructors on the Hawaiian contracts on or about the 26th or 27th of September, 1941, at which time he arrived in Hawaii; is that correct?

Mr. MARTIN. Well, by second-hand information I would say as to at least a substantial portion of the work that would be true. Mr. Grafe was the directing head, as I understand it, until January 1942. I understand that Mr. Rohl, through some arrangement with Mr. Grafe in the Islands, divided the responsibilities from the time that Mr. Rohl arrived there in the fall of '41.

108. Major CLAUSEN. I believe that is all I have right now.

[2346] 109. General GRUNERT. Any questions?

110. General RUSSELL. Mr. Martin, there isn't any confusion or doubt in your mind that after you talked with Rohl in Los Angeles in December of '40 you then went to where this man Paul Grafe was and told him that Rohl was an alien and that you had Rohl's consent to convey that information to Grafe?

Mr. MARTIN. None whatever. I made that statement to him in the presence of Mr. T. E. Connolly.

111. General RUSSELL. And it is your recollection that Connolly was on the telephone, on an extension of the same telephone, when you were talking with Rohl?

Mr. MARTIN. That is correct; at District 6196, Washington, D. C.

112. General RUSSELL. When you obtained this information from Rohl and when you conveyed that information to Grafe, did you think or would you consider that you were acting as attorney for those two parties, Rohl and Grafe, during that time?

Mr. MARTIN. No, not in connection with that matter. I was attorney for the Callahan group on the Canal Zone bid.

113. General RUSSELL. But you were acting more in the capacity of a friend, and the relation of attorney and client did not exist either when you were talking to Rohl or when you were conveying the information to Paul Grafe?

Mr. MARTIN. Not the relationship of attorney and client, but these—Mr. Rohl and Mr.—or Mr. Grafe and Mr. Connolly were my personal

friends, and I felt that I was in possession of certain factual information which they were entitled to have but which I was not privileged to give without Mr. Rohl's consent.

[2347] 114. General RUSSELL. Yes, I understood that, but I wanted to clear up this point.

Mr. MARTIN. No. It was just giving them factual information, not advising them either legally or as to the matter of policy as to what they should do.

115. General RUSSELL. Now, Mr. Martin, were you present in the District Court on the 15th of September, 1941, or on such date in September '41 as Rohl's application for naturalization was heard by the Judge of the District Court?

Mr. MARTIN. I was not. It is my recollection I was in the East trying a lawsuit. I was never present at the preparation of any of the Rohl citizenship papers or on any of the hearings or examinations or the Federal Court hearing in Los Angeles.

116. General RUSSELL. Do you know, either by original or primary or hearsay testimony, whether or not this Kingman letter about which testimony has been given was presented to and considered by the District Judge at Los Angeles when he was passing upon this application of Rohl in September of '41 to become an American citizen?

Mr. MARTIN. By second-hand information, it was not. By that I mean that on the occasion of a trip by Mr. Joseph G. Colgan as an investigator for the House Military Affairs Committee, a trip to Los Angeles where he came and stayed approximately five weeks making investigations, I was present when he interviewed a number of superintendents for the job, and other people, and I recall of asking Mr. Colgan if he had examined the Federal Court files in that citizenship matter. He told me that he had, that he had interviewed Judge J. F. T. [2348] O'Connor who heard the case, that he had obtained photostatic copies of the calendar and of the reports of the various departments in that matter, and that he had forwarded them to Mr. Burton at Washington; and I discussed with him a summary of the evidence that was received at that hearing, from apparently the—the evidence by the department to be considered by the Court was reduced to a written summary, and the Government counsel showed that summary to Mr. Cannon, and with joint consent the summary was presented to Federal Court while Mr. Rohl was on the stand. I discussed with Mr. Colgan the contents of that summary, and from that conference I would say that the General Kingman letter was not there. Now, that conference is a comparatively recent conference with Mr. Colgan, so that my recollection is fresh on that.

117. General RUSSELL. That is all I have.

118. Major CLAUSEN. I have one more: While you say the Kingman letter may not have been there, the fact is, is it not, that the Court was informed that the participation of Mr. Rohl in this defense project was necessary and was being held up until he had been naturalized?

Mr. MARTIN. I don't believe that is correct, but I have no first-hand information. If that is a fact, it is my first knowledge on the subject.

119. Major CLAUSEN. I refer to page 5 of the report of the House Committee on Military Affairs.

120. General RUSSELL. But you haven't straightened out the part that I thought I made absolutely clear. The point I have attempted to

develop is whether or not when this man's application for citizenship was being heard by the District [2349] Court there was brought to the attention of the District Court the desire of the Engineering Department or the Chief of Engineers that the application be granted, and I do not know of any way it could have been gotten to the attention of the Court except by this letter or some other testimony.

121. Major CLAUSEN. That is on page 5.

122. General RUSSELL. But that does not show that this letter was before the Court, as I understand it. Our record on that is blank at this time.

123. Major CLAUSEN. At this moment.

Mr. MARTIN. I am sorry, I have no information on that.

124. General GRUNERT. Is there anything further that you would like to tell the Board that you think would be not only of interest but of value to the Board in its attempt to get facts about this case?

Mr. MARTIN. If I could revert from the status of witness to the status of former counsel for Hawaiian Constructors and informally state to you certain things that I think might be of interest to this Board, I would be glad to do so; and if after such a conference you desire to ask me additional questions on the record I will be glad to answer them. I do have certain understandings as to facts which may or may not be within the knowledge of this Board. It is my desire to be helpful. I feel that I have been placed in a very embarrassing situation by some false statements that were made in this report.

For instance, it places me in conference at these negotiations five specific days in Washington, D. C. I was never present at any negotiations, never advised concerning [2350] any. On one of those days I was in continuous conference with—for B. Perini & Sons, Boston, and their engineers. On another day I was in continuous conference as attorney for the Arundel Corporation at Baltimore, with Mr. Froelinger, the president of that company, Mr. Warren Black, the vice president of the company, and Mr. James Sanborn, consulting engineer.

On another of the days mentioned I left at 5:15 p. m. from Washington, D. C. on a P. C. A. for Chicago. On one of the days mentioned I was at the Palmer House in Chicago and worked on the Bates and Rogers Blue and Kittatiny tunnel contracts where I represented them.

I left Chicago on one of the days mentioned, by Braniff Lines at 4:30 p. m. and flew to Wichita, Kansas. On one of the days mentioned I arrived at my mother's home in Hutchinson, Kansas, and had turkey dinner there.

So that I simply wasn't doing what that report says. If this Board is interested at all in some way of corroborating my statements, I have with me cards here that will show for every date between October 18, 1940, and Christmas 1940 the name of the client with whom I was in conference, and the name of a disinterested witness who was present at that conference, who can corroborate those duties.

125. General GRUNERT. Mr. Martin, the ground to be covered by this Board is limited to the phases that pertain to the attack on Pearl Harbor and what leads up to that. Outside of that the Board is not interested.

Mr. MARTIN. Of course, I have no personal knowledge on that. The only suggestion I could make on that was that there [2351] was a written report made by Mr. Joseph G. Colgan, as I understand it, to the Department of Justice, of some forty typewritten pages cover-

ing his five weeks' investigation of the Hawaiian Constructors while he was in Los Angeles. It is my understanding that that report—while I have never seen it, it is my understanding that it would completely discredit the so-called House Military Affairs report which was written, and was written at the instance of the Department of Justice, by Mr. Colgan after he had ceased to serve as an investigator for the House Military Affairs Committee. I have no personal knowledge of the contents of that report, but it seems to me it might be helpful to this Board to have such a report before it if such a report exists.

126. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions?

127. Major CLAUSEN. I have a question here, sir. Page 13 of this report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is an extract from a memorandum from your office. Would you read that and see if that is an extract [handing document to the witness]?

Mr. MARTIN. I remember of discussing, though I believe it was by telephone, not with Mr. Rohl personally, the advisability of Mr. Rohl ceasing to act as an officer or director of a corporation who was seeking to negotiate for Government work.

128. Major CLAUSEN. I just wanted to know if that was an extract from a memorandum in your files. Do you recognize it as such?

Mr. MARTIN. No, I don't recognize it as such, but the facts there stated I believe to be correct.

[2352] 129. Major CLAUSEN. O. K. Now, a member of the Board has asked that you leave your memorandum from which you have testified, those notes.

Mr. MARTIN. No objection to doing that. I am not sure that they are legible to the average person, but I have no objection to leaving them, and if the reporter has any difficulty in reading them I will be glad to help him. I would like for the record to show that they consist of ten cards in pen and ink memorandum in my own writing. May they be returned to me, or would you rather—

130. Major CLAUSEN. I have no objection at all myself.

131. General FRANK. Yes, return them to him.

132. Colonel WEST. Mr. Martin, one final thing: As these proceedings are confidential, it is required that the testimony given and other proceedings that took place be not revealed outside. Do you fully understand that?

Mr. MARTIN. I didn't understand that, but I do now.

133. Colonel WEST. We usually caution witnesses just before they are excused rather than at the beginning, about that point.

Mr. MARTIN. You mean that I am not to discuss with even people who are my clients what has occurred at this proceeding?

134. Colonel WEST. That is correct.

135. General FRANK. It has already been violated.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, I knew of no such instruction until—

136. Colonel WEST. No, you didn't. It is only the witnesses who have appeared. If some witness who had already appeared previously discussed it with you, you of course didn't know about it.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, the discussion that I had was with [2353] Mr. Connolly asking me three specific questions, and that is the only reason I am able to hand you this memo, is that I called my office and got the data in substance as it appears on these cards.

137. General GRUNERT. But you understand, what has taken place here has taken place between you and the Board and is not to be discussed with anyone else.

Mr. MARTIN. Yes, sir.

138. General GRUNERT. All right. Thank you for coming.

Mr. MARTIN. Pardon me. May I ask, are you still endeavoring to ascertain from me the date when I first saw this letter of August 28th?

139. Major CLAUSEN. Correct.

Mr. MARTIN. If I find it to be a different date from the September 4, 1941, I have given you, I will so advise you.

140. Major CLAUSEN. Very well.

Mr. MARTIN. If I find it to be the same, I will not advise you.

141. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

142. General GRUNERT. We shall take a recess for ten minutes.

(The witness was excused.)

(There was a brief informal recess.)

[2354] **TESTIMONY OF J. P. SHIRLEY, 501 BELAIR ROAD, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you state to the Board your name and address, please, Mr. Shirley?

Mr. SHIRLEY. J. P. Shirley, at 501 Belair Road in Los Angeles.

2. Colonel WEST. What is your occupation?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Contractor.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Shirley, I am going to ask General Frank, to be assisted by Major Clausen, to lead off in opening up this subject, and the other members of the Board will ask such questions as they see fit, as it develops.

Mr. SHIRLEY. Yes, sir.

4. General FRANK. Mr. Shirley, in 1940—well, wait a minute. To go back: You are associated with the Gunther-Shirley Company?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Yes, sir.

5. General FRANK. As contractors?

Mr. SHIRLEY. That is right.

6. General FRANK. In Los Angeles?

Mr. SHIRLEY. That is right.

7. General FRANK. There is a Mr. Gunther in this firm?

Mr. SHIRLEY. No. Mr. Gunther passed away in about eight years ago.

8. General FRANK. Who are the officials of the firm?

Mr. SHIRLEY. I am the president, and our secretary is a young woman in the office. My son was a vice president, but he went to work up in Canada, so he resigned when he went [2355] to work on a Government job up there, so I am the only official of the company now.

9. General FRANK. In 1940 you were associated with the Callahan Company and the Rohl-Connolly Company in a venture in Colorado?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Yes, sir; joint venture at Caddoa.

10. General FRANK. Then in December 1940 that same group became associated in a Hawaiian contract?

Mr. SHIRLEY. That is right.

11. General FRANK. That contract was consummated in Washington on the 20th of December, 1940?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Yes, sir.

12. General FRANK. Who represented you in that?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Mr. Grafe.

13. General FRANK. What were the circumstances under which he represented you?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Well, I think the start of that was that I think that I remember meeting Colonel Wyman and some contractors in Los Angeles, I believe Kelton's office, talking about the work in Hawaii, and he was looking for some contractors to do some work in Hawaii, about a million dollar contract, and I remember—I don't remember really the other contractors were there. There were two or three others. I think Mr. Guy Atkinson was one, and Mr. Rohl, and Mr. Grafe had previously sent over two men to Hawaii to look at this work that was contemplated, and they came back, and with not much of a report, as I recollect it. It is a long time ago.

14. General FRANK. Yes?

Mr. SHIRLEY. And I don't remember everything that [2356] happened, but as I remember it their report was very indefinite about what there was to be done. So then in about, it seems to me, a couple of weeks after this meeting with Colonel Wyman in Los Angeles Mr. Grafe was going to Washington about this work, and he was acting for me too on that.

15. General FRANK. Did he have a power of attorney?

Mr. SHIRLEY. I don't remember whether he had with him, but he did have a power of attorney on several other jobs, and I don't know whether I gave him one then or whether I gave it to him later.

16. General FRANK. I see. In any event—

Mr. SHIRLEY. But he was acting for our company.

17. General FRANK. He did represent the Gunther-Shirley Company in signing the contract in Washington on the 20th of December?

Mr. SHIRLEY. That's right.

18. General FRANK. And the co-adventurers' agreement—that is, the details of participation was the matter of an agreement drawn up among yourselves. I take it?

Mr. SHIRLEY. That is right; yes, sir.

19. General FRANK. Who drew that up?

Mr. SHIRLEY. I think it was Frank Martin.

20. General FRANK. Frank Martin?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Yes.

21. General FRANK. And that was generally along the lines of the agreement that you had in Colorado?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Just the same, I think.

22. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. SHIRLEY. Same percentage of interest, any way.

[2357] 23. General FRANK. Were you ever in Honolulu?

Mr. SHIRLEY. No.

24. General FRANK. You didn't go to Honolulu?

Mr. SHIRLEY. I did not.

25. General FRANK. Who represented you in Honolulu? Mr. Grafe?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Mr. Grafe; yes.

26. General FRANK. Go ahead.

27. Major CLAUSEN. You had talks in Los Angeles with Colonel Wyman, did you, in December 1940?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Very shortly, yes.

28. Major CLAUSEN. Where did that take place, Mr. Shirley?

Mr. SHIRLEY. I think it was in the Engineers office in Los Angeles, Colonel Kelton's office.

29. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember that there present was Mr. Rohl?

Mr. SHIRLEY. I think Rohl was there and I think Mr. Atkinson was there.

30. Major CLAUSEN. And this was a sort of a gathering together of contractors for the purpose of trying to get—

Mr. SHIRLEY. Somebody to do this work.

31. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. What did Colonel Wyman state to you gentlemen assembled at that time as to the nature and extent and scope of this work?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Well, not much about the nature of it, but possibly it cost around a million dollars, and it might increase. As I remember, it was liable to increase to more money.

32. Major CLAUSEN. Specifically what did he say the work was? [2358] What kind of work was it to be?

Mr. SHIRLEY. I don't remember whether he described the work or not. I don't know. I don't think he did, because we were prepared to do most any kind of work, and really what kind didn't make much difference, but I don't believe he described the work, and from their—from my recollection of the report of these two men that Mr. Grafe sent over, they didn't know much about it when they came back, either.

33. Major CLAUSEN. Well, did Mr. Grafe have the report down there? Did you have that report?

Mr. SHIRLEY. No.

34. Major CLAUSEN. When did you get the report?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Well, I just don't remember when they come back, but I think before this meeting, and I don't think Mr. Grafe was at this meeting, as I recollect it.

35. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, you had a report which had been obtained by these two men that Mr. Grafe sent over?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Yes.

36. Major CLAUSEN. And which report you had received before the meeting in Los Angeles with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. SHIRLEY. That is right.

37. Major CLAUSEN. Well, when you sat around and talked down there about the possibilities of going into this work, did you mention this report and have it with you there?

Mr. SHIRLEY. No.

38. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have the report?

Mr. SHIRLEY. I don't know. I never saw the written report, but I talked to these men. I knew them. They had worked for us before, and I knew them both, and I think that [2359] their report is so indefinite, I didn't pay much attention to it.

39. Major CLAUSEN. You talked with Mr. Rohl about the work to be done?

Mr. SHIRLEY. No. We intended to if we—in my talk to Mr. Grafe we intended to do this work ourselves if we could get it alone. I didn't talk to Mr. Grafe—to Mr. Rohl about it.

40. Major CLAUSEN. Well, the Gunther-Shirley Company and the Callahan Construction Company are in the same building, aren't they?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Yes, sir.

41. Major CLAUSEN. And the Rohl-Connolly Company, where are they?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Well, they had their office down on a boulevard out of Los Angeles about four or five miles at that time.

42. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you knew about the 20th of December, 1940, that the contract had been awarded?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Yes, I did.

43. Major CLAUSEN. To these three firms?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Yes, I did.

44. Major CLAUSEN. So from that—by the way, you were in Los Angeles during the period, then, say, from December 1940 to December 1941?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Well, was I in Los Angeles all that time, you mean?

45. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. I mean off and on you were there?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Yes, sure.

[2360] 46. Major CLAUSEN. Did you meet Mr. Rohl at different times?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Very seldom.

47. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you were really partners, in a sense, on this job. What did you discuss with Mr. Rohl in that interim concerning the work?

Mr. SHIRLEY. Well, you mean before we had the contract?

48. Major CLAUSEN. No. I mean——

Mr. SHIRLEY. After?

49. Major CLAUSEN. After the contract and for a period of about a year thereafter.

Mr. SHIRLEY. Well, Mr. Grafe was more or less in charge of this work, and really I didn't discuss this—I don't believe I ever discussed it with Mr. Rohl, this project.

50. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

51. General GRUNERT. Is that all you wanted out of this witness?

52. General FRANK. That is all.

53. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions? (No response.) None occurs to me, if that is what you wanted. Thank you very much.

Mr. SHIRLEY. Any other information I can give you, I would be very glad to help in any way I can.

54. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much. I think they have a program in which to develop their evidence, and whatever they want from you they apparently got. Thank you very much.

Mr. SHIRLEY. All right.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 4:40 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

[2361]

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[2362] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1944

PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

The Board, at 9:35 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

TESTIMONY OF PAUL J. LYNCH, 919 SUTTER STREET, SAN
FRANCISCO, CALIF.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Please state to the Board your name and address.

Mr. LYNCH. Paul J. Lynch, 919 Sutter Street, San Francisco.

2. Colonel WEST. What is your occupation?

Mr. LYNCH. I am an engineer, civil engineer, consulting engineer.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. LYNCH, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will cover this particular part of the investigation. I will let them go ahead and then the rest of the Board will ask any questions they see fit.

4. General FRANK. Mr. Lynch, on what duty were you in 1941 in [2363] Honolulu?

Mr. LYNCH. I was the Area Engineer for the 5th Field Area, under Colonel Wyman of the United States Engineers.

5. General FRANK. What was the area covered by the 5th Field Area?

Mr. LYNCH. The 5th Field Area covered approximately the territory between Kaleiwa and Diamond Head.

6. General FRANK. That is right straight across the island?

Mr. LYNCH. Right straight across the island.

7. General FRANK. That takes in the whole island?

Mr. LYNCH. That takes in that whole shore from Kaleiwa to Diamond Head.

8. General FRANK. From the south to the north, around by way of Barbers Point to Makapuu Point?

Mr. LYNCH. Diamond Head, Makapuu Point and Bellows Field.

9. General FRANK. Kahuku?

Mr. LYNCH. Kahuku.

10. General FRANK. Down to Kaleiwa?

Mr. LYNCH. That is right. Kaneohe.

11. General FRANK. How many Areas do they have there?

Mr. LYNCH. That was the 5th Field Area. They had—I have forgotten—11 or 15.

12. General FRANK. That takes in half of the island?

Mr. LYNCH. Well, I had that half in 1941. Then she was split up after the blitz. Kahuku was assigned to another Area.

13. General FRANK. What were your duties?

Mr. LYNCH. Area Engineer.

14. General FRANK. Specifically, what were your duties?

Mr. LYNCH. I was responsible and accountable for all of [2364] the construction and material, supplies and equipment, and the payroll in the 5th Field Area, construction of the underground storage, runways, ramps, and so forth.

15. General FRANK. When did you get there?

Mr. LYNCH. March, 1941. The date I have forgotten.

16. General FRANK. There was no permanent aircraft warning site in your area, was there?

Mr. LYNCH. There was no aircraft warning operating prior to December 7th, to my knowledge.

17. General FRANK. That is, permanent?

Mr. LYNCH. Permanent. There may have been one on Diamond Head, but I did not know of it.

18. General FRANK. At least, you did not have the construction of any such?

Mr. LYNCH. No; not prior to the 7th.

19. General FRANK. At any time?

Mr. LYNCH. That is right.

20. General FRANK. There was none under construction prior to the 7th?

Mr. LYNCH. No; that is right.

21. General FRANK. Now, let's go over to Bellows Field. There was a runway being constructed over there?

Mr. LYNCH. There was an existing runway there, when I got there, General, of 2,700 feet.

22. General FRANK. That was the one going straight in from the shore line?

Mr. LYNCH. That is right.

23. General FRANK. Was there another one, too, going out to the northwest?

[2365] Mr. LYNCH. Not when I got there.

24. General FRANK. Towards the bathing beach?

Mr. LYNCH. I made a survey there.

25. General FRANK. In what state of construction was that on December 7th?

Mr. LYNCH. I had about 2,000 feet completed; that is, with coral top, ready for the asphalt. I had a plant there. I didn't have it erected, and there was no asphalt on the field. That is, on the new runways, Runways A and B.

26. General FRANK. What was the total length of that?

Mr. LYNCH. Of the existing, before I got there?

27. General FRANK. No, of the new one, when it was finished.

Mr. LYNCH. 6,000 feet.

28. General FRANK. Do you know the state of funds for construction of that runway when you started?

Mr. LYNCH. Only through hearsay. You mean the finances for Bellows Field?

29. General FRANK. Yes. You were starting there on a shoestring, weren't you?

Mr. LYNCH. Yes, we were. I heard—I don't know this directly—that we borrowed funds.

30. General FRANK. Were you concerned with the construction of any of the sites for the mobile aircraft warning service stations?

Mr. LYNCH. No, sir, at no time.

31. General FRANK. You know Colonel Wyman?

Mr. LYNCH. I knew him, yes.

32. General FRANK. What was the nature of your associations with him?

[2366] Mr. LYNCH. Personally, do you mean?

33. General FRANK. And officially; both.

Mr. LYNCH. Personally, we had nothing in common. I worked directly for him in the islands for approximately a year, directly under him. Do you want to know what I think of him as an administrator and executive?

34. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. LYNCH. Well, I think he is one of the best.

35. General FRANK. As an administrator?

Mr. LYNCH. As an executive and as an engineer and getting work done, I think he is one of the best Army men I ever came across.

36. General FRANK. Do you know anything about the organization of his office?

Mr. LYNCH. Nothing. I did not know Colonel Wyman until I reached Honolulu. I had never met him.

37. General FRANK. All you know then is through your contact with the field organization, outside of his office?

Mr. LYNCH. Well, the Colonel and I—I worked directly under him, and any orders given he gave to me.

38. General FRANK. Your knowledge of the organization was purely with the field organization?

Mr. LYNCH. That is right, my own setup of the 5th Field Area which I had and was responsible to him for.

39. General FRANK. From your point of view were there any delays in construction?

Mr. LYNCH. Oh, General, on every job I have ever been on there have always been delays. That is a very general question I am going to answer generally. It is on every job. On any military job where you don't have a chance to make the surveys that [2367] you should, there is bound to be delay. There were delays in equipment, delays in getting men, delay in getting organized.

40. General FRANK. How long did it take you to get organized?

Mr. LYNCH. I would say about three or four months. The cause of that I would not know.

41. General FRANK. From your point of view what were the causes of the outstanding delays?

Mr. LYNCH. Lack of money, I would say, to go ahead. Colonel Wyman always cautioned me to be very careful about every expenditure that I made. He was very conscientious.

42. General FRANK. From your point of view, was there any waste, unnecessary waste, manifested anywhere?

Mr. LYNCH. Not on my end of it. Unnecessary waste?

43. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. LYNCH. There is waste on every job, and I have been in construction for nearly 40 years.

44. General FRANK. In that area can you name me the projects with which you were charged from Makapuu Point around to Haleiwa?

Mr. LYNCH. Haleiwa was my field of survey, prior to the blitz. Then I had Kahuku, Kaneohe Airfield, Bellows Field, Ulupau, and warning stations on Makapuu, close to Diamond Head, embracing the airfield principally at Bellows Field, which was the one which was under pressure.

45. General FRANK. Did you have a project for constructing any underground tanks at Bellows?

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. I started them and laid them out.

46. General FRANK. When?

Mr. LYNCH. I think it was August or September, 1941. We [2368] had no equipment. I had one compressor and two jackhammers and I mucked the stuff by hand and hauled it out by mules.

47. General FRANK. Principally because of what?

Mr. LYNCH. Lack of money.

48. General FRANK. Lack of money?

Mr. LYNCH. That is my opinion.

49. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Lynch, were these underground gasoline storage tunnels at Bellows Field?

Mr. LYNCH. One tunnel.

50. Major CLAUSEN. At Bellows Field; was that constructed by December 7, 1941?

Mr. LYNCH. No. I had 500 feet on December 7th, approximately, completed.

51. Major CLAUSEN. Can you give an estimate in percentage as to the amount that was completed on that date?

Mr. LYNCH. I would say about 40 per cent. I think the tunnel was 1200 feet.

52. General FRANK. What is the diameter of that?

Mr. LYNCH. Sixteen feet by sixteen, I would say, approximately.

53. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall a party named Robert Hoffman?

Mr. LYNCH. Yes, I do.

54. Major CLAUSEN. What connection did you have with him?

Mr. LYNCH. He was the Area Superintendent for the contractor on Bellows Field, Honolulu and Kaneohe, directly under my supervision.

55. Major CLAUSEN. Would you give the Board your opinion as to his business ability and experience?

Mr. LYNCH. He was a very good man.

[2369] 56. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have occasion to make complaints to Colonel Wyman concerning delays, oral complaints?

Mr. LYNCH. Yes, I did, and I got results.

57. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have a controversy with Colonel Wyman concerning layouts, designs, construction methods?

Mr. LYNCH. Yes, I had a controversy with him and we got together and settled the thing, and that is the last time we had any discussion on such a matter. We differed on the method of design and construction, and we took our hair down, and after that we got along beautifully.

58. Major CLAUSEN. After that was it done in accordance with your ideas?

Mr. LYNCH. Not altogether. I was not altogether right in the picture. As I say, we got together. There were a number of differences and we did get together.

59. Major CLAUSEN. You left the islands about March, 1942?

Mr. LYNCH. The latter part of March.

60. Major CLAUSEN. Then you were employed on the Canol Project under Colonel Wyman?

Mr. LYNCH. Yes.

61. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know of the personal relations which existed on the Hawaiian Islands between Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl and Colonel Wyman?

Mr. LYNCH. No.

62. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

63. General RUSSELL. You stated there was nothing in common between you and Wyman, outside of your official relations. Exactly what did you mean by that?

Mr. LYNCH. Apparently we did not have the same line of thought. By personal relations, I mean I would not go out with [2370] him. I would not want him to sleep with me. He would not want me to sleep with him.

64. General RUSSELL. How do you define those differences?

Mr. LYNCH. Well, from a personal view, his background and mine were altogether different. His methods, say, of pleasure are altogether different from mine. But I will say this for him, though; he was on the job; and he knew his stuff.

65. General RUSSELL. Did you think that these personal habits of his away from his work interfered with his efficiency on his work?

Mr. LYNCH. Not with me, absolutely not.

66. General RUSSELL. With anyone?

Mr. LYNCH. That I would not know.

67. General RUSSELL. Did you think that his personal habits away from the job rendered him at any time incapable?

Mr. LYNCH. Oh, no.

68. General RUSSELL. In carrying out his work?

Mr. LYNCH. As to my personal feeling that I may have for him, just my personal slant on any man, I may like or dislike. There is no twilight zone with me. But as far as working for him is concerned, I don't know of a better man I ever worked under.

69. General RUSSELL. His personal habits did not interfere with his efficiency?

Mr. LYNCH. Not in my judgment, as far as I was concerned, on either the Canol or the Hawaiian.

70. General GRUNERT. Do you of your personal knowledge know whether or not any of the delays that occurred were due to the contractors on the job?

[2371] Mr. LYNCH. Well, of course, there were delays; no question about that. I cannot recall offhand what those delays were, but there were bound to be delays by the contractors, bound to be delays by the Engineers. I made mistakes.

71. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not any delays that did occur were intentional on the part of the contractors or any other person?

Mr. LYNCH. No, sir.

72. General GRUNERT. Any other questions?

73. General FRANK. What is your opinion?

Mr. LYNCH. Oh, yes, there were delays.

74. General FRANK. I am talking about the intentional part of it?

Mr. LYNCH. No, I don't think there was anything intentional. You mean sabotage or anything of that sort?

75. General FRANK. Any kind of a delay that was intentional on the part of a contractor?

Mr. LYNCH. No, I don't think so. I know in my 5th Field Area that was absolutely none. There could not be. I was responsible. The contractors could not get away with it.

76. General FRANK. Was there any tendency on the part of the contractor to try to get away with it?

Mr. LYNCH. No, sir, absolutely not.

77. General FRANK. They gave complete, 100-percent, whole-hearted cooperation, effort and endeavor?

Mr. LYNCH. Well, yes, I would say they did. Hoffman worked directly for me as a representative of the contractors.

78. General FRANK. What made you hesitate?

Mr. LYNCH. Your question is pretty technical. You say 100 [2372] percent. There is no cooperation 100 percent. There is nobody going to work for me and get anything 100 percent. I have got my ideas and the contractor had his.

79. General FRANK. Do you suppose the contractors had a good spirit of endeavor?

Mr. LYNCH. Yes, very much.

80. General FRANK. All of them?

Mr. LYNCH. All of the contractors, you mean?

81. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. LYNCH. I would have to speak of my own 5th Field Area.

82. General FRANK. That is what I mean.

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. They would have to, General, or they wouldn't be on the job.

83. General FRANK. You say Hoffman was the contractors' supervisor?

Mr. LYNCH. Superintendent.

84. General FRANK. With whom did you work? The Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. LYNCH. The Hawaiian Constructors. He was on the job, I think, when I made a suggestion to Colonel Wyman, which he ap-

proved, that instead of having a superintendent for the dirt movement and a superintendent for the tunnel, they would throw everything under a general superintendent, so I could hold him responsible. Wyman thought that was an excellent idea and he put it through. Hoffman was made the Area Superintendent, and then we branched out. I will say this: He worked.

85. General FRANK. What was the Army building at Kaneohe?

[2373] Mr. LYNCH. That was the hospital, the insane hospital. Do you know where that is?

86. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. LYNCH. We took half of that over for the Army and then put some additions on it.

87. Major CLAUSEN. You mentioned, in connection with some of the questions of General Frank, Mr. Hoffman being the contractors' representative and your having worked with him. Do you have the approximate dates when Mr. Hoffman was the contractor's Superintendent?

Mr. LYNCH. In the 5th Field Area he was the superintendent approximately from the middle of April until I left in the latter part of March, the middle of April, 1941, until the latter part of March, 1942.

88. Major CLAUSEN. Prior to the time that Mr. Hoffman assumed the functions of Superintendent for the contractors had there been other superintendents whom you had caused to be relieved because of their inefficiency?

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. The Hawaiian Constructors sent out one man for superintendent and he lasted two days, and they sent out another man, and I think he stayed one day. Hoffman came out and he stayed right on.

89. Major CLAUSEN. Now, concerning the delays concerning which considerable complaints were made, did you have any discussions as to those delays with Mr. Hoffman?

Mr. LYNCH. Oh, yes.

90. Major CLAUSEN. And did he agree with you as to the delays or did you have differences with him?

Mr. LYNCH. Well, we had differences, no question about it, [2374] as any one will on a job of that kind, but, generally, I will say we agreed.

91. Major CLAUSEN. Did Mr. Hoffman complain himself as to these delays?

Mr. LYNCH. Yes, Bob did.

92. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon?

Mr. LYNCH. Bob did complain.

93. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know anything of a statement he made concerning these delays in writing to General Farthing?

Mr. LYNCH. No, I do not.

94. Major CLAUSEN. Or to the Inspector General of the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. LYNCH. No, I do not.

95. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

96. General GRUNERT. There appear to be no more questions, Mr. Lynch. Thank you for coming in.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2375] **TESTIMONY OF WILLARD BRUCE PINE, 320 CAROLWOOD DRIVE, LOS ANGELES 24, CALIFORNIA.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. PINE. Willard Bruce Pine. My address is 320 Carolwood Drive, Los Angeles 24.

2. Colonel WEST. What is your occupation?

Mr. PINE. Well, at the present time I am in the shirt business, but for the last four years I have been working for the Tenney Committee of the State Legislature.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Pine, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will develop this particular phase of our investigation. So I shall turn you over to the mercies of General Frank.

Mr. PINE. All right.

4. General FRANK. You may proceed, Major Clausen.

5. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. Pine, your connection was with the Tenney Committee, the California State Legislature's joint fact-finding committee on un-American activities?

Mr. PINE. That is correct.

6. Major CLAUSEN. And in connection with that would you give the Board a brief background as to how you became interested in these activities and just what you have done since you first became interested?

Mr. PINE. Well, prior to Pearl Harbor I wanted to get in the Army, and I found I had a heart condition which prevented [2376] me, so I knew a great many of the boys—not a great many but a few agents of the Federal Bureau, and I was anxious to make some connection to do something. So I presume that was about the fall of 1941. Then came Pearl Harbor, and right after that in February I met Jack Tenney, and the budget of the State Committee was rather limited, and as a consequence I offered my services, and from then until practically the present time I have participated in the investigations of Mankind United, most of whose leaders, you know, were afterwards arrested and convicted of sedition; and in the various communist investigations: for instance, now we are actively engaged in the Political Action Committee, that is, their ramifications within the State. And the Rohl case—I mean, when I say "Rohl case" I mean the investigation of Rohl—I was very much interested in because I knew the man and knew something of his background. Then, there were lots of local investigations besides Mankind United, various religious organizations who prey upon people in the State.

7. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Pine, you were present, were you, at the hearing of the California Tenney Committee, which I will refer to as "the Tenney Committee," on February 27, 1943?

Mr. PINE. Yes, I was.

8. Major CLAUSEN. And you recall at that time that certain questions were asked you as to your investigation particularly of the background of Hans Wilhelm Rohl as disclosed by the files and records of the office of the Immigration and Naturalization Commissioner in the Federal Building in Los Angeles, California?

Mr. PINE. Yes.

[2377] 9. Major CLAUSEN. And you were asked at that time, and it is a fact, isn't it, that you examined those files and those records for the purpose of ascertaining the background of Mr. Rohl?

Mr. PINE. That is correct.

10. Major CLAUSEN. And on one occasion you also were accompanied by the attorney for the Tenney Committee, Mr. R. E. Combs, chief counsel and investigator?

Mr. PINE. Yes, sir.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Now, in that investigation did you see the application of Mr. Rohl for naturalization?

Mr. PINE. Yes, I did.

12. Major CLAUSEN. And did you read the documents in support of that application, consisting of the interrogation of Mr. Rohl by the immigration inspector?

Mr. PINE. Yes.

13. Major CLAUSEN. As a result of that investigation are you able to say of your own knowledge, from having read those papers, what those papers disclosed as to the recommendation with respect to whether citizenship should or should not be granted this party Rohl?

Mr. PINE. I know that there was an application for a warrant, an application for the issuance of a warrant of arrest made by Judson Shore, who was the agent in charge, on the grounds that he was illegally in this country, and the one premise was the fact of the incorrect entry in Honolulu on the yacht VEGA in 1938.

14. Major CLAUSEN. And do you remember when it was that you examined these files and records, over what period of time?

[2378] Mr. PINE. Well, I probably—that's very hard to say. I was probably there six or seven times, once with Combs, twice I think with an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and probably two or three times besides that.

15. Major CLAUSEN. Have you read the report of the House Committee on Military Affairs?

Mr. PINE. Yes. I worked with them, with their investigator constantly while he was out here.

16. Major CLAUSEN. I refer to the committee report dated June 14, 1944.

Mr. PINE. Yes, I have a copy of it.

17. Major CLAUSEN. And do you recall a letter set forth I believe on page 5 of that report, purportedly sent by General Kingman to Mr. Schofield of the Immigration and Naturalization Bureau at Washington?

Mr. PINE. Yes, sir.

18. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember if the files in Los Angeles had that letter or a copy of that letter in the files?

Mr. PINE. I am very positive—very, very positive, having gone through that file several times, that there was no copy of that letter, because the first I ever knew of General Kingman's letter was when I read the House Military Affairs Committee report.

19. Major CLAUSEN. Now, do you recall in the investigation of these records at Los Angeles a letter from F. H. Crockett of the Immigration and Naturalization Service at Laredo, Texas, dated March 7, 1941, to the effect that he had no record there of Mr. Rohl having gone in or out of the United States at that point?

[2379] Mr. PINE. Yes.

20. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember a statement by Mr. Wilcox Cole or some other official of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to the effect that in 1932 it was absolutely impossible for an alien to go in or out of the United States at Laredo without being questioned as to his citizenship status?

Mr. PINE. Yes, I recall that.

21. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall a statement in the record at Los Angeles that when the yacht RAMONA stopped at Acapulco, Mexico, where it took on gasoline and supplies, that there was no record of Rohl being present on the boat either as a passenger or a member of the crew?

Mr. PINE. Yes, sir.

22. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember that?

Mr. PINE. Yes, I remember that very well.

23. Major CLAUSEN. The substance of that being in the file.

Do you remember whether in looking over these records at Los Angeles there was any letter from Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., in general urging that Rohl be made a citizen, that the case be expedited?

Mr. PINE. There was a letter dated, I think it was, January 22nd in 1941, which was an order for Rohl to proceed to the Islands to take his part in—well, I think I can't quote the letter; it's right in there—in the work in which you are interested.

24. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember the letter in the files there from T. B. Schumacher of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, dated February 4, 1941, asking that the case be [2380] made a special case and that the case be expedited?

Mr. PINE. Yes, I do.

25. Major CLAUSEN. And, by the way, when you examined this file you took notes, did you, Mr. Pine?

Mr. PINE. Yes, we did.

26. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember a letter dated March 13, 1941, from some official of the Immigration and Naturalization Service stating in effect that when the VEGA sailed from the West Coast to Honolulu, Rohl was not revealed on the passenger manifest as a member of the crew or a passenger?

Mr. PINE. No. As I understood it, it sailed from the East Coast but touched at Nassau in the Bahamas on that trip and in Panama and then proceeded to Honolulu.

27. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember that there were statements to the effect that that manifest showed Mr. Rohl as being born at Iola, Kansas?

Mr. PINE. Yes, which is the birth place of his wife.

28. Major CLAUSEN. And do you remember in the income tax returns, mention of which was made in these files at Los Angeles, that Mr. Rohl had stated under oath that he was a citizen of the United States?

Mr. PINE. Yes, I do.

29. Major CLAUSEN. And do you remember that some document there stated that he had set forth in a return that he had been naturalized in 1921?

Mr. PINE. That is correct.

30. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Pine, I show you the transcript of the hearing before the Tenney Committee, and certain purported

[2381] testimony given by Mr. Rohl, set forth on pages 807, 808, and 809, as bracketed off by me, and I ask you to read that and then tell me if you recall that testimony having been given by Mr. Rohl on that occasion.

Mr. PINE. Did I read particularly this you have marked here?

31. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. PINE. Yes, I was there. That is, as I remember it, exactly what he testified to.

32. Major CLAUSEN. And is that your recollection of the testimony that he gave on that occasion?

Mr. PINE. Yes, sir.

33. General FRANK. There is no error in transcription? Generally there is no error in the transcription of the testimony by the reporters?

Mr. PINE. No. Can I make a remark off the record? As a matter of fact, the explanation he gave his friends outside of that hearing was exactly the same thing, that he was too busy traveling, never gave it a thought.

34. Major CLAUSEN. The particular point of the part I have bracketed off was that he, Hans Wilhelm Rohl, had told Colonel Wyman that he, Hans Rohl, was an alien, and that he had told Colonel Wyman this before the contract of December 1940 had been signed.

Mr. PINE. Well, as I remember his testimony, when he was questioned as to whether he had ever told Wyman—that is Colonel Wyman—that he was a German alien, he replied to that by saying that he hadn't before, but in this contract he had to.

[2382] 35. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. PINE. Because it was a secret contract.

36. General GRUNERT. He had to, or had told him?

Mr. PINE. No. He said he had to. I think you will find his answer was that, "On this contract I had to tell them."

37. General GRUNERT. He had to tell him, but did he tell him?

38. Major CLAUSEN. It says here—do you want to read that and see?

39. General GRUNERT. What does it say there that he did do? A man may have to do things, but he sometimes won't do them anyway.

Mr. PINE. "I did on the Hawaiian Constructors." That was exactly what he testified to, and I know he gave that statement to the Military Affairs Committee, I believe.

40. Major CLAUSEN. Now, concerning that subject, Mr. Pine, is there any information of your own knowledge that you can give the Board as to a verification of the fact that he, Rohl, had told Colonel Wyman that he was an alien before that contract was signed?

Mr. PINE. No. No, not of my own knowledge.

41. Major CLAUSEN. Is there any information that you can give the Board as to any inefficiency of the work of Colonel Wyman in the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. PINE. Well, it would all be verbal. Now, I believe you have got Mr. Combs coming up here.

42. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. who?

Mr. PINE. Combs, who was the chief investigator for the committee.

[2383] 43. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. PINE. And he will have all those affidavits. They took a great many which were not even available at the time of the Military Affairs Committee hearing, but the only other people who now have them are the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

44. Major CLAUSEN. I see.

Mr. PINE. And he has them. They are all in affidavit form and sworn to.

45. General FRANK. I would like to ask some questions here.

Mr. PINE. Yes, sir.

46. General FRANK. How did the California Committee happen to be investigating an Army officer's activity in Honolulu?

Mr. PINE. Well, they didn't start to investigate an Army officer's activity in Honolulu, but they were investigating Hans Wilhelm Rohl in this State, and through the investigation of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, whose life was so bound up with Colonel Wyman's since his arrival here in 1935, why, naturally that came into it, but Wyman came in incidentally; I mean the committee had no jurisdiction over him.

47. General FRANK. You have been intimately associated with this committee?

Mr. PINE. Yes, I have, sir.

48. General FRANK. The Tenney Committee?

Mr. PINE. Yes, sir.

49. General FRANK. Based on the background of testimony that has been received by the Tenney Committee that you feel to be authentic, will you make a general statement to the Board as to the relations between Rohl and Wyman over a period of years?

[2384] Mr. PINE. Yes, I will be perfectly willing to make a statement.

50. General FRANK. Go ahead.

Mr. PINE. From numerous witnesses whom I have interviewed and others when I have been present when they were being interviewed—

51. General FRANK. Was this testimony under oath?

Mr. PINE. Yes. When they were being interviewed by investigators for the Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives and in some instances by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and by the statements, some of which were not taken under oath because at that time they seemed to be superfluous, that—

52. General FRANK. Let's confine this to conclusions reached through authentic information that is taken under oath.

Mr. PINE. That from the day—or correct that, please. Within a month or several months after Colonel Wyman's arrival as District Engineer in Los Angeles, that his association with Hans W. Rohl socially was certainly an inappropriate one for a District Engineer to maintain with a contractor, in that their lives, relationships, and pleasures were so closely welded together—

Now, do you want me to—excuse me. Do you want me to go ahead and explain that, or—

53. General FRANK. I should like to have it explained briefly. And have you knowledge as to who paid for all this entertainment?

Mr. PINE. No, I have not.

54. General FRANK. Well, explain it briefly so as to show [2385] the nature of this entertainment.

Mr. PINE. Well, it goes back long before there was any thought of Pearl Harbor or anything of that nature. Rohl owned the VEGA, after of course the RAMONA, and we had very many mutual friends who, every time they were invited aboard the VEGA, would say they would never go again if Bill was going to have the drunken major on board. I never knew Wyman's name, never knew who he was at that time, but I knew him by that name, and Mrs. Rohl had told her friends that she had to put up with him because of business reasons, and through the testimony of his servants, members of his crew—and I say "testimony," I mean by that affidavits taken by the Military Affairs Committee and statements taken by the Tenney Committee, that they were very often in residence together at the Biltmore Hotel, that Wyman was a frequent guest at the Rohl home and a partner in Bill's night life.

55. General FRANK. Do you think that any reasonable share of the expenses of this entertainment and pleasure could have been paid for out of the salary of an Army officer of Wyman's grade?

Mr. PINE. As I understand it, all the suites in the Biltmore Hotel and everywhere else were taken in the name of Rohl, and I don't see how it would be humanly possible for an Army officer to have maintained the pace that the Colonel seemed to.

Can I speak off the record? Of course, I have seen all his club bills, and so forth. I know about what he was spending on alimony and things of that kind.

56. General FRANK. All right. Go ahead.

[2386] 57. Major CLAUSEN. I wonder if you could say, from your examination of these club bills and other evidences of indebtedness, anything further in answer to the question of General Frank as to whether the Colonel would be living beyond his means as a Major and have to have independent resources to maintain this pace.

Mr. PINE. That, sir, is very hard to tell. Those club bills are very deceiving. In some months the Colonel would spend \$75, and other months it would be less than \$2, and very often—his first wife explained it that, well, when they would have these large bills it would be a group of friends who would go out, and because the Colonel belonged to the club, why, their check would possibly be only \$10, but it would reflect a very large amount on the bill. You see what I mean? In other words, the others would pay him their share in cash. You see, he belonged to a great number of clubs, but that was deceptive again because as an Army officer his dues were very small, and many of them he didn't use very frequently.

58. Major CLAUSEN. Now, what you are referring to, Mr. Pine, are club bills of clubs to which Colonel Wyman belonged and which bills were in his name?

Mr. PINE. That is correct, sir.

59. Major CLAUSEN. But what I have in mind are bills that would be normal bills for expensive parties at the Biltmore Hotel, for example.

Mr. PINE. Well, they would be all so far as I know—now, I didn't go through the Biltmore records personally; just one day. But you would really have to be a millionaire to support the expenditures made in that hotel—by Mr. Rohl, [2387] however.

60. Major CLAUSEN. And specifically also, with respect to the yacht trips that were taken by Colonel Wyman and the other forms of entertainment to which you have testified, the question is then posed as to whether, if Colonel Wyman paid his share of all that entertainment, it could have been done out of a Major's salary.

Mr. PINE. I don't think it could be done out of the President's salary, as a matter of fact.

61. Major CLAUSEN. Now, did you in Los Angeles yourself know a Werner Plack, Mr. Pine?

Mr. PINE. Yes, I did, quite well.

62. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have occasion to see Hans Wilhelm Rohl in company with this Werner Plack?

Mr. PINE. Yes, very possibly I saw them together three or four times, but there was only one incident which stands out in my mind when I know definitely they were together.

63. Major CLAUSEN. Would you tell that to the Board, please?

Mr. PINE. Well, it was in the summer of 1938. The reason I place it as 1938 was, a friend of mine who is now dead was out here visiting me, and we had been to the baseball game. We went over to this place called the Swing Club in Hollywood, which was at 1710 North Los Palmas, and I imagine we arrived there—I hesitate to say—probably around midnight. After we had been there a short time there was a floor show, small floor show going on, with a chorus, and the orchestra was playing, and suddenly the master of ceremonies stopped the music and they swung into a new tune, and all the girls and the two men, as I remember it, in the floor show all started [2388] to sing, "Here comes Bill, here comes Bill, here comes Bill, here comes Bill Rohl now."

Well, naturally, knowing—having known Bill, I turned to see who was coming in, and it was Bill, Werner Plack, and some white-haired gentleman; I don't know who he was, have never seen him since.

64. Major CLAUSEN. What was your acquaintance with this Werner Plack?

Mr. PINE. Werner Plack I met in 19—this has got to be an approximate date—about 1935. Werner came over here as a guest of Baron Von Gunhardt, who then lived on the corner of Roxbury and Lexington in Beverly Hills.

65. General FRANK. Just a minute. Spell that for the reporter.

Mr. PINE. V-o-n G-u-n-d or G-u-n-h-a-r-d-t, I guess it was. And I met Werner many times during that summer. He seemed to be completely anti-Nazi and against Hitler. Shortly after that he returned to Germany where, from my memory, I believe he remained about one year. On his return to this country he was a thoroughly indoctrinated admirer of the Nazi government. I saw Werner off and on in friends' homes and in my own, at various public places around Beverly Hills, frequently, until his return to Germany—I hesitate—it was before the Russian invasion. It was previous to June 22, 1940.

66. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know whether that return was voluntary?

Mr. PINE. Not of my own knowledge. I know that Harry Flannery of the C. B. S. told me, when he saw Werner in Berlin [2389] when he got back—you see, Werner during this last two years in this country spent most of his time drunk, and for anyone to believe that

he could possibly be an agent of the German Government seemed ridiculous. However, Harry W. Flannery, who was then representing Columbia Broadcasting in Berlin, told me that from the time Werner Plack arrived in Berlin a very few days only transpired before he became an executive of the German Foreign Office.

67. Major CLAUSEN. This Baron Von Gunhardt, who was he?

Mr. PINE. Well, there were four—I never knew them very well. There was Girt Von Gunhardt. They were married to the Anheuser-Busch family, I believe, or the Anheuser-Busch girl married Von Gunhardt, and they lived in Germany, and they moved to this country. There was one brother who was in a great deal of trouble with the Nazi Government over there. The other brothers, as I understand, were intensely loyal.

68. Major CLAUSEN. I was going to ask you, first, if you knew anything about the subsidizing of Werner Plack while in this country by the German Consul in San Francisco, Fritz Weideman, or the German Consul in Los Angeles, that doctor, what was his name?

Mr. PINE. Geisman.

69. Major CLAUSEN. Geisman.

Mr. PINE. I personally know nothing of that except again by hearsay, that Dr. Geisling was the one who was instrumental in sending Werner back to Germany, and from what I understand Werner sold Dr. Geisling a bill of goods, that is, by that, that he understood the American temperament and the American psychology, and if he had a job in the German Foreign Office, [2390] why, he could do a good job. You see, Werner was the one who was instrumental in putting P. G. Wodehouse and the Crown Prince on the air.

70. Major CLAUSEN. In Germany?

Mr. PINE. Yes, in Germany when he returned.

71. Major CLAUSEN. Well, can you tell the Board anything as to the connection of Wyman with this Hans Wilhelm Rohl relationship as it is affected by this Werner Plack, in a general way, with leads?

Mr. PINE. I don't think there was any connection whatever between Colonel Wyman and Werner Plack. So far as I know, they may have never met.

72. General FRANK. You know that Rohl knew Plack?

Mr. PINE. Yes, I know that he was with him that night, and they were very friendly. That I unhesitatingly can testify to, that in various parties where they were around in the same group I am sure they must have been together, but I wouldn't testify to the fact they were; but that night there is no question about it.

73. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

[2391] 74. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions, General Russell?

75. General RUSSELL. Yes. I would like to see what this is all about. This Tenney investigation started in 1943, did it not?

Mr. PINE. No, no; not the investigation. The investigation really started when we received the amazing news in Beverly Hills that Rohl had been executed in Hawaii—which turned out of course to be incorrect; and I'll tell you when that was. That was right after December 17, 1941, right after Pearl Harbor.

76. General RUSSELL. This Tenney Committee that was set up by the California legislature exists for the purpose of investigating un-American activities?

Mr. PINE. That is correct.

77. General RUSSELL. That is its function? Did you begin working with that committee about the time it came into being?

Mr. PINE. No, I didn't start working with that committee until, I believe it was, January 1942.

78. General RUSSELL. Now, when did this man Rohl become the subject of investigation by that committee?

Mr. PINE. Well, it was when all the rumors began to circulate very freely, we began to check into his background.

79. General RUSSELL. Briefly stated, what was the sum and substance of these rumors which prompted this committee to investigate Rohl?

Mr. PINE. The sum and substance of the first thing that ever came to my attention was when a gentleman by the name of J. Raymond Owens gave the Navy his yacht for the duration. That was about a 150-foot yacht. So Ray Owens and L. B. Askins [2392] went down to turn the boat over to the Navy. Ray was taking his personal things off—his liquor off, and taking his crew off. After they returned from Newport Harbor they called me, as well as almost everybody else they knew, that night, to tell that Rohl had been executed; Lieutenant Nivers had told them it had been discovered that Rohl had been receiving money from the German government for years, and that he had never been an American, and was an alien—the story of course was incorrect, as it turned out—was an alien at the time of Pearl Harbor, that he had had access to all the plans, information, and military installations there; and as a result of this, that he had been tried and executed for treason. Of course, that news spread like wild-fire. That was the 17th of December, if my memory serves me rightly, 1941; and so far as we knew for another month—it was at least six weeks after that—we thoroughly believed that Rohl had been executed, until several month, until Floy Rohl came back on a clipper, and she was asked by a mutual friend, and she said no, that Bill had not only not been executed, but was in full charge of construction work in the islands.

80. General RUSSELL. I have not found anything yet that set the Tenney committee on Rohl, or anything that they found out about him; and that is what I was trying to find out.

Mr. PINE. Mr. Combs is probably much better qualified than I am. He is the counsel and the chief attorney of the committee, and he has the entire files. It is pretty hard for me, out of my head.

81. General RUSSELL. Well, is there anything in the investigation which relates to improper conduct of Rohl in connection [2393] with the construction work out in the Hawaiian Department?

Mr. PINE. Yes; there are in the records now, which is not in that transcript.

82. General RUSSELL. Evidence to show improper conduct of Rohl, out in the Hawaiian Department?

Mr. PINE. Oh! I wish you would qualify that.

83. General RUSSELL. Well, you qualify it in your answer.

Mr. PINE. Why, yes, to this extent: There are affidavits from the general superintendent of the Hawaiian Constructors that when he was asked if he had ever seen Mr. Rohl drunk over there, in his affidavit he replied that he had seen him almost every day and he

never had seen him when he would have called him completely sober.

84. General RUSSELL. That is whose affidavit?

Mr. PINE. The name is King—John King, who for four or five months was general superintendent of Constructors.

85. General RUSSELL. That was prior to December 7, 1941, or was it thereafter?

Mr. PINE. Thereafter, because—

86. General FRANK. We are going to have Mr. King as a witness.

87. General RUSSELL. All right.

Mr. PINE. A man by the name of Wuckheiser, too.

88. General RUSSELL. Mr. Pine, how long had you known this man Rohl?

Mr. PINE. I would set that about 1932, because I remember asking, at the time of the change in administration, when Hoover went out and President Roosevelt came in, whether it would affect his business, and that is the only reason I say it must have been 1932 or '33.

[2394] 89. General RUSSELL. Had you had social contacts with him, and had you spoken to him over this period of time? Did he know who you were?

Mr. PINE. Yes, although I understood that Floy Rohl told a mutual friend that Bill had said that every time I had ever met him he had been so drunk he only remembered me once, when I sat on the arms of his chairs sometimes for two hours at a time. This was long before the time I had any idea he was a German alien, for that matter.

90. General RUSSELL. Did you ever have any business dealings with Rohl?

Mr. PINE. None whatever.

91. General RUSSELL. You only came into the investigation by virtue of your association with this Tenney Committee?

Mr. PINE. That is correct.

92. General RUSSELL. And do you think that they took after him with this Tenney Committee because they got the report that he had been executed in Hawaii?

Mr. PINE. Yes. I know that was the first thing that interested me, and then when he showed up back here—that is, everything was all right; and then I believe is the time that Mr. Combs started into work to find out how he became a citizen at a time like that.

93. General RUSSELL. That is all.

94. General FRANK. I have nothing.

95. General GRUNERT. I have one or two questions. From your association with the Tenney Committee, and what you know of your own accord, do you know of anything un-American that Wyman has ever done?

[2395] Mr. PINE. That Wyman has ever done? Well, of course, that depends upon your interpretation of "un-American." If you mean in regard to anything subversive—no.

96. General GRUNERT. Is it un-American to get drunk, if he got drunk?

Mr. PINE. No.

97. General GRUNERT. Is it un-American to carouse, if he did carouse?

Mr. PINE. No.

98. General GRUNERT. Mr. Pine, this Board is limited in the scope of its investigation, to such phases as may bear directly or indirectly on the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. PINE. I understand.

99. General GRUNERT. We are not investigating everything or carrying everything through to conclusions because of leads received in attempting to accomplish our objective. I explain that to most all of the witnesses that have been connected with former investigations, because I do not want anybody to understand that this Board will exhaustively go into phases that are not connected with what we have been charged with doing; and that, of course, is what led up to Pearl Harbor, and what happened at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. PINE. May I ask if you have Rohl's nurse under subpoena, Madeline Ferguson?

100. Major CLAUSEN. No.

101. General GRUNERT. I think we have testimony, haven't we, such as she gave?

102. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir; we do not have, here.

Mr. PINE. Madeline Ferguson was a trained nurse who [2396] endeavored to enter the Army, and she had sinus trouble, I believe, so she was rejected. However, the American Red Cross accepted her services and sent her to the islands, and shortly after her arrival there, I have forgotten the date on that, she had Rohl as a case, and her affidavit of course Mr. Combs has; but if she speaks the truth, it reveals beyond question that Rohl feared something of which I know nothing about; that is, that when he returned here to the coast she still attended him, at the Palace Hotel. The first thing that "Jim" Gwynn and—well, it was Tom Connolly's brother—I don't know—were in the insurance business; that when he moved into the suite, he used to go behind every picture, beds, and so forth; and when they had to move to another suite, they were positive that the place had been wired and that's why they had moved them; but they accused her, in front of Rohl, of being actively working for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, planted next to him by them, and that that was the first time, that she had attended him at Honolulu for months, and she continued to attend him at various times, in the Biltmore Hotel and the Palace Hotel; that she knew there wasn't anything wrong outside of his drinking. She didn't go to the Federal Bureau of Investigation at that time, because she thought it was such a silly story; but that he lived in constant dread, and particularly, that "Jim" Gwynn and "Pat" Connolly were more worried than Rohl.

103. General GRUNERT. Had any of these persons that you have mentioned ever been in politics here in California?

Mr. PINE. Who do you mean?

104. General GRUNERT. There was nothing political about this [2397] Tenney Committee, was there?

Mr. PINE. None whatever. "Jack" Tenney had never heard of "Bill" Rohl or known him, so far as I know.

105. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether Colonel Wyman, or Major Wyman at that time, dabbled in politics at all?

Mr. PINE. I have never heard such a thing.

106. General GRUNERT. Now, knowing what I might call our limitation on our field of investigation, can you think of anything else that

you might add that might help the Board or assist the Board in its mission to get at the facts on those phases that pertain directly to the Pearl Harbor attack?

Mr. PINE. Well, you probably have access to wherever she is, Gertrude Campbell, who is now Mrs. Brunner.

107. General GRUNERT. She has already been a witness.

Mr. PINE. She has? Well, then, there is a Mrs. Cooper, I believe.

108. Major CLAUSEN. We did not call Mrs. Cooper.

Mr. PINE. That's entirely hearsay on my part, from men who were there.

109. Major CLAUSEN. If you think Mrs. Cooper should be called, could you give us—

Mr. PINE. I don't think so. I am just trying. Was she the lady who was with him in Honolulu, and then with him up in Edmonton?

110. Major CLAUSEN. I think so. There is some statement to that effect in the affidavit of a Ferman K. Pickering.

Mr. PINE. Pickering?

111. Major CLAUSEN. Some things have been beyond the scope of the Board's activities.

[2398] Mr. PINE. You see, a lot of this is confused in my mind from what I knew of the Alcan Highway investigation. I think I was thinking of her in that connection.

112. Major CLAUSEN. Do you think Mr. Combs will have an affidavit from this Madeline Ferguson which would bear on this point that you mentioned this morning?

Mr. PINE. Yes; he will have, as I recall it, two long affidavits from her, sworn to.

113. General GRUNERT. Then you can cover that.

114. Major CLAUSEN. All right. And would he also have any pertinent leads, which would limit it to our mission?

Mr. PINE. You will have the complete file.

115. Major CLAUSEN. Or do you have anything in addition to what he might have?

Mr. PINE. No, I have nothing. He has everything—the entire file.

116. General GRUNERT. That appears to cover about all we can get from this witness. We thank you for coming over here today.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Brief recess.)

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT EUGENE McKEE, GENERAL CONTRACTOR, EL PASO, TEXAS, AND LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you state to the Board your full name and address.

Mr. McKEE. Robert Eugene McKee, and my address is El Paso, Texas, and also, Los Angeles.

2. Colonel WEST. And what is your occupation, Mr. McKee?

[2399] Mr. McKEE. I am a general contractor.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. McKee, this Board is particularly interested in facts bearing on what happened prior to Pearl Harbor and during the attack, and any phases that bear on that story. That in-

cludes an investigation of what happened in the construction line prior to Pearl Harbor. Now, the field that we cover is so broad that we have parceled out some of these special subjects to members of the Board, and your friend, General Frank, has that particular specialty, and he will be assisted by Major Clausen; so I will ask General Frank to lead in asking the questions.

4. General FRANK. Mr. McKee, will you state generally the scope of your operations, to show the size of your firm.

Mr. MCKEE. Well, we are working, we have offices today in Panama; Dallas, Texas; Santa Fe, New Mexico; Odgen, Utah; and Los Angeles, California, and we have considerable work for the Navy, the Army, the Veterans' Administration, and the Ordnance Department, I think the Santa Fe job is used; as well as for the various railroads. We do a good deal of work for them. We had an office out in Honolulu, as you know, up to the time—well, till about six months after Pearl Harbor. We were there about five or six years.

5. General FRANK. In 1941, on what work in Honolulu was your firm engaged?

Mr. MCKEE. We were working at Hickam Field, Schofield Barracks, and Fort Shafter; and I am not sure whether we were still working at Pearl Harbor. I don't think we were at Pearl Harbor. It might have been, the early part of 1941.

6. General FRANK. In the early part of 1941, what as you [2400] remember was about the estimated amount of your contracts?

Mr. MCKEE. Everywhere?

7. General FRANK. In Hawaii.

Mr. MCKEE. Well, I would say we must have had several millions of dollars worth of work.

8. General FRANK. Several? Five? Ten?

Mr. MCKEE. Well, I would say somewhere around from three to four million. That is in Pearl Harbor alone. I mean, in Honolulu, alone.

9. General FRANK. In Honolulu alone?

Mr. MCKEE. Yes. That is just from recollection.

10. General FRANK. Now, did you know Colonel Wyman?

Mr. MCKEE. I never met him. I had had correspondence and conversation with him over the long-distance phone.

11. General FRANK. What was the nature of that?

Mr. MCKEE. Well, the first—when he first came over to Honolulu, as district engineer, the first contacts I had with him was in connection with a building at Wheeler Field. We built a large barracks at Wheeler Field, and on the roof, without going into too much details, constructions and materials, user for insulating material, Vermiculite, and on top of that, put a roofing paper. The Vermiculite unfortunately holds moisture, and it formed bubbles of air or moisture underneath the roofing, and it raised up into blisters; and this occurred after we were through with the building. We hadn't yet received our final payment; and about that time I think Colonel Wyman came over, and we were trying to get him to accept the building; our contention being, and which I believe we were afterwards verified as being correct in, that we had put on the [2401] materials, as specified, and it wasn't our difficulties, to get our final payment. Well, Colonel Wyman brought up this question of these blisters on the roof, and he wanted

us to put up a cash bond—the money. I offered to put up—we already had a bond on the job, and the roofer, the Peerless Roofing Company, who did the work for us in Honolulu. We were willing to make good the guarantee, in case the roof went bad. That occurs frequently in Honolulu on account of the moisture; not enough interval between rainfalls to let a roof out there dry up thoroughly; and he wouldn't accept anything, he said, except cash. Well, we offered to give him Government bonds, and first one thing and another—anything else, but we didn't want to give him the money, because I thought it was difficult to impound cash; so we had quite a little correspondence about that matter, and finally, through efforts of—in Washington, we had them agree to accept some form of Government bonds, and the matter was closed, and we put up the bonds. I don't know where they were deposited; but as soon as Colonel Wyman left, why, they returned the bonds to us; and that was our first instance of having, you know, really from myself coming in contact, although our office had other contacts with him.

12. General FRANK. Who was supervising your work in Honolulu?

Mr. McKEE. Well, there was originally Mr. Jones, and we had a Mr. Hardie, and Mr. Stoker, and Mr. Wylie.

13. General FRANK. Who was heading up the organization for you?

Mr. McKEE. Well, originally, Mr. Jones, and then he left to come back, and then Mr. Wylie, and Mr. Stoker looked after the office, and Mr. Hardie, on the outside; and of course we had a lot of other men, there, you know—Mr. Clark, and Mr. [2402] Hatchel was over there, and quite a few others.

14. General FRANK. Now, do you remember when the Hawaiian Constructors came into being?

Mr. McKEE. Well, yes; to some extent. We had been doing considerable work there, and I think the Hawaiian Constructors first started to build some temporary quarters near Hickam Field, as well as I recollect it. We had been in association with another—on other work, under, I think it was Major Harold, for some various work. I think it was a hospital, Tripler hospital, with about six or seven other Honolulu contractors; and, as I say, about this time, I think, when Colonel Wyman came over, why, with Rohl-Connolly and the Callahan concerns, came over. We had figured some air fields on the various islands; sometimes, some of the other local contractors, there; and although we thought that we, and some others, were entitled to the business, why, we didn't get it, they gave it to, I think, Callahan, or Rohl-Connolly, I don't know which; and then as I say, about that time they formed this, what I understood was Hawaiian Constructors—wasn't that the name?

15. General FRANK. Yes; that is right.

Mr. McKEE. I don't know just exactly who were the parties to it. I think Mr. Woolley was in on it, as well as Rohl-Connolly.

16. General FRANK. Gunther & Shirley?

Mr. McKEE. Yes; some other concern.

17. General FRANK. And the Callahan Company?

Mr. McKEE. Callahan.

18. General FRANK. Were you approached to come in on this organization?

Mr. McKEE. Not originally, not when they first came over, [2403] not until after Pearl Harbor.

19. General FRANK. Did you have a plant and a constructing organization in Honolulu at the time?

Mr. McKEE. Yes, we had probably the largest organization over there, I guess, at the time.

20. General FRANK. Do you know why you were not approached to become a part of this organization, with the largest construction organization in the islands at the time?

Mr. McKEE. Well, only from what was hearsay, and that is that these men were friends of Colonel Wyman, and followed him around from various jobs that he had had in the past, that's all. I understood they were more or less favorites of his, Connolly and ourselves, but I don't think very few other contractors really had very much opportunity.

21. General FRANK. Who were the others who had no opportunity?

Mr. McKEE. Well, I think, as I say—Mr. Black was one, and there were quite a few others, I don't remember all the names of the fellows over there, now; and although I think the Hawaiian contractors—do you remember the Hawaiian contractors? They went in on it, didn't they, finally?

22. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. McKEE. They were not very happy about it, so they told us, and as I say, we were never approached, and I understood the same thing applied to most all of the other contractors. I don't remember all the names right now, and we discussed it more or less informally.

23. General FRANK. Do you know why you were not approached?

Mr. McKEE. No, I don't know the reason, I suppose, except that perhaps they wanted someone else.

[2404] 24. General FRANK. Were you ever approached?

Mr. McKEE. After Pearl Harbor, after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, why, we were approached by Colonel Wyman, and he insisted that we go in with the Hawaiian Constructors. Of course, I don't know whether you know it or not, but they kinda call me "the lone wolf," I don't usually go in on any combination of any kind, and I have always been opposed more or less to these joint ventures. I feel that greater efficiency and success can be gained and more responsibility by sending, in one place, and I was somewhat afraid that these joint ventures were leading to too much profit on some of the jobs. Frankly, I didn't think it would stand up, and the original—after the bombing, as I remember it now, after Pearl Harbor, he notified our organization that we would have to go in with the Hawaiian Constructors, as a subcontractor, or go out of business; and they wired me and phoned me, and I believe I wrote them and wired them back, whichever was available at that time, that I was opposed to going in with the Hawaiian Constructors on these general principles, that I was willing to do any work that the Army wanted me to do and I would be glad to do it without any fee whatever, and they could have our entire organization; and as I said, then, the amount of money involved, so far as I was concerned, it didn't make any difference. I didn't care whether we made anything at all or not. That didn't seem to satisfy him, and I think he called me over the long-distance telephone when I was in Los Angeles, and he talked to me and told

me that if I didn't—so that was my impression, anyhow, in words; I don't know the exact words he used—that if I didn't go in with Rohl-Connolly, that he would drive us out of [2405] business as far as the Hawaiian Islands were concerned. "Well," I told him, "Colonel, I guess if that is the way you feel about it, I guess you will have to do it." And I also impressed on him, and I also notified Wyman, that as far as I was concerned, they could have our entire organization, and we would do any repair work or any work that they wanted, and without any fee whatever, if they so desired, and we did finally, after quite an exchange of telegrams and letters and protests to Washington, why, we finally did take over the repairs on some buildings, and I think we were there about six months at Pearl Harbor, and we finally sold out to the engineers our equipment.

We had quite a few unfinished jobs, and of course what I was more concerned about was the fact that we wanted to get finished our own jobs, and he wanted us to throw those into Hawaiian Constructors and finish them as subcontractors of Hawaiian Constructors. I thought that we were more familiar with it, and I believe that the facts are that we were, and probably had a little more efficient organization especially for finishing those contracts than they could possibly have had with the Hawaiian Constructors; so I refused to go in as a subcontractor, and finally we did finish all the contracts we had, except two, which were stopped, and as far as we were concerned, were not completed. That was true I think of Fort Shafter Barracks, I am not sure—two contracts—and we settled up those contracts satisfactorily, apparently, to them and ourselves.

After a period of time, that part was settled. Then we went ahead and did considerable repair work. They used our [2406] equipment and our materials, and various other things, and after a long period of time, why, they finally, when it was finished, they paid us for it, and paid us a small fee, although we didn't request it.

[2407] 25. General FRANK. Were you ever given an opportunity to come into the Hawaiian Constructors on the same level as Gunther-Shirley and Rohl-Connolly?

Mr. McKEE. Not as I recollect, no. They wanted us to work as sub-contractors, the way I understood it.

26. General FRANK. Did you have any opportunity to know anything about the type of organization under which the Hawaiian Constructors operated?

Mr. McKEE. Well, very little. We had contact with some of the men. Then I had contact indirectly through my own men with some of their organization.

27. General FRANK. What was the general reputation of that organization?

Mr. McKEE. I would be probably vain if I told you what the general impression was. Their engineers told us we were the only ones for a while that did any work over there after Pearl Harbor, but apparently the organization wasn't very efficient. I am not—that's about the general understanding, that they were not operating a very efficient organization, which is usually the case with too many cooks in the broth.

28. General FRANK. Mr. McKee, do you know of any instances of unnecessary delay that occurred in construction of any projects over there?

Mr. McKEE. Well, I don't know of any specific instances without going into it pretty thoroughly. Some of our men—because I wasn't there, but it was the general understanding that the jobs that they had were not going ahead; now, for what reason, I don't know. A lot of jobs that we figured on, I know, that were supposed to be completed in a certain length of time, [2408] many times weren't even started for months and months after the contracts were let. Why that was, I don't know. But, as I say, the general impression in the islands was that they were delayed; I don't know why.

29. General FRANK. Do you know of any instances—did you hear of any instances—where there was any deliberate delay?

Mr. McKEE. No, I couldn't say that I know of any deliberate delays.

30. General FRANK. Have you any information or any knowledge of anything that happened among the contractors or between the contractors and Colonel Wyman that may have contributed to delays?

Mr. McKEE. What do you exactly mean by that, General?

31. General FRANK. Well, what I am trying to do is to give you an opportunity to state to the Board anything that you may have in the back of your head on the conditions that existed over there.

Mr. McKEE. Well, the only thing I would say in some of our instances, without going into other peoples' field which I am not familiar with—shouldn't be—but from the reports of Mr. Wylie and Mr. Stoker and others—

32. General FRANK. Who were your representatives?

Mr. McKEE. Yes. That many times Colonel Wyman was not in a fit conditions to attend to business. We had lots of times where we couldn't get decisions for reasons which we thought were: wasn't in a condition to attend to business. That was the whole thing.

32. General FRANK. That was because of his lack of sobriety?

Mr. McKEE. Well, apparently, yes. I have had one report [2409] where we had some papers to be signed where he told me that he wasn't—couldn't sign his name at that time. I don't know how far that went.

34. General FRANK. Who gave you that information? Your own representatives?

Mr. McKEE. One of our own men, yes. We had a conference up there and supposed to have it agreed, and at that time he was unable to continue for some reason or another. I wouldn't say that he was—how intoxicated, or anything, he was, because I don't know.

35. General FRANK. Was this before Pearl Harbor?

Mr. McKEE. That was before Pearl Harbor.

36. General FRANK. Who was your representative at that time?

Mr. McKEE. Well, I say, we had my son over there, John McKee, and Mr. Wylie and Mr. Stoker. We had quite an organization. John Clark, Mr. Hardie, Mr. Jones, and—

37. General FRANK. Who would know directly about this?

Mr. McKEE. Well, I think probably Mr. Hardie and Mr. Wylie. Mr. Hardy is down at San Bernardino now.

38. General GRUNERT. Did the lack of that signature at that particular time actually result in delaying any phase of work then going on, or just was it an administrative delay?

Mr. McKEE. Well, I really couldn't say, but we had had—I was just using that as an instance, but we had had difficulty in getting decisions

in order that our work proceed. That was one of the things that we were, of course, interested in. I wasn't so much interested in his habits as I was in getting my job done, because we had times when there was great difficulty in getting decisions for a while there. That was the only thing [2410] that apparently, as far as I am concerned—understand, I have never met Colonel Wyman personally. I wouldn't know him if I saw him.

39. General FRANK. Do you know anything about the association of Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl?

Mr. McKEE. Only what I had heard from previous talks with other members of the Engineering Department of the government, and just general, you might say—I wouldn't say whether it was rumors or general understanding of all the contractors and the professional people regarding his past associations.

40. General FRANK. What was that?

Mr. McKEE. That he was very close to Mr. Rohl, especially, and very intimate with him in many ways, and apparently it was hard for anybody else to get along with him, even officers and the people who worked with him, and such, and also any contractors or anyone.

41. General FRANK. Do you feel that that rebounded to the disadvantage of the government?

Mr. McKEE. Well, I should say so, yes. I think an officer in charge of work should not be bound too closely with anyone with whom he does business; I would say not only an officer but even my own men. I won't permit them, for instance, to be with them or get too intimate material men or sub-contractors. I want them to pay their own way. I don't want them to be obligated. I think the same thing applies to a good officer. I think he should be free to make a decision without any bias to it, feeling. Of course, he can't be if—of course, understand, I read this report which was sent to me of some congressional board, I guess. A copy was sent to me here about two [2411] months ago. I didn't know about all of those things that were mentioned in there, but I have heard generally that he was a man of excessive habits and hard to get along with and was very friendly to especially Rohl-Connolly and Callahan.

42. General FRANK. Can the statements that you just made cover his reputation among the contracting fraternity?

Mr. McKEE. Fraternity, yes.

43. General FRANK. But so far as you know there was no detriment rebounded to the government because of that association?

Mr. McKEE. Well, I would say I don't—it's awfully hard to say anything, specific thing, but I don't think there is any question about its rebounding to the detriment of the government. I don't think there is any question about that. How detrimental, well, that's a matter of comparison.

44. General FRANK. Just because that kind of an association is not healthy?

Mr. McKEE. Yes, and then, it costs the government money. I don't think there is any question about that. I know it cost the government money.

45. General FRANK. Will you expand on that a little bit?

Mr. McKEE. Well, for instance, as I say, we figured some of the air-fields on the various islands just about the time before Pearl Harbor.

They could have taken in several reputable contractors and given the work to and had—and actually saved money under the bid that they gave it to Callahan, for instance, and who are very good men. They were——

46. General FRANK. Who were they?

Mr. McKEE. I am just trying to think. We were low on one [2412] or two projects, and several other contractors involved I don't remember now. It is a matter of record. I could find out. I haven't it with me. But they were all good men. They were all men, I mean, that you would know in Honolulu.

47. General FRANK. And do you feel that the work would have been finished as rapidly as it was finished under the contract on which it was done?

Mr. McKEE. You mean that specific contract?

48. General FRANK. Yes, those fields.

Mr. McKEE. Well, it probably has developed. I don't think—I don't know that they have ever finished the jobs yet, unless the Army finished them. In fact, they didn't even get started on them. I think they would have been farther along. I don't know whether they would have been finished, or not, but I think they would have been farther along, from what reports I had. I don't know whether they would have finished them, because I think Pearl Harbor came in the interval there, and I am not sure whether the government finished them, or not, exactly. Fortunately it was a good thing for us. It could have been very expensive, and with the conditions like they were, but we would have done our best to get it done anyhow.

49. General FRANK. These firms that bid on them and didn't get them had the organization and the plant and equipment with which to do the job?

Mr. McKEE. Yes, I am quite sure they did.

50. General FRANK. Including your own organization?

Mr. McKEE. We had arranged for ours or we wouldn't have figured the job, of course, because it was——

51. General FRANK. Have you anything?

[2413] 52. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. I would like to ask Mr. McKee, for the record, concerning a letter that he wrote which I think should go in this record, to the Honorable R. E. Thomason, on March 1, 1943.

Do you recall writing a letter to Congressman Thomason?

Mr. McKEE. I don't remember, unless—I wrote a lot of letters.

53. Major CLAUSEN. I will read it:

(Letter of March 1, 1943, Robert E. McKee to Honorable R. E. Thomason, is as follows:)

DEAR CONGRESSMAN THOMASON: You no doubt will recollect (if not you can look up your files) that the writer had quite a controversy with the District Engineer's Office in Hawaii, right after "Pearl Harbor" in connection with the desire of Colonel Wyman to have the writer become a part of the Hawaiian Constructors, which was headed by Hans Wilhelm Rohl, of Rohl-Connolly Company of Los Angeles.

I am enclosing herein a newspaper clipping from the El Paso Times, regarding an investigation of Hans Wilhelm Rohl and his connection with Colonel Theodore Wyman. I am sending this to you as I believe this now, without doubt, justifies the position that I took at the time of the controversy, and no doubt they would have been far better off to have had us, or someone else, do the work, but we are probably better off to have had it end as it did. Nevertheless, from what I have heard, a further investigation of Colonel Wyman would not be amiss, and it seems

to me that the Army should follow this matter up. Such men [2414] as Chester Clark in Honolulu and others seem to be well posted regarding certain matters connected with Rohl and Colonel Wyman. How in the world anyone like Colonel Wyman could ever receive the Distinguished Service Cross I can't understand. Please note that portion of Mrs. Rohl's testimony wherein she said that they "tolerated Wyman only because of business." The general rumors are that he was inebriated most of the time.

All of this is for your information and for the good of the government. As far as the writer is concerned, it is a dead issue, but I do question the advisability of having a man like Colonel Wyman the head of anything.

Very truly yours,

ROBERT E. MCKEE,
General Contractor.

Do you recall that letter?

Mr. McKEE. Yes, I do.

54. MAJOR CLAUSEN. That is all I have.

55. General RUSSELL. You testified that you didn't think that this plan of having a number of contractors associated together, as the Hawaiian Constructors were, was a good plan; and as I remember your evidence, you said something in immediate connection therewith about profits, and I did not get the import of that.

Mr. McKEE. Well, the general trend of the so-called joint ventures—that is a new word that they have more or less concocted in the last two or three years. There is no question about it leads to higher prices, costs the government money, because of the fact that you eliminate competition.

56. General RUSSELL. Assuming that the contract entered into [2415] between the government and the joint adventurers is what they call a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, would the number of contractors engaged in the completion of work under such a contract result in higher cost to the government?

Mr. McKEE. Yes, I think it does, because it is the old adage, you know: Everybody's business is nobody's business; and the general tendency has been—I have had several fixed-fee jobs. Personally, I am not in favor of fixed-fee jobs except under dire necessity. I don't think they are economical.

57. General RUSSELL. Assuming that this group of contractors designates one of its members to carry out the work under that type of contract, wouldn't it be possible to operate with the same efficiency and get the same result as if one individual, one partnership or one corporation was doing the work?

Mr. McKEE. It should, but the history of the many such projects is that it has not been.

58. General RUSSELL. Your experience, then, Mr. McKee, in the contracting field, and your observations of that type of operation simply shows that experience indicates that it is more costly to the government?

Mr. McKEE. I think so.

59. General RUSSELL. Now, you were out in the Territory of Hawaii doing some work prior to the time that Wyman interested this other group to come out there, as I understood your testimony?

Mr. McKEE. Yes, several years.

60. General RUSSELL. That work which you had been doing for the government on the installations, had it been done on a flat contract basis or on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis?

Mr. McKEE. Flat contract basis.

[2416] 61. General RUSSELL. Were you familiar with the type of work which was proposed to have been done under this December '40 contract that went to Rohl and his crew?

Mr. McKEE. I don't, of course, know all the work that was embodied in his contract because I have had no opportunity to examine it, but in so far as the original work that he had, I should say we, not only ourselves but many others, were in far better position. He had had no experience in the line of work at all.

62. General RUSSELL. I didn't ask that question. My question was, Were you more or less familiar with the type of work which the government desired to have done when these negotiations with Rohl and his associates were made for the purpose of doing that work?

Mr. McKEE. I think so.

63. General RUSSELL. Did you know what they wanted done out there?

Mr. McKEE. Well, I couldn't say what they wanted done. I don't know just exactly what someone else would want. If you tell me what kind of work it was—

64. General RUSSELL. Let's see if we can understand each other. Wyman had some work out there for the government that he wanted done?

Mr. McKEE. Yes.

65. General RUSSELL. And he went to Rohl and his group to get them to do it; is that right?

Mr. McKEE. That is the best of my understanding of it.

66. General RUSSELL. Yes. Now, what was that work that he wanted done?

[2417] Mr. McKEE. Well, I couldn't say because I have never had an opportunity of examining the contract or to know what the projects were. I know there was some repair work. He built some temporary buildings and quite a variety of jobs.

67. General RUSSELL. Assuming that that work was the installations of underground petroleum tanks, radar stations, landing fields for aircraft, probably some building, was there any reason why, with conditions as they existed in the Territory of Hawaii at that time, that bids for this work could not have been obtained as the other work had been done out there?

Mr. McKEE. When they originally started, the bids could have been obtained, but not after Pearl Harbor.

68. General RUSSELL. In December 1940 was there any good reason that you know as to why the work that was to be done out there for the Army could not have been accomplished on bids?

Mr. McKEE. I don't know of any reason. We were doing it all the time.

69. General RUSSELL. Up to that time?

Mr. McKEE. Had the work under contract, and more permanent character: We were building engine test buildings and other buildings of a permanent character.

70. General RUSSELL. Do you know of any cost-plus-fixed-fee basis contracts that had been done in the Territory of Hawaii prior to December, 1940?

71. General FRANK. Were the Navy doing any; do you know?

Mr. McKEE. The Navy was doing some work at Pearl Harbor, I think; had just started, but it was the Pacific Constructors, I think; some such name of an association of private firms.

72. General RUSSELL. Was it a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract; [2418] do you know?

Mr. McKEE. Well, the first contract—I am sure, General, the first contract was, at the dock, you know; dry-dock. I think they let that by contract. That was the first job that came over. I don't think they let—I am not sure now, but I don't think they let any fixed-fee until later, because we bid on that. I am not sure whether we bid, or not, but the first big job, you know, that amounted to anything was that drydock that they asked for bids on.

73. General FRANK. Was there any work done by any contractor in Hawaii that your organization was not equipped to do?

Mr. McKEE. Yes, there might have been some.

74. General FRANK. What was it?

Mr. McKEE. Well, I would say tunnel work and probably dredging or something of that character, but there were other concerns there who were equipped who made a specialty of that business.

75. General RUSSELL. You were not approached at all by Colonel Wyman in connection with this other work to be done out there?

Mr. McKEE. Never, as far as I know.

76. General RUSSELL. That is all I have.

77. General GRUNERT. Did you have any what they call floating equipment for construction work available to your firm for such work, for instance, as was afterwards done on the string of islands down toward Australia?

Mr. McKEE. Well, we used a lot of floating equipment up here at Benecia. We built those, you know, at the Ordnance, and this big pier. We built all that work. We used floating [2419] equipment for that, this pier and dry-dock.

78. General GRUNERT. I think it appeared in testimony that there was no such equipment available in or about Hawaii or readily procurable for that class of work.

Mr. McKEE. There was some available in Hawaii. Whether it was enough or not, I don't know. The Hawaiian Contracting & Dredging Company had considerable work—had considerable equipment and had been doing considerable work for years there, for Howard Dillingham, isn't it?

79. General FRANK. And you had floating equipment here on the coast?

Mr. McKEE. We had them under lease. We had it rented by—but it was available. I don't know how much was available. In fact, most of the equipment they did use I think they either rented or bought for that purpose. It was available if you wanted to—you know, if you had the work to go out and get it at that time.

80. General GRUNERT. Now will you just give me a few illustrations of how local contractors could have done a better job than the Hawaiian Constructors did? Was it because of equipment available to them at hand that the Constructors had to get from the mainland? Was it because they had materials or could have access to materials to get them there quicker. Was it because they could have priority on shipment, or what was it that would have improved the situation

had these contracts been made with local contractors as compared to having been made with the Hawaiian Constructors? You see what I am getting at?

Mr. McKEE. Better supervision. Just a good General in the Army, the same; they have a good man at the head of it.

[2420] 81. General GRUNERT. Better management?

Mr. McKEE. Better management; that's all.

82. General GRUNERT. Better—

Mr. McKEE. Equipment. As far as equipment, I would say, and the materials, they were practically equally available to anyone with the Army's help. You understand at that time, why, in fact it was congested, traffic congestion to Honolulu, has been congested for many years, even before the war. There always was a shortage of transportation to everybody.

83. General GRUNERT. How about labor?

Mr. McKEE. We never had any trouble ourselves getting labor at the time. Of course, you know the labor situation is like the materials situation: it changes almost from day to day.

84. General GRUNERT. Now, you yourself were out there a considerable time, were you?

Mr. McKEE. I was there three or four times, spent some time.

85. General GRUNERT. And you and your main superintendents or assistants had a contract under the Quartermaster Corps?

Mr. McKEE. A Colonel Harold did. I think it was Harold, H-a-r-o-l-d. But also we had work over there for Colonel Nurse and Colonel Hunt and quite a few other men beside him.

86. General GRUNERT. What I am getting at, during the time you had that contract did you entertain any of them by social entertainments?

Mr. McKEE. General, I have an ulcerated stomach, and even if my inclinations were, Lord preserve me from such embroilments, so I never was able to go very far.

[2421] 87. General GRUNERT. Well, was it considered a heinous crime to have social relations in the line of entertainment, with somebody you are doing business with, if you don't go to extremes?

Mr. McKEE. General, it depends on the extent of it, you know. I have had dinner lots of times with many people that I did business with, and I might have at times—when the Lord permitted, I might have had a cocktail, but I found the men—

88. General GRUNERT. Well, it is a question of the degree, is it?

Mr. McKEE. The degree. I found the men I dealt with were very reluctant to—and I didn't discourage it—to enter into any, you might say, continuous entertainment.

89. General GRUNERT. Now, as to your ideas on the subject of cost-plus-fixed-fee, if you have something sort of nebulous to do, and you make a large contract on which you may have to have quite a number of changes, or under that let a number of sub-contracts or have what they call work orders or what not, doesn't a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee give you much more leeway without the red tape and delays that encumber the other type of contract?

Mr. McKEE. General, I don't want to be on a pinnacle differing with everyone else, but for one, we built Brownwood, which cost about \$20,000,000, at Brownwood, Texas. That's Camp Bowie. We did

that on a fixed-fee basis, and we had more trouble getting decisions there. And I turned around and built I think it's Camp Shepherd at Wichita Falls on a straight contract basis, which was larger in extent and cost less money. The one we did by fixed-fee—just as an example I can use that [2422] best, that I think at Brownwood where we had a fixed-fee it looked more difficult apparently to get things settled than it was where we had a straight contract, and the reason of that was that when we were at Wichita Falls, or anywhere else—we built quite a few large contonments—we would insist that these things must be decided, and we wanted to get through and we wanted to get done; while we had nothing to say about it at Brownwood. For instance, we only could do what we were told to do, and that's all. We had no prerogative, practically, of our own. But when we got to our contract, why, we insisted that they make these decisions. See?

90. General GRUNERT. That is what the Board wanted—at least, that is what I wanted to get information on. You being an experienced contractor and I being very much of a dub layman on that subject, I just wanted to see how the thing looked from both sides.

There is only one other question I have, and then if the others have no more questions, why, we shall go to lunch.

Do you know of your own accord or have you reason to believe that either Colonel Wyman or the contractors in Hawaii intentionally delayed work in order to give the Japanese a better opportunity of succeeding in their attack?

Mr. McKEE. You ask me my opinion?

91. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Mr. McKEE. I would say no. But that isn't the—there are all kinds of rumors that you hear to the contrary. I think it was just a case of Colonel Wyman's bad habits, frankly. I don't think he intentionally, as far as I know, did anything, no. Now, as far as Mr. Rohl, I can't say that, but I say as far [2423] as Colonel Wyman that I don't know whether he did anything maliciously to help either the Germans or Japanese. I just think he didn't know any better; that's all. I think, frankly, he was ignorant.

General, I want to say one thing. You said you knew of these years of experience I had. I was going to say, in all the years of experience I had, I find each day I know less, so I wouldn't say that—either that, or I am becoming mellowed with age; I don't know which. I used to be a lot more positive about things than I am now.

92. General GRUNERT. Now, Mr. McKee can you think of anything else that you might tell the Board that may help it in its mission?

Mr. McKEE. Well, I really don't know what the—

93. General GRUNERT. Anything occur to you?

Mr. McKEE. Particularly as far as Colonel Wyman is concerned, you mean, are you talking about?

94. General GRUNERT. Well, concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor, concerning what went on before and what happened during that time, and as far as construction is concerned; as far as Wyman and Rohl are concerned, only such phases as may have had a bearing on the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. McKEE. Well, I was just discussing the other day—of course I have talked to a great many people that came back from Honolulu;

Clark and—you know Chester Clark. Of course, he talks a whole lot, and you have to discount a little of that, of course, General, as you know, and he apparently talks very freely and very fluently, so you should get him down when you get over to Honolulu over there, and see if he will tell you as [2424] much as he told everybody else. But apparently up to about two weeks before Pearl Harbor, from all I can gather from my own men and others, the Army and the Navy were on quite an alert all the time. They were really rigidly looking after apparently the defenses of the islands. And then for some unknown reason all this stopped. Planes were parked out on the field, and the alert ceased. That happened, I understand, beginning about two or three weeks, I think, prior to that time, apparently; so I say, from all the reports I have, there was a very rigid condition of alert, and then for some unknown reason—of course, you hear lots of things; you read the newspapers, I suppose—this condition ceased and they became lax. That's all. I have heard that.

And you hear all kinds of rumors about Rohl's connection with the Germans, and things of that kind, which of course are purely, I imagine, imagination in a great many cases, which become rumors after passing from one man's mind to another. Of course, a lot of people think there was a definite connection between Pearl Harbor and Mr. Rohl and his activities, but I don't know that. I am just telling you. You know, everybody hears so many things, it is questionable whether they are worthwhile.

95. Major CLAUSEN. I have one more thing, sir. Just for the record I would like to show that the letter which I read and which Mr. McKee sent to Congressman Thomason was, through the good offices of Mr. McKee, sent through the Congressman to the War Department and thereafter was the basis of the investigation, in part, of Colonel Hunt, and is annexed to the report of Colonel Hunt, and verified in many respects by the statements of [2425] Mr. McKee.

Mr. McKEE. I just want you gentlemen to understand I have no animosity as far as Colonel Wyman is concerned. I am just merely a poor country contractor trying to do a job and trying to do it to the best of my ability, and we have a good organization. There are men with us for 25 years, lots of them. We have raised them in the business. Outside of that I have no particular axe to grind.

96. General GRUNERT. We thank you for coming and assisting us. (The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 11:50 a. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

[2426]

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[2427] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1944.

PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Saturday, September 2, 1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF R. E. COMBS, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW, VISALIA,
CALIFORNIA.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Combs, will you please state to the Board your full name and address.

Mr. COMBS. My name is R. E. Combs, and my address is 415 West Race Street, Visalia, California.

2. Colonel WEST. And what is your occupation?

Mr. COMBS. I am an attorney-at-law.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Combs, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will lead in this particular part of the investigation.

Mr. COMBS. Very well, General.

[2428] 4. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Combs, did you conduct an investigation concerning the activities of one Colonel Wyman and Hans Wilhelm Rohl, in connection with the activities of the California State Legislature's Joint Fact-Finding Committee on un-American Activities?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir; I did.

5. Major CLAUSEN. And would you state in a general way how you happened to conduct the investigation, so far as it related to Colonel Wyman.

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir. Mr. W. Bruce Pine, who I understand testified before this Board recently, became a volunteer special investigator for this committee, early in February 1942, following a hearing which the committee held in San Diego. Pine, who had resided in Beverly Hills for a number of years, had a casual social acquaintance with Rohl—that is Hans Wilhelm Rohl—and he related to me early in

1942—I don't remember the exact date—that he had occasion to go to Newport Harbor Yacht Club, where he overheard a conversation by someone, during which the statement was made in substance that Rohl had become involved in some difficulty concerning some subversive activities in connection with the installation of certain projects for the Army in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor.

Pine conducted a sort of desultory investigation on his own for two or three days, and then he informed me of the results of that investigation; and one of the things that he ascertained was that Rohl did not become a citizen until about two and a half months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Rohl was a resident of southern California, and had been, ever since 1925; and this committee being charged by the Legislature [2429] with the investigation of any subversive activity concluded it would investigate Rohl; particularly so, when Pine recalled that he had seen Rohl in company with a man by the name of Werner Plack, who had been an employee of the German vice consulate in Los Angeles under Doctor Gyssling, who went from Los Angeles to Japan and thence to Germany, and was given a rather responsible position in the German foreign office, censoring short-wave radio broadcasts that emanated from Berlin; so I authorized Pine to make a preliminary investigation, which he did.

In the course of the investigation, he inspected the records of the Immigration and Naturalization service in Los Angeles, and I also did, later, several times, made copies of the documents that were contained in the files, some of which later were missing, and as far as I know still are; went to San Pedro and checked the manifests on two of Rohl's boats, the RAMONA and the VEGA; and our interest in the matter of course was primarily centered on the alleged subversive activities of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, a resident of southern California, rather than on the activities of Colonel Wyman, which we considered, as far as we were concerned, of corollary and secondary interest to us, but which of course were involved.

We worked on the case from some time early in February 1942 until the date of our hearing on February 23, 1943. After that, there was some publicity given to the case, in the press. The hearing was closed to the public, but it was not a privileged hearing, as we were informed by the Legislative Counsel Bureau of the State Legislature, because the hearing was opened to the press, and through the medium of the press, the information [2430] concerning the proceedings was available to the public. We anticipated that some appropriate federal action would be forthcoming, by reason of the revelations made in the hearing, because we were convinced that each and every misrepresentation as to citizenship was a separate federal offence, each falsification as to citizenship, on the income-tax returns of Rohl, was a federal offence; his ownership of a boat in excess of 75 feet in length was a federal offence; his illegal entries into the United States were federal offences; and we felt that he had possibly had access to certain secret Army installations, and naval installations, too, for that matter, prior to his becoming a citizen, which was a violation of the statute of the United States Code, annotated, which was quoted during the course of the hearing of February 23, 1943; but nothing was forthcoming. until late in 1943, when Mr. Fulton Lewis arrived in Los Angeles, for the purpose of going into the case and making some broadcasts on the

case, based on the transcript of our hearing, if he found it expedient; which he did; and which whipped the case into considerable prominence. Mr. Weiner, as a result of Mr. Lewis's activity, directly came to Los Angeles. Mr. Pine and I worked with Mr. Weiner for several weeks.

6. Major CLAUSEN. You mean Mr. Weiner, of the House Military Affairs Committee?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir. And it was then that we began to concentrate a little more on Colonel Wyman's relations with Rohl with reference to their installations, than we had, theretofore. When Weiner returned to Washington, we continued our activities in the case. We interviewed I should say roughly about a hundred additional witnesses, took affidavits from those [2431] who seemed most credible and whose information seemed most applicable. We checked the records of various hotels that Wyman had occupied with Rohl, with the idea in mind of placing them together if possible during the preliminary negotiations for the basic contract of December 20, 1940; and shortly prior to its consummation on that date, in Washington. We checked additional telephone records. We interviewed a great many people who had worked in Pearl Harbor, in addition to those whose names were given to Mr. Weiner when he was out there, and we discontinued our active work on the case on or about the 14th day of June of this year, when the House Military Affairs Committee made public their findings and recommendation.

7. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Combs, since the House Military Affairs Committee made its report, dated June 14, 1944, has your committee, or have you, yourself, continued the investigation so as to uncover additional evidence?

Mr. COMBS. To some extent, Major; yes.

8. Major CLAUSEN. And does that additional evidence to some extent relate to Colonel Wyman?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

9. Major CLAUSEN. Then, specifically, may I ask this: whether you have any additional evidence, other than what might be available to this Board, as furnished by the House Military Affairs Committee, concerning the relationship between Wyman and Rohl, in Los Angeles, before Colonel Wyman was assigned to the Hawaiian Department?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir; we do have quite a good deal of additional evidence. You see, sir, when Weiner returned to Washington, which was in December of last year, we continued our [2432] investigation up to the 14th of June of this year, and it was during that interval that we developed some additional information concerning the relationship between Rohl and Wyman, that, so far as we know, the House Military Affairs Committee does not have.

10. Major CLAUSEN. Specifically, could you give the Board a very brief statement as to what the findings would be of yourself in that regard, and what leads or affidavits you might have, which could be furnished to the Board?

Mr. COMBS. I jotted down some notes, if I may refer to them, from my files, before I came up.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COMBS. It was after Weiner returned to Washington that we obtained two, and I think, three, but I am sure of two affidavits, from

Madeline Ferguson, who was the nurse for Rohl in the Hawaiian Islands and after he came to California, and in her presence, Rohl and his associates expressed apprehension of an FBI investigation of the relationship between Rohl and Wyman, and the manner in which the contract was being handled. This was prior to our hearing on February 23, 1943, and Miss Ferguson was not interviewed by Weiner, and we didn't know about her until after he had left; and as a matter of fact, she was accused point-blank of being an FBI agent; that she had insinuated herself into the confidences of Rohl and his associates, and had attended various of their parties, and so on, and had gotten a good deal of information that they became apprehensive about; so, after she had heard them express apprehension about some sort of federal investigation—and they mentioned the FBI—a few days after that, according to her affidavit, she [2433] was called into Rohl's presence and accused of being an FBI agent.

12. Major CLAUSEN. Would you make those affidavits available to the Board by sending them to me?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir; I will be glad to. I would like to send you the original and a copy, and have the original returned, if that would meet your purposes.

13. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COMBS. We have to attach the original to the report as an exhibit, that is the reason.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Now, do you have any additional evidence on that same point, as to the relationship which existed between Rohl and Wyman, before Wyman was assigned to the Hawaiian Department, other than the affidavits of Madeline Ferguson?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir; we do.

There is a witness, whose name I can't recall, off-hand, that we interviewed after Weiner had returned to Washington. He lives in Long Beach. He was a publicity man for William Wrigley in connection with Wrigley's enterprise at Catalina Island, and it was on Catalina Island that Rohl-Connolly Company had some rock quarries. Rock from those quarries was used to cap the breakwater at San Pedro, and according to testimony of engineers who should know, the thing isn't very satisfactory.

15. General FRANK. The breakwater is not very satisfactory?

Mr. COMBS. The rock that caps it, General. It melts away and has to be constantly replaced, and there was a bid submitted, for another type of rock which had been very highly [2434] recommended, and that bid was rejected by Wyman in favor of the Rohl rock, and the first trip that Wyman made with Rohl, when Wyman was a Captain, and came, I think it was either late in July or early in August, 1935, was over to the islands to inspect that rock with Rohl. The affidavit of Nils Olson, who was the steward aboard the RAMONA at that time, will show that Rohl told his steward, in effect, that he had an extremely important and influential business associate who was to come on board the yacht on that occasion, and who should be treated with every deference and courtesy; and Olson, of course, acceded, and they did go over and inspect the rock, and later went over, a subsequent time, and inspected the rock, and on the second occasion they stayed over the week end, and it was then, I believe, if

my memory is correct on it, or shortly thereafter, that they met this witness that we interviewed. The witness went on several parties with Rohl and Wyman, and related to us in substance some of their conversation, and we considered it as being somewhat significant as a link in the background of what we considered the process by which Wyman was softened up by Rohl.

16. Major CLAUSEN. Do you have any evidence, Mr. Combs, concerning the question as to whether Colonel Wyman exceeded his salary or earnings as an Army officer, in the time that he was at Los Angeles, prior to the time he went to Hawaii?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir; we do.

17. Major CLAUSEN. And could you give the Board some idea of what that evidence consists?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

18. Major CLAUSEN. And whether or not that can be made [2435] available to the Board?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir. I checked Wyman's bank account, both while Weiner was here and afterwards, because he didn't have time to check it in very much detail. I also went out to the Jantz Realty Company at Westwood and checked their record. Pardon me. First, I went to the recorders' and assessors' and tax collectors' offices in Los Angeles, to check all of the property owned either by Wyman, his present wife, or his ex-wife, and then I went to the Jantz Investment Company and checked the escrow transaction which involved the purchase of the \$16,000 home at 221 Woodruff Street in Westwood. I then made a complete check, which information Weiner does not have, of the clubs and fraternal and social organizations that Colonel Wyman affiliated with shortly after he met Rohl, and I checked each and every expenditure at each of those clubs, which of course showed the days that he was there. I do not know whether you have this or not. They included the Los Angeles Athletic Club, the Los Angeles Country Club, the California Club, the University Club, the Bel-Air Bay Club, the Hollywood Athletic Club, the Hollywood Country Club, and the Jonathan Club, in Los Angeles—his expenditures at those clubs. I bore in mind, of course, that being an Army Officer, the initiation fee or dues would be negligible, and we were interested primarily in the actual expenditures that were made, and they were considerable.

The home in Westwood was purchased with funds that were explained by Mrs. Wyman, but the upkeep of the home and the elevated social position that the possession and the operation of such a home entailed, involved a considerable expenditure.

[2436] 19. Major CLAUSEN. With respect to some of the entertainment of Colonel Wyman by Mr. Rohl, did you check as to the approximate cost of such entertainment in the Biltmore Hotel?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir. And after Weiner left we also checked some of the affairs in both the St. Francis and Palace Hotels in this city.

20. Major CLAUSEN. You mean affairs similar to the entertainment of Colonel Wyman by Rohl in the Biltmore Hotel at Los Angeles?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

21. Major CLAUSEN. Occurred here in San Francisco?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

22. Major CLAUSEN. That evidence is available in what form, Mr. Combs?

Mr. COMBS. Statements and affidavits by employees of the hotel.

23. Major CLAUSEN. Can you give me also some brief idea as to the nature of that evidence and as to the times when that entertainment occurred?

Mr. COMBS. I wouldn't—I would hesitate to do that, Major, from my memory, because I don't remember the dates. There were a great many dates. On some occasions Wyman was present and on many others he was not, but the parties continued whether he was there or whether he wasn't. They were just stepped up a bit, apparently, when he was there. But we do know that Rohls' expenditures at the Palace Hotel where he stayed with the greatest regularity were considerable. For example, he registered at the Palace Hotel on December 14, 1940, in suite 8064-6, which was a very luxurious suite, at [2437] \$35 a day. He got a rate, by the way. And he was also registered there on January 14, 1941, in the same suite, 8064-6, at \$41 a day, which indicates that he had guests.

24. Major CLAUSEN. Now, during that particular period, that is, December 1940, have you ascertained whether Colonel Wyman was in the company of Mr. Rohl in Los Angeles?

Mr. COMBS. In San Francisco, you mean, Major?

25. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, in Los Angeles, and in San Francisco also.

Mr. COMBS. I don't know as to Los Angeles, Major, but we have information that he was present in San Francisco.

26. Major CLAUSEN. With Mr. Rohl?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

27. Major CLAUSEN. And in what form is that evidence?

Mr. COMBS. Statement by Mrs. Rohl.

28. Major CLAUSEN. A statement by Mrs. Rohl. Can you give some brief idea as to the nature of that testimony?

Mr. COMBS. No, sir. I am sorry I can't. In substance she stated that she knew that her husband left for San Francisco to meet Wyman and with Connolly—that is Thomas E. Connolly—to discuss the preliminary negotiations for the contract of December 20, 1940; that Rohl did leave for San Francisco, and when he came back he told her that he had discussed the contract with Wyman and with Connolly.

And if I may interject a thought of my own there, I prepared a series of questions to be propounded to Thomas Connolly by Weiner, and Weiner took the list of questions and went to San Francisco—came to San Francisco, and was unsuccessful, in his opinion and in mine, in really getting [2438] into the meat of the thing to find out the occasions when Connolly and Wyman and Rohl were together discussing the essential matters that were called for by the contract of December 20th, and in my opinion that has never been done. We worked for months and months with the F. B. I. in this case, as we do in all cases, and in my own opinion I don't think that the case has been exhausted by any means, with regard particularly to the question of whether Rohl did or did not have access to the basic information set forth in that—or called for by that contract; and I think the chief telephone operator of the Palace Hotel, who was so intimately acquainted with Rohl that she would on her own initiative call up nurses to come and nurse him through his somewhat frequent hangovers, and who is now residing in San Francisco but no longer in the employ of the hotel, would be a very, very valuable witness, and so far as I know she has never been contacted by anyone.

29. Major CLAUSEN. Would you furnish the Board her name, please?

Mr. COMBS. Gladly, and her address.

30. Major CLAUSEN. And also the statement by Mrs. Rohl?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

31. Major CLAUSEN. And also the additional affidavits concerning the San Francisco relationship?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir. I have the man's name in Long Beach that I didn't recall a while ago. His name is Norman Kint, K-i-n-t.

32. Major CLAUSEN. And he was a man who had some evidence concerning the rock?

Mr. COMBS. Concerning the rock and the conversations of [2439] Rohl and Wyman and their relationship during the summer of 1935.

33. Major CLAUSEN. Now, in addition to the testimony of Mr. Rohl given before your committee on February 27, 1943, do you have any evidence as to whether Colonel Wyman was informed prior to the signing of the basic contract that Mr. Rohl was an alien?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

34. Major CLAUSEN. In what form is that evidence?

Mr. COMBS. I believe it's in the form of a letter. I am quite sure it's either a letter or two letters or a wire, but we have it available. The file, the material we collected, is quite voluminous over a period of over two years, and I don't recall really just what form it is, but I am positive we have such information.

35. Major CLAUSEN. Will you make that available also to the Board, Mr. Combs?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

36. Major CLAUSEN. Now, would you inform the Board as to the—

37. General FRANK. Just a minute. A little while ago you gave us a list of the clubs that you investigated in Los Angeles.

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

38. General FRANK. You didn't make the direct statement, and therefore I would like to ask the direct question: Did you find that Colonel Wyman was a member of each one of those clubs that you enumerated?

Mr. COMBS. He was a member of each of those clubs with the exception of two. One of them was the Jonathan Club, and [2440] the other was the University Club, and at those two clubs he lived for periods of time and made considerable expenditures. He was a member of each of the other clubs that I mentioned.

39. General FRANK. In this investigation did you get any record of his expenditures there?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir; we got a record of his expenditures at each of those clubs.

40. General FRANK. Do you have those available?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

41. General FRANK. Will you make those available to the Board?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

42. General FRANK. Such information along that line that you have?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

43. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, I am going to ask you this question: whether you determined in your own mind, from your investigation, as to whether there was a contrast between the activities of Colonel Wyman after he became associated with Mr. Rohl, as compared to his

previous services in the Army; whether you are able to say anything as to that.

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir; I was very forcibly impressed by it. I mentioned it to both Weiner and Pine about the middle of our investigation when Weiner was out here. It seemed to me that an interesting highlight of the entire investigation, at least as far as I was concerned, was the striking contrast in the tastes and personal characteristics between Wyman and Rohl up to their meeting in the summer of 1935 and immediately afterwards.

[2441] Rohl, on the one hand—of course this is just my own impression of the thing—came into this country in 1913, and he started his career by siring four illegitimate children in Sacramento. He adopted a consistent and very often a stubborn pattern of concealing his alien status; whether deliberately or not, of course, I don't know; I am not able to prove. In my opinion he did it deliberately.

When the *Ramona* came from Acapulco to Los Angeles in '33, his name was missing from the manifest, although the other members of the crew and the passengers' names appeared. When the *Vega* sailed through the Panama Canal and docked at Honolulu late in 1937, he was faced with a situation wherein for the first time he was compelled to make a categorical statement whether he was or was not a citizen, so he made a statement that he was born in Iola, Knasas, which was the birthplace of his wife, and although the date of his birth appeared correctly in the manifest, September 29, 1886.

There were many other occasions, of course, with which no doubt you are familiar. The next time he was faced with the necessity of making a categorical statement was in making his federal income tax returns during the period when they required a statement as to citizenship, and year after year he swore, and I have seen these income tax statements myself, that he was an American citizen, and on one occasion he said that he was naturalized on—well, I wouldn't want to give the exact date, but the precise date of his naturalization is set forth. In a preliminary statement to the Immigration and Naturalization officials he stated that he had been naturalized. He later repudiated that statement. So all through his career he [2442] apparently adopted a pattern of concealing that alien status, and one of the intriguing questions corollary to the investigation was why he did that. We have some ideas. Whether or not they are correct, of course, I don't know.

44. Major CLAUSEN. What are your ideas, Mr. Combs?

Mr. COMBS. My idea is that Rohl was essentially a stiff-necked, very proud, and somewhat overbearing Prussian, extremely proud of his father, who, as I understand it, was an instructor in a technical school in Hamburg; of his family.

He stated one time when he was drunk that he was a German agent, to a fellow employee up in the vicinity of Bear River in Northern California. He boasted of his acquaintance with officials of the German Government. He associated with Werner Plack, as we know. And there were a lot of other things that he did that I didn't consider important enough to mention to anybody, but they are little things that, when they are all added up, are a pretty good indication, in my opinion, of the man's over-all characteristics, of his basic inclinations; and I think Rohl thought too little of this country and too much of his own to bother to apply for citizenship; and when he was faced

with the necessity of either becoming a citizen or foregoing a lush contract that was dangled before him, it then occurred to him to become a citizen.

There were other things that I thought might possibly be of some significance. There is a footnote on page 31 of a book by Michael Sayre called Sabotage, which relates how a German agent by the name of Von der Osten came to this country from Japan in March 1941; March 16, 1941. Two days later he [2443] was hit and killed in Times Square, New York, by a taxicab. The F. B. I. traced his residence to the Taft Hotel in New York, and there they found a sketch of the installations the were called for by the contract of December 20, 1940, with a written notation on the bottom of it, "This will be of interest to our yellow friends." Von der Osten was a known German agent, a very important one. He worked under a man by the name of Ludwig.

In my opinion, Rohl was the type of a person who, if the monetary return would be great enough, wouldn't hesitate for a minute to make the information available. Of course, that again is my own idea, but I can't help but draw that conclusion from some of the other things that existed in the case. Of course, this is only a possibility, and in my opinion it is a rather remote one, but it still is a possibility.

We have a great many witnesses—we have statements from a great many witnesses whom I consider of terrific importance in connection with the manner in which the work was accomplished in the Hawaiian Islands, not King and Wickiser, the man whom Weiner interviewed, but we interviewed I guess about fifty men who worked in the aircraft warning tunnels, men who moved a concrete building six inches after the floor and the walls and ceiling had been poured and had set; B-17 hangars that were all ballixed up, according to the testimony of men who should be in a position to know. We have affidavits from civilian employees of the Engineering Corps who worked not only in Honolulu under Wyman and Rohl but also in Edmonton and some other cantons in Christmas Islands and some of them in Alaska. We have a great number. Some of these [2444] men kept guest books and diaries, and so forth, that they made available to us. All of that information has come to us since Weiner left, and I don't believe—I am not so sure that he does not have any of that information.

45. Major CLAUSEN. You have made that distinction several times as to something that you now have which you did not have when Weiner left.

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

46. Major CLAUSEN. You say that, do you, because the report of the House Military Affairs Committee dated June 14, 1944, from a reading of it by you, is essentially based on the evidence that was uncovered by Mr. Weiner when he worked in conjunction with you here in California?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

47. Major CLAUSEN. Is that correct?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

48. Major CLAUSEN. And therefore, for example, these affidavits as to delays in the defense projects in Hawaii would be in the nature of additional and new evidence?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

49. Major CLAUSEN. I was going to explore that field a little later. I didn't interrupt you. Would you now go back to my previous question as to whether you have, from the evidence, seen indications that Colonel Wyman, then Captain or Major Wyman, when he reported to Los Angeles, was theretofore not the same character of individual that he was when he later came under the influence of Mr. Rohl?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir; I am sorry I got off the point.

50. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

[2445] Mr. COMBS. From our information, prior to the time he met Rohl, Wyman was a very capable and hard-working engineer, devoted to his family. He had been married nearly thirty years in 1935. His family consisted of his wife and his daughter Jane, and he was rather conservative and steady in his tastes.

Rohl, on the other hand, was almost diametrically opposed in his personal tastes. He was a sort of middle-aged man-about-town in Southern California, a lavish entertainer, a lavish spender. He would charter an entire commercial airliner, a 21-passenger plane, to fly from one place to another because he didn't want to be bothered with anyone else aboard. When he entered the Biltmore Hotel, according to the information that we have from the employees, all the other guests' luggage would thump to the floor while the bellboys made a dash for Rohl to escort him to the elevator and get one of those fifty-dollar tips. Special songs were composed in his honor when he went to some night clubs that he frequented, and one that we know of, and others that we have heard of, and the entertainment would stop while they would sing this song. He was simply that kind of a man, a lavish spender, drank to excess.

But after Wyman met Rohl, Wyman's tastes ran peculiarly parallel to Rohl's, and he drifted away from the wife that he had been married to for thirty years, and she obtained a divorce on the ground of incompatibility, in Nevada. He commenced an affair with the sister of his deceased office secretary. He went on these parties with Rohl, some of which ran into the thousands of dollars. They were constantly getting in fights and brawls at night clubs, led the band, and [2446] tipped the waiters hundred-dollar bills at the time; and among many affidavits of guests who were aboard both the *Ramona* and the *Vega* they tell of the almost constant run of parties that the two men went on. An affidavit from Wyman's driver, which I think Weiner had, would bear that out, as would the testimony of this man Kint in Long Beach that I mentioned.

51. Major CLAUSEN. I just wanted to ask you one question concerning this boast of Rohl that he was a German agent. Do you know to whom that was made?

Mr. COMBS. I have the name, yes, sir. I don't recall it offhand.

52. Major CLAUSEN. Would you furnish that to the Board?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

53. Major CLAUSEN. Now, specifically regarding these delays in the construction work in Hawaii, would you furnish the Board the affidavits or statements that you mentioned in your testimony?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

54. Major CLAUSEN. Does your committee have evidence as to whether after Rohl was awarded this contract he was in communication with his associates concerning the plans before he was naturalized?

Mr. COMBS. I don't think so. We have evidence, considerable evidence, that he was in communication with his associates both within two days prior to the signing of the contract and very frequently thereafter, between December 20th and September 15th, 1941; but as to what the substance of the conversations was we have no evidence except, of course, inferential evidence.

[2447] 55. General FRANK. Did you ever see this basic contract?

Mr. COMBS. No, sir.

56. General FRANK. You are not familiar with the fact that the basic contract itself does not contain details?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, I am. I understand they are set forth in the supplements.

57. General FRANK. They are set forth in the job orders?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

58. General FRANK. Therefore, he might have complete knowledge of the basic contract and still not have very information?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, I understand. We do have some evidence, I might say, that prior to December 20th, 1941, he did have conversations in which some details of the installations were discussed. What those details were I do not recall, but I would be glad to make that information available to you. We do have the substance of one specific conversation between Wyman and Rohl prior to December 20th, 1940, in which some of the details that were called for in the contract and its supplements were discussed.

59. Major CLAUSEN. You will make that available to the Board?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

60. General GRUNERT. Wait a minute. You said prior to December 20th, 1941.

Mr. COMBS. 1940.

61. General GRUNERT. How could any settlements prior to that be discussed, when the basic contract had not yet been signed?

Mr. COMBS. What I meant to say, General, was this: that the substance of the conversation that occurred prior to [2448] December 20th, 1940 between Wyman in Honolulu and Rohl in Los Angeles concerned some of the installations that were thereafter called for by the contract of December 20th, 1940 and its supplements.

62. General GRUNERT. Then I understand that possibly Wyman gave to Rohl some information about what was to take place later under the contract?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

63. Major CLAUSEN. Now, specifically with regard to these delays again, is there anything additional that you can tell the Board?

Mr. COMBS. No, sir; I think not, with the exception of the statement, which I think I already made, that there are some 50 witnesses, I would say, on hand, all of whose statements I consider are of considerable value in connection with delays, men who were employed in building the project.

64. Major CLAUSEN. Do you have any additional comments on your written statement which bear upon the mission of this Board?

Mr. COMBS. I don't think so, sir.

65. Major CLAUSEN. That is all that I have.

66. General RUSSELL: In connection with this investigation, of course, you seem to have developed rather fully Rohl's history and

operations, socially and otherwise, in Los Angeles. Was he regarded in that area as an outstanding contractor?

Mr. COMBS. It is a rather difficult question to answer, General. He was regarded as a man who was capable of good engineering work.

67. General RUSSELL. He seemed to have spent a lot of money. [2449] Did that create in your mind an impression that he had been a successful man, making all of this money during this war?

Mr. COMBS. No, sir.

68. General RUSSELL. What was the thought about where that money came from?

Mr. COMBS. I concluded that he got it when he went to Germany in 1924, or arranged to get it.

69. General RUSSELL. There have been some suggestions or evidence from which the impression could be drawn that he made a lot of money out of that breakwater contract at Los Angeles. Did your investigation develop anything about that?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir; it did. He made a categorical statement to a man by the name of Staub that he did not make any money out of the Los Angeles breakwater.

70. General RUSSELL. In this investigation where you developed these affidavits did you or your associates attempt to determine the state of feeling of these people who gave the affidavits as to whether or not they were disgruntled or had any personal views which might have influenced their statements?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

71. General RUSSELL. You regard those people as being reliable people, without bias?

Mr. COMBS. Those from whom we took affidavits I am satisfied are completely unbiased. There were some of them who were obviously disgruntled for personal reasons and from whom we took no affidavits for that reason.

72. General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

73. Colonel TOULMIN. Mr. Combs, as I understand it, you are a member of the bar?

[2450] Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

74. Colonel TOULMIN. As a lawyer, we would like to have you prepare a lawyer's statement, in the form of possibly a brief, outlining exactly the information that has now come to you which has not been used heretofore before other investigating committees or boards, as to two things:

First, the relationship of Rohl to the contract for construction in Hawaii, both prior to December 1940 and subsequent to that date, with particular reference to his knowledge of the details of that construction and with particular reference to the changes, alterations, delays and other difficulties with the construction, with which Rohl had some connection or part.

Second, a statement of the relationship between Colonel Wyman and Rohl both before and after that contract, with respect to his operations under the contract or proposed operations under the contract.

Can you do that?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir; I can do it, but it will take some time, for this reason: We intend to have a hearing or a series of hearings commenc-

ing this month, both here and elsewhere in the State, involving matters on which we have been working for some time and on which I came to San Francisco on this trip, incidentally to this hearing, of course, to prepare. I will be in San Francisco probably ten days or so working on those things and then I am due in Los Angeles to set up a series of hearings down there. My files relating to the Rohl Case and all of the photostats and documents, and so on in connection with it that have been accumulated since about March, 1942, are at my home in Visalia. If they were here I could do the things that you [2451] ask me to do in a comparatively short time, in connection with other work.

75. Colonel TOULMIN. We want just a summary letter.

Mr. COMBS. Yes; I understand. I would not feel that the letter would be very helpful to you unless I could refer to the sources of proof on which the statements in the letter would be based and, unfortunately, those sources are not here. They are at my home and locked up, scattered through a dozen different files pertaining to the Rohl Case. So in order to prepare such a statement I would have to have access to that material so that the thing would be factual and helpful.

76. General FRANK. Could you prepare that statement and have it available to use by September 22nd?

Mr. COMBS. No, sir; I think not; not unless I had the files. I probably will be in the middle of hearings by that time. We have one on the Political Action Committee; we have one on the Hindu Gadar party, and others. I have to write the trial brief and have the witnesses subpoenaed and the hearings prepared.

77. General FRANK. It is highly desirable that this Board have that information.

Mr. COMBS. Yes; I understand.

78. General FRANK. Because we considered that rather vital testimony.

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

79. General FRANK. If you could throw some extra effort into making that available it would be appreciated.

Mr. COMBS. If I could get that file up here, General, I could prepare such a statement.

[2452] 80. General FRANK. Is not the means available to you to get the file?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, but it would take me about two or three days to get a reservation back and then I have to get another one back here.

81. General FRANK. Where is Visalia?

Mr. COMBS. It is about 190 miles from here.

82. General GRUNERT. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

83. General RUSSELL. You are continuing your association with the committee that you testified about here this morning?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

84. General RUSSELL. Does that committee plan any further investigation of this man Rohl?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

85. General RUSSELL. Do you expect, if the evidence warrants it, to take any action, criminal or otherwise, with respect to him?

Mr. COMBS. We are unable legally to do so, General, for this reason: Our committee is a fact-finding committee and, as such, we have a great deal of latitude in the ascertainment of facts. We are not bound by the rules of evidence. We can ask leading questions. Witnesses are not permitted the advice of counsel during hearings. We enjoy immunity from either prosecution or suit for slander or libel. But we have no power to do anything except ascertain facts and to make our records available to the appropriate federal or State agencies for such action as may be appropriate. That, we have done.

86. General RUSSELL. Do you mean in the Rohl Case you have [2453] done that already?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir. We have made our information available, first, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to the War Frauds Division of the Department of Justice, through Mr. Harrington's office in Los Angeles; we have made it available to the House Military Affairs Committee, which is also a fact-finding body; but we have made it available to every agency that we thought could do anything about it, and we have also made it available to the United States Attorney's office.

87. General RUSSELL. And nothing has been done yet?

Mr. COMBS. Nothing except lapsing of the statutes of limitations which would bar prosecution. They are being chopped off day by day.

88. Colonel TOULMIN. What is your explanation of why the Department of Justice does not take action?

Mr. COMBS. I don't know, sir. I can only give you my own idea.

89. Major CLAUSEN. I have one more question for the record which is merely a high light. In the investigation which you have made of files of Immigration and Naturalization did you discover that certain letters were missing?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

90. Major CLAUSEN. And what were those letters that you could not find?

Mr. COMBS. One of them, I am positive, was a letter or a wire from Wyman to some official in the Immigration and Naturalization stating that Rohl was an alien and asking that his application for citizenship be expedited.

91. Major CLAUSEN. How did you know it was missing?

[2454] Mr. COMBS. I read it and copied part of it before it was missing.

92. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

93. General GRUNERT. That was missing from the files of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir; together with several other documents.

94. Colonel TOULMIN. State, first, when you examined the file and found the Wyman communication in it.

Mr. COMBS. I can only approximate the date from memory, but it was some time during the summer of 1942.

95. Colonel TOULMIN. Now state when you looked at the file again and found it gone.

Mr. COMBS. Shortly before the hearing in February of 1943.

96. General GRUNERT. Are there any further questions?

97. Major CLAUSEN. No, I have none, sir. Mr. Combs, would you be available perhaps for rebuttal testimony in the event it becomes necessary in about two weeks or so?

Mr. COMBS. If our hearings have been concluded, Major, I will be.

98. Major CLAUSEN. All right, sir.

99. General GRUNERT. Mr. Combs, do you think of anything else that might be of assistance to the Board that has not come up, that will not be covered in your statement, plus the evidence that you are going to submit, that you think you should bring to the attention of the Board?

Mr. COMBS. No, sir. I would like to make one statement [2455] off the record, if I may, General.

100. General GRUNERT. All right. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

101. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Combs.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2456]

TESTIMONY OF REA B. WICKISER, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Wickiser, will you state to the Board your full name and address, please.

Mr. WICKISER. Rea B. Wickiser. I live at 1522 Rodney Drive, in Los Angeles.

2. Colonel WEST. What is your occupation?

Mr. WICKISER. My occupation is construction. I am principally a tunnel man.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Wickiser, General Frank assisted by Major Clausen will open up this special investigation that we want as far as you are concerned, and the rest of us will ask questions to fill out if needed, so I will turn you over to General Frank, here.

4. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Wickiser, would you give the Board some details on your background in construction work, please.

Mr. WICKISER. Well, I came out of school in 1931, and I went to Boulder Dam, worked on the tunnels at Boulder Dam, worked as laborer, and a miner, worked on the concrete work there, and underground, and high-scaling; and I went from there down on the southern California aqueduct and the tunnels there. I worked on several different jobs on the aqueduct, and went down as a shift boss, general foreman at Parker, on the diversion tunnels there, and about that time the Aliamanu Crater job in Honolulu came up, and I went to Honolulu under—at that time, it was Captain Hill, the Army Engineers, and drove the storage tunnels there, and I was general tunnel foreman on that job, and I came back from there, and worked at PG&E for a very [2457] short time, and I worked on the Pennsylvania turnpike, where I was superintendent of West Portal for Guthrie, Marsh-Peterson, and from there I came back, went down to Parker Dam again and drove the four penstock tunnels for the State of California. The contractor was C. W. Wood; and from there I went to Camp San Luis Obispo, where I was in charge of excavation, quarries. Then I went

to Honolulu for the Territory Airport Constructors; and I think that was in June or in July of 1941.

5. General FRANK. Is this a chronological statement?

Mr. WICKISER. Well, approximately so. I don't remember dates.

6. General FRANK. When did you get out of college?

Mr. WICKISER. 1931.

7. General FRANK. What college?

Mr. WICKISER. Heidelberg College, at Tiffin, Ohio.

8. Major CLAUSEN. In connection with your work in the Hawaiian Islands, did you meet a Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.?

Mr. WICKISER. Not personally, no.

9. Major CLAUSEN. Was the work that you were doing at that time work in connection with the contract of the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. WICKISER. When I first went there you mean, sir?

10. Major CLAUSEN. When you first went there, you were working for the Territory Airport Constructors, is that correct?

Mr. WICKISER. That's right.

11. Major CLAUSEN. You signed that contract for your participation in that, on July 18, 1941?

Mr. WICKISER. That is right, sir.

[2458] 12. Major CLAUSEN. And you then, later, went to work in connection with the Hawaiian Constructors' contract?

Mr. WICKISER. At the time war broke out, I was taken over by Hawaiian Constructors, because Territory Airport Constructors had their contract cancelled, and Hawaiian Constructors took over all the personnel of the Territory Airport Constructors.

13. Major CLAUSEN. Now, you are familiar with some of these defense projects in the Hawaiian Islands that were constructed by the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. WICKISER. Yes; I am, sir.

14. Major CLAUSEN. And in particular, do you know of the runway on which the grades were changed nine times by the Army engineers?

Mr. WICKISER. Allow me to make myself very clear. Now, I see that you are reciting or reading here from testimony that was taken by Mr. Weimer or Weiner, I believe it was. That is pertaining to the runways at Hilo, the Hilo airport. Now, there were no changes, up until after the war had come upon us down there, because the company that I was with down there, prior to December 7, had a unit-price contract for that job, and they had plans that they had bid on; and you just don't move in and change work on that type of a contract; but as soon as the contract was taken over by Hawaiian Constructors, which was a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, then we were operating directly under the engineers; and they were changed nine times, at that time.

I might draw a picture of that, so that you are familiar with it. They had an idea that they might have to move out of that country in a hurry, and they wanted to wreck the [2459] airport, so there were boxes that were placed. Theoretically, the tops of these boxes were even with or at the top of the surface of the runways, and then in these boxes there were supposed to be bombs placed, that they could demolish their runways. Well, these boxes were wooden, and as the runway elevation was changed, your boxes had to be sawed off or raised with the elevations of your runways, and they were changed nine times, because I changed those boxes on those runways nine

different times. As a matter of fact, they got so that I just threw up my hands. I couldn't keep up with them from day to day. I would get half of them changed, then there would be a new program tomorrow morning; and I just got "fed up" on it, and I got on a plane and went to Honolulu; yes, that's true. I think that elaborates a little bit on that, and explains.

15. General FRANK. What was the occasion of all these changes, once they had determined the grade?

Mr. WICKISER. Well, sir, you would have to get someone in the engineering department, the U. S. E. D., to find that, because we simply operated upon directives from the engineering department, from the engineers, the Army engineers.

16. General FRANK. I am trying to get an opinion from you, as an engineer. After the grade had been once established, was there any necessity for changing it to put these boxes in?

Mr. WICKISER. I am not an airport engineer, to begin with. I am a construction man. I don't know what the "powers to be" down there had in mind.

17. General FRANK. Was there anything about the subsoil [2460] that required a changing of the grade, to put the boxes in there?

Mr. WICKISER. No. There is a cut-and-fill problem on most of those boxes, but in the area where the boxes were changed, was through the intersection of these runways. Now, had there been a change in plans to balance the cut-and-fill on out at the end of runways, it would have certainly affected the intersection of the runways; if there was a maximum grade or minimum grade that they had to hold to for those runways, it would have; but once it was determined, sir, there would be no reason for it. If they had a plan, a master plan that they were going by, what they wanted, there was no reason in the world for it.

18. General GRUNERT. But this was all after December 7, 1941?

Mr. WICKISER. Immediately after.

19. General GRUNERT. Immediately after?

Mr. WICKISER. And not before.

20. General GRUNERT. No, sir.

21. Major CLAUSEN. Now, during the the time that this changing of the runways was taking place, was that under Colonel Wyman?

Mr. WICKISER. Yes. I believe Colonel Wyman left there in March, didn't he?

22. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WICKISER. Yes.

23. Major CLAUSEN. March 1942.

Were you ever instructed by Colonel Wyman with respect to a tunnel, not to leave the dirt in the tunnel, and not to take it outside?

[2461] Mr. WICKISER. I again want to make myself clear. I am not trying to crucify anyone. No, that statement is not true; and if it is that way, it is an error. We were only instructed by Colonel Wyman's men, the man that was in charge of the Hilo airport for Colonel Wyman.

24. General FRANK. Who was that?

Mr. WICKISER. That man was named Fred Henderson. He was a civilian at that time. No, at that time he was a lieutenant. He was commissioned, I believe.

25. Major CLAUSEN. You had one experience, did you not, where you made a 62° turn to the right off an exit, and you found out afterwards that the plan they had given you was incorrect?

Mr. WICKISER. That is correct. I can't remember the exact dates, but it was shortly after war broke out, that they were in a very big hurry for some radar tunnels, or—not radar; they were AWS stations they called them; was out at Pahoa, in an old cinder cone. It is called East Point. They had plans for one tunnel that was up inside the crater, and there had to be a road leading up to it. You had to get the material up to the top, and we built a road and camouflaged it up part way, and then over the cone, down inside, we just worked off of a foot-path, and inasmuch as the ground was cinders, we could handle it by just hand-mucking it, or hand excavation with wheel-barrows, instead of breaking a big trail and moving a lot of equipment in there, because it would have disturbed the surrounding country, and they wanted to have a perfect camouflage job where no one could find it from the air.

26. General FRANK. By "cinders," you mean volcanic cinders?

Mr. WICKISER. Volcanic cinders—what they call, out in the [2462] islands, Aa. There's two types of lava out there. One is Lapahoehoe, and the other is Aa. Well, we cut out this job by hand. Now, when I moved in there, the instructions were not to make a dump outside the portal of this AWS tunnel, because it would show from the air. Well, I didn't know what in the world I was going to do with it. I had to dump it some place, and I couldn't eat it; so I didn't know what to do with it, outside of just bringing it out and dumping it. I had no way of carting it off, so we brought it out and dumped it, and camouflaged it. Then, that tunnel was completed, and I had a plan for it; but down below, in back of the Camp at Pahoa, there had to be another tunnel driven, and they were in a very big hurry for that, and I asked for the engineers to come out and stake the job; and no one would show up; so they had an inspector on the job, there, at that time, by the name of Walker, who was not an engineer, but he and I located the tunnel, and we wanted it, to get busy and drive in. We were working on the schedule, but I still had no plans on the second tunnel, so they sent me out a sketch from the engineering office that showed the tunnel going in and making a turn to the left. Well, we drove this tunnel, completed it. After we had completed it, and I had moved off of the job, I got a set of plans on it that showed the tunnel going in and making a dog-leg to the right; so I didn't know what to do, unless they wanted to drive a new tunnel, I said they could make a turn to the left as well as to the right; so I didn't do anything more about it, because I went to Honolulu right at that time, and was wanting to go home; but instead of getting away from there, why they prevailed upon me to stay and do some of the work that they had, to be done right away.

[2463] 27. General GRUNERT. What you have related is all after December 7, 1941, is it?

Mr. WICKISER. I beg your pardon.

28. General GRUNERT. This driving of the tunnel you are speaking about is all after December 7, 1941?

Mr. COMBS. Oh, yes.

29. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Wickiser, did you have any experience with the engineers under Colonel Wyman before December 7, 1941?

Mr. WICKISER. Only the engineers that were handling the Territory Airport Constructors' work, representing the Engineers in Hilo.

30. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WICKISER. And I will say that the Engineers that we worked with there—the boy that we worked with was named Haynes (H-a-y-n-e-s I believe is the way spell that) and he was a very fine boy, and he was a competent engineer.

31. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Wickiser, in view of your testimony I am going to read a portion from this affidavit contained on page 37 of the House Military Affairs Committee report:

From the experience I had with Wyman's engineers, when I found he received the Distinguished Service Medal, I thought somebody had slipped up somewhere along the line, and that Washington just didn't know what had been going on.

Would you comment on that, please, to the Board?

Mr. WICKISER. Yes. Now, again I want to distinguish between the two types of contract that I worked under over there. One with the Territory Airport Constructors was the unit-price contract, and we had bid on that job, or the [2464] contractors that I was working for had bid on the job, and they were going to be paid so much for doing a job, a specific job that they had the plans on. We had no interference whatsoever.

But I went to work for Hawaiian Constructors, and immediately the picture changed. There was just such a vast amount of confusion and so many changes from day to day in the orders that we received on how we were to do the work that it was just impossible to get anything done. On top of that, the men were not being paid. They were from two to three months behind in their pay, they were wanting to go home, and it was just tough as hell trying to get any work out of them. And, oh, I could go on and on. But principally there was just a damn bad relationship there right at that time. Now, when I got over to Honolulu I was wanting to go home, and quite a few men that had just arrived from the States—

32. Major CLAUSEN. You found out, Mr. Wickiser, did you, that the conditions which you observed yourself after 7 December 1941 were similar to conditions that had obtained before that time?

Mr. WICKISER. No; they were entirely different, sir.

33. Major CLAUSEN. So far as the Hawaiian Constructors were concerned, were you familiar with those conditions before 7 December 1941 yourself?

Mr. WICKISER. Oh, yes. Hawaiian Constructors also had a job going at South Point down on the Island of Hawaii where Hilo is located, and I came in contact with those men. I might say that prior to December the 7th there seemed to be a minimum of confusion down there, but it wasn't that way after December [2465] the 7th. The reason for it I don't know. That is, getting orders on what you were going to do, they seemed to be pretty stable, but, you see, this whole—as soon as war hit us down there we were all turned over to the management of Hawaiian Constructors. Now, the airport that we were doing there under the Territory Airport Constructors was immediately taken over by Hawaiian Constructors.

34. Major CLAUSEN. And that is when these conditions commenced?

Mr. WICKISER. That is when these conditions came in.

35. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

36. General FRANK. Prior to this time you were working on a fixed contractual basis?

Mr. WICKISER. That is right, sir.

37. General FRANK. Now, will you make a statement, please, as to the difference in conditions between the time that the cost-plus-fixed-fee condition came into being and the condition under which you operated under the fixed-price contract basis?

Mr. WICKISER. Would you—you want me to make a comparison between the two of them?

38. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. WICKISER. Well, the first is the pay situation. The men were paid on two days' notice; in other words, your pay period stopped on Saturday; Tuesday you were paid, with the Territory Airport Constructors.

39. Major CLAUSEN. That was the fixed-price contract?

Mr. WICKISER. That is right. The contractors handled their own pay. But when the men were transferred to Hawaiian Constructors, the Army was doing the paying, and we had men— [2466] well, I know myself I waited—the first pay check was two months: when I went off the pay roll of Territory Airport Constructors until I got a pay check from the Engineers down there it was two months.

40. General FRANK. What about changes? What about changes in work?

Mr. WICKISER. You mean the orders coming down there, changes?

41. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. WICKISER. Well, you would have never known the old plans that we had to do the job. They were completely changed.

42. General RUSSELL. Were these changes constant and recurring?

Mr. WICKISER. From day to day, sir. I might tell you now, that not only existed right at that time but existed right up until the time Hawaiian Constructors' contract was terminated over there; not only under Colonel Wyman; it existed under General Kramer. The only man that we didn't have those conditions under was General Lyman. General Lyman did not operate that way, sir.

43. General RUSSELL. How many did you have? Wyman, Kramer, and Lyman? Were those the three?

Mr. WICKISER. Wyman, Lyman, and Kramer, in that order.

44. General RUSSELL. How long did you have Kramer?

Mr. WICKISER. Well, Kramer relieved General—took over the duties of General Lyman when he died. Now, it seems that General Lyman died in October, I believe it was, of 1942.

45. General RUSSELL. Then how long did you operate until Kramer?

[2467] Mr. WICKISER. From October 1942 until the time the contract was terminated.

46. General RUSSELL. That was when?

Mr. WICKISER. I believe it was terminated the first day of February, I believe.

47. General FRANK. 1942?

Mr. WICKISER. Of 1943.

48. General FRANK. 1943.

I would like to ask one more question here, about the effectiveness of the two methods of accomplishing work: first, through the fixed-price contract, and, next, through the cost-plus-fixed-fee.

Mr. WICKISER. Well, that would, of course, depend whether or not a man could safely bid a job. I don't think a contractor could have operated out there under a unit-price contract after war came on, sir, because you didn't know whether you could get equipment, replacement for your equipment; you didn't know whether you could get personnel; you didn't know whether you could get material to do the job. I think that the Territory Airport Constructors were just tickled to pieces to get their contract taken away from them, because I don't think they could have operated.

49. General FRANK. Then, you think there was no other way to do it than under a cost-plus-fixed-fee?

Mr. WICKISER. No, sir. I do not.

50. General FRANK. Have you anything else?

51. Major CLAUSEN. Your basic objection was not the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract but the supervision of the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract; is that correct?

[2468] Mr. WICKISER. Yes. I think you gentlemen are aware of a letter that was written outlining the procedure of the duties of the engineers and the contractors under a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis. If those instructions or those procedures were lived up to by both parties, I don't think there would ever be any trouble, but when one side starts to move over into the other man's territory he gets in trouble.

52. Major CLAUSEN. And did that happen?

Mr. WICKISER. Oh, that did happen. For instance, the duty of the Engineers under the cost-plus-fixed-fee is to use the contractors' personnel, to use their experience; and when you have experienced men that are sent out to do a job on that basis, it is to use that experience. But that was not the case there. I took over the tunnel work at Oahu as general tunnel superintendent in June of 1942. At that time General Lyman—or he was Colonel Lyman at that time—Colonel Lyman wanted this tunnel program expanded, and he wanted it done in a hell of a hurry. At that time there was also one job that was going on that they were doing for the Air Corps that was bad. They had had one cave-in at one of the portals getting underground, and, well, they were a little afraid of it.

Well, I went up there and I got ahold of some good men that were available right in Hawaii, and we went to work on that job, and we had just completed it at the time I left. There was practically a mile of 24-foot tunnel in bad ground, mud, and it had to be timbered, every foot of it, and spiled.

At the time I took that job over there was an inspector on the job. I'll get it [examining papers]. It was an inspector on the job; that the fellow who was superintendent of that [2469] particular job for me had no control whatsoever on his job. For instance, this inspector was doing the hiring. He was also making rate changes on men without ever notifying the superintendent of the job. The boy didn't know whether he was running the job or whether this inspector was. And I might tell you that the inspector on that job had never been on a tunnel job in his life up to that time.

53. General GRUNERT. What was he? The contractor's inspector or an Engineer inspector, or what?

Mr. WICKISER. Just an inspector. I think I have a note on that.

54. Major CLAUSEN. Inspector employed by whom?

Mr. WICKISER. Here [indicating]; I think this answers your question here.

55. General FRANK. Just a minute. The inspector represented the——

Mr. WICKISER. Engineers.

56. General FRANK. Corps of Engineers?

Mr. WICKISER. That is right, sir.

Now, here was a job over at Fort Shafter, a job called 208. When I took over I found this job was virtually at a standstill because of overinspection. The inspectors in charge would refuse to allow a concrete pour to begin unless the pour could be completed within the regular working hours of that day. This resulted in hours of wasted labor on the concrete crew because the pour would have to wait until the following day, even though the overtime in question was only one hour. The inspectors in charge would arbitrarily change the water content of the concrete without notifying the foreman. They were using pump crete, and if you do that— [2470] you gentlemen are familiar with pump crete operations—you know that the man that is operating the nozzle and the pump must know how much water is going in there so that he can keep that concrete moving through the pump without a plug.

The inspectors would also give orders to the men and in general assume the position of superintendents rather than inspectors. I might tell you that that was one of the first problems that I had confronting me there, and we rectified it by going to General Lyman or Colonel Lyman as he was at that time. I went directly to him and let my hair down, and it was straightened out.

Now, here was a job called 403-W. It was a bomb storage job, consisted of going up a valley that had high walls on either side, called Kipapa Gulch, and driving these short tunnels every 200 feet. Well, at Job 403-W I went out—this job was in the preliminary stages of building roads. The tunnel equipment was bought and was in Oahu. The battery locomotives had to operate over this road with the main railway laid out in front of these tunnels, see, so that you could get from one to the other with your tunnel equipment. The engineer that was out there, the chief of party surveying that job, had grades laid out as high as 14 percent. 14 percent, and there was a crew that was—jackhammer crew and shovel crew—working behind him taking up these grades of 14 percent that you were going to run light railway equipment over.

Well, you don't have to go into that. You gentlemen know that can't be done. So arbitrarily I moved back and started the crew at 3 percent maximum, which was entirely too much for [2471] railway equipment, but we moved back, and I went right in and got it straightened out with Colonel Lyman at that time; and he said, "Well, if the engineering can't keep up with you," he said, "let's get the job done, and we'll come out afterwards and we'll survey what you have got done. But for Christ's sake," he said, "let's get the work done."

57. Major CLAUSEN. That was Colonel——

Mr. WICKISER. General Lyman.

58. Major CLAUSEN. General Lyman, L-y-m-a-n.

Mr. WICKISER. L-y-m-a-n.

59. General GRUNERT. This all was after December 7 of '41?

Mr. WICKISER. That is right, sir. And I might tell you, with the exception of a survey party man, the chief of party that was there staking the job, he also had three other jobs that he was covering. There was no one representing the Corps of Engineers on that job, no one there at all, until I insisted on a man being there; and when they finally did place an inspector there, he was a man that had had no previous tunnel experience at all.

Now, if you gentlemen will care to investigate this next statement that I am going to make, I would certainly welcome it. There was a tunnel between 17-B and 17-A at Kipapa Gulch, Job 403-W, that is 60 feet long. Of course, we worked on center line and grade given us by engineers. This tunnel was staked wrong and, if driven to its entire full length, would have intersected the next tunnel to it. I had a hell of a lot of work, and I tell you 60 feet of tunnel could be punched down there in a mighty short time the way that we were stretched out on the tunnel, you know, because we were driving 200 feet of tunnel a [2472] day on that one job; and before they had had an underground on the lines that the engineers had given them, the back sights, and when I went up and took a look at this particular hole, and I says, "Fellows, you're wrong. Let's get another engineer out here with a transit and let's have him plot this work again and see if we're headed right."

They brought out another man, and he said, "Well, you're not right."

That tunnel was out there that they had—we gunited it and poured a portal on it, and they could use it for an office or something else that they wanted to have underground. But again, as I say, had they driven this tunnel as they were intending us to do, it would have intersected the other tunnel, but according to the specs on the job they had to be 200 feet apart at all points of parallel tunnels.

I can go on if you care to have me to.

60. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

61. General GRUNERT. You see, Mr. Wickiser, we are primarily interested in what happened prior to December 7th; and what information there is after December 7th, we are interested in only so much of it as has a bearing on the phases that pertain to the attack on December 7th.

Mr. WICKISER. I see, sir.

62. General GRUNERT. So, although we are interested in what you are putting out there, to give us a general line on the efficiency of the management, I think there has been enough evidence of that sort to cover what we need.

I have one question here: Do you know why Colonel Wyman was awarded a decoration?

[2473] Mr. WICKISER. No, sir, I do not. But I can tell you again that as far as the men that were working out there, working on the construction work, they thought it was a joke.

63. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything about his work on the string of air bases down toward Australia? Did you have anything to do with that?

Mr. WICKISER. No, sir.

64. General GRUNERT. Then, those who may have known about it and appeared to be surprised that he received a decoration didn't know but what he may have done extraordinary work on something else of which they were not aware?

Mr. WICKISER. That might have been. But I might also say that most of these men also knew of Colonel Wyman in Los Angeles, sir, which goes back a little further than that time.

65. General GRUNERT. Then, many of these men had been working for Colonel Wyman, then Major or Captain Wyman, in Los Angeles?

Mr. WICKISER. Well, either for him or they were associated with contractors.

66. General GRUNERT. Then it was a sort of common knowledge or rumored knowledge, at least, of certain existing conditions?

Mr. WICKISER. Common knowledge.

67. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

68. General RUSSELL. Do you know a man named Rohl?

Mr. WICKISER. Well, I know Bill. I know him not intimately. I might say that the only time that Bill Rohl was ever on any of my work out there in the Islands was along in the fall, latter part of October of 1942, and I was having a little trouble, and my wife was evacuated from Hawaii, and we [2474] had lost a youngster, and—well, she was here and I was wanting to come home, and I had fulfilled my contract and was staying over at the insistence of Mr. King, who was the general superintendent for Hawaiian Constructors at that time, and I was wanting to come home. Percy Benson and Mr. King and Mr. Rohl met me on the road as I was coming from Job 403-W, and I talked to them on the highway, and they said they wanted to go back and see the job. So I rode back, and we went up onto the job, and I told them at that time—I was talking to Bill and I told him I wanted to go home, and Bill told me this. He said, "Wickie, you can't go home," he said, "because if you go home who in the hell's going to do the work? We haven't got a man that we can turn the work over to, and the Engineers can't do it themselves. If you walk out," he said, "you are just leaving everybody down." And he says, "You can't go home. You got to stay and finish your job."

69. General RUSSELL. Was that the first time you saw Mr. Rohl out there?

Mr. WICKISER. That's the first time I ever saw him out there, sir. That is the truth.

70. General RUSSELL. And that was late in '42?

Mr. WICKISER. '42.

71. General RUSSELL. You did not see him nor did he visit any job that you were doing for the Hawaiian Airport Contractors prior to December 7, '41?

Mr. WICKISER. No, he had no reason to, because he had no connection with that.

72. General RUSSELL. Now, you expressed some familiarity [2475] in your earlier testimony with the work which was being done by the Hawaiian Constructors prior to December 7, '41, stating that you were impressed that it was running along normally and without confusion.

Mr. WICKISER. Yes. I might state, though, that there were probably four or five million dollars' worth of work involved at that time, and the organization that was there to handle it probable was adequate, but after the attack of December the 7th the work jumped to—well, at the end of the contract, I think 150 million or something like that. There is a hell of a big difference, gentlemen, between an organization that it takes to handle from two to five million dollars' worth of work than one that it takes to handle over a hundred million dollars' worth of work.

73. General RUSSELL. Do you know, by reputation or by common knowledge out there, what if any effect the appearance of Rohl on the Islands had so far as confusion in work or expediting work is concerned?

Mr. WICKISER. No, I don't. No, it wouldn't be fair for me to say one way or the other, I'll be honest with you, because it would be just hearsay.

74. General RUSSELL. Well, what the Board is interested in is whether or not, when Mr. Rohl came out there late in the fall, if he did, of 1941, that he immediately began to expedite the work.

Mr. WICKISER. Well, I will put it this way:—

75. General RUSSELL. Or did he produce confusion?

Mr. WICKISER. Allow me to put it this way: From the time I went over to Honolulu and from the time I went to work [2476] for Hawaiian Constructors there—now, I had worked for them, see, over on Hawaii, down at Hilo, but when I got there I was ready to go home, and in the meantime H. J. King was made superintendent, and when he took over I knew then things would hum, and he asked me to stay there and help him do the job.

76. General RUSSELL. You don't have any knowledge on the question I am asking you?

Mr. WICKISER. Yest, I do. I want to get to that.

77. General RUSSELL. All right.

Mr. WICKISER. Now, at the time King took over I knew that this man King was strong enough that Bill Rohl wouldn't ride him a bit: that is, if he was superintendent, that he would be doing the job, and not Bill Rohl. So that is exactly what happened too, because I think when you fellows get there—when you finally get Mr. King here tomorrow, you will find out that he insisted that Bill Rohl leave the job alone.

78. General RUSSELL. Well, do you think it was better for the job for King to run it?

Mr. WICKISER. I think so.

79. General RUSSELL. Without Rohl's, in other words,—

Mr. WICKISER. That's right, sir.

80. General RUSSELL. —interference?

Mr. WICKISER. That is right, putting it that way.

81. General RUSSELL. So that seems to be a sort of answer to my question.

Mr. WICKISER. That's right, sir.

82. General RUSSELL. All right. Now, you talked a little while ago about the people who were out on this job in Hawaii [2477] having had associations with Wyman back in Los Angeles, and you stated that as a result of those associations they were considerably surprised when he was decorated or received some official recognition?

Mr. WICKISER. Yes, sir.

83. General RUSSELL. Is it a generalization, then, that we may draw, that those people didn't think very much of Wyman as a contractor back in Los Angeles?

Mr. WICKISER. No.

48. General RUSSELL. As an engineer back in Los Angeles?

Mr. WICKISER. No, not as a contractor.

85. General RUSSELL. I mean as an engineer back in Los Angeles?

Mr. WICKISER. That is right.

86. General RUSSELL. Would you mind telling the Board the basis upon which these people predicated their thought that Wyman was not a good engineer officer?

Mr. WICKISER. I won't say that Wyman probably wasn't an able engineer, but the thought was, or the feeling, around Los Angeles among different contractors that Wyman was quite a drinking man and he was domineering. I have heard several legitimate contractors—good, honest men—that have told me of their experience of going in, talking to Wyman, and where they just walked out, walked out of his office, because they felt that they could be treated as men, didn't have to be treated in the domineering, insulting way that he treated them.

87. General GRUNERT. Do you think of anything else that you might add that might be of interest to the Board, in view of this limited mission that I have stated?

[2478] Mr. WICKISER. There is just one thing that I would like to say, and that is from the standpoint of confusion; I would like to say that there was just as much confusion over there when the contract was terminated as there was right after Pearl Harbor. The only relief that we got there at all, from an operational standpoint, was the time or during the time that Colonel Lyman, who was later General Lyman, was in charge of the Engineering office, and we did have it while he was there. We did have relief, and there was a good, wholesome, friendly relationship that he insisted upon, from both parties; and as soon as General Kramer took over it slipped right back to where it was before.

88. General GRUNERT. All right, sir. Thank you very much for coming.

Mr. WICKISER. All right, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon at 11:20 a. m. the Board recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[2479]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

TESTIMONY OF RAY ANDERSON, 1930 EUCLID STREET, SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you please state to the Board your full name and address?

Mr. ANDERSON. My name is Robert Arthur Ray Anderson, but I use Ray Anderson as my name.

2. Colonel WEST. And your address?

Mr. ANDERSON. 1930 Euclid Street, Santa Monica, California.

3. Colonel WEST. What is your occupation?

Mr. ANDERSON. Electrician.

4. General GRUNERT. Mr. Anderson, on this particular phase of the investigation I am asking General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, to take the lead.

5. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Anderson, by whom are you employed at the present time?

Mr. ANDERSON. In the L. A. shipyards, Todd Shipyards.

6. Major CLAUSEN. You have been a resident of the State of California for how long?

Mr. ANDERSON. Since 1930.

7. General FRANK. By L. A. you mean the Los Angeles shipyards?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, the Los Angeles shipyards.

8. Major CLAUSEN. How long have you been in the electrical business, Mr. Anderson?

Mr. ANDERSON. All my life.

[2480] 9. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have occasion to be employed on the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

10. Major CLAUSEN. In connection with the construction of defense projects for the Hawaiian Constructors, Mr. Anderson?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir. I was hired here in San Francisco.

11. General FRANK. How old are you, Mr. Anderson?

Mr. ANDERSON. I will be 63 in December.

12. Major CLAUSEN. During what period of time were you employed by the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. ANDERSON. I was hired by them in January.

13. Major CLAUSEN. What year?

Mr. ANDERSON. 1942, and I stayed out there until August.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Of 1942?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

15. Major CLAUSEN. Can you give me some very brief idea as to the projects on which you worked during that period?

Mr. ANDERSON. I worked in General Emmons headquarters from the time I went there until I left.

16. Major CLAUSEN. To your knowledge was electrical work done by others on these defense projects before you arrived in the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. ANDERSON. There had been some pipe put in on the job we were on, but nothing further. Pipe had been put down in the tunnel.

17. Major CLAUSEN. What was that pipe?

Mr. ANDERSON. Electrical pipe, conduit for the wiring of the tunnel.

[2481] 18. General FRANK. What tunnel?

Mr. ANDERSON. At Aliamanu crater. It was the headquarters of General Emmons. They had moved in there, General Emmons. The Navy had down below there the Navy magazines about three or four miles west of Fort Shafter.

19. Major CLAUSEN. Did you during the period you were in Hawaii meet Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir, I talked to him and saw him frequently.

20. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall whether Colonel Wyman during that time was ever intoxicated?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

21. Major CLAUSEN. To what extent?

Mr. ANDERSON. Well, he could navigate.

22. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon?

Mr. ANDERSON. He could navigate, but he was intoxicated. I will tell you something about this whole thing while we are on this evidence. I was made a kind of a political football over this deal to start out with.

23. Major CLAUSEN. Over what deal?

Mr. ANDERSON. This Tenney Committee.

24. Major CLAUSEN. Yes?

Mr. ANDERSON. And my personal opinion about that whole deal is that it is all over. Rohl has left those construction companies. Wyman has been put out of his job, and I believe General Emmons was possibly relieved over it. I can't be sure about that. And the whole thing, as far as those Islands are concerned, should be a dead issue. Today it is a political football. I told Jack Tenney last year about it. Fulton Lewis [2482] had broadcast my testimony nationally and it was not the right thing to do. I was going into Douglas on the morning when I was subpoenaed and I told them exactly how I felt about that, and at that time I felt very sore because I actually was afraid that the Japs might come back there. We had fight after fight over the installation of that electrical equipment back there, because I wanted to make the communications separate from the power, because the power might be knocked out. We had quite a fight over it.

And the story about the beds and the food is past and gone. Whether Colonel Wyman through his negligence permitted that condition, I don't know, but he told me that the food was good enough for us, and he had shut down on it because we were wasting it. We couldn't get a cup of coffee without paying 35 cents for it, or you could get the whole meal for 35 cents. They had issued Army rations to those men from the day we arrived there until we left. I went to the barracks, the Ordnance barracks at the headquarters around the 1st of April and lived there with the soldiers in the barracks, six of us,—two electricians, two carpenters and two plumbers—lived in the barracks with the soldiers. I was there the morning Colonel Wyman got relieved.

25. Major CLAUSEN. When you testified to the Tenney Committee you told them facts, didn't you?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

26. Major CLAUSEN. Regardless of your personal preferences, this Board wants the facts.

Mr. ANDERSON. I can realize that, too.

27. Major CLAUSEN. Well, tell me this: You said you knew [2483] Colonel Wyman was intoxicated. Just tell me whether you ever had occasion to see Colonel Wyman in an intoxicated condition.

Mr. ANDERSON. Well, he was what I would call in an intoxicated condition. His breath smelled a little bit and he didn't seem to be level-headed as a man in that position should be.

28. Major CLAUSEN. And that was during what period of time?

Mr. ANDERSON. I don't think he went back to his office after the 9th of March. I think the relief was ordered on the 9th of March, and he never went back there. He stayed at that hotel. The guards had to go in one night and jump him about keeping the light on in the room.

29. General FRANK. You stated that Colonel Wyman was intoxicated, but we have no dates on that. Can you give us the date?

Mr. ANDERSON. I do not recall the exact date. The first time I met Colonel Wyman, I went up to his office in the Young Building.

30. General FRANK. When?

Mr. ANDERSON. That was some time in the latter part of February, the last couple of days.

31. General FRANK. Of what year?

Mr. ANDERSON. 1942. We argued all the way down into Bishop Street.

32. General FRANK. Was he sober then?

Mr. ANDERSON. No, he was not. He had been drinking but I never saw Colonel Wyman take a drink. I can tell you that.

33. General FRANK. Now, from then on?

Mr. ANDERSON. Then I saw him the next week.

34. General FRANK. Which was still in February?

Mr. ANDERSON. He had been drinking at that time.

[2484] 35. General FRANK. Still in February of 1942?

Mr. ANDERSON. That would possibly be around the 1st of March.

36. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. ANDERSON. And then I talked to him the day before he was relieved, when the order came to him.

37. General FRANK. Was he still intoxicated?

Mr. ANDERSON. He still had whiskey on his breath.

38. General FRANK. But as to whether or not his faculties were impaired?

Mr. ANDERSON. That I could not say, General. That is the hardest thing in the world to say. A man can be drunk and maneuver around and do certain jobs fairly well.

39. General FRANK. In your own mind, when do you consider a man drunk?

Mr. ANDERSON. Well, it is a hard thing to say. Some people think if he is in the gutter he is drunk, but a man who has had more than enough for him, I consider him drunk.

40. General FRANK. In other words, you thought on these occasions—

Mr. ANDERSON. I actually thought he was drunk.

41. General FRANK (continuing). That Colonel Wyman was carrying more than he could hold?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes.

42. General FRANK. That was your interpretation?

Mr. ANDERSON. That was my interpretation, yes.

43. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Anderson, you testified to the Tenney Committee that Colonel Wyman was in an intoxicated condition or lay in the hotel drunk all the time for some five days before he [2485] left his job.

Mr. ANDERSON. He stayed up in that hotel five days before he came out, to the best of my memory.

44. Major CLAUSEN. What is the basis of your statement that he lay in the hotel drunk for those five days?

Mr. ANDERSON. Well, he was gone and we saw him down in the lobby once or twice during that time and he wasn't dressed for the street.

45. Major CLAUSEN. When you say "we saw him" you mean that you saw him?

Mr. ANDERSON. I saw him, yes, sir.

46. Major CLAUSEN. And could it have been that he was working in the hotel during those five days merely getting his papers ready to get out?

Mr. ANDERSON. That could be possible, sir.

47. Major CLAUSEN. I was wondering where you got the basis for your statement, that five days before Colonel Wyman left his job he lay in the hotel drunk all the time. Specifically what is your basis for that, Mr. Anderson?

Mr. ANDERSON. Based on that, I don't know.

48. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, the Board wants facts.

Mr. ANDERSON. That is true.

49. General FRANK. Do you know anything about the situation in Honolulu prior to December 7th?

Mr. ANDERSON. No, sir, nothing whatever prior to the time I went there.

50. General FRANK. And you arrived there when?

Mr. ANDERSON. I arrived there at the beginning of [2486] February.

51. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know anything, Mr. Anderson, about the work that was done on the Islands as an alternate air route down to Australia?

Mr. ANDERSON. Only that the men came back from Christmas Island and told us that General Tinker had ordered them out.

52. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, the Hawaiian Constructors had been given certain work to do for an air route down to Australia, is that correct?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes.

53. Major CLAUSEN. And some of the returning men stated something with respect to the Hawaiian Constructors. What did they say, sir?

Mr. ANDERSON. They said that General Tinker came to Christmas Island—Canton Island was still going on—they said that General Tinker came to Christmas Island and ordered all of the construction men to leave there.

54. Major CLAUSEN. Do you have the names of some of those men who told you that? Can you give those names to the Board?

Mr. ANDERSON. I doubt whether I can or not, Major.

55. Major CLAUSEN. You stated also to the Tenney Committee that you believed that sabotage, in the sense that there was deliberate holding up of the work, had been going on for some time.

Mr. ANDERSON. Well, that is what it appeared to be.

56. Major CLAUSEN. And what was the basis for that.

Mr. ANDERSON. On account of not being able to get certain things done, could not get plans and other things of that kind. They were always blaming the men. Middleton and Bazants in [2487]

particular blamed the men that the work was not being gotten out and the men would not work.

57. General FRANK. Have you talked to anybody about this testimony that you are giving here, in the last few days?

Mr. ANDERSON. No, sir, I haven't seen anyone, except one boy that came back from Honolulu two or three months ago, and we never discussed anything about the island other than different people we knew.

58. Major CLAUSEN. Over what period time, Mr. Anderson, did this sabotage go on?

Mr. ANDERSON. We had a great deal of difficulty about getting the job done all the way through.

59. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know if that existed prior to the 7th of December, 1941?

Mr. ANDERSON. That I could not say. That I would not know.

60. Major CLAUSEN. By whom was this holding up of the work done?

Mr. ANDERSON. Presumably the superintendents or whoever had charge of the various areas.

61. Major CLAUSEN. When this information came to you, Mr. Anderson, as to these things, did you make reports to anyone?

Mr. ANDERSON. Not about that, because there was no one but—well, I got a man to speak to Colonel Bathurst.

62. Major CLAUSEN. Who was Colonel Bathurst?

Mr. ANDERSON. A deputy chief of staff.

63. Major CLAUSEN. Who is this man that you got to speak to him?

Mr. ANDERSON. A fellow by the name of Glasgow.

[2488] 64. Major CLAUSEN. You say you got him to speak to the Colonel?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, about straightening this out, and he told Glasgow that the thing would be straightened out shortly and Colonel Wyman was relieved a week later.

65. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever make reports to G-2 concerning these conditions.

Mr. ANDERSON. Not about the work. About going into Hickam Field I did. I had a telephone call in the generator room one night from a Japanese woman for an electrician, and I reported that to G-2.

66. General GRUNERT. Mr. Anderson, I understand from your testimony that you know practically nothing about what happened prior to December 7th, 1941, in Hawaii?

Mr. ANDERSON. No.

67. General GRUNERT. And you do not know whether what you considered might be sabotage occurred prior thereto?

Mr. ANDERSON. That I think, General, would be an expression rather than a direct statement.

68. General GRUNERT. That was an opinion of your own?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes. I see there they have Fort Kam. I never to my knowledge ever heard of it.

69. General GRUNERT. All these things you know about happened after December 7th, 1941?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir. I was here in California when the Japs hit Pearl Harbor.

70. General GRUNERT. Is there anything that you could tell us about what happened prior to December 7th, 1941, or things that might have led up to the conditions which you found when you got over there?

[2489] Mr. ANDERSON. Well, General, I will tell you, this whole construction setup, I worked on construction all my life, and in the course of competitive construction we have to work when we have material. We were at one time working there without any wire and there were millions of feet lying there that we knew of, and things of that kind were carried on. It appeared that those people had the intention of always keeping the men disturbed. Now, I cannot say that any Army officer had anything to do with that, because Middleton, as far as the ordinary things went, was the big man there. Mr. Rohl and Mr. Woolley and Mr. Benson had a committee, of which Mr. Woolley was the head. Charlie Winsted told me they had started out there first and put Woolley on that executive committee, supposed to operate it. Then they decided that they should have another contractor from Honolulu and they brought Mr. Benson in. Mr. Benson and Mr. Rohl had nothing to say to any of the men of the Constructors when there were any complaints. They were always handed over to Mr. Woolley. We had no hot water to bathe in. The construction men needed it. They had a little 20-gallon tank and we could not get it. Different things of that kind had gone on. The food was bad. The Army cooks were good. When I lived with the soldiers there I had no complaint to make about the food. The Army ration was sufficient and well cooked.

71. General GRUNERT. But these were all conditions existing afterwards?

Mr. ANDERSON. Existing afterwards, yes, sir.

72. General GRUNERT. You see, this Board is concerned only with phases that had any bearing on the attack on Pearl Harbor and it is limited in its investigation to such phases, so this [2490] information which you may have about conditions afterwards, unless it has a bearing on what occurred or what the conditions were prior to the attack, the Board cannot see any great connection with what it has been charged with doing.

Mr. ANDERSON. I can understand that, General, and I would like to say this much about that whole deal. The best thing that ever happened to us was the Japs hitting us at Pearl Harbor and not at sea. The Japanese have had the full run of those islands for years. The people there are actually friendlier to the Japs than they are to us, from my experience on the island. To my mind, this whole business, the Truman Committee and all included, it is a political football today, for which the Army and Navy will have to suffer. It is something past to us. We have gotten over most of our soreness about the whole thing. We were sore, because men 40 and 50 years old to go into those things don't go in there for the fun of it. I can earn that money here without going out there for the amount of money we were paid. We went there because we thought we could help, and we could not. We just could not help. That is the thing that burned us up. We had this thing of working under Japanese. It is a crime that a man should have to work under a Japanese at a

certain time. They actually had a strike at Bellows Field for a day on that account. George Shaefer—he is in the Army now—he refused to work for 13 days, and they stopped his pay and wouldn't pay him afterwards, because he wouldn't work under a Japanese. A Japanese may be a good American citizen, born here, no doubt, but they haven't shown it. Of course, this whole thing, as I say, now, the politicians are kicking it around. There will never be [2491] anything come of it or done. Rohl got out of his job and the rest of them likewise.

73. General GRUNERT. That will be all, I believe. Thank you.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2492] **TESTIMONY OF GEORGE FRANCIS BARTLETT, EMARTVILLE, CALIFORNIA**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Bartlett, will you please state to the Board your full name and address?

Mr. BARTLETT. George Francis Bartlett; postoffice address, Smartville, California.

2. Colonel WEST. What is your occupation, Mr. Bartlett?

Mr. BARTLETT. Engineer.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Bartlett, General Frank here, assisted by Major Clausen, will lead in asking the questions, and the rest of the Board will develop any subject that they think needs development.

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir.

4. General FRANK. Mr. Bartlett, what is your present occupation?

Mr. BARTLETT. I am a principal engineer with the USED on furlough.

5. General FRANK. How long is your furlough?

Mr. BARTLETT. I am not doing anything at the present time. I am convalescing from an eye ailment.

6. General FRANK. Were you employed by the Engineers in Honolulu along about 1940 and '41?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir.

7. General FRANK. What was your job over there?

Mr. BARTLETT. In Honolulu I was stationed at Fort Shafter as resident engineer or principal inspector at the underground command post in the radio transmitter tunnels that were being built there by the Hawaiian Constructor [2493] Company.

8. General FRANK. At Aliamanu Crater?

Mr. BARTLETT. No. At Fort Shafter.

9. General FRANK. At Fort Shafter itself?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir. Not in the crater. We put in two tunnels there.

10. General FRANK. How long have you been with the Corps of Engineers?

Mr. BARTLETT. Off and on since 1937. I was with them in 1937 and '38, and then I quit and was up on the Shasta Dam for a while. Then I accepted a position that they offered me to go to Honolulu, and this is the time that I went and the time that I went to Fort Shafter.

11. General FRANK. What kind of work have you had most of your experience in?

Mr. BARTLETT. Mostly underground excavation and general contracting, railroad building, and so forth, roads and highways.

12. General FRANK. Will you state again what job you had in 1941?

Mr. BARTLETT. I was the associate engineer acting as resident engineer and principal inspector at the Fort Shafter underground radio transmitter tunnel and the command post tunnel.

13. General FRANK. From what date until what date, about?

Mr. BARTLETT. Some time in late April until December.

14. General FRANK. '41?

Mr. BARTLETT. '41. At Fort Shafter.

15. General FRANK. I see. Who were the contractors on that [2494] job?

Mr. BARTLETT. Hawaiian Constructors.

16. General FRANK. How did the work go?

Mr. BARTLETT. At times there was no cause for complaint, but most of the time, why, we were stepping on them pretty hard.

17. General FRANK. Why?

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, the general lack of procurement and passing the buck, if you know what I mean, back to us. There was a confusion of authority. In other words, we were supposed, as we understood the Engineers, to furnish certain things, and the Constructors would claim that they would furnish those things, and then it was reverse position, and it led to confusion. That was one item in which we had considerable difficulty: procurement, in other words.

18. General FRANK. Do you remember any of those items?

Mr. BARTLETT. They were all minor items.

19. General FRANK. Such as?

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, I can give you an example. We were starting a large excavation, a tunnel, there. We had finished one smaller tunnel, and we were putting in this command-post tunnel, which was quite an excavation, and it ran into a long haul, the material of the spoil. So I made a report of the general situation there and what should be done, and the report went through Major Robinson to Colonel Wyman, and Colonel Wyman, as I understand, took it up with the contractors, that they would have to get some other means besides wheelbarrows to move this muck out of there, and they expressed their inability to do it.

[2495] I found where there was some old equipment lying idle in Honolulu in a junk yard and called Colonel Robinson's attention to it, and immediately Colonel Wyman had me go down and get that material and equipment and have it set aside for the contractors to purchase it. They had to do the purchasing in that particular instance, for some mysterious reason. So they were several weeks in getting around to purchasing it, and day by day went by and we were intensely busy, so we—I finally went down to headquarters again, in the Young Building, and asked to see Colonel Wyman, and the Colonel was not in, but I stated my case, and that night—

20. General FRANK. To whom?

Mr. BARTLETT. To Major Robinson, then. He was then Major. And that night, why, the contractor went out there and got this equipment, in trucks.

21. General FRANK. Who was the contractor?

Mr. BARTLETT. Hawaiian Constructors.

22. General FRANK. Do you remember who the particular—

Mr. BARTLETT. Their representative at that time was a fellow we named—we called Curly Ellison.

23. General FRANK. Were there other instances of delay similar to that?

Mr. BARTLETT. Oh, yes. There were delays in procurement, in getting different items, and there was considerable routine involved in getting those items, but that was gradually—

24. General FRANK. Were the items available in the Islands?

Mr. BARTLETT. They would be, yes, sir.

25. General FRANK. Name some of them.

Mr. BARTLETT. We had to get some what we called inserts to [2496] put into this radio transmitter tunnel, from the Honolulu Iron Works, and they were available. I called up on the telephone and they were available. So I had a procedure of finding out where these things were and then notifying the procurement department of the USED, who would get busy and get the stuff for us. But if we could give them the leads, why, we found that, their time being taken up with other things, why,—and not knowing exactly what we wanted, and the nomenclature sometimes was indefinite, why, we generally told them where they could get this stuff, and they would go and get it.

So in this particular instance these inserts were needed, and it was holding up the work, and the Honolulu Iron Works had them and would deliver them immediately. So the contractor was supposed to call for them, and a day went by and two days and quite a few days, and they finally stated that they were not down there. I took a representative of the—

26. General FRANK. Who told you? The contractor?

Mr. BARTLETT. The contractor stated that they were not there. And I took a representative of the contracting company down there, and we found them and got them. Now, that was indicative of the trifling delays which do occur on all construction jobs, but I think it was more pronounced down there than anywhere I have ever been.

27. General FRANK. Can you give us another two or three instances?

Mr. BARTLETT. They were all just about as trivial as that, General, and I am trying to think of something that was of more magnitude, but I can't recall anything at present.

28. General FRANK. Each one of these things, however, was [2497] essential to the complete operation of the project when it was finished?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir.

29. General FRANK. Is that right?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, that is correct.

30. General FRANK. Could it have operated without these things?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, it could have. We could have got along, but the work would have been much slower. It wouldn't have been the general line of construction work as proper procedure.

31. General FRANK. Would it have been satisfactory?

Mr. BARTLETT. It would have been very unsatisfactory to any construction man, for instance, to see the laborer wheeling out over a

distance of twelve or fourteen hundred feet excavation material from a face of a tunnel that was 12 by 16.

32. General FRANK. In your observation of the operation of the contractors did you observe anything that indicated that there was any intent on the part of the contractors to delay the work? Was there anything that showed intent to delay the work?

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, that would be an opinion. My opinion is yes, there was an intent, but I couldn't definitely put my finger on anything right now.

33. General FRANK. What led you to your opinion that there was intent?

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, we would want certain things done at a certain time, and it would be resented on the part of the contractor. If I gave them a definite order that such and [2498] such a thing would have to be done at a certain time to make the work proceed in an orderly way, why, they would quite often find some subterfuge for not doing it, apparently, and we did not get along very well. There was considerable bickering on the job, but we made them to a certain extent expedite the work.

34. General FRANK. Would anybody take care of them? Was there anybody topside taking care of them? Could they appeal to somebody who would support them?

Mr. BARTLETT. The contractors?

35. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes.

36. General FRANK. Who would support them?

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, as a rule it would go up to Ellison, and he was the general superintendent.

37. General FRANK. A civilian?

Mr. BARTLETT. A civilian, yes, sir.

38. General FRANK. Yes?

Mr. BARTLETT. And from Ellison it would go to a chap, a local contractor that entered into that.

39. General FRANK. Woolley?

Mr. BARTLETT. Woolley. Woolley seemed to carry the load. We saw very little of Paul Grafe of the Callahan Company, although he was out there a few times, and old man Rohl was out there once, and it would be appealed to them and then apparently the thing would be adjusted at headquarters and we would have our way about it, but it would entail delays, and my impression always was that the delays were caused by the contractors and not by the USED, because every man that I [2499] knew in the USED was trying very hard to expedite the work.

40. General FRANK. Once the information of any of this delay having reached military headquarters, Colonel Wyman's headquarters, what was done about it?

Mr. BARTLETT. You would get action right away. If you could reach Colonel Wyman or Colonel Robinson you would get action immediately. If it had to go through a routine and some of their subordinates, it was a little slower. You would get a decision one way or the other from Colonel Wyman or Major Robinson.

41. General FRANK. Did you ever run across Mr. Rohl?

Mr. BARTLETT. Once.

42. General FRANK. What was the circumstance?

Mr. BARTLETT. He came out there to the command-post tunnel, and I saw a civilian walking over there, so I went over. It was during the noon hour. The men were not working. And he walked in. I think that either Colonel Robinson or Colonel Wyman was with him, and one or two others, but he was over there by himself, and the Army group was standing off to one side talking with some of the personnel at Fort Shafter. So we all went in the tunnel together, and Rohl made himself known to me and asked me who I was, and I told him, and we walked through the tunnel and he told me who he was, and it was his job.

43. General FRANK. Nothing unusual about his being there?

Mr. BARTLETT. No. It was the first and last time I ever saw him there.

44. General FRANK. I see. There was no incident that caused you to remember it?

[2500] Mr. BARTLETT. Yes.

45. General FRANK. What was it?

Mr. BARTLETT. We had put in a little Denver-Gardner mucking machine, a little sort of a toy arrangement for loading cars, and the contractors had brought that to facilitate loading and it wasn't our idea of just what we should have, but it apparently was all that was available, and Rohl asked me what I thought of that, and I says, "Well, what do you think of it?" I says, "It's yours."

And he laughed and he says, "I don't have to tell you." And that impressed itself on my mind at that time, and that is the way I happen to recall Rohl was in there, because Woolley came out quite often, and I had met Paul Grafe quite a few times. He had been out there several times when we first started the job.

46. General FRANK. Colonel Wyman ever come out there?

Mr. BARTLETT. Oh, yes, very often.

47. General FRANK. What was your impression of him?

Mr. BARTLETT. My impression of Colonel Wyman?

48. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, my impression at that time was that he was a good engineer, carrying a very heavy load, difficult to approach, but once you could get his ear long enough to tell him something, why, you would get a decent decision. That seemed to be the impression that we all had of Colonel Wyman at that time.

49. General FRANK. Did, at any time while you were there, you ever see him intoxicated?

Mr. BARTLETT. No, I haven't.

[2501] 50. General FRANK. What was his reputation among the group that were working for him?

Mr. BARTLETT. Why, he was not particularly popular with any of us. He was aloof, but we expected that, and he would come out there and have very, very little to say, but the next day, why, we would get a letter or something of that sort pointing out certain things and ordering certain things done. That was his general procedure. In other words, I would say that the Colonel didn't get close to his employees at all, like other officers that I worked under down there.

51. General FRANK. Do you think that the circumstances surrounding these delays could have been helped?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, I think they could have been helped.

52. General FRANK. How?

Mr. BARTLETT. I believe that a change in personnel in quite a few respects—

53. General FRANK. Of personnel. Personnel representing the Engineer Corps or the contractors?

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, both. Both, possibly including myself, because I was more or less cranky down there when things didn't go to suit me, and I presume I was temperamental, and I know some of the others were that took the job more or less seriously, and there were others that didn't take the job quite so seriously. You find that in every outfit, I guess.

54. General FRANK. Do you think that these delays prevented the completion of some of that work before December 7th?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir. That work should have been done—going on ordinary construction standards, we should have had our work done in 60 percent of the time that it took for [2502] accomplishment. That's offhand 60 percent.

55. General FRANK. Which of those projects, in your opinion, should have been finished prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. BARTLETT. The radio transmitter station on Kokee should have been finished.

56. General FRANK. That is up on Kauai?

Mr. BARTLETT. Kauai, yes, sir. And the radio transmitter tunnel should have been finished.

57. General FRANK. On Kauai?

Mr. BARTLETT. No.

58. General FRANK. At Shafter?

Mr. BARTLETT. At Shafter. Now, the Engineers had that ready for installation of equipment, but the Signal Corps had difficulty in getting the equipment; and when the equipment came, some of it had been ordered by the Signal Corps, some by the contractor. It was not the proper equipment. It was fouled up some way, and we couldn't set up things as we should, so we improvised and got it going anyway. But it was very unsatisfactory and disconcerting.

59. General FRANK. What other projects should have been finished before Pearl Harbor and were not finished because of these delays?

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, I can't recall any now.

60. General FRANK. Was there any dissention or squabbling among the contractors?

Mr. BARTLETT. Among themselves?

61. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, their personnel used to squabble considerably. They were fighting among themselves. The [2503] weather was hot, and there were the petty jealousies that you find on construction jobs sometimes where there is not a well ordered head to it.

62. General FRANK. What about the control of that construction group? Was it well controlled or poorly controlled, the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, my impression—my definite impression is, it was very poorly controlled.

63. General FRANK. Well, it was under two heads there at different times: it was under Mr. Grafe for a while, and then it was under Mr. Rohl. Was there any difference that you could feel?

Mr. BARTLETT. I didn't notice Rohl entering into the picture much. It seemed to be Grafe, and then after he left, why, Rohl was there for a short time, but Woolley seemed to take over.

64. General FRANK. You never thought that there was good positive control?

Mr. BARTLETT. No, sir, I didn't. And there wasn't good positive co-operation. We didn't feel that we were all shoving along together at any time. We just couldn't make them see our point.

65. General FRANK. All right.

66. Major CLAUSEN. When was it, Mr. Bartlett, that you saw Mr. Rohl?

Mr. BARTLETT. I think it must have been along in the summer months. We were from June until December on the command post, and it was along in probably August.

67. Major CLAUSEN. Of what year, sir?

[2504] Mr. BARTLETT. '41.

68. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know anything concerning the relations between Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman?

Mr. BARTLETT. No, I do not.

69. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

70. General RUSSELL. You state that when you saw Rohl on one occasion he said, "I don't have to tell you," referring to some little appliances for loading cars?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir.

71. General RUSSELL. And you said that impressed you, Mr. Bartlett?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes.

72. General RUSSELL. Now, why did that?

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, I thought that the other—his men had tried to sell me the idea that this little mucking machine was quite all right and it was doing effective work, and my impression was that it wasn't the indicated equipment for a job of that sort. So when Rohl made that remark that he didn't have to tell me and laughed, why, I just made a mental reservation, "Well, that old fellow is a little more—knows a little more about it than some of the men working for him," or something of that sort. That is the impression I got, but it was his—

[2505] 73. General RUSSELL. Your impression was that Rohl probably had the same idea about it that you did?

Mr. BARTLETT. No, sir; I don't think that. I think that he just figured that they put a mucking machine in there, and it was on the cost-plus basis, and it was in there messing along and jumping off the track and disconcerting the labor, and it didn't appeal to me, and he knew that it wasn't adequate, but he just said, "I don't have to tell you," and laughed about it; and I guess he was correct about it.

74. General RUSSELL. You got the impression he wanted to tell you that was the contractors' job, not the engineers' job, and he did not have to?

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, General, no, I did not get that impression. I got the impression that he was sort of evading the issue, and it was a rather delicate flattery to me, because he was talking, one construction man to another, and he wasn't going to tell me anything, but he was just going to laugh it off.

75. General RUSSELL. I do not remember when you stated you left out there, Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Fort Shafter?

76. General RUSSELL. When you left the islands to come back.

Mr. BARTLETT. Oh. I went to Kauai on the 2nd of December to expedite the work.

77. General RUSSELL. 1941, or 1942?

Mr. BARTLETT. 1941; to expedite the radar station over there. I was there until August 1942, and the work was pretty well finished up, and then I went over to Honolulu, and I was there until nearly December, and I think I arrived here, the 10th of December.

[2506] 78. General RUSSELL. Wyman was out there in 1942, when you left, was he?

Mr. BARTLETT. No, I think he had left. No, Colonel Wyman was district engineer in May, I think.

79. General RUSSELL. But you were serving with the Department Engineers for the United States Army all that time?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir.

80. General RUSSELL. Well, when you left the islands and came back to this country, did you then close your relations with the engineers? Have you been with them since, or not?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes; I went to Canada, up to Edmonton. Colonel Wyman requested five or six of us up there, and I was dissatisfied with conditions up there, so I resigned, and they wouldn't accept my resignation, but gave me a furlough.

81. General RUSSELL. Now, if I have gotten your testimony correctly estimated, you were of the very definite opinion that the operation by the Hawaiian Constructors during your association with them in Oahu and in the Hawaiian Department was unsatisfactory.

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir.

82. General RUSSELL. Distinctly unsatisfactory?

Mr. BARTLETT. Distinctly unsatisfactory.

83. General RUSSELL. And you would attribute that condition to a lack of positive supervision?

Mr. BARTLETT. A lack of experienced personnel.

84. General RUSSELL. In what grades? In the supervisory grades?

Mr. BARTLETT. In all grades, right down through, skilled labor, and everything but the common labor. The common labor, the Filipino labor, and the Hawaiian labor, when it was good, it was excellent; and what we had was mostly excellent.

[2507] 85. General RUSSELL. And the inefficiency extended on up to the top?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir; it did.

86. General RUSSELL. And you do not think that Rohl's appearance on the island influenced the situation which you are now describing?

Mr. BARTLETT. No; I am not familiar with anything that he did down there. The only time I ever saw the man was when he came out there, that particular time.

87. General RUSSELL. Did you tell General Frank when that visit was, by Rohl?

Mr. BARTLETT. I think it was in August, but I am not sure.

88. General RUSSELL. 1941?

Mr. BARTLETT. In 1941; yes, sir.

89. General RUSSELL. It could have been in September or October?

Mr. BARTLETT. It might have been.

90. General RUSSELL. Had you known Rohl before?

Mr. BARTLETT. No, sir.

91. General RUSSELL. Had you been in the construction work on the west coast for any time before this?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir.

92. General RUSSELL. You knew nothing of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. BARTLETT. Oh, yes; I knew "Tom" Connolly.

93. General RUSSELL. You knew "Tom" Connolly?

Mr. BARTLETT. Oh, yes.

94. General RUSSELL. How do you regard Connolly, as a contractor and operator?

[2508] Mr. BARTLETT. Well, "Tom" and I were pretty friendly at one time. We were both on the Hetch-Hetchy job, years ago, and he branched out and went into contracting, and our paths crossed a few times, and he seemed to be getting along pretty good, and I figured he was rather a bright, aggressive young man, as a contractor, and was doing all right, and I wished him well; but I have not seen "Tom" Connolly since I was over in Goat Island one time, there, and they were putting in a tunnel, and that is the last time I saw him, the last time I ever had any conversation.

95. General RUSSELL. How about this Callahan Company? How were they regarded in the construction world?

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, that calls for my opinion again, and I will say—I am trying to be as cooperative as I can on this, without sticking my neck out too far—but I will say that the Callahan outfit had the best personnel; their lead men were better, than men that they brought over to the islands were better than any of the others.

96. General RUSSELL. Including the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. BARTLETT. I didn't see any Rohl-Connolly men that were worth a darn. In fact, I don't remember any of them, now.

97. General RUSSELL. You do not know when their first supervisory personnel reached the island?

Mr. BARTLETT. I think it arrived in February or March 1941, and I arrived there in April 1941. There were some of them there when I got there.

98. General RUSSELL. You are certain of that? There were some Rohl-Connolly?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes; "Shorty" McCoy and "Curly" Ellison [2509] were there.

99. General RUSSELL. Were they Rohl-Connolly people?

Mr. BARTLETT. They were Callahan people.

100. General RUSSELL. I am talking about Rohl-Connolly supervisors.

Mr. BARTLETT. I don't know any of their men that were there.

101. General RUSSELL. And you do not know when they first came, or if they came while you were there?

Mr. BARTLETT. I don't know of any that came.

102. General RUSSELL. Did you know any of the Rohl-Connolly Company's supervisors that were out there at any time while you were on the island?

Mr. BARTLETT. No, sir; I can't recall any.

103. General RUSSELL. So far as you know, then, there were none, or do you mean that you cannot recall them?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir. There was supposed to be a tunnel outfit, and all the tunnel men that we got were from Callahan.

104. General RUSSELL. That is all.

Mr. BARTLETT. And Callahan picked some of them up from the Red Hill in the Navy. They were stealing each other's key men all the while down there, and we were trying to stop it.

105. General GRUNERT. Mr. Bartlett, do you know of your own knowledge, or have you any reason to suspect, that the contractors purposely and intentionally delayed any part of these projects with a view toward sabotaging them, or with a view toward making the situation more favorable to a Japanese [2510] attack?

Mr. BARTLETT. No. Of course, we all have our opinions, but I have no substantial basis for my opinion.

106. General GRUNERT. These minor things that you mentioned—and you called them minor—were they of such nature that they delayed projects that would have been of great value in the defense?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir.

107. General GRUNERT. For instance, how would your CP have been able, if it had been completed, to have had any effect on what actually happened?

Mr. BARTLETT. The CP wouldn't. The CP would—that went the best of any job that we had, and in spite of the fact that the expense was great, and the manner of operation was not good construction methods, still we felt that we were doing the best that we could by moving that spoil out in small quantities. Instead of having a big Conway mucking machine and large cars and so forth and going right through it, why, we had to whittle away with small stuff; but the command post would have been finished by the first of the year if we hadn't had the "blitz," it was that far along; but that didn't affect the general situation down there. It is my personal impression that, had the Kokee radar station been finished, it might have made a big difference.

108. General GRUNERT. What do you know about that particular situation?

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, I finished the job over there. That is where they sent me on the second of December. I went over there as area engineer to speed up the Barking Sand airport, and the Kokee radar station.

109. General GRUNERT. You went over there on the 2nd of December?

[2511] Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir.

110. General GRUNERT. What did you find when you got over there?

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, I found the Hawaiian Constructors there with three supervisory personnel. They hadn't the tower up. The material had been there for some time.

111. General FRANK. How long, about?

Mr. BARTLETT. Oh, it had been there for—it was a matter of weeks. I couldn't recall now just how long; but we had it up; in five days, that tower was up.

112. General GRUNERT. Without getting anything additional?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir.

113. General GRUNERT. All the materials were there?

Mr. BARTLETT. It seems they had difficulty getting the iron workers or something of that sort, and they went over there at the same time I did, and we got that tower up, and then the signal corps moved in, and we had the station going in a few weeks. Then we afterwards did a great deal more work, there, but we had the station operating; but, had that station been operating before December 7, it might have been a different story, probably. Again, it might not.

114. General GRUNERT. Whether other stations were operating, or not?

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, I think that that station, from what I have heard, it might have just emphasized to others that there was a seriousness of an attack.

115. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything about the information center, or the "control center," as they call it, of the Air Warning Service, whether that had been completed, so that [2512] the outlying stations could use the center, through which to transmit information?

Mr. BARTLETT. If you mean the filter center, why, that was—I am afraid I have confused you a little. We call that "command post," which it was to be—it is a filter center, now, as well as a command post, at Shafter.

116. General GRUNERT. It was built as a command post?

Mr. BARTLETT. It was built as a command post to start with, and we always called it that, and then we enlarged it, and so forth, and went along, and we put in the filter center.

117. General GRUNERT. What I am getting at is whether you know enough of the whole picture to be able to tell us what parts were complete, what not complete, and how it affected the picture of what happened on December 7. As far as I could gather, you were primarily concerned, up to December 2, with your command post, that tunnel at Shafter?

Mr. BARTLETT. That is right.

118. General GRUNERT. You did not get in this other game until December 2?

Mr. BARTLETT. That is right.

119. General GRUNERT. And then you saw this one station, the condition of that?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir.

120. General GRUNERT. Now, what do you know about the filter center, and what do you know about the other AWS stations, if anything?

Mr. BARTLETT. On Oahu?

121. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, only what I have heard, that there [2513] was, over on the other side of the island, a mobile station that was in operation at that time.

122. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

123. General FRANK. Hawaiian Constructors consisted of several firms working together?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, sir.

124. General FRANK. Where did the supervisors and overseers come from, representing the contractors?

Mr. BARTLETT. I have been told, I think by some of the men themselves, and by others, that Ellison came from Los Angeles—

125. General FRANK. No, what I mean is, how did they determine who supervised the jobs? Were there so many men from Callahan Co., so many men from Gunther & Shirley Company, and so many men from Rohl-Connolly, or how did that work out, do you know?

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, I talked with the boys about that, some of them, and it seems that they sent over whatever men they didn't need. Gunther & Shirley sent over some men, and they were mostly clerical men. There were very few construction men in their outfit. And the Callahan people sent over five or six construction men; some of them were all right; some were not.

126. General FRANK. In other words, the supervisors and overseers that the contractors sent over there were those that they could spare, and they were not outstanding construction men, is that the idea?

Mr. BARTLETT. There were some of them that were good construction men for the jobs they were doing. There were some of them really tried, and some didn't.

127. General FRANK. Have you any information, to be more [2514] specific along that line?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes. We had a fellow there, on Oahu, this Ellison, that was messing the things up pretty bad, and I didn't consider him efficient.

128. General FRANK. For whom was he working?

Mr. BARTLETT. He was working for Hawaiian Constructors, and he was a Callahan man; and they picked up a fellow from Red Hill, that had been a Callahan man, a fellow named Cherry; he was a good tunnel man. He made that command post go along pretty good. Then he moved, and we had a fellow named "Shorty" McCoy, from Texas, a Callahan man; and a fellow named Cummings, a Callahan man. They were good average construction men, dirt movers; and then one of them, his year was up. McCoy, he went away, and they sent a man over there that I could never find, he was intoxicated most of the time, and so I had him relieved, finally, but I had a lot of difficulty of getting rid of him. That took me months to get rid of him.

129. General FRANK. Who was it?

Mr. BARTLETT. I am trying to think of his name. The records will show it. And we finally got rid of him, and the engineers took over the work over there, completely.

130. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Bartlett, you mentioned previously in your testimony having gone to a certain island and there doing work on a radio transmitter, at which island you arrived on 2 December 1941. Do you recall that, and was that the Island of Kauai?

Mr. BARTLETT. Kauai; yes, sir.

131. Major CLAUSEN. You said the work that you did there was on that radio transmitter. Then, later on, you explained that it was a radar station; that is correct, isn't it?

[2515] Mr. BARTLETT. It was radar. It was an Air Warning Service station.

132. Major CLAUSEN. So, when you called it a "radio transmitter," you meant it was one of these?

Mr. BARTLETT. We put in a radio transmitter station there also, afterwards. The radar was the first one that we put up, the Air Warning Service station.

133. Major CLAUSEN. That was one of the permanent air-raid warning service stations?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, that was a permanent installation. We stuck it up in the house to start with, and then we went underground afterwards and connected it up.

134. Major CLAUSEN. All right. That is all.

135. General GRUNERT. Do you think of anything else that might throw light on this subject?

Mr. BARTLETT. I would like to be as helpful as I can. I feel that we were taken for a ride over there in lots of ways, and this thing has come up to me so suddenly, and I had a great deal of difficulty in getting down here, and not much sleep, and I haven't been a very good witness, I am afraid; but I have tried to be as cooperative as I could. I can't think of anything else at this time.

136. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Brief recess.)

[2516]

**HARRY W. FLANNERY, 537 NORTH WILCOX,
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Flannery, will you please state to this Board your name and address?

Mr. FLANNERY. My name is Harry W. Flannery, address 537 North Wilcox, Los Angeles, 4.

2. Colonel WEST. What is your occupation?

Mr. FLANNERY. Occupation, radio news analyst. Columbia Broadcasting System.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Flannery, I am asking General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, to develop this particular lead that we are after.

Mr. FLANNERY. All right.

4. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Flannery, you are a radio news analyst for what station?

Mr. FLANNERY. Columbia Broadcasting System, operating out of KNX, Los Angeles.

5. Major CLAUSEN. And you have been so for what period of time?

Mr. FLANNERY. Since March 15, 1942 on KNX. I have been with the Columbia Broadcasting System since January 1st, 1935.

6. Major CLAUSEN. You were formerly on duty in Berlin?

Mr. FLANNERY. Right. I followed William L. Shirer as Columbia correspondent.

7. Major CLAUSEN. And you wrote "Assignment to Berlin" on your return?

Mr. FLANNERY. Yes.

8. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know a party by the name of Werner Plack?

Mr. FLANNERY. Yes, sir.

9. Major CLAUSEN. Do you have occasion to know whether he was [2517] in Berlin working for the German Foreign Office?

Mr. FLANNERY. That is right.

10. Major CLAUSEN. That was during what period of time?

Mr. FLANNERY. That was during the period from some time in the early part of 1941, I think January, up until the time I left, and presumably he is still in Germany.

11. Major CLAUSEN. What date was it that you were sent to Berlin as correspondent for the Columbia Broadcasting System?

Mr. FLANNERY. I arrived there on November 4th, 1940.

12. Major CLAUSEN. And you were relieved on what date?

Mr. FLANNERY. And I was relieved on September 29th, that is, I left Berlin September 29, 1941, and arrived back here October 15th, 1941.

13. Major CLAUSEN. When did your acquaintance with Werner Plack originate?

Mr. FLANNERY. When he arrived in Berlin from the United States. The time was early in 1941, I believe January. My records do not show whether it was January or not, except that I know I met him with Charles Lanius, who was NBC representative, and Lanius, I know, did not arrive in Berlin until January, 1941.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know whether Werner Plack had any connection with Fritz Wiedemann, at one time the German Consul General at San Francisco?

Mr. FLANNERY. Of my direct knowledge, I do not know, but I understand he was in the Consulate with Fritz Weidemann in San Francisco.

15. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know whether he had any connection with Doctor Gyssling, the German Consul in Los Angeles?

[2518] Mr. FLANNERY. No.

16. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, you mention this Werner Plack in your book, do you not, "Assignment to Berlin"?

Mr. FLANNERY. Yes, sir, that is right.

17. Major CLAUSEN. Could you tell the Board in detail just what duties Mr. Plack performed?

Mr. FLANNERY. He was in the Radio Department for the German Foreign Office. There were two men principally in the office. The head of the office was George von Lilienfeldt, who was also in the United States previous to assuming his duties there. Plack was his assistant, and during a period of 1941, a period of several months, when Lilienfeldt was in the Baltic States in the Foreign Office, after the Russian War had started, Plack was in charge of the radio department of the Foreign Office. His duties consisted of arranging broadcasts to the United States on the Nazi radio, and being a censor for the American broadcasts or broadcasts by Americans to the United States, and also arranging a sort of an entertainment committee of the Nazis. They had a number of men whose duty it was to try to make the press and radio feel better, that is, arrange dinners and parties and things like that.

18. Major CLAUSEN. Did he indicate to you at any time his propaganda activities in the United States on behalf of the German Reich?

Mr. FLANNERY. You mean during the time he was here or during the time he was in Berlin?

19. Major CLAUSEN. Well, did he ever boast to you in Berlin that he had been active in the United States as a propaganda agent?

[2519] Mr. FLANNERY. He did not boast to me about it, but he seemed not disturbed and rather, instead, pleased at some notoriety he had achieved here, in which he was accused of having taken part

in propaganda activities here. There was an article we had—I believe it was in magazine Vogue—we had copies of a number of American magazines and newspapers over there—in which he happened to be mentioned as one of those who were working on Nazi propaganda in the United States, and he showed it to us with great pride. His name was merely mentioned in the article.

20. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember the issue of Vogue in which that appeared?

Mr. FLANNERY. I do not, but it usually took us two months or more to get a copy, so I presume it was issued some time in 1941.

21. Major CLAUSEN. Was he accused of espionage in this article written in Vogue?

Mr. FLANNERY. As I recall it, yes.

22. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know the circumstances under which this party, Werner Plack, left the United States and went to Berlin?

Mr. FLANNERY. As he told it to me, he left in the last part of 1940, going to Berlin by way of Japan, presumably, therefore, leaving from San Francisco. As he left he told me that he had a lot of trouble with the F. B. I. He claimed that this was due to his having made a number of telephone calls to girls all over the country. He claimed they were innocent calls. The F. B. I. apparently did not think so. The F. B. I. went all through his baggage. According to Plack, he was up all [2520] night before getting on the boat. They went all through his baggage his cigarettes and packages and everything else, after he had had them packed. He also had a little fight in Hollywood just previous to that with a man who is now in the United States Army. The man came up to Plack, according to newspaper accounts and told Plack, "You are a dirty Nazi," and Plack apparently did not reply.

23. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know the route taken by Plack back to Germany?

Mr. FLANNERY. By way of Japan, so I was told.

24. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, he went via Japan?

Mr. FLANNERY. That is right.

25. Major CLAUSEN. Could you approximate the approximate time he arrived in Germany on this return route from the United States?

Mr. FLANNERY. No, because I don't know exactly when he left the United States. The records will show.

26. Major CLAUSEN. You did not know this Werner Plack in the United States, did you?

Mr. FLANNERY. No.

27. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know whether he was the Werner Plack who formerly had lived in Los Angeles? Did he tell you he had lived in Los Angeles?

Mr. FLANNERY. Yes, he said he had lived in Los Angeles. He told me that, and I have heard since from other people about a Werner Plack who lived there. In every respect in checking on his habits and occupation and so forth, it is the same man. He was a wine salesman in Hollywood.

28. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know what if any connection with Werner [2521] Plack this party Hans Wilhelm had?

Mr. FLANNERY. I do not know, no.

29. General FRANK. Did he have anything on the ball?

Mr. FLANNERY. Plack?

30. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. FLANNERY. Yes, Plack was pretty clever as a propagandist. He arranged the Wodehouse broadcasts, and he also planned—I don't know whether he planned—those of Count von Luckner. Von Luckner was very well liked here after the other war, and putting him on the air, and Wodehouse, in the American magazines and so forth, and his also planning on putting on von Eckener and the Crown Prince, his idea of putting those on the radio was with the idea that more listeners would listen to it and the propaganda would get over. So he was an able man in that respect. At the same time he was handicapped considerably by his habits of drinking, as a result of which he sometimes could not read my copy, which was supposed to be censored.

31. General FRANK. That was going to be the next question; how about the use of alcohol?

Mr. FLANNERY. He was very fond of liquor.

32. General FRANK. To what extent did it incapacitate him?

Mr. FLANNERY. Well, he couldn't carry out his duties as censor in that particular respect, because he could not see the copy. One night he asked me to read mine to him. Of course, I could read anything, but he couldn't even concentrate upon what I was reading. I remember on this night he felt that as the censor he should put something on the script, so he took out his pencil and started at the front. I had to stop him on [2522] that and erase it, because it would not be decipherable by the time it left the place. I don't know whether this habit incapacitated him in his other duties or not, but I presume it would.

33. General FRANK. How effective in the United States do you think he would have been as an agent?

Mr. FLANNERY. He might have been—this is just my opinion—fairly successful, because he was that type of person whom the Germans, I understand, had a number of over here, who would give parties and would supply a lot of liquor and otherwise spend money for food and so forth, and after these parties a lot of things could be said in favor of the Nazis. As I came back to Hollywood afterwards the last time here, I understand that largely Plack did that sort of thing. It can be a very insidious sort of thing, because you will not be seeming to have that as your main purpose, but as you do have these parties you can talk about Germany being right in this respect and Germany being right in the other respect, and that was the way he could operate, and I think that was one of the reasons why he had that particular job over there.

34. General GRUNERT. Do you know Colonel Wyman?

Mr. FLANNERY. I do not know Colonel Wyman.

35. General GRUNERT. Do you know of any connection that Plack may have had with Hawaii?

Mr. FLANNERY. Hawaii, no. All of the other material in regard to Plack with Rohl and Wyman would not be of my knowledge, so I do not know about that.

36. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition).

Thereupon, at 3:50 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

[2523]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[2524] **PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD**

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1944.

PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

The Board, at 9:30 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

**TESTIMONY OF H. J. KING, 904 SOUTH OAKLAND STREET,
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. King, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. KING. My name is H. J. King. My address is 904 South Oakland, in Pasadena.

2. Colonel WEST. And what is your occupation, Mr. King?

Mr. KING. I am a construction engineer.

3. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. King, you are an engineer?

Mr. KING. Yes.

[2525] 4. Major CLAUSEN. You are a graduate of Northwestern University?

Mr. KING. Not a graduate of Northwestern, no. I attended Northwestern.

5. Major CLAUSEN. You studied engineering at that university?

Mr. KING. Yes, sir.

6. Major CLAUSEN. You have a son who is now a professor there?

Mr. KING. He is not—he is now at the University of California.

7. Major CLAUSEN. I see.

Mr. KING. He was at that time.

8. Major CLAUSEN. But you have had engineering experience, both civil and military; is that correct?

Mr. KING. Yes, sir.

9. Major CLAUSEN. You were in the United States Army the period of 1917 to 1919 with the rank of Major?

Mr. KING. I was, not during that time; I didn't hold the rank of Major. I resigned from the reserves in '29 as a Major.

10. Major CLAUSEN. But you have had——

Mr. KING. Yes, I was in the 4th Division during the last war.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall having met Hans Wilhelm Rohl in the Hawaiian Islands in the capacity where you were working for the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. KING. Yes.

12. Major CLAUSEN. In what condition did you find Mr. Rohl?

Mr. KING. Well, he was playing pretty hard.

13. Major CLAUSEN. He was what, sir?

[2526] Mr. KING. Playing pretty hard.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Playing at what?

Mr. KING. Well, that I couldn't say. He just wasn't paying very much attention to business; I know that.

15. Major CLAUSEN. You mean he was playboying?

Mr. KING. Yes.

16. Major CLAUSEN. He was a playboy?

Mr. KING. Yes, that's it.

17. Major CLAUSEN. Did you find him drunk?

Mr. KING. I never saw him when he wasn't, more or less.

18. Major CLAUSEN. And that observation of Mr. Rohl in that condition commenced when, Mr. King?

Mr. KING. On the 16th of February in '42.

19. Major CLAUSEN. And continued for what period of time?

Mr. KING. Until about the middle of June of the same year.

20. Major CLAUSEN. Now, when you reported there——

21. General FRANK. Did you know him prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. KING. I knew him to speak to, and that's all. I knew him by reputation.

22. General FRANK. Did this same condition exist prior to Pearl Harbor, that you know?

Mr. KING. I only know that, General, by inference and by hearsay.

23. Major CLAUSEN. The General has brought out that point. Did you know prior to Pearl Harbor, from hearsay and general knowledge, anything concerning Colonel Wyman?

Mr. KING. Yes, I did.

24. Major CLAUSEN. And what was that concerning his proclivities for playboying or drinking?

[2527] Mr. KING. Well, the general impression around Los Angeles where Colonel Wyman was stationed was that he was pretty much of a playboy too.

25. Major CLAUSEN. And what about his drinking?

Mr. KING. Well, that was generally understood, that he was a pretty hard drinker.

26. Major CLAUSEN. Well, later on did you meet Colonel Wyman in the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. KING. Yes, I saw him.

27. Major CLAUSEN. And what was his condition?

Mr. KING. I never did see him drunk.

28. Major CLAUSEN. Did that surprise you?

Mr. KING. It did, yes, because I had previously heard of his being a hard drinker.

29. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, when you reported, there was a considerable time in the Hawaiian Islands before you were

actually able to commence work because of the condition of Mr. Rohl; isn't that correct?

Mr. KING. Well, I presume that it had a great deal to do with it. He was chairman of the executive board at Hawaiian Constructors, and they just couldn't get him on the spot or get him to work.

30. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, you waited around there some—

Mr. KING. Thirty days.

31. Major CLAUSEN. Thirty days before he was sufficiently sober to put you to work?

Mr. KING. Well, at any rate he didn't put me to work, [2528] and I presume that was the reason.

32. General FRANK. When did you go there?

Mr. KING. I left San Francisco on the 15th and arrived in Honolulu on the 16th.

33. General FRANK. Of what?

Mr. KING. February '42.

34. Major CLAUSEN. You commenced work as area superintendent for Area 14, which included the Ewa area, on March 15, 1942; is that correct, Mr. King?

Mr. KING. Approximately, that is the date.

35. Major CLAUSEN. And you were area superintendent for the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. KING. Yes.

36. Major CLAUSEN. And about two weeks later you were appointed general superintendent for the Hawaiian Constructors; is that right?

Mr. KING. That is correct.

37. Major CLAUSEN. And you occupied that position until you left the Islands?

Mr. KING. Yes.

38. General FRANK. On what projects were you engaged over in the Ewa area?

Mr. KING. Well, in the Ewa area there was the A. W. S. station.

39. General FRANK. Where?

Mr. KING. Well, I can't remember the name of the mountain, but it was off to the right of Ewa, back up in the mountains there. There was a number of 5-inch battery positions that were under way at that time. There wasn't much going on in [2529] Area 14 at that particular time, and shortly afterwards Area 14 was consolidated with Area 3.

40. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. King, did you have occasion to observe the work that had been done by the Hawaiian Constructors before you arrived?

Mr. KING. Well, I saw what had been done prior to the time I arrived, of course, after I arrived there.

41. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. And as an engineer and skilled in building, you were able to form some conclusions as to the character of this work that had been done?

Mr. KING. Yes.

42. General FRANK. More particularly the conditions under which it had been done, the state or morale of the people that were engaged in the work.

43. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

44. General FRANK. What was that?

Mr. KING. Very poor.

45. Major CLAUSEN. Now, I invite your attention, Mr. King, to an affidavit dated December 18, 1943, and especially this part: "Generally speaking, the work that had been accomplished under the supervision of Colonel Wyman prior to December 7, 1941, was pretty lousy." Tell the Board first, Mr. King, what work—

This affidavit, you recall having made that statement?

Mr. KING. Yes.

46. Major CLAUSEN. This affidavit that I have in mind is an affidavit that you furnished the House Committee on Military Affairs; is that correct?

Mr. KING. That is correct, yes.

[2530] 47. Major CLAUSEN. And the date on which that was done is this date that I have indicated, December 18, 1943?

Mr. KING. It was some time around December 18, during December.

48. Major CLAUSEN. And at that time you gave this affidavit to Mr. John H. Weiner, representative of the House Military Affairs Committee?

Mr. KING. That is correct.

49. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Now, tell the Board just what work it was that you had in mind at the time that you stated in this affidavit that the work accomplished under the supervision of Colonel Wyman prior to Pearl Harbor was pretty lousy. What work was that, Mr. King?

Mr. KING. Well, first I want to make it plain that I am not absolutely certain that all this work was under his jurisdiction. I presume it was.

50. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KING. He being the Department Engineer, it must have been.

51. General FRANK. District Engineer.

Mr. KING. Well, District Engineer, if it is; this is different, yes. But generally speaking they are synonymous.

52. Major CLAUSEN. What work was it, Mr. King?

Mr. KING. Well, there was an airfield at Bellows Field which was in pretty bad shape.

53. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir?

Mr. KING. Due largely to lack of equipment, but more specifically to the state of mind, the morale of the people that were working there. There was also another airfield under [2531] way at—

54. Major CLAUSEN. Well, let us stay with Bellows, first, and tell the Board what there was about the work that you observed which indicated to you it was pretty lousy.

55. General FRANK. May I ask a question first?

56. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

57. General FRANK. How did you, being in charge of Ewa on the west side of the Island, happen to know so much about the work at Bellows, which is on the east side of the Island?

Mr. KING. Well, General, I must invite your attention to the fact that I was only in Area 14 for two weeks, and then I became general superintendent and my jurisdiction covered the entire Hawaiian group.

58. General FRANK. All right.

59. Major CLAUSEN. Would you read the question?

The REPORTER (reading) :

Question. Well, let us stay with Bellows, first, and tell the Board what there was about the work that you observed which indicated to you it was pretty lousy.

Mr. KING. Well, it was dragging. There wasn't sufficient equipment. The quarry operations in the pit from which the base material for the airfield was procured was only—it was operating at, I would say, 30 percent efficiency.

60. Major CLAUSEN. All right, sir. Now, what other work did you observe in the same condition?

Mr. KING. Well, there was another airfield at—at that time, that was referred to as Dillingham. I forget the name that they finally assigned to it. It was a Kanaka name, so I [2532] don't remember it.

61. Major CLAUSEN. And what was there about that work which indicated to you it was pretty lousy?

Mr. KING. It was dragging for the same reason.

62. Major CLAUSEN. Now, did you observe any other work?

Mr. KING. Yes, the airfield at Kahuku was in the same condition.

63. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. All right.

Mr. KING. In fact, all work at that time.

64. Major CLAUSEN. Well, let's see about the air raid warning system. Was that work in that condition?

Mr. KING. Generally speaking, yes.

65. Major CLAUSEN. And what work was there of the air raid warning system that was in that condition?

Mr. KING. Well, there was one station in Area 14. It is difficult for me to locate this station exactly because the locations were more or less secret. I know where it was; I could go and put my hand on it, but I can't tell you now just exactly where it was.

66. Major CLAUSEN. Is that the one that was on a mountain?

Mr. KING. Yes. If I heard the name I would remember it.

67. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

68. General FRANK. Was it Kaala?

Mr. KING. No. Kaala was another one.

69. General FRANK. Where is it? In the vicinity of Kahuku?

Mr. KING. Oh, no; it is around on the Ewa side, back up behind the Ewa plantation, in the mountains there.

70. General FRANK. Up on the Waianae Range?

Mr. KING. Yes, on the Waianae Range.

[2533] 71. General FRANK. Well, that identifies it close enough.

72. Major CLAUSEN. All right. And what was there about that work that was pretty lousy, Mr. King?

Mr. KING. Well, it was short of equipment, short of men.

73. General FRANK. What kind of equipment?

Mr. KING. Tunnel equipment.

74. Major CLAUSEN. Short of men?

Mr. KING. Short of men. The same status of morale was quite evident.

75. Major CLAUSEN. And did that same condition exist with respect to tunnel work on the Islands?

Mr. KING. Yes.

76. Major CLAUSEN. And tunnels for what, Mr. King?

Mr. KING. For ordnance stores.

77. Major CLAUSEN. You mean ammunition?

Mr. KING. Explosive stores, ammunition, bombs, and that of course was more or less in—the only underground work that was going on at the time that I took over was the A. W. S. stations. The other, the ordnance stores and underground storage for various things like explosives, ordnance stores, and so forth, was more or less in abeyance awaiting equipment from the States, which shortly arrived.

78. Major CLAUSEN. Now, did you know a Colonel Lyman, L-y-m-a-n?

Mr. KING. Yes, I knew Colonel Lyman, afterwards General Lyman.

79. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. How did you rate Colonel Lyman, afterwards General Lyman?

Mr. KING. In my opinion General Lyman was probably the [2534] ablest man in the Islands.

80. Major CLAUSEN. Now, what value to the work was Mr. Rohl, if any?

Mr. KING. I would say that insofar as the work was concerned, rather than his being of value, he was more a detriment.

81. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, he was so great a detriment that it was through a conference of Colonel, later General, Lyman, with you, that it was finally arranged that he be sent away from the Islands; isn't that right, Mr. King?

Mr. KING. That is true.

82. Major CLAUSEN. Tell the Board about that.

Mr. KING. Well, I think it was about the first of June—the date is somewhat—I am not quite certain about, but within a week; it was about the first of June or perhaps the last week in May of 1942, Colonel Lyman called me at the hotel and asked me if I would come to his office in the Young—

83. General FRANK. What hotel?

Mr. KING. The Pleasanton.

84. General FRANK. Yes. Colonel Wyman or Lyman?

Mr. KING. Lyman.

85. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. KING. Asked me if I would come to his office. He by that time had taken over and had succeeded Colonel Wyman, and asked me if I would come to his office, and he told me to come down after dark, which I did. So I drove down through the blackout and met the Colonel at his office. [2535] And, after some dilatory conversation, he came right out with what he had in mind, what was "on his chest," as he said: "What are we going to do with Rohl?" And he asked me then if I thought that the other members of the Constructors would have any objection to his putting Mr. Rohl on a plane and sending him back to the States. I told him that, so far as I was concerned, it would be a very happy move and I was quite certain that the other members of the firm would see it the same way; that I was quite happy that he had approached me on the subject rather than them, because of the fact that they probably would not be in a position to talk as frankly to him as I was, because they might feel that they were squeezing Rohl out, whereas I had no interest in the matter; so within a few days after that, Rohl left the islands.

86. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

87. General FRANK. You stated that all the work was dragging. How was that evidenced?

Mr. KING. Well, General, it was evidenced by the sad state of the men engaged in the work. Evidently they didn't think it was necessary to pay these men or feed these men or look after these men.

88. General FRANK. Who was responsible for that?

Mr. KING. Well, it was certainly the Engineer Corps, no one else. They were doing it. They were keeping the time. They were signing the pay checks.

89. General FRANK. The man at the top cannot be responsible for all the details.

Mr. KING. No, that's certainly true.

90. General FRANK. Now, there were some intermediaries between [2536] Colonel Wyman and the bottom, where this lack of morale existed, who shared that responsibility?

Mr. KING. Who were responsible for that; surely.

91. General FRANK. And who were they?

Mr. KING. Generally speaking, they were a flock of Reserve Officers he had on duty there.

92. General FRANK. Also, the contractors shared that responsibility, because the men were working for the contractors?

Mr. KING. That was a rather anomalous condition, there. They were the contractors' men, that's true; but the contractor was not functioning as a fixed-fee contractor, and never did function as a fixed-fee contractor.

93. General FRANK. It was functioning as a cost-plus-fixed-fee contractor?

Mr. KING. But with the work almost completely out of control of the contractor. For instance, the functions of keeping time, of preparing the pay rolls, and seeing that the men were paid promptly and on time, were not exercised by the contractor but by the Corps of Engineers.

94. General FRANK. Was that so, from the beginning, or was it taken over by the engineers because the contractor's organization did not handle it efficiently?

Mr. KING. No; I don't believe so. I think it was taken over immediately after Pearl Harbor, for the convenience of the Government, not because the contractor's organization was handling it inefficiently. I have no personal knowledge of that, General, because it was before my time, but I inquired into it, in a large number of cases, and have asked a good many people who had been working for Hawaiian Constructors, [2537] prior to Pearl Harbor, whether or not, prior to Pearl Harbor, they had been paid promptly and on time; and the answer invariably was Yes. I wish the Board could have seen what I saw.

95. General FRANK. Explain it.

Mr. KING. I was there, myself, for, I would say about some six or eight weeks before, and I begun to get to the point where I wanted some money, so I started looking around for my check, and I finally went down in the addressograph room of the Young Hotel, where these checks were written. There were checks on the floor, there were checks in the air, they were on tables, there were pay rolls mixed up. How they ever paid anybody, I can't tell you. It was the most startling thing I ever saw.

96. General FRANK. It struck you that there was considerable confusion?

Mr. KING. There certainly was.

97. General FRANK. That was caused by what—lack of organization?

Mr. KING. Lack of organization, lack of knowledge, lack of experience on the part of people that were doing it.

98. General FRANK. Lack of supervision?

Mr. KING. Yes.

99. General FRANK. From the top?

Mr. KING. All the way down.

100. General FRANK. On the other hand, when a question was put to the top for a decision, evidently it got action, are you conversant with that?

Mr. KING. I think a decision was made at the top, but whether or not that decision was transmitted all down through [2538] the various grades and translated into action, I don't believe it was. I know we tried and tried and tried, we worked continuously for a year, to pick this morale up, to make these people that were working for us believe that we had some interest in what they were doing, and were trying to build their morale up; and we didn't succeed very greatly, I can tell you. That condition obtained right through until I left.

101. General FRANK. Do you think the situation could have been solved by a unit-price contract?

Mr. KING. No, it could not, for the simple reason that in order to award a unit-price job you have to have some idea of your quantities and the character of the work. Now, those were indefinite.

102. General FRANK. Why were they so indefinite as to preclude a fixed-fee contract?

Mr. KING. Well, for instance, if you were going to take a job on the grading for instance and were to be paid a unit price per cubic yard for material moved, you would have to know how many yards of material there were in your job, would you not?

103. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. KING. Well, that information wasn't—we built those things without plans.

104. General FRANK. It was possible to make plans, was it not?

Mr. KING. Well, yes; it was possible, but they were not made.

105. General FRANK. Then there evidently existed not only a lack of organization but a lack of planning.

[2539] Mr. KING. Absolutely, absolutely.

106. General FRANK. And it was possible to provide plans, was it not?

Mr. KING. Yes, it was—it should have been; but they were not provided.

Perhaps the General will permit me to read an extract from a report that I made to the Hawaiian Constructors on that very subject, just before I left.

107. General FRANK. The thing that I would like to emphasize in the record, Mr. King, is the position you held in that organization in Honolulu during this time; and that position was what?

Mr. KING. General superintendent in charge of their field operations.

108. General FRANK. In that position, you certainly should have been conversant, in a detailed manner, with the general conditions.

Mr. KING. Absolutely, sir.

109. General FRANK. All right. Read it.

Did you, in your position, deal personally with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. KING. With Colonel Wyman?

110. General FRANK. Wyman; yes.

Mr. KING. No.

111. General FRANK. With whom did you deal.

Mr. KING. With Lyman. You see, at the time Colonel Wyman was there, I was standing by. If you remember, I stated that I was there 30 days before they could make up their mind what they wanted to do with me. Well, at about the [2540] end of that 30 days, Colonel Wyman was relieved, and Colonel Lyman succeeded him.

This is rather a long thing, so I am going to confine it to an extract of that part of it that deals with inadequate planning.

112. Major CLAUSEN. It may be you would let us have that when you are free. We will give it back to you.

Mr. KING. I would be glad to do that.

113. Major CLAUSEN. Thank you.

Mr. KING. (reading):

Much time and money have been lost and many delays have occurred through failure to receive plans. Job Orders of high priority have been issued accompanied by no plans or by partial plans. Work has been started on the basis of partial plans and then held up or temporarily suspended awaiting receipt of further plans. A typical example may be cited: Job Order C-88.0 calls for the construction of an extensive underground Command Post for the Forward Echelon.

That was a combined Navy and Army Command Post.

114. General FRANK. Where—in Aliamanu Crater?

Mr. KING. That is right. It replaced the old one.

Because of insistence on the part of the Commanding General that work on this project be started, a premature Job Order was received on November 18th calling for the "construction of an underground Command Post in accordance with plans to be furnished."

115. General FRANK. Who was responsible for furnishing the plans, at that time?

[2541] Mr. KING. General Lyman's office.

116. General FRANK. Lyman, or Wyman?

Mr. KING. No, I will take that back. It was General Kramer's, then. General Lyman had died before this.

Obviously no work could be started until some sort of plans were received. However, on December 7th, we received a memorandum from the District Engineer to proceed with the construction of the project, but to confine work to the access road and to the central underground corridor. Verbal instructions were received from the District Engineer to have men and equipment on the ground the following day. These men and the necessary equipment, consisting of wagon drills, compressors, a power shovel and trucks were hastily assembled, and were in fact, on the job and ready for work the following day. However, during the following three days, the access road and portal cut were staked in three different locations, and it was not until the fourth day that we were able to even start work, beyond the cutting of grass and the clearing of a few small trees. At this date (January 14, 1943), the access road has been completed,

the portal cut excavated, tracks have been laid, and we are now ready to "go under" with the main corridor tunnel. However, no plans for this tunnel have been received and work will necessarily be halted, in fact, has already been curtailed because of the lack of plans.

117. General FRANK. I think that is sufficient, along that line, because you are getting into a regime which is not under investigation by this group. You are now getting into the [2542] Kramer organization, which comes not only after the Wyman regime but after the Lyman regime.

Mr. KING. That's right.

I have another one, here, concerning job 104-W, which was started, I am quite certain, under Wyman.

118. General FRANK. All right.

Mr. KING (reading):

Job 104-W may also be cited as a typical example of inadequate planning. This job consists of a three story concrete shop structure, originally planned to be 263 x 291 feet in size, the entire structure to be below ground level and protected by a heavy concrete burster course.

I do not know whether you gentlemen are familiar with that particular shop. It is out near Wheeler Field.

Excavation to a depth of approximately 60 feet was made to the dimensions shown on the original plans, and the pouring of concrete footings for walls and columns was under way when revised plans increasing the size of the structure by 57 feet on one end and adding several projecting additions to two of the other sides, as well as lowering the grade of the entire structure 16 feet, were received. These revisions necessitated the shutting down of concrete operations, and the resumption of excavation work, the equipment for which had been largely removed from the work. The unit cost of the additional excavation necessarily was several times what it would have been had it been included in the original excavation. Detailed plans for this structure have not been received and delay after delay has occurred through lack of plans. [2543] For instance, work on the second story was delayed some thirty days awaiting plans for an elevator shaft. Plans for imbedded metal work have been lacking, thus holding up the placing of concrete in the structure. This project has, from its inception, been short of materials, particularly concrete aggregates. In my opinion, this project could and would have been long ago completed had it been adequately planned and had materials been made available.

119. General FRANK. All right.

Where were you, before you went to the islands?

Mr. KING. Where was I working?

120. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. KING. I was at Camp San Luis Obispo.

121. General FRANK. What were you doing there?

Mr. KING. I was general superintendent of the L. A. Dixon Company, the contractors on that job.

122. General FRANK. How did you happen to go to the islands?

Mr. KING. I went to the islands because I understood they wanted a tunnel man.

123. General FRANK. Who was responsible for getting you to go to the islands?

Mr. KING. Paul Grafe who was vice president of the Callahan Company, one of the members of the Hawaiian Constructors.

124. General FRANK. When you went to the islands as general superintendent, were you working for the Corps of Engineers, or for Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. KING. Hawaiian Constructors; and I worked for no [2544] one but the Hawaiian Constructors, while I was there.

125. General FRANK. Who was your immediate boss, or superior?

Mr. KING. The executive committee of the Hawaiian Constructors.

126. General FRANK. There must have been some one man to whom you looked.

Mr. KING. Well, Mr. Rohl originally was the chairman of that committee. Afterwards, Mr. Woolley was.

127. General FRANK. You have already testified as to the general effectiveness of Rohl's supervision.

Mr. KING. Surely.

128. General FRANK. Because of his use of liquor, it was generally ineffective; is that correct?

Mr. KING. Surely. That's entirely correct.

129. General FRANK. Why was this report written?

Mr. KING. This report that I have just read from?

130. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. KING. That was written at Mr. Woolley's request, shortly before I left. Mr. Woolley was chairman of the executive committee.

131. General FRANK. He was impressed with the fact that the work was lagging, from the point of view of the contractors, because of lack of planning on the part of the engineers, I take it?

Mr. KING. Yes. That was one of the reasons he wanted this report.

132. General FRANK. And what was another reason?

Mr. KING. Well, the lack of control that the contractors had over their work. The whole trouble in the islands, General, came about due to a conflict of opinion as to what the functions of a fixed-fee contractor were. We had one set of [2545] ideas—I say "we," meaning the Hawaiian Constructors—the Corps Engineers had another.

Now, under date of I think it was November 24, 1941, there was a directive from the Office of Chief Engineers, outlining the duties and functions of a fixed-fee contractor, and that was the basis of our contention, that we as contractors were being emasculated due to this duality of control. We had absolutely no control over our work; and that was the reason I resigned and came home. I have here a copy of my letter of resignation, which very definitely states it. It is dated January 7, 1943, and was addressed to Mr. Woolley, executive manager of the Hawaiian Constructors:

DEAR MR. WOOLEY: Owing to the apparent unwillingness of the District Engineer to permit the Hawaiian Constructors any semblance of control over the work entrusted to them, I am impelled to advise you that I elect to terminate my connection with your company and to return to the mainland upon completion of my employment contract * * *

Now, that was the reason I left there, because I was absolutely out on a limb. Now, let me explain the reason for that. So long as General Lyman lived, I felt, having known him a long time, having served with him during the last war, I felt that he trusted me. When he left and he was succeeded, I didn't feel that his successor did.

There was some possibility of making a defective system work as long as General Lyman was there, due to his personal characteristics; but the minute General Kramer got there why, there was absolutely no chance of our doing anything.

[2546] 133. General FRANK. Therefore, from your point of view, it generally was unsatisfactory, under Wyman, satisfactory under Lyman, and unsatisfactory again under Kramer?

Mr. KING. That is true, from my personal point of view.

134. General GRUNERT. What did you have to do with Wyman?

Mr. KING. I had nothing to do with Wyman.

135. General GRUNERT. Then how can you say it was unsatisfactory?

Mr. KING. On the basis of our preliminary talk, what we said here, to start with, my observation of what had been done under Wyman.

136. General GRUNERT. But no actual personal experiences?

Mr. KING. No; no absolute, personal experience.

137. General GRUNERT. I just wanted to get that.

138. General FRANK. But it was from observing the conditions of his operations, when you arrived there?

Mr. KING. That is right; what had been done under him.

139. General FRANK. What was the reaction of the executive committee to sending Rohl back to the United States?

Mr. KING. The two members of the executive committee who were present in Hawaii at that time—that is, Mr. Benson and Mr. Woolley—were quite pleased, because it relieved them of a very embarrassing situation.

140. General FRANK. That is all.

141. Colonel TOULMIN. Mr. King, you referred to an order of the Corps of Engineers, defining the relationship between the contractor and the Corps of Engineers, as about November 1941; was I correct in understanding that fact?

Mr. KING. November 24, 1941, if I am not mistaken.

142. Colonel TOULMIN. Have you a copy of that document?

[2547] Mr. KING. No, I have not.

143. Colonel TOULMIN. Will you state again what was the purport of that document?

Mr. KING. The purport of that document was to establish policy, to make sure that the various department division engineers made use of the contractor's facilities. In other words, it invited attention, that the Government was paying a fee for the services of these contractors, and warned against setting up duplicate organizations; which was exactly what they did in the islands.

144. Colonel TOULMIN. Who issued that directive?

Mr. KING. I think it was Brigadier General Robins, who at that time was acting Chief Engineer.

145. Colonel TOULMIN. Was this Chief of Engineers' directive of November 24, 1941, complied with, so far as you know, or was it not complied with?

Mr. KING. It was not complied with.

146. Colonel TOULMIN. Who was in charge in the islands for the Corps of Engineers, at the time, November 24, 1941, when this order of General Robins, Chief of Engineers, was issued?

Mr. KING. That, I don't know, not being there.

147. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all.

148. General RUSSELL. Mr. King, when this work was being done, as you have described, under the system of a duality of control, do you mean to testify, then, that the supervision of the work from a contractual standpoint was done by the engineer officers?

Mr. KING. That was their idea of what their function was. Now, perhaps I might explain it further, by [2548] reading another extract from this same report. I will be glad to turn this report over

to the Board, if it wishes it. This extract, I think, will show the point I am making. That is:

About March 15th, I was appointed Area Superintendent for Field Area No. 14, relieving Mr. W. J. Nichols, who had suffered a nervous breakdown because of his inability to accomplish the results that he demanded of himself. Immediately upon my taking over the area, Major Shields, the Area Engineer, called me to his office for a conference. Instead of reviewing the scope of the work before us and outlining the priority of the several jobs, he began issuing orders dealing with the disposition of men and equipment, stating that this foreman was to be assigned to that job, etc. I courteously, but firmly, told him that in my opinion he had a serious misconception of his functions as Area Engineer and that the prerogatives he was attempting to assume were those of the Contractor's Area Superintendent. I told him that his true functions as Engineer were:

1. To transmit to me as the representative of the contractor information as to the relative priority of various jobs.
2. To transmit to me job orders, plans and specifications for such work as was from time to time authorized by higher authority.
3. To furnish field engineering data and to stake out the work.
4. To perform such necessary inspection as would insure completion of the work in strict compliance with [2549] plans and specifications.
5. To see that an accurate record of time worked by our employees was kept and that the same was properly transmitted to the U. S. E. D. Payroll Section so that our men could be promptly and accurately paid.

Then there is another recommendation.

149. General RUSSELL. I think we have developed this position rather fully, Mr. King. The point I am directing your attention to now is whether or not these engineer officers took over the contractual work and attempted to carry it on as contractors rather than as supervisory engineers.

Mr. KING. Yes, that was their attitude.

150. General RUSSELL. And it was your opinion that they were not capable of doing that job?

Mr. KING. Surely.

151. General RUSSELL. And as a result of their invading the field of the contractors, coupled with the fact that they did not have the experience and the ability to do the work, the confusion arose, and delay occurred?

Mr. KING. Surely.

152. General RUSSELL. That is the story, as you see it?

Mr. KING. Yes.

153. General RUSSELL. You stated there were constant changes in plans, and one of those that you described indicated rather substantial changes?

Mr. KING. Yes.

154. General RUSSELL. Now, do you know where all these plans came from?

Mr. KING. Where they originated?

155. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. KING. Yes. They originated in the design division of the district engineer's office.

[2550] 156. General RUSSELL. Well, now, those people on the Islands, though, didn't have the authority to plan the developments? Didn't they come in there from Washington with those plans for the development of the Islands?

Mr. KING. No. I think the development largely was——

157. General RUSSELL. Have you got that somewhere?

158. Major CLAUSEN. I said, they had the authority over that, to do that, sir?

Mr. KING. I think that these plans were developed as time went on. I must say this in extenuation, perhaps, of that planning division. They had a tough job, for the simple reason that it was mighty difficult to get any two or three people to agree on what they wanted.

159. General GRUNERT. Meaning what? I don't get it.

Mr. KING. Well, for instance, one, we will say, speaking of this Job 104 of this shop, for instance, I know from actual experience that one Air Corps colonel would have this idea, another one would have that idea. They would have to get together, and perhaps the man who originally thought the thing out was relieved, and his successor decided they wanted something else, and that all gradually got back to the design division, and that is where these changes apparently originated.

160. General RUSSELL. Then, there was no coordination on top by the Department Commander?

Mr. KING. Well, I am not qualified to answer that question.

161. General RUSSELL. All right.

Mr. KING. I have a personal opinion, but I don't know whether you want that.

[2551] 162. General RUSSELL. Now let us go back and talk about those checks that you saw all over the place. Who was the engineer out there then?

Mr. KING. Well, General Lyman had taken over about a week before that.

163. General RUSSELL. If I get the picture, you contractors had gotten these laborers together and carried them out there?

Mr. KING. Yes.

164. General RUSSELL. You employed them?

Mr. KING. We did.

165. General RUSSELL. Procurement of personnel for construction was your job?

Mr. KING. That is right.

166. General RUSSELL. How did it come to pass, then, that their quartering and feeding became a function of the Engineers?

Mr. KING. Well, their quartering and feeding was not at that time a function of the Engineers, but by order of the Commanding General we had to feed our men Army rations, and naturally it was a function of the Engineers to provide those rations. We did not operate our camps with locally purchased stuff.

167. General RUSSELL. Who operated the messes? The contractors or the military personnel?

Mr. KING. We operated some and they operated some.

168. General RUSSELL. Well, then, the contractors were partly responsible for the poor feeding of the men?

Mr. KING. To a certain extent, yes. They perhaps were responsible for the preparation of the food, and the Army was responsible for the furnishing of the food. And I might say, [2552] too, that Army rations are not a very—while they are adapted to the feeding of military units, they are certainly not adapted to feeding construction people, for the simple reason that Army rations are

predicated on feeding three meals a day, at a given time. The components are set up on that basis. But where you have to feed men around the clock, three shifts, they don't fit in very well.

169. General GRUNERT. Isn't that just a question of management?

Mr. KING. I don't think so, General. For instance——

170. General GRUNERT. Could you not have had the rationing increased?

Mr. KING. Well, the rations were pretty skimpy all the way through. For instance, the substitution of canned meats for fresh meats: it would be weeks that we would get only a small amount of fresh meat, and would use the——

171. General FRANK. The troops were operating on the same basis, however, weren't they?

Mr. KING. Yes, surely. I'll agree to that. That was the argument. The argument was, "If it is good enough for the troops, it is good enough for your men."

172. General FRANK. Well, isn't that a pretty solid argument?

Mr. KING. Except that it does not fit, trying to—for instance, I may explain it this way: for instance, if you feed a man three times a day, suppose you have to get out lunches to feed your men underground: your bread component isn't anywhere near enough to do that. In other words, they eat more bread than the ration would furnish, due to the fact that one of the meals is a cold meal that has to be prepared and shipped out to the——

[2553] 173. General FRANK. That is a question of arrangement, planning and management.

Mr. KING. Also of procurement.

174. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. KING. If you haven't got the bread, you can't——

175. General FRANK. It can be made, though.

Mr. KING. It can be furnished.

176. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. KING. Yes; if you had sufficient bread, it would work.

177. General FRANK. That is just a question——

178. General GRUNERT. That is the question I am getting at. If you have sufficient quantity, whatever the quality is, it is what you can procure. Now, if you have quantity through proper arrangement, whether you feed three times a day or six times or send a meal out, or whatnot, it is a question of management.

Mr. KING. Yes. Well, there wasn't sufficient quantity.

179. General GRUNERT. There could have been, because——

Mr. KING. Although I will say that that varies entirely with the people who are handling individual camps.

180. General GRUNERT. Management.

Mr. KING. Some of the camps worked it out better than others; but there was, even in the best of the camps, considerable complaint of the lack of fresh meat.

181. General FRANK. If the boats do not bring it over, there is not fresh meat.

Mr. KING. Yes.

182. General FRANK. And if the soldiers don't get it and the [2554] workmen don't get it, and the soldiers don't yell, the workmen should keep quiet.

Mr. KING. Yes, that is true; I'll agree with that, although at that same time I went over to the Navy Yard on several occasions and found lots of meat over there.

183. General FRANK. That is all right. They had different facilities for bringing it over.

Mr. KING. Yes.

184. General FRANK. I would like to ask some further questions. Are you through?

185. General RUSSELL. No.

186. General FRANK. Go ahead.

187. General RUSSELL. As I get it, the Engineers were trying to run the contracting business and didn't know how, and you people were trying to feed your men with Army rations and didn't know how.

Mr. KING. Well, I wouldn't say that, General. I think we knew a little about feeding men. I've fed a lot of men in my day.

188. General RUSSELL. Yes, sir. But you couldn't satisfy, or you didn't satisfy, your people out there?

Mr. KING. No.

189. General RUSSELL. By giving them the Army rations?

Mr. KING. No, I couldn't.

190. General RUSSELL. Irrespective of the logic behind the situation, it didn't take with your employees?

Mr. KING. That is right.

191. General RUSSELL. That is the situation, isn't it?

Mr. KING. Yes.

[2555] 192. General RUSSELL. All right.

Now, I do not think that we developed very fully this conference that you had with Lyman when it was agreed that Rohl would have to go. What charges were made by Lyman against Rohl upon which he based his conclusion that Rohl had to leave the Islands.

Mr. KING. Well, he stated, in the first place, that he couldn't get ahold of him when he wanted him. That was one of his complaints, that he would run around—he particularly complained of his running around with certain Air Force officers and committed the General—that is, Colonel Lyman—to things that he couldn't—in other words, went out of channels, if you understand what I mean; and he also said that the fact that the old boy was drinking so hard was very embarrassing, and he felt that his presence there was just generally undesirable.

193. General RUSSELL. This final question, now, Mr. King: On December 7 the war came along, and the plans which had been made for the development of the Islands were all abandoned, and the scheme of operation was changed?

Mr. KING. Changed many times, absolutely.

194. General RUSSELL. And we stepped all of those operations up out there to a war tempo?

Mr. KING. Yes, sir.

195. General RUSSELL. Now, in your opinion, did these things that I have just narrated contribute to the confusion which followed?

Mr. KING. Yes.

196. General RUSSELL. Which existed?

[2556] Mr. KING. Unquestionably, General.

197. General RUSSELL. You were just working under conditions that were new to everybody?

Mr. KING. Quite so. But they didn't improve as time went on, some of these fundamental things that were wrong.

198. General RUSSELL. They didn't improve under Lyman, even?

Mr. KING. No. As a matter of fact, we never did get to the point—we never did get to the point, during my entire stay in the Islands, where our men were paid promptly and on time and accurately.

199. General FRANK. How long were you there?

Mr. KING. I was there from—just about a year, just within a day or two of a year.

200. General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

201. General FRANK. How long did Lyman have control of this before—

Mr. KING. I think the General died in the first days of September 1942. My recollection is that that's—

202. General FRANK. And he had had it how long?

Mr. KING. He had had it since—

203. General FRANK. March.

Mr. KING. It was the first part of March, about the first part of March.

204. General FRANK. Now, I would like to ask you, what were the relations among the contractors? There were Rohl-Connolly, Gunther-Shirley?

Mr. KING. Yes.

205. General FRANK. W. E. Callahan, and Ralph Woolley?

Mr. KING. Yes, and the Hawaiian Contracting—

[2557] 206. General FRANK. Constructing?

Mr. KING. Contracting Company.

207. General FRANK. Hawaiian Contracting Company?

Mr. KING. Yes, the Dillingham people.

208. General FRANK. What were the relations among the contractors themselves with respect to the supervision they were getting under Rohl? Rohl held what position.

Mr. KING. Rohl held the position of chairman of the executive committee. In other words, he was the top hand while he was there, or was supposed to be.

209. General FRANK. Was Rohl satisfactory to the contractors?

Mr. KING. No. To the other members?

210. General FRANK. That is what I am talking about.

Mr. KING. No, no, certainly not.

211. General FRANK. Well, then why was he kept?

Mr. KING. Well, largely because of the fact that—I think that these island members of the firm felt that there was a natural cleavage between the mainland members and the island members. The island members were the only people there outside of Rohl.

212. General FRANK. Who? What?

Mr. KING. How?

213. General FRANK. The island members?

Mr. KING. Yes. That is, Benson and Wooley and Rohl were the only representatives of the outfit there. See, Callahan and Shirley-Gunther, they didn't have any representative there at all during my tenure.

214. General FRANK. Mr. Grafe was not there?

Mr. KING. No. Grafe left, as I understand, about [2558] Christmas, right immediately after Pearl Harbor, and, as far as I know, had practically no communication with the job from that time on.

215. General FRANK. Well, was there anything done among the contractors themselves to get rid of Rohl, who the contractors themselves felt was unsatisfactory?

Mr. KING. I don't know. I can't answer that question, whether there was anything done by them as individual members. I don't think there was, for the simple reason that they felt that if they did initiate any move to get rid of him they would be accused of trying to take the thing over.

216. General FRANK. Well, was there any preference shown for Rohl in the Engineer Corps that you know of?

Mr. KING. Certainly not—I am not qualified to say about Wyman's relations with him. I assume there was as far as Wyman was concerned, although I do not know this of personal knowledge.

217. General FRANK. All right.

218. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, you are fairly well satisfied that, while this system of the contract and the supervision by the Engineers was bad, the connection of Rohl with that system aggravated an already bad situation?

Mr. KING. Well, it certainly didn't help it any.

219. Major CLAUSEN. Well, your answer would be yes, wouldn't it?

Mr. KING. Yes.

220. Major CLAUSEN. All right, sir. Now, the situation really was inherited by you?

Mr. KING. Yes.

[2559] 221. Major CLAUSEN. You came there when this system was in operation?

Mr. KING. Yes.

222. Major CLAUSEN. And do you know anything of the fact, even before Pearl Harbor when the Hawaiian Constructors had a much smaller job to do, as to the bad situation which resulted in the relief of Colonel Wyman?

Mr. KING. I had no personal knowledge of it, not being there.

223. Major CLAUSEN. Do you have any files there which you have been reading, any papers or documents, that might be pertinent to what you might assume the Board is interested in?

Mr. KING. Well, I have; I think probably some of these papers are of interest.

224. Major CLAUSEN. May I have it myself afterwards to read over, to return to you, sir?

Mr. KING. Surely. I will be glad to have you make copies of anything here, and return the original file to me.

225. Major CLAUSEN. All right, sir.

By the way, who preceded you as general superintendent for the field work of the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. KING. Well, there was a man by the name of C. G. Clapp who was over there, and he left about three days after I got there.

226. Major CLAUSEN. What is your present position, Mr. King?

Mr. KING. I am director of yard operations at Port Hoeneme for the Pacific Naval Airport Contractors.

227. Major CLAUSEN. That is about fifty miles from Los Angeles?

[2560] Mr. KING. That is this Seabee base down the coast.

228. Colonel TOULMIN. May I ask you a question, Mr. King?

Mr. KING. Yes.

229. Colonel TOULMIN. It is not clear in my mind as to exactly the sequence of events that took place as far as you are concerned. Now, first, what was the date of your arrival in the Islands?

Mr. KING. February 16, '42.

230. Colonel TOULMIN. Do I understand that about a week preceding your arrival in the Islands General Lyman, L-y-m-a-n, had taken command?

Mr. KING. No. It was——

231. Colonel TOULMIN. What is the fact about that?

Mr. KING. General Lyman succeeded Colonel Wyman about the first week in March of '42.

232. Colonel TOULMIN. And you came when?

Mr. KING. I came the 16th of February, some three weeks before the change was made.

233. Colonel TOULMIN. So you were there during the period of Colonel Wyman's incumbency in this office of District Engineer?

Mr. KING. Yes, the last month, I should say, of his incumbency.

234. Colonel TOULMIN. And three weeks after you arrived General Lyman took command in succession to Colonel Wyman?

Mr. KING. That is correct.

235. Colonel TOULMIN. Now let us go back to this order of the Chief of Engineers of November 24, 1941, which defined the relationship between the Corps of Engineers and the contractors.

Mr. KING. That is right.

[2561] 236. Colonel TOULMIN. You would regard that as a fundamental order establishing that relationship; is that correct?

Mr. KING. Absolutely, sir.

237. Colonel TOULMIN. That would be your basic working document between the Corps of Engineers and the contractors?

Mr. KING. Yes, and the prime contract itself.

238. Colonel TOULMIN. That is right. So you would have two things to look at: first, the order of November 24, 1941, from the Corps of Engineers, defining the relationship between the contractor and the Corps of Engineers, and the contract with the contractor; is that right?

Mr. KING. That is right. Those two documents would be your basic documents.

239. Colonel TOULMIN. They would be your "bible," wouldn't they?

Mr. KING. That is right.

240. Colonel TOULMIN. Now, when you got there and had this chance for about thirty days of observing what was going on while you were awaiting assignment and the pleasure of the executive committee to give you the final assignment, to what extent did you observe that this order of November 24, 1941, was being violated?

Mr. KING. I had no opportunity to observe, Colonel, for the simple reason that I didn't get out of Honolulu. I was just sitting there waiting assignment.

241. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, when you did get out of it, which was about a month after you arrived——

Mr. KING. Yes.

242. Colonel TOULMIN. What did you observe as to the [2562] violation of this order of November 24, 1941?

Mr. KING. Well, I immediately—at that time I was not aware of this order. I became aware of it later. But I certainly saw the duality of control which I knew was not contemplated by any fixed-fee contract.

243. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, from your observations when you did observe this condition, would you be able to state that these conditions in violation of this order had been in existence for some appreciable period?

Mr. KING. Oh, yes.

244. Colonel TOULMIN. How long would you say they had been in existence?

Mr. KING. Oh, I think they had always been more or less in existence in the Islands, certainly back as far as the 7th of December.

245. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, to violate the order of November 24, 1941, would have required a relationship between the District Engineer and the head of the contracting organization that was very acquiescent in making some new arrangement other than that specified by the order; isn't that right?

Mr. KING. Yes.

246. Colonel TOULMIN. So that, in order to violate this order it would be necessary for Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl, if he was the head of the organization, as I understand he was—the contractors—for them to cooperate in violating the order, in order to work out some new arrangement other than that specified by the order; is that right?

Mr. KING. I don't think the violation of the—this wasn't an order; it was a directive; a policy directive, as I remember it. I do not believe it was violated in letter by [2563] either Colonel Wyman or General Lyman, but it was violated in spirit by their subordinates, and those were the people that we had to do business with, and those were the people that controlled things.

247. Colonel TOULMAN. So the net effect, then, Mr. King, was that, whoever did, it took the cooperative arrangement between Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl, of the subordinates in the Hawaiian Contractors, to change the spirit of this order and do something else other than that directed by the Chief of Engineers?

Mr. KING. I don't see that Mr. Rohl would have anything to do with it.

248. Colonel TOULMAN. Well, the subordinates under Mr. Rohl would have something to do with it, wouldn't they?

Mr. KING. No. The attitude of assuming control was arbitrarily assumed by the Corps of Engineers.

249. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. Then, the responsibility for changing this order, either in letter or in spirit, was upon the Corps of Engineers?

Mr. KING. That is right. That is true.

250. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all I have to ask.

251. General FRANK. But the contractors were the ones who were suffering as a result of this interpretation?

Mr. KING. Absolutely.

252. General FRANK. Or violation of it?

Mr. KING. Absolutely. That is right. In other words, they could not function.

253. General FRANK. And the one man who represented the contractors was Mr. Rohl?

[2564] Mr. KING. True enough.

254. General FRANK. Therefore it was up to Mr. Rohl to try to alleviate the situation under Colonel Wyman, was it not?

Mr. KING. Yes.

255. General FRANK. And that was not done by Mr. Rohl?

Mr. KING. That I can't say. I do know that there was a continuous record of protest made by the Hawaiian Constructors to the Corps of Engineers, a copy of which I have here: a continuous record of protest starting as early as May 1942 and continuing throughout until the termination of the contract.

256. General GRUNERT. It appears that from your personal observation and your own knowledge practically all your testimony relates to after Pearl Harbor; is that right?

Mr. KING. That is true, General.

257. General GRUNERT. And that from your observations you found that the morale and certain conditions were inherited probably from before Pearl Harbor?

Mr. KING. I would say, rather, as a result of Pearl Harbor.

258. General GRUNERT. As a result.

Mr. KING. As a result of the tremendous confusion engendered by the attack, as part of the reason.

259. General GRUNERT. Now, you appear to have made quite an indictment of the Corps of Engineers or that part of it that functioned in Hawaii. In that indictment do you know whether or not it concerned their ability as engineers or as administrators?

Mr. KING. You have hit the nub of the situation there, [2565] General, exactly. Engineers, generally speaking, are not administrators, they are not managers, and there is where the mistake was made. These reserve officers are picked up. They are engineers, technical engineers. They have little experience in management, and they were attempting to do something that they knew very little about.

260. General GRUNERT. Now, that report you have there, the papers from which you read extracts, the Board would like to have you leave that with the Board so that we can see what is in it and see whether or not we want to put some of it in the record as an exhibit.

Mr. KING. Yes. I will be very glad to turn this over to you with the understanding that it is my personal opinion; it is not necessarily the reflection of the attitude or the opinion of the Hawaiian Constructors. It is my own personal opinion as the result of my observations there.

261. General GRUNERT. We accept it as such.

Any other questions?

Mr. KING. And I feel, in justice to the Hawaiian Constructors, that it should not be used to their prejudice. I will be glad to leave the entire file here, including—

262. General GRUNERT. Mr. King, do you know of anything else that you might think of that might be of assistance to the Board? You understand that the Board is limited in its investigation to such phases as pertain to the conditions prior to and during the Pearl Har-

bor attack, and that any evidence that we accumulate otherwise should have a bearing on that phase.

Mr. KING. Yes.

[2566] 263. General GRUNERT. So that what we have been going after is to see what bearing it has on that phase.

Mr. KING. Yes. In other words, then, General, the period of my tenure there is not under investigation?

264. General GRUNERT. Only insofar as——

Mr. KING. As it bears on——

265. General GRUNERT. So far as we are concerned, insofar as it bears on what might have happened before or during Pearl Harbor or had connection therewith; am I right with the Board?

266. Major CLAUSEN. Inferences which may be drawn.

267. General GRUNERT. And the inferences drawn; true enough.

Mr. KING. Well, I can't think of any information that I can give the Board that would bear on conditions prior to Pearl Harbor or at the time of Pearl Harbor or immediately thereafter.

268. General GRUNERT. I didn't want you to get the impression that this is a thorough investigation of everything in '42 or '43 or whatnot, except as it might have a bearing on what happened at Pearl Harbor or leading thereto.

Mr. KING. Well, I have nothing along that line.

269. General GRUNERT. We thank you very much for coming and assisting us.

Mr. KING. I am very glad to appear, gentlemen.

270. General GRUNERT. We shall have a recess.

(There was a brief informal recess.)

[2567] **TESTIMONY OF EMMA JANE BALLARD,
COLTON, CALIFORNIA.**

(The witness was sworn by the Assistant Recorder and advised of her rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Major CLAUSEN. Mrs. Ballard, would you state your name, residence, and present place of employment.

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, my name is Emma Jane Ballard. I live in Colton, California, near San Bernardino. I work at the Army Depot, in parachute repair maintenance.

The way I feel about anything that I know is, that I am not divulging any information that I heard over my switchboard in Honolulu, it is information that I saw and heard outside of my switchboard. I never listened to any information over the switchboard. I was always very much too busy, if I had had the inclination.

2. Major CLAUSEN. You were formerly employed by the United States Engineering Department, in the Hawaiian Islands, is that right?

Mrs. BALLARD. That is right.

3. Major CLAUSEN. And that extended over what period of time?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, I am not sure just what date I went to work, but I went to work in November preceding Pearl Harbor for the Procurement Department, the civil section of the Engineers, and until the 8th of December, when I was on duty for 24 hours a day for weeks. I had no contact other than just over the phone with any of the official staff. I was in connection with the civil section of the Engineers.

4. Major CLAUSEN. When did you leave the islands?

Mrs. BALLARD. I left there, the 20th of February, and [2568] arrived back in San Francisco the 1st day of March, 1942.

5. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall, during the time that you were on duty, before Pearl Harbor, having observed Colonel Wyman?

Mrs. BALLARD. I don't suppose I saw Colonel Wyman more than three or four times at the most, in the time that I worked, before Pearl Harbor.

6. Major CLAUSEN. And did you observe him after Pearl Harbor, and up to the time that you left?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, he wasn't there when I left. I don't know where he was, but I had observed him very closely when I was there on duty.

7. Major CLAUSEN. And can you give the Board some idea as to the number of times that you saw him, from Pearl Harbor up to the time that you left the islands, how frequently you saw him, if you saw him at all?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, several times a day.

8. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know whether, during that time, Colonel Wyman was drunk? If so, just answer, and then explain to the Board how you came to reach that conclusion.

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, I had orders to check and verify time and charges, and verify any long-distance calls which were made, and the calls that were made to this Hawaiian Construction Company, and the head, there, Wilhelm Rohl, and Ralph Woolley, and Chadwick. Every call that ever was made, Colonel Wyman went into a rage when I had to verify those calls, and many times came directly to the switchboard and raged and roared around, and everyone was in apparent mortal fear of him—he didn't awe me a bit!—and he continually [2569] smelled of liquor. He made the remark to my face one day, or rather to his man secretary, a Mr. Eads, that he didn't know whether he could trust me or not with those calls, and he resented it that I had to check on all of them. And I told him to his face that if he could trust himself as well as he could trust me, he would be doing all right.

9. Major CLAUSEN. When he objected to your checking on calls, were they calls that you were putting in, from himself to this Wilhelm Rohl?

Mrs. BALLARD. Yes.

10. Major CLAUSEN. And could you give me some estimate as to the number of those calls that he put in, and the number of times that he made this objection?

Mrs. BALLARD. No; I don't believe I could give them, but a great number, though.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Did that extend over the period from the time that you were first on duty there as a telephone operator down to the time that you left?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, after the 7th of December, and up until, well, a short while before I left there, he was removed from duty, and a Captain Trik, Carl H., later Major, was placed in command there over that section.

12. General GRUNERT. Do I understand these calls you referred to were made from approximately the 7th of December up until some time in March?

Mrs. BALLARD. I left there in March, but I don't know just how long he had been gone when I left there; but over a period of several weeks, that he made those calls.

13. General GRUNERT. And they were made to the mainland?

Mrs. BALLARD. Some of them. Some of them, this Wilhelm [2570] Rohl seemed to be in Maui and different sections of the island.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Was there a requirement that you check these calls?

Mrs. BALLARD. Yes, sir; I had direct orders that I had to check time and verify costs and keep a record of that.

15. Major CLAUSEN. You had that order from whom, Mrs. Ballard?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, I couldn't say. When I first went in on that board at Punahou, the chief operator from down town, at the engineers' office down town, was in charge, and that was her order to me.

16. Major CLAUSEN. On some of these occasions when you saw Colonel Wyman, Mrs. Ballard, was he in your opinion drunk?

Mrs. BALLARD. He was very drunk, many times.

17. Major CLAUSEN. Were some of those times before Pearl Harbor?

Mrs. BALLARD. No, I don't recall that I was ever close enough to him to notice that, before.

18. Major CLAUSEN. Before Pearl Harbor?

Mrs. BALLARD. Before Pearl Harbor.

19. Major CLAUSEN. What was the basis for your assuming that he was drunk?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, I wouldn't consider that a man in his right mind would storm and rage around and have everyone in mortal terror of him, like the man did; and then I knew one of the civilians there that was always bringing liquor in, and very often offered us a drink as he went through.

20. Major CLAUSEN. The civilian would bring liquor to whom?

[2571] Mrs. BALLARD. To Colonel Wyman's office. He was his civilian assistant.

21. Major CLAUSEN. What was his name?

Mrs. BALLARD. His name was Robert Dikes.

22. Major CLAUSEN. Did you get close enough to Colonel Wyman to smell his breath?

Mrs. BALLARD. Oh, many times. He was right at my switchboard.

23. Major CLAUSEN. And did his breath smell of liquor?

Mrs. BALLARD. Very badly.

24. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have occasion to observe his walk?

Mrs. BALLARD. He staggered when he would walk, many times, and bump the sill.

25. Major CLAUSEN. As a drunken man would?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, as I would imagine he would.

26. General GRUNERT. Why do you suppose Colonel Wyman was concerned about your keeping proper records of these calls?

Mrs. BALLARD. I never could understand that, at the time, until this newspaper article came out about him and Wilhelm Rohl, here several months ago.

27. General GRUNERT. But, at the time, you could not understand why he should interfere with your records?

Mrs. BALLARD. No, sir; I couldn't.

28. General GRUNERT. Did you imagine it was just because of his condition?

Mrs. BALLARD. Yes; I used to think that that was because he was——

29. General GRUNERT. What did he actually say to you?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, he couldn't see any sense in me [2572] sticking my nose in, and butting in on his business, why I had to check on his calls when they were personal calls, and remarks of that sort.

30. General FRANK. What do you mean, "personal calls"? Were they not on official business?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, they were on the Army switchboard, but they were calls——

31. General FRANK. Who paid for the calls—the Government?

Mrs. BALLARD. I presume that the Government did.

32. General FRANK. Were they not carried as official calls?

Mrs. BALLARD. Yes, sir.

33. General FRANK. When did you start in this position where you had supervision and checking of these calls?

Mrs. BALLARD. Right immediately after Pearl Harbor. I lived in the Naval Hospital Reservation, at Aiea, and the Marine guards—I had not worked very long for the engineers, and I had no pass or badge or anything to get in, to show that I was officially employed by the engineers, and to go to Honolulu from where I lived, I had to go right directly through Pearl Harbor, through the bombed area, and the Marine guards refused to even let me out of the Hospital Reservation, the 7th of December, and I finally worked my way out, the morning of the 8th. I got into Honolulu about 20 minutes after 7. I was sent right immediately. I think about 11 o'clock I went to work on the switchboard down in the Alexander Young building, and worked until about 11 o'clock, and relieved the girls there, and then I was sent to Punahou to take over for a day or two—well, maybe a week, there were two other girls that helped me, and then I was left in entire charge of [2573] that board.

34. General FRANK. What did you do, prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mrs. BALLARD. I had worked for the Procurement Department on Aleakea street for the engineers. I hadn't work very long. I hadn't been over there but about a year, and my husband had a very good job, and I didn't consider it necessary to work, but I got very bored doing nothing, so I finally went to work.

35. General FRANK. Do you remember any calls back to the mainland between Wyman and Rohl?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, I remember about half a dozen to San Francisco, that I put through.

36. General FRANK. Did he ever talk to Los Angeles?

Mrs. BALLARD. No, I don't know that I ever did.

37. General FRANK. These were all government calls?

Mrs. BALLARD. They were all put through as official calls.

38. General FRANK. And they were paid for by the Government?

Mrs. BALLARD. Yes, sir.

39. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall, Mrs. Ballard, ever seeing this German alien, Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Mrs. BALLARD. Yes; I have seen him many times.

40. Major CLAUSEN. Where?

Mrs. BALLARD. The engineers had one section, one building of the Punahou School, which was a very large area, and the Hawaiian Construction Company were directly across a narrow street, in another building.

41. Major CLAUSEN. During what period was it that you saw this Rohl?

[2574] Mrs. BALLARD. Well, evidently he flew in and out from the mainland to the islands at will, and at the times that he was there, in and out of the engineer's office, there, in Colonel Wyman's office.

42. General GRUNERT. Was this prior to September 15 1941?

Mrs. BALLARD. No, it was after Pearl Harbor that they took over Punahou.

43. General GRUNERT. Then you did not know whether he was an alien at the time that you knew him.

Mrs. BALLARD. No, sir; I didn't know very much about him, at all.

44. General GRUNERT. The question was asked, as if he were an alien at the time you knew him.

Mrs. BALLARD. No; I didn't know that.

45. Major CLAUSEN. I had reference, sir, to the fact that she had read in the newspapers concerning the German alien. I wanted to make my question specific, that that was the man that I was referring to.

46. General GRUNERT. All right.

47. Major CLAUSEN. It had no relation to the time of his alienage.

This man that you saw, named Rohl, did you ever see him in company with Colonel Wyman?

Mrs. BALLARD. Yes, many times.

48. Major CLAUSEN. When you saw him in company with Colonel Wyman, was Colonel Wyman ever in the condition that you stated, as to drunkenness?

Mrs. BALLARD. They were both pretty well drunken, at that time.

[2575] 49. Major CLAUSEN. You say they were both pretty well drunk? I beg your pardon?

Mrs. BALLARD. Yes, sir.

50. Major CLAUSEN. Where did this occur that you saw them in that condition?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, I was on specific duty in the library building at that school, and that was where my switchboard was, and the official staff were in through a corridor, and right directly behind our switchboard; and to get into their offices, they went through the entrance right by my switchboard.

51. Major CLAUSEN. Did you get close enough to this party, Rohl, to smell his breath?

Mrs. BALLARD. No, I don't know that I ever was as close to him as I had been to Colonel Wyman.

52. Major CLAUSEN. What was there about his actions that indicated to you he was drunk?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, loud talking, and staggering.

53. Major CLAUSEN. Mrs. Ballard, can you tell us anything about the prosecution of the work? I mean the actual work of the engineering department, so far as it relates to the things that they were supposed to be doing, in your opinion?

Mrs. BALLARD. No; I don't believe I could tell you much about that. I can tell you about the way the engineers tied up the work for the other agencies.

My husband worked for the Pacific Naval Air Bases, there, for the Navy, and for several weeks, Colonel Wyman had—I don't know just how he worked it with the Navy, but I do know that he had materials tied up in and around Pearl Harbor they [2576] were using for the emergency defense work, until they were stymied, they were helpless to go ahead with their work.

54. General FRANK. Who was that?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, the Pacific Naval Air Bases, there. My husband worked for the Turner Construction Company, which built the Navy housing there around Pearl Harbor.

55. General GRUNERT. Then what you know is hearsay from your husband?

Mrs. BALLARD. No; many calls that I had in on the switchboard about that, the different heads of that, from out around Pearl Harbor, "rowing" and "raising Cain" about the materials being tied up.

56. Major CLAUSEN. Mrs. Ballard, was the engineering office in which you were employed one big happy family, or did you have quite a bit of strife and commotion?

Mrs. BALLARD. The civil section, there, except for this one Robert Dikes, was a very congenial group.

57. Major CLAUSEN. Did Colonel Wyman ever act towards others, in your presence, as he acted towards you?

Mrs. BALLARD. Oh, yes; many times. The different ones that were in contact with him, he would yell at them and bark at them, and they were very much in awe of him. One particular time, he came out of his office, I was off the switchboard right at the minute, and was talking to this Captain, McCrone, whose desk was right directly outside Colonel Wyman's office; and if they didn't all jump just at attention, just the minute that he appeared, why he would yell at them; and this particular time there were about six of those captains and lieutenants after him; just fell in. He yelled at them, and they just [2577] fell in behind him and goose-stepped out of there; and I said, "I thought this was a democracy, and we have the 'little king' with us!" And he turned around and glared at me, but he didn't say anything.

58. Major CLAUSEN. Mrs. Ballard, did any of these exhibitions of that character occur when this Colonel Wyman was acting in this drunken fashion?

Mrs. BALLARD. As a rule, I think those occurrences happened when he was drunk.

59. Major CLAUSEN. And you told me something this morning about the townspeople of Honolulu's general impression of the engineering corps, as shown by statements to you, when you would say by whom you were employed. Would you want to elaborate upon that, or tell the Board what you told me?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, in cashing checks or anything, we used to be required by the merchants there to show our badge and pass, and they many times have made the remark to me, "Oh, you work for the engineers!" and then give me the regular horse laugh.

60. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

61. General FRANK. What did that indicate?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, I would say that the engineers were rather the laughing-stock of the island, the way they destroyed property there and all, after Pearl Harbor. They cut trees, and this school that they took over, they were paying an exorbitant sum for it, and they had many valuable art objects, and the library, there, that was of untold value and wealth, and Colonel Wyman, at his order—I have heard him, one morning, [2578] order a ditch digger in there, and the library, the books in that library, and the paintings, and everything in that library were thrown into a ditch eight feet deep and covered up.

62. General FRANK. Did you see this?

Mrs. BALLARD. Yes, sir; and the morning of the 8th of December, this Mr. Nelson, who was president of the faculty of that school, had tried to retain some of the buildings to store their things in, and Colonel Wyman ordered me—came out to the switchboard and ordered me to find the man, and, at a very difficult task, I located him, and he came up there, and he ordered him to open these other building which he had locked up with valuable things of the school in, and he said that in their agreement they had agreed to allow them to retain certain buildings for storage of their articles, and Colonel Wyman said, "Are you going to open those buildings, or am I going to get a battering ram and knock the doors and the walls down?" He said, "You can take your choice, Nelson!" Nelson opened the buildings for him.

63. General FRANK. When was this that you saw these books buried?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, it was in the week following Pearl Harbor; and going across to the canteen for breakfast one morning, I saw this ditch digger.

64. General FRANK. Where was this ditch?

Mrs. BALLARD. It was in the grounds, on the lawn of the school.

65. General FRANK. But where? Between what buildings?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, between the library building and [2579] Bingham Hall.

66. General FRANK. Were they ever taken up?

Mrs. BALLARD. Not as far as I know, those ditches were never opened.

67. General FRANK. Was there any commotion or remonstrance about it?

Mrs. BALLARD. Oh, there was an awful row about it. They rode rough-shod over everyone, the people in their beautiful residences there in Honolulu, the beautiful trees; Colonel Wyman ordered those trees chopped to the ground, on private grounds; those lawns and homes were denuded of their trees that were a thousand years old. They were supposedly used for camouflage. I wouldn't say as to where that shrubbery and all that was cut there was used.

General RUSSELL. This drunken condition which you have described, by Wyman, was any of that during the daytime, when he was supposed to have been on duty?

Mrs. BALLARD. They were on duty 24 hours a day, there. They had mattresses there and slept there in that library building.

68. General RUSSELL. Did you see him in that condition during the daytime?

Mrs. BALLARD. Yes, I have; many times.

69. General RUSSELL. That is all.

70. General GRUNERT. Is there anything else that occurs to you, that you think might be of value to the Board, or that you have, of your own knowledge?

Mrs. BALLARD. No, I don't think so: just the general everyday things that occurred were along that trend.

[2580] 71. General GRUNERT. Under whose jurisdiction were you employed as the telephone operator, there?

Mrs. BALLARD. I was employed by the Civil Service Board, which was in the Engineers Building, the Alexander Young building.

72. General GRUNERT. Then Colonel Wyman had no authority, and could not have discharged you if he wanted to, could he?

Mrs. BALLARD. Well, I suppose if I had given him cause for discharge he could have.

73. General GRUNERT. Did he ever attempt to get rid of you?

Mrs. BALLARD. Not that I know of.

74. General FRANK. You were a civil-service employee?

Mrs. BALLARD. Yes, sir. The one thing that I have always puzzled about, I didn't register for evacuation until the 13th of February, and I was out of there in a week, if that was engineered by some one, there, because other people that had registered immediately after the 7th of December were still there in August and September.

75. Major CLAUSEN. August and September of the following year?

Mrs. BALLARD. Of 1942.

76. General GRUNERT. I think that is all, then. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2580-A] **TESTIMONY OF EMIL LAWRENCE ZUCCA, SENIOR
AIRCRAFT SERVICE MECHANIC; SAN BERNARDINO, CALI-
FORNIA**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Zucca, will you please state to the Board your full name and address.

Mr. ZUCCA. Emil Lawrence Zucca, 1141 Magnolia, San Bernardino, California.

2. Colonel WEST. What is your occupation, Mr. Zucca?

Mr. ZUCCA. Senior aircraft service mechanic.

3. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Zucca, you are employed now by whom?

Mr. ZUCCA. By the Air Service Command.

4. Major CLAUSEN. And you have been, for what period of time?

Mr. ZUCCA. Since February 10, 1942.

5. Major CLAUSEN. You formerly were employed by the United States Engineering Department?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir.

6. Major CLAUSEN. And in that capacity, did you meet a then Major or Captain Wyman?

Mr. ZUCCA. I met him as Major Wyman, sir.

7. Major CLAUSEN. Did you meet him in that capacity, in Los Angeles?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir.

8. Major CLAUSEN. And that was when, Mr. Zucca?

Mr. ZUCCA. In 1936. Let's see; I started there, I believe it was March 10, 1936.

[2580-B] 9. Major CLAUSEN. And what were your relations with Major Wyman at that time?

Mr. ZUCCA. I was assigned to the district engineer as chauffeur, sir.

10. Major CLAUSEN. As whose chauffeur?

Mr. ZUCCA. I was assigned to drive the district engineer, as the district engineer's chauffeur, and that was Major Wyman, at the time, sir.

11. Major CLAUSEN. And when you drove him, did you use an official car?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir; we did.

12. Major CLAUSEN. And do you know Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir; I do.

[2581] 13. Major CLAUSEN. When did you first meet Mr. Rohl?

Mr. ZUCCA. I don't recall when I first met him. I really don't remember, you know, exactly when I first met him. It was some time during the period of time while I was driving the District Engineer.

14. Major CLAUSEN. How long did you drive for Major Wyman?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, it was approximately four years, around that. I started there in March, just, you know, driving there, and then I was assigned to the District Engineer about four months after I was employed, and I drove him until he was assigned to the Honolulu District.

15. Major CLAUSEN. Now, it was during that time that you met Mr. Rohl also?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir.

16. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever drive Major Wyman to the Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir; I did.

17. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever have occasion on any of these trips to go up with Major Wyman or anyone else to the apartment, in there, of Mr. Rohl?

Mr. ZUCCA. I did on a few occasions, I had been up to the rooms there in the hotel, sir.

18. Major CLAUSEN. You saw Mr. Rohl there at that time, did you?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, yes; I had seen him there on, you know—at different times he would be there.

19. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. ZUCCA. Sometimes.

[2582] 20. Major CLAUSEN. And on some of these occasions you would see Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl drink?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, I never—I wouldn't want to say that I actually saw them drink, sir.

21. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you saw liquor there, though, didn't you?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, yes, sir. I mean that wouldn't indicate, I mean, anyone was—

22. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon.

Mr. ZUCCA. That wouldn't indicate I saw them drink, though.

23. Major CLAUSEN. How many times did you drive Major Wyman to the Biltmore Hotel?

Mr. ZUCCA. I don't know, sir.

24. Major CLAUSEN. Can you give some estimate as to the number of times?

Mr. ZUCCA. That is rather a difficult question to answer.

25. General FRANK. How often did you drive him there, about? Twice a week? Once a week? Three times a week?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, sometimes I might say once a month.

26. General FRANK. Well, some other times how often was it?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, then again it might be twice a week. It depends—I mean that wouldn't indicate that Major Wyman was going to see just Mr. Rohl. I mean, after all, there were a lot of people that were connected with the Engineer district who stayed at the Biltmore Hotel when they arrived in the district, and he would go there to meet them, Army officers and other civilian personnel who were there for the district.

27. Major CLAUSEN. You saw, some of these times when you went [2583] up to Mr. Rohl's apartment in Los Angeles, Paul Grafe, didn't you, Mr. Zucca?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir, I met a Mr. Paul Grafe.

28. Major CLAUSEN. And on some of these occasions when you would drive Major Wyman to the apartment of Mr. Rohl you would wait for him, and wait sometimes from nine o'clock at night to two o'clock the next morning; isn't that right?

Mr. ZUCCA. I have, yes, sir; I have waited for him.

29. Major CLAUSEN. And you, also during the same period that you drove Major Wyman to the Biltmore, have on occasions driven Major Wyman to the home of Mr. Rohl, which was elsewhere than the Biltmore; isn't that right?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir; I drove Major Wyman to Mr. Rohl's home on a few different occasions.

30. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, the home of Mr. Rohl, or it might be another home of Mr. Rohl, was different than the Biltmore Hotel?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir; I believe he had a private residence.

31. Major CLAUSEN. In Los Angeles?

Mr. ZUCCA. In the Hollywood district, sir.

32. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. At Los Angeles?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir.

33. Major CLAUSEN. Now, you also had driven Major Wyman at times around to various night club; isn't that correct?

Mr. ZUCCA. I have on occasions, yes, sir.

34. Major CLAUSEN. All these trips were in the official car; is that correct?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, not all of them, sir. I believe that I said that all those trips at one time were in the official [2584] car, but that is an incorrect statement. They were not all. I mean there was occasions when they weren't in the official car.

35. Major CLAUSEN. What car would you then use?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, Major Wyman had a car of his own, sir.

36. Major CLAUSEN. And you would drive that for him?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, I had on very rare occasions driven his own car, sir.

37. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you have driven Major Wyman around to a lot of night clubs? Earl Carroll's? Or let me have the names. You give them to me.

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, Earl Carroll's is one. I don't recall. The Jane Jones Club.

38. Major CLAUSEN. Little Jane Jones Club.

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir. And the Cafe La Maze.

39. Major CLAUSEN. Trocadero?

Mr. ZUCCA. Trocadero, sir.

40. Major CLAUSEN. Ambassador?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir.

41. Major CLAUSEN. What other ones, Mr. Zucca?

Mr. ZUCCA. That is all I recall, sir.

42. Major CLAUSEN. Now, when you would drive him around to these places, who would be in the party with Colonel Wyman? Would Mr. Rohl be there?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, occasionally, yes, sir.

43. Major CLAUSEN. And this Paul Grafe sometimes?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir.

44. Major CLAUSEN. How about a man by the name of Plack? Werner Plack. Was he ever along?

[2585] Mr. ZUCCA. Don't know him, sir.

45. Major CLAUSEN. When you were driving there, you would wait until the party was over and then take them home; is that right?

Mr. ZUCCA. Sometimes, sir.

46. Major CLAUSEN. That would be around midnight, one o'clock, later on?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, yes. You know, the time varied. Sometimes it would be earlier; sometimes it would be a little later.

47. Major CLAUSEN. Now, on some occasions did you just take Major Wyman and Mr. Rohl to these places?

Mr. ZUCCA. I had, I believe, on a couple of occasions taken them, just the two of them, sir.

48. Major CLAUSEN. And in addition to those night clubs did you sometimes take Major and Mrs. Wyman and Mr. and Mrs. Rohl out to night clubs or country clubs?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir, I have.

49. Major CLAUSEN. And what were some of those places?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, I think they were the country clubs. The Bel-Air Country Club I believe was one; that was the beach club. I don't recall the names of the others, sir, at the present time.

50. Major CLAUSEN. Well, different hotels?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir; I would say, like the Ambassador.

51. General GRUNERT. Didn't Mr. Rohl have a car of his own?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir; he did.

52. General GRUNERT. Did he use it much, or did he ride a great deal with Major Wyman?

[2586] Mr. ZUCCA. Well, he usually had his car with him, sir.

53. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

54. General FRANK. What do you mean by that?

Mr. ZUCCA. I mean that sometimes that Mr. Rohl might ride in the car with us, but he would have his own car, you know, in the party, sir.

55. General FRANK. Trailing along behind?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir.

56. General FRANK. What for?

Mr. ZUCCA. Why, I really don't know, sir.

57. General FRANK. Did you know his chauffeur?

Mr. ZUCCA. I did, sir.

58. General FRANK. Would his chauffeur be waiting at these places outside while you were waiting for Major Wyman?

Mr. ZUCCA. Occasionally, sir; yes, sir.

59. General FRANK. Go ahead.

60. Major CLAUSEN. I believe you already said that you have driven Major Wyman out to Mr. Rohl's own home, and I wonder while you were out there if you ever met this party named Plack.

Mr. ZUCCA. I don't recall him, sir.

61. Major CLAUSEN. What is Mr. Rohl's chauffeur's name? I mean the man who was the chauffeur at the time that you were the chauffeur for Major Wyman.

Mr. ZUCCA. A Mr. Brown.

62. Major CLAUSEN. What is his first name?

Mr. ZUCCA. I don't know.

63. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know where he lives, his address?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, I don't.

[2587] 64. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know where he is working?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, I don't.

65. General FRANK. How often would Major Wyman stay all night at Mr. Rohl's?

Mr. ZUCCA. I have never known him to stay all night at Mr. Rohl's, sir.

66. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

67. General RUSSELL. When did you first begin working for Captain or Colonel Wyman?

68. General FRANK. Major Wyman.

69. General RUSSELL. Major Wyman.

Mr. ZUCCA. I was assigned to Major Wyman when I was assigned as the District Engineer's driver about four months after I was employed with the Army Engineers.

70. General RUSSELL. And that was when?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, I started, I believe the date was—it was either February or March the 10th, 1936: March, April, May, June, or July, some time around there.

71. General RUSSELL. And how long did you drive for Major Wyman?

Mr. ZUCCA. I drove until he was transferred from the district at Los Angeles to Honolulu, sir.

72. General RUSSELL. And then it covered a span of three or four years?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir; about three and a half years, roughly.

73. General RUSSELL. Now, were you an enlisted man in the Army and just detailed as Major Wyman's driver?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, sir; I was a civilian.

[2588] 74. General RUSSELL. You were a civilian employee?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir.

75. General RUSSELL. What kind of car did the Major have?

Mr. ZUCCA. You mean his own personal car, sir?

76. General RUSSELL. No. The official car. Did he have one assigned to him as his permanent official car?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir; there was a car assigned to the District Engineer.

77. General RUSSELL. And you were given the job of driving that particular car?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir.

78. General RUSSELL. And did you drive the Major around very much in the daytime?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir.

79. General RUSSELL. And then you would drive him some at night?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir, occasionally.

80. General RUSSELL. Did he live in more than one place during this period of approximately three and a half years when you acted as his chauffeur?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, sir, not that I recall, sir. He was——

81. General RUSSELL. Where did he live during that period of time?

Mr. ZUCCA. In West Los Angeles, sir.

82. General RUSSELL. Do you recall the number and street?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir; 221 Woodruff, West Los Angeles.

83. General RUSSELL. A very nice home he had there?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir, a very nice home.

84. General RUSSELL. You would pick him up there and take [2589] him downtown to the hotel or out to a club after he had finished his work at night; is that so?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir, sometimes.

85. General RUSSELL. Did he and his wife separate during this period of time that you acted as his chauffeur?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir.

86. General RUSSELL. Did he continue to live in the home, or did Mrs. Wyman live in the home thereafter?

Mr. ZUCCA. He continued to live in the home, sir.

87. General RUSSELL. Did she move?

Mr. ZUCCA. Mrs. Wyman—I believe she was in the East, sir.

88. General RUSSELL. She moved away?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, she was in the East. I don't know whether she moved or not.

89. General RUSSELL. Did Major Wyman marry again before he went out to the Islands.

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir, he did.

90. General RUSSELL. How long was it between the date of the first Mrs. Wyman's going to the East until the Major married again?

Mr. ZUCCA. I don't know, sir.

91. General RUSSELL. You don't recall when he married again?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, sir. I was on thirty days' leave at the time, and I don't recall how long it was.

92. General RUSSELL. Do you remember when you went on that leave?

Mr. ZUCCA. It was in—let's see. It was August. I think it was in August 1938, I believe.

93. General RUSSELL. Now, do you remember when Mrs. Wyman, [2590] the first Mrs. Wyman, left to go to the East?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, sir. I had no idea that they were having any difficulty or anything at all. I don't recall when she left to go

east, and I was rather amazed when I came back, to hear that they had separated, and later on I heard that he was married again.

94. General RUSSELL. Now, aren't we getting a little bit confused? Did he separate and marry again, all during this one period of thirty days' leave that you had?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, sir.

95. General RUSSELL. Where were you when the first Mrs. Wyman went out east?

Mr. ZUCCA. I was in the Los Angeles district, sir.

96. General RUSSELL. Weren't you his driver then?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir, I was.

97. General RUSSELL. You were taking him home and carrying him back to his office and going out to parties with him all that time?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, I was taking him home, yes, sir; but I mean I had no knowledge of Mrs. Wyman's whereabouts, whether she was home or in the East.

98. General RUSSELL. Well, all of the time before she went east, would you go get him and take him down to the hotel and leave the first Mrs. Wyman at home?

Mr. ZUCCA. I would like to clarify one thing: that when I'd go get Major Wyman, sir, I would usually take him to the district office.

99. General RUSSELL. Well, now, you told Major Clausen a little while ago, you took him down to the Biltmore Hotel.

Mr. ZUCCA. I did. I have, yes, sir.

[2591] 100. General RUSSELL. You told General Frank you would take him sometimes once a month and sometimes twice a week.

Mr. ZUCCA. I have, yes, sir. That's right.

101. General RUSSELL. But you left Mrs. Wyman when you would take him down to the hotel?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, let's put a time element in here. What time do you mean?

102. General RUSSELL. I don't know. You fix the time.

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, maybe in the mornings when I'd pick him up I would take him to the district office in Los Angeles.

103. General RUSSELL. We are not troubled about that. We want to know when the period was you were taking him to the hotel. Was that before Mrs. Wyman left and went to the East?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, sir.

104. General RUSSELL. You never did take him to the Biltmore Hotel while he was living with the first Mrs. Wyman?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir, I have.

105. General RUSSELL. Yes. You did and you didn't.

Mr. ZUCCA. I have taken him to the hotel and I have taken him to the district office, sir, when Mrs. Wyman was—when he was living with Mrs. Wyman, and I presume that during the time that Mrs. Wyman was away.

106. General RUSSELL. Now, have you ever taken Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman out to a night club, just the two of them?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir, I have.

107. General RUSSELL. Anybody else in that automobile?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, sometimes there would be, yes, sir.

108. General RUSSELL. Who would that be?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, sometimes it might be Mrs. Wyman; it [2592] might be Mr. Grafe, Mr. Sverdrup.

109. General RUSSELL. Did you have anybody else in there, in those cars?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, oh, there was—I—you know, I mean, after all, there was a lot of people connected there with the district office.

110. General RUSSELL. Ever have any other ladies in those cars?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, sir.

111. General RUSSELL. Mrs. Wyman and Mrs. Rohl are the only two ladies that you ever had in that automobile?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir. That's the only ones that I recall, sir.

112. General RUSSELL. Could there have been some others and you have forgotten them before now?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, it was a long—long time. Four years is a long time. After all, this is 1944. That was in 1936, '37, '38, and '39.

113. General RUSSELL. But you remember Paul Grafe?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, yes, sir, I remember Paul Grafe.

114. General RUSSELL. His riding in the automobile?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir.

115. General RUSSELL. You remember Mrs. Wyman riding in the automobile?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir.

116. General RUSSELL. And Mrs. Rohl riding in it?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir.

117. General RUSSELL. And these other two gentlemen you have mentioned, and those are the only ones you can remember?

[2593] Mr. ZUCCA. Those are the only ones. I mean I have seen them quite often, naturally, and remember them.

118. General RUSSELL. There might have been other people riding in there?

Mr. ZUCCA. There was undoubtedly other people, you know, that we had driven at different times, but I don't recall who they were.

119. General RUSSELL. Now, when Brown would come along behind you in Rohl's automobile, who was in there with him?

Mr. ZUCCA. No one, sir.

120. General RUSSELL. He would be just alone?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir.

121. General RUSSELL. Major Clausen asked you about going up to the hotel room where Mr. Rohl and Major Wyman were. Have you ever seen any girls up in those rooms?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, sir.

122. General RUSSELL. Never saw a one in your life?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, sir.

123. General RUSSELL. You saw some liquor but didn't see anybody drink any?

Mr. ZUCCA. I saw some liquor, but I didn't see anybody drinking it.

124. General RUSSELL. In all the times you had ever been in there you never saw one soul take a drink of liquor?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, sir.

125. General FRANK. What did you go up there for?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, I took some cigarettes up to Major Wyman a couple of different occasions. One afternoon I took a briefcase up to him, sir.

[2594] 126. General RUSSELL. What time of day was it that you were going up to this room where Rohl was, where the Major was?

Mr. ZUCCA. In the afternoon, sir.

127. General RUSSELL. Always in the afternoon?

Mr. ZUCCA. About four o'clock in the afternoon, yes, sir.

128. General RUSSELL. You never went up there at night at all?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, sir, I have never been up there at night.

129. General RUSSELL. When have you seen Mr. Rohl?

Mr. ZUCCA. When?

130. General RUSSELL. Yes, lately.

Mr. ZUCCA. I haven't see Mr. Rohl since I left the Engineers, sir, 19—let's see. That was 1941 when I left there, and I hadn't seen him quite some time previous to that.

131. General RUSSELL. When did you see Paul Grafe last?

Mr. ZUCCA. About the same time, sir.

132. General RUSSELL. '41?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir.

133. General RUSSELL. Do you know how you came to give this statement that Major Clausen has read sections from to you?

Mr. ZUCCA. Do I know how I came to give it?

134. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir; I was—let's see. Some Weiner—Werner.

135. General RUSSELL. Weiner?

Mr. ZUCCA. Weiner, I believe—I believe that was his name—contacted to me at the San Bernardino air depot at San Bernardino and questioned me along these same lines, sir.

136. General RUSSELL. Do you know who pointed you out to him or suggested that he go to see you?

[2595] Mr. ZUCCA. No, sir, I don't.

137. General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

138. Major CLAUSEN. I have one more question, sir: Some of these times when you went up to the Biltmore Hotel Mr. Rohl would have different apartments, wouldn't he? I mean, change around from time to time?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, yes, sir.

139. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. That is all.

140. General GRUNERT. Any other questions?

141. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir.

142. General GRUNERT. Can you think of anything else that you may want to tell the Board that hasn't been brought up?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, sir.

143. General FRANK. When you would call for Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl at these night clubs and hotels, and so forth, were they always both of them perfectly sober?

Mr. ZUCCA. To my knowledge, yes, sir.

144. General FRANK. Do you know?

Mr. ZUCCA. Well, I would say that, as far as I knew, they were sober, yes, sir.

145. General FRANK. But do you really know?

Mr. ZUCCA. Pretty near. Well, I think I could tell a sober man. I mean, pretty hard to say that a person is drunk.

146. General FRANK. If he is not in the gutter?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, sir, I wouldn't say that.

147. General GRUNERT. How did Major Wyman treat you? Was he rough with you abrupt or dictatorial, or was he nice to work for, or what?

148. General FRANK. Was he considerate of you?

[2596] Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir, I would say that he was.

149. General FRANK. That he was what?

Mr. ZUCCA. Considerate of me, sir.

150. Major CLAUSEN. Well, he gave you extra money, didn't he, Mr. Zucca?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, sir.

151. Major CLAUSEN. Well, who was it gave you the tips? Mr. Rohl?

Mr. ZUCCA. I received a tip, I believe, on two different occasions from Mr. Sverdrup.

152. General GRUNERT. You mean four years and you just received two tips?

Mr. ZUCCA. Yes, sir.

153. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Rohl told the Tenney Committee his idea of a man being drunk was one who couldn't stand up any more. Is that your idea of the definition of drunk?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, sir.

154. Major CLAUSEN. Did he ever tell you that?

Mr. ZUCCA. No, sir.

155. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

156. General GRUNERT. There appear to be no more questions. Thank you for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 11:50 a. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

[2597]

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[2598] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1944.

FORT SHAFTER, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Tuesday, September 5, 1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL HENRY T. BURGIN, ARMY OF
THE UNITED STATES

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

General BURGIN. Henry T. Burgin; Major General, Army of the United States. My station is Fort Shafter, T. H., I presume.

2. General GRUNERT. General Burgin, the Board is after facts as to what happened prior to and during the attack on December 7. [2599] Because of your assigned duties at that time, we hope we can get some facts from you, and also probably get leads to others who have such facts. Now, the Board, with the hearings held in the last month or more, has pretty thoroughly developed the subject, so, instead of piling up evidence on facts already substantiated, I will attempt to bolster up some of them by skipping from question to question, much of which is as a background of the Roberts Commission's report. Then, after I get through with that, we can open up any subject that the Board Members desire to have opened up, and also give you an opportunity to introduce anything that may occur to you, as it might have value to the Board.

Now, according to the Roberts Commission testimony, you evidently believed that Short counted on the Navy for warning of a sea approach, through the sources of Navy scouting, and you stated that Short expressed himself forcibly that no enemy ships could get close enough to land a plane. Why this belief, do you know?

General BURGIN. It should be "launch a plane." I did not say "land a plane."

3. General GRUNERT. To "launch a plane"?

General BURGIN. Launch a plane from a carrier.

4. General GRUNERT. Did you concur with Short in that belief, or had you given the matter thought?

General BURGIN. I concurred in General Short's belief, and I got it from conversations with General Short and others. We had no means whatsoever, so far as the Army was concerned, of getting information. We had no surface ships. We did have some planes. It was my understanding that those planes of the [2600] Army operated under the Navy so far as scouting purposes went, patrol purposes. Those patrols were seen to go out every morning, come back late afternoon. I was never shown or didn't attempt to see what routes they took, where they went, or what sectors they covered, but in my mind, and I am sure, in that of General Short's, was the idea that the Navy was doing the scouting, and that from the Navy we would get our information, should the enemy approach.

5. General GRUNERT. But you never knew just what scouting the Navy was doing, if any?

General BURGIN. I never know positively, no, only I saw these scouting planes go out and come back. It was not my business and I didn't bother to look into it.

6. General GRUNERT. What were they—the Navy PBYS?

General BURGIN. A great many were Navy PBYS, some of them were Army bombers.

7. General GRUNERT. Tell me, first, just what did you command at that time?

General BURGIN. I commanded what was known at that time as the Coast Artillery Command, consisting of a seacoast artillery plus all the antiaircraft artillery in the Hawaiian Department.

8. General GRUNERT. What was the Fifty-Third Coast Artillery Brigade? What was that?

General BURGIN. That was antiaircraft artillery, composed of the Sixty-Fourth Regiment, the Two Hundred Fifty-First Regiment, and the Ninety-Eighth, which came in just before the attack, two or three months before.

9. General FRANK. A National Guard regiment?

[2601] General BURGIN. The Two Hundred Fifty-First was the only National Guard regiment.

10. General GRUNERT. Now, it appears that you had in that brigade a brigade SOP of November 26, 1941, which charged each unit with responsibility for its own security against air and ground forces, and with the maintenance of air guards and dispersion of personnel and matériel, and which provided for alarms for air attack. Now, was this in conformity with the Department SOP of November 5, or was that your own idea, or what?

General BURGIN. At this time, I don't recollect whether it exactly conformed to the Department SOP. I believe it did. In addition to that, the idea behind that particular paragraph is the same old idea that you have with an infantry company marching along the highways. They are cautioned to be ready to shoot, to disperse, and every man shoot at the plane, should they be attacked. The same idea was behind this—each individual unit to look after itself, in so far as strafing planes were concerned, and keep dispersed.

11. General GRUNERT. Was this both in post and while out?

General BURGIN. Everywhere, the idea behind it. That is followed even today in all these units. They are scattered as much as you can, dug into the ground, hidden.

12. General GRUNERT. How did that work out during the attack?

General BURGIN. I did not have a chance to check it, because we were not particularly attacked. They had one target to go after, which was Pearl Harbor, and they went after it. They did it, and did the strafing of airfields, serious strafing, but so far as my AA units, they were not attacked [2602] seriously. There were probably half a dozen men injured from attack during the whole day.

13. General GRUNERT. Under that SOP, which required each unit to take care of itself, did that include preparing the necessary air-raid shelters and the preparation of slit trenches, and all other requirements to ward off an air attack?

General BURGIN. I do not think that would be in that particular paragraph, but that is SOP to do that when you go out into a field position for battle, and the men actually did it without having to be told, when they went out.

14. General GRUNERT. In the various garrisons in which your troops were stationed, were such precautionary measures taken prior to December 7?

General BURGIN. You mean, were slit trenches made, and so forth? No, they were not.

15. General GRUNERT. Was that done, shortly after December 7?

General BURGIN. Immediately after, and during.

16. General GRUNERT. Now, there is a statement in your testimony, I believe, to the effect that you turned your anti-aircraft over to the Interceptor Command for drills, prior to December 7, and on that date, for action. Was the Interceptor Command then in being?

General BURGIN. The Interceptor Command was being organized. It was never in being and functioning, as it should have been. It was only a temporary measure; but that particular feature of Interceptor Command controlling AA fire was jealously guarded by the air people, and we had constant training and maneuvers, practice, where that particular thing [2603] was stressed, and the anti-aircraft was turned over to interceptor command.

17. General FRANK. On what date?

General BURGIN. A peculiar thing attaches to that. For at least six weeks or two months prior to December 7, we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy. Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions. They would know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this simulated attack made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to December 7.

18. General FRANK. On Sunday?

General BURGIN. On Sunday; but, by some stroke, we did not go out on December 7. The fleet was in the harbor.

The interceptor command never got into being actually as a bona fide interceptor command, for weeks after December 7; but we were practicing as an interceptor command, through General Davidson, all the time.

19. General GRUNERT. During these practices and exercises, did the thing work?

[2604] General BURGIN. It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming in, and immediately the interceptor command would take over. All that is, so far as turning it over to the interceptor command, is that the interceptor command tells you when to hold fire and when to resume fire. If he doesn't want you firing, he tells antiaircraft to hold fire, and under the orders we have to hold fire.

20. General GRUNERT. Now, suppose that the interceptor command as had been working during these drills and exercises, was in being on December 7, and had been working as it had been working during the drills and exercises: what difference would it have made in warding off the attack or in minimizing the effect of the attack, in your opinion?

General BURGIN. In my opinion, none.

21. General GRUNERT. Why not?

General BURGIN. Because we didn't have ammunition with our mobile antiaircraft. If they had been out in the field without any ammunition, they would have been worse off than they actually were.

22. General GRUNERT. That brings me to my next line of questioning.

What did you have out with your antiaircraft batteries such as existed on December 7th? Where were they? In what condition were they to go into action?

General BURGIN. They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries along the seacoast, those batteries bolted down to concrete, had the ammunition [2605] nearby. I had insisted on that with General Short in person and had gotten his permission to take this antiaircraft ammunition, move it into the seacoast gun battery positions, and have it nearby the antiaircraft guns. It was, however, boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out. The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which, you may know or may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter, up in the old volcano. The mobile batteries had to send there to get ammunition. In addition to that, the mobile batteries had to move out from the various posts to their field positions. They were not in field positions.

23. General GRUNERT. What proportion of mobile to fixed, approximately? Two to one? Three to one?

General BURGIN. I can give you that exact figure from some notes here.

24. General GRUNERT. I can probably refresh your memory by your saying—

General BURGIN. 26.

25. General GRUNERT. Location of 60 mobile and 26 fixed antiaircraft guns?

General BURGIN. Yes, 26 fixed guns and 60 mobile at the time of the attack.

26. General GRUNERT. And then there were 26 fixed antiaircraft guns which had the ammunition alongside and ready for action?

27. General FRANK. In boxes.

28. General GRUNERT. Was that ammunition for the fixed guns boxed or uncased?

General BURGIN. It was boxed.

[2606] 29. General GRUNERT. But how long approximately would it take to unbox it and get it into action?

General BURGIN. It depends on the batteries. Some of them had ammunition immediately available; that could be done in a very few minutes, four or five: they get enough ammunition out to begin firing, and continue to unbox. The batteries at Fort Weaver that is across the other side of Pearl Harbor, a little longer, because this ammunition was at Fort Kamehameha, had to be carried across the channel. But for the other fixed batteries I would say they could have been firing within five minutes, as far as the ammunition was concerned. They did begin firing; they went into action, three of those batteries. Three of those batteries got into action promptly.

30. General GRUNERT. They didn't get into action for the first wave of the attack, did they?

General BURGIN. That I don't know. These waves, I have never found anyone yet who could distinguish the difference in waves and how many waves actually came in here, as a matter of fact.

31. General GRUNERT. Did you have any information that was gotten out to the batteries in time for them to get into action before the attack actually struck?

General BURGIN. Oh, no; we knew nothing about the attack until the torpedoes dropped.

32. General GRUNERT. Then, you succeeded, through your own request, in getting boxed ammunition with your fixed antiaircraft batteries, which consisted of approximately 26 guns?

General BURGIN. Right.

33. General GRUNERT. But you were not successful or did you [2607] attempt to get ammunition to keep with your mobile batteries that could have gone into position with their ammunition without having to wait to draw it?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir, we did. I would like to answer that a little more elaborately. You may recollect yourself the great difficulty in prying loose ammunition from our storehouses and from the ordnance during peacetime. It was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out because in the minds of everyone who has preservation of ammunition at heart it goes out, gets damaged, comes back in, and has to be renovated. The same was especially true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the magazines. We tried the ordnance people without results. General Max Murray and myself went personally to General Short. General Murray pled for his ammunition for the field artillery. I asked for ammunition for the antiaircraft. We were put off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty of time, that we would have warning before any attack ever struck.

34. General FRANK. Was that putting off made directly by the Commanding General or by a staff department?

General BURGIN. Both; staff departments first, then the Commanding General in person.

35. General FRANK. Supported them?

General BURGIN. In his own office, to General Murray and to me.

36. General FRANK. Well, what were the staff departments who opposed it?

General BURGIN. The Gs; G-4s, the Ordnance.

[2608] 37. General FRANK. And their reasons were?

General BURGIN. Same old reason, that they didn't want to issue any of the clean ammunition, let it get out and get dirty, have to take it back in later on and renovate it; and, besides, we would get our ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise.

38. General GRUNERT. Then it was just a question of maintenance and preservation. Did the question of possible sabotage come into it; do you know?

General BURGIN. That is quite true; the sabotage was foremost in everybody's mind. As long as the ammunition could be left locked up in the magazines, it was pretty safely guarded and could not be tampered with to any great extent.

39. General GRUNERT. Still, you being on an outpost here, with some intimation, at least, of the imminence of an attack, the guns were no good without ammunition?

General BURGIN. Quite true, sir.

40. General GRUNERT. And, therefore, what warning in the matter of time did you figure you should have in order to get your guns in position and your ammunition there with the guns to fire? Had that been practiced?

General BURGIN. We had many, many practices and tested that out, and it varied from the battery's position, where it started to where it wound up, and other things, but six hours was considered to be the maximum.

41. General GRUNERT. Six hours.

General BURGIN. Day and night. We went out daytime and we went out nighttime.

42. General GRUNERT. You actually took the live ammunition [2609] out there to practice handling it?

General BURGIN. No.

43. General GRUNERT. And to practice taking it out there?

General BURGIN. No, I never took live ammunition on any practices. That was done once. I can't say this for a fact, though, because I don't know. I was only told it was done before I came here, at one time. The ammunition was taken out. There was a flurry and a scare, and then there was all hell to pay when the ammunition came back in and had to be cleaned up, put back in the ordnance magazine. That, however, is not my personal knowledge.

44. General GRUNERT. Was there any question in your mind as to the ammunition not being put out there because it might alarm the public or indicate the intent of what was about to happen?

General BURGIN. The idea never occurred to me at the time. Looking back at the message General Short had, not to alarm the public, there is a possibility that was in his mind. I couldn't alarm the public in this way: to move one of these batteries out to take the position in a private field was practically impossible prior to December 7th. As soon as you got off the highway, the owner, the manager, the top-side man, all ran onto General Short's neck: The Army is trespassing

on their land. Get to hell out of there. You had to do all these maneuvers on Army land or on the highways.

45. General GRUNERT. All right. Now, how many of the mobile positions for the 60 mobile guns were on such private land that you had to trespass to put them in position? Do you recall that?

[2610] General BURGIN. I can look here and refer to this bulletin.

46. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

The actual number doesn't make so much difference. I would like to have an idea of what the percentage is, if possible.

General BURGIN. About 40 percent were on private land.

47. General GRUNERT. And the other 60 percent, then, could have been put in position without going on private land?

General BURGIN. Wait a minute. I have included those fixed batteries. Make that higher. That percentage, at least 50 percent of the mobile batteries were on private land.

[2611] 48. General GRUNERT. I believe General Short stated something to the effect that under Alert No. 1 each battery had a skeleton crew with it. Would that refer to the fixed batteries or to the mobile or to both?

General BURGIN. It referred to both as far as sabotage meant only.

49. General GRUNERT. But your mobile batteries had to move out from their location to go into a position, and then none of these mobiles went out in their position, and they had skeleton crews?

General BURGIN. I don't quite understand your question. I am sorry.

50. General GRUNERT. Here, your fixed batteries are fixed and they undoubtedly had a skeleton crew there to prevent sabotage.

General BURGIN. Right.

51. General GRUNERT. In other words, your skeleton crews to prevent sabotage came in, as far as your mobile batteries are concerned, as if they were at the post and had not moved out into position?

General BURGIN. They were taken more or less as a regiment or a battalion on the post and the sabotage guards did not necessarily go down to the battery itself.

52. General GRUNERT. There was not, then, much of a sabotage problem as far as guards were concerned, within the post itself?

General BURGIN. No, sir.

53. General GRUNERT. You may have answered this, but I will ask it again: What instructions, if any, prevented the antiaircraft command from having ammunition at the guns? Were [2612] there any instructions or could you not get the ammunition?

General BURGIN. There were no instructions forbidding the anti-aircraft or any other outfit from having the ammunition, but it was just impossible to pry the ammunition loose from the Ordnance, the G-4's, or from General Short himself.

54. General GRUNERT. Now, in February of 1941, Admiral Kimmel pointed out the critical inadequacy of antiaircraft guns. Were you here at that time, in February of 1941?

General BURGIN. No, sir. I came in August of 1941.

55. General GRUNERT. Since August, 1941, what improvement in the line of antiaircraft gun equipment took place, up to December, 1941?

General BURGIN. Up to December 1941?

56. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General BURGIN. No improvement in actual equipment, with the bare exception of about 20 37-mm. guns that arrived. However, there were more in training than were actually in use, because of no ammunition for them up to just a day or two of December 7th.

57. General GRUNERT. And they were 37s?

General BURGIN. 37 mm.

58. General GRUNERT. How did you consider your command prepared for action with what you had? Was it adequate, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory, and what explanation is there for your answer?

General BURGIN. With what we had we were prepared for action, with the one exception that our mobile antiaircraft did not have its ammunition. I have already explained the reason for that. So far as the equipment was concerned, it was [2513] as modern as the U. S. had at the time, with the bare exception, perhaps, that we had 37-mm. automatic weapons, yes, whereas they were using the 40-mm. Bofors and other aeriels.

59. General GRUNERT. Did you have any 90s?

General BURGIN. We had no 90s whatever at the time.

60. General GRUNERT. What was the status of their being supplied to the Army at that time, do you know?

General BURGIN. It was reported that there was an automatic supply and we would get them when they had them.

61. General GRUNERT. Do you know what priority you were on as compared with other commands at that time?

General BURGIN. No, I do not. The 90s came along fairly well after December 7th. We are equipped now with 90s and 120s; no 3s whatsoever. In fact, all the equipment we had on December 7th has been discarded, with the exception of the .50 caliber machine guns.

62. General GRUNERT. On December 7th, then, did you have practically your full allowance, as per tables, of the weapons that were prescribed for you at that time?

General BURGIN. No. We had the full allowance of guns, but did not have the allowance of automatic weapons.

63. General GRUNERT. Mainly what?

General BURGIN. Mainly the 37 mm. or the 40. You might say we had none of them because we had just received a shipment of 20, I think, but no ammunition. We were way short on .50 caliber machine guns. We had only about 40 per cent of our allowance. We had supplemented them with .30 caliber, however.

64. General GRUNERT. Have you anything else to add to the anti-aircraft situation picture that you think would help the [2614] Board?

General BURGIN. I think not, sir. The whole thing sums up in about this: We practiced making a quick get-away from central locations to field positions. We felt that we could get into field positions after the warning which we expected to receive.

65. General GRUNERT. Had you been alerted in what the SOP of November 5th describes as Alert No. 2, which is an alert to ward off an air attack, plus an alert against sabotage, then what condition would you have been in?

General BURGIN. The batteries would all have been in their field positions with the ammunition open ready at the guns.

66. General GRUNERT. Then it all boils down to your not being in the alert which required you to be ready for any eventuality, is that right?

General BURGIN. That is correct.

67. General GRUNERT. Now, a question as to your distribution of batteries. Was there an antiaircraft battery assigned to Ford Island or to cover Ford Island in its fire?

General BURGIN. Yes. Practically all the batteries surrounding Pearl Harbor were a protection to Ford Island. There was, in addition, a battery listed for actual position on Ford Island. It was later put in there.

68. General GRUNERT. How much of this fixed stuff was in the scheme of covering Ford Island, how much of a fixed antiaircraft battery?

General BURGIN. There were only three which you might consider in that category, unless your attacking planes came [2615] along the shoreline, from Diamond Head; then they could all be in that category, because they can shoot at the planes before they reach Ford Island.

69. General GRUNERT. Then, what you might call the main antiaircraft protection of Ford Island consisted of your mobile batteries, which had to take position before they could afford that protection?

General BURGIN. That is correct.

70. General GRUNERT. Was there ever a scheme made up of having these people dispersing your mobile batteries so as to get them into assigned positions more quickly than they could get into them from their concentrated locations?

General BURGIN. No. They were dispersed pretty well as it was, with one outfit at Shafter, one at Schofield Barracks, one at Camp Malekoli; three regiments, three areas. The regiments were assigned to field positions nearest to their locations.

71. General GRUNERT. I have one question here that refers to your testimony before the Roberts Commission, to the effect that you never knew when the fleet was coming in except when practicing, and you stated that such knowledge would have helped the defense. Was that information ever requested, if it was going to be of help to you in the defense? Was an attempt ever made to find out when the fleet was coming in?

General BURGIN. I would like you to read that answer to me again, that I am supposed to have given before the Roberts Commission.

72. General GRUNERT. This is what this says: "General Burgin never knew when the fleet was coming in, except when practicing. [2616] He stated such knowledge would have helped defense." Just what was the exact wording is I do not know. This is a summarization of such evidence.

General BURGIN. The last line there is what I take exception to, that it would help defense. I call your attention to the fact that we were not defending Pearl Harbor prior to Pearl Harbor. We were in a state of peace, not in a state of war. The practices prior to December 7th were the only instances in which I was personally told that the fleet was coming in between certain hours and carrier-based planes would make a simulated attack on us and we would oppose them with simulated opposition. We had at Pearl Harbor a harbor entrance

control post, where one of my officers sat with the Navy, but this officer was given very little information, except when we were maneuvering or practicing tactical situations. In the ordinary course of events, the fleet went in and out without any indication whatsoever to me, at least, and it is my opinion that no information was given to General Short. That I do not know.

73. General GRUNERT. I understood from former testimony that your control officer or the officer at the harbor entrance control post was only there periodically and not on a 24-hour basis, is that right.

General BURGIN. That is true, up to December 7th; he was there on a daylight basis, you might say.

74. General FRANK. What good did it do you to have him there at all?

General BURGIN. Practically none, except practice, tactical situations, so if such things developed we could quickly take care of the harbor entrance control.

[2617] 75. General FRANK. It did not give you any intelligent information as to the location of our own fleet units?

General BURGIN. Absolutely not.

76. General GRUNERT. The testimony before the Roberts Commission also appears to show you stated that you expected Alert No. 2 to follow almost immediately after Alert No. 1. What was the basis of that? What was back in your mind there?

General BURGIN. An actual statement by the Chief of Staff to that effect. When I got the orders to go into Alert No. 1, I put it into effect, checked here and there to see that it had gone into effect, that the guards were out. Then I made a trip to the Commanding General's office, General Short's office. I asked the Chief of Staff if he would mind telling me the reason for Alert No. 1. He showed me the radio that had come from General Marshall and stated "We will go into Alert No. 1; then we will slide immediately to Alert No. 2, and then to No. 3."

77. General GRUNERT. That was on November 27th, then?

General BURGIN. As I recall, it was, it was November 27th.

78. General GRUNERT. But up to December 7th you had not slid into Alert No. 2, had you?

General BURGIN. No, sir, there was no change in the alert. We had done many, many other things guarding against sabotage, sending guns and troops to Canton and Christmas, as I recollect, but we had not changed our alert status.

79. General GRUNERT. Then you actually saw and read the Chief of Staff's message on November 27th, 1941?

General BURGIN. I did.

80. General GRUNERT. Did that give you any idea to suspect [2618] that Alert No. 2 would be called soon, or the necessity for any other alert outside of Alert No. 1? In other words, how did you size up that message?

General BURGIN. It is easy enough from hindsight to say you would have gone into another alert, but it did strike me we were a little backwards; that we should have gone into Alert No. 3, gone all-out, in spite of the fact it would turn the whole town upside down if we had.

81. General GRUNERT. That is one of the questions I want to ask. In what way was that turning upside down going to affect things, outside of what you have testified to, going on private property?

General BURGIN. That is true.

82. General GRUNERT. In what way would you have turned things upside down, if you had gone into Alert No. 3?

General BURGIN. That would have been the main thing, getting your batteries into position, combating the opposition that would have taken place and the excitement we expected to cause among the local Japanese.

83. General GRUNERT. Before we get off into another trend of thought, there must have been in your mind some question about the adequacy of Alert No. 1, since you went to the Commanding General and questioned him about it; and from your testimony it appears that he had some idea of following it up with Alert No. 2. But what gave you the idea that Alert No. 2 might follow Alert No. 1, unless you considered No. 1 inadequate?

General BURGIN. I did consider No. 1 as being inadequate, but I did not voice that idea to General Short or his Chief of Staff. On the other hand, I considered seriously that radio [2619] that had come in to General Short, and wondered what I would do in his position, that he would not unduly excite, or words to that effect, the public.

84. General FRANK. Do you remember the wording of that radiogram?

85. General GRUNERT. General Frank will read you the radiogram, in order that you may refresh your memory on it, and I think the Board would then like to ask you a few questions about it.

General BURGIN. All right.

86. General FRANK (reading):

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.

General BURGIN. Now, wait a minute. That is not the radio I saw.

87. General GRUNERT. Go ahead and finish it and then we will ask you about it.

88. General FRANK (continuing):

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat not, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

[2620] That is signed "Marshall."

89. General GRUNERT. That was the Chief of Staff's message of November 27th. That apparently does not ring the bell on you?

General BURGIN. That does not ring the bell to me. That was not the message I read. It had a great many similar phrases in it.

90. General FRANK. Are you sure that you saw the original message. that you did not see a digest of it?

General BURGIN. I could not answer that. I am not sure. It was signed "Marshall" and it was to General Short. It had nothing about the Rainbow plan in it, for example, and while it said "The United States" this message said "The President".

91. General FRANK. This is the only message that was so signed "Marshall" on that date.

92. General GRUNERT. And that is the only message that the Board has been able to find of that date. Do you think there is a similar message?

General BURGIN. I certainly do.

93. General GRUNERT. Could it have been paraphrased and you be given the wrong conception of it?

General BURGIN. It is possible, but I don't think so.

94. General GRUNERT. Do you think possibly the last three years may have done something to your memory? You seem to be pretty certain. What cements that idea in your mind?

General BURGIN. I don't think so.

95. General FRANK. What was the substance of the message you saw?

General BURGIN. All right, I will give it to you just as [2621] my mind recalls it. "Diplomatic relations with Japan have broken down completely. Hostilities may be expected at any time. You will take the necessary action. The President desires that Japan shall commit the first overt act. The President desires that nothing be done to unduly excite the public." Then I think the rest of it was "Report action taken", or words to that effect. That is what sticks in my mind as the message that I read.

96. General GRUNERT. Then you do not recall this particular part of any message that you then read, "This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense"?

General BURGIN. I do not. I have no recollection of any such paragraph in it.

97. General GRUNERT. Had you received a message with that wording in it would you have considered action just for a sabotage alert as restricting your defense?

General BURGIN. I would, yes, sir.

98. General GRUNERT. We will go back to that subject again, later, when we get some copies of other messages.

General FRANK. You stated a little while ago that as a result of the message you had received there was some question as to action, in answering the question as to what kind of an alert you in person would have directed. From what you said it leads me to ask you this question: In your mind did the wording of this message put you in a quandary as to just what was expected of you?

General BURGIN. No, I cannot say that.

99. General FRANK. Do you think it put General Short in a [2622] quandary?

General BURGIN. That is hard to say.

100. General FRANK. If you had received this message what do you think you would have done?

General BURGIN. I think I would have gone out into Alert No. 3.

101. General FRANK. Why?

General BURGIN. Because I believe in doing the maximum rather than doing it by dribbles.

102. General FRANK. Would going into Alert No. 3 have handicapped your training, as far as your training is concerned?

General BURGIN. No, sir. It would help my training, train right into position.

103. General GRUNERT. Of course, your viewpoint at the time was that of the Coast Artillery Command, plus the Antiaircraft Command, and not the viewpoint of the top commander?

General BURGIN. Absolutely.

104. General GRUNERT. Let us get down to this series of questions: Were conferences held by the Commanding General or his Chief of Staff with the principal commanders, wherein they were kept informed of the situation, and in turn they would inform the Commanding General of the measures taken by them to meet such situation?

General BURGIN. No, sir, there were no conferences, at least while I was there.

105. General GRUNERT. Did you ever hear of a message received by the Navy on November 27th which started out "Consider this a war warning"?

General BURGIN. No, I never did.

[2623] 106. General GRUNERT. Just what did you know about the tenseness of the existing situation from late in November until the attack took place?

General BURGIN. Nothing officially, only what was in the papers and what you would glean at dinner parties and other places.

107. General GRUNERT. Then there was never a discussion, as far as you know, between the top commander and his principal commanders—and you were one of them—as to the tenseness of the situation, as to the information received from the Navy concerning that tenseness?

General BURGIN. No, sir, there never was.

108. General GRUNERT. Were you called into discussion on this message received from the Chief of Staff as to what measures should be taken thereunder?

General BURGIN. I was not.

109. General GRUNERT. Then the decision to go into Alert No. 1 was made without your advice or consultation?

General BURGIN. Correct, yes, sir.

110. General GRUNERT. If you did not consider Alert No. 1 as adequate, did you feel that you could go to the Commanding General and say "See here, I don't think this is adequate to give me a chance to do my particular job in defense"? Did that occur to you?

General BURGIN. That did occur and that could have been done at any time and might have been done had the attack not come quite so soon. All I was after was to get my ammunition; that was the main point, and I had already been there once on that. [2624] However, if we had had our ammunition and been in field position it would not have stopped that attack. It might have deranged it a bit, but the results would have been serious just the same.

111. General GRUNERT. The Board has had previous testimony as to Saturday conferences held. Were they conferences between commanders or staff commanders, or do you know anything about such conferences?

General BURGIN. I do not, no, sir. In my whole four months, August 7th to December 7th, I was called once to a Commanding General's conference, one time. At that conference there were minor subjects discussed; never anything along this line whatsoever.

112. General FRANK. Were you here when General Herron was here?

General BURGIN. No.

113. General FRANK. Were you familiar with the weekly conferences that he held with his people? Did you ever hear about them?

General BURGIN. Never did. General Herron had gone some time before I arrived.

114. General GRUNERT. Who was Chief of Staff while you were here?

General BURGIN. Colonel Phillips.

115. General GRUNERT. Colonel Phillips?

General BURGIN. His initials I do not know.

116. General GRUNERT. Did you have a chance to size him up as to his capability or efficiency?

General BURGIN. Yes, only casually.

[2625] 117. General GRUNERT. What did you think of him as Chief of Staff?

General BURGIN. That is a pretty tough question, but I will answer it. Normally he was looked upon as one of General Short's fair-haired boys, and he carried things with a pretty high hand.

118. General GRUNERT. But he never called, so far as you know, the commanders of the lower echelon in conference to discuss what was in General Short's mind, or to seek advice from them as to decisions to be made?

General BURGIN. No, sir, he did not. At least, I was never called, and I was next in command or next in rank to General Short.

119. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything about conferences held between the Army and the Navy and the cooperation between the Army and the Navy?

General BURGIN. No, sir, I do not.

120. General GRUNERT. Did you ever have occasion for such cooperative action or any reason for cooperation with the Navy?

General BURGIN. I went down and made my acquaintance with Admiral Bloch, who at that time was Naval District Commander. Through him we worked up this harbor control idea, where I put an Army officer in there with the Navy to work up the organization and functioning of a bona fide harbor entrance control plan.

[2626] 121. General FRANK. You gave one answer to General Grunert's question on Phillips. What was the concensus on Phillips' efficiency and effectiveness?

General BURGIN. It never occurred to me that he was extremely efficient, or otherwise—the average, run-of-the-mine.

122. General FRANK. How did he get along with his subordinate commands?

General BURGIN. I don't know; got along all right with mine, because I was fairly senior and ran my own command. I didn't know Phillips well and personally. I met him at various dinner parties and other things.

123. General FRANK. Would you have selected him as chief of staff?

General BURGIN. No, because I didn't know him.

124. General GRUNERT. Did you make up the plan for antiaircraft defense of Oahu?

General BURGIN. Yes; I sat in with my staff and helped work it up.

125. General GRUNERT. Did that defense include the equipment of the District and of the fleet when in harbor in a concerted whole for antiaircraft defense?

General BURGIN. Not prior to December 7.

126. General GRUNERT. Was it veering toward that, or did you expect to see it remain separate, if an attack had not occurred?

General BURGIN. There had been very little planning done along that line prior to December 7, but we soon saw that with various elements of the fleet always in the harbor they should be tied into our antiaircraft command, and the [2627] problem was attacked and worked out, whereas fleet units in the harbor had come under what was then the interceptor commander, now the air defense command. Still, the Navy reserves for each ship the right to decide for themselves whether they shall fire or not, so it is really not worth very much even under its present condition. The captain of the ship is still given the last say, which I think he rightly should have, whether he should shoot or not. It is the preservation of his ship.

127. General GRUNERT. General Russell.

128. General RUSSELL. In discussing the factors which should have been considered in going into Alert 2 or Alert 3, you used language, General, about the "opposition which you would have had to combat." I was wondering just what you meant by that language.

General BURGIN. I wonder if you can find that in your notes. Repeat your question to me, will you?

129. General RUSSELL. You were replying to a question from General Grunert, and in that reply you used language about "combatting opposition," and then I paraphrased the other—opposition which would have been provoked by Alert 2 or Alert 3. All of that language about combatting opposition was quite new.

General BURGIN. What I meant by that was the opposition, the annoyance we would have received from owners of land, and other facilities, when we took them over. We would have had to have gone with these batteries and other units, mobile outfits, trucks, tractors, out into the canefields and other fields, and all the lawyers in town would have been on our [2628] necks in a very short time. We had all that to consider, if we were to comply with the directive as I read it, to not unduly excite the public.

130. General RUSSELL. Is it true, therefore, General, that prior to December 7, 1941, so far as you recall, you had never had all of your mobile batteries in the positions which they were to occupy in the event of hostilities?

General BURGIN. That is correct; they had not all been in the actual position they were to go in.

131. General FRANK. Was that because of this opposition of the people who owned the land?

General BURGIN. Yes, and the fact that we had not yet gotten the leases all fixed up, so that we could move into those positions for practice.

132. General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, therefore, the action which would have been required under Alert 3 had never been taken on this island?

General BURGIN. In so far as the guns going actually in positions, digging their revetments, putting in their bunkers, that had never been done, so far as the mobile, in all their positions; in some, it had.

133. General RUSSELL. Elsewhere in your testimony you referred to "turning the town up-side-down," or language similar its meaning to that.

General BURGIN. I see I will have to curb my language.

134. General RUSSELL. No, we are just attempting to get at the thought behind the language. We are not interested in the language. Do you think that going all-out on Alert No. 3 would have resulted in disturbing the people of the City [2629] of Honolulu?

General BURGIN. I do.

135. General RUSSELL. Is there in your mind some thought that there would have been developed a considerable opposition among the influential civilian population here on the island toward the results of Alert No. 3?

General BURGIN. I think there is no doubt about it, in the world.

136. General RUSSELL. In other words, if General Short had ordered Alert No. 3—and I am asking this question in the interest of clarity—if General Short had ordered Alert No. 3 and thrown all of his people into readiness for immediate combat, including the issuing of ammunition, it might, or, in your opinion, it would have provoked opposition on the part of some of the responsible and influential civilian population here on the island?

General BURGIN. I feel positive it would.

137. General GRUNERT. Even though he might have explained that to the influential citizens, there would still have been opposition?

General BURGIN. I don't believe you could have explained it, at that time.

138. General GRUNERT. Who are some of those influential citizens that you think might have voiced their objection?

General BURGIN. Oh, my!

139. General GRUNERT. Is Dillingham one of them?

General BURGIN. Mr. Dillingham, Mr. Walker.

140. General FRANK. Which Walker?

General BURGIN. I don't know. He is a sugar man. General Wells.

[2630] 141. General GRUNERT. General Wells is what?

General BURGIN. General Wells is with the sugar people, a manager of some kind.

142. General FRANK. The Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association.

General BURGIN. He was instrumental in fighting the sugar people's battles quite strongly prior to the war, and even yet, so far as I know.

143. General GRUNERT. How about Petrie? Is he one of them?

General BURGIN. No, I don't think so. What was the governor's name, at that time?

144. General GRUNERT. Poindexter?

General BURGIN. Poindexter—right. Mr. Spaulding.

145. General GRUNERT. Who are known here as the "Big Five"? I believe I have heard that term.

General BURGIN. I don't know.

146. General GRUNERT. These so-called "big, influential people" have mostly land and crop interests, have they, where Alert No. 3 might interfere with or disrupt them?

General BURGIN. That was my idea. That's my idea; yes, sir.

147. General RUSSELL. I want to ask another question in line with this, General. I have gotten the impression from your testimony that the possibility of this opposition might have had a little bit deeper basis than indicated by your answer to General Grunert's last question, which rather limited this opposition to the land owners because of disturbing their profits, and whatnot. I had gotten the impression that we would have opposition from influential people on the island, because they did not want the community upset, and the [2631] relation between the races disturbed and their commercial trends broken into. Was that behind this opposition, too?

General BURGIN. It might have been; I don't know much about that feature of it. I don't see how it would have any bearing on the races, except perhaps the Japanese, they could see we were doing something, and those who wanted to try to get information back to their own country would have that opportunity. That had nothing to do with it in this case, so far as I can see.

148. General RUSSELL. Going away from that for the minute, you have given considerable testimony about the weapons available to you as antiaircraft commander. We have had testimony to the effect that, first, the weapons available for the protection of Pearl Harbor, of the smaller caliber, were not numerous enough, and were ineffective. What is your opinion on that?

General BURGIN. They were certainly not numerous enough. They were, however, about as effective as any weapons we had at that time, except for a few experimental models. For example, we had the 3-inch gun, a pretty good old gun in its day. The 90-mm. had hardly come into play up to that time to any great extent; there were some manufactured, some in use, on the mainland. There had been built 12 experimental model 105-mm. They were all sent to Panama, and were on duty down there. They never panned out well, and were discarded; but so far as our heavy equipment, it was pretty good for its day.

149. General RUSSELL. Did you observe the firing of the batteries in and near Pearl Harbor against the high-altitude Japanese bombers?

General BURGIN. Yes.

[2632] 150. General RUSSELL. What was your impression of that fire?

General BURGIN. Those bombers never reached any great altitude. As far as I could tell they were never over 11,000 feet, any of them. Any gun we had would reach that, even the old Navy 5-inch, which isn't a very good gun, either; at the time; very low muzzle velocity, very slow fire; also defective ammunition. That is the Navy 5-inch, their main weapon.

151. General RUSSELL. The fire against these bombers flying at approximately 10,000 feet has been described in testimony elsewhere as

ineffective, because the bursts were below, and frequently to the rear of the targets. Were you impressed that that was true?

General BURGIN. It didn't occur to me at the time, except that in any antiaircraft fire, you may have observed, yourself, the great percentage of bursts is behind the target, even in practice, even in battle. There are two reasons for that; the first is your deceptive appearance. The burst occurs there, the plane goes ahead, but before that burst is big enough for your eye to see it, the plane has traveled considerably, so your burst is not so far behind as it would appear to be. The other reason is our training; we are always trained on a comparatively slow-moving target. We get out on an actual plane, it is going at least twice as fast as any target you ever shot at, and it takes a few rounds at least to get your bursts up in the lead; but so far as your bursts being late, that wasn't observable to me to any great extent. It was certainly not due to the fact that the guns would not reach 10,000 feet. Every gun we had would reach that—17,000 feet. The same, with the Navy 5-inch. Just what their maximum height is, I don't know, but it is certainly beyond 17,000 feet.

[2633] 152. General FRANK. The question of shooting ahead or behind is a question of training and practice, is that right?

General BURGIN. That's my idea of it, yes.

153. General GRUNERT. I would like, before you leave that subject, to ask you about the Navy 5-inch ammunition. You say some of it was defective?

General BURGIN. A great deal of it was defective, and "duds." Unfortunately, the "duds" detonated on contact with the ground. They were not really "duds," so far as contact with any material object was concerned. However, they did not burst in the air. They burst all over town. They burst all over De Russy, where I was. I saw them burst two of them up in the crater on Diamond Head, knocking out one of my mortars. That 5-inch ammunition was falling all over the island. A great many people thought they were Japanese bombs, but only one bomb hit the town of Honolulu, and I think that was an accident. All the rest of them were Navy 5-inch shells.

154. General GRUNERT. How do you know that to be a fact?

General BURGIN. I went out and dug up the fragments and looked at the markings on them. I know they were Navy shells; and so does the Navy.

155. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not the Army was blamed for that damage? Do you know whether or not the Army was accused of having poor ammunition, and that they thought it was the Army ammunition that did that?

General BURGIN. I never heard of that.

156. General GRUNERT. All right. Go ahead. I just wanted to get that clear.

157. General RUSSELL. General, I am jumping about, because I [2634] just made a note here and there.

General BURGIN. Go ahead.

158. General RUSSELL. A great deal has been said about the interceptor command, whether or not it was in operation, and so forth.

General BURGIN. Yes, sir.

159. General RUSSELL. As I recall your testimony, it was to the effect that when the interceptor command was organized and operat-

ing, its only effect on you would be to tell you when to shoot and when not to shoot?

General BURGIN. That is practically correct.

160. General RUSSELL. There is nothing so very difficult and intricate about the interceptor command?

General BURGIN. Not a thing.

161. General RUSSELL. And this man, Davidson, had been designated a considerable time before December 7 as the interceptor commander, or had been named as the man who was going to organize that and exercise the command over it?

General BURGIN. Right.

162. General RUSSELL. In the exercises which had been held prior to December 7, 1941, the interceptor command had been in action?

General BURGIN. In a minor way.

163. General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, its operation was essentially minor, any way?

General BURGIN. Absolutely, up till well after December 7. I might elaborate on that, to give you my ideas. The whole scheme of things there was in embryo, you might say. These warning radars, you heard a lot about, were just being installed. [2635] They go in as part of the interceptor command. They were not complete in any manner of means. The Signal Corps was putting them in. They had no permanent home for interceptor command, and when I remarked a moment ago it was simple, it is simple enough in operation, but it is complicated as everything, for installation, equipment, and funds. They operated under General Davidson in a temporary shack on the Fort Shafter Reservation down here in the hollow. At the same time, the real interceptor command, which is now the Air Defense Command, was being dug in a hillside up above Fort Shafter, where it is now located—a million dollars' worth of stuff in there; so when I said it is simple, I don't mean simple in equipment and operation, but in control of the antiaircraft—extremely simple; nothing to do except to tell you when you can shoot and when you can't; but the interceptor command in itself is an enormous, complicated machine. You ought to look at it while you are here.

164. General RUSSELL. I hope to. It was new throughout the Army, in 1941?

General BURGIN. Incidentally, we do not call it the "interceptor command" any more. It went through several stages, called a "fighter command," and now it is called the Air Defense Command.

165. General RUSSELL. All right. Another disassociated subject: What percentage of your troops were with the fixed batteries on the morning of December 7?

General BURGIN. I would say about a third of them. We had a very small number of troops, however, in the fixed defenses, a total of 101 officers and 2,712 men.

166. General RUSSELL. How many were actually out with the [2636] batteries on duty, on that morning of December 7? What percentage?

General BURGIN. None of them, except the guard skeleton.

However, they were right at the batteries. They were manned in a very few minutes.

167. General RUSSELL. Some confusion seems to have grown up in my mind about your ammunition, about the status of your ammunition. You had your ammunition, on December 7, you did not have to go to ordnance to get it?

General BURGIN. No, you are wrong. I had the ammunition for seacoast artillery at the guns, in the magazine. I had the ammunition for the six fixed antiaircraft. We had that ammunition in the seacoast magazine. I didn't have the ammunition for the mobile anti-aircraft's 3-inch guns.

168. General RUSSELL. A moment ago, you referred to the table when you were discussing the personnel available to you on December 7. What percentage of your table strength had been given you on December 7?

General BURGIN. We were pretty well below strength. The percentage, I can't give you, but, all in all, we were short 900 or 1,000 men.

169. General RUSSELL. And you had how many—2,700, on this day?

General BURGIN. Well, that is seacoast, alone. You have got to remember, I have got two commands—antiaircraft and the seacoast.

170. General RUSSELL. You were short 900 on both commands?

General BURGIN. In the two commands combined; yes.

171. General RUSSELL. And in the two commands combined, could [2637] you give us quickly, there, what the table strength was?

General BURGIN. No, I haven't got it, I am sorry. I can get it for you very easily.

172. General GRUNERT. Approximately 20,000?

General BURGIN. No, no, no; I didn't have that many—probably about 13,000 or 14,000, total.

173. General GRUNERT. And that is just about 10 percent short?

General BURGIN. Yes.

174. General RUSSELL. General, is it true, or not, that in 1941 the plans for defense against attack by aircraft were in a state of flux or changing constantly?

General BURGIN. Quite true; and they are changing, yet.

175. General RUSSELL. As a result of the experiences on December 7, and other experiences, has the Army in its operations here in the island increased to any considerable extent the number of antiaircraft weapons?

General BURGIN. That fluctuates extremely, but at one time they increased enormously, they were a way up. Those have gone out in the middle and west Pacific, however. We are back now in the number of guns to about where we were on December 7. However, we have got a much better gun.

176. General RUSSELL. Do you think that the reduction in the number of guns, which has been accomplished in the recent past, results from the fact that there is no great probability of any further Japanese attacks, here?

General BURGIN. No, you are wrong. That has been discussed with General Richardson, time and time again. He and I both feel that we are yet subject to attack, that as long as the Japanese have a carrier afloat she can risk one or two or [2638] more, she can get in here; and all the navies in the world won't keep her out, if she wants to get here. That has nothing to do with the number of guns.

177. General RUSSELL. It has been reduced, then, simply because the people who are charged with responsibility for making the decision

believe that the number of guns which you have here now are adequate for the protection of the island?

[2639] General BURGIN. That is correct. I have so stated to General Richardson, and he agreed with me. He had established as a minimum the number that we have now.

178. General RUSSELL. Are you on any form of alert now? If so, what is the type?

General BURGIN. We are on a five-minute alert. We can get to the battery in five minutes.

179. General RUSSELL. That is neither 1, 2, or 3, the old type of alert, is it?

General BURGIN. That has gone out.

180. General RUSSELL. What is it? A cross between 2 and 3, or more nearly 2, or what?

General BURGIN. Well, more nearly 3 all the time. We have had since December 7th the men in the camps right at the guns, and they can get there as quick as you can sound an alarm, almost.

181. General RUSSELL. General, I am not sure that the record is clear between you and me on our recent questions you were asked.

General BURGIN. I am not either.

182. General RUSSELL. You don't seem to answer my questions.

General BURGIN. I try to.

183. General RUSSELL. And I don't seem to understand your answers.

General BURGIN. I try to.

184. General RUSSELL. Something is wrong.

I am attempting to develop whether or not it is the sense of the commanders here on the Island now that they have adequate weapons for the protection or for the accomplishment [2640] of their mission against aircraft raids.

General BURGIN. All right. I will answer you yes. Now, you have got to qualify that when you say "adequate protection." If you were left here with everything you could get, with all the influences of the world to help, you would probably take more; but when General Marshall tells you that with the manpower shortage and everything else you have got to scrape the bottom from here and there to provide your fighting force out in the Pacific, you have got to balance one against the other and come to a decision. General Richardson has said the minimum antiaircraft which below we shall not go, and he feels and I feel that under the circumstances that is adequate.

185. General RUSSELL. And you have gotten to that number?

General BURGIN. And we have not yet quite reached that minimum. We are above it.

186. General RUSSELL. How does that compare now with the number of weapons that you had available on December 7, 1941?

General BURGIN. The big guns, as I stated, are approximately the same. The gun is much better and probably ten times as effective as the equipment we had December 7, 1941. The defense around Pearl Harbor is stronger than anything that has ever been put up in Europe anywhere.

187. General RUSSELL. The smaller caliber guns, how does that compare now with December 7, 1941?

General BURGIN. Much more. We have got our full complement, 20 batteries.

188. General RUSSELL. In answer to one of General Grunert's questions you said, had you been in position with your ammunition ready to fire on December 7, that you might have [2641] affected the Japanese flights in some way. I believe you used the term, you might have broken it up to an extent, or words to that effect, but you would not have been able to have prevented the damage which they did here.

Assuming that the antiaircraft fire had been reinforced by the aircraft, are you in position to know what effect the two operating in conjunction would have had on the Japanese attack?

General BURGIN. I think your answer is as good as mine on that. We did have some aircraft that was operative; how many, I don't know. Personally I didn't see any, but there were a few fighters got into the air. The full force of fighters would have no doubt—well, we could have done much more effective operation than they did. The same as our antiaircraft; we probably could have broken up some of their formations, prevented some of the damage; but you never have enough antiaircraft to prevent an air attack. Just can't be done.

189. General RUSSELL. A little while ago you also stated that it was impossible to prevent the Japanese fleet from moving carriers into a point from which aircraft could be launched for an attack on the installation here on Oahu.

General BURGIN. I am going to have to ask you to repeat that, what you said.

190. General RUSSELL. Did you or did you not make the statement that it was impossible?

General BURGIN. I did not.

191. General RUSSELL. Will you read the General's answer about three questions up?

General BURGIN. I said General Short got that from the [2642] Navy, that it was the impression of everybody that they could not come here. I have never stated that they could not. I stated a moment ago that even now they could.

192. General RUSSELL. Well, that was what I asked you, if it wasn't true that you stated that it was impossible to prevent Japanese carriers from reaching a point from which they could launch an air attack against the installations here on Oahu.

General BURGIN. I think it is impossible right now.

193. General RUSSELL. Yes. Well, that is what I asked you.

General BURGIN. Correct.

194. General RUSSELL. Now, General, you were quite positive in your earlier statements that the message which you saw on the 27th of November used the term, "the President," at least twice.

General BURGIN. That is certainly my impression, sir.

195. General RUSSELL. That is your impression?

General BURGIN. I looked at that message handed out of the safe by Colonel Phillips, who held it in his hand while I read it, and it is certainly imprinted on my mind that it said "the President" twice.

196. General RUSSELL. And you recall, as you know, wherein the President's name was mentioned in connection with the commission of the first overt act?

General BURGIN. Not the President's name, but the word, "the President."

197. General RUSSELL. "The President"?

General BURGIN. Correct.

198. General RUSSELL. And you also have a distinct recollection that the term, "the President," was used in [2643] connection with injunction against alarming the public?

General BURGIN. That is my impression.

199. General RUSSELL. Yes. And you are yet definite in your impression that the message read to you by General Frank is not the message which Phillips took from the safe and showed you?

General BURGIN. I feel positive that is not the message, although it has many of the same terms in it.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

200. General FRANK. To clear this up a little: My questions will dodge around here and not follow sequence.

General BURGIN. Yes:

201. General FRANK. You stated in response to a question by General Grunert, I think, that, "The interceptor command was being organized. It was never in being and functioning as it should have been. It was only a temporary measure; but that particular feature of interceptor command controlling antiaircraft fire was jealously guarded by the air people, and we had constant training and maneuvers, practice, where that particular thing was stressed, and the antiaircraft was turned over to the interceptor command."

I asked you, "On what date?"

I think perhaps I was under the wrong conception there. You didn't mean that the antiaircraft on the afternoon of December 7th was turned over to the interceptor command, but that it was turned over to the interceptor command during these exercises and maneuvers; is that correct?

General BURGIN. That is correct, during the exercises and maneuvers, and then it was there for them on December 7. Now, I didn't actually turn it over to them.

[2644] 202. General FRANK. Yes.

General BURGIN. But under our practices the control should have been there by the interceptor command. Whether it was or not, I can't answer.

203. General FRANK. Well, as a matter of fact, do you know when the interceptor command was organized, formally organized?

General BURGIN. There was never any formal opening. I don't know the date.

204. General FRANK. When it was announced as the —

General BURGIN. Well, it was a long time, anyhow, before they got actually going.

205. General FRANK. December 7th?

General BURGIN. In fact, it was more than a month before they got in their permanent home up here and got going properly.

206. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, the radar and the interceptor command installation actually was under control of the Signal Corps?

General BURGIN. Right.

207. General FRANK. And had not yet been turned over to the interceptor command on December 7th; isn't that correct?

General BURGIN. That is quite true.

208. General FRANK. All right. Now, here is a statement here, "The interceptor command controlling antiaircraft fire was jealously guarded by the air people." Well, was there anything about their jealously guarding that that interfered with its effectiveness?

General BURGIN. Oh, no, not a thing in the world. That is an unfortunate remark there, and meant only this: that we [2645] had all these practices and there were many, many times when I, as antiaircraft fire man, thought they ought to be shooting, and as interceptor command he said no, because he had his interceptors coming in from a distance. An example of that we had in target practice down on the beach, and we got an order to hold fire, interceptor command. "Why?" I said. "Why to hold fire?"

"Well, the clipper is coming in."

The clipper wasn't even in sight, way over the horizon then. I said, "For God's sake, I am not going to shoot the clipper down. Go on, let me have my target practice."

It was just those little misunderstandings which made that statement crop out there a moment ago.

209. General FRANK. As long as I clear up the point.

General BURGIN. It had nothing to do with the December 7th flight.

210. General FRANK. Now, you stated that you thought the Navy was conducting reconnaissance.

General BURGIN. Yes.

211. General FRANK. "They were sending out planes every morning."

General BURGIN. Weren't they?

212. General FRANK. Did you know what those planes were going out for?

General BURGIN. No, I don't know positively. Practice, perhaps. We were told they were patrolling.

213. General FRANK. That is a fact. They were patrolling, but they were patrolling not for reconnaissance for defense of Oahu, but patrolling the areas in the vicinity of their task [2646] forces in guarding against submarine attack.

General BURGIN. Well, that's news to me.

214. General FRANK. Now I would like to get your reaction to this. We have had testified before the Board by a naval officer that it was necessary for the Navy to have intelligence information so that they would know within rather narrow limits of an impending attack, for them, the Navy, to meet it.

General BURGIN. I should think that would be a true statement. It certainly needs intelligence just as much as we do.

215. General FRANK. Did you have any information along that line? You evidently didn't.

General BURGIN. I had no way to get any information as to the enemy's arrival. I am tied down to the Island with nothing to go any farther.

216. General FRANK. Evidently there was not a free exchange of information that reached the level that you held.

General BURGIN. It didn't reach my level, no.

217. General FRANK. All right.

General BURGIN. I expected to get my information through General Short.

218. General FRANK. All right. Now, was the command generally apprehensive with respect to offending the local Japanese?

General BURGIN. I don't think the command as a whole was apprehensive at all. I don't think they cared whether they offended them very much or not.

219. General FRANK. Do you remember the wording in this message? Here it is:

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance [2647] and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should not be carried out to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.

General BURGIN. That rings a fairly familiar bell.

220. General FRANK. Well, the civil population was largely Japanese.

General BURGIN. Oh, well. That's quite true; a large percentage of the Island population is Japanese.

221. General FRANK. And here was a message not to alarm them. As a matter of fact, there were a series of messages that came in between October 16th and November 28th, seven of them, four of which contained the admonition not to alarm the population.

General BURGIN. That's news to me. I only knew of one.

222. General FRANK. Well, the question I wanted to ask, following: Was there a leaning over backward in the attitude to keep from offending the Japanese?

General BURGIN. I don't know. Looking back in retrospect I would answer yes, it looks that way from this distance.

223. General FRANK. What kind of a spirit among the officers and men resulted from this attitude?

General BURGIN. There wasn't any noticeable result, in my mind. I knew nothing about the admonition being repeated not to excite the public. It was not noised around as far as I know. It should have reached me if it had been. The only time I saw it was in that one message.

224. General FRANK. Did you believe that there would be a Japanese air attack on the Islands?

General BURGIN. I did not.

225. General FRANK. Why?

[2648] General BURGIN. Because I thought they were so far away that we would get some intelligence through our Intelligence Department first, and then I was positive that our Navy was scouting around out there and they would give further information of approach at all in this direction, and our own Navy was out here shooting target practice, maneuvers all the time. It looked like we were perfectly able to take care of ourselves against anything the Japanese should send this way.

226. General FRANK. Then, there was generally a state of mind of security?

General BURGIN. Yes, with a degree of nervousness underneath it.

227. General FRANK. I asked these last two or three questions to give you a little guide as to the trend I am following in the questions that I am asking, you see.

General BURGIN. Yes.

228. General FRANK. Was there any kind of a war attitude present in the command? Were the officers war-minded?

General BURGIN. No, not noticeably so. I was impressed when first arrived here in August that the war spirit was a good deal less than on the mainland.

229. General FRANK. Now, you stated in your testimony that people were apprehensive about sabotage from the Japanese. From your observation was there any aggressive attitude toward preventing the much dreaded sabotage, or was it mostly passive?

General BURGIN. More or less passive, and they selected the points that should need guarding, like the power plants and the bridges, and they actually went on Alert No. 1, put the guards on the power plant and the bridges, and my searchlights and my [2649] big-gun batteries that may have been knocked out with a dynamite charge or something. It was passive, I would say.

230. General FRANK. You are an officer of considerable military experience. I would like to get an opinion from you. What do you think would have been the predicament of a similar number of Americans in Japan under similar circumstances?

General BURGIN. You mean if the population had been reversed and we had been Americans in Japan?

231. General FRANK. Yes.

General BURGIN. I think we could have turned the place upside down by sabotage; probably would.

232. General FRANK. What do you think the Japanese would have done, however? Do you think they would have allowed Americans to have been at large in Japan?

General BURGIN. They certainly would not. We would have been locked up long before war started.

233. General FRANK. That is what I am after.

234. General GRUNERT. All right; go ahead.

235. General FRANK. Do you think the nation at large, from the press and your memory of it, was war-minded?

General BURGIN. Certainly the opposite, in my opinion.

236. General FRANK. You stated that you thought, that you believed, that you were going to get a warning from a system of reconnaissance that you thought existed.

General BURGIN. Right.

237. General FRANK. But which didn't. How were you going to get that warning?

General BURGIN. My idea was, the Navy had its scouts out there, had its carrier-based planes out farther to the west, [2650] still, scouting, that they were going out at least 800 miles from Oahu every day. The carrier during the daytime would have to be farther than 800 miles, and we would get as much warning as it would take the carrier to run in from beyond 800 miles and launch the planes. The next thing was, we figured we would have at least 12 hours' warning.

238. General FRANK. Did you ever figure that that protection would have to cover 360 degrees?

General BURGIN. Quite right.

239. General FRANK. Before you had that sense of security, did you ever think of that?

General BURGIN. Yes, we thought of it.

240. General FRANK. In fact, in a statement in a reply to General Grunert you stated that in your protection of Pearl Harbor against

attack you were confronted with a state of peace instead of a state of war. However, the dispositions that you made were practice for actual war. Therefore, to all intents and purposes the dispositions were the same, weren't they?

General BURGIN. No; the dispositions for peace were far different from those of war.

241. General FRANK. Why?

General BURGIN. Because the dispositions of peace, the whole 64th Regiment, for an example, were in the barracks here at Fort Shafter, with its field positions out well beyond here but nobody occupying them. The 98th were at Schofield Barracks, 251st at Malekoli. They were not in their field positions for war.

242. General FRANK. And you never moved out into all of your field positions?

General BURGIN. Never all at one time, no; but every [2651] battery went out didn't have to go into actual position in the cane field and knock down a man's cane. Go in alongside the road. Some more of these simulations that we did in peacetime.

243. General FRANK. What facilities, to your knowledge, did our Intelligence Department have to get information?

General BURGIN. I don't know.

244. General FRANK. You just know that it didn't reach you.

To get back to this question of disturbing the local Japanese, did you ever see any excitement among the local Japanese over any military divisions or operations?

General BURGIN. Never have, either before or after December 7.

245. You now know that there was not effective reconnaissance out, in compliance with the defense plan for the protection of the Island of Oahu?

General BURGIN. Yes, I know that.

246. General FRANK. Did you ever hear of the presence between November 25th and 30th of a Japanese carrier task force with submarines in the Marshalls?

General BURGIN. Never.

247. General FRANK. What would have been your reaction?

General BURGIN. I don't think it would have been any different. We were working under S. O. P. from topside. We would have waited on orders from him.

248. General FRANK. You still would have believed in the Navy?

General BURGIN. Yes, I certainly would.

249. General FRANK. Well, now that you are conversant with the fact that the Navy was not providing this protection in which you believed, had that circumstance been chased in the [2652] open where commanders of your level and above had known it, what do you think would have been your action?

General BURGIN. I think I would have gone to General Short and asked him, Let's go all-out and do everything we could here.

250. General FRANK. Now, you stated that you had some difficulty in getting into war positions with your equipment. And did you ever want to emplace any of your equipment on Hawaiian Pineapple Company land?

General BURGIN. I don't think we did prior to the war. Now, I am not positive. The pineapple go up to the northward and the sugar cane down around Pearl Harbor; there are no pineapples in there.

So I have no recollection of any difficulty with the pineapple people.

251. General FRANK. All right. What was the attitude of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association?

General BURGIN. Like everybody else, they didn't want the Army to go on their stuff, on their property. The same attitude is growing up right now. We are having terrible difficulty every time we want a piece of property or to use a piece of property. It is the same thing over again: time for the Army to get out. They don't want the Army around. The same attitude is growing up right now; not bad, because we can do most as we please now, acting carefully.

252. General FRANK. Where does that attitude head up?

General BURGIN. I don't know. Just human nature, I think.

253. General FRANK. In the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association?

General BURGIN. I don't know that it is confined to the sugar planters. I have nothing against the Big Five. I know [2653] nothing about them, or any other thing. I can't place any particular person. It's everybody. Anybody who owns land or property doesn't want us around.

254. General FRANK. Well, do you think that that is because of commercial interests?

General BURGIN. Why, of course.

255. General FRANK. Or because of Japanese interests?

General BURGIN. Commercial interests, selfish interests, of course.

256. General FRANK. In this endeavor to prevent alarming the population, do you think that that had reference to alarming the commercial interests or the Japanese?

General BURGIN. I thought, everybody.

257. General FRANK. Will you analyze a little bit the difference? What effect would it have had to have alarmed the Japanese, since war was coming anyhow?

General BURGIN. You can analyze it as well as I can. I don't see that it had any effect at all.

258. General FRANK. I would like an answer for the record, please.

General BURGIN. It is rather a difficult thing to answer. It's all a man's opinion anyhow. I don't think it would disturb the Japanese any more than it would anybody else.

259. General FRANK. All right. Now let's walk over on the side of the commercial interests.

260. Colonel TOULMIN. The question is not answered.

261. General FRANK. I know. Would you repeat it, please?

The Reporter (reading):

All right. Now let's walk over on the side of the commercial interests.

[2654] General BURGIN. I have no feeling one way or the other. I don't think there is any distinction between the commercial interest or the Japanese interest or anybody else's interests. A great deal of the commercial interests were Japanese, incidentally.

262. General FRANK. Well, it would have affected the normal conduct of business; it would have affected normal intercourse with the mainland; it would have affected industry?

General BURGIN. Yes.

[2655] 263. General GRUNERT. When you are speaking of that are you speaking of Alert No. 2 or the all-out alert?

General BURGIN. I mean the all-out alert.

264. General GRUNERT. How about Alert No. 2?

General BURGIN. Alert No. 2 is almost as bad, to go out and take your field positions.

265. General GRUNERT. Under No. 2 you get ready to meet an air attack and also guard against sabotage?

General BURGIN. That is right. No. 2 would probably have been almost as bad as No. 3.

266. General GRUNERT. And under No. 2 the infantry and artillery do not go out?

General BURGIN. I have forgotten what the infantry did under No. 3, but I think they did not go out under No. 2, or No. 3, those two divisions. As far as the antiaircraft is concerned, there is very little difference between 2 and 3.

267. General FRANK. You stated that had you received this message of November 27th you would have to go Alert No. 3. You also stated that you thought that it would have disturbed the population. Notwithstanding the cautions in that message not to alarm the population, would you nevertheless have gone to Alert No. 3 and have violated that part of it?

268. General BURGIN. I think so.

General FRANK. Had the Army and Navy known that the Japs were coming, do you think that a determined Japanese air attack in force could have been stopped?

General BURGIN. Yes, I do. I think the Navy could have stopped it themselves.

269. General FRANK. How?

[2656] General BURGIN. Met them carrier for carrier. They had at least two carriers here, as I recollect, the ENTERPRISE and the SARATOGA, and a whole battleship fleet.

270. General FRANK. I know, but they were out on task maneuvers.

General BURGIN. They were out, yes, but they got radio and they got information, however. They are supposed to be out if they meet the enemy. They are not going to meet him in Pearl Harbor, that is sure.

271. General FRANK. Considering that they require a 360-degree defense, and the only notice that you have of their approach is the fact that the Air Force has been launched from the carriers and is on its way, 130 miles out, do you think that it can be stopped?

General BURGIN. No. You are limiting it now. Why don't you put them 20 miles instead of knowing they were coming? Of course, you would have to do something if you knew they were coming, and if they had known they were coming down the fleet would have been there.

272. General FRANK. But the radar—

General BURGIN. The radar would not have helped any, because the fleet would have been too close. It would have helped some, but the antiaircraft and the fixed defenses could have been further along and ready to meet the initial attack, which they were not. The initial attack is probably the one that did the most damage, the torpedo planes.

273. General FRANK. Do you think a sneak attack would succeed now?

General BURGIN. Yes.

[2657] 274. General FRANK. Do you consider it reasonable for the American people to believe that the Jap attack on December 7th could have been absolutely prevented?

General BURGIN. I think it most unreasonable to even think so, under the conditions we were in, with that fleet. I still go back to that. If you are going to prevent carriers coming here, and battlewagons, you have got to meet them with the same stuff. They are not in Pearl Harbor but out in the Pacific. We had a 360-degrees at Midway, too, but we met them there and licked them.

275. General FRANK. But they had intelligence.

General BURGIN. Right.

276. General GRUNERT. What is the use of having a fighter command here if they are not going to be able to lick what comes in the air?

General BURGIN. None at all.

277. General GRUNERT. It is a waste of a fighter command if they are not going to be able to defend themselves here, to a great extent, anyway.

General BURGIN. They can defend themselves here. You get that 20-mile warning and you get fighters in the air, because now they are on the alert so they can get in the air.

278. General GRUNERT. Then why should a sneak attack be successful now, or what extent would you say that it would be successful?

General BURGIN. Well, it would not be successful to the extent that the disaster of December 7th was, but it would cause damage. There is no question in my mind if they want to get in here they can get in here, even now, with carrier-based planes.

279. General GRUNERT. We had a youngster who shot down four, I believe, even without that warning and so forth, and he testified that if they were ready they could have practically [2658] eliminated them, especially the torpedo bombers and so forth. So it is just your opinion that there would be a certain amount of success; it could not be absolutely stopped?

General BURGIN. Absolutely. They cannot stop them, if they determined to come in.

280. General GRUNERT. But it would not be another Pearl Harbor, anyway?

General BURGIN. It would not be another disaster like December 7th, 1941.

281. General FRANK. Could the defense forces be surprised now?

General BURGIN. Yes.

282. General FRANK. To what extent?

General BURGIN. I should say they could be surprised beyond radar surveillance by carrier-based planes.

283. General FRANK. Are you familiar with the technical details of radar?

General BURGIN. Not too deeply technical, no. I know that the long-range one will reach out to about 120 miles. It is not positive to go off and pick up planes that are down on the surface. We never had a hundred per cent success with it; so they can come in.

284. General FRANK. That is all I wanted right there. An attack could come in at about 20 feet?

General BURGIN. They have come in undetected, many times, with our practice attacks, undetected until they reach about 20 miles on our 268, when the searchlights pick them up.

285. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, even if they come in about 20 feet off the water at 130 miles, the radar does not pick them up until they get in within about 20 miles. Therefore [2659] if they come in low enough it is possible even now for a surprise attack; is that correct?

General BURGIN. That is correct. We have had it many times in practice. They are still working on radar to get one that will pick up low-flying planes out on the water.

286. General FRANK. Do you know anything concerning any delays or tendencies in the construction of the aircraft warning service facilities by the Hawaiian Constructors?

General BURGIN. I do not. I know nothing about that.

287. General FRANK. Did you ever hear any complaint with respect to this?

General BURGIN. Not until it came out in the papers some two or three months ago.

288. General FRANK. Did you ever come in contact with or know anything about the relations between a Colonel Wyman, the District Engineer, and a Mr. Rohl, in Hawaii?

General BURGIN. No, I know nothing whatever about that, and never did.

289. General GRUNERT. Did the antiaircraft setup have a triple-A. I. S.?

General BURGIN. Oh, yes.

290. General GRUNERT. How far out is that or to what extent can that give warning of the approach of hostile planes?

General BURGIN. As far as you can see.

291. General GRUNERT. And how much warning in time does that give your information system to get your information disseminated so that you can get ready to fire?

General BURGIN. Well, it is an awful short warning. It is only as far as you can put your own men out where they can see and get the message back. Probably two minutes, or something like that.

[2660] 292. General GRUNERT. That does give you some warning?

General BURGIN. It gives you a little warning.

293. General GRUNERT. And it supplements the air warning system?

General BURGIN. That is right.

294. General GRUNERT. But only for your own Command?

General BURGIN. That is all.

295. General FRANK. But you have some radar of your own, do you not?

General BURGIN. Oh, yes, now. We had not then. We have got many classes of radar, both for fighter control and picking up planes. The 268 is the main one.

296. General FRANK. And this radar you now have is effective how far?

General BURGIN. About 20 miles as a maximum.

297. General GRUNERT. But they can pick up better than the warning system?

General BURGIN. No.

298. General GRUNERT. I understood it could get the beam lower so it can get them coming closer in?

General BURGIN. No. We have a separate radar for the sea-coast, for the water.

299. General GRUNERT. I understand they are working on a combination of 268 and your 574?

General BURGIN. I forget the number of it, but we have the latest one at the fort command now, but it is in an experimental stage.

300. General GRUNERT. This command of Oahu and the Hawaiian Command is an outpost of the United States?

[2661] General BURGIN. No doubt about that.

301. General GRUNERT. And an outpost is intended to be awake and on the alert so the mainland can go to sleep; that is the general idea of an outpost?

General BURGIN. That is right, yes.

302. General GRUNERT. I asked you something about the Big Five, and you gave me a few names, but there is an article in the paper today under Kennedy saying "Big Five Does Not Control Hawaiian Airlines". And it gives their names. Mr. Kennedy named the Big Five as Alexander & Baldwin, Castle & Cooke, C. Brewer & Company, American Factors, and Theodore H. Davies, Limited. Is that just the big five airlines or is that the Big Five in business out there?

General BURGIN. I cannot give you any information on the Big Five. It is my impression it is the Big Five in business, not on the airlines. In fact, I am positive of that feature of it.

303. General GRUNERT. Which one of those is Dillingham connected with, do you know?

General BURGIN. I do not know. They are all interlocked one with the other. I don't know a darned thing about the Big Five, to be frank with you, and care less.

304. General GRUNERT. All right. Any other questions?

305. General FRANK. In military procedure, when a tactical and strategic commander is confronted with a situation he makes an estimate of the situation. That is normal, is it not?

General BURGIN. Correct.

306. General FRANK. And in determining what the enemy will do he tries to find out the action of the enemy along what line, in the extreme?

[2662] General BURGIN. Along the line of what he can do to hurt you.

307. General FRANK. To what extent?

General BURGIN. That is, you try to estimate what the enemy can do to hurt you. I suppose that is what you are getting at.

308. General FRANK. Yes.

General BURGIN. That is right.

309. General FRANK. But to hurt you, he will hurt you in varying degrees in what he does.

General BURGIN. You try to find out what he can do to hurt you most.

310. General FRANK. And in making your decision on your line of action, what do you do?

General BURGIN. Try to protect against that, the most serious threat.

311. General FRANK. That is all.

312. General GRUNERT. Is there anything else that you can think of to inform the Board that has not been brought out, that refers to the subject?

General BURGIN. Yes, there is one little thing on my mind.

313. General GRUNERT. All right.

General BURGIN. I think I stated that I attended only one conference where General Short called his senior officers together, and at that conference minor things were discussed, which is quite true, in the way of work projects, unloading lumber, and so forth. At that same conference there was a discussion of the war that arose, to a minor extent, but it was not [2663] the purpose of the meeting, however, but General Short did refer to the seriousness of the situation and turned to General Martin, who was his air commander, and said, "Martin, you keep one-third of your fighters on alert at all times."

314. General GRUNERT. Do you recall when that conference took place?

General BURGIN. That was a few days prior to the 27th. It was not that morning. I did not see General Short himself that morning. I saw Colonel Phillips. It was only a day or two prior to that.

315. General RUSSELL. Did you have contacts with General Short, other than at the conference that you are talking about, from August up to December?

General BURGIN. Yes, I had contacts in various ways. I will give you one example. I was hunting for a right good command post for my headquarters and decided on the magazine up in Diamond Head crater. General Short went with me to inspect this and to make the decision on the ground. On various things like that I came in contact with General Short.

316. General RUSSELL. Was he accessible and approachable in his headquarters?

General BURGIN. Oh, yes.

317. General RUSSELL. Did he come out to see you and have informal talks with you?

General BURGIN. No, sir; never. He never called any conferences except that one that I mentioned.

318. General RUSSELL. You say he never did come out to your command post and see you out there and see you in the field and talk with you?

[2664] General BURGIN. I have no recollection of his ever coming out at any time.

319. General RUSSELL. And such talks as you had with him were those where you went to his headquarters?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir.

320. General FRANK. How long were you under his command, the number of months?

General BURGIN. Four months, August 7th, until he was relieved about December 17th, or something like that.

321. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2665] **TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM S. LAWTON; COLONEL, GENERAL STAFF CORPS; HEADQUARTERS, PACIFIC OCEAN AREA; FT. SHAFTER, T. H.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel LAWTON. William S. Lawton; Colonel, General Staff Corps; headquarters, Pacific Ocean Area; Ft. Shafter, T. H.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, this Board is after facts, and leads to facts; and because of your assignment in 1941 and during the attack, we hope that we can get some of those facts from you, or leads to others.

Just what was your assignment?

Colonel LAWTON. I was an assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, sir.

3. General GRUNERT. Would you give the approximate dates?

Colonel LAWTON. I was in headquarters on March 7, 1941, in that position, and stayed in G-3 until August 1942, sir.

4. General GRUNERT. Who was G-3, at the time?

Colonel LAWTON. Colonel William E. Donegan, sir.

5. General GRUNERT. Colonel Donegan testified before the Board, and in effect stated that he did not know very much about certain G-3 matters, and that you knew it all, or words to that effect, on those certain things. One of them was the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. Another one was the liaison, I believe, and cooperation with the Navy. Is that approximately correct? Were those your specialties in the G-3?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, I handled those matters in G-3, sir.

6. General GRUNERT. What other matters in G-3 did you handle, particularly or especially?

Colonel LAWTON. For a while I handled Air Force matters, [2666] but I was not handling those on the 7th, sir, of December 1941; certain aspects of field fortifications, seacoast and antiaircraft artillery matters, generally.

7. General GRUNERT. All right. First, let us take up this Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. What do you recall, generally speaking, of the responsibilities of the Army, under that plan?

Colonel LAWTON. Could I refer to the plan, sir?

8. General GRUNERT. Yes, go ahead.

Colonel LAWTON. In any particular aspects?

9. General GRUNERT. What was their mission? What was the Army's mission, with what was it charged?

Colonel LAWTON. To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers, and support the naval forces. That is stated so in the plans, sir.

10. General GRUNERT. Under that mission, they were responsible for the land defense?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir.

11. General GRUNERT. And in implementing that plan, what did it include? They had the inshore aerial patrol, did they?

Colonel LAWTON. There was none established. That is prescribed as a mission for Army forces. There was none established on the 7th of December, or prior to that time, sir.

12. General GRUNERT. Did it make any difference as far as the plan was concerned, whether the fleet was in or out of the harbor?

Colonel LAWTON. To my recollection, no sir. There was nothing prescribed in the plan, I am quite sure; nothing stated in the plan to that effect.

[2667] 13. General GRUNERT. Who was charged with distant reconnaissance in that plan?

Colonel LAWTON. The Navy, sir.

14. General GRUNERT. When you say "the Navy," what do you mean—the fleet, or the district, or both?

Colonel LAWTON. No, sir; for the Fourteenth Naval District. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was charged with that, sir.

15. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not they lived up to that with which they were charged, in the line of distant reconnaissance?

Colonel LAWTON. I can't recall factually at this time, sir. My best recollection is that there was certain distant reconnaissance. It was sketchy, to my belief, if any. I am not sure on that.

16. General GRUNERT. Whose business was it, in the staff, to follow up whether or not the Navy was following its part of the plan, for the Commanding General? In other words, to whom did he look to see whether or not that plan was implemented?

Colonel LAWTON. It would be the General Staff Chiefs. There were certain aspects of the plan that were G-1 functions; others, G-2, -3, and -4, sir.

17. General GRUNERT. Well, whose function was it to see whether or not the Navy was carrying out its part of the plan of distant reconnaissance?

Colonel LAWTON. I think that would be primarily a G-2 function.

18. General GRUNERT. Just because of the question of intelligence, was that the idea?

[2668] Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir.

19. General GRUNERT. Just what cooperation was there between G-3 of the Department and operations of the Navy, or what corresponded to a similar position in the district or the fleet, or both?

Colonel LAWTON. You are speaking now of liaison, sir, of contact back and forth between the Army and the Navy, sir?

20. General GRUNERT. Yes, sir.

Colonel LAWTON. There was an officer in G-3 always who was primarily charged with naval liaison. I took over from Major Hobart Hewitt, in about August.

21. General GRUNERT. Then you actually performed the duties of liaison officer between the Department and the Navy, in so far as operational matters were concerned?

Colonel LAWTON. From the Army, as an Army officer; yes, sir. We also had a naval officer in the G-3 section.

22. General GRUNERT. And his name was Burr?

Colonel LAWTON. Burr; yes, sir; Lieutenant Harold Burr.

23. General GRUNERT. While we are on that subject, what was he worth to G-3?

Colonel LAWTON. His duties were not important, sir.

24. General GRUNERT. All right. Then you did not get much information from him, did you?

Colonel LAWTON. Just as a messenger going back and forth, sir, to get certain specific information, or to bring certain specific information to the Navy.

25. General GRUNERT. Of course, you do not know, but I wondered what the Navy thought of your being the liaison officer for the Army. Were you any better than he was for the Navy?

Colonel LAWTON. I think I was in a position to give them better information.

[2669] 26. General GRUNERT. All right. Now, what sort of information passed back and forth? What did you do over that period, say, the latter part, from October 1 to December 7? What happened between the two of them? What information was passed back and forth, and what did they jointly get, together? In other words, give us a story of that, of your activities during that time, in so far as the Navy or the fleet and the Naval District were concerned.

Colonel LAWTON. Why, I find it a little difficult to remember exact occurrences of matters that came up at that time, sir.

27. General GRUNERT. Give your memory, as it goes. Just tell us the story, and then we will piece it out by questions.

Colonel LAWTON. I would quite frequently go over to see Commander Knowles, who was the operational officer and War Plans officer in the Fourteenth Naval District; occasionally would see Captain Earl, who was the Chief of Staff for Admiral Bloch. Most of my business was done with Commander Knowles. I believe, during that period that you mention, there were one or two joint agreements that were gotten up between the Fourteenth Naval District and the Hawaiian Department, as to which I conferred with Commander Knowles quite frequently. We had a number of meetings, along with other officers. In training matters, coordination of use to training areas, I used to see him quite frequently.

28. General GRUNERT. Then your conferences were primarily on training matters and joint exercises, were they?

Colonel LAWTON. Training matters, joint exercises, and then there were, I think, in connection with the Hawaiian [2670] Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of 1941, several joint agreements made, as annexes.

29. General GRUNERT. The Board has knowledge of a Joint Air Operations Agreement, and it has knowledge of two addenda to that agreement. That is the only thing that I recall right now that the Board has knowledge of. Do you recall anything else?

Colonel LAWTON. There was one agreement, I think, at that time, with relation to harbor entrance control posts, sir.

30. General GRUNERT. That was a local affair. Was that put in writing?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir.

31. General GRUNERT. And was it made a part of a plan?

Colonel LAWTON. It was made part of this plan.

32. General GRUNERT. Is it in the plan that you have, there?

Colonel LAWTON. I believe it is, sir. Yes, sir; it is Inclosure B, Annex No. VII, to HCF-41, joint harbor entrance control post.

33. General GRUNERT. What annexes have you, there, and what are their topics?

Colonel LAWTON. Annex No. 1, Section VI, Allocation of Military and Civil Manpower; Annex No. II, Section VI, Allocation of Utilities and Installations; Annex III, Section VI, Allocation of Local Transportation Facilities: Land, Water, and Air; Annex IV, Section VI, Allocation of Signal Communications; Annex V, Section VI, Allocation of Supplies (Other Than Food), Construction Materials and Mechanical Equipment; Annex VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measures, Protection of Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base.

34. General GRUNERT. Wait. That sounds interesting. Generally, what is that about? What is the date of that?

[2671] Colonel LAWTON. That is the 28th of March, 1941, sir.

35. General GRUNERT. Generally, what is that about?

Colonel LAWTON. Conduct of joint air operations in defense of Oahu.

36. General GRUNERT. That is the Joint Air Operations Agreement, then?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir.

37. General GRUNERT. Well, go ahead. We know about that. Give the dates of those annexa as they go on from this.

Colonel LAWTON. The one I just mentioned was Inclosure B to Annex VII, which is a joint harbor entrance control post, approved August 12, 1941, signed by General Short and Admiral Bloch. That is the last one, sir.

38. General GRUNERT. Now, were you liaison officer for G-3 with both the fleet and the district, or only the district?

Colonel LAWTON. I was not designated in writing as either one, to my knowledge, sir. In general, when we had matters to take up with regard to the fleet, the chief of section accompanied the naval liaison, or the officer in G-3 charged with naval duties, when he went there.

39. General GRUNERT. Were these meetings that you had with the Navy periodic or just when one or the other wanted to have something to talk about?

Colonel LAWTON. When matters came up to be discussed.

40. General GRUNERT. And would you always go over to the Navy, or would the Navy sometimes come to the G-3?

Colonel LAWTON. It would come to us as often as we went over there, sir.

41. General GRUNERT. And when you had something like this to propose as an annex, or something to implement that plan, were those about the only times you got together, or what other [2672] subjects brought you together?

Colonel LAWTON. There were frequent discussions with regard to training, sir, and allocation of training areas.

42. General GRUNERT. And that is all local training areas?

Colonel LAWTON. Antiaircraft and seacoast artillery, firing areas, and training areas for naval vessels.

43. General GRUNERT. During any of those discussions, did the question of a long-distance reconnaissance ever come up?

Colonel LAWTON. I don't recall any that I was present at, sir.

44. General GRUNERT. Did they ever inform you what their task forces were doing, while they were out, or where they went, or when they would come back?

Colonel LAWTON. They would let us know—that is, we would get a memorandum from the fleet when their forces were going out for exercises, target practice.

45. General GRUNERT. What did that information usually contain?

Colonel LAWTON. It gave the composition of the forces, and I believe the general area in which they were going to conduct their training.

46. General GRUNERT. And did that information then disclose what amount of reconnaissance they were going to make in that area, and what actions were liable to or could be considered as working in the protective scheme for the islands?

Colonel LAWTON. I don't recall anything of that nature in those.

47. General GRUNERT. You knew they were going out; according to that, you knew the approximate area they were going to work, but then you did not know just what they were going to do when [2673] they got out there, whether they would send planes out to cover a certain wide area, or in, around where they were; whether they were going to look for planes or submarines, or anything of the kind, did you?

48. General FRANK. Did you know anything about the details of their operating after they got out?

Colonel LAWTON. The only information that I can recall we had in that regard, they would go out and operate with one; they would break it up many times into two task forces out there and operate, one against the other. I went out some time, I would say, in the fall of 1941, on the SAN FRANCISCO, which we broke up into two groups, and we endeavored to locate this group that had gone out the day ahead of us by air search and by other means.

49. General GRUNERT. Then anything that was done by those task forces while they were out there, in so far as the defense of Hawaii is concerned, was incidental to their own business of going out there and playing with each other in their training?

Colonel LAWTON. To the best of my knowledge, sir. As far as I know, every document we got in our section, with regard to these naval exercises, they were purely training exercises.

50. General FRANK. And they were not conducted for the defense of Oahu?

Colonel LAWTON. To the best of my knowledge they were not, sir.

51. General FRANK. Except as their presence there might be incidental to such defense?

[2674] Colonel LAWTON. That is right.

52. General GRUNERT. Now, was G-3, as the operations division for the Department, concerned about having protection all around, about the island, as a defensive measure? Were they concerned to the extent that they wondered whether the sea, north or south, was being covered in the line of reconnaissance?

Colonel LAWTON. There was very little attention paid to that matter at that time, sir?

53. General GRUNERT. Still, the plan and the agreement reached was that the Navy would perform the duty of distant reconnaissance, and that was a protective measure for the Army to do its work; but they never went after the Navy to ask them why they didn't give distant reconnaissance, as far as you know, did they?

Colonel LAWTON. I don't recall any specific instance, before the 7th, sir. It is hard to divide, before the 7th and after the 7th.

54. General GRUNERT. Yes, I know; but you and I make an agreement; I agree to do so and so, which helps you in what you are charged with doing; you agree to do so and so, which helps me: Now, I cannot understand why you do not insist that I live up to my agreement, and know that I am doing it, because it affects your business. Do you see what I am getting at?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir. I understand, sir.

55. General GRUNERT. So far as you know, that was not done prior to December 7?

Colonel LAWTON. I believe it was not done at the time, because in the opinion of the commanders there was no need for such reconnaissance.

[2675] 56. General GRUNERT. Then why put it in the plan?

Colonel LAWTON. That was a plan to be implemented at some future time.

57. General GRUNERT. After they hit you—yes. Implement that protection, after they hit you. That is a poor time to implement anything, after you have been hit!

58. General FRANK. Were you waiting for D-day?

Colonel LAWTON. No, sir; but this plan was agreed upon, as I recall, back in March or April.

59. General FRANK. When the plan was drawn up, was there any arrangement made to itemize the equipment that was available to implement the plan?

Colonel LAWTON. I do not know, sir, at the time. I had nothing to do with it, at that particular time, sir.

60. General GRUNERT. There was in the plan a provision that locally they could implement any part of that plan that they so desired, isn't that true?

Colonel LAWTON. I think that is correct, sir.

61. General GRUNERT. And as far as you know, they did not locally agree to implement any part of that plan except for their training and exercises, is that right?

Colonel LAWTON. Well, I couldn't say without going through it, how much of this was implemented. I mean there was nothing that came out to my knowledge that says "This plan, here, will be put in effect in all phases."

62. General GRUNERT. But in part of the phases, it apparently was put into effect for the time being, for practice and training?

Colonel LAWTON. In what regard, sir?

[2676] 63. General GRUNERT. Whenever you had a joint exercise outside, whenever the Air Corps had a joint exercise with the Navy.

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir; that is true.

64. General GRUNERT. That was implementing part of the plan for that particular exercise?

Colonel LAWTON. That, as a training element.

65. General GRUNERT. But, so far as you know, the plan was never implemented for distant reconnaissance?

Colonel LAWTON. I believe there was some distant reconnaissance before the 7th of December, sir. The number of planes that the Navy had available were few, and I am not sure right now, but it should be a matter of record.

66. General GRUNERT. Was the inshore aerial patrol implemented?

Colonel LAWTON. The surface patrol I believe was, sir. The air patrol was not.

67. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District had in his own command any aircraft with which to conduct this distant reconnaissance that he fought so hard to get?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir; he had PBVs and Patrol Wing 2.

68. General FRANK. And do you know whether they belonged to the Fourteenth Naval District, or to the fleet?

Colonel LAWTON. My recollection, they were under the Fourteenth District, sir.

69. General FRANK. It has been stated in naval testimony before the Board that they belonged to the fleet.

Colonel LAWTON. If that is the case, then I don't [2677] believe Admiral Bloch had any airplanes under him, sir.

70. General FRANK. And you did not know that he did not have any planes with which to conduct the reconnaissance that he agreed to conduct, in this joint plan, or did you?

Colonel LAWTON. I believe the airplanes, certain planes of Patrol Wing 2, were available to Admiral Bloch for that purpose. I think some of them—I am quite sure that some operated. I know they operated under him in our training exercises, sir.

71. General FRANK. But if the fleet commander wanted to pull them away for fleet operations—

Colonel LAWTON. I think he could, sir.

72. General FRANK. —that left the Fourteenth District commander high and dry?

Colonel LAWTON. I believe that is correct, sir.

73. General FRANK. Did you know that, at that time?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir; I knew that Admiral Kimmel could take those planes away, sir.

74. General FRANK. You did know that?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir.

75. General FRANK. Did you believe that the Navy was furnishing you reconnaissance that provided security? Did you believe that, prior to December 7?

Colonel LAWTON. Oh, I was sure they were not furnishing sufficient reconnaissance to provide security. That is, sufficient reconnaissance would have required a 360° search, which they did not have the airplanes to use, and the airplanes were not available for that purpose.

76. General FRANK. Did you expect an attack by air?

Colonel LAWTON. No, sir.

[2678] 77. General FRANK. Why not, if the Navy were not furnishing complete 360° reconnaissance protection?

Colonel LAWTON. I think the general understanding was that no considerable portion of the Japanese fleet could be absent from surveillance by American observers—

78. General FRANK. Naval?

Colonel LAWTON. —and intelligence personnel, in the Far East, for a long enough period to enable them to come this distance, without our knowing it and being informed of that fact.

79. General FRANK. And you trusted to that?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir; I think that might be so stated. I have heard numerous naval officers make that statement, as personal friends, from time to time.

80. General GRUNERT. Prior to Pearl Harbor, or afterward?

Colonel LAWTON. Prior to Pearl Harbor, sir.

81. General GRUNERT. Tell me whether or not you knew anything about a naval message, or a message received by the Navy from the Chief of Naval Operations, on November 27, which began with the words, "Consider this a war warning," and which wound up by saying, "Transmit this to the Army," or words to that effect. Did you know of that message?

Colonel LAWTON. I have seen it since the 7th. Whether I saw that message before the 7th or not, I am not sure, sir. I saw an Army message of similar character.

82. General GRUNERT. In view of the liaison between G-3 and the Navy, would it not have been natural for the Navy to have furnished G-3 with a copy of the message, or was that the channel through which the information would be given to the Army?

[2679] Colonel LAWTON. That went on a higher level, sir.

83. General GRUNERT. When it got to its destination, then did it not drop in the slot and come down to G-3 operations?

Colonel LAWTON. I don't believe that particular message did, sir, from the Navy.

84. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not the Commanding General received that message?

Colonel LAWTON. No, sir; I don't, as a fact.

85. General GRUNERT. What do you know about the message received by the Commanding General from the Chief of Staff of the Army, November 27? Do you recall that message?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir; I know they did receive a message, sir, and I saw it, I believe, that day, sir.

86. General GRUNERT. Tell me generally what you remember about the contents of that message.

Colonel LAWTON. The general import was that negotiations were continuing with Japan, and that we should take precautions against sabotage; we were not to commit any acts to arouse the local public. I don't remember more of the message than that. That was the general trend.

[2680] 87. General GRUNERT. Those things stuck out in your mind? You were to take measures against sabotage; you were not to alarm the public: those two things?

Colonel LAWTON. That is right, sir. And I recall another one, to the best of my recollection within five, six days or a week later, that said—I've always thought, from remembrance afterwards, that the wording was used, "Intensify antisabotage protection."

88. General GRUNERT. I shall ask the Recorder to read that message to you and see if that is the message of November 27 to which you refer. Listen to it carefully, because I want to ask you a few questions about it.

89. Colonel WEST. This is the radiogram dated November 27, 1941, addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, signed "Marshall," the body of which reads as follows:

(Radiogram to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., signed "Marshall", is as follows:)

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary [2681] but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civilian population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

90. General GRUNERT. Do you recall that as being the message to which you refer?

Colonel LAWTON. That is the message to which I refer, yes, sir.

91. General GRUNERT. Yes. Now, it seems to stand out in your mind—the reason I didn't have that message read to you first, I wanted to see what your recollections were of the things that stood out in the message. Now, you said (1) sabotage. Sabotage is not mentioned in that message. (2) Don't alarm the public. Yes, that is mentioned.

Now, what I can't quite get is why, "Don't alarm the public," stands out in your mind, where certain things like, for instance, "this policy should not restrict you to use any action which may jeopardize your defense"—why that didn't stand out if the alarming the public does stand out. Is it, do you suppose, because of the action taken, that that fixed that in your mind and the other one didn't, or what?

Colonel LAWTON. I believe it was, sir, because in the discussions at the time—I believe I saw that whole message before the—on the 27th of November or possibly the 28th, but I recall the action that was directed in G-3 by the Chief of Section was to the effect that we would go into the anti-sabotage alert. The members of the section, the officers in [2682] the section, were detailed, I don't recall exactly the date of the week; I would say that was about a Thursday. We went out Thursday or Friday, and we went out on Saturday afternoon and Sunday and checked the sabotage guards at various public utility installations.

92. General GRUNERT. Now, that was action taken as a result of a decision made on this message?

Colonel LAWTON. That is correct, sir.

93. General GRUNERT. Were you in on the discussion that the Commanding General held with the staff as to advising him on what action should be taken?

Colonel LAWTON. No, sir, I was not.

94. General GRUNERT. When that action was taken on Alert No. 1, alert against sabotage, and that was transmitted to the G-3 Section,

was there any discussion in the G-3 Section about that alert or about the message itself?

Colonel LAWTON. I do not believe there was, sir, and that is what makes me wonder now as to whether I saw that complete message at that time or not.

95. General GRUNERT. Because it is quite natural, when you get something from the "Old Man," to sort of discuss it and wonder why he did this and just what he wants us to do.

Colonel LAWTON. Yes.

96. General GRUNERT. And his decision and things of that sort. Don't those things occur in this new Army as they used to in the old Army?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir.

97. General GRUNERT. I thought so. But you don't recall any such discussion?

[2683] Colonel LAWTON. I am sure there wasn't.

98. General GRUNERT. All we want you to do is to remember.

Colonel LAWTON. I am sure there wasn't at that time, sir. There was no detailed discussion.

99. General GRUNERT. But when you heard of it the action had been taken to take No. 1 Alert?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir. Any discussion was with respect to what acts of sabotage might be expected.

100. General GRUNERT. All right. We will drop that and go to the S. O. P. of November 5, '41, and its provisions. Do you recall that S. O. P., and what did you have to do with getting it up?

Colonel LAWTON. I had very little to do with getting it up, sir. Major Horner got that S. O. P. up, sir.

101. General GRUNERT. What was Major Horner? Another assistant?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes.

102. General GRUNERT. What did Donegan do? His assistants seemed to be doing everything. What did Donegan do?

Colonel LAWTON. He supervised the work of the other members of the section.

103. General GRUNERT. Do you know what brought about the change from the old system of the department to have one alert which meant all-out alert, to three alerts, three spasms: sabotage, air and sabotage, and all-out? Do you know what brought that about? Were you in there at the time the change was made?

Colonel LAWTON. No, sir. I believe that was prior to the early part of '41.

[2684] 104. General RUSSELL. Did you see any messages from the Chief of Staff or from the War Department in late November, early December, other than the one that has been read to you by Colonel West?

Colonel LAWTON. I believe I did, sir. I thought there was one around the 3rd of December.

105. General RUSSELL. What do you remember about that message?

Colonel LAWTON. That was the one that, to my recollection, said, "Intensify antisabotage precautions."

106. General RUSSELL. Do you recall any message out here in which the Commanding General of the Department was told that the Presi-

dent had certain views about alarming the public and about the first overt act being committed by the Japanese?

Colonel LAWTON. In which the President was mentioned, sir?

107. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Colonel LAWTON. No, sir, I don't recall any such message.

108. General RUSSELL. You have no recollection of that. That is all.

109. General FRANK. We hear a great deal about the Big Five out here. Do you know what they are?

Colonel LAWTON. The heads of some of the big businesses here, sir.

110. General FRANK. You heard about it?

Colonel LAWTON. I couldn't name the members of the Big Five.

111. General FRANK. You have heard about them?

Colonel LAWTON. That is right.

112. General FRANK. Do they wield some influence in the Hawaiian Islands?

[2685] Colonel LAWTON. I think, a very great deal economically, sir.

113. General FRANK. How long have you been here?

Colonel LAWTON. Five years next week, sir.

114. General FRANK. Has there ever been any feeling or apprehension in the Army about influential civilians remonstrating to Washington relative to military measures they didn't like?

Colonel LAWTON. Well, you asked that whether there has ever been any discussion on that?

115. General FRANK. Has there ever been any feeling, any apprehension?

Colonel LAWTON. I don't believe I would call it apprehension, sir. I know it has been discussed among Army personnel that, for instance, the matter of taking cane land, that is, for defense purposes, profitable cane and pineapple lands, that there have been protests made by—whether going to Washington, I have no factual knowledge, but I certain am of the opinion that they did.

116. General FRANK. When those questions come up, has the knowledge that those people will be vigorous in their protests ever affected your decisions?

Colonel LAWTON. Never affected mine, sir.

117. General FRANK. Well, do you think they ever have affected military decisions to prosecute military plans vigorously?

Colonel LAWTON. Only to a minor extent, anything that has ever come to my attention, sir.

118. General FRANK. They have had some effect on projects, however?

[2686] Colonel LAWTON. My belief would be, of a very limited character, sir; I don't think anything major.

119. General GRUNERT. Were you ever told to "Lay off so and so. That will excite the Big Five, or one of them, and we'd better not try to put that across, even though it is good for the military end of it"? Anything like that ever come to you? Did you know of it?

Colonel LAWTON. I don't recall of any such incident.

120. General GRUNERT. As far as you know, then, as far as G-3 were concerned, they were free to advise the Commanding General as to the best military measures to be taken despite any influence that might be used to delay or offset those measures?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir; that is particularly true in the period before the war; I never ran up against that at any time, sir.

121. General FRANK. Right after December 7th the whole Territory was very cooperative, were they not?

Colonel LAWTON. Very much so, sir.

122. General FRANK. What is the situation right this minute?

Colonel LAWTON. I think the feeling now is, my personal opinion, many of the business interests feel the war is passing far enough to the west that they can resume some of their—

123. General FRANK. Restrictions on the Army?

Colonel LAWTON. No. Operations.

124. General FRANK. And restrictions on the Army?

Colonel LAWTON. As far as property is concerned, sir, because of certain agitation to release the curfew and certain elements releasing the internees.

125. General GRUNERT. Has complacency again set in?

[2687] Colonel LAWTON. I don't believe I would call it complacency, sir. I think it is a question of business and profits that are entering the minds of some of the larger business firms, who have been greatly curtailed.

126. General GRUNERT. Are attempts under way to put conditions back to what they were before December 7th, in the line of business?

Colonel LAWTON. I think that is the general trend, yes, sir.

127. General FRANK. Is there any plan in the Department to recommend a different attitude toward alien Japanese in the Territory?

Colonel LAWTON. Not to my knowledge, sir.

128. General FRANK. So, from a military point of view would you consider them a menace, the same as they considered them before the war?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir.

129. General FRANK. And there is no recommendation, from a military point of view, to clamp down on them?

Colonel LAWTON. I think the situation with respect to the Japanese population, both alien and citizen, from the military point of view, is about the same today as it was a year ago, two years ago, sir.

130. General FRANK. There are about how many Japanese on Oahu? About how many?

Colonel LAWTON. I think it runs around 40,000, sir.

131. General FRANK. If there were 40,000 Americans under similar conditions in Japan, how do you think they would be faring right now?

Colonel LAWTON. Not very well, sir.

[2688] 132. General FRANK. What do you mean by that?

Colonel LAWTON. I think they would be very much restricted, probably not eating very well.

133. General FRANK. And interned?

Colonel LAWTON. Interned, and working at forced labor.

134. General FRANK. Yes. What do you think the Japs would do to them when peace came, a group of Americans under the same conditions that the Japs are in Hawaii?

Colonel LAWTON. You mean in case of a Jap victory, sir? They wouldn't have much to say.

135. General FRANK. I am just talking of when peace is over, victory or no victory. What I am trying to do is to get a comparison out of you as to whether or not we would proceed reasonably to protect ourselves against that menace or whether we would still allow the menace to remain, and you have stated that the Department—

Colonel LAWTON. I don't believe I understand that question, sir.

136. General FRANK. You have stated that the Department has no plan drawn up to recommend to the civil authorities to make any change in the status of the Japs other than to continue to allow them to remain a menace after peace is declared; is that correct?

Colonel LAWTON. I don't—I didn't intend to make that statement, sir.

137. General FRANK. Well, have you any such plan?

Colonel LAWTON. I understood your question, General, was to the effect as to whether we had—the military had changed its viewpoint towards the Japanese at the present time.

[2689] 138. General FRANK. Yes. Well, has it? Let us proceed along that line. Let us get something that you really understand now.

Colonel LAWTON. No, sir; I do not believe the military has changed its attitude toward handling of the Japanese in the Territory today compared to six months, a year, or two years ago, sir.

139. General FRANK. And what is that attitude?

Colonel LAWTON. I think, a vigilant alera by the part of the Intelligence personnel which is reflected in the fact that hardly a week goes by that certain Japanese are not picked up and interned, having in their possession flags, Japanese flags or objects which should have been turned in, or making anti-American remarks or refusing to be drafted.

140. General FRANK. Do you think that that is a reasonable, healthy way to handle them, from a military point of view?

Colonel LAWTON. I think, under the circumstances, considering all aspects of the problem, yes.

141. General FRANK. Do you think any other nation in the world would do that toward a potential enemy?

Colonel LAWTON. No, sir.

142. General FRANK. Why do you—

Colonel LAWTON. I'll take that back, sir. I don't know, sir. I wouldn't say. No, sir. I think one thing that is involved here is a matter of economics and labor. If that number of Japanese were removed from these islands, were stirred up to the extent that they were improperly taken care of, didn't receive proper food and clothing, where many of these Japanese are citizens, that we would have aroused a resentment which would cause us more trouble, I believe.

[2690] 143. General FRANK. Do you believe that their presence here is a jeopardy to our national defense?

Colonel LAWTON. Not at the present time, sir.

144. General FRANK. What?

Colonel LAWTON. There are certain individuals that are, but the population as a whole, at this stage of the war, I do not believe is a menace.

145. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? General Russell?

146. General RUSSELL. No, sir.

147. General GRUNERT. Do you think of any, Colonel Toulmin?

148. Colonel TOULMIN. Yes, sir. I would like to ask him one question.

Colonel, was the real reason for not wishing to disturb the state of mind of the civil population prior to December 7, 1941,—was it that if that was done it would upset the labor conditions for the commercial interests here in the Island who did not want their Japanese labor in any way stirred up to interfere with their commercial operations?

Colonel LAWTON. I don't believe that had anything to do with it, sir.

149. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all.

150. General GRUNERT. Major Clausen?

151. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir.

152. General GRUNERT. Colonel West?

153. Colonel WEST. No, sir.

154. General GRUNERT. Do you think of anything else that you can tell the Board that may be of assistance to it in getting at facts as to what caused Pearl Harbor or what took place during Pearl Harbor, that you want to tell the Board?

[2691] Colonel LAWTON. The only thing that stuck in my mind since that time, sir: the radio that came in late on the 7th, and the information that was in back of that.

155. General GRUNERT. Meaning what?

Colonel LAWTON. As to why that information was not positively and rapidly furnished the Commanding General, under the circumstances.

156. General GRUNERT. What information do you refer to?

Colonel LAWTON. The radio that came in, actually delivered, I believe, to General Short in the afternoon of the 7th.

157. General GRUNERT. You mean the radio from the Chief of Staff of December 7th giving additional information on the situation, which did not reach the Commanding General until early in the afternoon?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir; said the Japanese were delivering an ultimatum, I think, at 7:30 local time.

158. General GRUNERT. Let me have that message, Colonel. Would you read it? December 7th. Will you read it to the witness?

159. Colonel WEST. Yes. This is the message dated December 7, 1941, which was dispatched to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, signed "Marshall." The body reads as follows:

[2692] - (Message of December 7, 1941, to commanding general, Hawaiian Department, signed "Marshall," is as follows:)

Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication.

160. General GRUNERT. Now, what was it about that message you wanted to put across to the Board?

Colonel LAWTON. Well, my thought has been that if the negotiation had reached that stage where an ultimatum was being delivered, code machines being destroyed, that steps would be taken to get that in-

formation rapidly to the Army and Navy Chiefs concerned in the Hawaiian area.

161. General GRUNERT. And, as I understand, you want the Board to consider whether or not the way that message was sent was what it should have been, how it should have been sent?

Colonel LAWTON. That is right, sir.

162. General GRUNERT. Do you know how it was sent?

Colonel LAWTON. Went through RCA, sir.

163. General GRUNERT. RCA. And how could it have been sent, in your opinion?

Colonel LAWTON. Through Signal channels, sir.

164. General GRUNERT. Through Signal channels?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, Army Signal channels.

165. General GRUNERT. You don't know whether it was sent [2693] through Army Signal channels, and the only way to get it here by the Army Signal was to send it through RCA to get it here as quickly as possible?

Colonel LAWTON. No, sir, I do not.

166. General GRUNERT. You don't know that?

Colonel LAWTON. I don't know that, sir. That might be true.

167. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not there was oceanic telephone available?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir.

168. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether it was working that day?

Colonel LAWTON. It worked later that day, sir.

169. General GRUNERT. What happened later that day, that you know that?

Colonel LAWTON. I know that Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff, talked to Washington, sir.

170. General GRUNERT. Talked to Washington?

Colonel LAWTON. I believe General Short did too, but I am not positive of that. I know that Colonel Phillips did, sir.

171. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

Colonel LAWTON. Another thought that I know has been in the minds of the people here: when the message of the 27th of November came in, the action taken here was reported to the War Department, that we had gone on a sabotage alert, and when no further direction was received from the War Department in that regard, I think the Chiefs here considered the precautions taken were what was desired by the War Department.

172. General GRUNERT. Then, as far as you personally are [2694] concerned, and what you understand to have been the talk among your fellow officers, it was, "If they didn't like what we did, why didn't they tell us what to do?" Is that the gist of it?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir. I have often wondered why they didn't sir.

173. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not, when the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department did not receive any further news after he put in his report, there was ever any attempt made on this end to find out whether what he had put in was O. K.?

Colonel LAWTON. I don't know of any message that went forward in that regard, sir.

174. General GRUNERT. You don't know whether any inquiry was made, "Well, now, I have just taken the sabotage alert. Does that suit you people?" Or did they just sit back and say, "Well, I put in the report, and if there's nothing about it,"—was there any acknowledgement of that report? Do you know?

Colonel LAWTON. I don't recall any, sir.

175. General GRUNERT. Just took it for granted, then, that the report was received and that the report was satisfactory, and nothing else desired?

Colonel LAWTON. That's to my knowledge, sir. I assume many things went on between General Short and General Marshall that I know nothing about, sir.

176. General GRUNERT. You just want to bring it to our attention.

Colonel LAWTON. I know there were matters between General Short and Admiral Kimmel that—conversations that were not transmitted at least to me in G-3. Whether Colonel Donegan knew [2695] it or not, I don't know. But they had, I know, numerous conferences during the period from the 27th on.

177. General GRUNERT. Is there a file in G-3, or was there a file kept in G-3 of the interchange of information and correspondence between the Navy and the Army that is available to the Board, or is most of this by voice?

Colonel LAWTON. All the preliminary discussions were voice. There were letters that went back and forth signed by the Adjutant General or by General Short that would be prepared in G-3.

178. General GRUNERT. But you don't know of any such particular file that records all, whatever was done and whatever was said?

Colonel LAWTON. No, sir.

179. General GRUNERT. If you had to do it over again, would you record these things?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir.

180. General GRUNERT. Are you doing it now?

Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir.

181. General GRUNERT. Any questions? (No response.) All right. Thank you very much, Colonel.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2696] **TESTIMONY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL EDGAR KING,
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, FORT SHAFTER, T. H.**

(The witness was sworn by the recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and present station?

General KING. Edgar King, Brigadier General, Medical Department, stationed at Fort Shafter, Headquarters of the United States Army forces in the Pacific Ocean.

2. General GRUNERT. General, the Board is after facts as to what happened prior to and during the Pearl Harbor attack, any leads that we can get from those who know such facts. The reason we asked you to appear as a witness is because General Short in his testimony before this Board referred to you as having knowledge of conditions in Honolulu and also of the measures taken, as I recall it, to prepare

themselves to meet such an attack. I think where you come in are the medical and sanitary preparations.

General KING. Yes, sir.

3. General GRUNERT. So we have called you to tell us generally what was done, what the conditions were, so we can ask any questions about those when they occur to us. There is nothing special, so far as I am concerned, except that general start. So you will please give us what you remember and the points you think you ought to cover.

General KING. I reported for duty in the Hawaiian Department in August of 1939.

4. General GRUNERT. By the way, what was your assignment?

General KING. Surgeon, Hawaiian Department.

5. General GRUNERT. You were the Department Surgeon?

[2697] General KING. Department Surgeon.

6. General GRUNERT. And you were that from when to when?

General KING. I reported on the 15th of August, 1939, and except for the change in terminology I am occupying the position now that I filled at that time.

7. General GRUNERT. All right, go ahead.

General KING. It was not long after I reported that it became necessary to consider the possibility of war and the preparations which were necessary to meet it in my department. We took the question of supply, personnel and so forth under consideration and did what we could to get certain increases in the next 12 months, the next 18 months. The principal thing to be mentioned as having been done was the rearrangement of the medical supplies to be readily usable in the expansion of medical facilities.

I think it was February of 1941 when it appeared to be probable that this area might be involved in war, and I made a recommendation to the commanding general covering what I considered certain minimum preparations which should be made to meet a possible attack upon these islands.

The recommendations could be considered in two parts. I am not attempting now to quote literally. I am stating things in general terms. One concerned the question of the organization to meet what had become known as civilian defense—I believe there had been that term used already at that time—and the other was to meet the requirements of the military forces themselves.

The first part, or the part which I mentioned first, the matter of civilian defense, consisted primarily in a recommendation [2698] that I be authorized to consult with the local civilian medical profession and others who were concerned, with a view to organizing the existing facilities and to securing supplies and creating, if we could, a workable organization which could take care of casualties in case the City of Honolulu should be subjected to a bombing attack. That was the thing we primarily had in mind, to make use of what there was available.

The second concerned certain increases in supplies, certain increases in bed capacity of hospitals, and increases in medical department personnel above what was then available.

A third thing was a revision, a careful revision of the plans for the expansion of hospitals in case war action occurred. This expansion program—I think it was called at that time a mobilization plan—is in

existence in all commands, but we found it necessary to give some particular consideration to that phase of preparation.

There were some considerations given to the medical service of the other Hawaiian Islands, but that covered more or less a normal medical service, depending upon the amount of troops placed on those islands, with particular reference to them.

8. General GRUNERT. How did those plans blossom as the time went on? Were you pretty well satisfied that you had a good setup on December 7th, 1941?

General KING. From my memory that I am using now I won't guarantee that every word is accurate for the record. But the organization of the civilian phase of this proceeded rather satisfactorily. In November of 1941—I think it was the latter half of November—all of this was with the approval of the commanding general, I might say; he was kept fully informed of [2699] this and where his approval was necessary it was given. I went to each of 21 aid stations, as we called them, in the City of Honolulu, strategically located as to possible points where casualties might occur, and we had what I thought was a very satisfactory situation, well trained, with the help of medical officers and physicians who volunteered. And the civilian hospitals had some modifications in routine which could be put into effect when necessary.

So far as the military preparations are concerned, we had gotten some increases in our bed capacity; we had gotten some progress toward leasing a building, now the 147th General Hospital; we had completed our plans for an air attack. We had not gotten all the personnel we had hoped for, for which presumably the War Department had their own reasons; and which I do not question. We had organized our existing medical personnel into teams and so on, such as would be required in an emergency; and considering all things we were not badly off for an immediate emergency. We were in a very dangerous position if we had anything like a sustained attack. We did all we could to meet that.

9. General GRUNERT. It functioned pretty well during the attack and immediately after the attack?

General KING. Yes, sir. We had to do a great many things that were of an emergency nature, but I felt, all things considered, that it was a very fine job, and I so stated in an official report concerning those officers and men and the civilian people who assisted us.

10. General GRUNERT. You stated that, in February of 1941, you considered this might be a possible theater of war. Why did that come to you that particular time? Why not in [2700] November of 1940 or July of 1941? What particularly brought that to your mind at that time?

General KING. My recollection of my mental processes, General, is this: From the time that I arrived I had in mind getting the medical department in shape for war. Certain things were present which particularly made that necessary for me to get busy on. I studied, as near as I could, the trend of things and I felt at the time that I wrote this particular recommendation that that was as long as I could wait, if I was going to accomplish anything in the way of training these people. That was my design. I kept thinking of it off and on in connection with other things up to that. Those were the processes, as I recall.

11. General GRUNERT. Now, what were your mental processes toward late in November of 1941, according to the information you then had?

General KING. Well, I felt absolutely certain that it would only be a little while till we were occupied with Japan. I had a little knowledge of the Oriental, had served them in the Orient, and I reasoned that we would not be given any warning whatever. Those were my actual mental processes.

12. General GRUNERT. Were you concerned when they just took Alert No. 1 instead of taking a more protective alert?

General KING. I was extraordinarily disappointed, sir.

13. General GRUNERT. You also referred, I believe, in your testimony here that you started to organizing with a view meeting the medical demands for an air attack. Did you consider an air attack as probable or more probable than a surface attack? Do you recall what your mental processes were on that line?

[2701] General KING. Rather clearly, I think, in preparing particularly the civilian population in this area against an air attack, based upon what we had heard of the use of air in Europe it seemed to me that the greatest amount of damage could come from an air attack, and that is why I stressed, in an effort to get the work done, the danger of air attack over surface, because I thought it was the keenest, most dangerous element, as we then saw it. So I talked more about that, and it was more in my mind than a surface or any other attack.

14. General GRUNERT. In your disappointment as to the alert taken, for security purposes, did you figure it was within your province to attempt to point out to the Commanding General or any superior that you did not think that that was sufficient to cover the subject?

General KING. I could not see that it was any of my affair, sir. I knew that they had more information than I did. That was my personal observation.

15. General GRUNERT. Tell me, from your long experience out here, can you give us any highlights as to the population, their degree of loyalty, their possible reactions under situations such as were experienced before and during the so-called blitz, and after it? Can you give the Board the experience of your long service here, so we can get a better insight as to what this population looks like and acts like? I can put some specific questions, if you wish, or you can make a general statement as to that.

General KING. It is very difficult to say anything about that which can be proven. That is about the best way to start my remarks. With the population approximately a third Japanese [2702] or of Japanese origin, personally I regard it as potentially very dangerous, and I believe—this is based upon a concept formed from many little things—that the population as a whole would have become very dangerous if the war had gone against us at Midway, for example, instead of going against the Japanese. That is the reaction that I had formed from my knowledge of the place.

16. General GRUNERT. Has your opinion changed any, or do you think that status still remains?

General KING. I would have no reason to change my opinion whatever about the great majority of these people, that is, the Japanese people. I cannot prove that statement, you understand.

17. General GRUNERT. Now that it appears that the United Nations are winning this world war, do you think there will be any trouble with the Japanese here in the future, unless Japan appears to be winning?

General KING. I could offer no predictions to that, General. The Japanese are a problem here. It is beyond my ability to say what they will be if we win the war. I don't know what it will be. I feel certain that if we were not winning the war there would be quite a different situation than it is now.

18. General GRUNERT. Were you consulted as to what form of alert the Department should take, or to give advice as to whether or not they should do this or that?

General KING. I think I was not at any time at that particular moment. I recall a dispatch which came in which I thought meant the thing would not be but a few days away, and I think that is the same you refer to when Alert No. 1 was [2703] adopted. I was simply told the decision of the Commanding General.

19. General GRUNERT. You were told of the decision and not asked whether or not you had any opinion about what should be done?

General KING. I cannot recall that I was asked, no. I am sure, in fact, that I was not.

20. General GRUNERT. Was that the message from the Chief of Staff of the Army or the message from the Navy which was transmitted to the Army?

General KING. I cannot say, sir. I was called to the office of the Chief of Staff. He handed me a message which I read, which had in it words like this: "It is expected that all necessary precautions will be necessary, but we want to hit the enemy first, if we can, but be ready to hit them." Something like that.

21. General GRUNERT. Was the President's name or his position used in that message, do you recall?

General KING. I do not recall.

22. General GRUNERT. But that was the only message that started out about the same as that?

General KING. That is the only one I recall specifically, and I recall that very specifically.

23. General FRANK. You said a little while ago that there was a Japanese problem here.

General KING. Yes, sir.

24. General FRANK. What is it?

General KING. Well, I can best describe it, I think, by the fact that it represents an oriental viewpoint which it will take several generations, at least, to change. If you look along some of the streets here where there are more Japanese than [2704] some of the other races, predominantly Japanese, it looks very like the streets in Tientsin or some of the other north China places. It resembles that more than an American street. It gives one that idea.

25. General FRANK. But is it a problem? Is it inimical to our national defense?

General KING. In my judgment, the presence of that amount of the population at an outpost like this, unless it is definitely controlled, is inimical to our national defense.

26. General FRANK. Is it controlled here?

General KING. It has been during the war, to the best of my knowledge.

27. General FRANK. If it is a problem, how would you solve it?

General KING. I doubt that I am capable of giving a solution to that. It is a highly-complicated problem, one which depends on the viewpoint of the nations of the world as to the disposition of the Japanese people after this war. I don't think I can offer a definite solution at this time.

28. General FRANK. Does the value of the Jap as a laborer in the Hawaiian Islands have a deterring effect on taking positive action to solve the problem?

General KING. May I qualify that by saying that I understand—it is assumed you could not get other labor—I hear, without being able to definitely state my source of information, that the Japanese people, that is, speaking of them now as Japanese people, are very valuable in many respects as laborers and particularly as artisans and men of that sort, which I think is an economic phase of the political problem and will have to be taken into consideration along with the other things.

29. General FRANK. Do the commercial interests control this [2705] solution?

General KING. I have no knowledge on which to base an answer to that question.

30. General FRANK. What do you think?

General KING. I don't think any commercial interest can control it, if the government wants to take positive action. If you are speaking of the local political situation, I have not enough knowledge to answer that.

31. General FRANK. Were you conversant with the official message that General Short had received from Washington relative to the situation existing between the period of November 27th and December 7th, other than this message you saw?

General KING. I recall this: that I was kept informed of everything which affected the medical department, to the best of my knowledge. as to whether I saw all these messages I cannot say, because I do not have any way of knowing.

32. General FRANK. Getting back to this commercial situation again, have you any feeling that commercial interests control the government's action as to the solution of this Japanese problem.

General KING. May I ask which government you refer to, sir?

33. General FRANK. The local.

General KING. The Territorial Government?

34. General FRANK. Yes.

General KING. I do not know, General, whether they do or not. I do not have any knowledge of it. I hear things; I read it in the papers, but I don't know anything about it, to be honest with you; I really don't know anything about it.

[2706] 35. General RUSSELL. General, I do not know that it is germane to anything we are out here upon, but the subject has been touched upon in the last question or two about this Japanese problem.

General KING. Yes, sir.

36. General RUSSELL. About a third of the population are Japs?

General KING. That is approximately correct.

37. General RUSSELL. The problem, therefore, was created by basing a substantial part of our Navy on a territory where a third of the inhabitants were hostile in a lot of ways toward our government.

General KING. I don't quite follow you, General.

38. General RUSSELL. The problem was created by bringing the Navy in and putting it at Pearl Harbor when all around it a third of the population was Japanese; isn't that true?

General KING. I believe the problem would have existed regardless of who were here, if we had Pearl Harbor Navy Yard and base here, if they had any people, Hawaiians or anything. The problem as far as the Japanese were concerned, the Japanese Navy in its attempt to start this war, would have been the same. The presence of this large number of Japanese sympathizers, in my judgment, made it very easy for them or much easier for them to get all the information they needed with reference to what went on here. But the problem, I think, would have existed regardless of the population if we had this area under our control and had our base here. It would have been more difficult for them.

39. General RUSSELL. It will continue to exist as long as these Japanese are on the islands, isn't that true?

General KING. Well, so long as we have any Japanese anywhere, as we have Japanese here, it will not be as easy as if we did not have them. Perhaps that is the only way I can answer your question.

40. General RUSSELL. That was all I wanted.

41. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? General, do you think of anything else that you might tell the Board that may be uppermost in your mind or that may be craving for an outlet, that the Board might consider, concerning this matter.

General KING. I have tried to state in a brief form the simple fact that we were not quite ready to meet those fellows at the time. As to why that was, I do not know.

42. General GRUNERT. If there is not anything else, we will thank the General and excuse him.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 1 p. m. a recess was taken until 2 p. m.)

[2708]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board, at 2 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)

TESTIMONY OF HON. LESTER PETRIE, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF HONOLULU, T. H., CITY HALL, HONOLULU, T. H.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Petrie, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. PETRIE. Lester Petrie. My business address or residence?

2. Colonel WEST. Your business address.

Mr. PETRIE. City Hall, Honolulu.

3. Colonel WEST. And you are, I believe, the Mayor of Honolulu?

Mr. PETRIE. I am, sir.

4. General GRUNERT. Now, Mr. Petrie, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, which is largely concerned with construction matters. Now, we are after facts or leads to where facts can be found. General Short has furnished the Board with a list of representative citizens living in Hawaii who, he says, may have information of value to the Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you here with the hope that you may have facts to present to us. General Short did not refer to any particular subject on which you might testify, so it is up to you to open up the subject, which may then give us a [2709] line on questions that we would like to ask about the subject. Have you anything in mind?

Mr. PETRIE. No, I have not anything in particular that might be pertinent to that. I do not recall. You have not the testimony of the other commission that was here? I was before that commission.

5. General GRUNERT. We have that.

Mr. PETRIE. I do not recall just what it was, now.

6. General GRUNERT. But in so far as our mission is concerned, we did not think it necessary to call you on any particular point in that testimony.

Mr. PETRIE. No.

7. General GRUNERT. But there may be something that stands out in your mind which you think the Board ought to consider. It was on General Short's request we ask you to come. He did not mention anything in particular.

Mr. PETRIE. All I can say, if I can recall now what I testified before, that I know nothing that is pertinent to the subject matter that I understand the investigation is for. I really believe the General was apprehensive of the situation here. As Mayor, I think it was along in the spring of that year, 1941, that I created a Major Disaster Council—there was no other organization here—to prepare for any emergency that might arise. In other words, we felt we were not prepared here as citizens. We invited the Army and Navy to have representatives there and they sat in with us, in an advisory capacity only. I am sure that General Short's representative was there, the Army and Navy. They may not have been at every meeting, but we created this council and we proceeded to supplement our [2710] fire equipment and our medical supplies, principally, and organized for personnel emergency assistance that might be needed on any occasion.

8. General GRUNERT. Was that similar to what we now know as—

Mr. PETRIE. O. C. D.

9. General GRUNERT. As O. C. D.?

Mr. PETRIE. That is right. They took over. When the blitz came in, they took over.

10. General GRUNERT. That is what was known as the Community Services of the O. C. D.?

Mr. PETRIE. That is right.

11. General GRUNERT. In that was anything organized in the line of defense measures that the O. C. D. now has, in the line of black-outs, in the line of air raid shelters, air raid warning service, and so forth?

Mr. PETRIE. Not at that time. That all came afterward. I think that all came after the blitz that these shelters were constructed.

12. General GRUNERT. Then at that time there was no consideration given as to the necessity for the protection, immediate protection, of civilians, from an air attack, outside of taking care of themselves after the attack happened?

Mr. PETRIE. I don't think so. I don't think we had gone that far.

13. General GRUNERT. This was all in the embryo stage of working up to what the O. C. D. has done?

Mr. PETRIE. That really took place afterwards, after the blitz came.

14. General FRANK. Who was the leading spirit in starting [2711] this?

Mr. PETRIE. I was in the Disaster Council and a few of the members around the City Hall and my department heads, we got together.

15. General GRUNERT. That is, in the line of your duties as mayor, you thought that is what you ought to be doing?

Mr. PETRIE. Yes, sir.

16. General GRUNERT. And the military worked in with that scheme whole-heartedly?

Mr. PETRIE. Absolutely, yes.

17. General GRUNERT. And rendered all assistance that you thought was necessary?

Mr. PETRIE. Yes, and they were advising the people continually at that time, I think, to lay in food supplies.

18. General FRANK. Did General Short cooperate very thoroughly with the city government and the commercial interests?

Mr. PETRIE. Yes, he did. I will say that, yes. We got along very well with General Short, very well.

19. General FRANK. Why do you say "we"?

Mr. PETRIE. The city; that is as far as I speak. The other branches of government, the Territory, I do not speak for. I speak for the city administration.

20. General GRUNERT. Do you speak for the prominent citizens in the city or just for the city administration?

Mr. PETRIE. I think I could go as far as to speak for the citizens of the city.

21. General GRUNERT. Do you think of anything else that you might add? Do you wish to express your opinion of General Short or the Army administration, either in preparation for what might happen or in action when it did happen?

[2712] Mr. PETRIE. Well, I cannot say anything more than that I honestly believe they did everything that possibly could be done. I know they were apprehensive of the situation, of an emergency, because they were quite active. They had these meetings. We had a meeting at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel and one of the members of the Chamber of Commerce, I think, could speak for that, but I attended one of the meetings when General Short spoke, the Army spoke and the Navy spoke, along these lines of preparedness.

22. General GRUNERT. Did that give you the impression that they understood or realized the gravity of the immediate future?

Mr. PETRIE. I would say so.

23. General GRUNERT. Did any of you visualize an air attack, or not?

Mr. PETRIE. No. I know I did not. I did not believe it after I had seen it and I looked at it for an hour, almost, from my front porch.

24. General GRUNERT. Then apparently the city population was not particularly war-minded, were they?

Mr. PETRIE. This was all being worked up. I would not say they were as war-minded then as they were after the blitz, but I don't think they anticipated any such happening as occurred on December 7th.

25. General GRUNERT. Suppose General Short or Admiral Kimmel or any of their subordinate officers or staff had gotten up at one of these meetings and said "You people are all asleep here; something is liable to happen next week," would you think that was jingoism, would you think he was an alarmist, or what?

Mr. PETRIE. My personal observation of that meeting with the Navy, I think Admiral Kimmel kind of insinuated that to the prominent citizen here in Hawaii, the Chamber of Commerce.

[2713] 26. General GRUNERT. Is it not true that one of your own papers here practically predicted the blitz, within about a week?

Mr. PETRIE. I do not recall that.

27. General GRUNERT. How did you consider the news in the papers; as a little far-fetched, or what?

Mr. PETRIE. I do not know. We were not paying too much attention to it at the time. I was quite busy at that time when all this was coming out and I didn't get much chance to read the papers before the day of the blitz. I came down that Sunday morning and I didn't leave the city hall until about 10 or 11 days after that. I stayed right there.

28. General GRUNERT. Then you do not recall this flare headline in the morning paper of November 30th?

Mr. PETRIE. No; I do not recall it.

29. General GRUNERT. It said that war was very liable to happen within a week or something like that.

Mr. PETRIE. I do not definitely recall it.

30. General GRUNERT. If you had seen it, then what? Would you credit it very much? I don't know how you size up your papers or your editors, or whatnot.

Mr. PETRIE. I don't know. Sometimes you think one way and sometimes you think another. To give you an illustration now, you read in the press today that our forces are here, and advancing here, and then tomorrow you pick up the paper and they are still back here. Now, you can take that for what it is worth and maybe that is the same all over. That is my impression of the latest news that we have been getting here. They are a little optimistic.

31. General GRUNERT. At that time did you think the situation [2714] was sort of tense or imminent or just would not happen to Hawaii?

Mr. PETRIE. I don't think they were imminent or tense at that time.

32. General FRANK. Had you been getting frequent alarms?

Mr. PETRIE. No. I think we may have had an alarm, but not other than a practice alarm.

33. General FRANK. What I mean is, had the Japanese situation become tense from time to time? Had you become accustomed to it?

Mr. PETRIE. Well, only what we saw in the papers there. That is all we had, and much of that was coming from Washington, from the mainland.

34. General FRANK. What I am getting at is—

Mr. PETRIE. The Admiral, I know, when he went through here, everything seemed to be all right.

35. General FRANK. They called, "Wolf, wolf" so many times that when they finally called it again you did not pay much attention to it?

Mr. PETRIE. If they did call it, I know there wasn't too much attention paid to it very seriously. I don't think they were worked up to any high pitch just immediately before that.

36. General GRUNERT. How about the population of your city at that time? Did you consider, on account of the Japanese element, both American born and alien, that that was a particular menace to the safety of the island?

Mr. PETRIE. No; we did not.

37. General GRUNERT. You say "we did not."

Mr. PETRIE. I did not.

[2715] 38. General GRUNERT. Was there any evidence that they engaged or intended to engage in sabotage?

Mr. PETRIE. No, I don't think there was, and even on that day I don't think there was.

39. General GRUNERT. Just how do you size them up now?

Mr. PETRIE. I have lived here with them, I have grown up with them. I have been here practically all my life, except two years of it. I look at them a little bit differently, perhaps. Of course, I believe possibly there are some, as has been demonstrated since, that are not loyal, and there may not be any question in my mind if Japan had succeeded in getting in here that a good many might have followed that way, but the opportunity did not arise, so you cannot say it would happen. I have no reason to say they would or would not.

40. General FRANK. How many aliens have you on the island?

Mr. PETRIE. I do not recall just now. 30,000, is it? Or approximately?

41. General FRANK. 30,000 what?

Mr. PETRIE. Aliens, if I am not mistaken. Those figures are off-hand.

42. General FRANK. Of what particular advantage are they?

Mr. PETRIE. Well, they originally came here as cane workers, workers in the cane fields. Then they gradually graduated into business, and most of the aliens now, I think, are or were in business.

43. General FRANK. Are they an asset in the labor situation here now?

Mr. PETRIE. Well, to a certain extent those that are in the mechanical field are all right, on account of the shortage [2716] of manpower. I think the government has recognized that, because they do practically nothing else but this construction.

44. General FRANK. In normal times, with so much unemployment in the United States, how do you reconcile giving employment to 30,000 aliens in Hawaii?

Mr. PETRIE. They were residents of Hawaii, I guess, and possibly they were more economical from a wage scale. They were in competition to the white labor. There is no question about that.

45. General GRUNERT. Was there any effort ever to get labor from the United States, to replace the alien labor, or was there any need for such an attempt?

Mr. PETRIE. I don't know. I could not answer that. That could come from someone else. I do not recall any.

46. General FRANK. Are they a problem now?

Mr. PETRIE. No, I would not say they were. I think the F. B. I. did a pretty job here, and the minute something happened they had them pretty well lined up. They did a very good job. They had them pretty well all located.

47. General GRUNERT. That was after the attack?

Mr. PETRIE. That was after the attack, yes, sir.

48. General GRUNERT. Do you think of any other subject upon which we might get information from you, that might be of value to us?

Mr. PETRIE. No, not that I think would possibly help you in your activities.

49. General GRUNERT. Any questions?

50. General RUSSELL. How many people are there within the corporate limits of Honolulu of Japanese origin?

[2717] Mr. PETRIE. Of Japanese origin?

51. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. PETRIE. In the City of Honolulu?

52. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. PETRIE. I cannot say offhand. In the Territory there were about 150,000, if I remember correctly. There may be 60,000 possibly.

53. General RUSSELL. In the City of Honolulu?

Mr. PETRIE. Well, the City of Honolulu now is the island.

54. General FRANK. City and county?

Mr. PETRIE. Yes.

55. General RUSSELL. You just have one political entity?

Mr. PETRIE. That is all, yes.

56. General RUSSELL. You are the mayor of the island?

Mr. PETRIE. Of the island, that is it.

57. General RUSSELL. Your police jurisdiction extends over the island?

Mr. PETRIE. Yes.

58. General RUSSELL. And you of course have a police force of some sort?

Mr. PETRIE. Yes.

59. General RUSSELL. And on that police force you have your secret investigators, a detective force as we know it?

Mr. PETRIE. Yes, we have a detective force.

60. General RUSSELL. Just how large is your detective force?

Mr. PETRIE. Oh, it is not very large. I don't recall now. 15 or 16 men, maybe.

61. General RUSSELL. Did they at any time prior to December 7th direct their attention toward observing these people of [2718] foreign origin?

Mr. PETRIE. I think they worked with the F. B. I. on that. They were working together on that. I know they took one of our principal

officers up there who was within the detective department. He went in and was assigned to the F. B. I.

62. General RUSSELL. If I interpreted your answer a minute ago correctly, you left the question of the regulation of the Japanese, in relation to the American government, to the federal agents, the F. B. I., principally, is that correct?

Mr. PETRIE. I did not get you, General.

63. General RUSSELL. You left the regulation or the investigation of these people of foreign origin to the F. B. I.?

Mr. PETRIE. Yes. It was handled all practically by the F. B. I.

64. General RUSSELL. I am interested to know whether or not these people of Japanese origin who are now American citizens participate in your elections?

Mr. PETRIE. They do, yes. Some of them are running for office. Some of them are elected. At that time, I think, in 1940, I guess it was, one was elected to the Senate of the Island of Hawaii.

65. General RUSSELL. Do they vote together? Do you consider them a Japanese bloc as a political entity?

Mr. PETRIE. That is hard to say. It is hard to prove anything like that. It has often been suspicioned, but it is awful hard to prove. When you start to analyze it you just get down—

66. General FRANK. Are there candidates from the Japanese [2719] bloc in both political parties?

Mr. PETRIE. Yes.

67. General RUSSELL. In other words, the Japs out here split up, too?

Mr. PETRIE. Oh, yes; they were not all together, the Japanese. They divided up. There was a Japanese member of the House of Representatives and there were some Japanese county officers on the other islands. I think the majority of the council on Kauai were Japanese, 3 out of 5, if I remember correctly.

68. General GRUNERT. I have one or two more questions.

Mr. PETRIE. That possibly may be due to complacency, on account of not getting in politics.

69. General RUSSELL. Have you got Democrats and Republicans out here?

Mr. PETRIE. That is all, Democrats and Republicans.

70. General RUSSELL. Are there some democratic Japanese and some republican Japanese?

Mr. PETRIE. That is right. Oh, yes, they are like you have them on the mainland, in California. It is nothing new down here. There are quite a few of them up north, northwest.

71. General GRUNERT. Do you know a Mr. Raymond Coll?

Mr. PETRIE. I do.

72. General GRUNERT. Is he still editor of a paper here?

Mr. PETRIE. Yes.

73. General GRUNERT. I have information here that a Hawaiian newspaper editor is quoted by a Washington newspaper, shortly after the submission of the Roberts report on January 24th, 1942, in substance; that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had [2720] made clear through their utterances before December 7th, 1941, of the probability and imminence of a Japanese attack at an early date. Do you recall any utterance of theirs to that effect?

Mr. PETRIE. I do not specifically recall it.

74. General GRUNERT. Suppose there had been an all-out alert instead of a sabotage alert; would that have made a difference as far as the population of Honolulu was concerned? You understand that General Short ordered a sabotage alert?

Mr. PETRIE. Yes; I understand.

75. General GRUNERT. You understand that there are various forms of alert?

Mr. PETRIE. A general alert and a sabotage alert. The sabotage alert was practically an invasion, I would say. Is that what you mean?

76. General GRUNERT. No; a sabotage alert is just against sabotage or subversive efforts.

Mr. PETRIE. I don't think we had any of that here at all, a sabotage alert.

77. General GRUNERT. Suppose you had had an all-out alert in which they had been prepared to meet any attack, would that have alarmed your populace, if they had taken such measures, do you know?

Mr. PETRIE. If the Japs had gone that far?

78. General GRUNERT. No. I mean if the Army had gone all out to meet an attack, would that of itself have alarmed the population here?

Mr. PETRIE. I doubt it very much. You mean to any subversive activities?

[2721] 79. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Mr. PETRIE. Particularly with reference to the Japanese?

80. General GRUNERT. To alarm them.

Mr. PETRIE. I doubt it.

81. General GRUNERT. You don't think if the Army had taken that alert—

Mr. PETRIE. I don't think they would have blocked together, no.

82. General GRUNERT. I want to make sure you understand what I mean. If the Army had prepared itself and had actually gone into all these position to withstand an attack, would the act of their going into a position and so preparing themselves prior to the war have alarmed the population?

Mr. PETRIE. It might possibly to a certain extent have put the public upon a general alert itself.

83. General GRUNERT. But what reaction would such an alarm have had? What could they do, if anything?

Mr. PETRIE. I don't think they could have done anything, because the public itself was really in a position—the armed services were here and they were leaving anything of that nature to the armed services.

84. General GRUNERT. Any other questions? There appear to be no questions, unless you can think of anything else you would like to tell the Board. Otherwise, we thank you very much for coming.

Mr. PETRIE. I don't know. I would like to give you whatever information I can.

85. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2722] **TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL B. H. WELLS, UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED, 4551 KAHALA AVENUE, HONOLULU, T. H.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your full name, rank and address.

General WELLS. My name is Bryant H. Wells. I am Major General, United States Army, Retired. I live at 4551 Kahala Avenue, Honolulu.

2. General GRUNERT. General, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee which is largely concerned with construction matters. Now we are after facts or leads to where facts can be found. General Short furnished the Board a list of representative citizens living in Hawaii who, he says, may have information of value to the Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you here with the hope that you may have facts to present to us. General Short did not refer to any particular subject on which you might testify, so it is up to you to open up the subject, which may then give us a lead to questions by which to develop it. He selected you as one of the representative citizens of Hawaii. What is your business among the citizens of Hawaii that you should be selected as a representative citizen? We know you are a representative of the Army, but we ask this of you as a representative citizen over here.

[2723] General WELLS. From the date that I retired from the Army, which was in January, 1935, I was employed by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association as secretary and treasurer of that organization, until, I have forgotten just when, but after a few years I was made the executive vice president and secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, which position I held up to June 30th of this year, when I retired from that. During that time I participated in the affairs of the community. For 9 years I was a director of the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, and I have been identified with the Red Cross and Boy Scouts and China Relief and various things of that kind of a public nature.

3. General GRUNERT. What do you think that Short thought you knew that might be of advantage to the Board in the mission, as I have stated, of the Board? Does any particular thing occur to you? Or just a knowledge of general conditions and so forth?

General WELLS. I am kind of sorry I have to answer that question, for this reason: I think that General Short put my name down because, after he had left, a certain prominent citizen in the city here brought to me a letter which he proposed to send, I think, to the Secretary of War, in which it asked for leniency in dealing with General Short. He asked me to sign it. I read it over. I told this gentleman that the first part of the letter I agreed with entirely, and that was that General

Short from the time he got here until the disaster overwhelmed him had entered into the spirit of the community, had cooperated wonderfully with them and shown a broad vision of conditions here and had become quite popular in the community, and people had a good deal of confidence in him.

[2724] The last part of the letter, I don't remember just what it said, but it was rather effusive. It didn't make so very much difference, but I told this gentleman I didn't want to sign it. It was on the second page. I said that I liked General Short, that "I think General Short has got a lot of ability; I think his relief from here is all that could be expected; he could not continue here after what has happened, and I hope he will be given some job elsewhere where he will have training, but I think you put down here a lot of things or are giving him credit for having done a lot of things that he did not do. Not that it makes so much difference, but I don't want to sign it."

He said, "Oh, do you think so?" And he asked me to explain. And I did, and he said, "I guess that is right." He said, "I will change it. It is all right if I change the last sheet, is it?" I said, "Yes, I will sign the first sheet", which was to the effect of what I said.

I learned afterward that he did not make any change in the letter at all, so my signature stands on that letter, and a copy of it was sent to General Short, and General Short wrote me a letter and thanked me for it.

Now, I like to be perfectly clear with the Board here on that. I meant what I said, that I was willing to sign it. I don't know why this gentleman did what he did. The reason I found it out is because later he brought one for me to sign in the case of Admiral Kimmel, which I told him I would not sign, and I upbraided him for having sent the other one in without having corrected it as he promised to do.

That is all I know.

4. General GRUNERT. In your position did you keep up your [2725] connections with Army matters in any way, or are you in position to testify as to the measures taken or the improvement in conditions as far as the military defense is concerned?

General WELLS. No; I would not be an expert witness on that. You mean, during his incumbency?

5. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General WELLS. All I can say is that things were rather lively from the time he got here. There had been a good many changes in the defense system of the island. For instance, as early as 1939, as I recall it, in the fall of 1939, Admiral Adolphus Andrews came down here with a Scouting Fleet; I think they called it the Hawaiian Detachment of the fleet or some such thing as that; which was a lot of ships and a lot of officers and men. And shortly after that the rest of the fleet came down under command of Admiral Richardson, who was then the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet.

6. General GRUNERT. Would you know that letter you referred to if you saw it?

General WELLS. I think I would, yes.

7. General GRUNERT. Is Frank E. Midkiff the fellow who composed the letter?

General WELLS. That is him. A very nice fellow, by the way, and very enthusiastic about the Army and Navy, and has been president of the Chamber of Commerce and always likes to help people.

8. General GRUNERT. I show you this letter, which is in the record, in the testimony of General Short at pages 338 and 339, and see if you recognize that letter.

General WELLS. It would take me a little while to read [2726] this. My eyesight is not particularly good.

9. General GRUNERT. We can read it to you if you wish.

General WELLS. If you could have the Recorder read it to me I would be very happy and it would save your time.

10. Colonel WEST. The letter is dated in Honolulu, December 22, 1941, and is addressed to The President, The White House, Washington, D. C.

SIR: We, the undersigned representing substantial business and social organizations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered to this territory and to our Nation by Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.

We have found him, at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such a plan.

General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas to our Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound "M-Day" Bill;—

General WELLS. I don't know about that; I doubt if I had very much to do with the passage of the M-Day Bill, but that is the letter, if that is the question you ask. You are beginning [2727] now to get into the things I would not subscribe to. Up to that point I was willing to.

11. General GRUNERT. Let us branch off to a few other subjects on which you may have some knowledge and may be able to give us some light. During your service here you have got to know these people pretty well, haven't you?

General WELLS. Yes, some of them.

12. General GRUNERT. How about the Japanese element? You employed a lot of them in the sugar business, didn't you?

General WELLS. Yes.

13. General GRUNERT. What is your opinion? Are they a dangerous element to the safety of this outpost here, or not?

General WELLS. They are not.

14. General GRUNERT. They are not?

General WELLS. In my opinion.

15. General GRUNERT. This is your opinion?

General WELLS. That has been demonstrated.

16. General GRUNERT. Do you know of any evidence of sabotage that occurred since you have been here to show their inclination?

General WELLS. On the contrary, I have made inquiries into quite a number of cases where sabotage was alleged to have been committed, and in every case when followed down it proved to be a false alarm.

17. General GRUNERT. Do you know that General Short decided on November 27th to take up an alert called a sabotage alert and decided not at that time to take up any more protective alert, and one of the reasons given for that is that he did not want to alarm the public. Now, had they gone to an all-out alert, gone [2728] on

into position, ready for anything, air attack, surface attack, or what-not, do you know what reflection it would have had on the public or how it might have disturbed the public?

General WELLS. I don't think it would have disturbed the public in any way adversely. I think there might have been some people in the public that were so much interested in it they would have liked to have gone out and seen what was happening. But the people of this island have seen alerts and have seen the command turned out to their war positions so many times that it is an old story. There would have been no excitement, in my opinion, had he gone to the war positions.

18. General GRUNERT. Would there have been any protest on the part of business interests or others because of possible disturbance of crops or their taking places in sugar fields, and so forth, that would have deterred anyone from taking that alert unless he had to?

General WELLS. I think not.

19. General GRUNERT. Taking the people in the sugar interests, would there have been a protest from the sugar people, if he had taken an all-out alert, because of disturbance to their labor, to their fields, to their cane and so forth?

[2729] General WELLS. The best answer I can give to that is to make it a little lengthy, rather than just yes or no.

At the time I came here in 1930, before I came here, while still in Washington, I had heard—I was in the War Plans Division there—that it was difficult to train on this island because of the high development of agriculture and the few places where troops might maneuver off the reservations, and of the reluctance of the people who owned property to let the Army have access to their property for that purpose.

I found it just the reverse. From somewhat close to thirty years of experience before that in many places on the mainland those conditions did exist. We had to keep on the road. If we went into fields or anything of the kind or into roads across fields we usually had to get not only the owner's permission but had to pay for it and frequently it was denied us. I found it just the reverse here. I never had any trouble, in the four years that I was in command, of getting permission. You had, of course, to ask. Only decency would indicate that you should ask permission and not just move onto people's property.

Of course, that doesn't mean that we could take trucks or wagons or horses or men through cultivated fields. We didn't need to. We had property of our own that we could maneuver on in rather a large way, and over in the Waianae pocket where there is very little cultivation there is land for that kind of work. But to cross fields, to go through their roads, to go through their valleys and over their hills, and so forth, to camp on their ground, to use their water, and all of those things, we had no difficulty whatsoever in getting permission to do it, and I never paid a cent for it. That is my [2730] recollection. If there was any money ever paid for any camp ground or for water or for firewood or anything like that, why, I never knew about it.

Now, coming to the answer now, in building a plan for the defense of the Island, where you had to use land of that kind, it was necessary, of course, to get permission of the owners or managers of various plantations. In my plan of defense of the Island I sent my G-3 all around the Island. We did a great deal of hiking ourselves, so we knew people

personally, and we had permission—we would show them what part of their lands might be used in case of an emergency, and we asked if we might include it in our defense plan and if, when we wanted to have practice or maneuvers, would it be all right for us, just by notifying them that we were going to pull off a maneuver, to go into those places without further ado. We never had any trouble of getting permission.

Now, during the time that you mentioned I have no doubt that the plan—whatever it was or whatever changes were made in it, since I had fooled with it, it had several Department Commanders since that time. What General Short had done to it I don't know in detail. I have no doubt that he had procured authority to include certain lands that might be needed, that they had been surveyed, and that he had received permission, and that it wouldn't have been anything unusual at all for the troops of his command to have gone to those places whenever he wanted to sound an alert for them to go. As a matter of fact, they did it time and time and time again.

20. General GRUNERT. Then, I gather from what you have told us that, as far as you know, there was no influence out here [2731] which might have caused the Commanding General to take some action that he didn't think was adequate for the occasion: in other words, that he took a sabotage alert and not a more protective alert, that was of his own volition and not influenced by the criticism and the influence of the prominent property owners? Is that generally the idea?

General WELLS. I feel very sure that it was not through any influence of a civilian character.

21. General GRUNERT. That was just one of the things we are looking into.

General WELLS. Well, I want to say this: that, in answer to your question, I've heard—don't know how true it is, but it was published. It has been published; I can't say where now. You probably would know. I think it is in the Roberts report that was published, or that part of it, that a message was sent from the War Department to General Short telling him that he should expect sabotage, asking him not to commit any overt act, and to report what action he had taken.

Well, I have always thought that naturally, when General Short got those instructions from the War Department that he should expect sabotage, maybe not having been here long enough to know the situation and to cast out of his mind the fear that there would be any, and fearful that if he didn't take steps against sabotage that he might bring criticism upon himself, that that was the reason that he sounded what was afterwards known as Alert No. 1. But that is only my opinion. That, I thought, was an error on his part because he was taking steps against his friends, when the danger was outside.

22. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything about whether there [2732] was any friction between the Army and the Navy in the line of cooperative action?

General WELLS. At that time, you mean?

23. General GRUNERT. Just prior to December 7th or at that time.

General WELLS. No, I don't know of any. I have heard it stated, seen it in papers, and so forth, that Admiral Kimmel and General Short didn't speak to each other. I don't believe a word of it. In fact, I have seen them together, been with them together. How ex-

tensively they cooperated by going to see each other when these messages began to come in, of course, I don't know anything about it, but I know that they were friendly or, if they were not, they made a pretty good bluff at it, because I have seen them together many times and they seemed to be cordial.

24. General FRANK. How many alien Japanese in the Territory?

General WELLS. Oh, I don't know. I think about 20,000, but that is just a guess. You can get those figures accurately. That would be the best way to get them, instead of taking them from me.

25. General FRANK. I am just after a representative bloc. That is as far as I want.

Is there any question about the loyalty of the alien Japs?

General WELLS. Well, General Frank, I want to say, from the time I came here—and I came here with a view which I got by reading papers, in the War Department, in talking to people who had served over here, in which they had conceived at one time that they would put all of the Japanese here in a stockade or send them to another island because if they had any trouble [2733] here they were all treacherous and they would pounce down upon us and sabotage, and so forth. Naturally, there wasn't any question that was more important to a commanding officer, so that during my four years I made a particular study of that for the purpose of deciding what was the truth of the matter, if I could get at it.

I came to the conclusion that there had been a lot written and a lot said for which there was no foundation. I concluded that we didn't know, and we never would know until the emergency came, just what the situation was. But there was nothing in the conduct of these people here in their daily lives and their conduct as citizens that justified me in believing that they were any different from any other hyphenated Americans, so far as those that were citizens, or that the aliens were any different from a lot that we were familiar with in other parts of the United States. As a matter of fact, they were law-abiding and quiet and industrious and provident and thrifty and not quarrelsome.

It is true they are not very pretty to look at. I wasn't struck with that. They are rather secretive, they are gregarious, and so on. But I figured that the great majority of them, aliens and citizens, would be loyal. There would be skunks, the same as there are in many other sections, that are hyphenated Americans, but there wasn't anything that the great United States couldn't handle with respect to them, and it would be a great deal easier to handle them and take care of them by treating them and giving them the rights that the Bill of Rights provides for citizens and that the proclamation of the President of the United States in the last war guaranteed to aliens.

[2734] As early as 1932 they had an organization here—well, earlier than that—they had an organization known as the New Americans, which were gotten together by a very prominent Japanese here named Okamura, who was a Christian minister. He cannot become a citizen, for reasons that I don't need to go into, although he would like very much to, but he has a home down there, and he brings in a lot of these boys, young fellows from all over the Islands, every year, or did up to the time of the blitz, to the number of about 75 or 100, in between there somewhere, representatives from the various Islands,

that he calls the conference of the New Americans, which lasts for a week, and he has prominent citizens talk to these boys about Americanism and things of that kind. He always has a theme in advance.

I think it was in '32 that I—I talked to him several years, but in '32 I brought up this question, my point of view. Admiral Stirling brought it up from the Navy point of view, and I told him that they were suspected, the thing that they already knew, but so far as I was concerned I believed that they were conducting themselves with propriety, and that I regarded them, in the plan of defense of this Island that I was building, as an asset.

I am glad you asked the question, because I have banked my reputation more or less. I have been one of the people who has shown faith and confidence in them, and I did that because of my regard for the Constitution of the United States. I didn't bring these people here, I wasn't responsible for it, but they are here, and they were here properly under the laws of the United States and under the Constitution, and they were entitled [2735] to whatever protection it fell within my jurisdiction to give them.

I say I am glad I did it because subsequent events that have happened since that time has convinced me, if it doesn't anybody else, but I can't see how anyone can—now the time has come, and I said at that time, "We can't tell now, but when the emergency comes we can tell in a very few weeks. We will know where you stand." And now it has been more than a couple of years, and aside from remarkably few who have been taken under our wing—and they are only suspected; it isn't because of anything they did particularly, the great majority of them—the rest of them have performed as well as or equally as well as a lot of our own, you might say, our own Caucasian people.

26. General FRANK. About how many Japs did the Hawaiian sugar planters employ totally?

General WELLS. The last time I looked at the list I think it was about 12,000.

27. General FRANK. I would like to ask you a question about the status of Japs in Hawaii as considered by the Japanese government. They consider all persons of Japanese ancestry as citizens of Japan, do they not?

General WELLS. I think that they did for a while. Most all nations do that, consider the children of subjects or citizens to be citizens of their country. I think we fought the War of 1812 on that question somewhat, as far as Great Britain was concerned, and they claimed the right to take our citizens off our ships. And that is one of the features. But Japan, I think, if my recollection is correct, is about the only nation I know of that has made provision—

[2736] 28. General FRANK. That is what I am getting to.

General WELLS. —have made provision for those who want to give up or to alienate themselves from that tie; they have provided a way for doing it.

29. General FRANK. Yes.

General WELLS. And I don't know of any other nation that has, although I am not an expert on that.

30. General FRANK. Do you know who is an expert? What I am after is to have that explained a little bit. What do they call this legal process by which these Japanese renounce their allegiance to Japan?

General WELLS. You mean those that they call dual citizens?

31. General FRANK. Yes.

General WELLS. Now let me see if I get that correctly. Up to a certain time, which I think was about 1925, a child born here—of course, any of them born here from any time are regarded by our government as citizens of the United States. Now, up to this year, which I think was 1925, the Japanese people regarded them as subjects of Japan; and then, on account of various questions concerning Japanese here and in California, and so on, they issued a decree or passed a law, or whatever it is they do over there, that any child born here whose parents wanted him or her to retain Japanese citizenship had to register that child three weeks after it was born with the Japanese consul here; and if they didn't so register the child, that Japan would lay no claim to it.

With respect to those that were born before '35 and who were American citizens, and they were then dual citizens and wanted to release themselves from that dual status, they provided [2737] a manner of doing it, which, as I recall it, was quite complicated, but it meant you went up to the Japanese consul here and you filed an application, and he did something with it and sent it on to the prefect or district or the home of the parents of this party in Japan, and then there was some rigmarole there, and then he came back, and usually maybe it will be approved, but oftentimes—and I have talked to some of these young fellows as to why they didn't do it. They said it took so long to go through it that they didn't want to bother to do it. They had always regarded themselves as American citizens; they had been told that they were, having been born here; and why should they go to the trouble and expense? It costs them a little. I think that \$3 was the fee for it, but there was a manner in which they could divest themselves of the dual citizenship.

32. General FRANK. From your point of view, then, you never considered this dual-citizenship group a liability to the United States?

General WELLS. Well, General, I have always considered it just the same as the millions of citizens that live on the mainland right now that are in that same status. I have made talks before these people and told them that, but I have also said that, "You are in a little different status here because you are under suspicion, and I advise you to do away with your dual citizenship." I have done that time and time again. I always had an idea that they should do that if they could. I have sent quite a number of them, individuals that I happen to know who have asked me what to do and how to do it, up to the Japanese consul to get it done.

[2738] 33. General FRANK. Was there any differential in pay between Americans and Japanese doing the same work in the cane industry?

General WELLS. Not doing the same work.

34. General FRANK. How did prices paid the Japs in Hawaii compare with prices paid in Louisiana, for instance?

General WELLS. You mean on the sugar plantations?

35. General FRANK. Yes.

General WELLS. Well, in recent years, since 1934 when they passed the sugar legislation, things have changed so that I can't tell that exactly, but our wages here have always been higher and are higher now, very much higher now, but those wages since—

36. General FRANK. Higher than what?

General WELLS. Higher than they are paid in Louisiana.

37. General FRANK. Oh.

General WELLS. Higher in cash, and no comparison with respect to the superiority of the perquisites that are furnished the men here as compared with those they have down there.

38. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions?

39. General RUSSELL. General, your discussion of the Japanese on the islands has suggested a question or two to me.

You were more or less familiar with these people as they were employed on the sugar plantations and, I assume, the other agricultural pursuits here on the islands?

General WELLS. A little louder, please.

40. General RUSSELL. I say, you were familiar with the Japanese as they were employees on the sugar plantations and the other agricultural pursuits on the islands? You knew of them, saw them?

[2739] General WELLS. Yes. I knew them fairly well, yes. You see, I wasn't the manager of any plantation. I was connected with the association which is an association of plantations. But I visited the plantations. Reports came to our office. I have talked to managers, and I am fairly well familiar with the Japanese on the plantations and how they work.

41. General RUSSELL. And in your experience did you have reports about the activities of the Japanese consular agents?

General WELLS. Well, from the time when I was in command I always considered that the consul was some fellow whom we had to keep track of and watch.

42. General RUSSELL. No. The information which we have of Japanese activities is to the effect that in the islands just prior to December 7th, '41, there were 219 agents of the Japanese consul here, that they circulated among the Japanese populations on these farms, and their mission seemed to be to keep the relationship between the Japanese on the island and the homeland established, work out this principal of dual citizenship, and so forth; and the question I am asking is as to whether or not you in your connection with the sugar growers got any reports of these activities.

General WELLS. No. I did while I was Commanding General. My G-2 told me about them. We didn't pay much attention to them. I always considered that they were, I thought—in fact, I thought I knew, and I believe now, that one of the duties of the Japanese consul here, that are laid down to him by his own government, was to keep track of the Japanese here in the best way he could, and I think that he—usually a new one would come here most—after being here a little while and getting himself located in his house and office and joining the Chamber of Commerce and meeting a few people and trying to ingratiate himself that way, he would go and make a trip around the islands, I suppose to make contacts with the prominent Japanese on the [2740] various islands.

43. General RUSSELL. But in all of your connections here—I am not talking about the Japanese consul; I am talking about these 219 people who were working out from his office.

General WELLS. Yes.

44. General RUSSELL. In all of your contacts with your association you never heard any report at all on their activities among the people on the plantations, the Japanese people?

General WELLS. I am saying that when I was in command my G-2 told me that there were people on the islands at that time who were reporting to the consul. Just what the nature of those reports was we never could find out exactly. I didn't consider it very serious, but from the time I have been associated with the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association I don't recall a single instance where I ever heard or the managers ever told me that they were a menace or that they were doing anything contrary to what they ought to do. In that connection—and it might be in that connection—when the F. B. I. came down here, quit a time before the blitz, the officer in charge there, Mr. Shivers, came over to see me. He said a large part of the Japanese were around on our plantations, and he thought it would be helpful to him in getting a line on things if I could give him some information about the reliability of those Japanese aliens and citizens who were on plantations. And I said, "Well, it is a kind of a ticklish thing, maybe. Only the reason I think about it is that I hate to be suspecting these people all the time, but," I said, "if you want it I'll do anything you want me to. I'll send out to the managers and ask them to send in lists of the names of every Japanese that is [2741] working on the plantation, and also to state what in his opinion the character of these men would be; particularly, if he feels that there are some that should not be trusted, to say so; and, if he feels absolutely sure that certain individuals can unquestionably be trusted, to say that."

I did that. I got in the list. Some of the managers thought, "Well, I don't know of anybody whom I have any reason to suspect." I recall one plantation manager who put down three men,—he's on a plantation that employed, as I recall it, something like 2,000 employees; they weren't all Japs—who stated that, of all the Japanese he did have, that there were three men that he thought ought to be watched, that he wouldn't trust them. On the contrary, he put down, I don't remember how many, but more than that, of men that he would trust with his own life. The rest of them he had no reason to suspect.

In general, I think that one plantation out of the 35, as I recall it now, was the only one where a manager was willing to put his name down on a list and say that he wouldn't trust anybody, and that man had three fellows.

45. General RUSSELL. That is all.

General WELLS. Does that answer your question?

46. General RUSSELL. Yes. The only thing I wanted to know was whether or not these consular agents made trouble for you, the people out on the plantations.

General WELLS. Yes.

47. General RUSSELL. And you say no?

General WELLS. I know they didn't make any trouble on the plantations. The only trouble we had, I think, on the [2742] plantations in handling Japs that amounted to anything was, occasionally,—of course, they had a strike here back a great many years ago. But they had some questions sometimes over religion, as a rule. There would be something. One sect like the Okinawas, which they have, put up the money to build a church, and another group of Japanese

who didn't like the Okinawas and looked down upon them, and they wanted a church. The manager said he was not going to have his plantation all covered with churches; they would have to get together. So they got together. One sect put up a monument to one of its reverend saints in front of it, and the other came and knocked it down. Things like that you might have in the plantations, but that is the only case I speak of.

48. General GRUNERT. General, suppose what would happen to the sugar interests if the 12,000 Japanese now employed were withdrawn. It would sort of upset things, wouldn't it?

General WELLS. It surely would put a—give them a headache. The best answer to that is that we had here before things started to hum over here, which was a year and a half or two years before the blitz, with these big contractors coming down and the Army and Navy having so much money to spend, what they called the Pacific Naval Air Base Contractors. There were five of them, with Walter Dillingham here associated with them, and then afterwards what they called the Hawaiian Constructors, which were some people who came down, too. We lost between then and now, on the plantations, as far as I can recall it, something in the neighborhood of 15,000 men, Filipinos and others, all told. They went because they got better pay, and they went because there was no one else to go. They were [2743] practically shanghaied in many places. But anyhow, it was unreasonable that either the sugar or pineapple could pay the wages that the government paid; and particularly, when the government put a ceiling price on the sugar we couldn't change the price of sugar. We couldn't increase the amount we got for it. So we had to get along. at the same time the government sent out requests that sugar was absolutely essential to the prosecution of the war, in the manufacture of industrial alcohol, wanted us to—they took off the ban that they had had on there with respect to the quota that we could have and asked us to produce our maximum. At the same time we were losing all these men.

Well, we have done remarkably well by going to mechanism very largely, in introducing grab harvesting as distinguished from hand harvesting, and many other of the operations in cultivation, harvesting, and milling the cane are now done in more economical ways. Those ways, of course, have produced headaches in another way and require more machinery when again we are handicapped by having to get priorities for the machinery that we needed, which has not been easy to do. In fact, new machinery we were prohibited from having. We have had to buy second-hand at enormous prices, but we have gotten along.

Now, you ask, if you took 12,000 more away from us. I don't know what would happen. All I can say is that this industry has survived in spite of hell and high water, through the industry and activity of the people who run it, but I think many of the plantations would go flat if you took those men away.

49. General GRUNERT. Is there anything else you think of that [2744] might be of value to the Board in its mission, that has not been brought up?

General WELLS. No, I don't think so. I doubt if what I have said will be of much value to you.

50. General GRUNERT. You would be surprised at the many leads we get and the many opinions we get which dovetail at times.

General WELLS. Yes.

51. General GRUNERT. All right. Thank you very much for coming up.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

General GRUNERT. We shall take a five-minute recess.

(There was a brief, informal recess.)

[2475] **TESTIMONY OF WALTER FRANCIS DILLINGHAM, CARNATION AVENUE, HONOLULU, T. H.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Dillingham, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Walter Francis Dillingham, Carnation Avenue, Honolulu.

2. Colonel WEST. What is your occupation?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I am president of the Oahu Railway and Land Company.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Dillingham, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, which are largely concerned with construction, that took place since 1941. Now, we are after facts or leads to where such facts can be found. General Short has furnished the Board a list of representative citizens living in Hawaii who, he says, may have information of value to the Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you here, with the hope that you may have facts that you can present to us. General Short did not refer to any particular subject on which you might testify, so it is up to you to open the subject which may give us leads as to questions we may want to ask you to develop that subject. That is rather a nebulous beginning, but that is the situation. Your name was presented in a list of names that General Short sent to the [2746] Board, so we hope that you have something in mind with which to lead us to other things about which we may question you. Have you any such?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I would not know where to start, General.

4. General GRUNERT. Have you any idea why General Short put your name down, except as a prominent citizen who may have known something about what he did over here? That is the main lead I can give you. You knew General Short, did you?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I knew General Short practically the whole time of his tour of duty here.

5. General GRUNERT. Did you know anything about his association with the citizens or his knowledge of the people or anything along that line that might give a lead?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir. I became very well acquainted with General Short through business dealings and also through social contacts. I might say this: that it has been my privilege and somewhat

my duty, in connection with my business activities, to become acquainted with all of the Commanding Generals who have been here since the first armed forces came to Hawaii in 1898, I think it was, at the time of the Spanish War. General Short was one of those with whom I came in contact.

6. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything about his accomplishments in attempting to better or perfect the defenses of the island?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. From my observation—and I think I was in a favored position to know what was going on in construction work, because I have been active in construction work for many years—I formed the opinion and stated it a good many times, that I considered him one of the ablest Commanding Generals we have [2747] had here. He was a driver; he wanted to see things done; he accomplished a great deal, a great deal, and was able to do that because he was a very satisfactory man to do business with. I may say I did not always agree with him, but that is possible. I have learned, in business, to disagree with those one deals with.

During the time he was here he acquired or started to acquire lands on the water front, and very successfully upset plans that I had had in mind in connection with the development of the Honolulu harbor extension, Kapalama Basin, by condemning some 70 to 75 acres across the water front property. The matter was so serious that I took it up with General Somervell in Washington.

7. General GRUNERT. And General Somervell at that time was what?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. This was before he was—I don't know just what his particular activity was, but he had control over situations such as was presented to me. He was interested in transportation, I think. In any event, I was told to see him. I did see him. I explained that in this over-all condemnation suit which was being instituted, they were taking away all of the water front property that was vitally necessary to the Hawaiian Dredging Company, of which I was the organizer and president, that if all this water front property was taken away from us our shops, repair shops, ways on which we build scows and dredges, and so forth, would fold up, as this company had developed all the harbors on the islands of the Territory that started with opening Pearl Harbor in 1909, with dredging the original channel there, and a good many million dollars for the Army and for the Territory. It would put us out of business [2748] unless we had a home port. It did not seem to me necessary, nor to the interests of the government as well as to us, if we were denied any place to work.

As a result of that conversation I thought and had reason to believe that word was sent out here, because upon my return from that trip I took up the question with General Short of rearranging the plans which the Army had so as to give us a part of this frontage of several thousand feet which we had on the water front.

8. General GRUNERT. What did he want it for, do you know?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir. It was for the development of warehouses in connection with terminal wharves which were to be built to serve the Army Transport. I made trips over the ground with him, and as a result of that it was decided that they could leave us the 12 acres which we were using, but it would be necessary for the

Government to entirely surround us with lands needed for military purposes.

That was not a happy situation to me, or to us, because we had no right of way into our property except through the courtesy of the Army, and easement to a right of way being a not very permanent connection. However, that was the arrangement. The lands were condemned. Steps were taken to condemn the property and we lost possession of it, and work was started to fill the low areas and make ready for the construction of warehouses.

In the plan for this development the railroad, which, as I have stated, I was connected with, was interested, because some years ago I arranged with the Territory to secure a right of way for a belt line road right around this probable some-day harbor extension, Kapa-lama, to have this railroad hook in with the warehouses and serve the wharves and so forth. Discussions were held [2749] with the United States Engineers and others to perfect a working arrangement on paper.

I have taken some time, very little time, to explain what took a great many meetings and discussions, but a very considerable amount of money was involved. You will appreciate that when you know the limited area of water frontage in this harbor, and the taking away of what we had definite plans for on locations which I bought, I think, in 1913, took a long shot ahead, looking for a final permanent location for a home base for our dredging enterprise.

All that came out of those discussions and plans was that a small area, much smaller than we required and planned for was left to us, and it is occupied and operated by us today.

9. General GRUNERT. You might call that a handicap to his desire for a full plan. Do you know of any other handicaps under which he may have suffered in attempting to build up a 100 percent defense?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. If I gave you the impression that it was a handicap, I think I have not stated the position correctly, General. It was a rearrangement which, as it turned out, was directly in the interests of both the Army and the Navy, for we have built scows, we have repaired equipment, we have been continuously at work 24 hours a day on that piece of property in connection with the war effort.

10. General GRUNERT. Still you considered him a very satisfactory man to deal with?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes; I think he is a clean-cut, straight-forward, hard-hitting man to get what he wants, and I am inclined to believe that if some word had not come from Washington [2750] to emphasize the importance of our place in the picture he would have grabbed it all off. As it turned out, had that taken place, it would have been a serious handicap to the defense operations of both the Army and the Navy, for we have built a very great many barges and scows and dredges and whatnot that have been actively used in this effort.

11. General GRUNERT. As it turned out?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes.

12. General GRUNERT. Suppose that Washington had not interfered, would you still have considered him a very satisfactory man to deal with?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I considered him very satisfactory, if you like, in driving home what he wants.

13. General GRUNERT. With what construction company were you associated? Any particular firm?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. With the Hawaiian Dredging Company.

14. General GRUNERT. Did that company have any construction contracts for the government?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. We have done construction work, dredging work, wharf building, dry-dock building, and so on, for the Navy; we have done dredging work for the U. S. Engineers, so that we have practically been continuously employed for 35 or 40 years in government work.

15. General GRUNERT. As to your dealings with the Army Engineers, who was the District Engineer with whom you did business, do you recall?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Oh, yes; I have done business with a good many. The last one I did business with was Colonel Wyman.

16. General GRUNERT. Wyman or Lyman?

[2751] Mr. DILLINGHAM. Both. Lyman followed Wyman. I have done business with Albert Lyman. Albert Lyman was the last engineer that I had any considerable amount to do with, and he followed Colonel Wyman.

17. General GRUNERT. Since we are on that subject and before I open any new ones, I think I will ask General Frank and Major Clausen to develop a certain specialty that they have assumed in this investigation, while we are on this subject. You go ahead with that line, and develop it, General.

18. General FRANK. Did you have any interest in any contracting company or construction company that was associated with the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir. I organized in 1919 the Hawaiian Contracting Company. The reason for organizing it was that I wanted to give—this is important I think—some of my associates who had gone along with us in the dredging company an interest in construction work of a wider field than we had in the dredging business. So this company was organized and the stock was offered to the young men who had been associated with me in the dredging business. The idea was, so there would be no competition between the two companies, because they were closely affiliated, that the contracting company would do the land work and the dredging company would do the water front work. That made a line of cleavage so that if it were wharves the dredging company handled it; if it were filling, reclamation, salvage work, dredging, any work of that character, the dredging company handled it. If it were bridges, roads, buildings, sewers, work of that character, the contracting company handled it.

I agreed with my principal associate in the dredging business [2752] that we would take whatever stock the boys were not able to take. So, as it turned out, while not getting the control, I had a substantial interest, but had no interest, nor was I a director, nor have I ever been, in the contracting company.

These companies were affiliated, used the same group of engineers, occupied the same building, under two separate managements. As to the contracting company, Colonel Wyman asked me, after he had been here some time, and I met him, if I would be interested in coming in and taking an interest in the Hawaiian Constructors. Is that the name of it?

19. General FRANK. That is right.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I said no, I would not. He wanted to know why not. And we had quite a talk. I said that all my time and all my efforts were dedicated to the work which we had in hand, that I was not interested in getting into anything more than what I had on hand.

20. General GRUNERT. About when was this, Mr. Dillingham, when he approached you as to this?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I think I can tell you pretty close to it. That was, I think, perhaps in May or June of 1941, along in there some time.

Colonel Wyman explained to me that the Navy had put one over on the Army in getting—I am repeating now; I am not vouching for facts—the Navy had put one over by giving my organization, my assistants, property work which the Navy was doing, that he came down here without any idea that there was any outfit, local outfit, that could handle the work which was in sight for the engineers to do, and because of my long residence in this place and connections which I had, to use his exact words, [2753] “you can get anything that is necessary to push your job along, and I have got this outfit I brought with me, that have got to find their way around,” and he said “I would like to have your outfit come in and take a hand in this, so as to help push our jobs along.”

21. General GUNERT. But this was after the contract had been awarded to the Constructors and they were on the job?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Oh, yes, they had been here and they were doing quite a lot of work. I don't know when they came here, but I know it was about the middle of the year of 1941, because—and this may interest you,—I turned it down flat, but I said this, “If at any time there is anything you think I can do to help out in the situation, you can call on me just as if I had the controlling interest in this contract of yours. I don't want anything for it, but I do want to help wherever I can. So if a situation arises where you think, as you seem to think, that I could be helpful, just let me know what to do.”

Well, along in October of that year, one Sunday noon, Colonel Wyman and Colonel Weimer came down to this ranch that I have, where I spend my week-ends. They arrived about noon and had a bit of lunch and then he said: “General Short has sent me down here to tell you we have got to have a 35-ton crane, and the only crane that is not now being used in war work is the one that you have down in your shops, the dredging shops.”

I said, “Well, Colonel, you can't have it.”

He said, “By God, we will buy it.”

I said, “You can't have it. We are outfitting right at the moment a dredge which has come from California and that they want to put to work as soon as possible. Without that [2754] crane it is impossible to lift the spuds or move any of the heavy pipe, and it will tie us up so we will have to shut down. We cannot do it. We have another one which has already gone and we can't allow this one to go.”

We was a very persistent man and a very forceful man. He and I did not always get along. But we locked horns on this one. He said “Short says you must let us have it.” I said “I can't help it; you can't have it.” He said “Well, you telephone some of your outfit.” I said “I won't telephone. It won't do any good. The answer is no.”

Well, he stuck to it for an hour and a half, or more, and then I said, "I will see you tomorrow, Colonel. In the meantime I will try and think up some way out of your fix here."

So the next morning I took up the question of whether or not there was a crane available, and to satisfy Colonel Wyman I took the shop foreman up to the Colonel's office, and I said "Now, I tried to explain to you how important this crane is to us. Here is the shop foreman, Manuel Costa. He will tell you what our situation is, and the answer is no."

Then he said "This is so important that nothing is comparable in importance to the getting of this crane. By God, you are going to let me have it." I said, "No, I am not."

Suddenly it struck me and I turned to this man, and I said "Listen, Manuel, what has become of that gantry crane that we had at Hilo when we finished the Hilo breakwater?" He said "I think it is up there." So I took the telephone and called up the superintendent.

Am I making this too long for you gentlemen?

22. General GRUNERT. Go ahead; it is very interesting.

[2755] Mr. DILLINGHAM. I called up the superintendent of the Hilo Railroad and said "Where is that crane you used on the outer end of that breakwater?" He said, "It is boxed up behind the round house." I said, "Tear it down, so it can be inspected. It is a 30 to 35 ton crane, is it not?" He said, "Yes."

So I said, "Colonel, have you got a man that can go up and inspect this rig?" He said, "Yes, I have, but," he said, "I haven't got any money to pay for sending him to Hilo." I said, "All right, I will pay for it, and you can pay me some time. I will send one of our engineers, mechanical engineers with your man, and they can go up tomorrow morning."

So I telephoned and arranged the transportation by air, and we then discussed how we could get it down, and Wyman said, "I have got a load going up on a scow that ought to be in Hilo tomorrow." I said, "You hold that scow in Hilo until we can find out whether this crane will answer the purpose or not." That was arranged.

Manuel Costa said everything was set to go. Then Wyman said, "I am going to tell you what a jam I am in." I may say, until the calendar ran against me, that I have for over 20 years been a reserve officer in good standing and have discussed the defense plans for this island with many commanding officers, and for several reasons, and one was because of the part which the railroad here would play in any attack that would be made upon the island.

He pulled down a chart and for the first time I learned where the Japanese were. I was shown these islands to the south and southwest of us and how they were placed there and how easily they could cut our line of communications between [2756] here and Australia. He said, "The Ludington is loading in San Diego. I have got orders to get equipment down to Canton to be used at Canton and/or Christmas, unload the Ludington when she gets there. We have got to get out of here in so many days with this equipment. I haven't a scow; I haven't a crane; I haven't a towboat; I haven't got a damned thing, and I have got to get this equipment together and get it off down there."

Well, Golly, I said to myself, if there is anything in God's world I can do to help this situation, this is a situation that should take priority over anything else. Word came back from Hilo that the crane was worth moving, but the boiler was shot. I got it down here and I put it in the shop. I had a battle royal with my son, the manager of the dredging company, because he said, "You can't, you just can't tie us up this way." I couldn't tell them why, but I said, "This has got to have priority. I don't care if you shut down right now, but we have got to have this thing ready to go. Take my word for it. You will have to take my word for it." We got it ready a day ahead of scheduled time and off, and it was down there to meet the Ludington. We got the scow, we got the tow boat, strapped this crane in the center so she could lift the stuff out and put it on one end and on the other end and then go ashore and lift it off again, guns and very necessary heavy equipment that had to be put ashore.

Subsequent events satisfied me that that was a contribution that was of the very greatest value to the war effort, because we hadn't been set up there. If the island was attacked or defended, we maintained the line of communications for our planes through to Australia; and I have said many times, I don't know [2757] of any job that was more important to the war effort than what was put over by Colonel Wyman.

I hold no brief for him, but I can tell you gentlemen that in over 50 years of business experience nobody I have ever known would have put that over unless he had had the drive that Colonel Wyman had, who wouldn't take no for an answer. He stuck to it until he solved the problem, and I couldn't discourage him, and until the thing was really put up in such shape that it had to be done, a way had to be found to do it. I am glad to bear testimony to this, because I read the papers.

23. General FRANK. Did the Hawaiian Contracting Company finally become a member of the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Subsequently they were. They were taken in. They were—I'll tell you. Let me tell you that story.

Colonel Wyman and Rohl called me to a meeting and tried to get me associated in this group, and I said that I wouldn't be interested, as I said before, and I wouldn't go along. So that was that.

Some days after that Mr. H. P. Benson, who was president of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, asked me if I would go with him to the engineer's office to discuss a proposition which they wanted to make to get the Contracting Company in to help on this construction work of the U. S. E. D. I agreed to go, and went. The Contracting Company had the contract to build the two wharves in Kapalama, and when the war came on they cancelled the contract; and under a clause of the contract, a recapture clause, they took all of the equipment, all of our men except the office force and the management, and took them over—Wyman did—into his group. He took the equipment, the men [2758] served, and I don't know just how they were handled, but we were left without any men, without any equipment, and we were just the shell of a company with some money which they eventually paid for some equipment.

24. General FRANK. Are you conversant with the manner in which that organization functioned over in the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No; I know very little about the details of what went on, but my advice to Benson was not to go in on it; and at that meeting which I started to tell you about, after ten or fifteen minutes I got up and said, "Well, I am not running this company, and I have no managerial interest in it, but any arrangement you make with Mr. Benson is your affair", and I left. He came to me and said, "We are flat. We have nothing to do unless we can go in there."

I said, "What I have heard, they need some assistance such as you can give in straightening out some of the tangles and snarls which result from driving ahead to grab materials and men and freeze this and freeze that and freeze the other thing so as to have something to work with." The result was, it had gotten awfully jammed up, and there was a lot of howling about it from the business community because they couldn't get their bills approved, and so forth and so on. I said, "There is a big job for you, Percy, in there, but I wouldn't touch it."

25. General FRANK. You said that to Benson?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, I wouldn't touch it. It's an awful mess, I think.

26. General FRANK. Were you familiar at all with those matters?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Only by hearsay and the difficulties that [2759] people were having in dealing with them. I wasn't connected with any deal of that sort, and so I wasn't affected.

27. General FRANK. Who were the people who were affected? Can you tell us that?

Mr. HILLINGHAM. Davies & Company. Theo. H. Davies & Company, I think the American Factors, Honolulu Iron Works, and a great many smaller concerns.

28. General FRANK. What were the reasons they needed help?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Well, I told Colonel Wyman one day, I said, "Colonel, the trouble with your outfit is that you haven't set up an organization big enough to do the tremendous job that is on you. You need a top executive, chief-clerk type of man to run the office. You need a man that's conversant with the pay and the checking up of orders and bills and so on. You are trying to do it all yourself, and there isn't any man living can handle the job the size that this has suddenly developed into without having properly trained and able men to handle the different jobs so that when it comes on your desk you can put your O. K. on and it's on the way. You are trying to do all that detail yourself, and no man can do that."

29. General FRANK. Do you know of any delays in defense construction because of that situation?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Oh, I couldn't. If I said I did, I would have to tell you where and when, and I don't know.

30. General FRANK. You said a moment ago, in talking to Mr. Benson, for him to do what he wanted to, but you wouldn't touch it. Why wouldn't you touch it?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Well, I had about all that I could handle, and policy matters, and details connected with business that I [2760] was trying to operate; and to take this on in addition was out of the question, plus the fact that I knew they weren't set up as any business of that magnitude would have to be set up to function perfectly. But it was war, and the jobs had to be done, and the drive

was to do them. The hours of work that those men spent were just beyond anything that I have ever known, because I have been called 9—one call I got 10 o'clock one night from Colonel Wyman, a rumpus about unloading some ship in the harbor. He drove these men, according to Mr. Benson, up to 12 and 1 o'clock, and he would be down in the morning at 5 or 6. He was a thief for work if ever a man was, and he drove everybody with him that way.

31. General FRANK. Are you sufficiently familiar with the details to tell us whether or not when the Hawaiian Contracting organization went in there, that they were allowed to use their organizational and directive ability in the Hawaiian Constructors, or were they directed by the Engineer Corps?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. If I may make the suggestion, the man that can tell you all of this and give you the detail and the straight of it is Mr. Benson, and anything that I might say would be what I remember of discussions or talks that I had with him; but he would have first-hand information about all of that I am sure.

32. General FRANK. That is what I want to get. Now, did you ever meet this man Rohl?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes.

33. General FRANK. Do you know anything about him?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Well, personally I didn't want him for a partner. In that perhaps I do him a great injustice when I say [2761] that, but I didn't like the cut of his jib, to be perfectly frank.

34. General FRANK. Would you ever hire him?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir.

35. General FRANK. Why?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I don't know why. I didn't like him.

36. General FRANK. How many times, ever, did you see him?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I think only three times.

37. General FRANK. Was he always sober?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I don't know.

38. General FRANK. Did you have any suspicion?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes.

39. General FRANK. Now, how long did you know Wyman?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I think I met him fairly shortly after his tour of duty started. I don't remember just when it was, but I didn't see much of him until it came pretty close to the attack here, the months before that, I think, four or five or six months prior to that when I first had discussions with him. I think that's right.

40. General FRANK. If Wyman were available would you hire him?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, for certain type of jobs I would consider him a very valuable man.

41. General FRANK. Are there any qualifications on that?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes.

42. General FRANK. Will you state them?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I would want to follow along with him. It's a very hard question to answer, but he was such a driver that he was not one that would get along with men in civilian life. In all probability, in civilian activities he would have [2762] trouble with his organization because of his domineering, driving character. But if there was a tough job somewhere to be done, and regardless of everything else it just had to be done, I would feel that in his hands it would be accomplished somehow.

43. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not he had any habits that affected his dependability?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I never saw him, in any meeting I ever had with him, when I thought he wasn't alert, on the job. I had practically no social contacts with him. I think he only was in our house once, and that was for a very short time when he came to inquire about something.

44. General FRANK. Would you say he was a man who called for close supervision?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Well, in what connection, General? "Close supervision?" Close supervision implies a check on his integrity or honesty, or so on.

45. General FRANK. Well, I am talking about his work. If you had been Division Engineer in San Francisco and responsible for him as District Engineer in Hawaii, what degree of supervision would you have felt were necessary? That is in the light of statements you have just finished.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Well, if it was a rush job that had to be done I would turn him loose on it. If it was a job that was a developing plan, and so on, I would want someone of entirely different nature, training, and ability to go over his setup and see how in balance he had his work planned out.

46. General FRANK. If his operations extended over a period of eight months, or any period, how often would you feel it necessary to check on him?

[2763] Mr. DILLINGHAM. Well, that would depend somewhat on the form of reports that came in, the progress reports, the labor reports, and costs of the operation. If those were full and complete, if those reports were satisfactory, I wouldn't consider that he needed very close supervision.

47. General GRUNERT. May I butt in there?

48. General FRANK. Yes.

49. General GRUNERT. Suppose you had him in the job which he did here in Hawaii, in which apparently the office was pretty well balled up due to a lack either of key personnel to administer the office: how then would you have known through these reports in what shape that office was unless you came and looked at it and knew conditions? Would those reports have reflected the conditions that actually existed here?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I wouldn't think so. I know nothing about it, but I don't believe that they were taking the time to write out reports and all the rest of it. I don't think the man is a good organizer. I think he is a driver.

50. General GRUNERT. Then, if he is not a good organizer, wouldn't you necessarily have had to provide him with such organizational brains to help him or at least come to see how his organization was getting along?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I would think so.

51. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

52. General FRANK. In his selection of men he was instrumental in bringing Rohl over here to help him. Do you think Rohl was of any help to him?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Well, I can repeat what he said to me. He said that, "These people have done good work for me on the mainland,

and I brought them over here because"—repeating what [2764] I have already said—"because I didn't think there was anybody here that was in a class to do the job that I knew they could do."

53. General GRUNERT. Well, had he investigated to find out whether there was anybody here to do the job before he went to the mainland to get them; do you know?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, I don't know.

54. General GRUNERT. Did he ever approach you prior to that contract being awarded?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir.

55. General GRUNERT. In December?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir.

56. General GRUNERT. Were there others beside yourself who had capable organizations to do a great deal of that work?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Why, there are other organizations here that do construction work of different kinds successfully.

57. General FRANK. Do you think Benson would have been big enough to have created the right type organization to have met that requirement, or Woolley?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Given the opportunity at the start, I think that Woolley and Benson could have put in an organization in the office, and that would have been of great value.

58. General FRANK. Are you conversant with the McKee Constructing Company?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir.

59. General FRANK. Mr. McKee who built Hickam Field?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I knew when they were here working on the field, but I didn't have any contacts with them.

60. General FRANK. Was this tour of Wyman's here his first [2765] tour in the islands, to your knowledge?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I think it was. I don't recall of ever knowing of his being here before.

61. General FRANK. You were here during the period prior to Pearl Harbor and afterwards and knew generally the reputation of this pair, Rohl and Wyman. Will you tell what it was?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I don't think they were very well known, frankly, in the community. It was, it seemed to me, a very involved setup that they had: I couldn't answer that question. I don't know. Rohl was, I think, here only a small part of the time, and there was a fellow named Paul Grafe who I think had the dealings with Wyman and with Benson and Woolley.

62. General GRUNERT. What is your opinion of Grafe?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Well, I wouldn't employ him. It is pretty hard to answer questions like that, what my opinion is. I had so little to do with him, practically nothing to do with him. The same with Rohl. I think we form our likes and dislikes and our impressions—oftentimes I do—in ten or fifteen minutes' talk; and what feeling I had was that this California outfit do business in a different way from what we do business. But that doesn't condemn them.

63. General FRANK. You knew that this Hawaiian Constructors was operating on a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir.

64. General FRANK. Will you state your opinion of the relative advantage and disadvantage of a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract as compared to a fixed-fee contract?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No interests of mine that I know of have worked on a cost-plus-fixed-fee except the interest that I [2766] have through the contracting company on this U. S. E. D. contract. The Hawaiian Dredging Company was one of the first three companies to work on a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the Navy. That was on the Pacific Naval Air Base contract. That contract grew from an estimated expenditure of money of between 12 and 14 million dollars to over 500 million. If the old method of advertising for contracts had been followed, the time it would have taken to get up the drawings, to write the specifications for the work in these far-flung locations such as Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, Canton, as well as the tremendous amount of construction work that was done on this island, I don't believe it would have been possible, because of the time element consumed in getting together these facts, calling for bids, securing the bonds, having the contract signed, and so on—I don't think it would have been possible to have accomplished half which was accomplished under the cost-plus-fixed-fee, in the work which we were connected with.

65. General FRANK. In that work, however, you had an opportunity to use the organizing and directive ability that already existed in your dredging company?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Very definitely.

66. General FRANK. And you had control of directing the work of procurement and in planning operations?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, subject to review and such control as the Bureau of Yards and Docks exercised over each job.

67. General FRANK. And the government did not take over supervision of your work?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir.

68. General FRANK. You supervised that yourself?

[2767] Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir.

69. General FRANK. They gave you the plans on which to proceed?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir. And when you say "you" you mean the group where we in turn formed a directive group centralizing the direction and control of ourselves within ourselves?

70. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir.

71. Major CLAUSEN. Concerning, Mr. Dillingham, some of the other contractors who have been available here to have done this work that was later done by the Hawaiian Constructors, can you tell the Board some of the group that might be here? You mentioned Mr. Woolley and Mr. Benson. Now, in addition to those two are there others?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Mr. E. E. Black.

72. Major CLAUSEN. Does he have an organization here, sir?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir.

73. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. And Glover, Jimmie Glover, both of whom were constructors, do construction work in wood and concrete and underground and roads and buildings, and so on.

74. Major CLAUSEN. Now, is there a Mr. Wiley, W-i-l-e-y, who is a contractor, local contractor, with whom you are acquainted?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I don't believe so. Mr. Wiley?

75. Major CLAUSEN. Is there a Mr. Clarke of the Clarke-Halawa Rock Company?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, I know Mr. Clarke.

76. Major CLAUSEN. And will you state to the Board your opinion as to his organizing and directing ability, sir?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I wouldn't employ Mr. Clarke.

[2768] 77. Major CLAUSEN. Just when was it, Mr. Dillingham, when you became a part of the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I never became a part of the Constructors.

78. Major CLAUSEN. You never were?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir.

79. Major CLAUSEN. I understood that you were.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir.

80. Major CLAUSEN. You have made a statement that this California outfit operated differently than the Hawaiian groups.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir.

81. Major CLAUSEN. You had reference to the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I had reference to Paul Grafe, and under Rohl's direction or management or whatever the relationship was.

82. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Paul Grafe represented, did he not, W. E. Callahan Construction Company and the Gunther-Shirley Company?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I think so.

83. Major CLAUSEN. Both those organizations, Mr. Dillingham, are Nebraska corporations.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Oh, are they?

84. Major CLAUSEN. And Mr. Rohl represented Rohl-Connolly Corporation, and that also was a Nebraska corporation.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Well, I didn't mean to say anything about California corporations. I should have said mainland corporations.

[2769] 85. General GRUNERT. Have you finished your line of inquiry, General Frank, or have you something else?

86. General FRANK. Are you through, Major?

87. Major CLAUSEN. This Mr. Wylie I refer to is an employee of the McKee organization. Were you acquainted with the McKee Contractors when they were here and built the Hickam Field and other permanent installations?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, I know of them. I was not connected with them in any way.

88. Major CLAUSEN. That is all I have.

89. General GRUNERT. Mr. Dillingham, from your long residence in the island and your wide acquaintanceship, could you give the Board just a little talk of what you know of the people, especially the Japanese element of the population, as to their—I won't call it loyalty to the United States, but as to their danger to this outpost of the United States?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Of course, that has been a question. I think three presidents of the United States asked me over a period of years what I could tell of what I thought of the loyalty of the Japanese-Americans here. My answer to that was this: No one really knows. The acid

test would be where they will stand if we ever mix it with Japan. If the thing can be staved off for another generation, the wish is father to the thought, but I believe that the roots of the third generation will be in the ground sufficiently deep so that it will be fully to their interests to be loyal and support the government as against any outsider.

90. General GRUNERT. Was there any indication because of the raid, the blitz, or whatever they call it, of any particular [2770] element showing their desire to turn against the United States or to perpetrate deeds or acts of sabotage that confirmed your belief that they showed an inclination of what the present-day generation out here was inclined to do?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I do not know of a single case where a Japanese agent or a Japanese-American showed anything out of line with support to this country. In our own experience, we had 45 Japanese-American brakemen, and on the morning of the 7th we had on our docks, which are served by rail and truck, a great many thousand tons of dynamite and high explosives. We used, because we had no other labor, our regular train crews, worked them around the clock, and they picked up and moved away from the docks in Honolulu enough dynamite and high explosives to flatten the whole city of Honolulu.

These boys worked on these trains, carrying train loads of ammunition, dynamite and high explosives, from the water front in Honolulu and the Pearl Harbor naval station and other restricted areas, now restricted areas, towed by locomotives without headlights, without any lights of any sort, and they had to give up using fog torches, electric torches, because when they were used it frequently happened that somebody on guard on the way took a shot at the fellow that was between the engine and the highball. We have had our men shot at, machine gunned as the train pulled out at the foot of Waianae Mountain, when we had Marine guards on the train, and guards along the side, and moving trainloads of ammunition; they would open fire and shoot back and forth. Of course, it made a job for me to do.

But never once was there an employee of the road, Japanese or otherwise, I may say, who failed to carry on or who showed any inclination to do other than his job and do it well and faithfully [2771] fully and stay on it 17, and 18, and 19 hours out of the 24, as many of them did. I do not know of a single case in Honolulu where there was sabotage. All the hooey that went out in the papers, everything that was published, every report suggesting something of that sort was run down, and not one particle of evidence was developed to support any of those yarns.

I think it was a marvelous record. What they were wishing or thinking, many of them, no one knows. But so far as any acts are concerned, I must say that they certainly delivered a square job to the United States.

91. General GRUNERT. Did you expect an air raid when it came?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir.

92. General GRUNERT. Had you any reason to believe that the international condition between the United States and Japan was such as to result in explosion about that time?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir.

93. General GRUNERT. Did you form an opinion as to the tenseness between the two nations about that time?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Naturally we were interested in what the press carried about the negotiations in Washington. I think there was a feeling—I felt they were not getting anywhere with those negotiations.

94. General GRUNERT. Your sources of information were the press and radio only, were they?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir.

95. General GRUNERT. Do you know the types of alert that were prescribed by the Army?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I am not sure that I know them all. I know there was a sabotage alert, there was the top alert, and I did [2772] know the week before the 7th that there was a form of alert which was described and discussed at that time as being the sabotage alert.

96. General GRUNERT. You had no occasion to ask yourself whether or not that was sufficient security under the circumstances as you knew them?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Well, it was considered a drill from that point of view, one of many drills that were being held.

97. General GRUNERT. Did you have any experience under the drill in an all-out alert, where they took their positions as if to meet an attack, be it from the air or sea or whatnot? Have you ever noticed any of those drills?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I do not recall a drill of that sort. There may have been, however.

98. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether not any of the precautions that were taken by the Army at any time alarmed the public?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I don't think so.

99. General GRUNERT. Suppose every defensive move that could have been taken to meet any possible condition had been taken, of occupying the positions, of placing live ammunition at guns and the location in position of antiaircraft guns, together with protection of various points against sabotage; would that have caused any particular alarm amongst the public that you know of?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I think it would cause considerable discussion, if that had been put into effect. The question very naturally would be why?

100. General FRANK. There would have been no upset?

[2773] Mr. DILLINGHAM. Oh, I don't think so.

101. General GRUNERT. Have you, outside of your interests in the railroad and your construction, any other interests that employ considerable labor?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Well, I have been interested for some 10 years in this cane fibreboard factory in Hilo. I have been vice-president of the Oahu Sugar Company employing some 500 men.

102. General GRUNERT. The Board does not want to know your interests. It just wants to get an idea of the amount of labor over which you have some control and of which you may have some knowledge, with a view to finding out what the conditions were as to their loyalty, as to their possibility of being a danger to the United States, and as to whether such business interests or commercial interests would lead the commercial people to interfere with anything the Army wanted to do in the line of taking defensive measures. Do you know of any such?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No.

103. General GRUNERT. You do not know of any protest that business or commercial firms or managers of labor would make if the Army took an all-out alert at any time?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir.

104. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions?

105. General RUSSELL. Were you down in this vicinity of Pearl Harbor on this day of December, 7th, 1941?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I was at the ranch, which is on the other side of the Waianae Mountains. Two planes engaged in a dog fight and we thought it was a target practice. I was at breakfast on the veranda, and after disposing of the family down there I came right down to Pearl Harbor and spent the day at Pearl Harbor, until about 4 in the afternoon. My son was in charge of dredging operations there. He came in ahead of me. [2774] I followed him in as quickly as I could, in time to see the planes come over that did the photographing, and I stayed out and watched them.

106. General RUSSELL. What I had in mind particularly was your testimony of a moment ago, in which you related that the operation of the trains indicated a lot of indiscriminate shooting by the troops, one shooting at the other. It indicated quite a bit of confusion among the American troops here; is that true?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir. To everybody that was just as much of a shock as there would be if this thing happened in Washington, D. C. The reaction was somewhat in the nature of paralysis, I would say, rather than excitement. Unbelievable. It was not on that day that any of this shooting went on, but when night came on, planes were coming in and being shot at, not far from my home, and fires in the cane field from a shot-down plane, and fire from the ships which was still burning, and the uncertainty as to whether that night the morning attack would be followed by a landing, all caused a pretty serious state of mind in the people here. It was not then so much as the following nights, that we were trying to reorganize, that we were moving, as we did every night, trains in and out.

107. General RUSSELL. But the night that you were describing about the planes coming in and getting shot at, that was the night following the attack on the morning of the 7th?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, that was the night of the 7th.

108. General RUSSELL. They were friendly planes?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes.

109. General RUSSELL. And our people were shooting at them?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes.

[2775] 110. General GRUNERT. What is the state of mind as of today?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. What is the state of mind today?

111. General GRUNERT. As compared to the state of mind as of December 7th, before the blitz. Are they growing complacent again? Don't they expect an attack now, or have you any index to that state of mind?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I think there is this difference, General: Before the 7th there was uncertainty as to what the reaction would be in the Japanese population here. I think the officials of the Army and Navy, from statements made by them—and I discussed it with a great many over a period of several years—the attitude of the public di-

vided somewhat as to how we could depend on the Japanese, or whether we could not, which led to the feeling that the most serious thing that could happen to us in the event of war would be what the Japanese would do, whether we would be knifed in bed, and hysterical people saying they wouldn't have them in the house if they didn't have to, because if there came along D-Day, or whatever they call it, they might pin you all in bed. There was a lot of loose talk of that kind. I don't think anyone today is afraid of any such reaction on the part of the Japanese. That is quite different from what the feeling was before the 7th.

112. General RUSSELL. That feeling was rather real and would enter into any decision made by a commander here, wouldn't it?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I think, in fact I know, that that was borne in upon them from some distance away, that they have got to be prepared to handle a situation that might develop locally in the event of trouble. If I had to die for it, I never met an officer of the Army or Navy with any idea that we would be [2776] bombed from the air. No one that I ever talked to ever intimated that such a thing was a possibility.

113. General GRUNERT. Is there any indication at present that business or employers of labor would be inclined to not cooperate with the military in what the military thinks ought to be done, because they now think that there can be no more raids, and, on account of the present war situation, a great many of these restrictions should be removed, because they interfere with business or pleasure?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I do not think the business men have raised that point even in their own minds. I think that this little community was solidly behind whatever was necessary in the judgment of our military leaders to be done, just as if they were all in uniform and drilled to support them. I have never known this community—I have seen them in trouble before; we had the plague, cholera and other scares here, yellow fever and one thing another, and they were pretty badly frightened and got together to do something about it, but I have never known this community so of one mind to get in and do whatever was necessary or give whatever was wanted as they have been since the 7th of December.

The exception to the rule was when politics entered into the thing and there was a feeling amongst some of our legal fraternity and colleges that we ought to say, "By God, we ought to maintain the rights of American citizens," and all that sort of hokey that nobody gave a damn about.

We were perfectly willing to go to bed at 10 o'clock and 8 o'clock and go without lights and all the rest of it, and nobody wanted any change. Irrespective of what was said, that was the truth. They didn't want to be moved into a different position, [2777] for one very good reason: They felt that if there was anything lurking in the minds of the Japanese or any tendency for any Japs to get together or any desire to do a thing like that, they were denied that opportunity under the curfew and were a darned sight safer as American citizens under that kind of military control, when the fear of immediate punishment was facing a violator of military law, as against cases dragged along in the courts, and the minute they lifted the thing up our troubles began with the police and the police department. The minute that was done they began having trouble.

114. General GRUNERT. Wouldn't that be good government on the part of the city or the county to have put that in of their own accord, then?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. To do what?

115. General GRUNERT. To have a curfew of their own.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, it is the fear of punishment, General. It was the teeth in the military control that made people feel comfortable here.

116. General FRANK. As you know, Mr. Dillingham, this Alert No. 1 that was in vogue as a defense against sabotage?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir.

117. General FRANK. And they decided upon that because they were so ultra-allergic to sabotage and that feeling, that state of mind had been built up. Now, from what you say I assume that that same feeling existed among the civilian population.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. The uncertainty as to whether or not—

118. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. That is right.

119. General FRANK. And there was a feeling among the civilian [2778] population of the necessity of taking measures against sabotage as a protection just in case?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Right.

120. General FRANK. That is right?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. That is correct.

121. General FRANK. I am bringing that up so as to indicate that notwithstanding there were some messages from outside the Department that came in that told them to beware of sabotage, there was a feeling right here in the community that prompted that same action?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes. I would not say that it was a unanimous opinion or anything like that. Except in time of great stress, you would find a variety of ideas on the thing. Some people felt there was danger from it, and others said "Oh, pshaw," or something, but as a precautionary measure I think those who believe in a conservative position felt we should not take any chances; would rather be ready than sorry.

122. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, are you acquainted with the reasons why Colonel Wyman was relieved as District Engineer for the Hawaiian Department?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, I am not. I happen to know that he and Colonel Albert Lyman did not see eye to eye on many things. I think there was a good deal of friction between those two officers.

123. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know, sir, why notwithstanding whatever reasons may have existed for the relief of Colonel Wyman, he was later awarded a D. S. M.?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Wyman or Lyman?

124. Major CLAUSEN. Wyman, sir.

[2779] Mr. DILLINGHAM. Wyman?

125. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Do I know why?

126. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I have always understood that it was in recognition of what he did in opening and keeping the door open between here and Australia.

127. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with that D. S. M.?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I haven't anything to do with making awards of that sort, naturally, but I made the statement a great many times, as I made it here, that I think it was a contribution to the war service. Everything else aside, he darned near did the impossible to make possible the keeping open of communications lying between here and Australia. To my mind that is one of the most important things that could have been done at that time, but he surmounted the difficulties and did it.

128. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with the recommendation for that? Did you ever so recommend to his superiors?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir.

129. Major CLAUSEN. Or did anyone else that you know of?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I talked at large on the subject, and I think I wrote Lee Warren, to be sure about that, that this Wyman was deserving of recognition for the accomplishment of that job that I knew so much about.

[2780] 130. Major CLAUSEN. Just for the sake of the record, would you state who Lee Warren is, Mr. Dillingham?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes. Lee Warren is an attorney in Washington that has represented me by power of attorney for 20 years. He was in the Navy, retired more than 20 years ago, studied law, and has represented business interests there.

131. Major CLAUSEN. This D. S. M. passed through a chain of origination in the office of the Division Engineer at San Francisco, then through the office of the Chief of Engineers in Washington and to the Commanding General of the Army Service Forces, General Somervell, for the usual routine handling.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes.

132. Major CLAUSEN. Did you talk or write to any of those?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir.

133. General FRANK. Just for purposes of the record, I would like to get in there that the Rohl-Connolly Company and the Shirley-Gunther Company and the W. E. Callahan Company have offices in and do business in California, notwithstanding where they are incorporated.

134. General GRUNERT. Have you any further questions?

135. General RUSSELL. No.

136. General GRUNERT. Was there much if any damage to property and loss of life in Honolulu aside from Army and Navy installations and personnel?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. There was some. There were a number killed. There were some houses hit by falling shells and shrapnel, but in proportion it was very light.

137. General GRUNERT. Is there any feeling existent or extant in the islands here as to what General Short and Admiral Kimmel [2781] did or did not do, as to whether or not they did their duty or did not do their duty?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Would you read that question again, please?

(The pending question, as above recorded, was read by the reporter.)

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I judge, from letters received from the mainland and further away, that feeling was much more keenly critical of their failure to do their duty than here in the islands.

138. General FRANK. Had you been at the other end of this attack, Mr. Dillingham, would you not have been feeling that you were participating in a very courageous task of jeopardy?

139. General GRUNERT. Do you mean on the Japanese end?

140. General FRANK. Yes.

141. General GRUNERT. Oh.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, I would have felt so if I believed all that I read in the papers about the impregnable Hawaii, that I was going up against a buzz-saw.

142. General FRANK. It, therefore, was a courageous undertaking that could have been disastrous, just as disastrous in defeat as it was successful in victory?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Well, I wouldn't say that, because the loss of life and property if we had bagged the whole lot would have been very little compared to the odds in personnel and matériel; we stood to lose a great deal more than they could have lost if we had knocked them all out.

143. General FRANK. But, had they lost the carriers that participated in this,—

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Ah, yes.

144. General FRANK. —it would have had a great effect upon future Japanese naval operations?

[2782] Mr. DILLINGHAM. That is very true.

145. General FRANK. Therefore, they made a gamble?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No question about that.

146. General GRUNERT. Although we have gone quite far afield from our original start here, and we didn't know why General Short wanted you to appear before the Board, except that you knew something the Board might be able to use, I think we have covered considerable ground, but now is there any ground left that you can think of, any facts that you can give the Board that have not yet been covered, or subjects that have not been touched upon, that you would like to tell the Board?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I have read so much hooey about the relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel that I feel that I would like to go on record, having known both these gentlemen, having known them, General Short in a business and social way, and Admiral Kimmel only in a limited social way. I am perfectly positive that there was a speaking and pleasant relationship between Admiral Kimmel and General Short. I never heard that there was any friction or any lack of get-together between those two men until after the fracas was over. I would like to say this: that prior to the 7th there was no one ranking officer here recognized by both branches of the service. The question of whether the top Admiral or the top General had authority over the other branch of the service, as far as I know, was never determined. In other words, there was sort of a dual control. Under those conditions, from my point of view as a citizen, I think that is a very difficult situation. If after the 7th the thing was set up, Admiral Nimitz was put in supreme command and the Commanding General here made military governor, there there [2783] was a sort of a question as to whether this controlled that or this individual controlled the other, and it got down to details. But with the individuals who represented those two tops the relationship was good, as I know of my own knowledge; and I thought, and still think and believe, that it is abso-

lutely necessary that there be one control in a locality when there is a job for both to do; and I think that that situation not only applies here but it applies in the islands to the south and elsewhere.

147. General GRUNERT. At that time had you that same thought through to conclusion, how would that have been in Washington, one head here receiving instructions from two heads in Washington? Wouldn't that unity of command or of control be necessary from top to bottom?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I would think so. I am a believer, in business, of having a boss that has the final say in the direction of policies, and so forth and so on.

148. General GRUNERT. But that has come about now through our system of joint Chiefs of Staff which made unity of command possible. Prior to that, had they had unity of command without a joint chief of staff in Washington, they would probably have received conflicting instructions from two heads.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes.

149. General GRUNERT. So the system as a whole would have to be adjusted to meet the conditions extant at that time.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I have just finished reading *Ten Years In Japan*, by Ambassador Joseph Grew. When I read of that year leading up to December 7th, to say nothing of what came before, and read that on January 27th, because of the amount of conver- [2784] sation there was about a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, that that was sent to the State Department, and then follow along up to the time of these conversations, and no progress, and the military and the civilians' controls in Japan shifting from one foot to the other, and so on, and a growing antagonism against the United States, and on the third of November Ambassador Grew sent a long cablegram to Mr. Hull outlining the situation; and the fact, the deduction, the only deduction I can make, was that war would inevitably follow if they didn't fix the situation promptly, and there didn't seem to be any prospect of that, and so forth and so on; and the next day in his journal he said, "I think that my telegram of the 3rd will become history." One month and four days before the attack on Pearl Harbor this information is sent to the State Department in Washington; and if, as I assume, a message was sent out to be alerted for any emergency, and Admiral Kimmel and General Short knew of this background or had those instructions from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy, and the captains of warships who were in town with their families on Saturday night, and the Army didn't have ammunition at the guns and the men placed, I think they were very derelict in their duty. So if that would be information that they had, that would be the warning that they had, and nothing more was done about it than to look out for the possible sabotage here, and so forth and so on, they certainly didn't do their job.

150. General FRANK. Have you read the Roberts report?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, I have not read the Roberts report.

151. General RUSSELL. This dereliction of duty that you have pictured just a moment ago—in outlining the factual basis there- [2785] for you spent some considerable time in talking about the details of what the ambassador who wrote the book knew, and its transmittal to the State Department.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir.

152. General RUSSELL. I was not clear as to whether you thought that the dereliction was more apparent and real if the commanders here knew what the ambassador in Japan knew. Do you think that that would affect their dereliction whether they knew what was going on in Japan or not?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, I'd think so, for the reason that I don't believe—in fact, I feel positive that there wasn't an Army or a Navy officer stationed here in Hawaii, and maybe elsewhere, who believed that it was likely or possible that we would be bombed by Japan. I don't believe they were. And unfortunately I can't tell you the opinion of a man high in office in this country who believes just as I do and included himself in the statement that that couldn't be, that that situation couldn't arise.

Much of the work that was being done here for the defense of these islands I think was considered on the part of a great many officers as being a hell of a good opportunity for some contractors to make some money, but that it was wholly unnecessary. And certainly I was on the wrong end of that one.

153. General GRUNERT. Any further questions?

154. General FRANK. No.

155. General GRUNERT. We seem to have exhausted what has occurred to us. So we thank you very much for your presence and taking your time and giving us of your testimony.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Very well, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 5:34 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

[2786]

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[2787] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1944.

FORT SHAFTER, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF FRANK H. LOCEY, WAIALAE RANCH,
HONOLULU, TERRITORY OF HAWAII

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Locey, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. LOCEY. Frank H. Locey, Waialae Ranch, Honolulu.

2. Colonel WEST. And what is your occupation, Mr. Locey? You operate that ranch?

Mr. LOCEY. I operate the ranch. Oh, I do several other things. I am an importer of livestock.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Locey, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7th, 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the [2788] phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, which was largely concerned with construction activities prior to that attack. Now, we are after facts or leads to where facts can be found. General Short has furnished the Board a list of representative citizens living in Hawaii who, he says, may have information of value to the Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you here with the hope that you may have facts to present to us. General Short did not refer to any particular subject on which you might testify, so it is up to you to open the subject, which may then give us leads on which we can ask questions.

Do you think of any particular reason why he should have suggested your name as possibly having information that may be of value to the Board?

Mr. LOCEY. Well, as far as Pearl Harbor on December 7th is concerned, I was not that close to the military situation, although at the

time I was president of the Board of Forestry and Agriculture, for 10 years, and I came in contact over land deals with General Short. I sat on the Governor's Food Commission, which General Short was very much interested in. General Short several times sent for me prior to December 7th to discuss issues that I was familiar with.

4. General GRUNERT. Then you can possibly give us some sidelights on his attempts to build up his defense of Hawaii and his cooperation with the civilian governmental officials.

Mr. LOCEY. I was president of the Department of Agriculture for 10 years, and I saw in General Short's time a marked stepup in preparing. I could see the hookup in my business with him. He was continually—I have charge of all the forestry in the [2789] Territory which was Territory property—he was continually working on roads, trails, getting permits to get into different water setups and studying the water conditions. He was greatly interested in the food situation of our people. He quite a few times—I would not say quite a few times, but he was continually harping at the civilian population here to right themselves in case of a war.

Several months prior to December 7th, he had put guards on all the bridges and installations here. There was not a day or night that you would go out—I might go a little further than that, which would be hearsay, and say that his fear and Washington's fear was of sabotage here, not an attack. He did his utmost. He put out guards on all of our utilities, on all of our bridges, day and night. He put them all through our forests, all over our water setups. They had a continuous guard over them. There was hardly a day that there were not letters coming in on the forestry situation from General Short, most of them personally signed by General Short.

5. General GRUNERT. Then the way I size it up, as far as you can see, he did his utmost to be physically prepared for anything that might happen; at the same time he paid a great deal of attention to antisabotage measures. Does that about size it up?

Mr. LOCEY. He did the utmost. I saw him prior to December 7th several times, on the food situation. On December 7th I was with him for a while; on December 8th I was at quite a lengthy meeting with him. I think that General Short was a savior to this country on December 7th. As I say about 10 or 11 o'clock I was with him, and saw the way the man held himself.

[2790] On December 8th he called a meeting at headquarters of about 40 of us, and he outlined what he wanted us civilians to do. He outlined the food situation. He talked probably for two hours.

Soon after he left I took over the civilian defense, and it was a big problem for me. We had about 11,000 people on our staff to organize and put on the staff. We had construction and hospitals and bomb shelters, which was piled on me in directives that were written in General Short's time. We revolutionized the whole hospital setup. We went into all phases of civilian life, that were prepared under his administration.

He sat and talked on December 8th to us boys for probably two hours, and for a year after that, when I got out of the civilian defense—I was not a war man and what I was doing I never did before, and problems and directives were coming at me en masse. There

wasn't a day or many times a day that questions would come up to me that were a mystery. I did not know how to decide them. I could pretty near always go back to General Short's speech that he made on that day, the 8th, and get an answer.

6. General GRUNERT. This was all after December 7th?

Mr. LOCEY. That was December the 8th, this meeting.

7. General GRUNERT. Was any of this preparatory work done prior to December 7th?

Mr. LOCEY. Well, there was a marked stepup here with the engineers, through their branch.

8. General GRUNERT. Did you have any air raid shelters, any black-out drills, any slit trenches dug, and so forth, prior to December 7th?

[2791] Mr. LOCEY. We did not on the civilian setup. The civilian setup here was like you might say it was in the United States. It had to be sold to the public.

9. General GRUNERT. In other words, the public had to be convinced of the necessity for it?

Mr. LOCEY. There had to something happen. The public was not sold on the food setup. General Short made a lot of public statements on the food setup. General Short feared a blockade here.

10. General GRUNERT. The former commanders had also feared that, hadn't they?

Mr. LOCEY. Well, yes, but they were so far ahead of war that we did not notice it, probably.

11. General GRUNERT. You did not pay any attention to it?

Mr. LOCEY. We didn't pay any attention. General Short was a very calm and convincing man.

[2792] 12. General GRUNERT. How long have you been in the Islands?

Mr. LOCEY. I have been here thirty years, thirty-four years.

13. General GRUNERT. Then possibly you can assist the Board in some general observation. Do you mind if we question you along general lines?

Mr. LOCEY. No, sir.

14. General GRUNERT. How about the population you have over here, particularly the Japanese element, both aliens and American citizens? How do you size them up as to their being a menace or a danger to the United States and the Islands? Would you like to express yourself on that?

Mr. LOCEY. I would.

Our community talks of statehood here. I think it is the most asinine thing I ever heard. I think we have the finest form of government here that there is in the United States today. I have been through the mainland. I have seen more or less things that weren't right, that couldn't be changed. We have a form of government that you can put your finger on and clamp down at any time. Our judges here are appointed by and go up as high as the President. We have got a better staff of judges in the territory, and have had for thirty years, than this territory could ever have or any state has ever had, because they are appointed, they are fearless, they don't have to look forward to election when a case is decided. They are clean and above-board, and there is no election mixed up with it.

You speak of the Japanese here. General Short, General—oh—

[2793] 15. General GRUNERT. Herron?

Mr. LOCEY. No. He was a Colonel at the time: Green was General Short's executive officer that was put in military governor. He was quite concerned, and I was on his advisory staff on civilian affairs. He kept asking me about these Japs. I constantly said that these Japs were—we were amazed at the way they did behave, but there isn't anything else they could do at the time. But I kept a-telling the General that when he would bring this subject up, that if this Island ever had an invasion and it got to a point where we had 60 percent of the advantage and the Japs had 40, look out; Goddamit, they would all go against us. I don't say all of them. I'll take that back. There are some good Japanese boys here. But we are just a-kidding ourselves. Our population: go to our schools here and look at the masses just filling the high schools, just the statistics of the graduates of the high schools in two or three years. They are voters. See what our vote, estimate what our vote will be here in four years. Why, hell, the population is 40 percent Japs now, and there is always a sway in vote that you can't depend on.

16. General GRUNERT. Are most of them Democrats or Republicans, or both?

Mr. LOCEY. Well, they are mostly youngsters; they don't know what they are.

17. General GRUNERT. But there are some on each side?

Mr. LOCEY. More on the Democrat side than the Republican side. More on the Democrat side.

18. General GRUNERT. Then, you think they would be a definite menace in case the Japanese attacked and appeared to [2794] be winning?

Mr. LOCEY. Oh, definitely. I wouldn't say all of them; there's a lot of the boys that would rally to our side. But there's a lot of them here.

19. General GRUNERT. There is no indication of that now in the present state of the war, is there?

Mr. LOCEY. Oh, not the slightest. On December the 7th there wasn't a thing hardly went wrong here.

20. General GRUNERT. Do these Japanese all cling together, vote together, and vote as a bloc, or are they separated into parties, or what?

Mr. LOCEY. They will bloc some, and then they kind of fear to bloc, and they waited to gain more strength. You can take in our House, compare. I will go back a little further on the question you asked me of the setup here. Go a little further back. I spoke of the appointments of the people that were appointed here. I didn't make any mention of the elected setup. If you would take and get before a bunch of elected officers here and a bunch of appointed officers, why, there is the difference of day and night. Now the Japs started to crawl into our House of Representatives. A few of them got elected. They kept a-crawling until they got one—prior to December the 7th, a couple of years before that, they got one Japanese member in the Senate. But there was a marked climb-up of Japanese getting elected to our House. Then one crawled into the Senate. But it's nothing now to what it would be, in my mind, in ten years from now. Why, Goddamit, if we got statehood, some day we would

have a Japanese governor and a couple of Japanese delegates in Washington. That's my opinion; hope [2795] this is not for—

21. General GRUNERT. All this is secret, but whoever digs out the secret record has to have the authority to do so. But it is not for publication.

Mr. LOCEY. I am interested here. It's not becoming of me, really, to talk this way against the community and this territory.

22. General GRUNERT. You use your own judgment on that, and if you think there is anything that you might say that is liable to rebound on you that way—

Mr. LOCEY. I don't ask to have it stricken out. It is my feeling; Goddamit, I can stand up under it. The bigger percent of the population here is for statehood. Everybody laughed at it when they started it. A couple of politicians began to talk about it to get more votes amongst that class, until it has grown and grown; Goddamit, they have all got to believing it. I think it is most ridiculous, and I am way in the minority on that thought; there are very few people that's got to thinking as I do.

23. General FRANK. What advantage would statehood be to industry?

Mr. LOCEY. I can't see it. I just—I can't see. They had a congressional meeting over here years ago on statehood, and they harped and harped on statehood. The only advantage that it would have, we don't get proper representation in Washington. We have one delegate that sits in the House. He has a voice but no vote, and his voice is not any good if he has not got a vote to trade, and these representatives kept a-asking what we wanted. The answer was very easily answered: [2796] We want representation in Washington that will have a value. But I think that we are asking for a lot of trouble to get that representation. We sure need representation in Congress and in the House. We have a House member, but he has no vote, and they pay no attention to him. He's a—Republicans, now they don't pay any attention to them, even if they do have a vote, because they are in the minority; but just think of a man that hasn't got a vote; they just pay no attention to him.

24. General GRUNERT. Do you have any questions?

25. General FRANK. No.

26. Major CLAUSEN. No.

Mr. LOCEY. I might go a little further on December the 7th, and speaking of preparedness, I left out the Navy. You didn't ask me. I was also Fish Commissioner for ten years, and we have a deep sea fishing industry here that depends on what they call nehu. It is a small fish for bait, and about 90 percent of those are in Pearl Harbor, and quite a while prior to December they just shut us down; we couldn't get a fisherman in Pearl Harbor to get bait.

That wasn't my business, but I appealed and represented them. We couldn't get them in, and it got to a point where we couldn't get our own game wardens to police Pearl Harbor, which is a great fish reservoir. It got to a point where we couldn't get a one of our officers in there to police the shore for fishing violations. Pearl Harbor was just as tight as could be. That went on for, oh, probably a year prior to Pearl Harbor.

27. General GRUNERT. Their fear of sabotage or fear of the signaling, or what?

Mr. LOCEY. I think fear of sabotage. My understanding of this whole situation before December the 7th, it was a great [2797] fear of sabotage. Plenty of Army officers here told me that this place was impregnable; they just waved aside the thought of attack, but that was just hearsay, but I know of General Short's feeling, and I knew that it was the feeling in Washington, through hearsay which comes so straight to me, that it was sabotage that we had to look after.

28. General GRUNERT. Well, they are sent out here for defense purposes.

Mr. LOCEY. Yes, sir.

29. General GRUNERT. Sabotage is just one element of defense.

Mr. LOCEY. That is right.

30. General GRUNERT. Now, do you people out here feel that the Army and Navy have let you down through not being able to do more to resist that attack?

Mr. LOCEY. No. No, we don't.

31. General GRUNERT. You didn't have very much damage or loss of life among your civilians in this thing?

Mr. LOCEY. No; we only had—well, there was at Pearl Harbor. I don't think there was hardly any loss in the military reservations, of individuals?

32. General GRUNERT. I mean among your civilian population.

Mr. LOCEY. Civilian. Well, there was some civilian population at Pearl Harbor, but in the town—

33. General GRUNERT. Those were employees, were they?

Mr. LOCEY. Yes, employees. In town there were only a very few, and those came from shells of our own guns that were popped at the Japs.

34. General GRUNERT. And you people, you civilians, you businessmen, and so forth, did you anticipate any such attack?

[2798] Mr. LOCEY. No.

35. General GRUNERT. Were you complacent? Were you satisfied that this place was impregnable, and therefore—

Mr. LOCEY. No. Well, to a civilian, the war—we don't understand it; and if a man is a businessman he takes the advice of a man that is in that business.

36. General GRUNERT. That is, you look to the constituted authorities to take care of you, naturally?

Mr. LOCEY. Yes, that is right.

37. General GRUNERT. Well, now, were you conscious or war-minded, conscious that war was in the immediate offing? Did you realize the tense situation?

Mr. LOCEY. Yes, we did.

38. General GRUNERT. Where did you get that information?

Mr. LOCEY. Well, you just couldn't help from the attitude of Japan; you couldn't help from the attitude of our own nation of beginning to clamp down on Japan. Something had to happen. It had to break.

39. General GRUNERT. Then, as I gather it, you thought there was going to be war but it wasn't going to hit here, first, at least?

Mr. LOCEY. It wasn't going to hit here. The attitude, it seemed we got a lot of our attitude from Washington, because we read the

papers, and it was my experience with papers that they are a menace; they don't tell 10 percent of the truth in a lot of cases. They will switch things around. They always have in my business.

40. General GRUNERT. But you still think that the Army and Navy did what they should do here, under the circumstances?

Mr. LOCEY. I don't know a great deal about the Navy; [2799] I wasn't in touch with them, never have been, but I have been more or less close to the Army and the Generals that have been here prior to Short, and I think that the Army was very much on the job. Their construction efficiency was high. Their officers are a high type of men. We had criticism here in the press on this Colonel Wyman.

[2800] 1. General GRUNERT. What do you know about Wyman?

Mr. LOCEY. Well, Wyman was a very funny man, but everything these papers said about Wyman was utterly false, in my mind. I have never seen a man that came into a community, that made more enemies. He was ruthless and hard and cold and tough, and if he worked an hour, he worked 20 hours a day; and if there was ever a driver that ever came to Hawaii it was Wyman, and we would have been so far back in our work, or the Army would—why, they couldn't have got a man that would have driven work through as Wyman did. He was just like a "bull in a china shop." He didn't make friends. He wasn't a personal friend of mine, but I believe in justice, and the papers, the items they printed on Wyman, all letting down, was just all bosh.

42. General GRUNERT. Did you know this man Rohl?

Mr. LOCEY. No.

43. General FRANK. Did you know Wyman?

Mr. LOCEY. I knew him personally. I had business contacts with him. General Short appointed me on December 8 to make an inventory of farming machinery that was necessary to produce more food here, and turn it over to Wyman. I contacted Wyman on that, and anything after December 7 that pertained to food or agriculture, I was Wyman's contact man. Of course it mostly came through an agent, but hell! you could get Wyman at 12 oclock, or 2 oclock, in his office, at night; and I have been out on the jobs. On agricultural problems and vegetables he had called me in a few times to consult me and take me out and show me the jobs, get my advice on them; but I think everything that I have seen in the paper about Wyman was false, in my mind.

44. General GRUNERT. Did you see any reports about his [2801] imbibing of liquor to excess? If so, would you say they were false, also?

Mr. LOCEY. Well, I am not a social man. I knew Short very well. I was never in his house. I never met him socially. It was always in a business way. The same applied to Wyman. I guess Wyman took a drink. A few Army men do take drinks, don't they?

45. General GRUNERT. We have you as a witness, and we are not on the stand.

Some of those "hard-boiled guys" who get things done are sometimes, not always, hard drinkers.

Mr. LOCEY. Well, they have got to have "an out." That has always been my experience and observation; that if you see a man who is a "driver," and a man who accomplished something, he had some "out." Maybe he drank, I don't know; I guess he did; but I don't know, why should I say he drank? I never saw him drinking.

46. General GRUNERT. In your associations with or in your knowledge of Wyman, did you ever know whether his taking a drink or his having liquor interfered with his work?

Mr. LOCEY. I never have seen anybody that liquor did any good. I am a teetotaler. I keep liquor in my house. My friends come there, sometimes, and get too much. I have never seen liquor do anybody any good. There are lots of them that drink it, but as far as General Wyman's work, here and "driving," we would have lost, without General Wyman.

47. General GRUNERT. You mean Colonel Wyman?

Mr. LOCEY. Or Colonel Wyman; yes.

48. General GRUNERT. The other one was General Lyman.

Mr. LOCEY. Yes. I knew General Lyman very well.

49. General GRUNERT. But you mean Colonel Wyman?

Mr. LOCEY. I mean Colonel Wyman. He was a man that probably couldn't stay too long in one place. He was such a [2802] "driver" and so ruthless that in time they build up a sort of barrier around him, that they don't get through things as well as the man that goes a little calmer; but if there was ever a "driver" it was Colonel Wyman. If there was ever a man worked hard, or worker long hours, it was Colonel Wyman.

50. General GRUNERT. Do you think of anything else that you would like to tell the Board, that has not been brought up, that might be of value to us?

Mr. LOCEY. No.

51. General GRUNERT. Anything leading up to Pearl Harbor, or during Pearl Harbor?

Mr. LOCEY. Well, I don't know anything. I have always had my opinions.

52. General GRUNERT. Sometimes people have something in the back of their mind they would like to turn loose. Now, this is the opportunity.

Mr. LOCEY. No, I haven't anything. I don't think I have anything else.

53. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

Mr. LOCEY. I have always felt in this case that there were records here that would show, and clear General Short. I feel that General Short has been crucified. I think he was our savior on December 7. I worked so close with him. He was so calm and so broad, and I think it has been a crime the way he has been treated. I think he has been a savior to this country, a savior on December 7. That's not as a personal friend, because, just a business associate of mine. He wasn't a personal friend, at all.

54. General GRUNERT. All right, sir; thank you for coming over and giving us your time.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2803] **TESTIMONY OF FRANK E. MIDKIFF, 406 CASTLE
& COOKE BUILDING, HONOLULU, T. H.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Midkiff, will you please state to the Board your name and address.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Frank E. Midkiff, 406 Castle & Cooke Building, Honolulu.

2. General GRUNERT. Mr. Midkiff, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster, of the report of the House Military Affairs Military Committee. This report largely concerns construction prior to the attack. Now, we are after facts, or leads to where facts can be found. General Short has furnished the Board a list of representative citizens living in Hawaii, who, he says, may have information of value to the Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you here, with the hope that you may have facts to present to us. General Short did not refer to any particular subject on which you might testify, so it is up to you to open the subject, which may then give us leads to questions by which to develop it.

I think possibly his suggesting that you be asked to appear was because, as I understand, you prepared a letter, or at least signed a letter that went to the President, the date of the letter being December 22, 1941. That is probably the reason; so you may start by telling us about that letter and its contents, and what you people thought of General Short, and [2804] the reasons, and so forth.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I tried to find a copy of that letter, General, last night, and was unable to put my hand on it.

3. General GRUNERT. I have it here, if you wish to refresh your memory.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Well, I am only glad that you have it, because that is my chief concern, that you have it.

4. General GRUNERT. That was the letter, as it is contained in the files of the Roberts Commission's report, and we have the Roberts Commission's report to consider.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF (reading):

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative, and, furthermore, he has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this purpose, and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan.

That is our opinion. A number of us were under the general impression that General Short was certainly one of the most active Army officers in making preparations for an attack by Japan.

Along in April, or March possibly, of 1941, he caused one of his staff officers, then Colonel Albert Lyman, to meet with a group of men down town—these men represented, I believe, the Mayor's Defense Committee—to discuss a plan for protective measures for the civil population of Oahu, in case of bombardment. Colonel Lyman left with the members, certain of them, copies of that plan, with the exception of Part II, which Part II was omitted from the plan, because it was a description [2805] of a possible attack by airplane. That was omitted. All the rest was there, containing the measures to be adopted by the civilians, how to organize the city for the emergency, to provide air-raid protection, take care of evacuation, and utilize the workers, and so on. It went into great detail.

Furthermore, at about the same time, there was the annual meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, at which General Short spoke, very eloquently urging the people to be prepared, to lay in stocks of supplies, to avoid panic, and giving them instructions in case of emergency that might arise. At the special session of the legislature, the General appeared in person, and it was I think due to his straightforward presentation that the legislature enacted the M-Day Bill, which they had failed to enact at the regular session of the legislature, earlier.

5. General GRUNERT. Then I gather from your testimony that General Short was an asset in preparing this command for defense; particularly, within your own knowledge, an asset in preparing the civilian end to defend themselves?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

6. General GRUNERT. What do you know about how those measures that were planned for were actually put into effect when the attack came?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. By the civilians?

7. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I was not a member of the Mayor's Defense Committee until after December 7. On about December 8, I was asked to come over and assist in the civilian defense set-up, then, and take charge of the evacuation procedures. To my general observation, not being a member of the organization, [2806] I note that the personnel were selected and appropriations were made by the legislature for the use of civilians, and unusual powers were given to the Governor, and training that personnel in the civilian defense corps was being carried out regularly. The Civilian Defense Corps, to what exact extent I am not certain, did cooperate with the Army in the Army's maneuvers and problems.

[2807] 8. General GRUNERT. Was this prior to December 7th?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir. A man who is now, I believe, Major Dopy, was in charge of that civilian defense corps. He is now in the Army.

9. General GRUNERT. Then you believe that General Short did everything, as far as you can see, that should have been done in preparing his command to defend the island?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I think so. The plan that he laid out, General, was supposed to have cost the civilians about a million dollars, and Colonel Lyman made that plain, that it would be quite an expensive thing for them, and I well recall the cold chills that the business men had at the prospect of having to spend that much money. Nevertheless, General Short placed it before them, as to what they should be doing.

10. General FRANK. Was anything ever done with it?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Only that the business firms loosened up with their personnel to assist in the civilian defense corps. I do not believe that the Territory really began spending money to any considerable extent until after December 7th.

11. General GRUNERT. Were your people war conscious? Did you think this thing was coming, or what?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I think it was our general feeling that General Short was stressing this thing more than necessary; because

of the fact we had the fleet here and because we could see these fortresses going out in all directions and planes going out in all directions on reconnaissance, and they having submarines and destroyers out, we felt that we were quite well protected. But I think, even more than that, we were of the impression, the most of us, that there was no great imminency of war.

[2808] 12. General GRUNERT. But when they struck is when the money started pouring out?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. That is right.

13. General GRUNERT. When the necessity showed itself?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

14. General GRUNERT. So, as I gather it, your state of mind was one in which, yes, war was in the offing, but it would not come here because of the protective measures you thought were in existence?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. That is right, sir, and I believe we also had the feeling that Japan would be plumb foolish to attack the United States, absolutely asinine.

15. General GRUNERT. Maybe she would have been plumb foolish, but she took that chance.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

16. General GRUNERT. You thought it was a desperate chance to take?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir. I think we didn't even think they would be that rash and that crazy.

17. General GRUNERT. That brings me to the subject of the Japanese population here. Are they of that same foolish disposition, that they will take chances? In other words, what do you think of the Japanese part of the population of the island, both alien and American?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. There is a wide range, as I see it. I have often been asked that question, General, because I helped form a company of American citizens of Japanese ancestry before the first world war, and took them in, and had their training and so forth, until I was put in charge of an officers training [2809] school.

18. General FRANK. You mean a company of soldiers as a part of a battalion?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir. Because I had that contact and because after the war we formed an American society of Japanese ancestry, citizens of Japanese ancestry, and tried to teach Americanization here, I have often been asked that question by the Commanding Generals of this Department, and I have always felt there is a wide range in the attitude of the Japanese we have here toward the United States Government and in the kind of Japanese that we have here. Some are highly intelligent, well educated. A great many of them are not very well informed. Most of them are literate. They read the Japanese papers, but they are not very well informed. They go to church and are what you might call well disciplined, but they have been taught to love Japan and adore the Emperor and so forth, the old-timers. So we have the American citizens that are educated here, the American citizens that have been sent to Japan for their education, and then we have the old-time aliens here who are rapidly dying out.

These old-time aliens, for the most part, are simple, harmless people, not well enough informed or astute enough to be trusted with any kind of military intelligence, but just plodding away. I don't think they would be capable of being organized into planned resistance. The Kibei, the ones born here but sent to Japan, I have always felt were not trustworthy. I have always felt they have really been indoctrinated with the love of the Emperor and the feeling of the superiority of Japan and so forth, very much like the Germans.

[2810] 19. General GRUNERT. Are there many such?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I do not know the number, but there may be some hundreds. They are not too common, but enough of those so that we resented their sending their children to Japan, did not think it was a good thing. I would say it was a small number, comparatively, but in the hundreds.

20. General GRUNERT. When they return here do they attempt to spread propaganda as to what they find out about Japan when over there?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I have never heard of their doing that actively, but they impress on their children or try to impress on their children, more than the ones born and educated here, the superiority of Japanese culture, love of the Emperor and so forth. They do that in their own children, in their houses.

21. General FRANK. Does not the Japanese family head have a more positive control over the family than the Americans?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Very much more, yes, sir. It is what you might call a well disciplined family, indeed. The young people are brought up according to the customs of Japan, rather carefully. They get that in the Japanese language schools as well as at home. The old people openly loudly deplored the tendency of the young Americans, born here and educated here, to pull away from them. They were getting too fresh and too uppity. They were not controlled. They objected to that.

On the whole, the Japanese have been a more or less docile group here, hard workers, good citizens, law-abiding, as the records will show, on the whole, no serious crimes, a few serious crimes. The people here trusted them.

To my knowledge, having been here for 31 years, there has [2811] never been a case, for example, of a yard man or a house man stealing any property, money or anything like that, to which they had access at all times in the residences; nor have they let the employers down by neglecting their duties or permitting trespass, if they can avoid it. They have always been helpful as employees in that respect, and trustworthy.

22. General GRUNERT. On and after December 7th, 1941, did you have occasions to observe the actions of the Japanese as to whether or not stuck to their jobs or they let their employers down, or attempted to organize, or anything of that sort?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I have had occasion to observe the actions of the Japanese and the people here generally, and to my knowledge there was no evidence of anything like that.

23. General GRUNERT. Do you think that most of them were ignorant of the attack that came?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I think so, yes. I think the most of them were sort of stupid, people that were not really astute enough to

be trusted with any serious intelligence of that sort, and they were confused, many of them were crying and running around distractedly and could not understand what it was all about.

24. General FRANK. You believe that had there been a landing or the Japanese invading force had been partially successful, that there would have been a large support of that Japanese invading force by the native Japs?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I think that is quite probable, that a great many of the aliens, practically all of the Kibei, and a number even of the American citizens educated here might have attempted to cooperate with a landing party, and if the Japanese [2812] had been successful in an area and not all over the entire island there might have been many who would have joined them and operated with them. I think that is quite probable.

25. General FRANK. You think, then, that they were a problem, from a military point of view?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I think that under the circumstances you mention many of them would be a problem, yes, sir.

26. General FRANK. What is the solution of that problem?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. For the future, after the war?

27. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Most of them now, I think, after Japan is defeated, will not need any further attention. The old timers, their curve is dropping off very fast here, the old aliens. The Kibei, I should say it would be a good thing to send them all back to Japan and to send any alien that did not wish to show loyalty to the United States or was disturbed over defeat of Japan, send him back. Give a chance to the American citizens born and educated here to state whether or not they wish to be thoroughly loyal to the United States, assuming that as American citizens they will be loyal, but give them a chance to state, and if they do not wish to declare their loyalty view there would be no harm in sending them all back.

28. General GRUNERT. What do you think the reaction to that would be? How many would you lose, do you think? Have you ever tried to analyze it that way?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I think that from a practical standpoint those few American citizens educated here would want to go back. I think very few of the old timers, with their children and grandchildren here, would consider going back. Some [2813] would prefer to go back there, join the remainder of their families, and die there, but on the whole I think it would be possibly 5 per cent of the population that would be deported under the terms I suggested.

29. General GRUNERT. Do you think the defeat of Japan would influence those who are on the fence to become citizens?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Of the United States?

30. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Of course, the opportunity is not available to them, unless they were born here, but I think the defeat of Japan in many cases would cause them, those that have been inclined to favor Japan, to think twice and to show their loyalty toward the victorious nation.

31. General GRUNERT. Suppose that 80 per cent of those did not want to remain or 80 per cent of your Japanese would be taken out from here, how would it affect your economic interests?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. It would be very serious.

32. General GRUNERT. Which industry would be hit the hardest?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. The two industrialized agricultural industries, sugar and pineapples.

33. General GRUNERT. Sugar and pineapples?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Those two. They would be very hard hit.

34. General FRANK. From your point of view, then, as pertaining to the Japanese situation, you would like to put it on a stable, clean-cut basis, and eliminate the uncertainty with respect to the Japanese?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I should. I advised, at the beginning of the war, when time made it impracticable to adopt my recommendation, that everybody here be processed and to find out the loyalty of the people here, because had there been an invasion, of course, our duty was to confine all of the Japanese, and all like the Japanese, all the Orientals, and our work would have been seriously affected. I thought it would be advisable for us to go through and process them all and put a big identification mark on the ones that we decided would be trustworthy, and, if we had to use the others, in case of an invasion to lock them up.

35. General FRANK. Has anything like that been done?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. No, sir.

36. General GRUNERT. I was going to say, it sounds very sensible. Why don't you people do it?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. It has been done for those people who have to be used on the water front and in strategic places.

37. General GRUNERT. Are the business interests against such action?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I don't think they would be. There was a time when it was thought of, but the time seemed so short, it could not be passed to get around to it.

38. General GRUNERT. Is it being thought of now seriously?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes.

39. General GRUNERT. Whose business do you think it is to get that thing started? The Territorial Legislature or what?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. An idea like that, I think, probably should originate in the Territory or with the department entrusted with the security, the F. B. I. I am sure Mr. Shivers of the F. B. I. thought the plan was a good one at the time.

40. General GRUNERT. Certainly, if a thing like that should be [2815] done in the future, it would look like now is a good time for the people to strike, when they have definite impressions of their danger and what happened in the past and what may happen in the future.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes. May I, before I leave—

41. General GRUNERT. We don't want you to leave for some time, unless it is on the same subject; otherwise I will give you an opportunity later to line up anything you want.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, thank you.

42. Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to ask a question there, if I might.

You mentioned the Japanese language schools. Will you describe briefly what they are and why you continue to allow them to be taught Japanese and segregate themselves under their own language?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. The language schools were all closed by order of the military government on December 7th or 8th and they have not been reopened. No assemblages have been permitted of the Japanese.

43. Colonel TOULMIN. What did you have before that time?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. We did have the language schools right up to December 7th.

44. Colonel TOULMIN. Who ran them?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. They were run by groups of Japanese, people who organized and brought teachers over from Japan. Quite often they were Buddhist priests. They were decidedly sectarian on the whole. Some of them were Buddhist schools, some Shinto schools. A few were non-sectarian. But they taught the Japanese language. They thought it was a necessary thing, [2816] that they needed it in their business, but they also thought that certain items of ethics had to be taught in these schools that were neglected in the public schools, such as filial piety and loyalty and disinterestness and things like that. They justified the need for those language schools in order to teach the children to speak with their elders and to respect their elders properly.

45. Colonel TOULMIN. May I interrupt you there? Do you recommend that those schools should not be reopened?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I do. I think those schools should not be reopened, any language schools.

46. Colonel TOULMIN. What about Japanese newspapers, are they still being published in Japanese?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. There are two papers, the Hawaii Herald and the Hawaii Times, which formerly were the Hawaii Nippu Jiji and Hawaii Hochi, that are published in English and Japanese. It was the feeling of the military government that in order to get announcements and probably propaganda over it was necessary to use those papers.

47. Colonel TOULMIN. Do you recommend their continuance after the war is over, in Japanese?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. If they are duly interpreted, they might be useful for a while, until these old timers die off. I think they will die a natural death. I should be very glad when the time arrives that they are unnecessary. If they are really necessary from the standpoint of giving some of these old fellows who cannot talk information and if they are duly checked and interpreted and the interpretation is filed and so on, I think they would be all right.

[2817] 48. General FRANK. What kind of a problem do you run into in putting a restriction like on the freedom of the press?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. For example, after the First World War, in this organization that I was the head of, in the American Legion, we took the initiative in doing away with the language schools. A case went from Oregon to the Supreme Court of the United States which knocked that out. We legislated against it in this territory. We had to restore the language schools then, because of that Supreme Court decision. We might be up against it on that account, too.

49. Major CLAUSEN. I have one question on the same point. Sir, what proportion of the Japanese attended these Japanese language schools?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I think 90 per cent of them.

50. Major CLAUSEN. 90 per cent?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. A very large per cent. They attended an hour a day after the public schools.

51. General FRANK. They attended the regular English public schools?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. That is right. That is required.

52. General FRANK. And after that was over they then went to the Japanese language schools?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

53. General GRUNERT. Is it not a question of reciprocity? What is done in Japan? They are allowing freedom of worship or religion; they allow certain churches. I do not suppose there are enough Americans grouped over there to have a school of their own. I think that must be taken into consideration. Were not there agreements made between fellow nations as to what [2818] to allow their nationals to do. When it comes to your own nationals, if you can define them as nationals, those that are not held to a dual citizenship, it is a question of arrangement between the nations.

54. General FRANK. It is not a question of reciprocity, unless the laws and customs of the two countries coincide with the question of reciprocity.

55. General GRUNERT. I think this is very interesting, but I want to get down to our task here.

Summing up your testimony regarding General Short, I gather that you sized him up as being a great asset to this command over here in preparing it to carry out its mission of defending these islands?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

56. General GRUNERT. That he cooperated well with the civil authorities and made considerable progress in preparing the civil population to take care of itself in the case of an emergency?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

57. General GRUNERT. Now, then, when the time came and the surprise attack struck, do you people over here feel that the military authorities let you down by not taking the proper alert to use the means that had been perfected for that defense?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. There is, I think, on the part of a great many people just that feeling. I think that on the part of many more thoughtful people there is a feeling that the Army was doing everything humanly possible, practically, to maintain the security of the Territory, to prepare the people and the troops.

[2819] 58. General GRUNERT. Then you say everything was being done to prepare the troops, the civilian population. However, we assume that all proper measures that were necessary were taken, but when the time came they were not applied. Did the people feel they were not applied? You understand that the alert adopted was the alert against sabotage?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

59. General GRUNERT. It was not an all-out alert against anything else but sabotage?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

60. General GRUNERT. In that respect has there been any feeling here that the Army should have taken the all-out alert in order to fulfill their mission, for proper protection?

[2820] Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. That has been expressed. I have heard it expressed. I think, however, that there are a number of people who are better informed—think they are better informed on this subject—that feel that if the general public knew the details the general public would not blame the local commander here.

61. General GRUNERT. And by the details that you referred to, just what have you in mind?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I have a feeling that it has been impossible, for many reasons, for General Short to tell anyone, much, any of the details as he knows them, and I have a reference to details of what he was doing in the way of work here to prepare airfields, what he was requesting in the way of supplies and material, troops, and equipment, and, from the other end, what his instructions had been as to his conduct in these tense and touch-and-go times. All of those, it is my belief, had a very definite bearing on this whole situation, but the general public knows nothing of that.

62. General GRUNERT. Then, you appear, from what I gather, to think that, if the public knew what General Short knows, it might put a different complexion on it.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I really believe so, yes, sir.

63. General GRUNERT. Now I am going to ask the members of the Board whether they have any other questions, and then I will give you an opportunity to add anything that you can think of that might help the Board.

General Russell?

64. General RUSSELL. Did you visit in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor on the day of the 7th, the night of the 7th or 8th of December, '41?

[2821] Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I did not visit there, but I was up on the hills back at the Kamehameha Schools from 8:05 a. m. December 7th until about 12 noon December 8th, where I could see a great deal of what went on.

65. General RUSSELL. Could you give us your impressions briefly of what you saw and what you think about it?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I heard these tremendous explosions shortly before 8 o'clock. I was to speak at the Kamehameha Schools that morning up on the hills there, and I went up just as fast as I could get up there, and arrived to see great smoke clouds and fire at Pearl Harbor, hear these tremendous explosions, seeing the Japanese planes flying around the place, flying back up over the hills and circling around over town, and so forth; and my first duty as the trustee of the Kamehameha Schools was to quiet the students and teachers and tell them to have no fear, that in a very short time our planes would be up and the fleet would be out and this would be all settled, and that comforted them.

And so we waited for that to happen. But to our amazement these Japanese planes continued to fly around. They didn't seem to be very fast planes either, flying low around here, cracking away at everything, and the explosions continued. I was not close enough to see any plane drop any bombs, but I could see the—like, for instance, a little later time I saw some destroyers go out of the channel, and I saw Japanese planes following those and bombs straddling ships [indicating]. The ships kept on going. We began then to get—we had gotten reports over the radio of what was going on. They tried to explain what we were seeing there. Then the radio

was silenced, [2822] and we just had to wait until the refugees began to flee from Hickam and Pearl Harbor and come up to the Kamehameha Schools to tell us what they had been through.

66. General RUSSELL. When did you see the first evidence of defensive measures or response by American forces?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. About—well, I could see our Army trucks moving along the highways at great speed, in different directions, but chiefly toward Pearl Harbor and Hickam, and I could—about ten o'clock or ten-thirty, I am not certain of the time now, I saw two B-17's take off and start out over the town and go out toward Molokai. I am informed that there were other planes active, able to get off the ground, but I didn't happen to see any of those out toward Schofield or Barbers Point or Kahuku where I am told they were active. After 8:05 the only planes of ours that I noticed were those two B-17's. I was also told that some of our B-17's came in at about eight o'clock right in the midst of this thing. I didn't see those.

67. General RUSSELL. But from what you saw there was very little opposition offered to the Japanese invading force at any time that day?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I saw a great deal of antiaircraft. A great deal of antiaircraft. And there were other small-caliber machine guns, and so forth; and the antiaircraft, on the whole, was far higher, exploded far higher than the planes. I noticed that. Way up high.

68. General RUSSELL. After the Japanese were all gone home that day, during the afternoon and night did this shooting continue by the American troops?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. It did. In the evening I saw a B-17 [2823] come back almost over the same course, and it came out and circled and made ready to land at Hickam, apparently, and for some reason or other then it did not land but leveled off and went on over across Pearl Harbor, with everything in the book opened up at it, tracer bullets and everything else going way up into the sky. And a little later that other, second B-17, or one—the second B-17 came back and had the same experience, and the next morning—

69. General RUSSELL. Go back to that night. Was there shooting going on in our troop areas almost constantly through that night of December 7th? Could you hear firing almost constantly throughout that night?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. There were probably both civilian and Army troops scouring the heights and scouring the valleys and active on the coasts all around, very active; and, for instance, in the valley alongside the Kamehameha Schools, Kapalama Valley, there was shooting all night from time to time. I didn't know whether it was civilians in these parties or whether it was Army troops making this, searching around to see if there were any Japanese activities up there, but there were shots being fired all through the night.

70. General RUSSELL. All right. Now, I am sorry to have disturbed you.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. The next morning about four o'clock or four twenty-five I heard over the radio, "Unidentified planes coming in from the northeast, approximately 60 miles from Kauai. That is all." And I went down to the dining hall of the Kamehameha Schools where I had a good view. A little later I saw planes coming in, and again

everything was opened [2824] up at them, antiaircraft, and so forth. Those planes then, they were up so high that there was a little sun on them by that time, and they went out over the sea and later came back, settled down some place.

71. General RUSSELL. That is all I have.

72. General FRANK. You stated that you did not believe that there would be a Japanese attack on Oahu; you believed this prior to December 7th?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

73. General FRANK. Did that general feeling in the community result in the conclusion that local sabotage was a much greater menace than an air attack.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I think the people here did not fear sabotage. I think they had no fear of the maids. There were people who immediately circulated stories that the maids had tried to poison the ranking Army officers, and so forth. There were all kinds of rumors of that sort. None of us believed that, and so far as I know nothing of that sort occurred. We had no fear of the local Japanese, nor did we believe that there was any substantial organization outside of the consul's clique and his associates.

74. General FRANK. Yet you yourself have stated that you didn't trust the——

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Kibeis?

75. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Kibeis.

76. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. That is right. I think they are Japanese, but I don't feel that they—unless they were attached [2825] to the consul and serving him, I don't believe that they are part of an organization or ever were a part of an organization that amounted to anything, or were entrusted with plans.

77. General FRANK. And also you stated that, had the Japanese landed, you thought that a large portion of the Japanese would have gone over to them?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I think that is probably true.

78. General FRANK. Now let us get back to the question I just asked.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes. Then do we—did we fear sabotage?

79. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I think we did not fear sabotage. We thought these Japanese were more or less docile, with the exception of those uppity, those Kibeis who we felt were Japanese, but we didn't feel that there was any likelihood or probability of the Japanese landing here and of their being a chance for the local Japanese to be able to do anything. It would be nothing but suicide, and I might have thought that would have been easy less advisable than for Japan to attack the Islands. I think that was the feeling locally.

Excuse me, General. Let me say this: that there are people here who have always distrusted the Japanese and have said for years that the only good Jap is a dead Jap, and there are many people like that. They haven't been here very long, I think, on the whole, but I can give you an outstanding example of one for your consideration, if you will

not put it on the record right now as coming from me. Just let me give it to you informally, if I may.

80. General GRUNERT. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

[2826] 81. General FRANK. There had been built up a very decided consciousness about the probability of sabotage?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, that is right.

82. General FRANK. And on the part of General Short?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

83. General FRANK. That was supported to a certain degree by a certain number of the local populace, was it not?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I think it was, yes, sir. We were anxious to do everything that he would recommend. For example, he wanted the civilians to be well organized and trained so that in the civilian defense corps there would be men available to guard the waterworks and the electric plant, and so forth.

84. General FRANK. The point on which I am about to crystallize is this: Generally in the community was there a greater apprehension against sabotage than there was against an air attack?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I believe that there may have been, as I try to think of it myself, my own attitude and those with whom I was in closest touch, the attitude that both were preposterous but that we had, nevertheless, in these times, to take the advice of those responsible for our security and get ready, to train our civilian defense corps and train against sabotage, and so forth, and that the Army and Navy should be on the alert, as we thought they were.

85. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, if sabotage were going to take place, it right then and there was upon them because the people to do it were here present.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

86. General FRANK. Whereas the raid was yet to come.

[2827] Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. That is right.

87. General FRANK. You think that that was an influencing point of view?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. With the people here?

88. General FRANK. With the people, yes.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Most people themselves, I think, would not have been afraid of the Japanese. Most people felt that they should do everything possible to cooperate with the conservative stand of the Army. I think most people would have felt that the first thing that would have hit us, if anything would hit us, after the air attack, would be some sabotage and not a landing party immediately.

89. General FRANK. Do you believe a Jap raid now possible?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I think it might be possible. I don't know what these fast carriers could do. They might elude our submarines and our reconnaissance, come in fast enough to take a poke at us, about as they did on December 7th. I think it might be possible, a raid; yes, sir.

90. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, air bombardment attacks in force are being pressed through to varying degrees of success on targets all over the world, and in the face of determined opposition.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

91. General FRANK. Right today.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I am quite impressed with that. I have this feeling, and I don't wish to be unjust, but I have the feeling that our Navy, prior to December 7, did not have a due appreciation of the danger of air; and I think, if our fleet hadn't been sunk, that there was a good chance that it might [2828] have sailed out into the deep water against the Japanese out here and been sunk in deep blue water. That is what I have always felt about it, indicating, I believe, the reaction I have had at that time that up until that time there was not the appreciation of the danger of the air force to ships.

92. **General FRANK.** As a matter of fact, that Japanese air attack was a very courageous, daring, hazardous, spectacular project?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I feel that it was one of the most remarkable, well planned, coordinated, and lucky things that ever happened in warfare. There was a good deal of luck about it, it seems to me, too.

93. **General GRUNERT.** I hear much about this sabotage. Just because they have personnel here, why should there be so much danger of sabotage? What have they got to sabotage with? Is it dynamite or weapons available to them? Are explosives available to them? Are the authorities here so careless in taking care of the dangerous things that this public could get at such weapons with which to sabotage? Have they anything from which they can make bombs and things of that sort? I don't quite get, just because there is a lot of personnel available, that the danger of sabotage is necessarily there unless they have something to sabotage with. Do you care to express yourself along that line?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. In the days before Pearl Harbor a great many of our expert powder men in the quarries and on the plantations, and so forth, were Japanese: old powder men. Many of them were Japanese. They had access to the explosives. We don't know how much material and supplies the consul may have [2829] had or what distribution he may have made of the material and supplies that may have come to him from Japan. There is somewhat of a customs immunity. But if he had not had a good organization, well distributed, even though he had brought in explosives, and so forth, from Japan, he couldn't have used those things to any great extent. I think that General Short was more apprehensive of sabotage than the people here were, I might say. He hadn't been here so long, and at any rate I don't think he would have taken any chances. He was apprehensive, I am sure, about sabotage, and more than we were.

94. **General GRUNERT.** Now, the other point, the other question I have, is this, more or less bringing up a topic to get a reaction. I think everybody respects the air forces that can do a lot of damage, but if you are properly prepared against an air attack you can minimize that damage. Now, since December 8th or 7th haven't you people been preparing yourselves to minimize whatever damage could be done by a return air raid, in the line of discipline, in the line of O. C. D. organization, in the line of air raid shelters? And at the same time the Army and the Navy have undoubtedly taken measures to have all their weapons of defense in position, which was not done in December 7th; so that even though an air attack is possible the damage it could do is not so great if you are prepared for it. Is that right?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. That is right, yes, sir.

95. General GRUNERT. Of course it is going to do damage, and I do not think an air raid, as such, a determined raid, can be stopped, but the effect of it can be greatly minimized. Is that your way of looking at it?

[2830] Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

96. General GRUNERT. I just didn't want to leave the impression that an air force could come over and do as it pleases.

Are there any other questions? (No response.)

Is there anything else that you think of that you would like to tell the Board about, for its consideration, that may be of assistance to it in accomplishing its mission?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. After I joined the O. C. D. and had charge of evacuation, I had a great deal of contact with the Army.

97. General GRUNERT. This was after December 7th?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. December 7th, yes, sir; after December 8th. And I am not able to tell whether many of my impressions and many of the things I have learned came before or after December the 8th, but I have a decided belief and I have been informed that General Short was making earnest efforts to increase the protection here, was asking for supplies, personnel, and equipment from the War Department, and that things were not coming as fast as he would have liked, but were coming much faster than they had been coming in years past. There had been a change in the tempo. It wasn't nearly what General Short was expecting and hoping for, and it is that feature that I think would be productive of investigation also, that one point right there, whether the War Department really was supporting General Short.

98. General FRANK. But he didn't use what he had.

99. General GRUNERT. That is the big question: Did he use what he had?

[2831] Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes. Well, he had—the question would be, how much did he have in the way of radar, and how much did he have in the way of personnel to man it, and so forth.

100. General GRUNERT. We know what he did have. Did he use what he had? All those questions must be considered, and the Board is glad to get all these leads with a view to coming to conclusions.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir. There was also the feeling among some of us that the reconnaissance over the sea was entrusted to the Navy and that there was a definite division of responsibility.

101. General GRUNERT. Might you rather not say "charged to the Navy" instead of "entrusted"?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

102. General GRUNERT. Does that about cover everything you can think of? Because we would like to have everything that is in the back of your mind.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. The one thing that has been referred to in the press and that we were concerned with at the time was the fact that a telephone might have been used instead of a coded message arriving here so that it became intelligible to General Short at 11:30 a. m. instead of at an earlier hour.

103. General GRUNERT. You are referring to the so-called December 7th message?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

104. General GRUNERT. Was the oceanic telephone in operation and had it been used that morning, do you know, by anyone?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I don't know that, but I have no reason—

105. General GRUNERT. Well, it is a point that you think ought [2832] to be considered?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

106. General GRUNERT. I see.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I have no reason to believe that it was out of commission. I am most thankful that the investigation has finally come around, because I am sure justice will be done. I have in my own mind felt that it was necessary on December the 7th, and after that incident, for us to have someone to blame, and shortly afterwards it was advisable to have someone to make a hero of, because I have felt, from what I have understood to be the situations, that conditions were not so dissimilar out in the Philippines from what they were here.

That is about all I have to say.

107. General GRUNERT. All right. Thank you very much for coming. We appreciate it.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

108. General GRUNERT. We shall have a recess for ten minutes. We have sat now for two hours.

(There was a brief informal recess.)

[2833] **TESTIMONY OF JOHN H. MIDKIFF, WAIALUA, HONOLULU**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Midkiff, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. John H. Midkiff; address, Waialua, Honolulu.

2. Colonel WEST. And what is your occupation, Mr. Midkiff?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I am the manager of the Waialua Agricultural Company, Limited.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Midkiff, I always explain to most of the witnesses what this Board is attempting to do, and it was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December 1941, and in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster, of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, largely concerned with construction matters prior to Pearl Harbor.

Now, we are after facts, or leads to where we can get facts. General Short has furnished the Board a list of representative citizens living in Hawaii who he says may have information of value to the Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you to come here, with the hope that you may be able to have facts to present to us.

General Short did not give us any particular leads as to what facts we might find, or what these various witnesses might be able to tell us, so we depend on you to open up the subject, and then we will ask some questions. Now, just what your connections with General Short were, what you know about him, at [2834] about, prior to, or during the attack, we leave that to you; so, if you wish to make a statement, we would be glad to have it as an opener.

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Well, that's a little bit difficult, nothing too definite on that.

4. General GRUNERT. If you would rather, I will open it up with a question.

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I will try to cover it a little.

5. General GRUNERT. All right.

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I have been fairly well acquainted with most of the Department Commanders, for a good many years, here, and I was impressed, and our engineering department on the plantation has mentioned a number of times the very large amount of new things that were being done on our plantation, and I am referring to the northern part, Waialua, Haleiwa, and around in that direction, that would make it a safer place in case of attack—oh, for instance, such things as a north shore railroad, that came through from Wahiawa, that came down and branched both ways on the plantation, that could not be cut off as readily as the Oahu Railway that went around to the beach line.

There was a great deal, a tremendous amount of rights of entry asked of the plantation for maneuvers, probably more than there ever had been; and a great deal of training going on.

6. General GRUNERT. This, I assume, was when?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Well, a couple of years before the Pearl Harbor attack; and a very large number of large gun positions that had rights of entry to put them on various strategic places on the plantation, especially high up on the hills, overlooking the ocean, to where they could cross-fire; and those, in the [2835] main way, would be the things that impressed me.

7. General GRUNERT. And this was under General Short, from when to when, do you recall? He came here in February 1941 and left in December 1941. It was during that period, that you noticed this progress, also?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. That is true. Under General Herron, a great deal of this type of work had been started, and I suppose the fact that apparently we were coming nearer to war, at least the civilian population seemed to think so, it seemed to be speeded up under General Short.

8. General GRUNERT. Do you know of any handicaps that he may have had in preparing for the defense of the Island of Oahu, such as not being able to get positions that he wanted? Were there any positions on your plantation that he wanted, that he could not get?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I think not. I don't recall any, at this time.

9. General GRUNERT. Did they have a number of so-called "alerts," in which they practiced going into position?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Many.

10. General GRUNERT. They had no trouble in going into such positions as they selected, because they got your permission to go there?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. That is right.

11. General GRUNERT. Did that apply generally in other places, do you know?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I think that it did. I believe that most people in my position realized that we needed to cooperate with the Army.

[2836] 12. General GRUNERT. Now, you spoke of being near war. Just what did you mean by "being near war," prior to the attack?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Well, there was a general feeling that we were going to have war with Japan.

13. General GRUNERT. What caused that state of mind on your part? What were the reasons back of it? Where did you get your information?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Some of them, from the preparedness speeches of the President of the United States. He had very evidently been attempting to prepare the Nation, at least it seemed so to me, mentally, for the war, and to get a great deal more war equipment built.

14. General GRUNERT. That came from newspapers and radio, primarily?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. That was true.

15. General GRUNERT. Did you have any private sources of information?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. No.

16. General GRUNERT. Did you have any conversations with the Commanding General of the Department as to the possible imminence of war?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I have had conversations with practically all the preceding commanding officers, but in a general way, I think, when you talked with the Army or the Navy—and I think even more so with the Navy—for years before, you had a sort of feeling that “Well, some day we are going to fight Japan”; nothing more with General Short than with any other Commander.

[2837] 17. General GRUNERT. Did you anticipate an air attack as of December 7, or about that time?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I did not; no. It was a great surprise to me.

18. General GRUNERT. Did you think we were going to war with Japan within six months of that time, approximately?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I did.

19. General GRUNERT. Then, why did you not think it might hit here, instead of elsewhere?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Well, I am not a military man. I couldn't answer that, General. I could only say, of my own reactions in March of 1941, I had a meeting of all the Japanese on our plantation.

20. General GRUNERT. How many such Japanese were there approximately?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Well, we have about 500, but we had this meeting of representatives of the various groups, and I told them that I felt we were going to have war with Japan, and the things that I felt they should do to put themselves in the right position if we did—the things that I thought would be expected of them.

21. General GRUNERT. What were those things?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Well, in the first place, I felt that it was a very good thing, there were bond drives at that time, for them to invest in our bonds; never, by word or deed, to say or do anything that anybody could interpret as being disloyal to the United States; to remember that their children were here, and that if we did have war, they would undoubtedly be fighting for the United States; not to put themselves, as [2838] aliens, in a position where they were on one side and their children on another—just general things of that kind.

22. General GRUNERT. Were most of these Japanese the older generation, or youngsters, or was it a combination?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. They were both. They were representatives of both the older and the younger.

23. General GRUNERT. Had you occasion between that time and December to note what they did with your advice?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I felt that our people followed it very closely. I think probably the best proof of that is that we haven't had a single one of our men picked up and interned. I think that's very unusual.

24. General GRUNERT. Did they buy bonds?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Oh, yes! Many of them!

25. General GRUNERT. Can you give us your general impression of your employees, as to their feeling toward Japan and toward the United States?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. In some months back, the Army gave young Japanese people a chance to volunteer for active combat, and over 97 percent of our people did volunteer for that active combat; and I think that would probably be about as good an answer as I could give to that.

26. General GRUNERT. That sounds quite unusual; or was it unusual, compared with other plantations, or do you know?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. It is considerably higher than the Territory, as I remember it. I am not quite sure about the Territorial figures. It was somewhere around 22 percent for the Territory, that volunteered; I am not sure about that. I think that's about that.

[2839] 27. General GRUNERT. How did you feel on this subject of sabotage by Japanese aliens, or Japanese Americans?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I felt that if there were any sabotage it would not be committed by the mill run of the Japanese people here; that if there were going to be sabotage, it would be definitely directed by the Japanese consul or his staff; that the people who have lived here on the plantations, and particularly, most of the parents have been here all the way from, oh, 30 to 50 years; and their children are born and brought up here, and are to make their homes here; they have no intention of going back. I didn't feel that we had much to worry about from the ordinary run of the population; that they would not be entrusted with military information by Japan.

28. General GRUNERT. Now, suppose Japan had followed its air raid with a surface attack and been reasonably successful; what then do you think the attitude of the Hawaiian Japanese would have been?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Well, undoubtedly there would have been some of them that would have sided in with the invader. I think a large percentage of the local-born would not have. Of course, my views undoubtedly are colored by the knowledge of my own people that I have lived and worked with out there for over 20 years, at Waialua; and, as I say, I don't believe that 97 percent of them would volunteer to fight for the United States if before that they were going to side in with an invader.

29. General GRUNERT. What form of agriculture was it that was followed on this plantation?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Sugar.

30. General GRUNERT. How about the pineapple people, were [2840] they in about the same category?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I should think mostly; the production men in the fields, at least. I couldn't answer for the people in the canneries, in town; I don't know enough about that.

31. General GRUNERT. We are trying to get away from this word "surprise," but were you surprised by the attack on December 7?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Yes, I was surprised. We had had a party. We have an annual sugar planters' meeting here early in December, each year, and had a number of friends from outside, managers from the other islands; they spent the night with us, and we had had a party, that was a little too much of a party, probably. They certainly surprised me. Got me out of bed. I heard a great deal of commotion over at our place, and I had a hard time believing that it was Japanese.

32. General GRUNERT. Do you know what forms of alert the Army had to take care of the various contingencies?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. There were many. I couldn't say exactly what forms of alert they had; no. I know that prior to that, there had apparently been a feeling that something unusual was about to happen, because there had been more alerts by the Army staff.

33. General GRUNERT. That is, more turning out of troops, more occupation of positions, or what?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. That was my impression, yes. My house is a house with large grounds, there, and about 9 o'clock in the morning, I think it was 9 or 9:30, on the morning of the 7th, the Twenty-First Infantry had moved into my back yard and had the battalion headquarters set up there. They were certainly prepared to move rather fast, to have that all down there at [2841] that time.

34. General GRUNERT. Where did they come from?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Schofield.

35. General GRUNERT. How far is your place from Schofield?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. About 10 miles.

36. General GRUNERT. But they were not out there on the 6th?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. They were not in position at my place, no. They had been, formerly, many times, down there, but they were not, on the 6th.

37. General GRUNERT. It appears the Army was on what they called the "Alert No. 1," about November 27, and continued on that alert until the attack. That alert calls for protection against sabotage only; it does not call for protection against air attack, nor against surface attack. They had two more forms of alert. The second form was that which was protection or readiness to meet an air attack, plus sabotage; and the third form was an all-out alert to meet everything. They took this first alert, an alert against sabotage, and that is the alert they were on when the attack struck. Was that generally known to the public, or was it known to you?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. No, it was not known to me. It was simply that things that we saw gave us that impression; but it was not known.

38. General GRUNERT. Now, my next question: Did the general public, as you know it, feel let down by what the Army failed to do, or by the inadequate measures they took to meet this attack?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I don't think so.

39. General GRUNERT. You don't think so?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Not in Hawaii.

[2842] 40. General GRUNERT. How do you feel about it?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Well, for publication, I rather sort of hate to have this thing down in these notes, if I could, in some of our meetings, discuss it off the record.

41. General GRUNERT. It won't do us any good unless we have it on the record, because we must come to our conclusions from the record; so if you have something you do not want to say, why, don't say it; but if you have something you can tell us, we would be glad to hear it.

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Well, all right—you asked what I thought of it. I thought that the Army in Hawaii, compared to the Army leaders in the Philippines, got a very bad deal, frankly.

42. General GRUNERT. You mean they got a bad deal in what way?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Well, in the very fact that, at the time—and as I say, I am not military; I know very little about it—but the impression was that here, practically the same thing happened in Hawaii that had happened in the Philippine Islands, and the commanders here were certainly relieved, and, apparently to me, held up to a good deal of shame, while under rather similar conditions in the Philippines they were quite heroes.

43. General GRUNERT. You didn't know, of your own accord or knowledge, whether both of them were, so-called, "guilty," or were innocent, both of them?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. No, I didn't. I couldn't say that I did. You ask my impression. I am giving you my impression.

44. General GRUNERT. Then your impression was made up from what you have heard and read about what happened in the Philippines, and what you know happened here?

[2843] Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. That's right.

45. General GRUNERT. Well, what I was really getting at is, did the people here think that the Army let them down by not using all that they had to meet the attack?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I think that the people of Hawaii, as a whole, under the conditions, knowing that the ambassadors were talking over the situation in Washington, felt that it was a thing that would have happened under most any circumstances, with any commanding officers, and that they did not feel "let down."

46. General GRUNERT. Still, you looked to your Army and your Navy to protect you, did you not?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Yes, sir; definitely.

47. General GRUNERT. And that they must have more knowledge than is ordinarily available to you, to come to a judgment as to what to do?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. That is true. In that, I might repeat, I am giving my impressions.

48. General GRUNERT. Naturally; that is what we want.

Now, is there any other thing that you think of, any subject you might want to open up on, that will give us a lead on which to develop it?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I don't think of anything more. As I say, it was just a feeling that we had that a very great deal had been done for some months prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor, and that about everything was being done, from the civilian point of view, that could be done.

49. General GRUNERT. Suppose we admit that the 100% preparedness measures had been taken; they would not have been of avail if [2844] they had not been used, would they?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. That is true.

50. General GRUNERT. But, from what I gather through your testimony, you noticed progress was being made, and the Commanding General and his staff, and his troops, were interested and working toward preparing themselves to defend the island?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. That is right.

51. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything about the construction that took place, here? Did you have any connection with it?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Which construction?

52. General GRUNERT. Mostly in the line of tunneling, building emplacements, and building air warning stations, and so forth.

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Well, of course, I know of the construction work that took place out on my own plantations—railroads and gun emplacements, and things of that kind. The fact of the underground storage of oil, and things of that kind, for the Navy, it is more or less public knowledge; but just exactly what it was, I did not know.

53. General GRUNERT. Were you acquainted with, or did you know about Colonel Wyman, who was a district engineer in Hawaii?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I had met him.

54. General GRUNERT. What do you know about him?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Well, he called the plantation managers, some time before the war, I believe; I am not exactly sure about the time, but anyway, it was felt that they would need the help of our Filipinos for war work, construction, and also some of our Japanese; and there was formed in Hawaii what they called, in [2845] this island, the Oahu Volunteers, and, on the Island of Hawaii, the Hawaiian Rifles, and so on; and we were supposed to be able to help in any way with construction work, if necessary, or fighting, if necessary, whatever we were called upon to do; and Colonel Wyman called us in one Sunday morning shortly after the war to talk about, oh, the building of airfields and things of that kind, where we were helping, the use of our men. We turned practically all of our men and all of our equipment over to Colonel Wyman and his staff for some time; had several hundred of our men regularly, and all of our equipment, building airfields and things of that kind.

55. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything about Colonel Wyman's deficiency or his ability in his job as district engineer?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Again, impressions. He impressed me as a rather "hard boiled go-getter" that I would sort of like to have in charge of a job, but didn't like personally. I didn't care much about him personally, but I did think he was moving things along pretty well.

56. General GRUNERT. Did you know a man by the name of Rohl?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I did not. I have heard of him.

57. General GRUNERT. Did you know a man by the name of Grafe?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I did not.

58. General GRUNERT. Can you think of anything else that you would like to tell us about? General Short evidently depended on you to give us some leads. You have been trying to give us some. Are there any others that are in the back of your mind that may be of help to us in coming to conclusions or ferreting [2846] out other things?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. I really don't think of any other leads, General. I feel that most all my testimony has been very intangible just simply impressions. I have no very definite knowledge. I knew General Short and talked to him on a good many occasions, as I had with General Herron before him, and other commanding officers.

59. General GRUNERT. You liked him and respected him, did you not?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Very much. The community as a whole I am sure liked and respected him.

60. General GRUNERT. But you knew nothing definite about his military ability or capacity or judgment?

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. No, except the impression that he was doing a very good job in preparing the place.

61. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming. It is a pleasure to have met you, and thank you for helping us out.

Mr. JOHN MIDKIFF. Thank you. If I do think of anything more if I may volunteer, I will do that.

62. General GRUNERT. All right.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 11:35 a. m., having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day, the Board took up the consideration of other matters.)

[2847]

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[2848] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1944

FORT SHAFTER, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Saturday, September 9, 1944, conducted the hearings of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM J. FLOOD, U. S. A., CHIEF
OF STAFF, 7TH AIR FORCE, HICKAM FIELD, OAHU

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General FLOOD. William J. Flood, Brigadier General, U. S. Army; Chief of Staff, 7th Air Force, Hickam Field, Oahu.

2. General GRUNERT. General, the Board is after facts and after leads to where we can get facts. The reason we requested you to come here was that the Board understood that you had command of Wheeler Field during the attack, and so we hope we [2849] can get some facts from you to fill out the story that is gradually taking shape.

What was your command in 1941 over here, and during the attack?

General FLOOD. I was in command of Wheeler Field, sir. Wheeler Field at that time consisted of our fighter airplanes. Practically all of them were at Wheeler. I was not in command of any fighter units; merely the field.

3. General FRANK. Base commander?

General FLOOD. Base commander, yes, sir.

4. General GRUNERT. Suppose you tell us about what defense measures were taken prior to and after the attack, at Wheeler Field. In defense measures I mean what preparatory work was done, what was the system of defending the field itself against an air attack, and what was done after the air attack took place that had not been done prior thereto?

General FLOOD. Prior to the attack, sometime in November, we were called—all base and tactical commanders were called to General Martin's office, who was then in command of the Hawaiian Air Force (that was a forerunner of the 7th Air Force) and we were told that Head-

quarters Hawaiian Department was in receipt of a message outlining the strained relations between the Japanese and the United States, and that we were to be particularly on alert for sabotage. At that time I think the sabotage readiness phase was 1. We increased our guards around the field. We pulled all our airplanes in groupments on the ramps, and so forth, in order to save manpower, and felt that we could probably better take care of sabotage that way, and we increased our guards around the [2850] perimeter of the field. We also put more stress on training of the rifle. We were short of men, and, of course, as you know, in the Air Force all our men are mechanics and we don't have time to train them how to shoot a gun so much, but we did then. We drew some of them out and tried to make marksmen out of them, to know how to handle rifles, and so forth.

5. General GRUNERT. What was the defense of Wheeler Field, the ground defense, as planned?

General FLOOD. Well, sir, at that time we had some machine gun positions on our big hangar, and we had a perimeter guard, is all, at that time. That was before we had the fence.

6. General GRUNERT. Perimeter guard armed with rifles?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir.

7. General GRUNERT. And some machine guns on the hangars?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir; and on top of the hangars, on top of the big barracks.

8. General GRUNERT. On top of the barracks?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir.

9. General GRUNERT. To protect the hangars?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir.

10. General GRUNERT. Had the men been instructed with the machine gun?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir.

11. General GRUNERT. So you had a perimeter guard of riflemen partly instructed, and how many machine guns?

General FLOOD. Well, sir, I don't think we had more than about five.

12. General GRUNERT. Five machine guns?

[2851] General FLOOD. Yes, sir.

13. General GRUNERT. Was there an S. O. P. on just what everybody would do in case of an attack by air?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir, there was an S. O. P. I am sure that the Hawaiian Department had an S. O. P.

14. General GRUNERT. Were there any women and children on the post?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir; we had all the families here.

15. General GRUNERT. What were the instructions, what were the plans as to taking care of them in case of attack?

General FLOOD. Well, we were to evacuate, if we had any notice; the local Red Cross, and so forth, here, under the Office of Civilian Defense—I am pretty sure that that was the agency that had made arrangements to take families into the homes away from the stations and into, you might say, the suburbs or the hill areas of Honolulu if such became necessary.

16. General GRUNERT. Then, I understand your scheme was evacuation rather than protection in or about Wheeler Field?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir; we had no protection right there at Wheeler Field. We had no trenches or anything.

17. General GRUNERT. You had no air raid shelters?

General FLOOD. No, sir.

18. General GRUNERT. Or any place for immediate protection?

General FLOOD. No, sir.

19. General GRUNERT. In case you were caught by surprise?

General FLOOD. No, sir.

20. General GRUNERT. Yes. Now, tell me briefly what happened when the attack came.

General FLOOD. Well, the attack, as I remember it, hit us [2852] about 7:55 Sunday morning on the 7th. It struck me at first—the first we knew about it, I just happened to be out in front of the quarters talking to some people, and there was a bomb hit down near the Wheeler Depot area, and my first reaction was that it was an accidental bomb due to someone having been out on maneuvers, or something like that. Then immediately following that these low-flying airplanes came in, I would say around 25 of them, about 50 to 75 feet in the air. You could almost hit them with a rock if you had it. And then, of course, we saw the insignia of the Japanese rising sun on it, and then right away we knew what had happened, and we all hurried to the line. Well, we started to the line when the bomb hit, and they dropped I think not more than five bombs on Wheeler Field, two of which hit one of the barracks and, say, maybe three hit the shop area. Then they machine-gunned the whole post. I mean they went up and down the line and in the residential area strafing. They went up and down the line strafing, I presume incendiaries, at our airplanes, because they burned most of them. They were all loaded with gas, and so forth, and of course they went up right away; and unfortunately that morning there wasn't any wind, and the black smoke and all, we couldn't see down there. We were trying to get airplanes out, tow those out that were not burning, but you could hardly see anything around the hangar area, just this black smoke with no wind to amount to anything. We found afterwards that they had practically got all our planes. I think we probably had, oh, maybe 45 or 50 left out of an original about 150.

21. General GRUNERT. In what shape were those that were left?

General FLOOD. Well, those that were left were not bad, sir. [2853] Fortunately we had gunnery exercise on Saturday, and we had some few airplanes over at Haleiwa, which is a field a few miles from Wheeler, that the Japs didn't hit. So we rushed some boys over there right away, and they had some ammunition and everything ready to go, there, because they had been practicing gunnery; and we got approximately 14 ships in the air that morning, and I think we approximately got 14 Japs down. As far as I know, those were the only airplanes in the air.

22. General GRUNERT. What was the scheme of anticraft protection for Wheeler Field?

General FLOOD. Well, there wasn't any scheme. We didn't have any antiaircraft other than machine guns.

23. General GRUNERT. I know, but it was covered by antiaircraft fire of the Department, wasn't it?

General FLOOD. I presume it was, sir.

24. General GRUNERT. Do you know of any anticraft that went into position before the blitz was over, that went into action before the blitz was over, as far as you know, as far as you were concerned?

General FLOOD. Not at Wheeler, but they were firing from Schofield Barracks. I don't know where, but I could see them, I am pretty sure.

25. General GRUNERT. Well, after the thing was over, what additional measures were then taken for anything that might come in the future?

General FLOOD. Well, I made a survey right away that morning, and, figuring that most of our airplanes were destroyed, I got ahold of four officers who had been in the Infantry, Air Force, and I immediately formed four infantry companies [2854] with my air force people. We put them around the field, particularly over near Kunia Gulley there, to watch for anybody that might come in; and then I called on the Department for some troops to guard the airfield. We thought we might be able to get some planes up. Of course we didn't know what was coming. They sent me a battalion of infantry from Schofield. We started the battalion around, and their guns, and so forth. Major Nave I believe at that time was in command, and I turned all that ground personnel over to him, including the four companies that we formed with air force troops.

26. General GRUNERT. This was on your request and not according to a plan for the protection of the field?

General FLOOD. It was on my request I got the battalion; yes, sir. Colonel Collins, who is now General Collins, was then, as I remember it, the Chief of Staff, and I got in touch with him.

27. General FRANK. Chief of Staff where?

General FLOOD. Of the Hawaiian Department. I believe he was. No; it was Phillips, I believe was, according—no; Phillips I believe was Chief of Staff. Yes, that's right. It was not Collins.

28. General GRUNERT. Now, you said as soon as they went on the sabotage alert you had to pull in all the planes from wherever they were, to concentrate them so it would take less guards. Where were these planes before you concentrated them?

General FLOOD. Well, we had them around the field, sir, spotted in different positions around the field, and we pulled them all into the apron.

29. General GRUNERT. Well, weren't they being guarded while [2855] they were all around the field, prior to your pulling them in?

General FLOOD. Well, they were guarded, yes, sir, by the guards on the field, but no particular guard on the individual airplanes as we do now have.

30. General GRUNERT. The day before you got the sabotage alert they were all spotted around, and they were being taken care of?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir.

31. General GRUNERT. And the day you got the sabotage alert you pulled them in?

General FLOOD. We pulled them in.

32. General GRUNERT. Into a group, to take care of them?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir.

33. General GRUNERT. Weren't they being taken care of?

General FLOOD. Well, sir, we thought they were. We asked—as a matter of fact, I asked General Martin if we could continue to disperse,

and he said, "Well, Flood," he said, "no. The orders are to concentrate your planes." Well, then I got a wire from the Commanding General of the Department that we would not disperse the airplanes, or a teletype. I haven't got a copy of it, but I am sure there is a record of it here.

34. General GRUNERT. Then, it just looked as though they expected something to happen the day after, that might not have happened the day before, as far as sabotage is concerned?

General FLOOD. Well, it appeared to me, sir, that they might have thought there might have been some kind of organized sabotage in this area, which I don't know about.

35. General GRUNERT. But you just carried out your orders?

[2856] General FLOOD. That's all; yes, sir.

36. General GRUNERT. If you hadn't received those definite orders, what would have been your disposition on your own?

General FLOOD. Sir, I believe I would have left them dispersed. I asked for that permission.

37. General GRUNERT. How would you have taken care of them dispersed? How much more personnel would it have taken, in your opinion, to take care of them dispersed, as compared to concentrated?

General FLOOD. Well, there were men working on the airplanes all day, and I don't think it would take any more, except at night you would probably increase your guard, say, as we do now. We have a guard per airplane now, or try to. We did up until recently. We don't right now.

[2857] 38. General GRUNERT. Do you know what department orders required the concentration of airplanes under Alert No. 1? Was that the SOP of November 5, do you know?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir; there was a condition of readiness No. 1; yes, sir; that is what we were under, at the time.

39. General GRUNERT. That was an SOP of November 5? General Russell, have you any questions?

40. General RUSSELL. I do not think that is particularly clear, General. Were you acting under an SOP in concentrating your planes, or did you have an order from the Hawaiian Department explicitly directing a concentration of the planes?

General FLOOD. We had a directive from General Martin, at this meeting, that we would pull our planes in and group them up for guarding against sabotage. That is where I got my instructions, from General Martin.

41. General RUSSELL. What did your testimony mean, a moment ago, to the effect that you had a teletype or some form of recorded order?

General FLOOD. No, sir; I did not mean a teletype, that way. I say that after this meeting, I asked General Martin if we couldn't disperse the airplanes, and he said, "No, Flood, that is not the orders, but," he said, "I will investigate it." I then later, I think the next day, got a teletype saying that I would not disperse the airplanes. That teletype as I remember it was not signed "Martin," it was signed "Short."

42. General RUSSELL. Would it be possible for you to get that teletype and let us have it, at this date?

General FLOOD. Well, I presume, sir, that Wheeler Field has that in the files. I will try to locate it for you.

[2858] 43. General RUSSELL. We will appreciate that.

44. General FRANK. Will you locate it and furnish the Board an official copy of it?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir. If they haven't got it, I am sure the Department here has it.

45. General FRANK. You will dig it up?

General FLOOD. I will take steps to try to locate it; yes, sir.

46. General RUSSELL. There has been evidence at one time or another about a third of the airplanes being required to be on the alert constantly, by a department order; do you know anything about that?

General FLOOD. No, sir; I don't anything about that.

47. General RUSSELL. It is true, however, that none of the planes at Wheeler Field were on the alert 7 December 1941? Wheeler Field was where you were?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir; Wheeler Field. On December 7, sir?

48. General RUSSELL. Yes. Do you know whether any airplanes were on the alert on the morning of December 7, 1941, or not?

General FLOOD. No, sir; I don't. That would be General Davidson, the Fighter Command.

49. General RUSSELL. You saw the planes, and where they were when the attack came?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir.

50. General RUSSELL. You saw none of them make an effort to get off the ground and into the air?

General FLOOD. Oh, yes; yes, sir. In addition to my job as Base Commander, I was Acting Executive of the Fighter [2859] Command, and General Davidson had given me permission to aid him in running the set-up out there; and two or three airplanes did get off the ground. They were not on the alert, however, as far as I know; they might have been put on by the Fighter Command; but they got up, because the pilots went down there and saw what was going on, and the mechanics and the pilots loaded their ships and took off from Wheeler. There were not more than two or three that got in the air from Wheeler. The airplanes I mentioned being in the air, about 14, were practically all from Haleiwa, which is a station where we have planes for gunnery. We send them over there for maneuvers in gunnery. It is right on the water.

51. General RUSSELL. On previous Sunday mornings, say the Sunday mornings in November 1941, had your fighter planes participated in any exercises or maneuvers held here in the Hawaiian Department?

General FLOOD. We had maneuvers, sir, periodically. I cannot tell you whether there was any in November. General Davidson's records would show that, I think.

52. General RUSSELL. You do not recall any early Sunday morning maneuvers just prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, in which your fighter aircraft participated?

General FLOOD. No, sir; I don't know of any, myself.

53. General RUSSELL. That is all I have.

54. General FRANK. You just stated that you were Base Commander, but you were also Executive of the Fighter Command?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir; that was an agreement that General Davidson and I had, because at that time we were building this Air

Defense Command Post, which is your present set-up, right [2860]
here at Shafter.

55. General FRANK. The information center?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir; and he was dividing his time between Wheeler and that point.

56. General FRANK. What tactical authority did you have over the Fighter Command?

General FLOOD. I had not tactical authority. I didn't order any airplanes out, or any maneuvers of any kind.

57. General FRANK. What were your duties, then as Executive?

General FLOOD. Just to take care of the set-up at Wheeler Field, help the groups along.

58. General FRANK. In what way?

General FLOOD. Well, in an advisory capacity. We had a lot of young fellows up there that, when General was away, he felt an old officer ought to be around to whom they could turn and ask questions, and that was the type of work I was doing for him. I had no tactical responsibility.

59. General FRANK. When did you become Base Commander at Wheeler Field?

General FLOOD. I became Base Commander, there, in about November, sir.

60. General FRANK. 1941?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir. Prior to that, I was A-4 of the Hawaiian Air Force—since that the time you put me in that job, in March 1940.

61. General FRANK. As A-4 of the Hawaiian Air Force, did you have contacts with the district engineer?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir; quite often.

62. General FRANK. What was the nature of those contacts?

[2861] General FLOOD. They were all construction projects, the development of the Hilo Airport, the Homestead Airport, Bellows Field, Barking Sands, and Wheeler.

63. General FRANK. Was there any money appropriated to develop those fields prior to December 7?

General FLOOD. There was money appropriated to him, sir, not to us, as I remember it. He got the money. I know that he set up the estimated costs, and so forth, and I presume he got the money, himself. We didn't handle any money ourselves in the Air Force—that is, the Air-4 office.

64. General FRANK. Did the construction proceed satisfactorily?

General FLOOD. Excellent, under Wyman—faster, under Wyman, I believe, than it did under the Department Engineer, who at one time was in on a lot of the stuff.

65. General FRANK. Who was the Department engineer, do you remember?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir; that was Brigadier General Lyman, "Queen" Lyman. I do not know whether that is his regular name, or not. He was of Hawaiian descent, and they called him "Queen."

66. General FRANK. How well did you know Wyman?

General FLOOD. I only know him, sir, in an official capacity. I had never been out with him socially. I saw him though at least two or three times a week during the course of his construction period.

67. General FRANK. Were you always able to find him and to do business with him?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir; he had an office down-town. Of course, at some times we would call him up and he would not be there, but he would always be out to see us on any big [2862] project.

68. General FRANK. Was he cooperative?

General FLOOD. Exceedingly so, with the Air Force. I don't know whether he was an advocate of air or not, but we never had any trouble with him. We would tell him what we wanted. Well, naturally, of course, we would have the usual arguments about runways and so forth, and the way he wanted to build them and the way we wanted, so we took his word, as being an engineer.

69. General FRANK. Was the runway at Bellows Field under construction when you were A-4 of the Hawaiian Department?

General FLOOD. Yes sir; we started on Bellows Field, the whole Bellows Field project, when I was A-4. Colonel Wyman undertook that project, himself, and at the time, we were asking for money, and I remember—I don't know whether this has anything to do with any interest in this case, but I asked him about starting on it. I said, "You are starting it pretty fast. Did you get the money for it?" He said, "Well, we'll get the money. We will go ahead. We need this"; so he put that project over in no time at all; and it is a good thing he did, because we needed it.

70. General FRANK. The work proceeded satisfactorily, then?

General FLOOD. Yes, sir.

71. General FRANK. Were there any construction projects that, from your point of view as A-4 of the Hawaiian Air Force, lagged, that were under his jurisdiction?

General FLOOD. No, sir; I would say they went faster under Wyman's jurisdiction.

72. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, are you familiar with the exact [2863] times that this work was required to be done by the contract and the job orders?

General FLOOD. No; we had nothing to do with that. That was Wyman's.

73. Major CLAUSEN. So, in answering General Frank's questions as to whether it was satisfactory, you would not know whether the contract and job orders had been lived up to?

General FLOOD. I meant it was satisfactory from an Air Force standpoint of having the facilities, getting it ready for us. Now, as to whether or not it came up to specifications that the engineers laid down or not, I can't answer that, because that wasn't our responsibility.

74. Major CLAUSEN. With respect to Bellows Field, the runway there would not take a heavy ship, would it, on 7 December 1941?

General FLOOD. Well, I don't think it was a question of the runway there. I can't answer that. I would say it could take a heavy ship, but in fact, we never put any heavy stuff in there, because of the nature of the field, because it is a bad field. It was never designed to put heavy stuff over there.

75. Major CLAUSEN. You said something about concentrating the airplanes, the airplanes having been pulled in before the 7th of December. Were they put wing to wing?

General FLOOD. Yes, they were pulled in on the apron in front of the hangars and practically wing-tip to wing-tip.

76. Major CLAUSEN. Did you empty the gasoline tanks on some of them?

General FLOOD. No, sir; we kept them so we could fly. We did not drain them. It takes quite a while to fill an [2864] airplane, if you ever need it.

77. Major CLAUSEN. You also said something about the practice now being to guard each plane with one man, and having in mind that you have more planes now than you had before the 7th of December 1941; you had sufficient personnel before 7 December 1941 to do that same thing, did you not?

General FLOOD. Not one man per airplane; no, sir.

78. Major CLAUSEN. How many planes were there on Wheeler Field?

General FLOOD. Right on Wheeler Field? Oh, I would say maybe 110.

79. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have 110 men?

General FLOOD. We had more than 110 men, but we could not spare 110 men for guards for each individual airplane, because at that time our service units were short, and these people were all mechanics. You had no real set-up for guarding, except what we call "basics." Of course, now we have; we have MP companies that are sent out, assigned to the air force for the purpose of guarding. We do not use trained men in guarding, unless in emergency.

80. Major CLAUSEN. Suppose you had dispersed the planes instead of concentrating them, before 7 December 1941, would it have been possible to have assigned one man to each plane?

General FLOOD. I think it would, in emergency. It would skin us down.

81. Major CLAUSEN. But you could have done it?

General FLOOD. I think we could have done it.

82. Major CLAUSEN. How many men did you have?

General FLOOD. I do not know the strength off-hand of [2865] the men at Wheeler Field, but we could skim down and have done that if it had been necessary to put one man per airplane.

83. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

84. General FRANK. Colonel Toulmin, have you anything?

85. Colonel TOULMIN. Nothing.

86. General GRUNERT. Have you anything that occurs to you that you would like to bring to the attention of the Board that has not been brought up? The Board has pretty thoroughly covered the ground with other witnesses, and there is no need of just building up testimony, just to pad the record.

General FLOOD. No, sir.

87. General GRUNERT. But if you know of anything that is in the back of your mind that may be of assistance to the Board, let us have it.

General FLOOD. No, sir; I haven't anything, at all.

88. General FRANK. Did you ever know a Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General FLOOD. No, sir; I never knew him.

89. General FRANK. Did you ever hear of him?

General FLOOD. I have read in the papers. Isn't he the man that Wyman has entered into contracts with, or supposed to have contracts over here?

90. General FRANK. Yes.

General FLOOD. I have read of him. I never knew him, and I never knew he was here until after the stories broke in the papers.

91. General FRANK. Did you ever know a Paul Grafe?

General FLOOD. No, sir; I never knew him. We had no contact at all, as you remember, General, with any of the contractors. Our men are with the Department and the district engineer. They were the ones that let the contracts out, and we didn't even know who had them except we heard the names.

92. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming in.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2866] **TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL CHARLES H. McMORRIS
UNITED STATES NAVY, CHIEF OF JOINT STAFF, PACIFIC FLEET
IN PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his right under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Admiral, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization and station?

Admiral McMORRIS. Charles H. McMorris, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Chief of Joint Staff, Pacific Fleet in Pacific Ocean Areas.

2. General GRUNERT. Admiral, this Board is after facts and lead to where it can get such facts, if it cannot get them from the witnesses present. The Board asked you to come here because you had testified before the Roberts Commission, and from that testimony and your assignment in 1941 we hope we can get some facts from you. The field which we have to cover is so broad that we have parcelled out some of the phases of this investigation. General Russell here has charge of this particular phase of it, so he will lead in questioning you and the other members of the Board will fill in. So I turn you over to the tender mercies of General Russell.

3. General RUSSELL. Admiral, what was your assignment in November and December of 1941?

Admiral McMORRIS. Head of the War Plans Division of the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

4. General RUSSELL. How long had you been on that assignment prior to December 7th, 1941?

Admiral McMORRIS. Since 1 February, 1941.

5. General RUSSELL. That was about the time that General Short came out and became Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department? [2867]

Admiral McMORRIS. Almost exactly the same time.

6. General RUSSELL. During that period, Admiral, from February 1, 1941, to December 7, 1941, were there frequent or infrequent conferences between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Admiral of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral McMORRIS. There were a very considerable number of conferences between those two officers. They were generally held in the office of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and I attended most if not all of them.

7. General RUSSELL. Briefly stated, what subjects were discussed at those meetings?

Admiral McMorris. The defenses of the Hawaiian Area and the operations in case of war of the Pacific Fleet and, among other things, the possibilities of moving some of the units of the Army under the command of the Commander, Hawaiian Department, to Midway and Wake, and the building up of certain defenses at Canton and other outlying islands.

8. General RUSSELL. Were those conferences more frequent or less frequent in the latter part of the year 1941, or were there any changes in the frequency of holding those conferences?

Admiral McMorris. As I recall now, they were more frequent, but a certain degree of tenseness in the international situation obtained throughout 1941 and I cannot say with definiteness that the frequency had markedly increased.

9. General RUSSELL. Was this subject of the tenseness in the relationship between the Japanese Empire and the American Government discussed at any of these conferences?

Admiral McMorris. Yes, more frequently than not that situation was discussed.

10. General RUSSELL. Is it your opinion or impression that there was a realization on the part of those participating in those conferences that the situation between the Japanese Empire and the American Government was becoming more tense in the year 1941 as the year progressed?

Admiral McMorris. Yes.

11. General RUSSELL. Is it your opinion that there was a realization on the part of these officers, both naval and Army, that a war with the Japanese Empire was inevitable?

Admiral McMorris. I would say highly probable.

12. General RUSSELL. Highly probable?

Admiral McMorris. Rather than inevitable.

13. General RUSSELL. Were speculations indulged in at these conferences as to the imminence of war with Japan, its likelihood of breaking out in the immediate future?

Admiral McMorris. Yes.

14. General RUSSELL. What, in your opinion, was the consensus of judgment of those officers attending these meetings as to the imminence of war with Japan in late November, 1941?

Admiral McMorris. It is my opinion that those officers believed that war with the Japanese Empire might occur in an extremely short time, although there may have been expressed some uncertainty as to whether a war between the Japanese and British Empires might not precede the involvement of the United States by a short time. I do not believe, however, that there was serious doubt but that we would actually be involved on very short notice.

15. General RUSSELL. You have introduced the subject of war [2869] occurring between the British and Japanese Empires a short time before we became involved. Was it the opinion of the assembled officers in these conferences that we would go to the rescue of Britain if she became involved in war with Japan?

Admiral McMorris. It was felt that if Great Britain became involved that some overt act, real or fancied, would almost surely occur and that it would not be so much of going to the rescue of the British Empire as to defend American interests.

16. General RUSSELL. Was this opinion or conception based on facts, or was there some factual information which had been received, or was it mere speculation on the part of these officers?

Admiral McMORRIS. Largely speculation, and a general acquaintance with movements of certain Japanese forces in the southeast Asia area, and the feeling that Japan might be unwilling to expose her line of communications to a threat from the Philippines.

17. General FRANK. You felt that the United States would be forced in by an overt act by Japan rather than by a determined decision by the United States?

Admiral McMORRIS. Yes.

18. General RUSSELL. But your reasoning was that our entry into the war would probably be preceded by an outbreak of hostilities between the British and Japanese Empires, which would give our forces some notice of the coming events?

Admiral McMORRIS. I would not say that I believed that, but in discussions it was certainly regarded as a distinct possibility or even probability.

19. General RUSSELL. Now, Admiral, if high naval officers had [2870] reached the conclusion that war with Japan was highly probable and that its imminence was a very great possibility, what conclusions, if any, were reached about the probability or the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor and the Army installations on the Island of Oahu?

Admiral McMORRIS. Certainly I personally regarded such an attack by saboteurs or by submarines as extremely probable. I did not at any time envisage such an attack as actually occurred.

20. General RUSSELL. You now refer to a surprise air attack from carrier-based airplanes?

Admiral McMORRIS. Yes, sir, I did regard it as a possibility that a small raiding force might at some time undertake it and run efforts along our lines of communication in this vicinity and that such a raiding force might include some carrier strength.

21. General RUSSELL. Admiral, did you know of the presence of a carrier force or a task force, Japanese task force, in the Marshall Islands in which carriers had been discovered late in November of 1941?

Admiral McMORRIS. I believe I recall some intelligence data that indicated the possible presence of carriers in the Marshalls area. Parenthetically, I might add that it has since become well established that no such force was in the Marshalls, but, of course, this added information was not available to us at that time. The intelligence that we actually had was of a speculative nature.

22. General RUSSELL. What is the information which you have received since that time that establishes clearly that no such task force with carriers was in the Marshalls late in November, 1941?

[2871] Admiral McMORRIS. Interrogation of prisoners or reports of interrogations of prisoners and captured documents that seemed to quite clearly indicate the movements of the Japanese carrier force in late November and early December.

23. General RUSSELL. Where are the documents that you now refer to?

Admiral McMORRIS. I believe that our intelligence organization in the Pacific Ocean Areas has that information available.

24. General RUSSELL. Would that be in files here on the Island of Oahu?

Admiral McMORRIS. I should say very probably, but I would have to consult our Intelligence Officer to give a positive statement in that connection.

25. General RUSSELL. Would you be willing to undertake that for us and let us know whether or not you find those documents and if they could be made available to us?

Admiral McMORRIS. Yes, sir.

26. General RUSSELL. Are there reports, Admiral, of the questioning of the witnesses upon whom you base your opinion that the carriers were not in the Marshalls in late November and early December available in records any place?

Admiral McMORRIS. I would expect to find that information at the same source.

27. General RUSSELL. Will you attempt to ascertain that for us and let us know, please, sir?

28. General RUSSELL. Prior to the morning of December 7th, 1941, possibly on the date of November 27th, 1941, do you recall specifically a conference attended by you, General Short, possibly Admiral Kimmel, and others, in which the possibility of [2872] an attack on Pearl Harbor was discussed?

Admiral McMORRIS. I recall that about that time, certainly in very late November, a number of dispatches concerning the existing military situation had been received, and that conference did take place in Admiral Kimmel's office at which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and various other officers were present. I particularly remember a discussion with regard to the movement or the possible movement of certain pursuit planes from Oahu to Midway and Wake and that certainly the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was mentioned, and I recall that the merits or demerits of sending certain particular units to Midway were inquired about. I had advocated sending the less efficient group to Midway, and Admiral Kimmel inquired when I felt an air attack on Pearl Harbor might occur, and I replied that I felt such an attack would never occur.

29. General RUSSELL. Admiral, we have discussed the fringes of it, possibly, without going to the heart of it. Would you state to the Board the reasons upon which you based this conclusion, that an air attack on Pearl Harbor would never occur?

Admiral McMORRIS. Again, I am expressing my own views, but they are the views which colored such recommendations as I made from time to time to the Commander-in-Chief. I felt that the Japanese interests lay in the Asiatic area and that they could more effectively utilize their full power in that area. I doubted that an attack on the Pearl Harbor area would inflict great damage and felt that the Japanese would have a similar conclusion. I felt that if we were contemplating a similar attack on the Japanese homeland that the damage we might inflict would not be commensurate with the risk and probable losses [2873] involved, and that, similarly, the Japanese would reach such a conclusion as regards an attack on Hawaii. Subsequent events, of course, proved my conclusions very unsound.

30. General RUSSELL. Earlier you stated, Admiral, that you had come to the conclusion that the event of war against the United States,

assuming it was brought on by an offensive action on the part of Japan, would result from threat to the Japanese line of communication in its progress to the south. Did it occur to you that possibly the main instrument which the American people had to attack that line of communication was the fleet here at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral McMORRIS. I knew that such was not the case, that our logistic capabilities at that time would not have permitted any considerable portion of the fleet in the Pearl Harbor area operating in that portion of the Pacific. I did know, however, that there had been considerable augmentation of the air strength in the Philippine area as would endanger such lines of communication, and that submarines based on Manila would be highly effective against such a line.

[2874] General RUSSELL. But you did not regard our surface fleet at Pearl Harbor as a threat to the Japanese line of communications to the south, from the Japanese Empire?

Admiral McMORRIS. I did not. I did not so regard it until we were able to establish ourselves much further west and have facilities for logistic support that could not be developed for a very considerable period.

32. General RUSSELL. Admiral, to go back to a question which has been suggested to me in relation to the attack made here on Pearl Harbor: You state that subsequent investigation has been made, and you have now come to the conclusion that the task force which made the attack did not assemble in the Marshall Islands; is that true?

Admiral McMORRIS. That is correct, sir.

33. General RUSSELL. What is your opinion now as to where this task force came from?

Admiral McMORRIS. That they departed from ports in southern Honshu, made a rendezvous in the southern Kuriles, and steamed almost directly eastward on a line that approximates the latitude midway between Pearl Harbor and the Aleutians, and then almost directly south.

34. General RUSSELL. For the purposes of the record: the first port from which this task force sailed, is it, or not, located on the mainland of the Japanese Empire, the home island?

Admiral McMORRIS. The initial port of departure was from the main base of Japan, but that their assembly point from which they finally sailed was an isolated harbor to the northward of the main islands of Japan, that is, to the northward of Hokkaido.

[2875] 35. General RUSSELL. And from that point they traveled in which direction?

Admiral McMORRIS. East.

36. General RUSSELL. Almost directly east?

Admiral McMORRIS. Almost directly east.

37. General RUSSELL. And thence almost directly south?

Admiral McMORRIS. Almost directly south.

38. General RUSSELL. Do you know of any refueling point between the point that you have described as their assembly point after leaving the homeland and the point from which they launched their attack on Oahu?

Admiral McMORRIS. From their point of departure I believe they proceeded in one force, did fuel enroute, but I do not now recall just the location of the refueling point or points.

39. General RUSSELL. How long, in the opinion of the Navy, was it from the time this task force left the mainland of Japan, or its initial assembly port and point of departure as you have described it, until it reached Pearl Harbor?

Admiral McMorris. It has been some time since I have reviewed that information, but it was in the neighborhood of two weeks from the time of departure from their main bases.

40. General RUSSELL. Have you any factual basis from which deductions have been made by the Navy as to the constitution of this task force?

Admiral McMorris. There were six cruisers and attendant light craft in this task force, but the aircraft from only four of the carriers actually participated in the Pearl Harbor attack.

41. General RUSSELL. Could you tell us roughly how many [2876] surface ships, including carriers of various categories, would have been in this task force?

Admiral McMorris. Without refreshing my memory, I believe an answer to that might be misleading.

42. General RUSSELL. Admiral, the thing I am attempting to learn, if possible, is whether or not this was a considerable convoy, this task force, and if you can estimate roughly the number of surface craft that might have been in it.

Admiral McMorris. The force in question was a fast striking force that did not include the heavy battleships but was in general comparable in strength to two of the carrier task forces which the United States now operates. Let us say there were in the neighborhood of 15 combatant vessels, including the 6 carriers.

43. General RUSSELL. Does the Navy have conclusions as to the distance that these forces were from Pearl Harbor when they launched their aircraft which participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral McMorris. In the neighborhood of 300 miles. I might add that the distance was considerably greater than we felt that it was feasible to launch an attack on the part of our own carriers at that time. The special fittings of belly tanks, and the willingness to sacrifice planes that might run out of gas, permitted the operation to take place from that distance.

44. General RUSSELL. At the time of this attack on December 7th, as we recall, there were two or three task forces from the Pacific Fleet based on Pearl Harbor operating away from Pearl Harbor, American vessels: is that true?

[2877] Admiral McMorris. That is correct. There were at that time three American carriers in the Pacific. One was completing or had just completed overhaul at Puget Sound and was enroute to San Diego to obtain her air group. One carrier with attendant cruisers and destroyers had just delivered certain marine fighters to Wake and was expected to arrive at Pearl Harbor on 7 or 8 December. The remaining carrier, also with attendant cruisers and destroyers, was returning to the Pearl Harbor area after delivering fighters to Midway.

45. General RUSSELL. Admiral, to shorten the examination, and without describing the elements of the Navy present in Pearl Harbor, was the fighting strength of those elements at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 5th, 6th, and 7th, we will say, of sufficient

capacity to have destroyed the Jap task force had the Jap task force from which these aircraft were launched been located and intercepted?

Admiral McMORRIS. It would have been impossible for that force to have brought the Japanese task force within gun range of the heavy ships unless by some fortuitous circumstance which I do not envisage; and unless they could have been brought within gun range they could not have been destroyed.

46. General RUSSELL. Well, let me state that question another way. Let's assume that on the 4th or 5th of December this approaching Japanese task force had been discovered, by reconnaissance or accidentally or otherwise. Was there here in Pearl Harbor a force which could have gone out and prevented this task force from reaching a point from which the aircraft could have been launched for the attack?

Admiral McMORRIS. If the force in question had been [2878] discovered on the 5th of December, there is no question in my mind that the forces present would have been moved to intercept the Japanese forces, and that it is highly probable that if such interception had taken place the Japanese force would have been deterred from making an attack on Pearl Harbor. On the other hand, and we are now in the field of speculation, I suspect that a fight would have occurred in which our losses might have been even greater than actually occurred.

I'd like to amplify that a moment, if I may.

47. General RUSSELL. Yes. Would you?

Admiral McMORRIS. The antiaircraft defenses of our ships at that time were by no manner of means as effective as they have since become. We would have had but two carriers present as against the Japanese six; and, while I believe that we would have inflicted damage on the Japanese, I believe that our own losses would have been extremely heavy and might well have included the loss of both our carriers.

48. General RUSSELL. Well, to state it a little bit crudely, they were going to get you whether you stayed at home or whether you went out and fought them; is that it?

Admiral McMORRIS. I regret to say I think that is probably true.

49. General RUSSELL. Now, Admiral, the documents which this Board has seen relating to the plans for the joint operations of the Army and Navy, in estimating the situation, have, as I recall, without exception, stressed the probability of a submarine-air attack on Pearl Harbor as being very, very probable. These documents, as I recall, were prepared in the spring of '41. As a matter of fact, the Secretary of the Navy [2879] sent a letter to the Secretary of War in which the attention of the Secretary of War was called to the possibility or probability of that form of attack, and there was stressed in this letter the weakness of defenses here against such an attack. Are you familiar with those documents and those estimates?

Admiral McMORRIS. Without having any detailed recollection of the matter, I feel quite sure that at the time I knew of them, and certainly the matter of AA defenses of this area had been a matter of very grave concern, and representations were made to the Secretary of the Navy to increase the AA gun power, radar, and so forth, to insure more effective protection of ships in Pearl Harbor.

50. General RUSSELL. Do you recall making an inspection of the antiaircraft defenses here on Pearl Harbor as they were maintained by the Army?

Admiral McMORRIS. I at one time did make a tour of the defenses of Oahu with General Gardner, who gave a presentation of his anti-aircraft setup; and then I rode around the Island, saw a number of the installations, and attended several antiaircraft practices. I do not now recall whether that was when General Herron was here or after General Short had taken over. I did know that Army authorities felt that the AA gun power immediately around Pearl Harbor needed improvement, and they were particularly concerned over the possibility that aircraft coming in from the south might be able to drop bombs before they had been under very serious AA fire. I did not, however, have detailed familiarity with the AA defenses here, nor would I be a competent judge to pass on many of the [2880] technicalities. What I now have outlined is rather a general impression.

51. General RUSSELL. Do you know of any reports made by the Navy here to the Navy Department in Washington or to Army authorities here or elsewhere in which these deficiencies or inadequacies of the antiaircraft defenses were pointed out? I will confine that question to the period after February 1, '41, if I did not in the the original question.

Admiral McMORRIS. I do not now recall very clearly. Such matters could have occurred within the staff without my recollecting it, but I do recall, when on a trip in the summer of '41 to the Navy Department with Admiral Kimmel, representation to naval authorities that the AA gun power and radar defenses of Pearl Harbor should be improved; that I do recall that the matter of acquiring radars was one very frequently discussed, and that during 1941 very marked improvement was made in that connection.

52. General RUSSELL. Admiral, do you know any reason why the thinking of the Navy might have changed from February 1941 to November 1941 as to the probability of a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral McMORRIS. Perhaps I had better express my own views in that connection, that to my mind as the defenses here were strengthened I thought that the Japanese would be very promptly aware of it; and I thought that as the year wore on the Japanese were becoming more fully committed to an all-out effort in another direction. I did not discount the possibility of air raid here, but I did doubt that it would be highly effective. I did believe that any raiding group would suffer [2881] disproportionately to damage that they might inflict upon us.

53. General RUSSELL. This last question so far as I am concerned, Admiral: Do you know of any directive or order which may have been restrictions or limitations upon the freedom of the Admiral of the Pacific Fleet in the disposition of the elements of that fleet; from higher authority?

Admiral McMORRIS. I am sure there were none.

54. General RUSSELL. And you base that assurance on the fact that you knew of none, and would have known of such if they had existed?

Admiral McMorris. That is correct.

[2882] 55. General FRANK. Do you know how Jap intelligence revealed to the Jap navy the conditions here, so favorable to this attack?

Admiral McMorris. I do not.

56. General FRANK. Is there any thought about that in the Navy? There must have been some discussion of it.

Admiral McMorris. I never entertained any doubt, any time during 1941, that the Japanese were fully informed of all military activities in this area.

57. General FRANK. Do you feel that there was sufficient effort made in the islands, and that could have been made, to protect against Jap intelligence?

Admiral McMorris. You are getting out of my bailiwick, General.

58. General FRANK. You are Chief of Staff; you must have had some thought on it.

Admiral McMorris. I was War Plans Officer at that time, and my concern was very largely with the plans for offensive operations in the Marshall area.

59. General FRANK. From a general point of view, is there any feeling about that, in the Navy?

Admiral McMorris. I would say in general that there was a feeling that intelligence efforts on the part of the United States in time of peace, toward restricting information reaching the enemy, are weak, and that it takes stress of war to obtain popular support for restrictive measures.

60. General FRANK. You have already commented on this. I would like to approach it from a little different point of view, with respect to this question: Had the Japanese attack [2883] been anticipated and met by the Navy, could aircraft from the carriers have been successful, do you feel, in an attack on the Jap carriers?

Admiral McMorris. Will you read that question?

(Question read.)

61. General FRANK. I will tell you what I am after, just to clear this up a little bit. I am going to follow this with a question as to what would have been the effect on subsequent operations of the Jap fleet, had they not lost those carriers. Do you see my approach?

Admiral McMorris. Had the Japanese lost their carriers, undoubtedly they would have been handicapped in some of their subsequent operations, but it is improbable that all of their carriers would have been lost. In fact, at one time or another, those carriers have been under attack; and I believe that one of the six carriers that came to Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December 1941 is still operative.

62. General FRANK. Then would you say that this Japanese attack was not so hazardous, so courageous, and such a decided gamble?

Admiral McMorris. I would say that I felt that it was a considerable gamble at the time, and that had the Japanese continued in, with all the defenses fully manned and alerted, there would have been suffered very severe damage, and, in so far as locally is concerned, would not have inflicted great damage. I do think however that we would surely have suffered damage within our fleet.

63. General FRANK. Do you feel that there was a certain complacency here which led the command, both Army and Navy, to feel secure against such an attack?

[2884] Admiral McMorris. No, I would not say that in quite those words.

64. General FRANK. How would you state it?

Admiral McMorris. I would say that they felt an attack of that particular nature was improbable, but that their capabilities for withstanding such an attack, with the measures at hand, would be quite effective.

65. General FRANK. That is, the capabilities of the Jap attack would be effective?

Admiral McMorris. No, that the capabilities of defense would be effective.

66. General FRANK. But there seems to have been an effective Japanese intelligence system.

Admiral McMorris. I am quite sure of it.

67. General FRANK. Therefore, in the face of that intelligence system, which kept them advised of the attitude and measures taken here, do you feel under those circumstances that this Jap attack was hazardous, courageous, and a gamble?

Admiral McMorris. I so felt at the time. I still feel that there was great risk involved, even though they escaped undamaged.

68. General FRANK. But you have already stated that at that time there was not a sufficient naval force here to have met them successfully.

Admiral McMorris. That's correct.

69. General FRANK. Do you consider this was a suicidal attack in that it was made so as to sacrifice the airplanes and crews but save the carriers?

Admiral McMorris. I believe that that was in their minds [2885] to a large extent. I do not believe that they expected to lose all of their crews, but that they were prepared to lose all or a great portion of them. I believe for that matter that they were prepared to accept some losses within their carriers, themselves.

70. General FRANK. Had all or any part of this analysis through which we have just gone taken place prior to the attack?

Admiral McMorris. Certainly not, as it has been outlined, here, subsequently. There had been consideration given to the question, and to the effectiveness of these carriers.

71. General FRANK. What I don't quite understand is how, if you felt fears that six carriers could come in that could not be handled by the United States fleet, here, how you felt that Oahu was so secure against attack.

Admiral McMorris. Let me say, here, that the fleet is not primarily to defend Oahu, but rather, that Oahu was a place of refuge for the fleet. It was not expected that in time of war the fleet would be present in Oahu, except the units here for rest and replenishment; just as, today, the fleet is not present in Oahu, but rather is operating for the most part far afield.

72. General FRANK. So far as you know, did this Jap attacking task force completely evade all United States naval intelligence detection?

Admiral McMorris. As far as I know, no intelligence, on the part of any portion of the United States authorities, was developed.

73. General FRANK. Intelligence indicated a Jap task force in the Marshalls, with carriers and submarines. Do you know whether or

not the radio intercept was successful in picking [2886] the force, but wrong in the location?

Admiral McMORRIS. I feel quite sure that that did not obtain.

74. General FRANK. Is it a difficult task to make a rendezvous with supply ships at sea without the use of radio?

Admiral McMORRIS. No; it should be very simple.

75. General GRUNERT. Admiral, do you recall whether or not you were present or knew anything about a conference that was held as a result of two messages received, November 27, 1941, one coming to the Admiral of the fleet, and one, to General Short; the one to the Admiral of the fleet starting out by saying, "Consider this a war warning"?

Admiral McMORRIS. I remember such a message, and I remember that, subsequent to that, there was a conference; but whether or not it was entirely on the basis of that dispatch or on proposals of other dispatches that came in about the same time, I do not recall. Minutes of those meetings were never made.

76. General GRUNERT. Is it common practice in the Navy to receive a message starting out, "Consider this a war warning," or what did that mean to you navy people, when they said, "Consider this a war warning"? Was that discussed?

Admiral McMORRIS. It was certainly considered to mean that the internal situation was continuing to deteriorate, and that we might find ourselves engaged in war, in very short order. This was not particularly disturbing or unexpected, but rather confirmatory of the general thoughts at the time.

77. General GRUNERT. Then you presume it was sent just as a routine matter?

[2887] Admiral McMORRIS. No, sir; by no manner of means.

78. General GRUNERT. Then it would seem that if you had that thought in mind, there was no use in sending you such a message. That is just an observation on my part. As to your estimate, wherein, at one of the conferences, you expressed yourself as estimating or feeling that the Japs would never so attack, and there was no probability of such an attack, or words to that effect; now, at such conference, an expression on your part, in your position, is not an expression of your own opinion, it is the expression of an official opinion which possibly a commanding general of the Department could take as reflecting the Navy estimate of the situation, and possibly, on which he could base action that he took, because of your understanding; is that a correct expression? If not, will you correct me in its incorrectness?

Admiral McMORRIS. I would not pass an opinion or conclusion as to the merits or demerits of the conclusion which you have just given.

79. General GRUNERT. But is true, is it not, that when you express yourself at any official conference, that is an official opinion, at least?

Admiral McMORRIS. That certainly was an expression of the opinion of the War Plans officer of the fleet commander. I should be highly surprised, however, if the individual who is charged with defenses should govern his actions or preparations for defense or offense entirely on an opinion so expressed.

80. General GRUNERT. During any conference subsequent to November 27, do you recall whether or not the Commanding [2888] General of the Hawaiian Department informed the Navy as to the

measures he was taking in view of what we will call the "warning messages" received?

Admiral McMorris. I do not recall.

81. General GRUNERT. Do you know what measures the Commanding General took about that time?

Admiral McMorris. No.

82. General GRUNERT. Then you do not know whether or not he informed the Navy of the measures that he did take?

Admiral McMorris. I do not know. That, however, does not imply that such action did not take place.

83. General GRUNERT. Were you not interested in the measures he took, or was going to take, in order to protect your fleet?

Admiral McMorris. My own concern and my duties were with the implementation of the plans for offensive action. The commander of the Hawaiian sea frontier, and, to a lesser degree, the operations section of our staff, would have had those matters of their immediate concern.

84. General GRUNERT. Then as I understand it, you were concerned practically with operation of the fleet after it was out of the harbor, and not particularly in the harbor?

Admiral McMorris. My concern was with the future rather than the immediate present.

85. General RUSSELL. Admiral, the course which you have described as being the one that the Navy thinks now the Jap task forces took in order to launch their aircraft, is about how many miles in length? Do you recall how far that is?

Admiral McMorris. You mean from the port that they last departed, until they arrived?

[2889] 86. General RUSSELL. Until they arrived at the point at which they launched their attack.

87. General FRANK. Did they have to refuel before they got back home?

Admiral McMorris. I don't know that they have got information on that, that they tried to estimate that distance. I mean, without a chart at hand, it is certainly several thousand miles; but with a quick reference to the chart, which I suppose is not obtainable here, I could give it with a considerable degree of accuracy.

88. General RUSSELL. I am not sure that we can, from the record, determine, but we were attempting to relate that back of December 7 to the date of November 26, which would have given them approximately 11 days' traveling time. We were wondering if they could have followed the course which you have described and have completed it within eleven days.

[2890] 89. General RUSSELL. Have you any information which you could give us from which we could deduce the distance travelled by the task force, assuming that it followed the course which you now think it did?

Admiral McMorris. I believe that we have certain intelligence data that might furnish very closely the dates and courses.

90. General RUSSELL. Would you make that data available to us?

Admiral McMorris. Yes, sir.

91. General GRUNERT. Admiral, on several occasions you referred, in addressing this body, to it as a court. It is not a court. It is a Board.

Admiral McMorris. Very good, sir.

92. General FRANK. Admiral, you seem to adhere to the sincere belief that this Jap attack was possible and at the same time have the sincere belief that it was not probable.

Admiral McMorris. Those were certainly the views that I entertained at that time.

93. General FRANK. Also the Japs had rather complete intelligence information of the conditions here. That has been indicated by captured orders of the attack?

Admiral McMorris. Yes, sir.

94. General FRANK. Also that the Army here took measures against sabotage only. Was that satisfactory to the Navy?

Admiral McMorris. I do not know that I can answer that question in that way. Certainly, the chief concern that we felt at the time was that saboteurs or a submarine attack constituted the chief hazard.

95. General FRANK. What defense measures against air attack did the Navy have on December 7th?

[2891] Admiral McMorris. The details I do not know.

96. General FRANK. They had certain guns aboard the ships?

Admiral McMorris. A plan had been drawn up and signed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier—

97. General FRANK. Who was Admiral Bloch?

Admiral McMorris. Yes. —that included provisions for ships and aircraft in port participating in the local defense, but exactly what those provisions were or what conditions were prescribed I cannot say.

98. General FRANK. In analyzing the testimony, the Jap attacking force had a relative degree of security against attack by our fleet did it not?

Admiral McMorris. Probably, unless there was chance encounter.

99. General FRANK. But you stated that had our fleet known of its existence, it would probably have suffered defeat had they met.

Admiral McMorris. I think that is quite possible.

100. General FRANK. Then about the only threat the Jap air attack had was from local defenses, after the attack had been launched is that correct?

Admiral McMorris. Not quite, because the things that the Jap fleet would have to contend with would have included both elements of the fleet, which even had our fleet been defeated would probably have inflicted some damage, so that no one element or consideration can be taken as a thing apart.

101. General FRANK. According to your own testimony, it would not have been a paying venture for the United States Fleet have gone out after this attacking Jap force; that is correct, [2892] is it not?

Admiral McMorris. No, sir, I did not say it would not be a paying venture. I did say and feel that our own losses might well have been heavier than those actually experienced, but that I would have expected some damage to have been inflicted on the Japanese Fleet, whereas they actually escaped scot-free.

102. General FRANK. Except for the loss of their—

Admiral McMorris. Except for the loss of some aircraft.

103. General FRANK. What in your opinion would have been the result of a conflict at sea between the available naval craft here, with two carriers, and the Jap force that came in?

Admiral McMORRIS. I believe that our fleet would have suffered quite severely and that it would largely have been a contest by air forces, and that it is improbable that we would have succeeded in bringing the Japanese carriers under gunfire. That, however, is necessarily highly speculative.

104. General FRANK. That is very true, but in the face of this analysis it would seem that this attack would show up to have been much more probable than with the existing conditions at the time then estimated?

Admiral McMORRIS. It might be considered very doubtful if the Japanese Fleet had been discovered, with our forces at sea, as to whether or not they would have continued the attack.

105. Major CLAUSEN. Admiral, was the reason that no counter-attack was launched because of the lack of available means, or because you did not know where the attackers were?

Admiral McMORRIS. We did not know where the attackers were.

106. Major CLAUSEN. Would the present radar installations on the higher mountains as presently operated, had they been operated [2893] before or on 7 December, 1941, have permitted you to have found the attackers?

Admiral McMORRIS. It might have materially assisted.

107. Major CLAUSEN. That is all I have.

108. General GRUNERT. Any other questions?

Admiral, is there anything else that you think of that you would like to advance or tell the Board that may be of assistance to it in coming to a conclusion about these matters?

Admiral McMORRIS. No, sir.

109. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming up. We appreciate your giving us your time.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2894] **TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JOHN STEWART BRAGDON, CHIEF OF CONSTRUCTION DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, grade, and organization and station?

General BRAGDON. John Stewart Bragdon, Brigadier General, Chief of Construction Division in the Office of Chief of Engineers.

2. Colonel WEST. In the War Department?

General BRAGDON. In the War Department, yes.

3. Colonel WEST. Washington, D. C.?

General BRAGDON. Washington, D. C., yes, sir.

4. General FRANK. Will you state, General Bragdon, how you happen to be here?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir. I am here under orders, of which I have copies, issued by the Adjutant General, dated the—(the witness examines paper) I think it's the 2nd of September; and these orders

instruct me to proceed and report to the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Area, on temporary duty in connection with the activities of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, which meets 17 September 1944.

I was called on the telephone by General Styer, I think about two weeks ago, and told that this investigation was going on and that I should—they wanted somebody to appear before the Board who was conversant with the procedures and policies of—construction policies of the Engineer Department, to appear before the Board, and that I was the person that [2895] should do it, and—

5. General FRANK. You were to appear as a witness before the Board?

General BRAGDON. They told me, they stated—stated that Colonel Wyman was coming back from France, and they wanted somebody as counsel and adviser to him, but they also indicated that I should also make sure that any facts concerning construction and the Engineer Department or the War Department's methods along that line should be—I should inform the Board of anything which they wanted to know in that line.

6. General GRUNERT. Was this at the instigation of the Chief of Engineers or the Commanding General of the Army Service Forces?

General BRAGDON. No, sir.

7. General GRUNERT. Or what?

General BRAGDON. General Styer told me that General Somervell wanted me to do that, and I think at the same day or possibly a day later I got a call from the Under Secretary's office, from General Reber, and General Reber stated that he had been present when that discussion had been going on and that the Under Secretary's office felt that I should have the assistance of a lawyer, and suggested Major Powell, and of course I said I was very glad to have that assistance and would be very glad to have Major Powell accompany me, and he is here, and he has orders just similar to mine.

8. General GRUNERT. The Board has no information about your coming, as far as I know. Is that true, Mr. Recorder?

9. Colonel WEST. Yes, sir. The only information that the Board possibly had regarding General Bragdon was that little [2896] memorandum that came through the other day, forwarded from our Washington headquarters, over Colonel Hughes' signature, advising us that General Bragdon had been designated as Colonel Wyman's counsel and had made request of our headquarters in Washington for certain information. That came second-hand from the Washington headquarters through Colonel Hughes, and we have no copies of orders such as that which General Bragdon has in his possession, or no other official information.

10. General GRUNERT. You go ahead, finish; then I will begin.

11. General FRANK. Why is this lawyer with you?

General BRAGDON. I take it, to assist me, sir. I mean that is the—

12. General FRANK. In what capacity?

General BRAGDON. I would say, the same reasons that I am here. He has his orders to be here with me, sir.

Now, what we had hoped that the Board would do, sir, was allow us to submit statements concerning each of the phases—all phases of the matter. We have particularly read the interim report of the Congressional Committee, and I rather felt that probably that put this

particular phase of the matter somewhat different from other phases, because in that were a lot of conclusions affecting primarily Colonel Wyman's actions in connection with certain of the work under his charge.

That committee—that report has been published, and of course the newspapers carried these criticisms all over the United States, and it was thought desirable that every effort be expended to see that all data were submitted to the Board. In the Office of the Chief of Engineers Major Lozier has been [2897] studying exhaustively all the files bearing on it, and particularly the A. W. S. files and the War Gas Reserve files and the circumstances surrounding the awarding of the Hawaiian Constructors' contracts. Those three phases were the three things chiefly touched on by the Congressional Committee, and so we have been studying the files to see if we can get out all the data that it was possible to get and pin down the various circumstances, connecting them up with the dates chronologically so as to show a true picture, and that turns out to be a prodigious task, because the ramifications of all of these things, if pursued, are almost inexhaustible. Major Lozier has done a lot of work like that, on that line; and ever since Major Powell was told that he would come, he similarly has made exhaustive studies, and we are now working, have been working, started working on the files yesterday when we came here.

This wire that I have here—

13. General FRANK. Now, just a minute. Specifically in what capacity are you here?

General BRAGDON. Well, I take it I am here for two things: in the first place, to—this order says, "in connection with the activities of the Army Pearl Harbor Board": in other words, to get any data that the Board may want, particularly in connection with the Engineer Department activities; and the next thing: and then as counsel for Colonel Wyman, to help him work up data which bear on his connection with the work, and also in connection with the charges made in the interim report.

14. General FRANK. You are out here, from your point of view, to act as counsel for Wyman, as a counsel for the Corps of Engineers, or whom?

[2898] General BRAGDON. Counsel for Colonel Wyman, in helping him produce data for the Board, more or less in defense of his actions; but I didn't—don't conceive it, General, to be solely that; I also conceive it to be my duty to present everything I can that affects those particular activities, namely, the—

15. General FRANK. Do you feel that you were sent out here as a sort of special investigator for this Board?

General BRAGDON. No, sir; not at all, sir.

16. General FRANK. Do you feel that you are sent out here as a sort of counsel for the Engineers?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir; I would say partially that.

17. General FRANK. From whom did you get your instructions?

General BRAGDON. From General Styer.

18. General FRANK. What were those instructions?

General BRAGDON. Those instructions were about like this, sir—

19. General FRANK. Have you anything written?

General BRAGDON. No, sir. I had a telephone conversation, but I don't know whether that's along with me or not. I can tell you just about the way the conversation went. The Chief of Engineers and the Deputy Chief happened to be out of the office, and General Styer stated—

20. General FRANK. Who is the Deputy Chief?

General BRAGDON. General Robins.

21. General FRANK. Yes?

General BRAGDON. —were out of the office, and General Styles got me and stated that Colonel Wyman was back from France and going through Washington, was in fact over there, had just been in General Somervell's office, and that he was [2899] coming out to appear before this Board; and they stated that they wanted somebody to appear before the Board who understood the Engineer Department's construction procedures and policies, who was well acquainted with those and could present those as it might affect this case before the Board, and he ended up by saying, "You are it."

I said, "I am it, am I?"

And that was about all there was to it. He said that Colonel Wyman was proceeding on out to San Francisco to have a few days' rest. They had pulled Colonel Wyman, who was in command of the base at Cherbourg, out from there, from his activities. He was all tired out, and he should get a few days' rest. I should contact him in San Francisco.

22. General FRANK. In San Francisco?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir; which is exactly what transpired. I contacted him about two days before I came out, and we went through some of the files there, that we thought some of the data might be there that might not be here.

23. General FRANK. Did you get any instructions from General Somervell?

General BRAGDON. Not personally, no, sir; nothing other than just what I told you, from General Styer.

24. General FRANK. Did you get any instruction from Mr. Patterson's office?

General BRAGDON. No, sir, not directly from him himself. I talked to General Reber, and General Reber's sole discussions with me were with reference to having a legal man along with me.

25. General FRANK. For what purpose?

General BRAGDON. To assist me.

[2900] 26. General FRANK. Well, why is the Assistant Secretary's office interested in having a special lawyer out here as an assistant to Wyman's counsel?

General BRAGDON. I don't know, sir. I know that except—well. I would say any office would be interested in having as much data presented by—well, I guess I might consider myself as a specialist, because I have specialized in construction so much.

27. General FRANK. Well, we have an officer who is an Assistant Recorder on the Board.

General BRAGDON. Yes.

28. General FRANK. Major Clausen, who has been put on the Board, at the instance of the office of the Under Secretary, Mr. Patterson, to assist the Board in this very matter.

General BRAGDON. Yes.

29. General FRANK. Now, he, I understand, is here for the purpose of representing the War Department and the Under Secretary's office; and now, as I understand it, the same Under Secretary's office is placing another lawyer here to take care of Colonel Wyman's interests.

General BRAGDON. Well, I would say he was here primarily to assist me, sir, and I have found in—I have asked—

30. General FRANK. And you are here as counsel for Colonel Wyman?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir. I have found, though, in looking through these files that it is a terrific task, and I have been using Major Powell on that. He has been searching—since he has been on this work what he has been doing has been searching files, the A. W.—

[2901] 31. General FRANK. When he came back—Colonel Wyman—to whom did he report in Washington? To General Somervell?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

32. General FRANK. Or to the Chief of Engineers, or to whom?

General BRAGDON. To General Somervell, sir. You see, he over in France—over in—yes, in France, he wasn't under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Engineers. He reported to General Somervell. I haven't got a copy of Colonel Wyman's orders, but he has. He is here, sir. He is now in Hawaii.

33. General FRANK. Can you state what you are here to prove?

General BRAGDON. No, sir; I am not here to prove any particular thing. I am simply here to—I take—conceive that I am here to see that all data that can possibly bear on construction and the activities here are brought before the Board.

I wonder if I can give you an example of how I figure I might be helpful? I think I can, sir. Before Pearl Harbor, when peacetime regulations were in effect, the procedures were very cumbersome. We had very small limitations on awards of contracts. For instance, a District Engineer had a \$10,000 limitation, a Division Engineer a \$50,000 limitation. Everything above that had to travel out all the way back to Washington, and there was all that complicated procedure, which was proper procedure to protect the United States. But after Pearl Harbor things changed, and there was a transition, too, along that line! and after Pearl Harbor even an Area Engineer, a subordinate of a District Engineer, had a \$3,000,000 limitation.

I think general policies like that do make clear quite a [2902] number of things.

34. General FRANK. Are you on full time status as a counsel now for Colonel Wyman?

General BRAGDON. Well, I am not doing anything else, sir; I mean—

35. General FRANK. It seems sort of peculiar, because General Short has been given a counsel to act in addition to his other duties.

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir. Well, of course,—

36. General FRANK. And here Colonel Wyman comes along and has you, a Brigadier General, and a Major out of the Assistant Secretary's office to take care of him.

General BRAGDON. I think, sir, the reason I was designated was simply because I am head of the construction division and supposed to be well acquainted with our construction procedures.

37. General FRANK. Do you know anything about the operations at Pearl Harbor around December 7, 1941?

General BRAGDON. Except as revealed from a study—I have been studying this up, naturally, since I was assigned to the job—no, sir. I had—

38. General FRANK. Yes. But you had no experience with the contractors' nor with the District Engineer's operations in 1941 in Hawaii?

General BRAGDON. No, sir, I did not.

39. General FRANK. All right. Now, who is Major Lozier?

General BRAGDON. Major Lozier is an officer who has been on duty in the Chief of Engineer's legal—

40. General FRANK. Is he a service officer?

[2903] General BRAGDON. No, sir. The Judge Advocate General's Office. He has been on duty in the Chief of Engineer's office, and he has been sent out here on permanent change of station.

41. General FRANK. Did he come out here with you?

General BRAGDON. No, sir; he preceded me. His permanent change of station orders I think have been in existence about six weeks. I don't know why they didn't get clearance. And when the Board in Washington called Generals Reybold and Robins before it, he was assigned to work on this case, to get up data for them, so those two Generals could answer you gentlemen's questions before the Board. He has worked intensively on that ever since—well, I think for about five weeks. He worked on the files in Washington, the A. W. S. files and the War Reserve Gasoline Storage files.

42. General GRUNERT. Still working on that, is he?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

43. General GRUNERT. Then was he sent out here also to help somebody else?

General BRAGDON. You see, General, he was out here—his orders out here, I think, about six weeks ago.

44. General GRUNERT. Then, why is he still on this work? Has he been instructed to be still on this work out here?

General BRAGDON. I don't know whether such instructions were given him or not, sir, but we did send a wire out here in connection with my coming, asking them to please arrange these files out here in the chronological order and to segregate them according to what we conceive to be the three main branches of investigation, that is, to segregate the Air Warning Service files from the Reserve Gasoline Storage files [2904] and the Rohl-Connolly contract so that they can be examined here. I found, in the little questioning I have done of various people connected with this, that very few of them can give answers that are specific. They just give you leads, and you have to go to the files to find out anything that is really anyways conclusive.

45. General FRANK. To whom were you to report when you got here?

General BRAGDON. General Richardson, sir. I just got here yesterday, and I came over, and General Richardson was not here. General Ruffner was out when I got here, too.

46. General FRANK. You have an official copy of the telegram to General Richardson?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir, I do.

47. General FRANK. Will you read it into the record, please?

General BRAGDON. Do you want all these numbers also?

48. General FRANK. Yes.

General BRAGDON. Or shall I read the written matter? This says: (Priority dated August 2, 1944, is as follows:)

PRIORITY

29 Aug 44

WASHINGTON, D. C.

A WAR 300004Z WTJ

W-88692 30th Orders are being requested for Brigadier General J. S. Bragdon to proceed to Hawaii in connection with the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings there. General Bragdon will act as counsel for Colonel Wyman who will appear before the Board. It is desired that [2905] these officers reach Hawaii on or about twelve September. (To Richardson from Somervell signed Marshall) It is requested that you have the Department Engineer have the records pertaining to the construction of aircraft warning stations, the war reserve gasoline project and all work pertaining to both, also the records pertaining to the Rohl Connolly contract and any other contracts for work or materials relating to the above projects, reviewed and a chronological analysis made thereof so that it will be available for the officers above. It is particularly desirable that there be a chronological record of the actual work done and of all delays in connection therewith, with reasons therefor. Also that local priorities and changes therein be listed according to their occurrence. It is further suggested that the analysis be developed under the three general headings of:

- (a) the project for the aircraft warning stations;
- (b) the war reserve gasoline storage project; and
- (c) the Rohl Connolly contract—

That should have been "Hawaiian Constructors."

—in its relation to those projects and any other work or materials for which that contract was used. Major Lue C. Lozier who is being transferred to the Office of the District Engineer on permanent change of station—

Apparently the second page of it is not here, sir. I will have to get that. It was very brief on the second page, [2906] to the effect that he also was coming. I will have to get that, sir.

[2905-A]

ADDENDA

(A corrected and complete copy of the above-mentioned radiogram which was furnished the Recorder of the Board by Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, (Through Lt. Col. R. W. Hain, G. S. C.) reads as follows:)

This is a re-decipherment of the message dated 30 August and contains corrections.

12 Sept 44

(Date of re-decipherment)

PRIORITY

A WAR 300004Z WTJ

WASHINGTON, D. C.

W-88692 30TH Orders are being requested for Brigadier General J Pd S Pd Bragdon to proceed to Hawaii in connection with the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings there pd General Bragdon will act as counsel for Colonel Wyman who will appear before Board Pd It is desired that these officers reach Hawaii on or about twelve September Pd Paren to Richardson from Somervell signed Marshall paren It is requested that you have the Department Engineer have the records pertaining to the construction of aircraft warning stations cma the war reserve gasoline project and all work pertaining to both cma also the records pertaining to the Rohl Connolly contract and any other contracts for work or materials relating to the above projects cma reviewed and a chronological analysis made thereof so that it will be available for the officers above Pd. It is particularly desirable that there be a chronological record of the actual work done and of all delays in connection therewith cma with reasons therefor Pd Also that local priorities and changes therein be listed according to their occur-

rence Pd It is further suggested that the analysis be developed under the three general headings of colon paren a paren the project for the aircraft warning stations seml paren b paren the war reserve gasoline storage [2905-B] project seml and paren c parent the Rohl Connolly Contract in its relation to those projects and any other work of materials for which that contract was used Pd Major Lu C Pd Lozier who is being transferred to the Office of the District Engineer on permanent change of station is being sent out immediately Pd Major Lozier also has studied this case

[2906—continued] 49. General FRANK. Have you received any other instructions—any other instructions from anybody—other than those you have mentioned?

General BRAGDON. No, sir. I talked it over with General Robins, and General Robins said, "Just give the Board all the facts you can find." That was almost exactly his words. And General Reybold got back about an hour before I left—no, a few hours before I left, the same morning. He had no instructions to give me.

50. General FRANK. To whom are you directed to report in Washington after you complete your duty here?

General BRAGDON. I wasn't directed to report to anybody, sir. I suppose that I should inform my superiors of what happened.

51. General FRANK. Who directed you to come here?

General BRAGDON. These orders, sir [indicating].

52. General FRANK. I know, but I am getting to the authority that originated these orders.

General BRAGDON. I take that to have been General Somervell, because General Styer so told me.

53. General FRANK. Yes.

General BRAGDON. General Styer first called my Chief and Deputy, but they were both absent.

54. General FRANK. I think that is all.

General BRAGDON. General, could I say—I think I did say it before, but I did feel, sir, that this particular phase of it was somewhat different from other phases because [2907] there had already been an investigation, and printed report of investigation which actually states certain things were not efficiently done, and that's been in the press all over the country. That's known, and I don't think there is any other phase that has been that way, and I think that undoubtedly is why our superiors felt that somebody who was supposed to know our procedure, both then and now, should be here to make sure the Board could get all those phases and aspects before it. I think that was all there was behind that, sir.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General BRAGDON. Maybe I had better correct that, sir. General Reber is with the—you mentioned it, Colonel.

55. Colonel WEST. Well, I understood he was with the Legislative and Liaison Division of the War Department.

General BRAGDON. With Colonel Persons.

56. Colonel WEST. General Persons.

General BRAGDON. General Persons. Yes, I think he is. Maybe I am mistaken on that. I know he went over to be with the Under Secretary, and I am not just sure, sir, of the relationship between that Legislative Liaison Section and the Under Secretary's office. I know that General Reber—I thought he was right with the Under Secretary's office. I have only been in Washington about two and a half months, and I am not quite sure of all the relationships between those officers.

57. General GRUNERT. What conversation did you have with Reber?

General BRAGDON. It was solely to—as I said before, sir, he thought I should have a—he stated that he had been in General Somervell's office when the conversation had taken place there, and he stated he thought I should have a legal man [2908] to help me.

58. General GRUNERT. Then, do you know whether he represented the Under Secretary of War or whom he represented when he made that statement?

General BRAGDON. No, sir, I don't know exactly that. I can't answer that, sir.

59. General GRUNERT. Let me see if I understand the situation correctly. You came over here under orders to act as a counsel for one Colonel Wyman. That's one thing.

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

60. General GRUNERT. You came over here also to provide the Board with data from the War Department files and from the Hawaiian Department files if the Board wants such data; is that right?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

61. General GRUNERT. Then, you are in a dual capacity of representing one Colonel Wyman and of being an agent on behalf of the War Department; is that right?

General BRAGDON. I would say, on behalf of the Engineer Department of the War Department. Yes, sir, I would say that was correct.

62. General GRUNERT. Now, as far as the Board knows, Colonel Wyman has not yet been accused of anything except by a Congressional Committee report; and therefore, as far as the Board is concerned, why, we do not admit that there is a counsel required by any witnesses who have appeared before this Board, although any witness may have the advice of counsel in that respect, and not counsel as distinguished from somebody charged with something as far as the Board is concerned.

[2909] General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

63. General GRUNERT. You understand that?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

64. General GRUNERT. Now, the Board will be very glad to get any evidence that is available or any explanation of evidence which has not already been advanced and is not already thoroughly understood by the Board. Do you understand that the Board is limited in its investigation to phases that led up to and are directly connected with the Pearl Harbor disaster, and nothing after that unless it relates to that attack?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir. I understand that, sir.

65. General GRUNERT. And these records that you have been investigating, most of them are after Pearl Harbor or prior thereto, or what?

General BRAGDON. All prior thereto, sir, and the fact is, we have been concentrating on the records of the time between the Hawaiian Constructors' contract and December 7th, the date of Pearl Harbor, and of course we had to go back somewhat prior to that in order to understand that part of it.

66. General GRUNERT. Now, from your investigation have you made up a running story or statement that you would like to submit to the Board or testify to before the Board?

General BRAGDON. Not at this time, sir.

67. General GRUNERT. How long will it take you to do that?

General BRAGDON. I would like as much time as I could get.

68. General GRUNERT. This Board is very limited as to its time, and it is going to leave here probably on the 19th and go back to Washington.

[2910] General BRAGDON. I had understood from our orders that you were going to call Colonel Wyman on the 17th, so we had been aiming our studies that we have been making to have our data ready on the 17th.

69. General GRUNERT. Wyman has been scheduled to appear here on the 14th. It may originally have been intimated the 17th, but it is actually scheduled now as the 14th.

General BRAGDON. The 14th?

70. General GRUNERT. We have to move up in order to accommodate or take care of everything we are charged with doing within the limited time we have to do it. Now, whether or not we could postpone his hearing until a little later, that would be up to General Frank, who has that particular part of the investigation. But there is no use in rehashing a lot of this stuff if the Board already has the evidence that you desire to present on behalf of the Chief of Engineers and on behalf of Wyman. Therefore, it would be very necessary for us to hear what you have to make in the line of a statement before we determine whether or not it is just piling evidence up. In other words, you don't know what the Board knows.

General BRAGDON. No, sir, I don't.

71. General GRUNERT. And we don't know what you may have found out that the Board doesn't know.

General BRAGDON. Could I present the statement of that on the 15th, sir?

72. General GRUNERT. I think you ought to present your statement as early as possible, to Major Clausen, with a view to seeing whether or not it is new evidence to the Board; the earlier the date, the better. Then we can determine what in [2911] your statement the Board hasn't had and doesn't understand or hasn't had in the evidence so far.

General BRAGDON. Could I—

73. General GRUNERT. This is as if you were coming new into the case. You are coming into the case, newly into the case but probably with old evidence as far as we are concerned, and we have not time to bother with rehashing all this stuff.

General BRAGDON. No. I see that.

Could I have the privilege, sir, of reading any of the evidence that pertains to those particular phases?

74. General GRUNERT. I do not see the necessity of your reading the evidence that the Board has taken.

General BRAGDON. My whole point was to see if—in many cases I have found things—

75. General GRUNERT. You may consult Major Clausen as to whether or not such evidence exists on any point you wish.

General BRAGDON. Yes.

76. General GRUNERT. But to turn over the evidence of the Board to any particular witness or anyone who is interested in another wit-

ness would be giving one witness the benefit of knowing what all the other witnesses had said, and in case of any future action therein it wouldn't be "turkey."

General BRAGDON. Of course, my idea would be just to do it in his presence, in his office.

77. General GRUNERT. But you are in the capacity here—that is why I wanted to bring out that dual capacity. You are in the capacity here of a counsel, to counsel some particular witness. Therefore I do not see where it is pertinent that you should read all the evidence, nor should the witness know [2912] what the others testified to.

General BRAGDON. Yes.

78. General GRUNERT. If, as an aftermath of whatever may happen, anyone is particularly charged with anything, then the law and the regulations give him ample opportunity to prepare whatever case may be against him.

It seems that most people have an idea that this is a court of inquiry or something or a court to investigate some particular man or some particular person. We are here to find facts about those things charged to us.

General BRAGDON. Yes.

79. General GRUNERT. And as far as you people are concerned, now that you have shown yourself as counsel for Wyman, as far as you are concerned, those phases that pertain to the Pearl Harbor disaster, it may or may not have a bearing on the Pearl Harbor disaster, and that will include Colonel Wyman.

General BRAGDON. Yes.

80. General GRUNERT. So we want to get all the evidence we can, but we can't include you as a member of the Board to know everything that has gone on, and so forth.

General BRAGDON. That is right.

81. General GRUNERT. There is nothing to be hidden except through our instruction of holding this in closed session.

Do you sort of get an understanding of that, I mean?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir. Of course, it is a fact that those—we had then an awful lot of data which bore on those matters which were in that Congressional report. Of course, we had naturally addressed ourselves to that, because that was pretty definite—rather, an awful lot of things were said there, [2913] and that was why we thought it was important that these things that we had found which answered a lot of those things should be most certainly placed before you.

82. General FRANK. Well, you understand that the Board has a regular procedure, and we have developed a requirement for things that we want, and we have established the routine of getting it.

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir. I only want to fit in with that procedure, sir. I say, I only wanted to fit in with that. I wasn't—

83. General GRUNERT. You might ask the Assistant Recorder whether certain evidence has been brought out, introduced or not, with a view to finding out what has been done, so that if you have anything new the Board would be glad to get it.

General BRAGDON. Yes.

84. General GRUNERT. Is that about right?

85. General FRANK. Yes.

General BRAGDON. I can submit all the statements I want, can't I, with reference to these——

86. General FRANK. Yes.

87. General GRUNERT. Yes, but we don't want to pile up evidence. If we are satisfied that we have evidence on a point, there is no use piling up records of it. We would be glad to get anything you want to submit for consideration.

General BRAGDON. General, would there be any objection, with reference to particular witnesses that have to do with Wyman's case, to either myself or Major Powell being present, just for those particular witnesses that had to do with Wyman and the air warning service?

[2914] 88. General GRUNERT. You mean, to sit in with those witnesses when they give their testimony?

General BRAGDON. Just to be present.

89. General FRANK. No.

90. General GRUNERT. No; we cannot consider that anybody at present needs a counsel for that, except where it is authorized by the War Department directly, as was done for General Short, and that was just to sit in during the time General Short was giving his testimony, and for no other witnesses.

General BRAGDON. Not while others affecting him were there? My whole point would be just to make sure you got everything bearing on those individual points.

91. General FRANK. You seem to have come out here to have joined the Board.

General BRAGDON. No, sir, I don't believe that—I mean, I have no such intention.

92. General GRUNERT. Well, the Board is a little bit confused as to the necessity of the War Department's sending two or three people out here when the War Department is already represented by an Assistant Recorder who was specially detailed for that purpose by the Under Secretary of War.

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

93. General GRUNERT. So that this coming of this avalanche of talent, or rank and talent, is not understood by the Board; but if this avalanche has anything to contribute to the Board, we shall be very glad to get it.

94. General FRANK. Have you some questions, Colonel Toulmin?

95. Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to ask him one or two [2915] questions, if it is agreeable, General.

General, I am confused and I think the record is not entirely clear as to just whom you are representing, or defending, rather, other than Colonel Wyman. Whom else are you acting either as counsel for or defending here besides Colonel Wyman?

General BRAGDON. I wouldn't say I was defending any individual. I do feel that I should bring to the attention of the Board any procedures which might explain to the Board any charges of wrong policies or inefficiencies on the part of our methods of doing things.

Do I make myself clear on that?

In other words, if it is asserted that due to certain methods of the Engineer Department certain things might have been delayed, and I can explain them, then I would conceive it to be my duty to do that.

96. Colonel TOULMIN. Then you would be acting as a witness; is that it?

General BRAGDON. I would say that that was it, too, yes.

97. Colonel TOULMIN. And you would also be acting as counsel?

General BRAGDON. Yes, because, General, of course, you see, the two things are intermingled. Colonel Wyman was the officer who was in direct charge. Of course, he was under the Commanding General here, but he was in direct charge. But there are a lot of things to be explained by existing procedures at that time, which were peacetime procedures, and there is a legitimate line of demarcation, although there was a transition between them, and that transition had to do with things—for example, CPFF contracts were not in existence in time of peace, [2916] and they came in before Pearl Harbor, but just before it.

98. Colonel TOULMIN. But it is a little unusual to have a man appointed both as counsel and as witness. Under any sort of procedure before a board or a court that is a bit unusual, so I am puzzled in asking the question.

Now let me ask one more question: What was the reason for the conference between such high authority as General Somervell, General Styer, and General Reber in connection with this matter? That is, what is the objective sought to be accomplished?

General BRAGDON. I don't know that, sir, because I wasn't present. The only thing I knew about when I received a telephone call and I received those instructions which I have already mentioned.

99. Colonel TOULMIN. You are not counsel for those people, are you?

General BRAGDON. No, sir.

100. General GRUNERT. Well, then, have you finished?

101. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all.

102. Colonel WEST. I have one question, General.

103. General GRUNERT. Yes.

104. Colonel WEST. Suppose, General, in the course of your research for certain documents or data which this Board desired, you should run across some information which might be inimical to the interests of Colonel Wyman: what would you do in a case of that sort?

General BRAGDON. I would give it to the Board.

105. Colonel WEST. Even though you have been designated as his counsel, you feel under a duty to see that a full, free, and frank disclosure of all the facts is made?

[2917] General BRAGDON. Of course, you ask a very difficult question, but I asked General Robins—

106. Colonel WEST. I think you are in a very difficult position, and I am wondering if you gave any thought to the matter before you left Washington.

General BRAGDON. Well, I did to this extent: I said to General Robins—I didn't ask him that question, as such, but General Robins said, "You should give the Board all the facts you can find, but our point is to give them all the facts." And that is what I conceive it to be my job to do, to give you all the facts, because I thought there was a great paucity of facts.

I would like to reiterate, too, with every one of those I questioned—I believe it was about four or five people who had to do with the

air warning service in Washington: a Colonel Smith, a Mr. Richardson, a Colonel Letts, who had been in that job for about 35 years; Colonel Mayo, now with the Air Force; and when I talked to those people all I got was generalities; I couldn't get specific things. But they would give leads, and the only way I could get anything I could pin down was when I went to these files, and then I would get something that was specific. That was one thing that worried me. Just questionings didn't get it, but when you went to the files and commenced to pin things down, then the story commenced to be clear.

107. Colonel TOULMIN. General, I would like to ask one question: Is Colonel Wyman aware, General, of the fact that your position will be such as that indicated in your answer to Colonel West, that as his counsel you feel that you are also going to produce any information that may lead to his [2918] conviction?

General BRAGDON. Well, he isn't on trial, sir. I mean you say—

108. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, have you told him that you are going to produce all of this evidence no matter whom it hurts?

General BRAGDON. No, we did not discuss that point at all.

109. Colonel TOULMIN. I see.

General BRAGDON. I mean, I don't think "conviction" is a word that should be used, because—

110. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, omit the word "conviction." Have you told him that you are in this unique capacity of both his counsel and as an investigator to get all the facts?

General BRAGDON. No, sir. I am willing to tell him that I will conceive it to be my job to produce anything before the Board that I find the Board could—

111. General FRANK. Who appointed you as counsel for Wyman?

General BRAGDON. Well, I would say that, as far as the appointment is concerned, there was no written designation.

112. General FRANK. Well, who designated you?

General BRAGDON. Well, that was the time, of course, when General Styer talked to me on the phone, General.

113. General FRANK. What I am trying to get is who designated you as that, as counsel.

General BRAGDON. Nobody gave me an official designation. Those were the terms used by General Styer when he called me up.

114. General FRANK. It is, then, General Somervell's office that has designated you as counsel for Wyman?

General BRAGDON. Yes.

115. General FRANK. All right. Now, who gave you the [2919] instruction to provide all this information to the Board? General Somervell's office?

General BRAGDON. No, sir.

116. General FRANK. Or the Office, Corps of Engineers?

General BRAGDON. No, sir. General, you are making it more formal than it was. I simply talked with General Robins about coming out here. I asked, "Have you anything to tell me to do, General, when I get there before the Board?"

And he said, "No. Just tell them the whole straightforward facts, anything you find."

Now, that is the only basis I have for this other reply to Colonel West. I didn't get a lot of specific instructions.

117. General GRUNERT. Then, it is the Engineers that want the Board to hear you as a witness?

General BRAGDON. Well, they had—they never initiated that, sir. They never initiated that.

118. General GRUNERT. Well, we didn't initiate it. Did Wyman ask for you? Why are you out here? Somebody initiated it.

General BRAGDON. Well, all I know is, I was called by one of my superiors in General Somervell's office.

119. General GRUNERT. Well, then, it was initiated in General Somervell's office?

General BRAGDON. It was initiated in General Somervell's office, yes, sir.

120. General GRUNERT. That is, as far as your coming out here as counsel for Wyman is concerned?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

121. General GRUNERT. Well, now, who initiated your coming out here to give the Board additional information the Board hasn't [2920] already received or called for?

General BRAGDON. Well, nobody told me that I would be a witness before the Board—that is, and defined it as formally as you gentlemen have formulated it.

122. General GRUNERT. We only accept evidence here through witnesses.

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

123. General GRUNERT. And official documents.

124. General FRANK. After all, there has to be some sort of formality about the operations of this Board.

General BRAGDON. Yes. On the other hand, sir, I would say if we should chase that down technically, it is simply a fact that this ordered me here to report to General Richardson in connection with the activities of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

125. General FRANK. But the Board calls the witnesses it wants, not those that are imposed upon it.

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir. Well, I would like to appear before the Board if you will all give me the authority to do it, sir. If you simply say I can't do it—

126. General GRUNERT. That is what I am getting at. The Board will then consider you as an officer desired by Colonel Wyman to counsel him. I say "counsel him"; not as his counsel, but to counsel him, because he hasn't been charged with anything that I know of.

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

127. General GRUNERT. And also as a witness.

128. General FRANK. For the Board.

129. General GRUNERT. Yes, as a witness, we will call you; as a witness for the Board.

[2921] General BRAGDON. I appreciate that very much, sir.

130. General GRUNERT. So that you can find anything you have in mind, make up your statement, and I would advise you to consult with the Assistant Recorder so as to avoid wasting your time and our time on what is not necessary.

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

131. Colonel TOULMIN. May I ask one question?

132. Colonel WEST. I have one.

133. Colonel TOULMIN. General Grunert, may I ask just one question, please?

134. General GRUNERT. Yes.

135. Colonel TOULMIN. General, may I ask you this?

General BRAGDON. Yes.

136. Colonel TOULMIN. Did Colonel Wyman's visit to General Somervell precede the instructions that came to you from General Somervell's office? Did they tell you anything? Or General Styer?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

137. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all.

138. Colonel WEST. May I ask another question, General?

139. General GRUNERT. Yes.

140. Colonel WEST. Did Colonel Wyman ask for you by name, as counsel?

General BRAGDON. I don't know, sir. I have wondered that. I just don't know.

141. Colonel WEST. Do you know whether or not he asked General Somervell's office to designate someone as counsel?

General BRAGDON. No, sir; I do not know that.

142. Colonel WEST. Did I understand you to say that you had [2922] talked with Colonel Wyman in San Francisco?

General BRAGDON. Yes.

143. Colonel WEST. On the way over here?

General BRAGDON. Yes, that is right.

144. Colonel WEST. Did you inquire of him whether or not your designation as his counsel was satisfactory to him?

General BRAGDON. No, I didn't ask him that at all.

145. General GRUNERT. Well, we will ask him that.

146. Colonel WEST. I have no further questions, sir.

147. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much. And get busy now, so that you will be prepared to help the Board when the time comes for you to be called.

General BRAGDON. Thank you, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2923] **TESTIMONY OF MAJOR BOLLING R. POWELL, JUNIOR;
GENERAL STAFF CORPS, LEGISLATIVE AND LIAISON DIVISION,
WAR DEPARTMENT, GENERAL STAFF, WASHINGTON, D. C.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Major, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Major POWELL. Bolling R. Powell, Junior; Major, General Staff Corps, Legislative and Liaison Division; War Department, General Staff. Washington, D. C., is my station.

2. General GRUNERT. Major, we really do not know what you are a witness for, or to, or against, or whatnot; but it appears that you have come out here on something connected with this Board. so I am going to have General Frank try to find out what you are here for, and what we are going to do with you.

Major POWELL. All right, sir.

3. General GRUNERT. General Frank.

4. General FRANK. Will you state how you happen to be here.

Major POWELL. I am here pursuant to orders of the Adjutant General dated 4 September 1944, which direct me to—

Proceed, not later than 13 September 1944, to the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean area, on further temporary duty for approximately 31 days, in connection with the activities of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, which meets September 1944, and upon completion of this temporary duty, will return to proper station.

That is a quotation from these orders of mine. I was instructed. [2924] 5. General FRANK. By whom?

Major POWELL. By General Miles Reber, of the Legislative and Liaison Division, War Department, General Staff.

6. General FRANK. In whose office does he function?

Major POWELL. He functions under the War Department General Staff. General Persons is the head of that particular division of the War Department General Staff, and I was directed by General Reber to report to General Bragdon for instructions, and to serve General Bragdon in any capacity I could, in connection with the consideration of the interim report of the House Military Affairs Committee, involving the Wyman-Rohl relationships and the charges contained in that interim report, with which you are familiar; and that was my instruction.

7. General FRANK. In what manner are you serving with respect to the Assistant Secretary's office?

Major POWELL. Well, I have no directions or instructions from either the Assistant Secretary or the Under Secretary. My only instructions came from General Reber.

8. General FRANK. You have no instructions from Judge Patterson's office.

Major POWELL. No, sir; the only instructions I have are from General Reber, and he, as I said, directed me to report to General Bragdon.

9. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not your coming out here was coordinated with Judge Patterson's office?

Major POWELL. I don't know, of my own personal knowledge; no, sir.

10. General FRANK. When you came out here, did you know that there already was an officer on the Board who was [2925] designated by the War Department?

Major POWELL. Yes, sir; I had secured a copy of the order appointing the Board, and the order referring to the Board this consideration of the interim report; and I knew that Colonel West had been designated Recorder of the Board, and Major Clausen, Assistant Recorder; but I was not directed of course to work with the Board, or become any part of the personnel attached to the Board. I was told that I was to work with General Bragdon and assist him in preparing evidence to be presented to the Board in connection with the charges contained in this congressional committee, report—in other words, in the nature of counsel or advisor.

11. General FRANK. Did you receive instructions from anybody else besides General Reber on this thing?

Major POWELL. No, sir.

12. General FRANK. None?

Major POWELL. None whatever—other than General Bragdon, after I reported to him, of course.

13. General FRANK. What instructions did you receive from him?

Major POWELL. Well, General Bragdon has used me in assisting him in preparing the evidence involving the charges contained in this House report, the interim report, assisting him in getting that together and trying to develop it in orderly and coherent fashion so that we could present it to the Board and be of assistance to the Board in that respect.

14. General FRANK. That is, the evidence concerning what?

Major POWELL. The charges leveled against Colonel Theodore Wyman and—

[2926] 15. General FRANK. That he did what?

Major POWELL. Well, the charges in this report of the House committee. There are a number of charges and accusations and innuendoes and everything else contained through there; and we have been trying to develop evidence and get the facts, all the facts that have anything to do with that, in the files of the office of the Chief Engineer, and in the files of the office of the division engineer in San Francisco, and in the files of the engineer office here at Honolulu; and my only purpose was to get that together and present it in an orderly and coherent way so the Board will have the whole picture.

We are not attempting in any way to present a biased or just one side of the picture; we want the Board to have the whole thing, of course; but that is the nature of our activities.

16. General FRANK. Was there some question about the ability of the Board to get at the facts?

Major POWELL. None whatever, to my knowledge; certainly no one ever told me of anything, or made any such accusation; but this Board, I was told, was charged, of course, with the investigation of the whole Pearl Harbor matter, and the engineer, the Chief of Engineers and his officers have been accused of irregularities and inefficiencies, through this House report, and no other branch of the service has a House report such as this one facing it, and I was advised that it was because of the charges contained in that House report that it was desired that we prepare evidence and aid the Board in answering the charges contained in the House report; not the general Pearl Harbor investigation as such, if you get the [2927] distinction, there.

17. General GRUNERT. What are your investigations? Had you any instructions in the nature of preparing a defense against such charges?

Major POWELL. Not a defense, other than presenting the facts, the whole facts, and presenting them in a coherent manner that would be easily understood.

18. General GRUNERT. Wherein is the Legislative Division, as such, interested in this matter? Why should they have selected someone from the Legislative Division—why not some one from the Adjutant General's Office, or from the Judge Advocate General's Office, or what? Why were you selected to do this, do you know?

Major POWELL. No, sir; I don't know.

19. General GRUNERT. You do not know why Reber was called upon to produce somebody, do you?

Major POWELL. No, sir; I don't.

20. General GRUNERT. Are you an ex-engineer, or an engineer?

Major POWELL. No, sir; I am a lawyer in civil life.

21. General GRUNERT. But have you been connected with the engineers?

Major POWELL. No, sir.

22. General GRUNERT. This just came out of the clear sky to you?

Major POWELL. Yes, sir.

23. General GRUNERT. And apparently they are just using you to advise with and help General Bragdon, because of your legal experience?

Major POWELL. Legal background; I think so; yes, sir.

[2928] 24. General GRUNERT. And they thought it was necessary to have someone with legal experience to dig up these facts, is that it?

Major POWELL. I can't say what they thought, sir, that they thought it was necessary, or not. I think they thought it would be helpful to have a man with legal background prepare this evidence.

25. General GRUNERT. And what progress have you made?

Major POWELL. Well, as I say, we have gone, and gone through the records in the Chief of Engineers' office, in Washington; we have gone through the records in the division engineer's, in San Francisco, and are now in process of going through the records here; and we are preparing exhibits and maps, and we are preparing documents and things of that nature that we are finding, to present.

26. General GRUNERT. Are you preparing these things just as if the ones to whom you were going to submit them do not know anything about the case?

Major POWELL. No, sir; but we are preparing them from the point of view of giving the Board, being absolutely sure that the Board has everything that has a material bearing on the case, and trying to present it to the Board in a manner that will save the Board a lot of time and assist them in understanding the real significance of it.

27. General GRUNERT. The Board will appreciate anything you can do in that line that is not redundant, that is not already contained in the record; and then you will be prepared to be called as a witness by the Board, will you, as soon as you have obtained this evidence and put it in form?

[2929] Major POWELL. It had not been anticipated that I would be called as a witness. As I say, it was anticipated that I would aid in preparing witnesses to appear before the Board, more than being called as a witness, because I have no personal knowledge of this matter, as General Frank brought out.

28. General GRUNERT. Now, when you prepare a witness, what do you prepare that witness for, except to produce certain evidence or certain lines of thought or lines of action? Now, why should you prepare witnesses?

29. General FRANK. Evidence is "fact."

Major POWELL. Well, when I say "preparing a witness," I mean seeing that the witness will present to this Board, the witnesses that have been called by this Board will present to it, everything that is of record, and is pertinent, here.

30. General FRANK. You think that needs a lawyer—an expert lawyer to do that for the Board?

Major POWELL. Well, I can't say, of course, would not be presumptuous enough to say the Board needs me, but I received these orders to come and help in any way that I could.

31. General GRUNERT. Then I understand that you simply have been detailed to assist General Bragdon in whatever he has been ordered to do?

Major POWELL. That is correct; yes, sir.

32. General GRUNERT. Well, I think that settles it, right there.

33. Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to ask him just one question.

34. General GRUNERT. Go ahead, ask him a question.

35. Colonel TOULMIN. You are from the Legislative Division, as I understand it. You have read this committee interim report of Congress, is that right?

[2930] Major POWELL. Yes, sir.

36. Colonel TOULMIN. Is it your purpose to show that the committee's statements were wrong, in whole or in part?

Major POWELL. Well, it is our purpose to show all facts that have anything to do with the statements of the committee.

37. Colonel TOULMIN. You do not answer me.

Major POWELL. And whether its statements are wrong or not, or whether they are half truths, will just depend on the facts.

38. Colonel TOULMIN. Is it your position that Congress did not either have the ability to get at the facts, or did not put all the facts in the record?

Major POWELL. It is my own personal opinion from the facts that I have uncovered in the files of the engineers' offices that there are a great many inaccuracies in that report of Congress, and I think the facts that we present to you gentlemen will definitely show that.

39. Colonel TOULMIN. What firm were you connected with in civil life, Major?

Major POWELL. Well, I was first connected with the law firm of Martin, Turner, & McWhorter, in Birmingham, Alabama. I served for a year on the law faculty at the University of Virginia, and immediately before coming in the Army, I was associated in legal work with the American Telephone & Telegraph, as a house counsel.

40. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all.

Colonel WEST. May I ask a question?

41. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Colonel WEST. What was General Reber's assignment prior [2931] to his going on this Legislative and Liaison Division?

Major POWELL. I don't know, sir. I didn't know him before that. I don't know just what it was.

42. Colonel WEST. Has he just recently gone on that assignment?

Major POWELL. He has been there for some time, to my knowledge. Now, he has been acting as head of that division, in General Persons' absence.

43. Colonel WEST. Is that division under the Under Secretary of War's office in any way?

Major POWELL. Well, I know it is a division of the War Department General Staff, and I cannot say just how the War Department General Staff fits into the picture, but it was my impression that, in

effect, that was General Marshall's staff, and that the line of command would go right on up through General Marshall to the Secretary of War.

44. Colonel WEST. Just one other question: Is it your understanding that you are functioning as a sort of assistant counsel for Colonel Wyman?

Major POWELL. That's my understanding—to assist him.

45. Colonel WEST. In other words, you are General Bragdon's assistant, and he is designated as counsel?

Major POWELL. As counsel.

46. Colonel WEST. So you are really in the nature of assistant counsel for Colonel Wyman?

Major POWELL. That is right, sir; I was assigned to assist Colonel Wyman in any way possible, and our approach to this thing has been, as I have said—I would like to emphasize—not from the point of view of the over-all investigation of [2932] this Board, into the Pearl Harbor disaster, but this House interim report. We have studied that very carefully and analyzed all the charges contained in there, and have been endeavoring to develop the evidence on those charges.

47. General FRANK. I would like to ask a question. You stated that you considered it one of your duties, to prepare the witnesses. We simply are after facts, and if the witness has the facts, that is all we are after—the simple facts.

Major POWELL. That is right.

48. General FRANK. How do you expect to prepare a witness to give us simple facts, other than the normal way in which he would do it?

Major POWELL. Well, we have been endeavoring; when I say "prepare the witness," I mean, to see that the witness knows all of the facts that he is supposed to know, that are in the files, there, that are contained, there, and have them organized in some orderly way to come down here and present them to you gentlemen.

49. General FRANK. After all, is it not the Board's option to get its facts and its witnesses, without having the witnesses tampered with?

Major POWELL. Well, I wouldn't want my statement with reference to the preparation of a witness to be interpreted for one moment as tampering with the witness, or advising the witness to say anything less than the whole truth, and everything that is material; but it is of some assistance, I think, for a witness to go over all the facts and come prepared, rather than just walk in "green", not knowing what he is going to be faced with.

[2933] 50. General FRANK. Do I understand that you are about to ask the Board for a list of the witnesses that it is going to call, so that you can have an opportunity to deal with them?

Major POWELL. Well, no, sir; I am not about to ask the Board for any list of witnesses.

51. General FRANK. All right.

52. Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to ask you one question, Major. Do you regard it as proper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for a man, and also appear as a witness in disclosing all of the records and other data and facts, which may be adverse to the man whom he represents?

Major POWELL. I say it would be highly irregular, sir, and as I have stated before, I have no instructions to appear as a witness, and

I would be of no aid as a witness, because anything I said would be second-hand.

53. General GRUNERT. See if this statement of mine is correct: As far as you know, then, the War Department and the Chief of Engineers' Office have sent you people out here to be sure that the Board gets a chance to get all the facts?

Major POWELL. Correct.

54. General GRUNERT. Pro or con?

Major POWELL. Right, sir.

55. General GRUNERT. That is all.

Major POWELL. And to withhold nothing.

56. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming in. We wanted to get your status settled, because we did not know where you stood.

Major POWELL. All right, sir; fine!

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, having concluded the hearing of witnesses, the Board took up the consideration of other business until 2 p. m.)

[2934]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board, at 2 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)

General GRUNERT. The Board will please come to order.

TESTIMONY OF SENATOR WILLIAM HARDY HILL, 72 KEOKEO ROAD, HONOLULU, T. H.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Senator, will you state to the Board your full name and address, please?

Senator HILL. William Hardy Hill, 77 Keokeo Road, Honolulu.

2. General GRUNERT. Senator, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee. This latter report is largely concerned with construction. We are after facts and leads to where facts can be found.

General Short has furnished the Board a list of representative citizens living in Hawaii who he says may have information of value to the Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you here with the hope that you may have facts to present to us.

Now, General Short did not refer to any particular subject on which you might testify, so it is up to you to open the subject, which we may then develop by our questions. Do you know of any particular thing that General Short might wish you to [2935] tell the Board?

Senator HILL. I do not, and as far as facts are concerned regarding the attack I do not have any. I knew General Short very well, had many talks with him. We have discussed briefly, as much as a military man would care to discuss with a civilian, the situation over here, but I have no definite facts that I can give this Board.

3. General GRUNERT. Possibly he might have wanted you to tell us what you thought of him, together with what you may know of your own accord as to his endeavors here to build up a defense. Is there anything in that line that you might tell us?

Senator HILL. Well, I have never known a man who I thought more highly of. I think he was a very fine man. He was a serious and conscientious man and very high idealed. I felt and he led me to believe, at least I gathered from what he said at different times, that he was not being given support in the way of men and ammunition from Washington that he should. I believe that he felt that he should have had more men and more ammunition and better equipment.

The General was not afraid of an attack from Japan. In fact, nobody in Hawaii gave any thought to that. We thought we were safe and Japan would attack possibly the Philippines or possibly Panama. There was no thought in my mind and I am sure there was no thought in General Short's mind that Hawaii would be attacked.

On one occasion, when General Short returned from Washington, I said to him "Well, how did you get along?" And his answer was that he did not feel that he was being given the support that he should.

[2936] 4. General GRUNERT. You did not know what he expected, did you?

Senator HILL. I believe—and all of this is belief—that he wanted more planes, that he wanted more men, and I am not sure that he told me, but somebody told me, some military people, that some of the guns had not been fired for some 15 or 20 years, until he came here, and I gathered that he was back there to try to get larger appropriations in order to better fortify the Islands of Hawaii, the Territory.

5. General GRUNERT. Although these things that you tell us may not be facts, this Board, although it wants facts, is also obtaining some impressions. It wants to size up the conditions. Can you give us something in the line of the condition or the state of mind of the population here?

Senator HILL. Yes. The population had a tremendous amount of confidence in the armed forces. They felt they were absolutely protected against any attack that could ever be made. As an example, about two months before the attack I made a little speech up in Spokane, Washington to the Rotary Club, and I told them that I thought they were in just as much danger of attack as we were; we had high-powered guns and we had the radars, we had planes, and that we were absolutely safe, and that was the feeling of all of the civilian population.

6. General GRUNERT. Having that impression when the attack came did you feel let down by the military?

Senator HILL. Frankly, we did. We felt that we were let down to a certain extent, but the feeling here, and almost all of the people feel, that the let down was not here but in Washington.

[2937] General GRUNERT. Have you any basis for that feeling?

Senator HILL. We feel that in Washington the powers that be were being hoodwinked by the Japs and that they were afraid to do very much for fear that they would offend the Japanese. I know we read in the papers where they refused some 30 or 40 thousand dollars to do some work on Guam, for fear that it would offend the Japanese.

The general feeling, I think, is that Washington did not give us the protection and the men and equipment and so forth that we were entitled to. We feel and have felt since the war that Cordell Hull and others in Washington knew a great deal more about the situation than we were told. There was no feeling that I know of that General Short had let us down or had sort of gone to sleep on the job. He was recognized, I think, throughout the Territory as a very serious-minded and an efficient and a good man, doing the best that he could. He was not out on parties at night, not a drinking man, but he was all business. There is a kindly feeling toward General Short throughout the Territory.

8. General GRUNERT. Now, you said that it was general belief that he did the best he could. The Board has had testimony to the effect that he took an alert, called No. 1, the sabotage alert, where he could have taken an all-out alert. What the consequences were or what happened is well known. What might have happened had he taken a greater alert that would have provided greater security, one does not know. But I cannot well ask you what was in General Short's mind when he took the lowest form of alert, but can you tell us anything about the public mind as to the danger from sabotage of your population?

Senator HILL. We were not afraid of sabotage and there was [2438] very little of it here. The different races, we feel differently toward them from what they do on the mainland, and still feel that a great many or nearly all the Japs were loyal citizens or, at least, loyal enough not to do any harm.

I think that the armed forces—I think that General Short was not too much afraid of sabotage and work of that kind. We have heard that at that time they were on a sabotage alert. We have also been led to believe that these alert orders came from Washington. They were on the alert so much for a year or two before the war—I talked with some of the officers—"My God, we have been on the alert so much off and on and off and on" that it got to be a sort of a tiresome thing. I did not know that the General had it within his power to name the type of alert. We were under the impression—at least I was, and most of us were—that these orders came from Washington.

We have also heard that orders were cabled from Washington on December the 7th regarding this attack and the possibility of it, and the message did not reach General Short until sometime in the afternoon. General Short did not tell me that. Some of my information, I am very glad to tell you where I got it so you can follow it up, was from a man named Dick Haller, a newspaper man who was very friendly with General Short also. I think that he can give you possibly some information that you want.

9. General GRUNERT. Is he located here in the city?

Senator HILL. He lives here in the city, I think at the Pacific Club.

10. General GRUNERT. And at that time he was a newspaper man?

Senator HILL. He was.

[2939] 11. General GRUNERT. And he gave you an impression? Just what impression did he give you?

Senator HILL. He gave me the impression—some of the impressions I have given you here—that General Short was doing the best that he

could and that he was being let down a little by Washington, they were not giving him the equipment and men that he should have and that he had asked for repeatedly.

12. General GRUNERT. Did he tell you that this sabotage alert was ordered from Washington?

Senator HILL. I cannot say whether Haller told me that or not. We heard it at the time. I cannot say, I do not recall whether Haller was the man who told me that, but it was general information.

13. General GRUNERT. What do you suppose his source of information was?

Senator HILL. I have an idea it was General Short direct. He was very close to General Short.

14. General GRUNERT. Was there any influence that you know of by citizens or groups of citizens that would have prevented or would have influenced General Short in refraining from going on the all-out alert because of the disruption it might cause in plantations as far as the sugar-cane crop or the pineapple crop or this and that were concerned?

Senator HILL. Since the war, since the outbreak, it has been shown that the actions of the Commanding General here are influenced somewhat by the civilian population. Now, I mean this: General Emmons had in mind moving a great many of the Japanese from the Territory. He discussed this with me. I also discussed with his Deputy Chief of Staff, Phillips. He wanted to move many, many thousands out of here. It was his idea that the Japanese, the intelligent or semi-intelligent, semi-educated Japanese was the more dangerous; that the old alien out of the [2940] canefield was not so dangerous. But the sugar planters, the so-called Big Five in the Territory, immediately got busy, contacted Washington, contacted General Emmons, contacted everybody that they could and put it up to them in this way: "We put out a million tons of sugar per year. If you take our Japs out you get no sugar." They were very badly frightened that something of that kind would happen and they used all the pressure that they could, and apparently they were successful in getting what they wanted, because General Emmons definitely did want to ship out many, many thousands of Japanese.

15. General GRUNERT. Where was he going to ship them, do you know?

Senator HILL. Anywhere on the mainland, but get them out of here.

16. General GRUNERT. You knowing the Japanese and Filipino elements of the population, how do you size them up as regards their being a menace to the defense of the group of islands?

Senator HILL. At the present time? You mean whether they are a menace now?

17. General GRUNERT. Then or now.

Senator HILL. I cannot see that they are in any way a menace to the war effort. The Filipino is definitely a good worker and a loyal man. The Japanese, I believe, are loyal to us, most of them, because we are in charge. I do believe that as soon as a Japanese soldier is put on Hawaiian soil, the majority of the people will be loyal Japanese. I think they are just riding—

18. General FRANK. The bandwagon?

Senator HILL. Riding on the fence. I have many of them [2941] working for me and with me. I have lived with them here for 33 years. I know that even in the third and fourth generation the Jap is just as much a Jap as he was a thousand years ago. As you know, their religion, their State, their politics, are all in one,—the family. Recently there was a third generation Japanese married. His mother was born here. He was married in the old Japanese style, just exactly as they did in Japan 2,000 years ago. They are not becoming Americanized.

19. General GRUNERT. But they do have two political parties, don't they?

Senator HILL. Yes. We have two political parties, the Democrat and the Republican parties here, and up until a few years ago, when their numbers were small, they voted en bloc. As they got larger, as the group became larger, a few others aspired for a little power or leadership, and with the help of some of the rest of them we got them sort of divided and fighting among themselves, so they are not now voting in a solid bloc, although they have been able to elect many Japanese to public office, in the Legislature and in the different boards of supervisors.

20. General GRUNERT. Do any of you think of any other avenue of approach, anything else to ask the Senator? If not, I will ask the Senator to bring up anything that he thinks might be of value to the Board, realizing that we are looking at the attack on Pearl Harbor, what led up to it, what happened there, and only those things afterwards as are related to the attack.

Senator HILL. I am sorry I have not been of more help to you. I realize I have not been of much help. There are two or three things, though, that I would like to mention. One is that [2942] the Roberts report stated that there was no cooperation between the Army and Navy. Again, I do not know the facts, but we never heard before the war of any lack of cooperation. We knew there was a certain rivalry in the football games, and so forth, but we felt and knew, or thought we knew, that they were conferring and cooperating. Now, that is the general impression in the Territory.

21. General GRUNERT. You do not know how effective that cooperation was, do you?

Senator HILL. I do not.

22. General GRUNERT. You knew they were getting together, but you do not know what happened when they got together?

Senator HILL. No. I do know that Admiral Kimmel and General Short both were holding conferences every day for many, many months; not together; I mean with their various men. I know that they were getting together; to what extent or how far they went, I do not know; but nobody thought of the Army and the Navy working at odds. They all felt they were cooperating with each other and doing it properly. I think that is about the only thing that I could bring up that might be of interest.

23. General GRUNERT. We thank you very much for coming and appreciate your coming all the way up here.

Senator HILL. I am very glad to come, but I am sorry I cannot be of more help.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2943] **TESTIMONY OF COLONEL KENDALL J. FIELDER, GENERAL STAFF CORPS, HEADQUARTERS POA, FORT SHAFTER, T. H.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel FIELDER. Kendall J. Fielder, Colonel, General Staff Corps, Headquarters POA, APO 958, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, I am going to turn you over to General Russell as being the Board member who will go into this particular phase specially. The rest of us will piece out by questions.

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

3. General RUSSELL. When did you become G-2 on the staff of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel FIELDER. In the late summer of 1941. I think I reported on the 22nd of July.

4. General RUSSELL. From January 1, '41, until you became G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, what was your assignment?

Colonel FIELDER. I was with the 22nd Brigade at Schofield Barracks on this Island, as executive officer.

5. General RUSSELL. You came down as a member of the staff and immediately became the G-2 of the Commanding General of the Department?

Colonel FIELDER. That is correct, yes.

6. General RUSSELL. Colonel, would you tell the Board what personnel you had in the G-2 organization as of November and December 1941, in the G-2 division?

[2944] Colonel FIELDER. The G-2 section at that time was engaged in counter-intelligence as well as so-called combat-intelligence, of which there was none because there was no combat, but we did have a small combat section. We had the public relations section and the censorship. It was subdivided into two general subdivisions, one of which took in combat-intelligence, public relations, and plans for censorship. That comprised one lieutenant colonel, three captains, two first lieutenants, and six clerks. Then, we had the counter-intelligence division which was engaged in planning, preparing for anything subversive. That was composed of one lieutenant colonel, one captain, seven first lieutenants, two second lieutenants, and nineteen counter-intelligence corps agents, plainclothesmen. That was the G-2 section at that time.

7. General RUSSELL. Total personnel in the G-2 section, therefore, was some fifty?

Colonel FIELDER. Commissioned, I can tell you exactly: eighteen, and nineteen agents. They are enlisted men, but they are plainclothes.

8. General RUSSELL. Thirty-seven. And then your clerical force?

Colonel FIELDER. We had about nine clerks: six with the public relations section and three with the counter-intelligence.

9. General RUSSELL. Colonel, sometime prior to December 7 a subdivision of work had been made on the Island between the Office of Naval Intelligence, the F. B. I., and the G-2 section of the Department. You are familiar, of course, with that delineation of duties, and so forth?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, I am.

[2945] 10. General RUSSELL. As a result of the agreements reached between those three agencies, would you tell the Board the limitation on the operations of the G-2 section of the Hawaiian Department, or the fields in which they could operate pursuant to the terms of that agreement?

Colonel FIELDER. We were limited to operating among military personnel and among civilians employed by the military establishment.

11. General RUSSELL. Did you, or not, in 1941, irrespective of the limitations of this agreement, operate among the Japanese people on the Island? And by "Japanese people" I mean all of those who were aliens and those of alien origin, Japanese origin.

Colonel FIELDER. We did to a limited extent. The F. B. I. and the O. N. I. and the Military Intelligence Division were very closely associated even then, and we had meetings once each week of the heads of these three organizations, and we did assist them with our translators and with our agents, but we had no authority to open new cases or to prosecute, or anything like that.

12. General RUSSELL. You repeat, therefore, that your jurisdiction over civilians was limited to those employed by the military establishment?

Colonel FIELDER. That is correct.

13. General RUSSELL. Colonel, I am going to ask you some questions in a minute, probably, about the sabotage and the threat of sabotage as existing because of the presence of so many Japanese people on the Island. It may be necessary, however, to lay a little broader groundwork than I have done [2946] already.

On and after December 7, 1941, military law was declared on the Island; is that true?

Colonel FIELDER. That is correct. About noon on December 7th martial law was declared.

14. General RUSSELL. Will you tell the Board what effect on the jurisdiction of the G-2 section over Japanese people this declaration of martial law had?

Colonel FIELDER. It had the effect of placing all the responsibility for control of the alien population or the subversively inclined population in the hands of the military. That was by joint agreement. The War Department and the Navy Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington had agreed that in the event of martial law in Hawaii the senior military commander would be responsible, and it was what we call the limitation agreement, and it does delineate the duties of the various investigative organizations.

Now, when we got a copy of that over here, we had our own little local agreement signed by General Emmons at that time and Admiral Bloch, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, and Mr. Shivers of the F. B. I.; and that merely elaborated a little bit on the central agreement, the main agreement.

15. General RUSSELL. Have you been in touch with the Japanese population since that time, in a more detailed way than prior to December 7th?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, I have, very much more so.

16. General RUSSELL. You have continued in your assignment as G-2 until this time?

Colonel FIELDER. I haven't changed assignment; I am still [2947] G-2.

17. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Colonel FIELDER. Although the commands have changed, I am still the G-2 for the Senior Commander.

18. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel Fielder, there has been considerable discussion by various people as to the threat to our national security and the probability of sabotage because of the presence here of so many Japanese people on the Island. I want to break this down and go through it hurriedly to get G-2's reactions to that situation, and possibly it would be better to do that with it under certain heads.

The Japanese as individuals, how many—what is the percentage of Japanese population in the territory?

Colonel FIELDER. It is almost 40 percent, about 160,000.

19. General FRANK. On this Island or in all the Islands?

Colonel FIELDER. All the Islands. About 90,000 on this Island.

20. General RUSSELL. The total population of the Islands. Then, there is approximately 400,000?

Colonel FIELDER. That is right; 450,000, about.

21. General RUSSELL. How does the Japanese population on all of the Islands compare with what we commonly refer to as the white population?

Colonel FIELDER. Just about the same. Roughly the population is divided into three thirds: one-third white, one-third Japanese, and one-third mixtures: Chinese and Hawaiians, and part Hawaiians, and Filipinos, and so forth.

22. General RUSSELL. What is the predominant pursuit of the Japanese population on the Island?

[2948] Colonel FIELDER. I suppose you would call the predominant pursuit agriculture, but they also control many other things. Practically 80 percent of all the artisans, carpenters, plumbers, electricians, and so forth, were of Japanese extraction, and then of course many businessmen, many professional men: lawyers, doctors, even bankers. They were engaged in almost every pursuit.

23. General RUSSELL. Based on your work among these people, the data which your section has accumulated, and the data which have been furnished you by F. B. I. and O. N. I., have you reached any conclusions as to the percentage of loyalty or disloyalty to the American Government—I will put it another way: have you reached any conclusion as to the percentage of Japanese who, in a contest between the American Government and the Japanese Government, would be loyal to the American Government?

Colonel FIELDER. It is almost impossible to arrive at any definite percentage. There is no question but what a great number of them would be completely loyal to the United States. There is no question but what a large number would be pro-Japanese because they are aliens; you couldn't expect them to be otherwise. The queer thing about the Japanese is that you cannot differentiate between those who are potentially loyal and those who are potentially disloyal. But we just don't think the way they do; we can't solve their minds; and unless they commit some overt act or unless we have evidence against them,

such as knowing that they have large financial holdings in Japan or that their nearest relatives are there, or that they have contributed toward the Japanese war effort in the war [2949] against China, and things like that, there is no way of telling whether they are loyal or not.

24. General RUSSELL. I was going to ask you if any conclusions as to loyalty and disloyalty could be drawn because of the place of birth or the time spent on the Island.

Colonel FIELDER. You can't draw a definite conclusion. But there is one class of Japanese called Kibeis, those who are born here and then received much of their education in Japan; they are dual citizens. We consider them the most dangerous group because they are young, they are active, they are smart, and they have been indoctrinated with this fanatical worship of the Emperor and willingness to die for the Emperor, and all that stuff.

25. General RUSSELL. It is from that group that you might expect the leaders of the Japanese people to come, if at all?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes; at the present time. Now, prior to the war, of course, they had many alien Japanese leaders, people engaged in shipping, the NYK Line officials in this town, the bankers, the editors of the local papers, and the Shinto priests, the language school teachers, and several other categories, they were the potentially dangerous ones at that time. Many of these, of course, were picked up promptly on December 7th.

26. General RUSSELL. Now, those people were aliens and had come to the Island from Japan after having attained their maturity in Japan?

Colonel FIELDER. Not necessarily. They might have been born there. If they are born in Japan and come right away, they are still aliens.

[2950] 27. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Colonel FIELDER. Many of them are—or most of them are 40 years old or over, but some of them are not that old.

28. General RUSSELL. Well, now, Colonel, to hurry along: You have in the Islands a great group of Japanese people who are poorly educated, work with their hands, the laboring class; that is true, isn't it?

Colonel FIELDER. That is true, definitely.

29. General RUSSELL. And then you have the upper crust, the people that you are talking about, the Kibeis and the merchants and the bankers and the shipping interests and the professional people. They are the educated Japanese people. Now, from the standpoint of loyalty to the American Government, where would you expect to find the greatest degree of loyalty, among the uneducated group or among that educated group?

Colonel FIELDER. You would expect the greatest degree of loyalty not among any of those that I have mentioned, but among the citizens who were born here, educated here, and who have never been away from these Islands, which is still another group. None of the groups that you mention.

30. General RUSSELL. Well, they are potential leaders, aren't they?

Colonel FIELDER. Many of them are.

31. General RUSSELL. All right.

Colonel FIELDER. We have hundreds of them here who have gone through our colleges and universities on the mainland, have gone through the college here, who have never been away from the American soil.

32. General RUSSELL. Now, you think those people, all those [2951] that belong to what we will roughly call the intellectual class, are loyal Americans?

Colonel FIELDER. I think 95 percent of them are.

33. General RUSSELL. And they would go down the line in a contest with Japan?

Colonel FIELDER. Right. That is borne out by the fact that about 6,000 of them are in our Army and have given a splendid account of themselves in Italy with the Hundredth Battalion.

34. General RUSSELL. Therefore your conclusions are that among the intellectual group some part of them would be disloyal, and then there would be a large element of them that would be loyal?

Colonel FIELDER. That is correct, yes, sir.

35. General RUSSELL. And among the uneducated or laboring group they would probably follow the leaders?

Colonel FIELDER. They would probably follow the leaders. Many of the old aliens have been here so long, they are more or less harmless in a group because most of their interests are here. They have raised their families here. They have severed many of their ties with Japan. Consequently, as a group you couldn't consider them necessarily dangerous, but as individuals any one of them might be dangerous.

36. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, prior to the outbreak of—I will come back to this sabotage thing in a minute. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in December of 1941, December 7, 1941, you had lists of Japanese people here, "A" and "B" lists?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, we did.

37. General RUSSELL. Now, what did the "A" list mean?

[2952] Colonel FIELDER. "A" list?

38. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Colonel FIELDER. Meant those that would be picked up immediately in the event of any hostilities, even against the Philippines, we will say, or against Malaya, anywhere between the United States and Japan, even though notwithstanding—

39. General RUSSELL. How many people did you have on your "A" list as of December 7, '41?

Colonel FIELDER. I have forgotten now. I could get those figures, but I don't recall.

40. General RUSSELL. Did it run into thousands?

Colonel FIELDER. No.

41. General RUSSELL. Or into hundreds?

Colonel FIELDER. I would say three or four hundred. But I can get those figures if it makes any difference.

42. General RUSSELL. Well, three or four hundred is enough for us.

"B" list?

Colonel FIELDER. The "B" list is those that were also considered potentially dangerous but who would not be picked up immediately, in the event they sank one of our transports on the way to the Philip-

piners, or diplomatic relations were severed, or something like that. But they would be picked up in the event of an attack on this place or war in this part of the Pacific Ocean. Otherwise they would just be watched.

43. General RUSSELL. Now, on this subject of percentage of loyalty and disloyalty, do you think they would be affected materially by the success of Jap arms in the Territory, assuming that they might have been successful here?

[2953] Colonel FIELDER. Yes; many of them would. Many of them who would be neutral otherwise would turn to the winning side.

44. General FRANK. Or the invading side?

Colonel FIELDER. Or the invading side.

45. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, what about the Japanese organizations on the Island, very briefly?

Colonel FIELDER. They are great on organizations. They organize for every form of sport, every form of religion, and everything else. There are literally hundreds of Japanese organizations, but those that were considered dangerous, most dangerous, were the Shinto religious sects, and of course the Black Dragon Society, which everybody is familiar with, was one of their very rabid imperialistic organizations.

46. General FRANK. What characterized the two of them?

Colonel FIELDER. Intense loyalty to Japan, I think, more than anything else, and desire to better Japan's position in the world of nations.

47. General RUSSELL. Now you are discussing with General Frank this Shinto group?

Colonel FIELDER. That is the Shinto; yes, they are. When you get into religion I am just not familiar enough with it to go into much detail, but in the Shinto religion it is tied in pretty close with the federal government, the Japanese Empire, the worship of the Empire.

48. General RUSSELL. Go to heaven if you die for them.

Colonel FIELDER. Well, that's right.

49. General RUSSELL. Well, do you think that that sort of thing is taught here in your Shinto temples?

Colonel FIELDER. It certainly is taught; there is no [2954] question about it. It isn't any more because we don't let—we have closed up all the Shinto temples, but it was taught prior to December 7.

50. General RUSSELL. How many Shinto temples did you have prior to December 7, 1941?

Colonel FIELDER. I have no idea, but it ran into hundreds.

51. General RUSSELL. Didn't you have some conception of the number of followers of Shintoism here in the Territory?

Colonel FIELDER. I would say probably the F. B. I. did have. We didn't have, except what they turned over to us.

52. General RUSSELL. Well, they hadn't been here very long, had they, Colonel?

Colonel FIELDER. The Shintos?

53. General RUSSELL. No. The F. B. I.

Colonel FIELDER. I think they came about probably ten years ago.

54. General RUSSELL. Well, don't you think as G-2 it would have been a part of your function to have learned how many of these Shinto people there were among the Japanese, if they believed in that sort of a thing?

Colonel FIELDER. Well, I am not sure but what my own counter-intelligence people did know, but I as head of it didn't know exactly how many they had. We undoubtedly had access to the records of how many; otherwise we couldn't have arrested those that were considered dangerous.

55. General RUSSELL. No, but how many Shinto temples were there that you closed up after December 7, 1941?

Colonel FIELDER. I will have to get that from the records.

[2955] 56. General RUSSELL. Will you get that and give it to us?

Colonel FIELDER. I will do that. As a matter of fact, the office—if you are going to call Major Meurlott, who is my assistant,—

57. General RUSSELL. He is supposed to come in later.

Colonel FIELDER. He can give you all of the details of that.

58. General RUSSELL. What kind of reaction did you get from closing up these Shinto temples?

Colonel FIELDER. Strangely enough, it wasn't bad. They didn't seem to mind it so much. They seemed to expect it more or less, many of the Shinto priests, or at least a few, and a few of the other leaders. When we went around to pick them up on the morning of December 7, we had a plan. It was just a regular dragnet affair. Some of them even had their suitcases packed. So they knew what was coming.

59. General RUSSELL. All right. I would like to have the background on this Shinto organization.

Colonel FIELDER. I'll see that Major Meurlott has this when he comes up before the Board.

60. General RUSSELL. Now, the consular activities, including the consular agents. The reports we have indicate that there were 219 of these agents operating in the Islands on the 7th of December or shortly theretofore. Were you at all familiar with the activity of these people?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes. We knew that they were in the employ of the Japanese consulate, but we didn't know in what capacity. Many of them were very minor clerks and probably informants.

[2956] 61. General RUSSELL. Were you furnished reports on these consular agents and Shinto priests by the F. B. I., Colonel?

Colonel FIELDER. As individuals, yes, we exchanged files, and we had at that time—we still have—many filing cabinets full of reports of investigations of individuals. We had on December 7 access to practically all the information that the F. B. I. had on individuals. That is how we got the "A" and "B" lists. We had a map as big as the side of that wall (indicating), of the city of Honolulu and of this entire Island. Every house for one of these people that we were suspicious of, we had a pin there, and it was a comparatively simple matter to put out our dragnet and pick them up when hostilities started, but we couldn't touch them prior to that.

62. General RUSSELL. Well, did it come to pass that as of December 7, or November 27, based on the information which you had and which has been referred to in these previous questions, that you felt that there might be an element of Japanese on this Island or on these Islands that would engage in sabotage efforts against the Government in event of war?

Colonel FIELDER. Very definitely.

63. General RUSSELL. In the event of hostilities or war?

Colonel FIELDER. Very definitely. Everything pointed in that direction. You couldn't—you can't conceive of that many people of a different race not engaging in some subversive activity in the event of hostilities. I can't conceive of 160,000 Americans being in Japan, when war is declared, without them doing something against Japan. And the same way here; we couldn't think otherwise.

64. General RUSSELL. In other words, you had the feeling [2957] that if relations became more tense and war should intervene, or war was immediately imminent, that you might expect activity of some sort in the nature of sabotage by some elements of the Japanese on the Islands?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, everything pointed to that. In analyzing the big picture of the war, we knew that Japan's ambition was to the south where they could get resources. We knew that they needed tin, they needed rubber, they needed oil; and we also knew that this was their one stumbling block.

65. General RUSSELL. What was their one stumbling block?

Colonel FIELDER. Pearl Harbor.

66. General RUSSELL. You mean the Navy?

Colonel FIELDER. The Navy. The Navy. Our Navy, Pearl Harbor.

Consequently it looked as if the easiest thing for them to do would be to inflict great damage on our military and naval installations here any way they could. Well, with 160,000 potential saboteurs scattered throughout the Islands it is perfectly reasonable to assume—

67. General RUSSELL. How were they going to get their hands on their equipment, the explosives and whatnot, to commit acts of sabotage?

Colonel FIELDER. About all they would need would be a box of matches.

68. General RUSSELL. Explain that; will you please, Colonel?

Colonel FIELDER. Well, for instance, the oil tanks over here near Pearl Harbor, dozens of them, right out in the open, not underground at all; the docks, the waterfront. Any waterfront can be—

[2958] 69. General RUSSELL. You can't set them afire with a match, can you?

Colonel FIELDER. You certainly can if you spread a little gasoline on it, and right within 500 yards of the docking facilities, all of the commercial aviation that's stored on the Island was there.

70. General FRANK. You mean aviation gas?

Colonel FIELDER. No. Aviation gas, yes. That's it. As a matter of fact, every other kind of gas, automobile gas; and under those docks, for instance, are a very intricate series of pipe lines where they bunker the ships, and so forth. It would be a very simple matter to open one of those valves and flood a little oil, a little gasoline on the water, and set it on fire.

71. General RUSSELL. Well, what about blowing up utilities and destruction of aircraft that was parked back there? What was your fear there?

[2979] Colonel FIELDER. The fear, there, was that you could more easily protect aircraft when they were concentrated than if they were dispersed.

72. General RUSSELL. How were they going to get the thing to blow them up with?

Colonel FIELDER. Well, dynamite, for instance, was very plentiful here at that time, because of the nature of this particular island, for instance. Every time you build a home up there on one of these hills, you usually have a blast away a lot of rock, consequently all of the constructions companies, almost every gang of builders had cases of dynamite which might have been used. That is one way they could do it.

73. General RUSSELL. Do you recall a message which came out to General Short on the 27th of November?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir; I do.

74. General RUSSELL. Did you see that message?

Colonel FIELDER. I saw it.

75. General RUSSELL. Did you know of a message which arrived for the Navy, on or about that same date, which began with the words, "This is a war warning"?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir; I didn't see that; never heard of it, until after this thing was all over.

76. General RUSSELL. When General Short received that message on the 27th that we are discussing, and which began with the statement that "negotiations with the Japanese government are practically over, to all intents and purposes," did he have a staff meeting and discuss what to do about that?

Colonel FIELDER. As I remember it, he called the staff officers in, the Chief of Staff did, one or two at a time, but [2960] it was called to my attention. We read the thing, and we actually discussed the message, and intensified our inspections of the sabotage plans. I personally was detailed by General Short to go to Wheeler Field, go to Fort De Russy, go to Fort Kamehameha, and check on the interior guard systems, check on the plans for repelling enemy action, subversive acts.

77. General RUSSELL. Did you agree with the decision made by the Commanding General, to go on a sabotage alert and not to take a more effective form of alert?

Colonel FIELDER. I don't consider that my prerogative, to agree or disagree with the Commanding General.

78. General RUSSELL. He did not ask you for your opinion about it?

Colonel FIELDER. He did not ask me for my opinion.

79. General RUSSELL. Colonel, you are about the only man we have found here who was not willing to express an opinion about whether he thought the sabotage alert was good or bad.

Colonel FIELDER. I have indicated that I thought—I very definitely thought it was sound. I didn't expect anything else, if that is the answer you want.

80. General RUSSELL. I do not care what the answer is, I just want the question answered.

Colonel FIELDER. I did not mean it just facetiously, or anything like that, but I want to make it perfectly clear that I did expect sabotage, very definitely.

81. General FRANK. Did you expect an air attack?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir; I did not.

82. General RUSSELL. Colonel, there has been shown us a telephone call from Doctor Mori on the Island of Oahu to someone [2961] in Japan. Have you ever heard of that telephone call?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir; I am familiar with that.

83. General RUSSELL. When did you first see it, and under what conditions?

Colonel FIELDER. I first saw it on the late afternoon of December 6, 1941. It was brought to me by Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, who was my assistant at that time. I read it, and went over to General Short's quarters and discussed it for about an hour with him, and Bicknell was there at the same time. We couldn't solve it, we couldn't make heads nor tails out of it. We considered it very suspicious, very fishy, but the person doing the talking on this end was a newspaper woman, and it appeared from the conversation that someone in Tokyo, some newspaper was trying to get material to advise the Japanese public of conditions in Hawaii, and there were a lot of things they talked about—flowers, for instance, poinsettias and hibiscus, which didn't seem to make sense, and till this day that message has not been solved, so far as I know.

84. General RUSSELL. Who did you say brought that message to you?

Colonel FIELDER. Colonel Bicknell—Lt. Col. George Bicknell.

85. General RUSSELL. Did he remain with you, so long as you and General Short were considering the message?

Colonel FIELDER. He remained at least an hour. General Short and I considered it for perhaps another hour, because we were going to Schofield Barracks together. We were an hour late getting there as a result of that message, and, riding out in the car, we discussed it; and then on the way back, about 9:30, we discussed it still further, and arrived at no conclusion as to its significance.

[2962] 86. General RUSSELL. To go back to the November period, you received a message on November 27 from G-2, the War Department, is that true?

Colonel FIELDER. That is true.

87. General RUSSELL. Have you got the original of that message, which was in the file, here?

Colonel FIELDER. I believe that has been turned over to the Board. I have a copy of it.

88. General RUSSELL. I hand you a message, No. 473, dated 27 November 1941, which reads:

"Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate STOP Hostilities may ensue STOP Subversive activities may be expected STOP Information Commanding General and Chief of Staff only."

Do you remember what time of day you got that message?

Colonel FIELDER. I do not remember. I could find out from the original, perhaps.

89. General RUSSELL. Was it before you were in the conference with the Chief of Staff about the sabotage order, or not?

Colonel FIELDER. I am not sure of that, but I think it was subsequent, I think this came after the other message, but I am not sure. It has been so long, now, that some of the details have slipped my mind.

90. General RUSSELL. Colonel, on this subject of sabotage, and of how broadly prevalent the sentiment about it was, do you recall my calling your attention on Saturday to a letter of August 3, 1941, which was signed by a man named George Paisn, written to the President of

the United States, from Blue Ridge, New York? Do you remember that?

[2963] Colonel FIELDER. Yes, I remember that.

91. General RUSSELL. Was that letter, or a copy of that letter, forwarded from Washington out to the Hawaiian Department, and is it now in the files of the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel FIELDER. It is.

92. General RUSSELL. Do you recall my asking you to check on this man, George Paisn, to determine who he was, and why he was writing the President about the danger of sabotage here on the island?

Colonel FIELDER. I checked so far as our files; we had nothing on him, at all. That letter came out in September 1941, as I remember it.

93. General RUSSELL. This is a letter written by a man named George Paisn to the President and sent out here to the Hawaiian Department, and I will read one sentence from it:

I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of some kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live in Hawaii, the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source of this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can be trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of these reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and demand the most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval and of the military authorities in Hawaii.

Colonel, do you mean to testify that when you got a letter with that sort of information in it, coming from the President, you did not check on the man who wrote it, to see whether or [2964] not it was worthy of serious attention?

Colonel FIELDER. That's exactly what I mean to say. A copy of that letter was sent out here for our information by General Miles, who was then the G-2 of the War Department. We immediately checked here as best we could to find out whether any ring of saboteurs or potential saboteurs existed. We immediately discussed it, as I remember it, but we got nowhere. This was probably one of, I would say, eight or ten letters that I have seen which predicted sabotage and other subversive acts by local Japanese.

The fact that it is addressed to the President does not make it any more impressive. I presume that this letter was turned over to the FBI, and I presume that the FBI on the mainland investigated this fellow, but our files do not show a result of that investigation. Now, I would be very glad to go to the FBI files and perhaps we could find out whether this was run down, but we didn't do it in my section.

94. General RUSSELL. Now, so much for the sabotage evidence.

Colonel, is it true that you had a great number of these people whom you detained after December 8, 1941. Did you ever try any of those people on any criminal charges?

Colonel FIELDER. One man was tried, a German named Kuhn, for espionage, and he was sentenced by a military commission to be shot, or hanged.

95. General RUSSELL. Those records I have been looking for, and I ask you now. They told me today they thought they would have them for me. You did not find them in your records?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes; we have them. I thought they had been delivered to the Board, by Colonel Hayne.

[2965] 96. General RUSSELL. Hayne told me today he would check.

Colonel FIELDER. He has them.

97. General RUSSELL. Now, so far as you know, however, of all the Japanese people that you interned after December 8, not a one of them has ever been tried?

Colonel FIELDER. I do not know of any that have been tried.

98. General RUSSELL. Since December 8, 1941, or immediately prior thereto, has any Japanese from this island been tried for disloyalty to the American Government, or for acts of sabotage?

Colonel FIELDER. Not to my knowledge.

99. General FRANK. Would you know?

Colonel FIELDER. Not necessarily. That would come under the Military Governor's office, and they could have a military commission sitting on one of the other islands and I might not ever know.

100. General FRANK. Would you know it if it were on this island?

Colonel FIELDER. Not necessarily. I could very quickly find out, though, by a telephone call.

101. General RUSSELL. Do you not believe, being in as close touch as you are with the Japanese Hawaiians on this land, that if such thing had occurred, you would know something about it?

Colonel FIELDER. I think if it were an outstanding case, there is no question but I would know something about it. The chances are I would know, yes; but you can see that some of the consular agents might have been tried before a military commission on Japanese of gathering information of our fleet, he might have been acquitted, or might have been sentenced to a penitentiary sentence; I don't know.

[2966] 102. General RUSSELL. All right.

Turning now from sabotage, Colonel, what are the sources of information available to you as G-2 on this island, from which you might make deductions as to possible Japanese activity by the armed forces, either naval or military?

Colonel FIELDER. You are speaking at the present, or prior to December 7?

103. General RUSSELL. Prior to December 7.

Colonel FIELDER. The only source of information we had was through the Navy. That's locally. Now, of course we had access to War Department information, Navy Department information; that would come to us; but locally, our only source of information was through the Navy.

104. General RUSSELL. Do you believe that the information was being sent from these islands to the homeland of the Japanese government by their Japanese consul or his agents?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, I do.

105. General RUSSELL. Was it possible for you to have intercepted any of that information and have made deductions therefrom which might have been of benefit to our armed forces here on the island?

Colonel FIELDER. It was not possible under the conditions; no.

106. General RUSSELL. What were those conditions, Colonel?

Colonel FIELDER. The first thing I think of is that we were not authorized to do anything in connection with the local population. The consular agents had diplomatic immunity; and even the FBI I understand were not permitted to intercept the commercial cables.

[2967] 107. General RUSSELL. What were the means of communication available to the Japanese consul, if he desired to communicate with the homeland?

Colonel FIELDER. Probably the safest thing would be by courier. The boats ran regularly, and the diplomatic mail is not subject to examination. I would say the safest method would be physical transmission of messages, not by radio or telephone. Then of course they had the commercial cables, they had telephone connections, and they had the Mackay radio and the RCA, all of which had circuits to and including Tokyo.

108. General RUSSELL. Were you permitted to intercept messages from these other means of communications?

Colonel FIELDER. We were not.

109. General RUSSELL. Are you permitted to do that now?

Colonel FIELDER. We are not. It is illegal.

110. General RUSSELL. On the 7th of December, did the military people raid the Japanese consulate here on the island?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes; they did.

111. General RUSSELL. Did they discover any messages which had not been destroyed, in that consulate?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes; they did.

112. General RUSSELL. Is this folder which I have in my hand, marked "Confidential, 336.92, Japanese Consulate and Consular Agents," a folder or file containing all of the messages delivered to you by the FBI as taken from the Japanese consulate on the day of the raid?

Colonel FIELDER. It contains all that have been pieced together and decoded and translated. We had probably several waste-paper baskets of scraps which were never solved. We [2968] worked on this, oh, some six or eight months, piecing the various little scraps together, and we finally did solve some of them. This is the complete file of messages that have been solved.

113. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, did I ask you, on Saturday, last, to go through that file and to select any message or messages which might have been helpful to you as G-2 in predicting Japanese future actions, had they been in your hands prior to December 7, 1941?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes; you did.

114. General RUSSELL. And did you select any such messages?

Colonel FIELDER. I selected several messages here which would have been very much of interest to me. They might not have given us any definite warning of an attack.

115. General RUSSELL. Would you read into the record two, three, or four that you would consider more material, so that the Board might hear them, and so they may become a matter of record. Will you identify them by date, Colonel, so that we might know.

Colonel FIELDER. Yes. Here is a message, No. 115, 14 May, 1941, from Kita, who was the local consul, to Tokyo. It says:

With respect to message No. 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reinforcing the local air force 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieut. General Emmons, departed San Francisco at 1559 the 13th flying in formation and arrived Hickam Field at 0558 the 14th.

116. General RUSSELL. That went to whom?

Colonel FIELDER. To Gaimudaijin, Tokyo.

117. General RUSSELL. Did you know then, Colonel, or do you know now, who that addressee was?

[2969] Colonel FIELDER. I do not.

Here is one that might have been of interest to us. It indicated that they knew that some of our fliers were joining the Chinese forces. It is from Kita on 8 July 1941, to the foreign minister, Tokyo:

A report regarding the Washington report of the Latin Pact of May that American pilots are joining the China air force. The local Chinese consul general on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his consulate (largely from local air groups) Newspaper reports indicate that the Chinese military attache in Washington (makes arrangements?) Furthermore according to English (language) newspapers on the 5th—

that must be a misprint.

—200 men have already (Toppa Senn) gone (?). The Chinese consul general avoids a statement regarding his orders.

End of message.

On September 2, 1941, from Kita to foreign minister, Tokyo, a similar message, one sentence of which is pertinent:

A ship left port en route for the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and mechanics. Although the group declined to reveal their destination they are an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma Road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their military duties.

Here is one of December 3, 1941, from Kita to foreign minister, Tokyo, No. 363:

Wyoming and two seaplane tenders departed third.

December 4, 1941, RCA message No. 364, from Kita to [2970] foreign minister, Tokyo:

One British warship arrived Honolulu and departed early morning fourth, approximately 100 tons, one stack, one four-inch gun forward and aft. Fueled. Immediately after arrival enlisted ratings, received mail from British consulate.

On December 4, 1941, RCA message 365, from Kita to foreign minister, Tokyo.

USS HONOLULU arrived 1300 4th.

December 6, 1941, from Kita to foreign minister, Tokyo, message No. 368:

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis North Carolina on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.

That, to me, is a rather significant message. That left here on December 6, 1941.

118. General FRANK. By cable or radio?

[2971] Colonel FIELDER. By cable, RCA.

Here is a message, 3:20 a. m., December 7, 1941, from the Japanese consul, Honolulu. No, it is received by him from Togo:

Relations strained between Japan and the United States and Britain.

That is dated 3:20 a. m., on the morning of the 7th.

Outside of those, there are no messages in there, that might have been particularly helpful.

119. General RUSSELL. Is it your testimony, or not, Colonel, that with the messages which are contained in the file recently identified, and the telephone message which we have discussed already, and which is known as the Mori message, that those include all of the messages which reached you, as G-2, from FBI, prior to December 8, 1941?

Colonel FIELDER. Well, these messages did not reach me for weeks after December.

120. General RUSSELL. But they were seized by the FBI from the consulate and turned over to you, weeks after December 8?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir; that is correct.

121. General RUSSELL. Therefore, the number of messages which you have produced in response to the Board's notice to produce, as coming from the FBI, consists of this one telephone transcript about which you have testified?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir; that is correct, so far as the armed forces of Japan are concerned.

[2972] 122. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, did you read the local papers along about the first of December, 1941, to see what the relationship between the Japanese Empire and our government was?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, I naturally read the papers.

123. General RUSSELL. What was your conclusion at that time as to the inevitability of war with Japan?

Colonel FIELDER. It appeared inevitable to me.

124. General RUSSELL. You thought it was coming some time?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir. I had no idea when, but it seemed inevitable.

125. General RUSSELL. You did not have the impression that it was imminent?

Colonel FIELDER. No, I did not.

126. General RUSSELL. I asked you or the Board asked you to produce all the messages which you might have received from G-2 or the War Department indicating to you the imminence or the inevitability of war. As I recall, you have produced only this one message of November 27th. We had some other messages which we might want to identify. Here is a message which might be interesting for the record. Will you identify and read that message and tell the Board where it came from and what the basis of information therein contained is?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir. This is a message that we sent to the War Department on the 14th of November, 1941. I authenticated the message. It reads:

(Message to War Department authenticated by Colonel Fielder, dated November 14, 1941, is as follows:)

The ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.

For G-two interviewed W. G. Keswick, British courier from [2973] Singapore now enroute San Francisco comma Washington and London in same plane with Saburo Kurusu comma Keswick states quote mission of ambassador is primarily to confirm Nomura reports that United States Government is not bluffing stop If he sees any indication of weakness in attitude of United States comma then Japan may move toward other hostilities stop Should he observe only attitude of strength and determination great possibility no such hostile

acts would take place unquote stop. Keswick information and opinions hitherto fairly accurate period

127. General RUSSELL. As I get it, you people here interviewed this man named Keswick, who was travelling with Kurusu, and Keswick's opinion was that he was going to the States to see whether or not we were bluffing in our attitude toward Japanese aggression in the Pacific?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir, that is true.

128. General RUSSELL. And you made that sort of reply?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir. We interviewed many people that passed through here. That was one of our sources of information. Honolulu has always been somewhat the crossroads and many Britishers, Dutchmen and Filipinos and whatnot travel through here. We interviewed a great many of them prior to December 7th, 1941.

129. General RUSSELL. That message went from you to the War Department?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir, that is right.

130. General RUSSELL. Here is a message of July 8th, 1941, from the Adjutant General to you, in which he discusses the international situation. I believe that message is in the record [2974] from other sources. But you did receive this message of July 8th, 1941, which discusses the War Department's idea as to what the Japs were going to do?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir, that is correct.

131. General RUSSELL. Will you read into the record that part of that message which deals with the War Department's prophesy about the Japanese future action?

Colonel Fielder. The date of this message is July 8th, 1941; the number is 94-War-BC-207, to the CG, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter:

(Message to commanding general, Hawaiian Department, from War Department, dated July 8, 1941, is as follows:)

For your information deduction from information from numerous sources is that Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving possible aggressive action against maritime provinces of Russia if and when Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia. Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval, Army and air bases in Indo-China, although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. Neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated. They have ordered all Jap vessels in U. S. Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first August. Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned.

That is the end of the message.

General RUSSELL. Do your files have any other messages [2975] from the War Department touching the Japanese situation until the message of November 27, 1941, from this date in July?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir. That is all that appears in the G-2 files.

132. General RUSSELL. There is another source of information we want to deal with briefly, and that is this newspaper situation. You say you were reading the newspapers out here in early December and late November?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

133. General RUSSELL. Do you remember the headline of Sunday, November 30, 1941, to the effect that the Japanese might strike over the week-end?

Colonel FIELDER. I do not remember that in particular. It probably impressed me at the time.

134. General RUSSELL. I will ask you this: Did you during that critical period in November and early December, 1941, prior to the attack, as a result of seeing any headlines in the local papers go down to their offices and contact them to determine from where they were getting the information on which these headlines were based?

Colonel FIELDER. No, I did not, because that never would occur to me. Unless it was something very outstanding and did not represent opinion, I don't think I would ever query them on it.

135. General RUSSELL. Was not that a source of information which you people did not have out here, as to the imminence of war?

Colonel FIELDER. I do not consider it such. I do not consider a daily newspaper a source of official information, because [2976] I think everything that they would have access to would be available to the War Department.

136. General RUSSELL. Your mental attitude, then, excluded all sources of information coming to you except official information?

Colonel FIELDER. Not at all. I just cited a couple of cases where we interviewed people passing through. We were seeking information from all sides. But it never occurred to me to query a daily paper because it had a headline that war was imminent. We knew war was imminent.

137. General RUSSELL. Colonel, we have been discussing the things that we did not know about the Japanese. I now want to ask you a few questions about the maps which you took off the Japanese or which were taken from the Japanese after or during the attack of December 7th, 1941. You have before you now a map. Will you tell the Board what that map is?

Colonel FIELDER. It is a chart, an American chart, a very old one, showing the depth of the water of Oahu. It shows the outline of Pearl Harbor. It shows Hickam Field. It shows Fort Kamehameha. It shows several military installations. At this particular point in Japanese is written "4 6-inch tractor-drawn guns." It shows around the perimeter of Pearl Harbor where certain ships are berthed. It does not mention them by name, but it has a fairly accurate outline of the installations inside of Pearl Harbor.

138. General FRANK. On what date?

Colonel FIELDER. The date is not shown. They had this map in their possession a number of years, because there is one entry on there dated 1933 in Japanese, but it is a coastal [2977] Geodetic Survey map which anyone could buy before the war at any map store. Apparently, they have gathered information from time to time and overprinted it in Japanese on this particular chart. In addition to that, there are modern entries apparently made by the aviator himself. He has got certain magnetic bearings to certain targets in Pearl Harbor.

To my mind the significance of it is that they were very meticulous in briefing their pilots prior to this attack. To me it indicates they had practiced a great deal. They probably rehearsed this thing many

times before it came off, because they had very detailed information and instructions for the pilots.

139. General GRUNERT. Tell us some more things about the maps, Colonel.

Colonel FIELDER. It shows the drydocks at Pearl Harbor. It shows the fuel—the tank farm of oil, Navy oil, which did not exist at the time this chart was printed originally.

140. General GRUNERT. What is shown about Hickam Field?

Colonel FIELDER. It shows the number of hangars, a total of 8 hangars, and one headquarters building, all apparently sketched in in ink over the original chart.

141. General GRUNERT. How many hangars actually existed there on December 7th?

Colonel FIELDER. Five.

142. General GRUNERT. How do you account for eight being shown?

Colonel FIELDER. The plans for Hickam Field called for eight hangars, although those plans are more or less standard, and there is in existence a drawing or a sketch of Hickam Field which dates back to about 1936, at least, which shows in outline five hangars constructed and three outlined in broken lines or dotted lines.

[2978] 143. General FRANK. The original plans called for that number of hangars and they had not gotten the money to date by way of appropriations to construct them.

144. General GRUNERT. What impressed me was that it appears on this old map to have been a lot of modern installations put on there, but when they get to Hickam Field they apparently do not know that five are constructed and they put eight on there. It just doesn't make sense. If they had recent information about this and that, why didn't they have recent information about the large hangars on Hickam Field? Do you suppose they got ahold of some plans and took that for the granted as the number there?

Colonel FIELDER. Probably did.

145. General RUSSELL. It is the first time he said anything to me about the plans being in existence in 1936. The story he told me was that they had plans that they were working on Hickam Field then at the time of the attack, calling for eight, and that only five of them had been put in, which indicated to my mind very clearly that they had the current plans under which the field was being constructed. Now he comes up and says it was in 1936. I know nothing about that.

Colonel FIELDER. I beg your pardon. I did not mean to mislead. I don't understand now what you are after.

146. General RUSSELL. It is perfectly obvious that if they were working on current plans calling for eight hangars and only five had been put up and that map showed eight, then that map was made from the plans and not from an observation of the field.

Colonel FIELDER. Oh, yes, that is granted.

147. General RUSSELL. But if the plan was made in 1936, they may have had it for three years. That is the first time I knew [2979] it was a 1936 plan.

Colonel FIELDER. That is the first time I knew it, today. You asked me to look it up Saturday and I went to Hickam Field and got their files.

148. General RUSSELL. Do you have the map on which you showed me Pearl Harbor with the number of ships there by name, the WYOMING and some others, on Saturday?

Colonel FIELDER. I think that is it right there.

149. General RUSSELL. Could you identify what you are referring to?

Colonel FIELDER. This is a translation and photostat of an overlay made from a chart taken from the body of a Japanese submarine operator. A two-man submarine ran on the reef off this island. One of the operators was captured and the other one drowned, and this was on the body of the one that was drowned.

150. General RUSSELL. What does it show about Pearl Harbor?

Colonel FIELDER. It shows the ARIZONA and the PENNSYLVANIA by name as being—it shows their place of berth. It shows the TENNESSEE, the CALIFORNIA, the SARATOGA, the WYOMING, the SAN FRANCISCO, the OMAHA, the TRENTON.

151. General FRANK. Was the SARATOGA at Ford Island?

Colonel FIELDER. It was not. Very few of these cruisers were in port.

152. General RUSSELL. Are those the places where they were habitually berthed when they came in there, Colonel?

Colonel FIELDER. I am not sure. I am quite sure that it is correct for the—the location is correct. Whether or not the ships berthed in those places, I do not know. I know where [2980] they were on that date. I know where the CALIFORNIA, and the WEST VIRGINIA and the ARIZONA and the UTAH were, and this does not quite correspond, but it is sufficiently accurate to indicate that they had pretty good knowledge of where our ships tied up.

153. General RUSSELL. That is all.

154. General FRANK. Give us a short statement on the industry of the Japanese workers as compared to others on the islands.

Colonel FIELDER. In my opinion, they are much better. They lose less time, they work harder, they are more law-abiding.

155. General FRANK. Do they work much faster?

Colonel FIELDER. Much faster.

156. General FRANK. You get a lot more labor out of eight hours of Japanese labor than you get out of any other labor on the island?

Colonel FIELDER. That is correct. This particular building is an outstanding example. Most of the labor on this building was Japanese, and they put it up in, I think it was, five weeks from the time they broke ground, these two buildings.

157. General FRANK. Did you render G-2 estimates periodically prior to December 7th?

Colonel FIELDER. We did not.

158. General FRANK. Why not?

Colonel FIELDER. I better modify that. I was thinking of periodic reports which are based on combat. We submitted periodically reports of the local situation which covered economy and communism, racial disorders and things like that.

159. General FRANK. How periodically?

Colonel FIELDER. I believe it was once each month.

[2981] 160. General FRANK. How often did you submit strategic estimates?

Colonel FIELDER. I did not submit one that I remember, a strategic estimate, prior to December 7th, from the time I became G-2.

161. General FRANK. Do you submit them now?

Colonel FIELDER. We submit a weekly report and a monthly report.

162. General FRANK. What is in it?

Colonel FIELDER. That is based on operations. We have a periodic report that goes in every week and then we have one that goes in bi-weekly now, every other week.

163. General FRANK. You stated that there were few, if any, messages that you received prior to December 7th.

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir, that is correct.

164. General FRANK. As G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

165. General FRANK. You did not get much information from the War Department as a G-2, then?

Colonel FIELDER. Very little in the messages. Now, they would send us out studies, of various islands, for instance, maybe the Philippine Islands. We had a lot of terrain studies; we had a lot of economic studies, strategic studies.

166. General FRANK. Did they give you any information on the political situation?

Colonel FIELDER. The local political situation?

167. General FRANK. No, the international political situation.

Colonel FIELDER. I do not remember any report on the international situation at all.

[2982] 168. General FRANK. Well, was the Department Commander expected to get it? Is not G-2 the normal source for that?

Colonel FIELDER. That is the normal source for it and we normally get those things. I just don't happen to remember. I could very easily look in the files. But we got nothing, to my knowledge, that had any particular bearing on the imminence of war.

169. General FRANK. Did you get any intelligence messages from the Navy?

Colonel FIELDER. No, we did not.

170. General FRANK. The Navy had an intelligence message which reported a Japanese task force in the Marshall Islands. Did you know anything about that?

Colonel FIELDER. I did not.

171. General FRANK. Do you get any messages now?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, we do.

172. General FRANK. From the Navy?

Colonel FIELDER. From many different sources. We get very detailed valuable information.

173. General FRANK. Do you get any messages on the international situation?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, we do.

174. General FRANK. Do you feel that you now are kept fully abreast of the situation?

Colonel FIELDER. I do, definitely.

175. General FRANK. Do you feel that a Japanese air raid is probable or possible now?

Colonel FIELDER. I feel it is definitely possible, but not probable.

[2983] 176. General FRANK. Have you any means of watching for it now?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, I have.

177. General FRANK. Are you taking those steps?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, I am, very definitely.

178. General FRANK. Do you feel that Oahu could be surprised to any such extent as it was surprised before?

Colonel FIELDER. I don't think it could be surprised to that extent, but I think it is entirely possible to raid this plate again from the air and do a lot of damage.

179. General FRANK. Do you feel that a hostile force could come in here flying its planes about 20 feet off the water and reach its objective?

Colonel FIELDER. I think undoubtedly they could.

180. General FRANK. Without being reported?

Colonel FIELDER. I think it would be reported, but possibly too late to repel them.

181. General FRANK. It would be reported from about only 20 miles?

Colonel FIELDER. Twenty miles, line of sight; further than that from the higher installations.

182. General GRUNERT. Only 20 miles out?

183. General FRANK. That is all.

184. General GRUNERT. They could only get them from the time they got within 20 miles?

185. General FRANK. Right today the facilities are such that if they came in at about 20 feet over the water they can get within about 20 miles before they can be detected, unless they are seen visually.

186. General GRUNERT. Low flying?

[2984] 187. General FRANK. Yes, sir.

Colonel FIELDER. That is right. I thought it was a little further than that. I thought it was at the height of the line of sight.

188. General FRANK. They have to be seen, by vision. Did the Navy know of that Poinsettia-Hibiscus message?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, they did. I don't know just when they got it, but a copy of that was sent to the Navy and Army by the F. B. I.

189. General FRANK. Was there ever any discussion that Poinsettia and Hibiscus might apply to types of naval ships like carriers and battleships?

Colonel FIELDER. Very definitely, except it did not make sense, because they said they were both in blossom and there were no carriers in Pearl Harbor. There were battleships and one or two cruisers.

190. General FRANK. Might "blossom" have meant that they were at sea?

Colonel FIELDER. It could have contained a code, there is no question about that, but we tried to solve it, and so far as I know it has not been solved.

191. General FRANK. I have nothing further.

192. General GRUNERT. Do you remember one Captain McMorris of the Navy making statements to the effect that in his opinion the Japs would never so attack, meaning by air, and also there is no possibility of such an attack? Do you remember that being discussed or that opinion being stated?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, I do not.

193. General GRUNERT. Was the Army informed of the sinking of [2985] a Jap sub about 6:45 a. m. December 7th?

Colonel FIELDER. It was not.

194. General GRUNERT. Now, in your testimony before the Roberts Commission it appears that you reported at a staff meeting that the Japs were burning papers at the consulate on December 6th, that the information came from the F. B. I. and that no one paid any attention to it.

Colonel FIELDER. That is incorrect. I did not. I did not report that to the Roberts Commission.

195. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything about that?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, I do.

196. General GRUNERT. What was that about?

[2986] Colonel FIELDER. The information came to us that the consulate was burning papers, and if I am not mistaken that came from sources other than the F. B. I. I think it came from the War Department, but it also came from F. B. I. sources. And that was reported at the staff meeting, and it was discussed, but that in itself, while significant, was not in any way conclusive, because there is not a day goes by that we don't burn secret papers right out here, for instance, and it was quite possible that the Japs had been directed to burn up certain codes. In fact, we know now, from the material that was captured at the consulate, that they were destroying their codes and a lot of their files of messages at that time.

That was not ignored at the staff conference, but no particular action was indicated, and it merely indicated that war was more nearly upon us, but not of an impending air attack.

197. General GRUNERT. You definitely understood that the consulate was the head of the espionage system in the islands?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

198. General GRUNERT. Had you any way of getting information as to what was happening at that consulate?

Colonel FIELDER. None whatever.

199. General GRUNERT. Did you ever make an attempt to get it?

Colonel FIELDER. We discussed it at great length with the F. B. I. as to how—what we should do, and I am of the—

200. General GRUNERT. You never went beyond the letter of the law or the letter of the instructions by easing operators in there to find out what they were doing?

Colonel FIELDER. We did not.

201. General GRUNERT. Now, it is also in the digest of this Roberts report: it says, "Fielder discussed possibility with Commanding General in a purely academic way." Why, what is discussing the possibility of an attack in an academic way? [2987] We have our academic ways at our schools and colleges. When you discuss whether or not you are going to have an attack, what can you discuss in an academic way?

Colonel FIELDER. I don't know whose testimony that refers to.

202. General GRUNERT. Well, did you discuss the possibility of such an attack with the Commanding General? And, if so, what was done about it?

Colonel FIELDER. That was discussed innumerable times, not only with the Commanding General, but with all the staff officers. We

didn't necessarily discuss an air attack as such, but we planned how the troops would be disposed; where would the defenses be installed, what regiments would be dispersed on certain beaches, where the main line of defense would be in the event of invasion. All those things were discussed.

203. General GRUNERT. All those things were discussed, and a lot of them practiced, were they?

Colonel FIELDER. A lot of them practiced.

204. General GRUNERT. But when it came down to the actual time, they found the command in Alert No. 1, which was sabotage, and therefore the implements that had been prepared could not possibly be used? Is that so?

Colonel FIELDER. That is so.

205. General GRUNERT. Then, it appeared that if Alert No. 2 had been in force there would have been a much better chance, if not of stopping the attack, of minimizing the loss; is that right?

Colonel FIELDER. Undoubtedly losses would have been smaller. They could not have stopped the attack.

[2988] 206. General GRUNERT. If an error was made or a mistake in judgment, it was a lack of comprehension of just was about to come about, or a question of adopting the proper alert?

Colonel FIELDER. That enters into it. There is no assurance at all that Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3 would have repelled the air attack. In my opinion it would not. It might have—it undoubtedly would have reduced the losses.

207. General GRUNERT. Now let me ask you a little about these staff conferences. How many staff conferences did they have? They had periodic staff conferences between the Chief of Staff and the heads?

Colonel FIELDER. Every Saturday morning we had a staff conference.

208. General GRUNERT. Was it a routine matter?

Colonel FIELDER. That was a routine matter, but they——

209. General GRUNERT. What did it amount to?

Colonel FIELDER. Well, for instance, my part of it consisted of bringing the staff officers up to date on world conditions.

210. General GRUNERT. Did you give them a little talk every Saturday?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, every Saturday morning.

211. General GRUNERT. Then, in a way that was sort of an estimate of the situation?

Colonel FIELDER. That is exactly what it was.

212. General GRUNERT. How did you estimate the situation along about November 27 to December 6th, say?

Colonel FIELDER. I considered it serious, I considered war imminent, but frankly I didn't think it would be precipitated in that manner. I expected the Japs to expand towards the south. [2989] About that time we had knowledge of a large number of ships going down the China coast to the south, which looked as if an invasion force was taking off for Indo-China or the Malay States, or the Philippines or some other place. I felt that there was great danger of war, but I couldn't—I didn't anticipate that it would be inflicted on us so suddenly. I thought perhaps there might be a sinking

of a transport, one of our transports, maybe on overt act against the Philippine Islands, maybe a severing of diplomatic relations; but we had pacified the Japs so many times, had had this critical situation for weeks and weeks, and then we would give them maybe a little oil or something, and I didn't—I definitely did not anticipate war as being imminent.

213. General GRUNERT. But you considered the Hawaiian command as in an outpost, didn't you?

Colonel FIELDER. More as an outpost, more as a base from which the Navy could operate. I had great confidence in the presence of our Navy here, and we had most of our Navy here at that time, and I couldn't—I just didn't know enough to visualize the approach of an enemy task force as long as our Navy was present.

214. General GRUNERT. Then, you had what we might call a sort of blind confidence in the Navy; is that right?

Colonel FIELDER. Well, it must have been.

215. General GRUNERT. Did you know that the Navy was not making distant reconnaissance for the protection of the islands?

Colonel FIELDER. I knew that under the joint agreement they were charged with it.

216. General GRUNERT. Right.

[2990] Colonel FIELDER. And I thought they were making reconnaissance.

217. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether any steps were ever taken to ascertain just what they were or weren't doing in the line of distant reconnaissance?

Colonel FIELDER. I made none personally. I don't know whether the other—whether the Commanding General made any or not.

218. General GRUNERT. Did you know what the task forces were going out for or what they were doing out there and in what way it would have helped to protect the island from an approach?

Colonel FIELDER. I merely assumed that they were going out for battle practice, maneuvers. We could hear firing in the distance occasionally when they were out.

219. General GRUNERT. I want to clear up a few points and then I will go to the gist of what I really want to find out.

Now, did I understand you to tell General Russell that you did not see an article or a flare headline across your morning paper of November the 30th predicting war within a week?

Colonel FIELDER. I didn't say I didn't see it. I said that I didn't remember it at this time as having impressed me particularly.

220. General GRUNERT. Then, you didn't place much credence in what the papers put out?

Colonel FIELDER. I apparently didn't, and I still do not—some of their headlines.

221. General GRUNERT. Now, tell us about the statement that appears in the Roberts report record to the effect that Mr. Shivers stated that Mr. Angus Taylor, District Attorney, wanted to prosecute some Japanese agents for failure to register under the alien registration act, but General Short was opposed to this without giving them notice so to do, claiming that it would [2991] react unfavorably to his plan of trying to make friends and create good relations amongst them.

Now, what did you have to do with that, and what advice did you give General Short on the subject?

Colonel FIELDER. That happened before I took over as G-2, but I am familiar with it and I know the background for it. Still in the backs of everyone's mind was the old sabotage bugaboo, and with so many Japanese here the Army authorities felt that any way—any steps, almost, should be taken to control the local element of—the local Japanese population; and also they had been told not to disturb the population, not to bring on racial disorders, not to commit any overt act. And very definitely, if these agents so-called had been prosecuted it would have thrown the community into a tailspin, and I still think it was wise not to do it. General Short's policy has proven sound, in that they have had no trouble from the Japanese population.

222. General GRUNERT. How do you know it was proven sound if they never attempted it?

Colonel FIELDER. His policy was to treat them fairly and not antagonize them or stir them up, but to handle them fairly, and I say it is sound because it has had no overt acts.

223. General GRUNERT. Isn't it the characteristic of the Japanese to be told what to do in no uncertain terms? Won't they respect you more?

Colonel FIELDER. They do respect authority. They also respect fair treatment.

224. General GRUNERT. Or is it possible that they have a contempt for those who they appear to think are weaklings—following the German and the Japanese custom?

[2992] Colonel FIELDER. If they construe it as weakness, I think that is correct; they have a contempt.

225. General GRUNERT. Well, weren't they laughing up their sleeves that they could have these agents trotting all around against our laws and nobody lay a finger on them?

I don't expect you to answer all these unless you want to.

Colonel FIELDER. I am delighted to answer them, because I think that the stand that General Short took was absolutely sound.

226. General GRUNERT. Then, at that time, at least, you thought appeasement was the best policy?

Colonel FIELDER. I did. I don't call it appeasement, exactly. I call it fair play. These people had not been advised of their rights; they had not been told that it was illegal to act. Many of them were just as ignorant of their offense as anything in the world.

Now, here is—he didn't decline to prosecute. He wanted to give them warning and tell them that if they didn't register before a certain date they would be prosecuted.

227. General GRUNERT. Well, why hadn't this warning been given all this time?

Colonel FIELDER. That I don't now.

228. General GRUNERT. Since the law was in existence.

Colonel FIELDER. That I don't know. That is not within the—

229. General GRUNERT. Yes. All right; we will drop that subject.

Now, it is recorded here that in your testimony before the Roberts Commission you denied that Washington had advised you [2993] of three code words that would signal attack. Was there ever any understanding with Washington as to signals or messages of this kind to denote imminence of actuality of attack?

Colonel FIELDER. Absolutely none.

General GRUNERT. That's all out of clear sky?

Colonel FIELDER. That's out of the—that's a figment of someone's imagination.

230. General GRUNERT. Now tell me a little more about the time that Bicknell came up—according to the testimony we have, he got this message, this message this woman is supposed to have telephoned to Japan, and he goes, according to his story, takes it up to the Commanding General's house where you and the Commanding General were about to start out for some other place, and he has a short discussion with you, and that's all that came of that case as far as he knows; but he expressed himself as feeling that that was a most important thing and that it meant a great deal.

Will you tell us more about just what happened there? As I remember it, he said he had a very short conversation and intimated that you discussed that thing for about an hour.

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, I did; for longer than that.

231. General GRUNERT. Was he there all the time?

Colonel FIELDER. Bicknell was there the whole time. He had called me up first, I don't remember the exact hour; I imagine around 6 o'clock in the afternoon, and he came—I said, "Well, come right on out".

He came out to my quarters, we read it over, and I said, "This is—we had better go over and see General Short," who lived next door, and we, the two of us, went over, sat out on [2994] his porch for I don't know how long, but I would say 45 minutes to an hour at least, because we were over an hour late leaving for where we were going; and we all considered it extremely interesting, possibly important, but we couldn't make heads or tails of it.

232. General GRUNERT. It didn't induce General Short in any way to go to his next step in another alert, did it?

Colonel FIELDER. No, because, if you will analyze the conversation, the simplest thing is to read it, and all it is, it is getting information. It ask about the searchlights and whether there are many sailors on the streets, whether there is—how the military reacts toward the—

233. General GRUNERT. But didn't all these things add up into something? All these indications should have added up into—of course it is hindsight.

Colonel FIELDER. It is hindsight.

234. General GRUNERT. But it might then at that time have been foresight to have all these things add up into meaning something more than mere sabotage.

Colonel FIELDER. It didn't. It is easy enough, when an act has been committed, to look back and see a lot of indications of that act, but hindsight is so much better than foresight. We studied it at great length; we really did.

235. General GRUNERT. Tell me, in the same connection: I believe in the hearings before the Congress on whether or not to demand that so-and-so be done, one congressman testified or at least announced that when Bicknell got up to the Commanding General's quarters the Commanding General cursed him out and practically kicked him out. Will you tell us whether that is [2995] true or not, sir?

Colonel FIELDER. That is untrue.

236. General GRUNERT. All right; that is all on that.

Now let us go over a few messages here and see what you know about these things.

Here is a message or a paraphrased dispatch of the 16th of October, '41, from the C. N. O., which warned all concerned of the existing grave situation and which directed the Navy to take due precautions which would not constitute provocative action against Japan. Did you know anything about that October 16th message? That was the gist of it.

[2996] Colonel FIELDER. I don't remember it in particular. It might have been discussed at a staff meeting, but I don't remember it, no, sir.

237. General GRUNERT. Here is a message from the same source to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, November 24, 1941, in which it is stated as an opinion, "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction is a possibility," and in which it was directed not to "precipitate Jap action." Do you know anything about that message?

Colonel FIELDER. I do not.

238. General GRUNERT. You have already told us you know nothing about this message of November 27th to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, which is paraphrased and includes the following: "Consider this dispatch a war warning."

Colonel FIELDER. I was not familiar with that, either.

239. General GRUNERT. You were familiar with the Chief of Staff's message to the Commanding General November 27, '41, which brought on Alert No. 1?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir, I was familiar with that.

240. General GRUNERT. Were you at the discussion prior to the decision as to what was to be done then?

Colonel FIELDER. I discussed that with the Chief of Staff and I think with the Commanding General prior to the decision, but I don't remember those details. The message was called to my attention, and we did discuss it.

241. General GRUNERT. Prior to or after the decision?

Colonel FIELDER. I am not sure.

242. General GRUNERT. Did he ask you for an estimate of the situation, in view of what was known then?

[2997] Colonel FIELDER. No, he did not.

243. General GRUNERT. Was there any discussion, as far as you remember, as to whether or not you should go to No. 2 or No. 3 alert?

Colonel FIELDER. There was no discussion as to whether we should go to No. 2 or No. 3, that I remember. I do remember discussing with the Commanding General what might be expected of the local population, and that was discussed any number of times. Sabotage was more or less foremost in our minds; there is no question about that.

244. General GRUNERT. Foremost in your minds why?

Colonel FIELDER. Because of the imminent danger from so many—

245. General GRUNERT. Did you have any experience to back that up with?

Colonel FIELDER. Nothing except the experience that the Germans had given us, and we knew that the Japs were collaborating with the Germans. We knew that there were Germans in Japan training the Japs.

246. General GRUNERT. In that experience you read about the Germans did you also run across the fact that they usually hit on

Sunday morning? I think that was part of that same series of stuff they put out.

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, that is true. And it was well known, of course, that the Japs liked to surprise-attack. That's what they did at Port Arthur.

247. General GRUNERT. Now, you got this G-2 message from the War Department November 27, to you, G-2, in which it states that acts of sabotage and espionage were probable, and also [2998] possible that hostilities may begin. That was a straight G-2 message to G-2, and it was just inter-office, really?

Colonel FIELDER. It was inter-office.

248. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Colonel FIELDER. I was directed to bring that to the attention of the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff only, which I did.

249. General GRUNERT. Now, on November 28th you also got a message which pertained more to protection against sabotage and airfields?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

250. General GRUNERT. That was an Adjutant General's message?

Colonel FIELDER. That was an Adjutant General's message.

251. General GRUNERT. But those of these G-2 messages that referred to sabotage were received after the decision was made to go on an Alert No. 1, sabotage?

Colonel FIELDER. I am not sure of the time, General. That is probably correct. We could check the hour of receipt very easily.

252. General GRUNERT. Now, there is a naval dispatch of December 3rd to the effect that information disclosed that instructions were sent to various Japanese diplomatic and consular posts to destroy certain codes and ciphers and to burn secret documents. Was this information transmitted to you? Do you remember that?

Colonel FIELDER. I don't remember it from that source.

253. General GRUNERT. Now, there is one on December 4th and one on December 6th somewhat along the same line. Do you recall any additional information you got from the Navy after [2999] November 27th?

Colonel FIELDER. I do not.

254. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything about the actual time of receipt of the Chief of Staff's message of December 7th?

Colonel FIELDER. Only that it was after the attack. I don't remember what hour; I think it was around noontime.

255. General GRUNERT. Had you had occasion to use the oceanic telephone for anything with Washington? Was that used as a means of communication?

Colonel FIELDER. I never used it until after the attack. I used it twice on the morning of December 7th.

256. General GRUNERT. And prior to that?

Colonel FIELDER. Prior to that I had never used it.

257. General GRUNERT. Now, do you know how long it took you to make connections and get messages through by using that means?

Colonel FIELDER. It took approximately an hour to get a message through.

258. General GRUNERT. From the time you put in your call until the connections were made?

Colonel FIELDER. From the time I put it in until I talked to General Miles in Washington. And he called me back later. I talked to him twice on that day.

259. General GRUNERT. After December 7th you actually got in contact with General Miles, and then he called you back?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

260. General GRUNERT. Now give us a little more to wind up with. Give us a little bit of information about just what [3000] your contacts with the district and the fleet were, in the line of getting information and giving information.

Colonel FIELDER. It was very, very close insofar as counter-intelligence was concerned. The investigations and the suspect list and those things were discussed regularly every week. But insofar as combat-intelligence and my associations and relationships with the fleet-intelligence officer, they were not very close because we had practically nothing in common. There was no combat at that time.

261. General GRUNERT. And you say the district never transmitted to you the fact that they had picked up a task force in the Marshall Islands?

Colonel FIELDER. They did not.

262. General GRUNERT. Any other questions?

263. General FRANK. Do you get that kind of information now?

Colonel FIELDER. Oh, yes, very definitely.

264. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, we have some on the Rohl-Wyman matter.

Colonel Fielder, are you acquainted with a Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel FIELDER. I am not.

265. Major CLAUSEN. You, while in charge of the G-2 of this Headquarters, though, have conducted investigations concerning this individual, have you?

Colonel FIELDER. I think the F. B. I. did.

266. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you did hand me a G-2 file which indicated an investigation of Hans Wilhelm Rohl by your section here, sir.

Colonel FIELDER. I thought that was a—it's a series— [3001] we do have a file on him which includes a report of an investigation by the F. B. I., and we have in that file also a series of newspaper clippings, and so forth, but we did not make a full investigation of this man.

267. Major CLAUSEN. Well, I didn't ask you whether you had made a full investigation. You have, or had in July 1942, a Captain Meurlott?

Colonel FIELDER. Meurlott.

268. Major CLAUSEN. Who was he?

Colonel FIELDER. He was in—what was the date of it?

269. Major CLAUSEN. July 1942.

Colonel FIELDER. He was in the counter-intelligence section of the G-2 office at that time.

270. Major CLAUSEN. And did he conduct an investigation concerning Hans Wilhelm Rohl, any type of investigation whatsoever?

Colonel FIELDER. Well, I don't think he did. He might have perused the files, and so forth, but I wouldn't call that an investigation.

271. Major CLAUSEN. Well, I show you a report titled, "Memo for files," dated July 22, 1942, and ask you if you recognize that as being in the handwriting of Captain Meurlott.

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, that is his handwriting all right.

272. Major CLAUSEN. And that is a photostatic copy, is it, Colonel, from the files to which you just referred?

Colonel FIELDER. That is right.

273. Major CLAUSEN. Was that report made under your supervision?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, it was.

[3002] 274. Major CLAUSEN. You were acquainted with it at the time?

Colonel FIELDER. No, I was not.

275. Major CLAUSEN. I see.

Well, I will offer in evidence this memorandum dated July 22, 1942, and read it to the Board at this time. This is entitled:

(Memorandum dated 7/22/42, by Captain Meurlott, is as follows:)

Memo for files:

Decision made to bring this case to a close without the formality of a C1-R1 report. Subject is claimed by Colonel Mollison to be a confirmed drunkard, and, inferentially, to be incompetent as a subversive influence for that reason. Irresponsibility rather than subversion appears to characterize the irregularities in his activities, as brought to the attention of this office.

Case closed.

Signed "R. M. Meurlott, Capt. M. I."

To whom is that subject applicable? it says, "subject is claimed." Who was the subject?

Colonel FIELDER. Oh, that is Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

276. Major CLAUSEN. I see. Now, are you acquainted with Captain Ulrich von der Osten, who was a German spy? Are you acquainted with that case?

Colonel FIELDER. No, I am not.

277. Major CLAUSEN. Let me read you this from the F. B. I. report dated March 11, 1943:

[3003] (Excerpt from F. B. I. report of March 11, 1943, in re Captain Ulrich von der Osten, is as follows:)

Captain Ulrich von der Osten was in fact one of the chiefs of the German intelligence service among whose duties it was to establish contact with individual agents operating throughout the world. En route to the United States from Shanghai he had reported detailed information concerning national defense preparations of the United States at Pearl Harbor and other vital points in the Hawaiian Islands. In his report on the Hawaiian Islands he mentioned that this information would be of particular interest to "our yellow Allies." This report of von der Osten, fortunately, failed to reach its destination and was ultimately turned over to the FBI.

Are you acquainted with that case?

Colonel FIELDER. I am not.

278. Major CLAUSEN. Did you maintain liaison with the F. B. I. concerning matters of that kind, sir?

Colonel FIELDER. That could very easily be in the hands of my section without my knowledge. I say that I personally was not familiar with it.

279. Major CLAUSEN. This report was made in 1941 and resulted in conviction and sentences to terms of imprisonment of five to twenty years, of a ring of spies.

Colonel FIELDER. I am not familiar with that.

280. Major CLAUSEN. March 1942 the court convicted these people.

I wondered, in connection with that report from which [3004] I have just read, if you ever gave any consideration to the possibility of a coincidence between the construction of national defense preparations in the Hawaiian Islands and the actual bomb pattern of the attackers on 7 December 1941.

Colonel FIELDER. No, I haven't.

281. Major CLAUSEN. You don't know? Well, if you have never have given consideration to it, you would not know.

Colonel FIELDER. I have considered the pattern, but not in connection with the construction plans.

282. Major CLAUSEN. Did you know, Colonel, about the alternate air route to the Philippines that was constructed or under construction about October?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, I knew about that. In the fall of '41.

283. Major CLAUSEN. And that was commenced about October 1941?

Colonel FIELDER. '41.

284. Major CLAUSEN. Did your office ever receive any information concerning the fact that the plans for that alternate air route may have come to the attention of the Japanese Government prior to 7 December 1941 and thus have indicated to Japan the fact that this nation, that is the United States, was going to wage war with Japan?

Colonel FIELDER. No, that never came to my attention.

285. Major CLAUSEN. Did your office ever receive information that Colonel Wyman, in the spring of 1942, at a drinking party with three other Army officers,—or I will ask this first: You know Colonel Theodore Wyman, Junior, sir?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, I know him.

[3005] 286. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever receive information to the effect that Colonel Wyman, in the spring of 1942, in connection with several other Army officers, participated in an evening of drinking and made this statement, Colonel:

There are probably a good many things which I have done during my life that are not exactly right, but there is one thing I have not done and that is to sell out my country the way that s. o. b. Rohl did to his German friends. I should never have trusted him and what I should do now is take this service revolver, go out and shoot him and then blow my own brains out.

Colonel FIELDER. That never came to my personal attention.

287. Major CLAUSEN. Well, now, you indicated a few minutes ago that such an important thing as a case of a spy might well be in your section here and not come to your personal knowledge. Will you search your files and see whether there is, any place in this Department or under your jurisdiction or command, any place, information concerning this statement that I have just read?

[3006] Colonel FIELDER. That could very readily be in the files of the Inspector General. Unless an Army officer is suspected of espionage or some disloyal act, he would not come to the attention of the G-2 section. If he went out on a drinking party, or if he gambled, or if he went in debt, or something like that, he would probably be investigated by an inspector; but unless it was subversive, we probably wouldn't investigate him at all.

288. Major CLAUSEN. The incident to which I refer is reported to us to have been referred to the G-2 office at Honolulu; so would you conduct that investigation and advise the Board, sir?

Colonel FIELDER. I will have the officer who can answer that, and who has charge of the files, as a subsequent witness. It would be much more appropriate to have him identify the files, and search his files.

289. General GRUNERT. Will you coach him to look that up so he can testify on it?

Colonel FIELDER. I will. I have already done that, and he reported to me that this was the only thing he had in his files.

290. Major CLAUSEN. I am going to read you a paragraph, here, from a lead, and ask you if you have ever heard of this:

Check assertion that Rohl was close to the owner of a barn near Schofield base. This man is said to have been operating an illegal short-wave radio on December 7, 1941, and was shot by military police. There should be some data in the Honolulu FBI office about this matter, since we are informed that an inquiry was made by the FBI office in Los Angeles. This man's name was given to us as Bert Hasby, and his friendship with Rohl was said to have been intimate.

Do you know anything about that, Colonel?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes; I know about that.

[3007] 291. Major CLAUSEN. What are the facts?

Colonel FIELDER. The facts are that Hasby was a Japanese alien, and he ran a beer garden adjacent to Schofield base. He was not even picked up after December 7. We subsequently investigated him some year or year and a half after the war started, and he was interned for a while on the mainland and was subsequently paroled. He is now out, though; he was not shot.

292. Major CLAUSEN. Did Colonel Wyman ever talk with you regarding the immigration application of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel FIELDER. Never mentioned it, never talked to me about anything about Rohl.

293. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know anything of any letters or oral conversations that Wyman had with respect to that application of Rohl?

Colonel FIELDER. No; no; he never talked to me about it.

294. Major CLAUSEN. I have just one question on this other matter of Doctor Mori. Was this Doctor Mori a woman dentist?

Colonel FIELDER. Doctor Mori was a man, but the woman that did the talking was a newspaper woman, and I think a daughter-in-law; I am not sure; but Mori was a professional man. I don't know whether he was a surgeon or a physician or a dentist.

295. Major CLAUSEN. Well, this "hibiscus and poinsettias" conversation was by a woman from this end, and not this Doctor Mori, a dentist?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, except the call was placed for Mori, and she did the talking after the connection was completed. That is my recollection of it.

[3008] 296. General GRUNERT. Did you ever "G-2" her afterwards?

Colonel FIELDER. Oh, yes; she was picked up.

297. General GRUNERT. What was done?

Colonel FIELDER. She was interned. She was interned, and so was he; and I have forgotten what became of him, he may still be interned; but they did not get enough on any of them to proceed before a military commission, but they did get enough to intern them.

298. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions?

299. General RUSSELL. No.

300. Colonel TOULMIN. Is this photostat in evidence?

301. General GRUNERT. No; they were not put in evidence, they were just explained.

302. Colonel TOULMIN. Do you not think it ought to be put in evidence, General?

303. General GRUNERT. It would be very interesting to have it in there, if the Board wants it in.

304. General FRANK. Is this on the record?

305. Colonel TOULMIN. I was talking on the record.

306. General GRUNERT. Does the Board want this in the record?

307. General FRANK. It may not be of interest, because it is an old photograph. It is obsolete. It has several hangars on there that never were built, but it does not have on there either the big engineering docks nor the supply warehouses at the other end of the line.

Colonel FIELDER. Nor the Aqua system.

308. General FRANK. Yes—nor the Aqua system.

309. General RUSSELL. It had on there enough for the Japs to blow hell out of us down there with, and that is what they were [3009] using it for.

310. Colonel TOULMIN. My thought is that some question might be raised at some time why the record was not complete. It is a very simple thing to put it in and then nobody could be critical of our not having it in the record.

311. General GRUNERT. Identify it, and we will put it in.

312. Colonel TOULMIN. This photostat of the Japanese map found on a Japanese aviator, December 7, 1941, is offered in evidence with the next number.

(The photostat referred to was marked as Exhibit No. 22, and was received in evidence.)

313. General GRUNERT. Colonel Fielder, do you know of anything else, on any subject that relates to what we are after, that has not been brought up here, that you would like to introduce in evidence?

Colonel FIELDER. I have one other very short statement I would like to make.

314. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

Colonel FIELDER. That is to the effect that, while everyone in the Army here was materially concerned about sabotage, certain other steps were taken to prepare the group of islands for defense; and I did mention the fact that we held maneuvers, and that we fortified the beaches, and things like that; but as far as my testimony is concerned, I don't want it to appear that all we did was prepare for sabotage, because we went a great deal further than that.

315. General GRUNERT. You prepared for a number of things, but what was actually put into effect on December 7 when the attack struck? You were actually in alert No. 1?

[3010] Colonel FIELDER. We were in Alert No. 1 at that time; that is correct.

316. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? There appear to be none. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 4:55 p. m., having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day, the Board took up the consideration of other matters.)

[3011]

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[3012] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1944

FORT SHAFTER, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The Board, at 8:30 a. m., pursuant to recess 'on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL LEONARD D. WEDDINGTON, AIR CORPS,
SIXTH AIR SERVICE AREA COMMAND

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Leonard D. Weddington, Colonel, Air Corps, Sixth Air Service Area Command; APO 959.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, this Board is after facts, and leads to where we can get facts; that is, concerning what led up to, and what happened during, the attack at Pearl Harbor. We asked that you attend because you are listed here, at the time of the attack, as commanding Bellows Field; is that right?

[3013] Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

3. General GRUNERT. Now, I wish you would tell the Board the conditions at Bellows Field at the time of the attack, as to its preparation for defense and what it did to defend itself that day.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Do you desire, on the preparation, our defense as to the type of alert, orders that we had received, or something like that?

4. General GRUNERT. What were the physical means of defending the field? What measures were taken to defend the field, to ward off an air attack?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Prior to December 7, there were practically no means of warding off an air attack available at Bellows Field.

5. General GRUNERT. Did you have machine guns in position?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir.

6. General GRUNERT. Did you not have any-no emplacements of any kind for weapons, or any protection for the personnel, in the line of slit trenches or air-raid shelters—anything of that sort?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir; natural ditches and ravines were the only thing.

7. General GRUNERT. In the line of protective measures, what took place after December 7?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Our preparation was hurried, and we accomplished some, from the time of the warning until the attack, because at Bellows Field we had one plane make one pass, firing his forward guns through a tent area, approximately an hour before we at that field came under any attack other than that.

[3014] 8. General GRUNERT. What protective measures have you there, now? Do you know what there is, now?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I know approximately. I do not know the numbers of organizations, because they have changed a number of times since I have read over the station list at that place; but I do know that they have numbers of emplacements for automatic weapons and have sites in the vicinity for antiaircraft gun positions. They have placed them in there several times. We placed them within a few days after the attack, and kept them there for many months.

9. General GRUNERT. What aircraft was at Bellows Field on the morning of the attack?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. The O-47s, I believe there were 7 there at the time belonging to the Eighty-Sixth Observation Squadron. They also had on the line two O-49s. There was one squadron of fighters at Bellows Field engaged for a month's aerial gunnery practice. I am not certain of the number of P-40s that they had, but they had in the vicinity of 12 on the field that morning.

10. General GRUNERT. Making a total of about how many airplanes?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. 21, approximately.

11. General GRUNERT. These were all concentrated practically wing-to-wing, were they?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir; at the time the first airplane came over the field. Before the next attack, they were dispersed as much as possible on the field at that time, which, with the number that we had, the maximum distance between airplanes was approximately 50 to 75 feet.

[3015] 12. General GRUNERT. Was this of your own volition that the airplanes were so placed, or were you required to so place them?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. It was the volition of the indoctrination on the field. I personally arrived, it had been done.

13. General GRUNERT. In other words, it was done according to orders from higher up, is that right?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I believe our indoctrination certainly came from there; yes, sir.

14. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions, General Russell?

15. General RUSSELL. You state that when you arrived these planes were all in, wing-to-wing, is that what you testified?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. When I arrived?

16. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir.

17. General RUSSELL. When were they placed wing-to-wing?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. From the time the first airplane came down and fired into our tent gap and went away, we had about an hour.

18. General RUSSELL. We do not understand each other. When did you place your airplanes wing-to-wing, or close together?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. The night before, when the flying for the day was over.

19. General RUSSELL. How long had you been doing that prior to December 7, 1941?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. All the time except when we were placed under some kind of special order.

20. General RUSSELL. In October 1941, were you doing that?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

21. General RUSSELL. You had been doing it always?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

[3016] 22. General RUSSELL. That is all.

23. General FRANK. At that time, were there any pilots on the field?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

24. General FRANK. How many airplanes were destroyed?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Actual destruction?

25. General FRANK. Well, how many airplanes were made incapable of flight?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I believe, four.

26. General FRANK. Did any of them try to take off?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

27. General FRANK. What happened?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. They were shot down immediately, with the Japs right behind them. They couldn't hit the airplane while taxiing down. I personally watched, wondering what would happen if the pilot was hit while taxiing, whether the airplane would just go on off, over the island, or whether he would die there, or whether he would groundloop, or what would happen; and I was watching particularly, because I saw them make at one of them taxiing down six passes. Six different airplanes made passes at him and seemingly never hit him, but when he got on the runway and started to take off, they got right square behind him, and just as he got off, shot him down in flames; and he was turning, trying to give them a bad target, and crashed into the beach and burned there.

The other one that they shot down taking off, I did not see take off, because there were some of them making passes at the position I was in at that time, and I ducked. I had seen him taxiing down, however. They shot him down in the same [3017] manner, except that he was not so badly shot up, landed in the water about three quarters of a mile to a mile down the beach, and swam ashore. He was not killed.

28. General FRANK. That morning, did any of the B-17s that had been flown over from the mainland land at Bellows?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

29. General FRANK. How many?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. One.

30. General FRANK. Did you examine it?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

31. General FRANK. What armament did it have?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Six 50-caliber machine guns, I believe, is the total.

32. General FRANK. Were they mounted?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir; I believe so. I am certain they were, because we used the two on the top turret that were capable of being manned. We left them in position, and manned them for a number of days, because we had no other mounts. We took the others out and tried to improvise mounts at other parts of the field, and obtained ammunition for them. That was the next day or two before we got it. They had no ammunition aboard. They were mounted, but no ammunition aboard.

33. General FRANK. Do you know the direction from which they came in?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. You mean to that field, or to these islands?

34. General FRANK. I mean the B-17s.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. To that field, or to these islands?

35. General FRANK. No, to these islands.

[3018] Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir.

36. General GRUNERT. Has anyone else any questions?

37. Major CLAUSEN. I have some, here.

Sir, what facilities did you have for gasoline for these planes?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. We had a small storage tank. They were in the process of putting in more, but at that time there was a storage tank I believe of only 20,000. I am not positive of that number.

38. Major CLAUSEN. And so, on the 7 December 1941, they were then constructing the underground gasoline storage tanks, is that correct, sir?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

39. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know roughly what percentage of completion that underground work had reached on 7 December 1941?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Approximately 50 percent of the tunneling. I believe the total figure of the depth was 417 feet into the hill.

40. Major CLAUSEN. And was it usual, Colonel, for the truck with gasoline to come over the mountains every day about 10 o'clock?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I don't recall any specific time they didn't come over. They came around.

41. Major CLAUSEN. From what point did the truck with the gasoline have to come—how far away?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. The gasoline had to come from Honolulu.

42. Major CLAUSEN. That was about 30 miles?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Approximately; a little more; a [3019] little more than 30, I believe.

43. Major CLAUSEN. Now; were any of the aircraft on the field drained of gasoline on this morning, for security reasons, or otherwise?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Not drained for security reasons. They had been flown the day before, and it had been the practice when the squadron was on its month of aerial gunnery practice not to refuel the airplanes when they got through on Saturday afternoon, but to refuel them during Sunday; and other days, they normally simply cleaned the guns, and armed the next morning when they were ready to go; but on Saturday afternoons it was the practice to get a better job of cleaning, to actually take the barrels or whatever portion of the gun necessary at that time to take off and to give them a better cleaning. The guns were actually dismounted from most of the P-40s.

44. Major CLAUSEN. Specifically, with reference to the gasoline, could you give me some idea as to what percentage of gasoline these planes that were on the field had in their tanks?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir; I have not heard what percentage. I know some of them were not fueled, and some of them might have been.

45. Major CLAUSEN. So, in addition to being wing-to-wing, they also needed to be fueled?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

46. Major CLAUSEN. Can you tell me something about the runways, Colonel? Were the runways being constructed at that time, also?

[3020] Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

47. Major CLAUSEN. Just tell the Board roughly what had been done and what needed to be done to these runways as of 7 December 1941.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. The plan was for a 2-runway field, and they had been working over a month taking out sand hills and coral hills and working the coral into a depth to give them a good base on one of the runways. The other runway had very little work done on it, because it was going to be built directly over the existing runway, so, to keep the field operative, they were not doing anything on that runway until the other runway was capable of handling aircraft.

48. Major CLAUSEN. And with reference to what you called "the other runway," can you give the Board some idea as to the percentage of completion on 7 December 1941?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, not definitely a percent, because so much work had entered into it, and they worked 24 hours a day and in 7 days had it so they could take any sized bomber that we had, by Thursday.

49. Major CLAUSEN. By Thursday?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. They worked night and day.

50. Major CLAUSEN. The following Thursday?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. The following Thursday, by working night and day; and we reported on Wednesday that we could take anything over there by Thursday. We hesitated to tell anybody we were working night and day. However, we were afraid that we would get stopped working at night, so we worked night and day to get that thing ready, and then told them on Wednesday that we could take any bomber that they had the next day. We had [3021] been informed that Hickam Field was out, and for several days we got no other information as far as operation.

51. Major CLAUSEN. Colonel, the Wednesday and the Thursday to which you have just referred were the Wednesday and Thursday following?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Immediately following December 7.

52. Major CLAUSEN. Now, as of December 7, you had no runway there which was capable of taking the bombers, is that correct, sir?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. They landed very light on it. It was 75 feet wide and I believe 3,800 feet long.

53. Major CLAUSEN. And this one B-17 that landed, in fact was wrecked, isn't that correct?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir. He was wrecked, however, because he landed down a very strong wind, and not up-wind.

54. Major CLAUSEN. Now, getting back to this gasoline storage, do you know the amount of gasoline that was in the tank that you had at Bellows just before the attack on 7 December 1941?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I don't recall if it was full or not. I believe it was kept fairly right up to the top of it. I never heard, one way or the other, so it must have been full.

[3022] 55. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know where I could get that information, sir?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Possibly the records, but I am not sure.

56. Major CLAUSEN. Was there any construction taking place at Bellows Field in addition to the gasoline storage facilities and the runways?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir, there were buildings for a complete permanent camp or permanent post.

57. Major CLAUSEN. Had they been completed?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir.

58. Major CLAUSEN. Can you give the Board some idea of the percentage of completion of these additional facilities?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. There were 16—I have forgotten the exact number in the oval of the so-called 63-man barracks. The buildings themselves were supposedly completed. There were no sewage facilities. The sewage had not been started, even, and half of these buildings were so low that without the sewage they could not even put in temporary latrines or cesspools. On the higher half they dug and connected up temporary cesspools and were using about six of these, six or eight. The one office building—we called it No. 1 item, I think it was—approximately of the standard cantonement type construction, 26 by 108 feet—I believe that is the size of the building, I am not positive of that size, but it was a standard cantonement type construction. Two of those had been completed. However, the U. S. E. D., Area Engineer, was still occupying one of them.

59. Major CLAUSEN. Now, you said you understood that Hickam Field was out on December 7th?

[3023] Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes.

60. Major CLAUSEN. Was Bellows the only field available that could be used?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir. Our information was that the runways at Hickam were not usable. We had not heard one way or the other about Wheeler. However, Wheeler, not being a field with runways at that time, had no runways on it. We felt that it could be used, but we did not know the extent of the damage to Wheeler Field. We had not been informed of that.

61. Major CLAUSEN. Did you later learn the extent of the damage, as to whether Bellows was the only available field?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

62. Major CLAUSEN. What was that?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. That they could be used. They swept the runways and repaired what little damage had been done. It was mainly debris and not damage to the runways actually at Hickam, and since they were expecting more airplanes to arrive, and we were trying to relieve the congestion, they decided to send all available B-18's that were left to Bellows, and we informed them that we could use them on Thursday.

63. General GRUNERT. At Bellows Field was the lack of gasoline any handicap to what took place that day?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I believe we could have gotten, if the airplanes had been armed and refueled, more of them into the air.

64. General GRUNERT. Could you have gotten all of them in the air with the fuel you had?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I do not believe that that many pilots were available.

[3024] 65. General GRUNERT. I mean, as to gasoline. Did you have enough gasoline to put all the planes in the air, if necessary?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, there was enough gasoline there to take care of the planes.

66. Major CLAUSEN. In regard to the construction of this gasoline storage facility, the runways and other items you mentioned, do you know the dates on which they were supposed to have been completed?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir. I do not recall if we heard an estimated date of completion.

67. General FRANK. Were you satisfied with the progress of the construction?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

68. General FRANK. Was it being prosecuted vigorously?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I believe so. There were other projects going on on the island and they were continually pulling equipment from the job there and taking it somewhere else, until finally the Area Engineer was very disturbed about it, because it interfered with his program, and we would find out that equipment would leave and he did not know about it and I did not know about it. We had very little to say about it. I instructed the guards at the gate that no equipment left that field without the personal O. K. of the Area Engineer.

69. General FRANK. Who was the Area Engineer?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Mr. Paul—

70. General FRANK. Lynch?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Lynch, Paul Lynch.

71. General FRANK. Were there any delays in construction that were brought to your attention?

[3025] Colonel WEDDINGTON. I do not recall any specific delay, except, as I mentioned, the equipment being pulled off, and then a little project being held up and the location of a certain building. We would argue with them. They tried to locate buildings once in a while from down town by an incorrect contour map, and they would hold the Area Engineer to placing it the way it was shown on their drawing, and we would say "It can't go there that way," and so we would have to call up and get them to come out and show them it would not go that way.

The District Engineer continually did things like that. In one area, particularly, that was completely smoothed off to be the shoulder of one of the runways later, they wanted to put buildings around the contour, on the hill. We said that was entirely out, that no buildings go in that area. Finally we got a fairly open authority to place the buildings where we wanted to. If it was too much out the Area Engineer would—we got along very well with the Area Engineer.

72. General FRANK. Did you have any difficulty with the District Engineer's office, other than this confusion with respect to location?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No. Outside of a little confusion like that we had no real trouble, because when it got to a problem larger than that, we knew we were without authority and would pass it on up to the Air Force.

73. General FRANK. Did you feel you were getting full support from the District Engineer's office?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Of course, we didn't know all the problems that they were up against.

74. General FRANK. There was some confusion?

[3026] Colonel WEDDINGTON. We felt like we could direct for our own benefit out there better than they were doing. That is a natural feeling on the part of the lower echelons, I believe. I would not say that we were not getting cooperation.

75. General GRUNERT. Have you anything else that is on your mind that you would like to tell the Board that you think would be of benefit to the Board?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No one has asked about the availability of ammunition to the personnel we had there.

76. General GRUNERT. All right, suppose you tell us about that.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. We had no ammunition, except the belted war reserve ammunition belonging to the 86th Observation Squadron, 32,000 rounds, I believe.

77. General GRUNERT. What did you want to have; what did you think you ought to have?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. We should have had some for the rifles we had there, that had been given to us for training recruits. We thought we should have had some ammunition for them. The 86th Observation Squadron also had a few .30 caliber machine guns which we could not obtain the belts for.

78. General GRUNERT. Did you ask for what you needed or did you just wait to be served?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir. We asked for it several times.

79. General GRUNERT. What was the answer?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. It was not available and it was not authorized for any purpose that we were over there for.

80. General GRUNERT. As to December 7th, were you handicapped by not having it then? Were you in a position to fire and use [3027] it, if you had it?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. We could have fired the machine guns if we had had belts. We did have them in the hour over there between the first airplane and the attack of the 9 fighters that finally attacked the field; we did unbelt war reserve ammunition belonging to the 86th and issued it to all the people, all the men there that we had issued rifles to. Many of them had never fired a rifle, but we at least armed them.

81. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[3028] TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN EDWIN T. LAYTON, U. S. NAVY

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Captain, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Captain LAYTON. Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy, attached to staff of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. My present capacity is combat intelligence officer.

2. General GRUNERT. Captain, the Board is after facts or leads to facts. We have developed quite a bit of background and also quite a bit of the story, so we are piecing out as much as possible.

First, will you tell us what was your assignment and position just prior to the attack and during the attack?

Captain LAYTON. I was fleet intelligence officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

3. General GRUNERT. Did you have anything to do with the Naval District?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. The Naval District is a separate command, and the operations of the intelligence organization there are directly under the Commandant and the Chief of Naval Operations. However, the district intelligence officer keeps the fleet intelligence officer apprised of any information ashore that would have any effect upon the morale of the fleet, or subversive elements, or activities towards sabotage, or anything that might disturb the activities of the fleet from its base.

4. General GRUNERT. Now, will you please give the Board a [3029] brief general summarization of your duties as fleet intelligence officer, and wind up by telling us just what connection you had with the department headquarters ashore, the Army?

Captain LAYTON. The duties of the fleet intelligence officer were to assemble, collate, to evaluate and disseminate information to the fleet, also to the Commander-in-Chief and to sub task force commanders, of all matters that were concerned with the operations of the fleet, whether it was a matter of matériel or a matter of tactics, or matters of cognizance of junior commanders. My collation and evaluation and dissemination of intelligence to the Commander-in-Chief itself generally concerned itself with the broader picture of the situation in the Pacific.

I do not recall the exact date, but somewhere mid-1941 Colonel Raley—Colonel Edwin Raley of the Air Corps, who was G-2, Hawaiian Air Force—called on me and suggested that we establish immediate and intimate relationship of liaison, telling me that he had been so directed by the Department G-2. His selection, he explained, was because the Air Corps and the Navy based here would operate closely in case any operations of the fleet in these waters would be expected, and that the function of the ground force here was largely of a defensive garrison category. From that time on Colonel Raley or one of his assistants and I were in almost daily conferences. As the time grew closer the end of November, and principally the middle of November on, there was never a day but which I saw Colonel Raley in person at least once and sometimes two and three times. That was also particularly [3030] marked toward the end of November when considerable intelligence was received from various sources

regarding the Japanese intentions in the Far East. He informed me that he was keeping his General informed of all these matters.

5. General GRUNERT. By "his General" he meant whom? Do you know?

Captain LAYTON. I believe it was General Martin. I am not real—

6. General GRUNERT. Martin.

Captain LAYTON. It is so long, I have forgotten the name of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force at that time. I believe it was General Martin.

7. General GRUNERT. What connection did Raley have with G-2, if any?

Captain LAYTON. As a subordinate under G-2, as I understand the setup, he was told to contact me as a liaison between the G-2 and the fleet.

8. General GRUNERT. And then the information that passed between the two of you passed for the Department and not just between the Air Force of the Department and you?

Captain LAYTON. I cannot say that at first hand. I do not know what he did or what action he took with regard to this material. It was my assumption, however, that, rather than he talking to the G-2, that the Commanding General of the Air Forces was to confer or have conversations regarding the situation with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. That is not first-hand evidence.

9. General GRUNERT. Just what took place at these conferences? What type of information did you pass to him?

[3031] Captain LAYTON. Starting about the early part of November, somewhere between the 10th and 12th, we started to receive a series of reports from naval observers in China, naval attaché in Tokyo, naval attaché in Chungking, from the British and other sources, regarding the movements of Japanese troops, vessels, naval vessels, transports, and so forth, south along the China coast. There was also information of the highest secrecy from the British sources and from other sources which indicated invasion of the Kra Isthmus was impending. The intelligence from all sources, added up, indicated a southern movement on the part of the Japanese amphibious forces, and as the days grew on more confirmatory intelligence was received to strengthen this picture.

10. General GRUNERT. What was the source of your information?

Captain LAYTON. I would have to ask the Board now as to what degree of security I am given on my testimony.

11. General GRUNERT. I don't want you to divulge anything that may be used by—I will put the question a little differently: Did you get information from the District radio intercept?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, we received information from many sources. The principal source of information, of course, is Office of Naval Intelligence under Chief of Naval Operations.

12. General GRUNERT. But the principal source came from Washington?

Captain LAYTON. That would be—all sources from Washington would be channeled through that source.

13. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. That is, we will say that I presume the [3032] military attaché at Chungking, if he received some information, he

would pass it in turn to G-2, who in turn would pass it to O. N. I., who in turn would pass it to us. Most of our dispatches coming from China direct or from Japan direct or from the Philippines or from French Indo-China or from the Singapore area would be passed through the naval observers there, but it wasn't necessarily their original information; it may have come from some other source.

14. General GRUNERT. All right. Let us get nearer home. During the latter part of November do you recall having received information of the presence of a task force in the Marshall Islands?

Captain LAYTON. There was a statement to the effect that it was believed that some carriers and a majority of the submarines were estimated to be in the Marshall Islands.

15. General GRUNERT. That came from what source?

Captain LAYTON. That came from, what the source is called, combat intelligence, 14th Naval District.

16. General GRUNERT. Who evaluates that sort of information as to its credibility, or who checks it up?

Captain LAYTON. I did.

17. General GRUNERT. How did you evaluate it?

Captain LAYTON. Since that information was not checked from other combat intelligence sources having available to them the same material, it was not possible to add it or to evaluate it as "A-1." It is after all, an assumption rather than a definite statement of fact. It was, however, believed that the submarine situation was more clearly identified than the carrier situation insofar as no carriers themselves were [3033] identified. This, I may say now, has been proven erroneous. Captured documents and interrogation of prisoners have proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that no carriers were in the Marshalls at that time.

18. General GRUNERT. Was this information not confirmed, or was this information confirmed, by the intercept at Cavite?

Captain LAYTON. It was not confirmed at Cavite.

19. General GRUNERT. It was not. Are you at liberty to tell us what is your source of information as to what you actually think happened now, instead of what was then at that time supposed to be the origin or the source from which the task group that attacked Hawaii came?

Captain LAYTON. I am at liberty, and I would be glad to tell the Board. Based on the interrogation of several prisoners, both locally and in the Southwest Pacific area, based upon documents that have been captured, it is established beyond shadow of doubt, as far as I am concerned, that the task force allocated toward the attack on Pearl Harbor departed Empire ports and bases about 22 November and proceeded direct to Takan Bay on Etorofu Island where they assembled, fueled, and departed on 27 November, proceeding on easterly courses until on or about 4 or 5 December (I say that because one prisoner says 4 and one says 5; these dates are all east longitude dates) at which time they turned south. The course taken was to avoid all shipping and avoid being sighted.

On the night of the 7th, east longitude date again, they increased speed to 26 knots and proceeded on to the attack. The fly-off was at about 6:30 Honolulu time, although one captured document shows at least an intended fly-off slightly later than that.

[3034] 20. General GRUNERT. How far out, approximately?

Captain LAYTON. The document which showed the intended fly-off point was about 250 miles. This was based—off the record a minute, would the Board care for a photostat of that document?

21. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. I have it here if you would like it.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

[3035] Captain LAYTON. I would like to introduce a photostat made in my office of a captured Japanese chart taken from the chart-board of a dive bomber two days after the attack, when it was raised in Pearl Harbor. I, myself, took this from the plane, and saw that it was photostated in my office unchanged.

(The photostat referred to was marked Exhibit No. 23, and was received in evidence.)

I have marked on there, in English, our interpretation of these markings. There is a point with a circle around it, timed 0300. All these times are Japanese times minus 9, which they maintain at all times, as well as the Japanese date, without changing it going across the date-line as we do. There is a line running slightly to the west of south, headed for the north point Oahu, on which space to part our positions with times 0320, 0340, and 0400 hours. These correspond, starting off with the assumed fly-off point of Honolulu times of 0730, 0750, 0810, and 0830. Their spacing is about 156 to 160 nautical miles per hour, which obviously must be a plane speed, and which is evaluated as being a plane speed, with lean mixture, to make the longest distance with the most amount of bombs and the most amount of "gas" they could carry and take off.

22. General FRANK. With the least amount of consumption of "gas"?

Captain LAYTON. The least amount of consumption of "gas."

I would like to invite your attention to several points on this, one of which, translated in English, says:

No. 1 Assembly Point, 30 degrees 20 miles from Kahuku Point.

No. 2 Assembly Point, 30 degrees 20 miles from Kanohe Bay.

On various points Oahu, such as Barber's Point, points on Hawaii, points on Maui, are reference points. These are merely like reference points on a map, A, B, C, D, and E. Those will [3036] probably be used in connection with sightings. It is to be noted this chart is gridded in Japanese fashion, A, B, C, D, and so forth.

There is another line running due north, the southern position of it being slightly to the south of the fly-off point, which would represent a fly-off on a southerly course, and then the carriers being south of the fly-off point at the end of the fly-off proceeding north. These positions are marked as follows: 0350. It is to be noted that this is 50 minutes after fly-off time. The next northerly point is 0450, the next northerly point is 0550, the next northerly point is 0650, the next northerly point is 0750. These times are again Tokyo time. Placed in English, they are Honolulu time: 8:20, 9:20, 10:20, 11:20, and 12:20.

The spacing of these on the chart indicates a speed of about 26 knots and indicates the carrier retirement course. There are three positions in the left-hand corner, rather indistinct, representing three submarines, I-19, I-21, and I-23. One prisoner-of-war interrogation states that three submarines accompanied this task force from Takan Bay

and proceeded with this force, deploying to protect the force prior to the run-in at high speed.

Here is one that is not translated, marked up, so that you can see what it looked like in the original.

23. General GRUNERT. Make a proper notation, identify it, and put it in the record, please.

Colonel WEST. This document will be received in evidence and marked Exhibit 23.

24. General GRUNERT. Now, let us go back to the radio intercept, which indicated some Japanese vessels in the Marshalls. [3037] Was this information transmitted to the Army, do you know?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall off-hand. I believe I told Colonel Raley about it, but I don't remember, now, positively, whether I did or not.

25. General GRUNERT. At that time, without the knowledge you have now, it indicated that there was something in the Marshalls, because of which it might have been well to suspect something might come from the Marshalls. Have you ascertained where the two-man "subs" came from?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. With slightly less positive identification than the previous testimony I gave regarding the task force, the 2-men "subs" were carried "piggyback" on submarines specially designed to carry them, and were released in the vicinity of Oahu. Their mission was to proceed inside Pearl Harbor and to destroy American naval vessels there.

I may offer, if I may, another chart showing the positions of five submarine numbers inside the Pearl Harbor channel entrance, which it is assumed are the submarine positions. It also shows the course and time element of a submarine passing around Ford Island, inside Pearl Harbor, and is the predicted track of the submarine, from which this chart was taken. This chart was taken from the "midget" submarine captured off Bellows Field.

I would like to invite the attention of the Board that three submarines, marked here "I-16," "I-20," and "I-22," are on the left-hand side of the channel, entering Pearl. The I-18 and the I-24 are on the right-hand side of the channel, entering Pearl. The captured submarine was either the I-16 or the I-18, I have forgotten which. They apparently took their names from their parent submarine, which was the real I-18 or I-16 or I-20.

26. General GRUNERT. How many of these submarines were destroyed, do you know?

[3038] Captain LAYTON. All of them, sir. The reason I say "all of them" was, the Japanese announced nine officers and petty officers had all been raised in rank, and had lost their life on their suicide mission against Pearl Harbor. The Japanese press subsequently was forced to announce that one of the members of these crews had been taken prisoner, because many Japanese knew these were 2-man submarines, and nine men could not be divided in two.

I also have photographs of these people, now.

27. General GRUNERT. At what time were any of these submarines destroyed in Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. One was destroyed by gun fire and ramming on the morning of December 7, during the attack.

28. General GRUNERT. Do you know approximately what time?

Captain LAYTON. I couldn't testify that, first-hand; it would be hearsay.

29. General GRUNERT. Was one destroyed before the attack?

Captain LAYTON. One was destroyed outside of Pearl Harbor by the USS WARD.

30. General GRUNERT. Do you know what time that was?

Captain LAYTON. I don't know at first-hand evidence; no, sir.

31. General GRUNERT. But it was well before, about two hours before the attack?

Captain LAYTON. It was somewhere around two hours before the attack. I can get the records to find out the exact time.

32. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether that information was transmitted to the Army?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know, sir.

[3039] 33. General GRUNERT. Whose business would it be to transmit such information to interested agencies?

Captain LAYTON. At that time it would be the mission of the duty-officer who had the staff duty.

34. General GRUNERT. Do you know what time that information was received, where it could have been transmitted to the Army?

Captain LAYTON. It was received in the Fourteenth Naval District, first. What action they took, I do not know.

35. General GRUNERT. Then through ordinary channels it would have been up to the Fourteenth Naval District to transmit the information to the Army, if such transmission were to be made?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

36. General GRUNERT. And it would be in their judgment as to where to transmit, and whether or not to transmit, and what dissemination to give it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; being an event within their naval sea frontier.

37. General GRUNERT. I have one more question on the pick-up in the Marshalls. Although you could not verify it at the time, and you did not give it an "A-1" priority, as I might call it, at the same time there was evidence of some Japanese naval vessels in the Marshalls?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

38. General GRUNERT. Wouldn't that, in your opinion, have been sufficient news in order to at least check up on whether or not measures had been taken, to be sure that your defense was all it should be?

Captain LAYTON. Checking up the measures of defense was not my function as a fleet intelligence officer. I would like [3040] to invite the attention of the Board to the fact that there had been naval officers in the Marshalls since early December 1940.

39. General GRUNERT. Naval officers?

Captain LAYTON. Naval vessels, in the Marshalls.

40. General FRANK. You mean Jap naval vessels?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; Jap naval vessels in the Marshalls, since December 1940. May I refresh my memory? As a result of which, I made a personal study of the Japanese movements into the Marshalls and Carolines and Marianas, as we were in possession of intelligence that they were then actually fortifying and building air bases on various strategic atolls. I informed Admiral Richardson of this in late December 1940, and informed Admiral Kimmel of this activity when he took command in February 1941.

As of February 1941, I laid out what was my opinion at that time of the defenses and aviation stationed in the Marshalls, and noted that as of that time some 30 auxiliaries were engaged in transport of supplies, material, and personnel, and at least five men-of-war were in the general Mandates area. Subsequently, this number of ships, naval and auxiliary naval, in the Mandates, and including the Marshalls, rose to the total of some eighty per month, en route, at, and returning.

The fact that one unit of the communication intelligence net assumed that carriers were in the Marshalls was based on their tentative identification of destroyers, which had previously worked with carriers, being in the Marshalls. The submarine concentration in the Marshalls was accepted as almost A-1, and submarine activity was anticipated. We had had, from [3041] time to time, innumerable submarine contacts off Oahu. They had been followed up, and eventually lost. Admiral Kimmel's decision to treat all submarines in the Hawaiian area as enemy was based upon the information which we have mentioned, and also the thought that submarine action was most likely in case of hostilities.

41. General GRUNERT. Do you recall a message received by Admiral Kimmel from the Chief of Naval Operations on the 27th of November, which, as paraphrased, started out by saying, "Consider this dispatch a war warning"?

Captain LAYTON. I do.

42. General GRUNERT. Did you have any connection with transmitting that to General Short?

Captain LAYTON. I did.

43. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not it was transmitted to General Short?

Captain LAYTON. I do. It was.

44. General GRUNERT. By whom?

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Kimmel directed me to make a paraphrase and insure its delivery to General Short. Prior to that, he told me to show him the paraphrase, to be sure it met with his approval, and that it paralleled closely the original message. I typed the paraphrase, after several revisions, and took it into his cabin for his approval. At that time, the Chief of Staff of the Fourteenth Naval District, Captain Earl, arrived with a message from General Short, which the Admiral read, and, said, or words, "This is almost like ours." He said, "All right. Get this to General Short," and returned the message to the Chief of Staff of the Fourteenth Naval [3042] District, Captain Earl. We walked out of the cabin together, and Captain Earl said, "Lieutenant Burr, the Navy liaison officer with the headquarters, Hawaiian Department, is returning General Short's message to General Short, and it is appropriate that he also deliver this message, as he is the official liaison officer." He then asked Burr to read the message, which I had in my hand, for General Short, to be sure that he understood it. I handed them to Lieutenant Burr, and he delivered them, that evening. It was done about 5:30, or maybe a little later.

45. General GRUNERT. Of the 27th?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

46. General GRUNERT. Then, as far as you know, you understand that Burr delivered the message?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

47. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions?

48. General FRANK. Was that a matter of assumption, or a matter of fact?

Captain LAYTON. He has told me he delivered the message.

49. General FRANK. To whom?

Captain LAYTON. When he arrived at the headquarters, General Short and his Chief of Staff were absent, inspecting the condition of alert that had been put in, and he delivered it to the senior staff officer, who was head of G-3, I believe, and I believe his name was Colonel Donegan, or Donovan—Donegan, I believe, sir; I am not real sure—for delivery to General Short.

50. General RUSSELL. With the possible exception of some reference which you made to the evidence or the statement of [3043] the captured Japanese, you have given the Board none of the factual bases for your conclusions as to the course which the carrier task force followed in reaching the point from which the planes were launched in the attack of December 7. How extensive is this information upon which you have based your conclusions as to that course?

Captain LAYTON. I did not say from one prisoner; I said, from several prisoners, from independent sources. We have one other prisoner who is at present under interrogation, who was secret secretary on the staff of Admiral Yamamoto, then CINC, combined fleet, who was present when the original operation order was drawn up, and he also, without knowledge that we knew, wrote a rough draft of the order, as he remembered it, in which it said:

On X minus—

that was 18 days.

the striking force composed of the first air fleet would sortle home waters and proceed via Takan Bay and carry out a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, taking courses such as to avoid shipping, and to arrive undetected on X-Ray Day.

Of interest is that they prescribed that if any third power's vessels, including Russia and Japan, were found within 600 miles of its destination, that vessel was to be destroyed; that if any third power's vessels, including Soviet Russia and Japan, were found outside of 600 miles of the force's destination, the vessel was to be seized, and to be prevented from making any radio transmissions; if suspicion was existent that it had made transmissions, the vessel was to be destroyed.

[3044] 51. General RUSSELL. That document is in your possession?

Captain LAYTON. That document has not yet been fully translated. This prisoner is still under interrogation. I give you that as a first-hand evidence of having talked to the prisoner and having read his initial draft. That document will be translated, with others that this man is doing, within two or three weeks, and will be published as an official intelligence bulletin from the Pacific Ocean Areas Command.

52. General RUSSELL. How many witnesses who have given evidence bearing on the course of that task force have been examined by ONI, by your agency, and by all naval agencies of which you know?

Captain LAYTON. I think three have been examined by Pacific Ocean Area agencies, and two have been examined by General MacArthur's agencies.

53. General RUSSELL. And these five were personnel of this task force?

Captain LAYTON. That is right, sir. Additionally, I might add, we also have a facsimile of a captured Japanese map, which shows the courses of the carriers between November 1941 and June 1942, when they met their end at Midway. That was captured in the South Pacific area and translated by that combat intelligence center at Noumea. It also shows a course due east of Takan Bay, and then a course southeast to north Oahu.

[3045] 54. General RUSSELL. What was the strength of this task force that we are discussing, the Japanese task force?

Captain LAYTON. From a captured official Japanese document taken from the plane from which the charts, the photostats I have produced before the Board were obtained, a small call sign list was extracted that showed the following carriers there, and other documents that bear this out:

Six aircraft carriers, including the AKAGI, KAGA, HIRYU; SORYU, SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU; two battleships, two fast battleships, the Hiei and the KIRISHIMA; two heavy cruisers, the TONE and the CHIKUMA; one light cruiser, the ABUKUMA; Desron 1.

55. General RUSSELL. That is what?

Captain LAYTON. Destroyer Squadron 1. It should be pointed out that Destroyer Squadron 1 is a command and the ABUKUMA is its flagship. The number of destroyers present cannot be positively determined, because they were not given by name on the call sign list.

56. General RUSSELL. Estimated, how many surface craft were in this task force?

Captain LAYTON. Six aircraft carriers, two fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and some destroyers.

57. General RUSSELL. More than 11?

Captain LAYTON. More than 11.

58. General RUSSELL. You have enumerated 11, and there were a number of destroyers also?

Captain LAYTON. There should have been a number of destroyers, although the prisoners of war said there were destroyers in Takan Bay, plus 3 submarines, which were not on the [3046] call sign.

59. General RUSSELL. You gave the maximum speed that this task force maintained after it turned south, southeast, in the direction of Oahu. Was that 26 knots?

Captain LAYTON. 26 knots is what the prisoners said.

60. General RUSSELL. Approximately 30 miles an hour?

Captain LAYTON. Very close to it, yes.

61. General RUSSELL. What is your estimate of the relative combat strength of this task force and the elements of our Navy which was based at Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. This task force was a very powerful organization in air and was the same organization that in one raid on Port Darwin made the force at Darwin, Australia, to be no longer used as an advance naval and air force. Part of this force hit Ceylon and Trincomalee in the Indian Ocean, and destroyed the aircraft carrier HERMES and the cruisers DORSET and CORNWALL.

It might be added that part of this force returning to Japan stopped by Wake and supported the final assaults on Wake. This force was

the cream of the Japanese Navy. Four of these aircraft carriers came to Midway and were sunk there. It is to be recalled that several reports on Japanese naval air activity have stressed the fact that the character of the pilots and their aggressiveness and their tactics have never returned to a par since the disruption of the carrier forces at Midway.

I would like to speculate for a minute on the tactical disposition of this force. It is to be recalled that on the night of the 7th of December, 1941, our date, Midway was bombarded by two cruisers and four destroyers, and the shell holes [3047] indicated 8-inch shells. It is my conviction that the two heavy cruisers of this force, the TONE and the CHIKUMA and some destroyers, broke away from this task force prior to their last run in for Oahu and made a run to arrive off Midway in the late evening for a bombardment. I say this because every other 8-inch cruiser of the Japanese Navy was well accounted for and has been subsequently checked by captured documents from prisoners.

62. General RUSSELL. Assuming that the elements of the American Navy based on Pearl Harbor, with two of its carriers present, had discovered this task force at a time which would have enabled it, the American elements, the fleet at Pearl Harbor, to have gone out to sea and engaged in combat, what is your opinion as to the outcome of such an engagement?

Captain LAYTON. This is my personal opinion.

63. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. I think the American forces here would have taken the licking of their life, first, because the American people were not psychologically prepared for war.

64. General RUSSELL. How would the psychology of the American people influence a naval engagement off of Oahu?

Captain LAYTON. I am referring to the American Navy as a part of the American people, and I use this example: During the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a portion of a squadron of American carrier planes were then flying in from a carrier to Ford Island. They were attacked by Japanese fighters, and it is to be observed that these planes were armed with machine gun ammunition and machine guns ready to fire, and I can find no record of any of these carrier planes firing one single [3048] shot at any Japanese plane.

65. General RUSSELL. Well, let us analyze that a little further. Would this terrific licking which you think we would have taken in a naval engagement have resulted from the psychology of our fighters or from the lack of equipment to compete with the Japanese task force?

Captain LAYTON. I do not mean that the psychology would lick them, at all. Lack of equipment would certainly have been very disastrous; lack of cruisers, because the battleships would never catch that force of the Japanese. But the Japanese aviators at that time were all charged up to go fight. Our people were not charged up to go fight, until after Pearl Harbor was hit.

66. General RUSSELL. Would not they have gotten pretty tensely charged if they had an order to proceed and meet and engage a Japanese task force which was seeking to invade the Island of Oahu?

Captain LAYTON. I do not belittle their fighting spirit. I do not

mean it that way at all. I merely mean the shock of Pearl Harbor, which I saw at first hand, caused a reaction among certain people that I think the initiative being in the hands of the other fellow, regardless of his great superiority in planes and numbers would have made him, fresh from an attack, fresh from the exhilaration of having delivered his attack, a psychological foe worthy of consideration.

67. General RUSSELL. How many aircraft do you estimate were present in the Japanese task force?

Captain LAYTON. 424 aircraft on the carriers.

68. General RUSSELL. Could the naval elements at Pearl Harbor [3049] have mustered any aircraft fleet in strength to compare with and engage the Japanese aircraft in battle?

Captain LAYTON. If both our carriers had been present—and only one was—their total planes would have been a maximum of somewhere around 180.

69. General RUSSELL. Each had a capacity of around 90?

Captain LAYTON. At a maximum, and, as you know, there were no combat flyable aircraft after the Japanese hit the Hawaiian Islands.

70. General RUSSELL. I was attempting to draw a picture of what would have happened had we discovered the approaching Japanese task force in time to have intercepted it and engaged it in the open sea.

Captain LAYTON. That then brings this point of psychology: If they were sent out to intercept a Japanese task force, they would undoubtedly have done a good job. I believe that they would have been completely smashed.

71. General RUSSELL. Because of the superiority of equipment of the Japanese task force?

Captain LAYTON. And the Japanese task force had the initiative in so far as long training of the air units is concerned, preparation for war, constant training on the dive bombers. We know from a few documents here and there that this was worked out in advance, rehearsed.

72. General GRUNERT. May I interpose a question there? Suppose, now, the Japanese had used the same reasoning that you did, that you are putting forth now, would it not have been to their advantage to entice the United States Fleet out of Pearl Harbor, if they were going to do so much damage to it, than [3050] take the chance of coming within reach of land-based aviation? Why did they do what they did, if they were reasoning as you are reasoning now?

Captain LAYTON. The Japanese mission was to destroy as much as possible of the Pacific Fleet. The Japanese also realized that were they to be caught at night or under conditions of bad visibility, whereby their carriers would be of no value, they would have been wiped out by gunfire, with no power. They had no power in gunfire. I would like to repeat that. I said before they were very powerful in the air. They were very weak in defensive gunpower. A handful of cruisers under fog, rain or bad visibility opposing them would have destroyed them completely by destroying their planes on deck with gunfire, and fire resulting. Cruisers and destroyers would have been able to put in killing blows. My statement they were powerful, I want to emphasize, was from the air. Therefore the Japanese decided to make their fast run in to be able to use their air against the naval ships in the harbor.

We know their priority was: 1, aircraft carriers; 2, battleships; 3, cruisers; 4, naval installations at Pearl Harbor and, of course, the overall priority covering the action was to destroy planes on the ground on the way in. In other words, their fighters would destroy planes on the ground; their dive bombers and speedy planes would destroy, in order, aircraft carriers, battleships and cruisers, and, thereafter, shoreside installations.

73. General RUSSELL. What facilities or means were available to you to detect or discover such a task force you have described, a hostile task force?

[3051] Captain LAYTON. We would have to be informed through our normal channels of information. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet possessed no independent intelligence organization. The Commander-in-Chief was kept apprised through the intelligence organizations of the formation, composition and almost destination of the Japanese task force that invaded Malaya or invaded the Philippines. That was all brought out in the message referred to prior to the 27th of November, where some aircraft carriers were estimated to be in the Marshalls. Those task forces followed the picture presented, moved to the areas indicated and carried out the missions presumed.

74. General RUSSELL. Let us go back to the task force that invaded us at Pearl Harbor. Your report assumes they were assembled off the mainland of Japan, where the task force gathered before starting its eastward journey.

Captain LAYTON. General, that position is in the north Kuriles. They moved from the Japan home waters up there where it is an uninhabited location for their departure east. That force was under the strictest injunction, according to a prisoner I have referred to previously, who is now under interrogation, to use their radio under no circumstances whatever. Also, he has stated that one of the outlines of this plan was that the communication unit belonging to the combined fleet would initiate deception tactics, to give the impression that the major force of the combined fleet was remaining in inland sea waters. They said that the TATSUTA MARU was to sail to the West Coast as scheduled; and some days prior to this X-Ray Day of execution she would be turned around and return to America. They thought of everything.

75. General RUSSELL. Then there was nothing on this rendezvous [3052] part of the northern islands—

Captain LAYTON. There was absolutely no evidence from the radio intercepts.

76. General RUSSELL. I mean, nobody lived there?

Captain LAYTON. No.

77. General RUSSELL. At this rendezvous?

Captain LAYTON. This is a very desolate island. It has a few fishermen on it, who are, of course, Japanese. Two prisoners of war stated they were absolutely forbidden to go ashore. The only shore party, of which he was one member, went in to burn trash. They were forbidden to throw overboard garbage or trash in any form.

78. General RUSSELL. The only place we could have had spies to observe the formation of the task force would have been on the mainland of Japan?

Captain LAYTON. Spies even on the mainland of Japan would have merely noted their departure. Their departure we know almost cer-

tainly was through the Bungo Channel between the Islands of Kyushu and Shikoku, which forms the outer rim of the island there, and that is the channel they go out of when they go to the Kuriles.

79. General RUSSELL. The point is that the elements of the task force that left the home island went in isolated units, and met at a distance from there and proceeded en masse on this assignment?

Captain LAYTON. That is the best information we have.

80. General RUSSELL. That is all I have.

81. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

82. Major CLAUSEN. I wondered, sir, if you wanted the name of [3053] the duty officer whose responsibility it was to communicate the information to the Army of the sinking of this Jap sub?

83. General GRUNERTS. Yes, ask that question.

84. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, will you give me the name of the duty officer whose responsibility it was to have informed the Army of the sinking of this submarine?

Captain LAYTON. The name of the duty officer of the 14th Naval District I do not know. First, it is too far past and, second, I would not make it my business to find out who was the duty officer in the 14th Naval District. The duty officer on the Commander in Chief's staff was then Commander Murphy. He was informed, as I recall it, about 7:30.

85. Major CLAUSEN. You stated there were 420 aircraft on the carriers. Do you have an estimate of the number that was used in the attack?

Captain LAYTON. I have tried to make that estimate but, unfortunately, our observers vary so much; but at least 300 came to Oahu.

86. Major CLAUSEN. That is all I have, sir.

87. Colonel TOULMIN. May I ask one question?

How long before the attack on Pearl Harbor did the Japanese rehearsals probably start?

Captain LAYTON. The best indication was that the rehearsals were held somewhere in July or August at Nanseishoto.

88. Colonel TOULMIN. You are referring, of course, to 1941?

Captain LAYTON. 1941. There were maneuvers held in that area. May I check my memory? I better check as to what date that was. I think that is correct.

[3054] 89. Colonel TOULMIN. And when did you acquire the information about these rehearsals?

Captain LAYTON. About a year ago.

90. Colonel TOULMIN. And to what extent, if any, were you able to get any information out of the Marshall Islands as to the activities of the Japanese force of two or three years prior to December, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. There was no information from any source out of the Marshall or Mandated Islands, due to the Japanese regulations, which would permit no foreigners and very few Japanese to enter that area, particularly after they commenced the militarization in late 1940.

91. Colonel TOULMIN. Did you have any instructions from the State Department not to intervene in that situation without its approval?

Captain LAYTON. There had been long existing differences between the Navy Department and the State Department as to American

naval vessels calling in the Marshall Islands, that is, the open ports of the Marshall Islands.

Having served in Tokyo myself and seen some of this material handled, it will be interesting, perhaps, to the court to hear.

The Japanese Navy would say, of course, there are open ports and we would be glad to have you call in at Jaluit or Truk, of course. And we would approach the State Department, that is, the Ambassador or Secretary would. And they would say "We cannot see any reason at all why you should not stop in at Yap or Palau or Truk; they are open ports."

Then when you would press them for a [3055] date or written approval, either they would say "The home office is very bad. They can't get along with the Ministry of Colonies, and they are not willing at this time," or they would give the excuse that there are no pilots to take you in, very bad reefs and very treacherous. At other times they would say they had no one there of suitable rank to greet this vessel, and therefore it was disapproved. It always ended with the word "disapproved."

92. General RUSSELL. Let us go back to one thing more on this task force. The elements of this task force when they left the homeland proceeded in a northerly direction?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

93. General RUSSELL. The movement of other elements of the Japanese Navy was in a southerly direction, at that time?

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

94. General RUSSELL. Therefore, had the movement of these elements to the north been discovered, it would have indicated missions other than those of the elements which were moving to the south?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

95. General RUSSELL. That is all.

96. General GRUNERT. I wish you would give the Board—by the way, this is a Board and not a court.

Captain LAYTON. Excuse me, sir. In the Navy it is a court. I am sorry. Please change that to "Board" when I said "court."

97. General GRUNERT. Would you inform the Board or give the Board an idea of how much of what you got in the line of information of all of these situations was eventually transmitted to the [3056] Army, and the system of so doing? For instance, the information that you received, was that transmitted to the District or did it come from the District, and did you in your position transmit anything to the Army or did you consider that the District's business to transmit such information to the Army?

Captain LAYTON. The information received from the Office of Naval Intelligence, Chief of Naval Operations, was, I presume, passed to the Army by Washington, where they were the fountain-head of intelligence, both military and naval.

Now, I think I should clarify the matter of the combat intelligence, or communications intelligence, as it is now known. The naval communications intelligence channel is run by Washington, supervised by Washington, over which the Commander-in-Chief has no direct responsibility, nor concern, except he is informed by the adjacent unit nearest him, and his intelligence officer has access to their files and to their intelligence as a matter of speed and ascertaining the accuracy of certain views or statements.

98. General FRANK. What do you mean by adjacent unit?

Captain LAYTON. For instance, if the Commander-in-Chief was here in the Hawaiian Islands, he would have liaison or entree to the communications intelligence unit of the 14th Naval District. If he were in Guam, then he would have liaison or access to the intercept unit. It was not a communications or intelligence unit. It was an intercept unit at Guam. If he were in Cavite, he would do likewise. The units at Cavite and in Pearl Harbor, 14th Naval District, and one in Washington, were on one separate circuit. The Commander-in-Chief held the crypto by which that circuit was controlled.

[3057] 99. General FRANK. Commander of which fleet?

Captain LAYTON. Pacific Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet. So that they could be informed directly regarding any matter of high security, but they did not fit on the circuit as an intercept unit, it being an automatic land line or high-speed transmitter which no receiver wire would take. It was the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations, under whom the Director of Naval Communications is subordinate, and to whom this communications intelligence organization is responsible and operating. It is the Chief of Naval Operations or his subordinate whose responsibility it is to pass appropriate matters of that intelligence to appropriate government agencies, and not the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. As a matter of fact, he is not authorized to do it. When I was passing information that came from those sources to Colonel Raley I was doing it on my own responsibility and I so explained to Colonel Raley that I was so doing.

100. General FRANK. The amount of material that you could pass to Colonel Raley, compared to the total that you received, had to be limited?

Captain LAYTON. I passed him only the highlights and most important spots.

101. General GRUNERT. And those things that you thought the Army had an interest in, is that it?

Captain LAYTON. All of these had to do with the situations in the Far East, the intrigues, how the British reported to us that spies, for example, were going to put a false report out that the Japanese had landed at Singora on the east coast, and had a false report to go to the British in Malaya across the [3058] border that they needed assistance, and to entice them across the border from Padang Bessa, across the border from Alor Star. The British having been enticed across the border, they were then to be declared by Thailand as an aggressor, and Thailand was to call on Japan for assistance, and the Japanese entry into Thailand was then to be as an ally and a joint attack be made on Malaya on the basis of sovereignty. The date was tentatively scheduled for 1 December.

102. General FRANK. 1941?

Captain LAYTON. 1941. The movement of troops south, the movement of amphibious craft, warships, all these things all added into a picture, which I told Colonel Raley.

General GRUNERT. You do not know what conferences or conversations the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in which he may have passed information to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know, sir. I do know, however, that I delivered one message—may I refresh my memory? I delivered one message on the direction of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to General Short in person, on either the 24th or 25th of November, where it said that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan was very doubtful and that the situation, coupled with the statements of the Japanese Government and the movements of their naval and military forces indicated, in the opinion of naval operations, a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam as a possibility. It stated that the Chief of Staff of the Army had seen the dispatch and concurs and re- [3059] requested that the people addressed in the dispatch inform the senior Army officers in their area. It also had an injunction that the utmost security was necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or to precipitate Japanese action.

General Short asked me what I thought of it at which time I told him that we had considerable intelligence from various sources of the movements of Japanese units to the south, that troops, amphibious craft, warships, movements of planes, had all been detected. He asked me if the Navy had an airfield in Guam. I told him we did not, that an airfield on Guam had been allowed to go into disuse, and that Guam had its guns removed, and that Japan was so informed, in the year before Pearl Harbor, to make the Japanese realize our very peaceful intentions.

[3060] 103. General GRUNERT. Have you anything?

104. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Did you know in November of 1941 of the existence of any agreements between the British, the Dutch, and the Americans as to taking action in concert in event the Japanese armed forces should do certain things, such as attack British, Dutch, or American possessions or go into the Gulf of Siam, for example?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

105. General RUSSELL. Do you know now whether any such agreement as that existed?

Captain LAYTON. Not of first-hand knowledge. I have heard that there was such an existing agreement, but I have never seen it nor heard of it officially.

106. General RUSSELL. Assuming that such agreements did exist in the fall of 1941 from October on, and you had known of those agreements, would they have influenced you in your estimate of the situation as to the probability of war with Japan and its inevitability?

Captain LAYTON. General, it is pretty hard to go back now, with all the things that have happened, and remember what I would have thought then, but, doing the best I can, it would depend upon the type and nature of the agreement, the locality concerned; and, in other words, all the circumstances would have to be taken into their proper position and their proper weight.

I would like to mention that we had in accordance with this a message from the Dutch who said that they had these secret sources which told them the Japanese were going to move in on Dutch Timor and possibly even Portuguese Timor, and asked us [3061] if we had any information of that move. We told them we had nothing whatsoever, but there was some indication that some Japanese

forces would soon proceed to the Palau area, but whether or not they had aggressive intentions against Timor we could not confirm.

107. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, from the information that you did have, did you anticipate, did you think war was imminent with Japan?

Captain LAYTON. We had a war warning. The Department had ordered a reconnaissance made by flying boats over the French Indo-China coast, the approach of the Gulf of Siam. Japanese submarines, vessels, a whole convoy, transports and aircraft, were seen in the area on the 6th of December. A dispatch from the C-in-C Asiatic Fleet reported two transport convoys en route into the Gulf of Siam.

The discussion then, as previously, that I heard in the Commander-in-Chief's office was: Would the Japanese attack, or was this a further movement into the west coast of French Indo-China to establish an advance base to use in the future on occasion of other moves? Or, if the Japanese decided to pull this Thailand induced invasion, would they leave the Philippines on their flank? The possibility of war was fully debated. I did not personally think that the Philippines would be left on the flank in case the Japanese decided to make an all-out southerly push with military force.

You must remember at this time, although the negotiations had broken down and there was very little evidence that they might be renewed, these negotiations had been going on in Washington since somewhere around April 1941, intermittently, [3062] but they had broken down once before and suddenly Kuru was given the right of way of a clipper being held for him in Hongkong, and there was nothing that would indicate that perhaps they couldn't find some other way. After all, the Japanese is essentially an oriental, and bargaining is one of their fortes. If they can't get their way one way, they will go around another way to bargain, and they never ask first what they really want: they ask for about twice as much so they can meet you in the midway of compromise.

So with that in mind there was also the situation of: Was this a military move or was this a show of force, or did they think that they could put a little more pressure on French Indo-China and that we would not do anything?

Those are questions we all know the answer to now, but at that time, lacking all the pictures in this jigsaw puzzle which included naval operations and diplomacy, national policy, we couldn't form a complete picture from which you could guess the entire puzzle, because you will never have all the jigsaw pieces, but we had insufficient pieces to see the whole picture clearly.

108. General FRANK. You still haven't answered my question.

Captain LAYTON. I beg your pardon, sir.

109. General FRANK. As an intelligence officer you make intelligence estimates for the Commander-in-Chief, don't you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

110. General FRANK. Did you consider at that time, in view of the information that was available, that war was imminent?

Captain LAYTON. I did not think that war was imminent, although war was an entire possibility.

[3063] 111. General FRANK. All right.

112. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? (No response.)

Captain, have you anything that you think of that we haven't touched on that you think might be of value to the Board in coming to conclusions, that you haven't brought up or that we haven't brought up?

Captain LAYTON. I would like to state that I have good information that there is, or that there was, intelligence of value in the Office of Naval Intelligence and also in G-2 in Washington which bears on the case in question, and, while it was not the decisive pieces of evidence, they were just some more pieces of jigsaw puzzle that might have assisted considerably in arriving at a proper estimate of the situation.

113. General GRUNERT. In other words, what was the gist of such information? You must have some idea of what it amounted to.

Captain LAYTON. The gist of the information was the most highly secret sources and had to do with the presence or absence of naval vessels from Pearl Harbor, reports concerning them, also concerning international relations, particularly ourselves versus Japan, Japan versus and concerning her allies, Germany and Italy.

114. General GRUNERT. You mean, that you think should have been transmitted to the Admiral and the General here? Is that the idea?

Captain LAYTON. I do, sir.

115. General GRUNERT. And having had those, from what you now know—or I don't know what you do know on that subject, but [3064] had you had additional information it would have given you a different idea, a different outlook, or a different viewpoint, or what?

Captain LAYTON. I think it would have assisted General Short and Admiral Kimmel into seeing a broader picture of the situation as it existed then than without their being able to see the other parts of this jigsaw puzzle of which many pieces were missing, but these pieces were ones that we possessed in our Government and we did not have out here.

116. General GRUNERT. That, of course, is hindsight, like most everything else we get before this Board.

Captain LAYTON. Of course.

117. General GRUNERT. However, someone must judge as to where to draw the line as to how much they give. Otherwise we would have a state, or a chief of naval operations or a chief of staff headquarters at each one of the lower commands, with everything they get.

Is there anything else that you think of?

Captain LAYTON. Nothing further, sir.

118. General FRANK. I would like to ask him a question.

119. General GRUNERT. All right.

120. General FRANK. Does your estimate of the situation indicate that a surprise air raid is possible right now?

Captain LAYTON. It is always within the Japanese potentialities to place aboard their carriers the planes from the shore bases, for instance, to assign to them by land line telegram from Japan certain escorts, to give them explicit instructions that they shall not break radio silence, to sail them and take advantage of weather fronts that form, as they [3065] know they periodically do form, and they can strike Hawaii, Oahu, tomorrow.

121. General FRANK. Do you know how close they can get to Oahu right now, even in good weather, if they are not under visual observation, without detection?

Captain LAYTON. Not first-hand evidence, but I would guess somewhere within radar range, if they are not visually detected by a plane.

122. General FRANK. To what distance do you believe radar range to be a protection, positive?

Captain LAYTON. Positive protection, sir?

123. General FRANK. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. Against low-flying planes, about 20 miles.

124. General FRANK. That is right.

Captain LAYTON. Unless you have got a very high mountain where you can get your radar way up in the air, and then you can extend it out to about 28 miles, and from there on you have to have too high a mountain for a horizon.

125. General GRUNERT. In order that the record shall not be misconstrued or misread, if it is read by someone, I think a little item of explanation ought to be entered therein, because the layman has the idea that they can detect up to about 120 or 130 miles, and many of them cannot understand that a low-flying craft cannot be detected until it gets very close in. That is the idea, is it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. The radar wave we could call, in other words, human sight going out from the eye, hitting something, coming back, and reflecting on the eyeball its [3066] vision, its impression. Now, if you stand on a high mountain, you may only see then to the horizon due to the curvature of the earth. If you stand on the seashore you may not see out very far due to the fact that your height of eye is the actual height of your eye above the sand you stand upon; and based on the triangle, one leg of which is the height of your eye, and the hypotenuse is to the horizon, and the base is from the base of your feet to the point where your eye touched the horizon, the higher you go the longer the leg of the right angle triangle.

126. General FRANK. No.

Captain LAYTON. Excuse me.

127. General FRANK. Not always.

Captain LAYTON. Well, up to a degree.

The higher you go the greater becomes the upright, and therefore the hypotenuse must be increased also. That is the distance you see the plane.

128. General FRANK. That is all right in theory, but it doesn't always work in practice. For instance, right here on this island it didn't work.

Captain LAYTON. I am only speaking of theory now, to explain what radar does.

129. General FRANK. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. Therefore, a low-flying plane two or three feet off of the waves—

130. General FRANK. Or twenty.

Captain LAYTON. —cannot be detected as soon as one who is flying way high because he is the same as visual observation then.

131. General GRUNERT. I think that gives enough explanation [3067] for the record, anyway.

If there is nothing else, Captain, we thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER HAROLD S. BURR, U. S. N. R.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Commander Burr, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and present station?

Commander BURR. My name is Harold S. Burr, Commander, U. S. N. R., and I am at present assistant district intelligence officer, 14th Naval District.

2. General GRUNERT. Commander, we are after facts and leads to facts. Now, we have developed a great deal in the testimony we have heard, so there are just a few things that we would like to check up with you.

Will you tell the Board just what duty you were on in the latter part of 1941 and during the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Commander BURR. Immediately preceding the attack and following it I was naval liaison officer representing the 14th Naval District at the headquarters of the Commanding General.

3. General GRUNERT. Then, you represented the 14th Naval District. How about the fleet? Did you represent the fleet?

Commander BURR. No, sir.

4. General GRUNERT. And with whom did you do most of your business in the department headquarters?

[3068] Commander BURR. My desk was located in G-3, and most of my work was with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

5. General GRUNERT. Who was that at that time?

Commander BURR. Colonel Donegan.

6. General GRUNERT. Donegan?

Commander BURR. Yes, sir.

7. General GRUNERT. Will you tell the Board what that liaison consisted of? What did you do there, and why were you there?

Commander BURR. While I am an intelligence officer, sir, most of my work was of a general utility nature, assisting the Army in its contacts with the 14th Naval District.

8. General GRUNERT. So all the business that the 14th Naval District did, was that transmitted through you?

Commander BURR. I wouldn't say all of it, sir, but—

9. General GRUNERT. What classes of business that was conducted, or cooperation between the Department and the District, passed through you? What sort of things did you handle?

Commander BURR. Well, it was a wide variety of things, sir. There were no specific instructions, but I was the only naval officer at the time in the headquarters of the Commanding General; and as matters came up with headquarters within the Army that involved contact with the 14th Naval District (it might be on matters of finding the right ordnance man or the right public works man or the right operations man for the Army to contact) that was my job.

10. General GRUNERT. Were you a sort of leg man for the District?

[3069] Commander BURR. Yes, sir, I would say that.

11. General GRUNERT. Then, you did a great deal of contacting of other staff officers who transacted business between themselves; is that right?

Commander BURR. Yes, sir.

12. General GRUNERT. Was it your duty to keep the Army informed of what the District was doing or what intelligence it received?

Commander BURR. Not on operational intelligence matters as a rule, sir.

13. General GRUNERT. But occasionally they would use you for that purpose?

Commander BURR. But occasionally on things, yes, sir. As the Commandant of the District issued directives which I thought would be of interest to the Army, I did my best to bring them to the attention of those Army officers who I thought would be concerned.

14. General GRUNERT. All right. Let's have the other side of the picture. Did the Army give the District all the information the District wanted? And, if so, was it transmitted through you, or did the same thing apply, that they used you in finding out with whom to do business, and then they did business sometimes with your knowledge and sometimes without?

Commander BURR. That is it, sir; sometimes with my knowledge and sometimes without.

15. General GRUNERT. Let us think of this special case on which the Board would like to have information. This was a message from the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington to the [3070] Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated November 27, 1941, which, paraphrased, started out, "Consider this a war warning." Do you remember that message?

Commander BURR. I remember a secret message that came in at that time. I wouldn't be able to say definitely that that was the message, but it sounds very much like it.

16. General GRUNERT. At that time were you used, in your capacity as liaison officer, to deliver this message from the fleet or from Admiral Kimmel to General Short?

Commander BURR. Yes, sir, I was used for that.

17. General GRUNERT. How did you receive the message, and what did you do with it?

Commander BURR. Well, it was in connection with a similar message which General Short had received from the War Department, in which he showed it to me, asked me to read it; and, as I remember, there was an instruction in there for General Short to inform the Commandant of the District, and I took it over to the District. The Commandant was not present, and so I showed it to the Chief of Staff, who promptly took me to Admiral Kimmel's office where the message was shown to him also, and it was at that time that—

18. General GRUNERT. This that you are talking about is the Army message?

Commander BURR. That is the Army message. But that is how I happened to be over in Admiral Kimmel's office when he gave me the message that the Navy had received, to show to General Short.

19. General GRUNERT. Did you show it to General Short?

Commander BURR. No, sir. When I returned to Fort Shafter [3071] General Short was not present and could not be located. And similarly with the Chief of Staff: the senior officer present was Colonel Donegan, as I remember, in G-3, and he said that he would assume the responsibility for seeing to it that the message was delivered to General Short as soon as he could be located.

20. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not that message actually reached General Short?

Commander BURR. It is a long time ago, sir, but I am under the impression that I did ask Colonel Donegan afterwards if that message had reached General Short, and he said that it had. That is my impression.

21. General GRUNERT. Was that message a secret message, as far as you know?

Commander BURR. Yes, sir.

22. General GRUNERT. What is the standing operating procedure of handling secret documents? Was a receipt demanded or given?

Commander BURR. A receipt was not demanded on that, sir.

23. General GRUNERT. So as far as you know there is nothing in writing to show delivery or receipt?

Commander BURR. No, sir. There is, I believe, an officer present here in the Islands who was present at the time I handed the message to Colonel Donegan, and he might be able to confirm my statement.

24. General GRUNERT. Who is that officer?

Commander BURR. Colonel Lawton. Colonel William Lawton.

25. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether G-2 of the Department knew anything about this message? Was he concerned [3072] in any way as to the transmission?

Commander BURR. I don't think so.

26. General GRUNERT. Or was he included in the know?

Commander BURR. I don't think so, sir. It appeared to be a G-3 pigeon as it was handled.

27. General GRUNERT. All right. That covers the points that I wanted to use this witness for. If you want to ask any other questions of him, you may. General Russell?

28. General RUSSELL. No, not I.

29. General GRUNERT. Now, before you go, tell us what is in the back of your mind that you would like to have the Board know. Is there anything that occurs to you that might be of value to the Board, any other subject you think of bringing up? Somebody usually has a little something they want to say.

Commander BURR. Yes, sir.

30. General GRUNERT. We want to give you the opportunity if there is anything that occurs to you.

Commander BURR. Well, I was a very young reserve officer, only being on duty a short time, and tremendously impressed with the importance of that message, although it was very confusing to me.

31. General GRUNERT. You read both the Army message and the Navy message?

Commander BURR. Yes, sir. I couldn't distinguish one from the other at present, although they impressed me as being essentially the same, but the import of it as I read it seemed to focus attention on the Philippines and the Far East and apply to this area only as a security precaution, an antisabotage precaution, as I remember.

[3073] 32. General GRUNERT. Do you remember whether there was anything in either message that refers to sabotage?

Commander BURR. That word sticks in my head, sir, but I only had a quick glance at it, and that was some years ago, and I wouldn't—couldn't swear to it.

33. General GRUNERT. But it did impress you as one that required something to be done in order to insure your own security here in the Islands?

Commander BURR. Yes, sir.

34. General GRUNERT. Anything else?

Commander BURR. I was very much upset that I couldn't deliver the message directly to General Short, but there seemed to be nothing more I could do about it; and, knowing its urgency and the fact that probably prompt action was indicated, and knowing that messages of that sort usually went pretty directly to G-3, I felt that G-3 was the appropriate place to deliver it.

35. General GRUNERT. Quite natural. Thank you very much for coming.

Commander BURR. Yes, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

36. General RUSSELL. Let me put these in evidence, unless somebody has some objection to it.

37. General GRUNERT. I have no objection to putting them in evidence. I said we did not want them, but if you want them, far be it from me to keep you from putting them in.

38. General RUSSELL. I want these to be marked exhibits next in number: two captured Japanese maps which were identified [3074] before the Board by Captain Layton; and also another exhibit which is a copy of a captured map with translation in English of the Japanese endorsements; and those three will be marked next in order.

(Captured Japanese maps identified, by Captain Layton were marked Exhibits Nos. 24 and 25 and received in evidence.)

(Copy of captured map with translation of Japanese endorsements was marked Exhibit No. 26 and received in evidence.)

39. Colonel TOULMIN. Are there any more witnesses?

40. General GRUNERT. No more witnesses this morning.

(Whereupon, at 11 a. m., the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the morning, took up the consideration of other business.)

[3075]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(At 2 p. m., the Board met and continued with the hearing of witnesses, as follows:)

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL MAXWELL MURRAY, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

General MURRAY. General Maxwell Murray, O2216; Major General, United States Army; commanding Guadalcanal Base.

2. General GRUNERT. General, this Board is after facts, and leads to where we can get facts, as to what led up to Pearl Harbor, and also

the attack. Because of your assignment during the latter part of 1941, and because you testified before the Roberts Commission, we put you on the list, here, as a witness.

Now, the Board has developed a great deal of the story, and there is no use piling evidence on evidence, so we will skip around here and try to piece out some of this story, and then open up any subjects that any Members of the Board want to open up, as well as give you an opportunity to open up anything we may not touch on.

First, I would like to talk to you about artillery ammunition, and ask you this question: Why was not sufficient ammunition at hand for the artillery, on December 7?

General MURRAY. There was sufficient artillery ammunition on hand, but it had not been issued to troops.

3. General GRUNERT. I mean "at hand," not "on hand."

[3076] General MURRAY. I was not authorized to draw the artillery ammunition from the magazines. I requested authority from General Short to draw artillery ammunition and stack it; I suggested either in the gun parks or on the division review field, in small stacks. The division review field, as you know, is a large area immediately adjacent to the old artillery park, and had been planned as the dispersal area for the artillery.

4. General GRUNERT. Tell us, first, what your assignment was.

General MURRAY. I was in command of the 25th division, at that time.

5. General GRUNERT. And that was stationed where?

General MURRAY. That was stationed at Schofield Barracks. I was a senior divisional commander and had been in command at Schofield Barracks until, I can't be certain of the date, but I believe that the organization of the post command under Colonel Earl M. Wilson had been established shortly before Pearl Harbor, before the attack on December 7.

6. General GRUNERT. That was a station command?

General MURRAY. It was a station command; yes. As I recall it, that had just been organized, and I had moved into a divisional headquarters which was separate from the post headquarters.

7. General GRUNERT. Then you had the tactical division, and had nothing to do primarily with the post?

General MURRAY. Nothing with the post.

8. General GRUNERT. And in your division you had what artillery?

General MURRAY. I had the Eighth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Field Artillery, but it is not generally known that we had [3077] practically doubled the gun strength of the brigade before the 75-mm. gun batteries; the Eighth and the Thirteenth were 75-mm. gun regiments, and each of those batteries had eight guns to the battery instead of four. The Eleventh was the 155-howitzer regiment, but they were in addition manning two batteries of 155 guns, and some 240-mm. howitzers. The 75 regiments both had 240-mm. howitzers assigned to them, too.

We had a total of six 240-mm. howitzer batteries organized, and two howitzer batteries—"two-gun batteries" we called them; and those had all been equipped and furnished, and we had as I recall it a total of 136 guns mounted in the single brigade, which made a very heavy artillery deployment.

9. General GRUNERT. Under the new plans for defense, what was the assignment as to mission, as to your division, and as to the use of that artillery?

General MURRAY. The division was assigned to the south sector.

10. General GRUNERT. Will you describe that sector.

General MURRAY. The south sector extended from a point north of Waianae pocket—I have forgotten the name of the exact point—stretched around through the southern half of the island, and up to just beyond the northern edge of the Kanoeh Bay side, the eastern side of the island, at a little island off the coast, Lae-Ka-Oio.

11. General GRUNERT. Did that sector include the City of Honolulu?

General MURRAY. It included the City of Honolulu, yes.

You asked for the mission of the artillery?

12. General GRUNERT. Yes.

[3078] General MURRAY. The artillery was charged with the establishment of the immediate support of the beaches by approximately half of the 75-mm. guns in the brigade. They were emplaced on the beaches to provide close-in enfilading fire as support of the machine-gun positions, which also covered the beaches. In addition to the immediate beach defense, the infantry defense of the beach was supported from fixed artillery positions, dug-in positions, running from 1500 to 2500 yards in rear of the beaches, the 75 gun batteries, and in rear of those, or about on the line, were the 155 howitzer batteries; observation for all batteries being set up on the beach for a close defense.

In addition to those organic guns, the 75 guns and the 155 howitzers, the 240 howitzers were in position, so that practically the entire beach that was assigned to the division was under fire of at least one 240-mm. howitzer battery, and in many cases, the batteries; the important areas of the beach were covered by two batteries. I would like to correct one statement that I made earlier. I said that the brigade manned 155 guns. I recall now that we had turned those over to the Twenty-Fourth Division just before December 7, because they were in the northern sector. They had been assigned to the Eleventh Field, but we had turned them over. I had forgotten that when I made the statement.

I might add, I have not prepared myself for this discussion, but it comes from memory.

13. General GRUNERT. All right.

General MURRAY. So we had additional 240s.

14. General GRUNERT. Then your mission was primarily against a surface attack?

[3079] General MURRAY. Entirely, except for individual small arms and automatic weapons, which were organic in the division.

15. General GRUNERT. Primarily, for your own protection?

General MURRAY. Primarily; yes.

16. General GRUNERT. Do you recall the types of alert that were prescribed at that time?

General MURRAY. Yes. We were ordered to go on No. 1 Alert, on November 27, and on December 7, immediately after the initiation of the attack, we had a message to go on No. 2 Alert, and that was immediately followed by a directive to go on No. 3 alert.

17. General GRUNERT. See if I am correct in this: No. 1 Alert is the so-called "sabotage alert"?

General MURRAY. Primarily.

18. General GRUNERT. No. 2 is the alert against an air attack, plus sabotage; No. 3 is the all-out alert, including everything; is that right?

General MURRAY. I am not certain. I would have to look up the division order, which is not available to me; at least, the order that we had. As I recall it, the Department alert probably included the anti-aircraft, but the division alert, in so far as I can recall it, the No. 2 Alert, involved a movement of certain infantry troops and certain light weapons to position, but did not call for the installation of the heavy artillery units, the 240s.

19. General GRUNERT. I see, then, you had a division alert, under the prescribed Department alert?

General MURRAY. Yes.

20. General GRUNERT. It may have been different in nomenclature?

General MURRAY. In minor details. The nomenclature was [3080] the same, but the details were not.

21. General GRUNERT. Then really when you turned out it was the all-out alert, in which you used your infantry and your artillery?

General MURRAY. Yes, sir; we jumped from the No. 1 Alert to the No. 3 Alert.

22. General GRUNERT. Now, we get back to the ammunition. You say that there was no ammunition immediately available to you for quick action, is that right?

General MURRAY. So far as I can recall, we did not have a round of ammunition in the gun parks.

23. General GRUNERT. And, in case you were turned out, to go on an alert which required ammunition, you would then have to draw it from somewhere?

General MURRAY. We had to draw it.

24. General GRUNERT. Where did it come from?

General MURRAY. We drew it directly; the majority of it was drawn at Schofield Barracks, although the artillery units of the Eighth Field Artillery, which came directly to the positions in Honolulu and Hickam Field, immediately adjacent to it, were to draw ammunition at the Aliamanu Crater, which was down here near Pearl Harbor.

25. General GRUNERT. What additional time, outside of turning out from where you were to get to positions, would it take to get ammunition to your positions, approximately?

General MURRAY. I would say that there had been set up for the regiment two separate entrances, made so as to expedite the issuing of ammunition, so that my estimate would be that it took not over an hour to issue the unit of fire which we took to the beach with us on December 7.

[3081] 26. General GRUNERT. And did I understand you to say that you had requested that you be given authority to stack some ammunition here and there so as to expedite it?

General MURRAY. Yes.

27. General GRUNERT. And to whom did you apply, and what was the result?

General MURRAY. To General Short. I should go into it a little further. I was not satisfied, myself, with the status of our ammunition for either the infantry or the artillery. We were authorized by the Department, an old order had limited us to 6,000 rounds of small-

arms ammunition per company in the parks. It was held there primarily for antisabotage purposes. That made a limited amount of machine-gun ammunition and a limited amount of rifle ammunition. Our infantry companies were all equipped with extra machine guns. We had, I think, at least 15 machine guns in each rifle company; the average may have been nearly 20. It was obviously impossible—most of our ammunition was not belted—it was obviously impossible to get out the ammunition and belt it without a serious delay. We were ordered to have 10,000 rounds at each machine-gun position, which was a very heavy allowance, a little over three units of fire, so that when I brought that point up to General Short that it had taken, on experiment, three days, with only two. We had two belt loading machines for a heavy-weapon company, and it took us three days to load up our belted ammunition on a previous trial, so that he had authorized us to draw and belt machine-gun ammunition, draw the necessary rifle ammunition, and store that in the parks. As I recall it, the only limitation that he made on infantry ammunition was [3082] that we could not have mortar ammunition or high-explosive grenades inside the barracks. That was left us in the ordnance depot, in the infantry warehouses, as was the artillery ammunition. However, the fact that we were able to get all of the infantry, rifle, and machine-gun ammunition at all ordnance magazines cleared the congestion in the ordnance area to such an extent that we could draw artillery ammunition very rapidly, and as I said before, the artillery ammunition was prepared for prompt issue in stacks of a unit, so that the trucks of the Eighth could go directly to the doors that were assigned to them with the ammunition crews on board and load very promptly. That is what made for the expeditious delivery of ammunition.

As a matter of fact, while I said there was an hour possibly delay, that is merely guesswork because I am certain that the artillery was loaded and had the ammunition, ready to go, and that the first unit of fire, which was 300 rounds per gun for 75s, and 150 rounds for the 155 howitzer, that was loaded and ready by the time the artillery was ready to move from the post. I don't think that the actual movement of the guns to their positions was delayed on December 7.

[3083]. 28. General GRUNERT. Then on December 7th you got in position by 4 p. m. Was that normal?

General MURRAY. I would say it was a little before that. It was an exceedingly rapid move, especially when you consider we had that much ammunition. As a matter of fact, Colonel Kelliher, who checked the movement of the post for me, came back and reported that the movement out was the best he had ever seen the division execute.

29. General GRUNERT. Now, it appears from the Roberts Commission report, or, at least, I gather the impression that you had drawn some ammunition in violation of standing orders. What regulation did you violate in drawing ammunition for emplacement in battery position?

General MURRAY. I do not recall that, sir. The only question that came up, so far as I can recall, was the drawing of infantry ammunition, which was authorized. It is possible that certain batteries may have had some at the gun positions on the beach, but I say that as a possibility and not of my knowledge. So far as I can recall, all ammu-

nition was drawn for the field artillery units on the day of December 7th; that is all the ammunition that was taken to the positions, that went to the guns in their initial movement to position.

30. General GRUNERT. The evidence, as I recall, also states that you drew this ammunition really in violation of standing orders, because you anticipated a surprise raid. Is that true?

General MURRAY. I do not recall that, sir. I would like to check it up, but I do not recall it.

31. General GRUNERT. Let us see that testimony here. Or let us see what the digest of that is. I then had the question, [3084] What caused you to anticipate a surprise raid, but if you do not recall that you did—

General MURRAY. No, sir. As I say, I have not discussed it with anyone since that date. I may have made that statement. I may have known of some that was in the hands of the artillery at that time, but I do not recall it at this time.

32. General GRUNERT. In the meantime, we can go to another subject.

General MURRAY. I would like to suggest that Colonel Kelliher, who was the executive of the artillery brigade at that time, is in charge of the Planning Section of the Department Headquarters, and he would know.

33. General GRUNERT. We will get him if it is of any material moment. Were the commanders of major units—and by major units I mean such a unit as you had, such as Wilson and Burgin had, and Martin and so forth—kept informed of the War and Navy Department warning messages?

General MURRAY. So far as I know, we received every message. I received only one personally.

34. General GRUNERT. So far as you know, you received only one?

General MURRAY. Yes, sir, with reference to the preparation or the immediate preparation for possible attack. We had a number of informal conferences. We had a number of informal conferences with General Short as to the status of our troops, and the equipment at hand.

35. General GRUNERT. Do you recall ever having seen a message of November 27th from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, which started out "Consider [3085] this is a war warning"?

General MURRAY. It did not arrive in that exact wording. I have a true copy of the message that was given to me orally, which I would like to present.

36. General GRUNERT. All right, read it. Then we won't have to have so many appendices to our record.

General MURRAY. May I describe this document?

37. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General MURRAY. At the time the order for the alert was received on November the 27th, as I recall it, it was approximately 3 o'clock, possibly 3:30 p.m. I was in the dentist chair. My aide came to me and said Alert No. 1 had been ordered, and I asked whether the necessary steps had been taken to put it in operation. He said the initial units were loading out at that time. I asked as to whether the liaison officer had gone down to the Department Headquarters, which was

routine. He advised me that he had gone, and I told him that I would report to headquarters as soon as the dentist could complete the temporary work he was doing.

Shortly after I arrived at my divisional headquarters, the liaison officer returned with an oral message which he told me he was to deliver to me in person and with the utmost secrecy. He repeated his message to me and I asked for his notes. He said that he had no notes, that he was not authorized to take notes, that the message had been read to them twice by the Chief of Staff, but they were not allowed to take any notes. So I asked him to repeat it, and I was certain that I had the gist of the message, so I then directed him to write out the message as he had given it to me and file it as secret in the divisional G-2 safe.

[3086] The copy that I have at hand now is a copy of the original message which I was fortunate enough to find with the 25th Division on Noumea the other day and they still had the original one in headquarters. It reads:

Negotiations have come to a standstill at this time. No diplomatic breaking of relations and we will let them make the first overt act. You will take such precautions as you deem necessary to carry out the Rainbow plan. Do not excite the civilian population. This will be held to minimum people. Note.—I was told to tell General Murray, General Wilson, and Colonel Wilson only.

That is initialed by Colonel Haynes; message from Colonel Philips, November 27, 1941.

That was the only message as a direct message that I received prior to the order to move out on No. 3 Alert on December 7. As I say, there were a number of conferences and discussions, detailed instructions, given, of which I have no record, from General Short at that time.

38. General GRUNERT. Were you ever called into conference on this message to discuss what might be the best thing to do under its terms?

General MURRAY. I feel certain that we were. I recall one discussion particularly. The question came up as to whether any further procedure was necessary on the completeness of our sabotage and patrol cover. The sabotage order required not only standing guards but heavy patrols and the readiness of one battalion to move at short notice as a reserve unit. And the discussion included the fact that the report had been made to the War Department of our antisabotage status.

[3087] 39. General GRUNERT. But that was after the decision had been made to go on Alert No. 1?

General MURRAY. Yes, sir.

40. General GRUNERT. And you were discussing how best to carry out that alert?

General MURRAY. Yes, sir.

41. General GRUNERT. But you did not discuss prior to going on Alert No. 1 or your advice was not sought as to whether you should go on No. 1, No. 2 or No. 3?

General MURRAY. I do not recall any further discussion in that detail.

42. General GRUNERT. And you do not recall on that same day knowing anything about a message received by the Navy which started out "Consider this a war warning"?

General MURRAY. I have never seen or have never heard directly of that message.

43. General GRUNERT. Did you hear anything about any other messages after or around November 27th which related to the international situation, the burning of papers at the consulate and so forth?

General MURRAY. No. No, sir. I heard nothing.

44. General GRUNERT. How often or how frequently were your conferences with the Commanding General? Were they periodic, were they when something came up, or what?

General MURRAY. That is a rather difficult question to answer. I should say that I saw General Short at his office possibly five times between November the 27th and December the 7th.

45. General GRUNERT. Do you recall generally what you discussed [3088] with him at those meetings?

General MURRAY. We discussed the general situation as we saw it in Washington, the discussions of the daily reports of the conference in Washington, and General Short maintained a very close personal interest in the activities of the division.

46. General GRUNERT. In those discussions do you recall the source of General Short's information about the situation in Washington and the situation in the diplomatic field and so forth?

General MURRAY. No, sir. I cannot be certain as to that. I know that General Short was in communication with Washington by telephone from time to time.

47. General GRUNERT. Before December 7th?

General MURRAY. That is my impression, sir. I know that he had one of these scramblers, as we call them, and my impression was that he talked with Washington, and I considered or I know that part of the discussions were based on the newspaper reports.

48. General FRANK. Is that an inference by you or a fact?

General MURRAY. That is an inference. I say that we discussed it. I know there was a discussion of the newspaper reports.

49. General GRUNERT. In that discussion what was the state of mind? What did you conclude from your discussions? Were you in accord with what you concluded or was there difference of opinion? In other words, what did you discuss?

General MURRAY. I recall no differences of opinion, General. My reaction was that we were on the verge of war, that we were ready for it, the ground troops were ready for it, [3089] and it took merely a move to position to meet them. We all anticipated, I am certain, something further than the message that was received on November 27th.

50. General GRUNERT. But you were on a sabotage alert and you took no other alert until the blow struck?

General MURRAY. No other alert.

51. General GRUNERT. Then if the consensus of these discussions was that war was imminent, why do you suppose no other form of alert was taken? Was that discussed?

General MURRAY. I do not think that any one of us considered it as imminent as it was.

52. General GRUNERT. Imminent for somebody else but not immediately imminent for you?

General MURRAY. I would say not immediately imminent. I might elaborate. You asked whether we did anything besides the antisabotage. Of course, there was continuous work by all troops in

establishing their gun positions and digging machine gun installations and completing the installations and checking the installations, improving the telephone lines, improving the trails to the infantry positions, putting wire in the critical areas. That was being carried by troop details, but the troops were carrying it out not from positions on the beach but by details from Schofield. Those were part of the discussions we were carrying on with General Short as to the progress that was being made.

[3090] 53. General GRUNERT. All excellent preparatory measures.

General MURRAY. Preparatory altogether.

54. General GRUNERT. But not implemented unless the proper alert had been adopted?

General MURRAY. That was correct, sir.

55. General GRUNERT. Now, so far as you were concerned, as the attack took place and what happened, even if you had been on Alert No. 3, would you have had any influence on the attack one way or another?

General MURRAY. So far as the ground troops are concerned, I do not think it would have made a particle of difference insofar as the events that occurred on December the 7th were concerned.

56. General GRUNERT. Your mission was primarily concerned with sabotage and with all-out position?

General MURRAY. Our mission was primarily sabotage and defense against ground or close-in naval attack, and we were not equipped or prepared to execute an active defense against an air attack.

57. General GRUNERT. Now come back to testimony before the Roberts Commission, in order to help your memory as to what was said then. In a statement to a question from General McCoy it says here that a part of the statement was as follows:

Several days before the alert I violated the usual regulation regarding ammunition by moving all infantry ammunition except high explosives into the company barracks, the barrack room, and that meant that most of them had as much as thirty rounds of ammunition in the belts, so they were ready for immediate action.

[3091] That was an evident violation of something, but—

General MURRAY. Well, it is a statement of a violation of the old regulation, but that was—I would like to correct that as to the statement that I made before this Board. That movement of ammunition into the barracks was in violation of the standing orders of the post, but I made that movement of the ammunition on the authorization of General Short.

58. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General MURRAY. Is that clear, General?

59. General GRUNERT. That is clear to me.

General MURRAY. The standing regulations of the post permitted us to have only 6,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition in the barracks, and that confirms my recollection to the effect that he did not permit me to bring the high explosive ammunition into the barracks. That was the mortar ammunition and grenades.

60. General GRUNERT. Then, in reply to a question from the chairman, you said,

I was just looking after the alert. I thought there might be a surprise raid.

That is where that digest got this,

I thought there might be a surprise raid.

Now, do you recall what caused you to think there might be a surprise raid?

General MURRAY. That is in line with what I stated or meant to convey in my statement that I considered an attack might be imminent. We all considered the possibility of a surprise raid, an attempt to raid either some of our installations by a small landing—I think that the general impression, certainly among the ground troops, was that the most possible attack would be what would correspond to a [3092] commando raid.

61. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General MURRAY. That was my own impression.

62. General GRUNERT. But if a commando raid was in the offing, do you think you, being on Alert No. 1, would have been prepared for it?

General MURRAY. No, sir. As an afterthought, it looks—I say there is no question but what as far as protection against commando raids or any small raid, any sort of a surface raid, we would have been in a better position had the troops been in the defense position.

63. General GRUNERT. I wanted to keep away from this afterthought, this hindsight.

General MURRAY. Yes, sir.

64. General GRUNERT. That is why I dug up that remark of yours that you expected a surprise raid. That was not really afterthought; that was practically at the time that you thought that. That is why I wanted to develop the thing a little more. If you expect a surprise raid, it isn't afterthought, now, that you think there ought to have been a better alert than Alert No. 1?

General MURRAY. I think that I expressed myself fully. I would have made a better statement of my position had I said that I would have been certain we would be better prepared for a surprise raid had we the ammunition in the hands of troops. It was a prevention that I thought should be taken; prevention [3093] of a disaster in case of surprise was to have ammunition in the hands of troops; and, as I say, it is better—I think I made clear that I would have preferred to have had the artillery ammunition in the hands of the troops.

65. General GRUNERT. Another remark, another part of the testimony, is to the effect that when General Murray got Alert No. 1 he was not informed as to the seriousness of the existing situation; no intimation, nothing, although he talked to the Commanding General and Headquarters several times between November 27 and December 7. Is that still your impression?

General MURRAY. That is approximately the—the only direct inference—the only direct information that I had had with reference to the war status was in this message which I read of November the 27th.

66. General GRUNERT. I will ask the Recorder to read you the Chief of Staff's entire message from which evidently that part was transmitted to you, this with a view so that you will understand what was in the entire message, and that you only got a part of that message, evidently. Have you seen the entire message since?

General MURRAY. No, sir, I have never seen it.

67. General GRUNERT. You have never seen it.

I will ask the Recorder to read it to you, to see whether or not that would have made any difference had you heard the entire message.

Colonel WEST. Shall I read it now, General?

68. General GRUNERT. Yes.

[3094] Colonel WEST. This is the message dated November 27, 1941, addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., signed "Marshall," the body of which reads as follows:

(Message of November 27, 1941, to commanding general, Hawaiian Department, signed "Marshall," is as follows:)

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

69. General GRUNERT. Evidently, then, they just picked out such parts of that message as they thought you needed?

General MURRAY. There is another possibility: that it [3095] was read twice to the staff officer whom I sent down there and who told me definitely that he took no notes, was not permitted to take notes, probably because of the obvious secrecy of this message, and his notes omitted two or three important sentences in that message.

70. General GRUNERT. He may have forgotten them.

General MURRAY. He may have forgotten them.

71. General GRUNERT. Or they may not have been impressed upon his mind.

General MURRAY. That was it; yes, sir.

72. General GRUNERT. Now, that sentence in there that in effect says: No matter what you have to do, don't you jeopardize your own defense.

General MURRAY. Yes, sir.

73. General GRUNERT. That is rather serious: No matter what is required otherwise, he must not jeopardize his own defense. Now, that in a way might have caused—

General MURRAY. May I—one sentence—ask the second sentence there, with reference to the imminence of hostilities? I think it is about the second or third sentence.

74. General GRUNERT. All right. Reread that.

General MURRAY. This need not be on the record, General. It is merely for my own information. I would like to hear it read.

75. General GRUNERT. Read it in the record. Put it in the record again.

Colonel WEST. I had better read it all again. It begins:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest [3096] possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.

Now, the second sentence is:

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

That is the end of the third sentence, and the fourth sentence is:

This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

76. General GRUNERT. I think that covers as much as he wants.

General MURRAY. That covers it, yes, sir.

77. General GRUNERT. Now, that sentence in there about alarming the civil population: Do you know of anything that would have alarmed the civil population had you gone on an all-out alert, as far as you were concerned?

General MURRAY. No, sir, I don't think it would have alarmed them. It was the question that the act—the fact that we were taking over all of the important installations: the water, lights, gas and oil utilities, patrols all over, all important bridges guarded.

78. General GRUNERT. That's Alert No. 1?

General MURRAY. That's Alert No. 1, yes, sir.

79. General GRUNERT. Do you think that would have been more of an alarm than if you had gone into position?

General MURRAY. I think that is just as much of an alarm [3097] to the people that we were anticipating something as if they had gone to the beaches.

80. General GRUNERT. How about if you had gone into Alert No. 3? How much would it have interfered with your training? What sort of training was going on at the time?

General MURRAY. At that time our training was, I would say, complete and right up to the handles.

81. General GRUNERT. Then that would have been just a question of going into the field and continuing such training as you were able to do?

General MURRAY. Yes, sir.

82. General GRUNERT. It would not have made much difference to your command at that time?

General MURRAY. I don't think it would have made any difference as far as training. Possibly the training would have been a little more active, actual. We were rather limited in our training during that period due to the fact that we were on defense construction work.

83. General GRUNERT. General Russell?

84. General RUSSELL. You state that you had numerous talks with General Short between November 27 and December 7, four or five; is that true?

General MURRAY. Four or five, I should say.

85. General RUSSELL. During those conversations the international situation was discussed?

General MURRAY. Yes, sir.

86. General RUSSELL. You were keeping up with developments by the local press, what you read in the papers?

General MURRAY. That is my impression, General.

[3098] 87. General RUSSELL. Do you recall General Short telling you anything about other information that had been coming in from Washington?

General MURRAY. My impression is that he mentioned—I have quite a definite impression that about the first of December, two or three days after the report of the action that had been taken, and under the message that has just been read, that he mentioned a reply from the War Department acknowledging the receipt of the information. That is memory of nearly two years, and I cannot be certain, but I am strongly of that impression.

[3099] 88. General RUSSELL. Then General Short had reported the alert status which was in existence here, to Washington?

General MURRAY. That is my impression; yes, sir.

89. General RUSSELL. And it was his impression that it had been approved in Washington—that is, the alert status had been approved by Washington?

General MURRAY. That was the impression that I have carried for nearly two years.

90. General RUSSELL. General, there has been some testimony about Sunday morning exercises for several weeks prior to the Sunday morning of December 7. Did your command participate in any such exercises as those?

General MURRAY. None that I can recall. We had completed a maneuver. As I recall it, it ended about the end of October. We had had a 15-day maneuver of both divisions and the artillery, the Department artillery troops; antiaircraft and coast artillery had been involved to a certain extent, but that was the completion of the training period, and so far as I can recall those were the only exercises that were held on Sunday morning. Those, of course, included Sunday.

91. General RUSSELL. How long had you been in command of the unit on the island prior to December 7, 1941?

General MURRAY. I had command of the artillery brigade from about the 1st of July 1940 until about the middle of June 1941, approximately, and I took command of the Twenty-Fifth Division—of the Hawaiian Division, first, and I believe the separation of the Hawaiian Division, which was a Sixth Regiment organization at that time, into two triangular divisions, was completed approximately the 1st of October. I would have to [3100] check the records on that, but my recollection is it was taken the 1st of October.

92. General RUSSELL. And you were on the island only from the middle of the year, from July until the attack?

General MURRAY. Yes, sir.

93. General RUSSELL. There seems to be some confusion in the record about the number of alerts, practices of going into position, and so forth, which had taken place during the period that you just described. What is your recollection of whether or not numerous alerts were staged and practices of going into defensive positions?

General MURRAY. During the entire period?

94. General RUSSELL. Yes.

General MURRAY. I could give no estimate of the number, General, but it was a routine. A great many occupations of position were made as part of regimental exercises. A regiment sent a battalion down.

95. General RUSSELL. Were these occupations of positions confined to the units of your division, or were they a part of general all-out alerts by the Hawaiian Department?

General MURRAY. There were cases of a general all-out alert, but in no case that I can recalled did we take the complete ammunition component with us. Just before I joined the division, a complete move, including the fire allowances, had been made in June 1940, just before I came to the department, but so far as I can recall, we made—I will have to change my statement. I believe we made one which moved the ammunition to the positions. We had after General Short arrived a loading problem, to check the time involved in distribution of ammunition, our ability [3101] to transport it; and my impression is that the troops went to the positions at the same time. I cannot give the exact date, but I believe that was shortly before the Hawaiian Division was broken up.

96. General FRANK. Was that under Short or Herron?

General MURRAY. The last one was under General Short. The first one was under General Herron, on a War Department order.

97. General RUSSELL. In these conferences with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, or elsewhere, was consideration given to the effect on the morale of the troops of constant or continued alert during peacetime—in other words, the effect on the troops of being out in peacetime, looking for Japanese who never came?

General MURRAY. Crying “wolf”? No, sir; because I believe that in practically all cases we knew that they were training alerts. I do not recall of any one that we moved in while I was in command of troops on the island, where the troops felt that it was anything other than drill, to determine our ability and the time it would take us to set our positions and be ready.

98. General RUSSELL. That is all.

99. General FRANK. Really, how much intelligence information did you get over a period of time? Did you get any?

General MURRAY. That is a very difficult question, General, because that would be a G-2 record, which I am not sufficiently familiar with to know.

100. General FRANK. I am not after the fine points of the record, I am just after your impression as to whether there was an official distribution of information.

General MURRAY. I cannot answer that question definitely. [3102] My impression is that we did. I know that G-2 of the division was in constant contact with Colonel Fielder of the Department, but I cannot recall at this time exactly what the contents of the G-2 reports were.

101. General FRANK. Do you remember of ever getting anything “hot”?

General MURRAY. I do not recall definitely of having received anything that I considered what you call “hot”; that is, active information bearing on the possible initiation of hostilities.

102. General FRANK. Have you, since that critical period between the 25th of November and December 7, become conversant with information that did exist at that time?

General MURRAY. No, I do not recall it.

103. General FRANK. Well, what I was about to lead up to was this question—if in your opinion you thought the caution with which vital information was handled hindered full-out defense measures?

General MURRAY. I do not feel that it did; because I was so convinced of General Short's immediate interest and his full knowledge of what steps were being taken; and his directives were so definite that I did not feel there was anything that he had that was not being applied to the position in hand. I felt that I was in possession of the information that he had. Is that a clear answer to your question, General? I am not certain whether I have covered exactly what you want or not, sir.

104. General FRANK. It would be necessary that you knew that something went on of which you were not informed, in order to [3103] be able to answer the question; therefore, the lack of preparation for the question made it impossible for you to answer it.

General MURRAY. I might say that this report, here, is much more definite as to conditions than the abbreviated report that was given to me directly, which was from my G-2.

105. General FRANK. I have nothing further.

106. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions by any of the advisors or counsel?

If not, can you think of anything that you feel that you know, that you could tell the Board, to assist us in arriving at conclusions as to this matter in hand? Usually, witnesses have something in the back of their head which, if it is not brought out by questions, they wish to bring it out.

General MURRAY. Well, I have no hesitation. It is merely a question as to what I can offer that will clear the picture. The only point that occurs to me at this instant is, you asked as to the next information that I had had with reference to a dispatch from Washington. The only positive information that I have as to a dispatch which succeeded the one received on November 27 was on the afternoon of December 7. General Brush and I—General Brush was my assistant division commander—reported to General Short's command post, at, I would estimate, approximately 3:30 p. m. on the afternoon of December 7, to inform him that the division was completely in position and had the first unit of fire at the guns, for all weapons; and while we were discussing the details, that he wished carried out, the Chief of Staff brought in a telegram, which he presented to General Short, a radio message, which I have never seen, but which apparently was a great shock to General Short, and he [3104] made some explanation, and as I recall it, said, "Well, this is a lot of news that would have made a great difference in the situation," or words to that effect. I have never seen the message.

107. General FRANK. Have we located that?

108. General GRUNERT. That was the December 7 message; yes. It arrived early in the afternoon of December 7. That is the one to which the witness evidently refers.

General MURRAY. I presume that is the message.

109. General GRUNERT. You have never heard it, so you would not know that.

General MURRAY. I never heard the message, and that is the only thing; that is the next direct contact that I can be sure of, of having been received from the War Department.

110. General GRUNERT. Then you never heard of any messages received through the Navy, concerning this situation?

General MURRAY. No, sir.

111. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions?

Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[3105] **TESTIMONY OF RILEY H. ALLEN, EDITOR, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, BUSINESS ADDRESS 125 MERCHANT STREET HONOLULU, T. H.**

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Allen, will you please state your name and address?

Mr. ALLEN. My name is Riley H. Allen; business address, 125 Merchant Street; home address, 3275 Pacific Heights, Honolulu, T. H.

2. Colonel WEST. And you are, I believe, editor of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin?

Mr. ALLEN. I am, sir.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Allen, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December the 7th, 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, the latter of which was largely concerned with the construction that took place here prior to December 7th.

Now, we are after facts or leads to where facts can be found. I requested that you come before the Board in view of your position as an editor of one of the prominent papers here, with the hope that you might be able to give the Board some facts, or at least impressions and background, and possibly some opinions, if they are well based.

I do not know just what line to proceed along, except to ask you what your impression was, together with that which you transmitted to the public during the latter part of November and early in December, as to the status of the international [3106] situation, particularly between the United States and Japan, including your impression of the possible imminence of war and whether or not the impression was that war would hit here and, if so, how soon.

Would you give us a little story on that, just a little rambling talk to give us an idea of what the editors thought and what impressions they gave the people through their papers?

Mr. ALLEN. I will be glad to, General.

I think it is fair to say that an examination of the columns of our paper throughout a good part of 1941 will show that we were aware of the increasing tensivity of the situation on the Pacific and the increasing possibility that friendly relations between the United States and the Empire of Japan would be severed and that this severance might lead to combat.

As early as the forepart of 1941 we were urging preparation by the civil community to meet such an eventuality, and we were instrumental and I in some of my activities, outside of editing a newspaper, was in some degree instrumental in endeavoring to build up agencies of preparedness in the community.

If I may go back a little further, sir, I was a member of the executive committee of the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, as I am now, and early in 1941 we were considering the possibility that this island might become a scene of defense, or at least that we might be called upon to defend ourselves, and that such defense might result in civilian casualties, and we began aiding other agencies, including the Preparedness Committee of the Medical Association in their first aid stations. In mid-summer of that year, I recall we appropriated a considerable sum to aid that agency, the Preparedness Committee of the [3107] Medical Association.

We urged very strongly the increase of island food production. We urged particularly that steps be taken by the Territorial executive to cooperate in the bringing in and storing of surplus commodities.

Our editorial columns called attention to the increasing tensivity of the situation, and we interpreted particularly the negotiations, or the diplomatic exchanges in progress at Washington, first with Ambassador Nomura and the Secretary of State, and later with Special Emissary Kurusu and the Secretary of State, we interpreted the lack of successful conclusion of those negotiations as a very ominous sign.

I think that is a fair statement of the text of the tone of our editorials.

We urged the passage of what is called the M-Day Legislation. We did criticize the Territorial executive for what we felt to be a lack of realistic action to carry out the provisions of an M-Day Bill as it was passed by the Territorial Legislature.

I mention that not to bring up an old criticism so much as to answer your question, sir, as to what we attempted to do.

4. General GRUNERT. Mr. Allen, can you tell the Board the sources of your information for your editorials and for your write-ups concerning the international situation? In other words, did you have some authentic sources from which to get information to publish to your people?

Mr. ALLEN. Most of our information, General, was derived from a reading of the dispatches.

5. General GRUNERT. What dispatches?

[3108] Mr. ALLEN. Which came to us by the Associated Press, United Press and our own Washington bureau, together with what I felt to be an increasingly grave atmosphere locally. It was impossible to escape the feeling, I think, that there was an increasing apprehension here locally that this tense situation on the Pacific might involve the Territory of Hawaii.

I do not recall any particularly confidential information, General, that I received. I do recall at various times the officers with whom I was acquainted here spoke to me about the possibility of such eventualities, and civilians, too.

I spoke about the principal source of information being the dispatches and information from Washington. A search of our paper, I am sure, would show that the headlines and the news stories told of this situation. I recall we carried headlines on the imminence of trouble at Singapore, based on dispatches. We carried headlines on preparations for eventualities at Manila. We carried statements by Secretary of State Hull in which he indicated that the conversations proceeding between his office and that of the Ambassador of Japan and the Special

Emissary from Japan were not resolving themselves into friendly accommodations or friendly solutions.

We interpreted the vary sharp warning of our administration to Japan that the Japanese must, in order to retain the confidence of the United States, treat with China. We interpreted that as a very serious warning and a very serious note, and also, if I recall correctly, we stated our own conclusions that Japan was quite unlikely to yield to that demand or to that insistence.

We interpreted some of the moves which were made, the possibilities, such as were obvious to a layman and a citizen [3109] such as myself. We interpreted those moves as signs of increasing tensivity; the requisitioning of some of our great passenger ships for transport use, the warnings to our nationals to leave the Far East.

That, General, was our chief source of information on which we based our conclusions, rather than any confidential or off-the-record information that we had as to the actual imminence of a break with Japan.

6. General GRUNERT. Were you as the editor of a paper free to interpret these things to your own satisfaction, without coercion from any source?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir.

7. General GRUNERT. Did you in any way have to cater to your local population, particularly since a great deal of it may have been Japanese? Do they read your paper?

Mr. ALLEN. They do, sir.

8. General GRUNERT. And did you have to tone down anything you wanted to say because of their reading the paper, or anything of that sort?

Mr. ALLEN. Not in the slightest.

9. General GRUNERT. You did not think that anything you put in there, or did you have to consider whether that would alarm them or possibly make the situation worse locally by predicting a break or calling attention to the strained relations, or anything of that sort?

Mr. ALLEN. We had to consider, General, the possibility that we might misinterpret the news too seriously and needlessly alarm and disturb not only our readers of the affected nation, but the citizenry as a whole. So far as I can recall, I never [3110] held back on calling the facts as I saw them.

10. General GRUNERT. Were you conservative in such interpretation?

Mr. ALLEN. I felt that I had to be at least conservative to a degree that I should not be jingoistic.

11. General GRUNERT. Did you just prior to the—I don't know what you call it over here, whether disaster or blitz or what-not, but prior to December 7th did things appear tense to you, so that you had to put out a big headline on anything? Did any particular point stand out during that week prior to the attack that you figured something was quite imminent?

Mr. ALLEN. That, sir, I do not recall. I do not recall exactly what it was.

12. General GRUNERT. Does an editor pass on anything except the editorials, or does he pass on the scareheads, as I call them?

Mr. ALLEN. In our organization I am responsible and I do pass, especially in time of tensivity and time of special delicacy or respon-

sibility, upon headlines as well as upon the text of articles, although I do not always see all the headlines before they are written or before they are published. I do keep pretty closely in touch with them.

13. General GRUNERT. I have before me a few of the headlines of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, and I will just read them in the record to see what the general trend was.

The 29th of November, 1941:

U. S. Waits Japan Reply.

First of December:

U. S. Army Alerted in Manila, Singapore Mobilizing As War Tension Grows

Again, December 1:

Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension.

[3111] Another one on the 1st of December:

War Fears Grow in Philippines.

The 4th of December:

Japan Spurns U. S. Program.

The 6th of December:

Singapore on War Footing.

Again on the 6th:

New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo.

Another one on the 6th of December:

Civilians Urged To Leave Manila.

Of all those the one of the 4th of December seems to indicate to me more than any other,

Japan Spurns U. S. Program.

There is an excerpt here:

Domest Japanese News Agency reported tonight that it is "utterly impossible for Japan to accept American proposals" for settlement of the Far Eastern Situation as Premier Hideki Tojo and Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo explained current diplomatic issues to the privy council.

There is no answer to that; only I just wanted to read this into the record.

During all this work here what connection did you have with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on the work of building up the civilian end of the defense?

Mr. ALLEN. I knew the Commanding General fairly well. I talked with him occasionally. Our chief contact, General, with both of the services was through, at that time, the Naval Intelligence or the Army G-2 Intelligence, now Public Relations or Public Relations Branch.

14. General GRUNERT. Do you feel that they played the game with you?

Mr. ALLEN. I have no criticism upon that point at all. I should add that there may have been matters which they knew [3112] about which I knew nothing, but I have no criticism of our contacts with them.

15. General GRUNERT. Did you depend on them as sources of information for articles, or did they refuse any such information, if asked

for? In other words, did you ask for anything and, if you asked for it, did you get it.

Mr. ALLEN. We were under a voluntary censorship, which has been in effect for a considerable time. I at times have differed with some of the aspects of that voluntary censorship and have expressed myself in an entirely friendly way. I should say that with the exception of those matters which were represented to us as being of secret in the interest of military secrecy, we received adequate cooperation. I do not recall any instance in which we were denied access to information, except on the ground of necessity for military secrecy. May I add just this: that our relations were never hostile; always, so far as I know, friendly and cooperative.

16. General GRUNERT. How were the people over here generally; war-minded or peace-minded, or complacent, or what?

Mr. ALLEN. I think that there were large sections or considerable sections that were acutely apprehensive. That would be elements in all races, perhaps. I think there were other sections who relied completely on the believed ability of the defense forces to detect an attack in case one should be made. I think the atmosphere, rather than one of complacency—I don't think you can call it complacency—I think the atmosphere was rather one of reliance upon the military and naval leadership and military and naval installations and forces to give warning, first, of a possible attack and to repel that attack if it was [3113] made.

I think in general the people of the territory were extremely cooperative in providing such support and such aid as was requested by the military and naval commanders, such as might be done by civilians.

17. General GRUNERT. You have answered my next question in a way, but I will put it anyway: Did you have confidence in the military? By military I mean both Army and Navy?

Mr. ALLEN. Personally, sir, I had great confidence in them.

18. General GRUNERT. Do you or does your public, as I will call it, consider that the Army let you down, because of what happened at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. ALLEN. If you will just pardon me, General, I want to phrase my answer precisely.

19. General GRUNERT. Take your time.

Mr. ALLEN. I think we feel that we had a right to expect of the Army command a greater degree of alertness than was manifested on December 7th, 1941.

20. General GRUNERT. By that you mean another degree of alertness which gave more security than that degree of alertness they call sabotage?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir.

21. General GRUNERT. That is an answer to my question. Anything else?

22. General RUSSELL. Did you come out here on the day of December 7th, the night of December 7th?

Mr. ALLEN. I came out along—I did not come to Fort Shafter. I came along the roadway. I did not come out until late in the afternoon. I was busily engaged all morning in newspaper duties, as we were issuing extras. I came out late [3114] in the afternoon. I drove out along the roadway. I did not go to Pearl Harbor. I drove part way and then drove back again along the roads.

23. General RUSSELL. Did you come out that night?

Mr. ALLEN. No, sir.

24. General RUSSELL. Was there a lot of confusion that afternoon?

Mr. ALLEN. Not a great deal. I came out about 4 o'clock. There was a great deal of traffic. There had been impressed into service a great variety of miscellaneous vehicles. I did not detect what I would call more confusion than one would expect after such an attack. It is rather hard to answer your question exactly.

I have heard—and this is hearsay, because I did not see it—I heard in the morning there was not so much confusion as a tremendous jam of vehicles because of the tremendous pressure to get people from Pearl Harbor and other installations. I thought when I came out that things were moving pretty well. My observation early in the day downtown had been that the movement of troops through the city was proceeding expeditiously, so far as I could judge.

25. General RUSSELL. Did you and the people here in general have the feeling that there was a possibility of sabotage or subversive activities on the part of the Japanese people on the island in the event of war with Japan or the imminence of war with Japan?

Mr. ALLEN. You are speaking of the people as civilians, sir?

26. General RUSSELL. Civilians, Japanese civilians.

[3115] Mr. ALLEN. For myself I will speak perfectly frankly. I have had for many years a great deal of faith and confidence in the Americans of Japanese ancestry, American citizens. I have repeatedly said and written that I thought they would stand the test as American citizens, realizing that there might be exceptions to that general statement. I know that there were a great many others who were of the same mind as myself, particularly the people who deal with the young Japanese, not merely as servants and employees, but deal with them in a more intimate way, are better acquainted with them.

I think it also fair to say that there are other citizens who had in their minds a doubt as to the conduct of Americans of Japanese ancestry under such a task or in the case of war between the United States and Japan.

27. General RUSSELL. This latter group regarded the Japanese population here as furnishing a potential source of fifth column activity?

Mr. ALLEN. I think so.

28. General FRANK. Did you ever know the District Engineer who was out here at that time, Colonel Wyman?

Mr. ALLEN. I knew him very slightly.

29. General FRANK. Did you ever have any business with him?

Mr. ALLEN. No, sir, not directly with him. On matters of information I have talked briefly with him and on matters of information have talked briefly with his subordinates, but I had relatively little contact with him.

30. General FRANK. Did anything ever arise in your association with him or your dealings with him about which you would like to comment to the Board?

[3116] Mr. ALLEN. Not with him personally, General. This is second-hand information. I give it as nothing else. I heard instances given of his what might be called ruthlessness, about which I am personally not familiar. Therefore, I hesitate to answer your question in the way it was put.

31. General FRANK. That is the full extent to which you are conversant with his activities?

Mr. ALLEN. You mean his official activities?

32. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir.

33. General FRANK. Do you know of any personal characteristics, in your opinion, that adversely affected his efficiency?

Mr. ALLEN. I do not personally, no.

34. General FRANK. By reputation?

Mr. ALLEN. Do you want me to give hearsay? This is only hearsay. I will give it, if you wish.

35. General FRANK. I would like to know, to establish that information on the basis of reputation in the community.

Mr. ALLEN. I heard that at times he was a heavy drinker.

36. General FRANK. Which affected his official capacity?

Mr. ALLEN. No, sir, I did not hear that.

37. General FRANK. Did you ever know of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Mr. ALLEN. No, sir.

38. General FRANK. Do you know anything about him?

Mr. ALLEN. Only what I have read. I am familiar with the reports that have come in.

39. Major CLAUSEN. What information, Mr. Allen, did you receive as to the characteristics of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, either from original source or by hearsay?

[3117] Mr. ALLEN. Frankly, until the case became of public notoriety some months ago, I cannot recall that I had more than heard that there was such a man. It was not until the news came out of the investigating committee in Washington that it had made any impression on my mind about him. I just do not recall that I more than heard of him as one of the interested contractors.

Major CLAUSEN. With respect to the information you received from Colonel Wyman that you have related to General Frank, was that information received by you during the time that he was on duty here?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir.

40. Major CLAUSEN. I believe that is all the questions I have.

41. General GRUNERT. Colonel Toulmin?

42. Colonel TOULMIN. Nothing, sir.

43. General GRUNERT. Colonel West?

44. Colonel WEST. No, sir.

45. General GRUNERT. Do you employ Japanese on your paper?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir.

46. General GRUNERT. How do they size up? What kind of Japanese are they? Young men, old men? How do they size up?

Mr. ALLEN. We have, I think, only one Japanese alien, part time. We have a number of Americans of Japanese ancestry. We select them as carefully as we can, and we endeavor to extend to them—if we feel that they are people who can be trusted—we extend to them our confidence and support.

I might add that on the morning of December 7th one of our Americans of Japanese ancestry employed on our news staff begged to be able to be allowed to go out on the street and cover the news. I was apprehensive that I might be mistaken, on that [3118] tumultuous

morning, that he might be shot or locked up. I finally decided that we would send him out to the Japanese consul and bring back what news he might find there. He came back and related with every evidence of satisfaction that the Japanese consul just had been taken over and he was glad to see that the Japs were locked up at this time.

I might say that he himself on previous occasions had been sent by us to cover the news and he felt that he was being, as he expressed, pushed around by the Japs of the consulate. He himself is of Japanese ancestry, a graduate of St. Louis College, which is a Catholic institution, and a young man we felt to be of fine character and integrity. We have a number of others. We feel that they are loyal citizens and good workers.

[3119] 47. General GRUNERT. This one that went to the Japanese consulate that morning—outside of that general news item he didn't get anything else, did he?

Mr. ALLEN. I don't recall, frankly. I can find out, if it is material, but so far as I know, why, he wasn't on the street very much. We had to be careful lest if he were too active, as a newsman would be, he might get himself into difficulties and have difficulty explaining what he was doing.

48. General GRUNERT. Now, Mr. Allen, do you think of anything else that you want to tell the Board that might be of value to them in reaching conclusions as to the mission charged to the Board?

Mr. ALLEN. Just one thing, and perhaps that may have been completely or sufficiently touched on for your purposes: I have always felt that the preoccupation or, let me say, the concern of the military and naval commands with the fancied or feared situation from within, the sabotage situation, was such that it took their concern away from the possibility of attack from without. I felt that they had, or some of them had, a very strong belief that there would be uprising or wide-scale, wholesale sabotage within, at any slightest opportunity, and did not sufficiently take into account what has been done in the territory over a period of a great many years to mold our young citizens of Japanese ancestry in the same beliefs and the same devotions that American citizens of other ancestries have. It seemed to me that that was a fundamental and a tragic error in their conception of the situation in the territory.

49. General GRUNERT. These were your thoughts prior to [3120] December 7, or have they been formed in your mind since December 7?

Mr. ALLEN. Prior to December 7. I expressed them to a considerable degree editorially at a time when there was pending in Washington a so-called martial-law bill, which, whatever its merits, did seem to be based at least partly on an acute distrust of the Americans of Japanese ancestry in the territory.

50. General GRUNERT. Anything else? (No response.)

We thank you very much for coming up, and we appreciate it.

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir. Thank you.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

General GRUNERT. A five-minute recess, and then we have one witness after that; we shall take but a short time with him.

(There was a brief informal recess.)

**TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. MELBOURNE H. WEST, HEADQUARTERS
7TH AIR FIGHTER WING**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Lt. Col. WEST. Melbourne H. West, Lieutenant Colonel, Headquarters 7th Fighter Wing, APO 958.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel West, this Board is after facts or leads to facts pertaining to the Pearl Harbor attack. We called you because you had testified before the Roberts [3121] Commission. Now, this Board has covered a lot of ground and has developed most of the main subjects, so we are just filling out by checking up on various points.

Will you tell me what your assignment was the latter part of 1941, including at the time of the attack?

Lt. Col. WEST. I was battery commander of a searchlight battery.

3. General GRUNERT. Stationed where?

Lt. Col. WEST. At Camp Malekoli.

4. General GRUNERT. Malekoli. That was the home station, or what you might call the home station. Was that also the position of the battery when and if you were alerted?

Lt. Col. WEST. That was the home station of the battery, but it was not the field position of the battery when we were alerted.

5. General GRUNERT. I notice in the Roberts Commission testimony that you are alleged to have said that at Malekoli the anti-aircraft had to be gotten out of storage and set up; no equipment in place nor any ready to fire. Is that correct?

Lt. Col. WEST. It is correct.

6. General GRUNERT. Will you explain that to us? We don't know just how to interpret that: "The anti-aircraft had to be gotten out of storage and set up." What does that mean? If your position was not at Malekoli and you had to take it out, does that mean that all this equipment was placed in dead storage and you had to dig it out, oil it up, put it together and take it out, or what? Explain it to us.

Lt. Col. WEST. The equipment was not in dead storage. The guns were on wheels, ready to be connected with their prime [3122] movers and moved to their battery positions. They were stored at Camp Malekoli for the purpose of protection during the alert, the type of alert that we were in.

7. General GRUNERT. Then, it simply meant that you took it from there to your position?

Lt. Col. WEST. That is right, sir.

8. General GRUNERT. And got it in position ready to fire?

Lt. Col. WEST. That is correct.

9. General GRUNERT. Well, that is what misled me when I read it. I just asked you to come down here to clear up that point.

As far as Alert No. 1 was concerned, the sabotage alert, there was no call for your mobile battery to be in position for action, was there?

Lt. Col. WEST. That is correct.

10. General FRANK. May I ask him a question?

11. General GRUNERT. Yes.

12. General FRANK. Would you mind showing on that map where your field position was and where Malekoli is?

Lt. Col. WEST. Malekoli is about two miles north of Barbers Point, southwestward tip of the Island. The field position of my battery, which was a searchlight battery, was in the Ewa plain area adjacent to Pearl Harbor and including the Wainae pocket.

13. General GRUNERT. How many searchlights in your battery that you had to put out in position?

Lt. Col. WEST. 15 searchlights.

14. General GRUNERT. And they were all concentrated at Malekoli; is that right?

[3123] Lt. Col. WEST. All the searchlights were, sir. There were three radars which were in field positions.

15. General GRUNERT. And you didn't have your searchlights out in position with small detachments to take care of them and operate them in those positions?

Lt. Col. WEST. We did not. That's not customary even now, sir. The searchlights go out to the position, they operate at night, they come into the central position in the daytime, up until just recently.

16. General GRUNERT. Well, you take them out just before dark?

Lt. Col. WEST. Yes, sir.

17. General GRUNERT. And operate in the position?

Lt. Col. WEST. That is right, sir.

18. General GRUNERT. About how far does the farthest searchlight have to travel?

Lt. Col. WEST. About five miles.

19. General GRUNERT. Then there is no need of keeping searchlights out there in the daytime, is there?

Lt. Col. WEST. No, sir.

20. General GRUNERT. Except to save wear and tear on rubber and use of gas and oil?

Lt. Col. WEST. And the guards which may be necessary to guard the position. The radars were in their field positions.

21. General GRUNERT. And, as I understand, the searchlight and the radar act in combination; did they?

Lt. Col. WEST. That is correct, sir.

22. General GRUNERT. Is there anything that you have in mind that you would like to bring to the attention of the Board, to see whether or not we may or may not have gotten information [3124] on it, that you think is pertinent to the issue, knowing what took place and probably some of the reasons why the things happened? Sometimes the witnesses have something in the back of their heads that they might like to have somebody else know about. Have you any such information? If so, this is the time to let us know.

Lt. Col. WEST. I have none, of my personal experience. I don't know what has been brought up before the Board. The things I have in my mind or have expressed have probably already been brought up before them.

23. General GRUNERT. Then, there is nothing that is particularly itching to come out, is there?

Lt. Col. WEST. No, sir.

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24. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions?

25. General RUSSELL. No, sir.

26. General GRUNERT. Any questions by the Board? (No response.)

Thank you for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 4:45 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

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